

A Novel Approach to Detecting Covert DNS Tunnels Using Throughput Estimation

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Abstract

In a world that runs on data, protection of that data and protection of the *motion* of that data is of the utmost importance. Covert communication channels attempt to circumvent established methods of control, such as firewalls and proxies, by utilizing non-standard means of getting messages between two endpoints. The Domain Name System (DNS), the system that translates text-based resource names into machine-readable resource records, is a very common and effective platform upon which covert channels can be built. This work proposes, and demonstrates the effectiveness of, a novel technique that estimates data transmission throughput over DNS in order to identify the existence of a DNS tunnel against the background noise of legitimate network traffic. The proposed technique is robust in the face of the obfuscation techniques that are able to hide tunnels from existing detection methods.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Control of the data that moves between hosts on a computer network is vitally important in order to be able to enforce security policies and protect sensitive information. To this end systems such as firewalls, proxies, and content filters are put into place in order to monitor and control network traffic. Covert channels are utilized to circumvent these control mechanisms for purposes that range from benign to malicious. This work focuses specifically on DNS tunnels, however other types of covert channels do exist.

Detecting a DNS tunnel effectively on a busy network link becomes an exercise in discrimination. Since there is such a wide variety of network traffic that is generated on a busy link, there is generally no simple definition of *normal* for a particular class of traffic, including DNS. This tends to either rule out, or decrease the viability of, algorithms that depend on finding a definition of normal and alerting based on deviations from that norm.

A highly sensitive and specific detection of DNS tunnels on a busy network link is an important problem in the arena of network security as it enables administrators to block or otherwise control these potential sources of compromise. A non-exhaustive, but informative, list of potential uses for covert channels (including DNS tunnels) is:

- Data exfiltration

- Communication through restrictive firewalls
- Receiving commands or information from a remote source
- Transport layer for complete VPN solutions

In enterprises that deal with sensitive data such as financial, health, personal or intellectual property information, it is of the utmost importance to control the access to this information. Even if an enterprise does not have information that needs protecting, DNS tunnels should still be blocked in order to prevent malware from communicating[20]. Because DNS tunnels can be used for arbitrary communication, they can be used as command-and-control channels for botnets[2] or any other malicious system that relies on data transmission. Preventing botnets from operating is in the best interest for the Internet as a whole and should be a concern of every user of the Internet.

Existing algorithms for detection of DNS tunnels rely on one of two primary methods, character frequency analysis and signatures, to detect the presence of a DNS tunnel. The signature-based solutions attempt to identify portions of the tunnelling application data (as opposed to the user data that is sent using the tunnelling application) for which a signature can be built. These signature based solutions are subject to many of the same problems that plague signature based anti-virus solutions including their inability to detect zero-day situations. For example, if the application changes its communication schemes, the signatures may no longer be valid and may no longer trigger when they are intended and expected to. Additionally, signatures cannot be built for applications that are not available for study, or that are not known of. For applications that use a custom communication scheme that has not had a signature built specifically for it, it is very unlikely that an existing signature will be relevant and will successfully detect it.

Because signature based schemes are not effective in detecting DNS tunnels in a zero-

day¹ situation, another method is required. Analysis based on character frequency is proposed in[11] by Kenton Born with similar approaches proposed by several other authors (see section 3.3 for more details) which uses character frequency analysis under some assumed properties. More details are given in section 3.3.

Due to the weaknesses listed above, it is clear that a new approach is necessary that detects DNS tunnels in a zero-day situation and without the known weakness involving character frequency and probabilistic encoding. A demonstration of this weakness is given in section B. This work proposes, and demonstrates the effectiveness of, a method of detecting DNS tunnels that meets these requirements.

The proposed method operates under the assumption that DNS tunnels move more data than a normal domain but don't necessarily do it by moving more bytes than a benign domain. This distinction is important since, on a busy network, a large content or service provider such as Google, Amazon, Facebook or Twitter may make up orders of magnitude more DNS traffic by byte count than a DNS tunnel. By leveraging this fact, it is possible to detect any use of DNS to transmit arbitrary data by measuring the amount of data that is transmitted using a particular DNS domain or subdomain. The details of this measurement methodology are contained in chapter 5 and requires estimating the amount of unique data that is transmitted by analyzing the queries themselves and not simply counting characters in the query string.

This proposed detection methodology is shown to detect DNS tunnels in as few as ten packets (as shown in section 6.1.2 and continues to be robust in highly hostile detection environments such as those that contain a great deal of non-tunnel traffic as well as benign uses of DNS for transmitting arbitrary data². Detector performance on commodity hardware is shown to scale to greater than two gigabits of UDP port 53 throughput per second,

¹*Zero-day* refers to a situation where nothing is known about the attack as it has never been seen or analyzed before.

²Many security vendors utilize the fact that DNS and UDP port 53 are so loosely controlled in order to ensure that their deployed devices can communicate with the vendor intelligence unimpeded.

indicating that this methodology does not sacrifice performance for detection accuracy and remains practical for monitoring very large networks.

Chapter 2

Background

2.1 Entropy

Entropy[3][4] is intuitively speaking, a measure of how random a particular collection of items is. In the context of a random variable, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty in the output of the random variable. A random variable that has a distribution that outputs a particular symbol seventy five percent of the time has considerably less uncertainty, and thus less entropy, than one that outputs all symbols with equal frequency. In the context of a collection of symbols in a stream, or data source, entropy can be thought of as a measure of the information content of that collection. If the collection comprises almost entirely a single symbol, then that collection can be thought of as containing less information, and thus having less entropy, than a collection where all symbols occur with equal frequency.

Entropy can be calculated for a collection of symbols $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$ with symbol c_i appearing with proportion $0 \leq p_i \leq 1$ where $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1$ as

$$H(\mathcal{C}) = - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \log p_i$$

The base of the logarithm determines the units of the resulting value. If a logarithm

in base 2 is used, then the entropy has the units of *bits*, if the logarithm with the natural base *e* is used then the entropy has the units of *nats*, and if the logarithm is in the common base 10, then the entropy has the units of *digits*.

2.2 Domain Name System (DNS)

DNS is the service through which names are mapped to resources[34][35]. Typically, this maps a name (such as *www.google.ca*) to an IP address. The value of this service is that names are considerably more flexible, and typically considerably easier to remember, than the resource or record that they point to. For example, *google.com* is considerably easier to remember than one of the IP addresses that it points to, such as 74.125.226.34. *google.com* is also considerably more flexible, since it points to not just one but several addresses, and successive responses will receive different records in a round-robin, or random, fashion. This rotation of responses allows for a crude, but natural, form of load balancing and automatic fail over, while retaining its ease of use.

The DNS protocol is assigned both User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 53 for communication with most communication operating over UDP as opposed to TCP. The use of TCP depends on the implementation of the resolver, however the specification indicates the TCP should be used if the response data exceeds 512 bytes or during a zone transfer[35]. Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), due to the fact that it requires a signature of authenticity for all responses, will often cause the response to require TCP[5]. Because there are no restrictions on when TCP may be used, some resolvers may be implemented to use TCP for all responses as this does not violate the specifications for DNS.

The experiments related to this work do not consider the situation of DNS over TCP since the analysis techniques are identical due to the fact that the formats of the UDP and

TCP responses is identical once the TCP stream is reassembled. Modification of the tools developed for this work would require the ability to perform TCP stream reassembly in order to extract the responses from the TCP response¹.

Because DNS is such an integral component of Internet communication it is not generally reasonable to simply block it while still expecting functional Internet connectivity. A common approach, called *DNS proxying*, which forces all DNS queries to be made to a DNS proxy server that is controlled by the interested entity (Internet Service Provider (ISP), company, etc...). This DNS proxy server is responsible for handling all DNS queries for the internal network, and any DNS queries that are destined for the Internet (as opposed to the proxy) are typically dropped by the firewall in this type of configuration. The DNS proxy server operates in *recursive mode*, which means that if a question is asked of it to which it does not know the answer, the proxy server will then query for the answer (by issuing its own query to the global DNS system) and then respond to the initial request using the response from the global network.

DNS is a heavily cached protocol due to how often data can be reused between queries. Consider how often a desktop Internet user causes a request for *google.com*. If a request had to traverse the entire DNS system every time, this would represent a very considerable amount of traffic being generated. To avoid this, every DNS record has extra information about it that includes, among other things, how long it can be cached for. Standard caching lengths put it around one hour which means that a DNS server will only recursively pass on a query for a record once an hour. This caching period is not constant and can be set differently, depending on the information the record contains. Some records require a considerably lower Time To Live (TTL), as low as one minute, while for others a considerably longer duration (months) may be appropriate.

This proxy architecture removes some naive operation modes for DNS tunnels that will

¹A tool that performs this reassembly is included in the same source distribution as the code for this work.

be discussed in more detail in 2.4, but does not offer any protection against the more sophisticated forms of DNS tunnels.

2.3 Covert Channels

Covert channels are methods of communication that use non-standard means of communication for the purpose of evading detection and/or blocking by the existing security infrastructure. Covert channels may utilize portions of an existing protocol[10] or communication channel, or they may find ways of transporting information utilizing a completely new medium. An example of the latter is called a *timing channel*[47], which can utilize the timing between packets to convey information. A timing channel carefully controls the timing between packets sent to a remote server to encode information, thereby utilizing a method of communication that is not utilized by any standardized protocol or communication method.

Covert channels come in many forms and not all types support the properties that are normally associated with a communication channel. Because they are built on unorthodox, or unreliable, transmission media and are subject to the effects of intermediate routing and networking devices they cannot always offer all of the same functionality as a legitimate channel. For example, covert channels need not support bi-directionality due to either the constraints of the underlying medium, or the effect of intermediate devices. A covert channel that is only useful for reception is one that utilizes a third-party image hosting service. It is possible to embed arbitrary information into the header portion of an otherwise completely benign JPEG image file[1] which could then be posted to Facebook, Flickr, or any other publicly accessible image hosting service. This image file can then be checked by the remote hosts to pull the information however, due to the nature of the image services, the remote hosts may have no way of posting information back to the other endpoint, thus

making the communication channel unidirectional.

Real time data transfer refers to the ability for a communication channel to send data immediately. UDP, by its very nature, supports this and TCP supports this via the PUSH flag which indicates that data is being sent before a full window has been accumulated. The TCP PUSH flag is used, for example, during a Secure Shell (SSH) connection in order to provide interactivity when typing and viewing output. Timing channels, or any channel that relies on modifying normal system traffic instead of generating their own traffic, by their nature, are unable to support real time data transfer. This is because they need to wait for a system packet in order to send their data, and if the system goes for a period of time without sending data then the covert channel must wait as well.

2.4 DNS Tunnels

DNS tunnelling is the method by which arbitrary data is transferred over the same channels as DNS. DNS tunnels come in one of two primary types: raw, or conforming.

Raw DNS Tunnels

Raw DNS tunnels do not attempt to mimic or conform to the DNS specifications, and simply attempt to utilize the fact that UDP port 53 is often left relatively uncontrolled in firewalls. Raw tunnels attempt to exploit this by transmitting arbitrary traffic using UDP port 53 packets with arbitrary payload ². This is the most efficient exploitation of the ubiquity of DNS as it incurs the lowest amount of overhead, both computationally and in terms of network throughput. The trade off for this efficiency is that it is the least conforming and the most likely to get stopped by either a firewall or a proxy. In the situation where all DNS queries are forced to be proxied through a dedicated DNS

²Iodine demonstrates this behaviour when operating in its raw transport mode

server, raw DNS tunnels will fail to operate as expected. This is because when the UDP port 53 traffic is redirected to the proxy, the DNS server will attempt to interpret the arbitrary payload as a DNS packet and will likely fail. When it fails, it will drop the packet thereby preventing all raw UDP port 53 communication. Because these types of tunnels are effectively blocked by standard firewall and proxy practises, detection of these tunnels is not considered in this work.

Conforming DNS Tunnels

Conforming DNS tunnels produce DNS packets that conform to all appropriate specification and RFC documents and, as far as any DNS server is concerned, the traffic generated is valid DNS traffic. These tunnels incur the highest computational and throughput overhead, but have the advantage that detecting and blocking them is a very difficult process. The detection of this type of DNS tunnels is the topic of this work. This type of tunnel is capable of operating in almost any environment, even those with very strict firewall and proxy policies. Because this type of tunnel operates in very hostile (to the operation of the tunnel) environments, detection of this type of DNS tunnel is of interest to all levels of government and industry.

Conforming DNS tunnels operate by embedding the data for transmission into the query string and response, requiring a modified, non-conforming, server on one end of the connection and a piece of software on the client end. Typically these types of DNS tunnels have one endpoint that is controlled by the tunnel user, with that controlled endpoint running dedicated server software. The client and server software are responsible for transforming arbitrary information to and from DNS queries and responses. The precise details of how the translation is done between DNS and the raw data depends entirely on the implementation.

DNS Tunnel Software

Some existing DNS tunneling software currently available is OzymanDNS[41], Iodine[19], Dns2tcp[18], DNScat[40] and DeNiSe[21], and PSUDP[9]. Each of these have slightly different operational characteristics, but they all aim to do the same thing, which is transmission of arbitrary data over DNS.

Iodine supports raw tunnels, as well as moving information back from the server in IPv4 addresses (A), mail server (MX), arbitrary text (TXT) and many other supported DNS record types. TXT records are rarely used by consumers or end-user applications, and so a blanket block policy of TXT records for end-user devices would have very little impact on end-user applications. TXT records are as close to a raw tunnel that a conforming tunnel can get to in terms of throughput since they allow large blocks of largely uncontrolled content.

DNScat utilizes a type of DNS record that is an alias to another record (a CNAME record) and a supplementary A record, when appropriate³. OzymanDNS and DeNiSe utilize solely the TXT record, which is as close to the raw tunnel as possible, however can be easily blocked by simply blocking TXT records. Because these tools only use TXT records it is possible that they are the least flexible and deployable out of those listed above given a hostile environment. Dns2tcp utilizes either TXT or KEY records⁴ which makes it as flexible as OzymanDNS and DeNiSe. The KEY DNS record was designated for specific uses[23], but has been deprecated now[33] in favour of the DNSKEY record for use with DNSSEC[52] and IPSECKEY for use with IPSEC[44]. Because of this deprecation, use of the KEY record is subject to strict filtering which greatly reduces the effectiveness of this solution.

³The A record is not actually used for throughput but rather to give a 'termination' point for a sequence of CNAME records

⁴Historically KEY records were used to transmit encryption related keys, however their use has been phased out by other DNS record types

All of the above tools utilize encoding and decoding mechanisms that would successfully propagate through a proxy server, at the cost of the fact that the tunnel applications have to generate their own traffic. PSUDP, proposed by Kenton Born, aims to remove the latter requirement by creating slack space within existing DNS packets at the UDP transport layer. He proposes two ways of creating this slack space: naively placing it at the end of the packet, and rearranging the DNS query string to utilize pointers to create this slack space in the middle of the packet. Pointers allow for the re-use of DNS query strings within a packet to save on space. They are an optional component of the specification, but allow for considerable space savings. A pointer in a DNS packet is a special sequence of bytes that indicates where in the packet the processing of the query string should jump to. When processing a query string, only a single pointer can be followed, according to spec, which prevents multiple redirection and infinite loops (where a pointer points to itself). By having a pointer point forward in the packet, it is possible to cause the parsing of a query string to skip a number of bytes, creating slack space.

This method relies on this slack space, which is not parsed by normal servers or clients, but can contain arbitrary data that is extracted by special clients. However, because this slack space is not processed by DNS servers, in an environment where all DNS queries must go through a proxy, this method is incapable of producing a covert channel that is able to penetrate a strictly proxied DNS environment.

Chapter 3

Review of the State of the Art

The solutions that exist to date generally make very little use of complex and static signatures, but rather attempt to exploit a characteristic trait or property that the DNS tunnel will exhibit. If a tunnel can be crafted to not exhibit that feature, then those detection strategies will normally fail in their detection. This section summarizes the known detection methods, their commonalities, advantages, and disadvantages. It will then take the body of detection methods as a whole and establish the existence of any gaps, or weaknesses, that could be exploited by an application to circumvent an IDS that made use of *every one of the mentioned detection methods*. This will essentially identify gaps in the current state of the art that could be filled by a new technique, or an adaptation of an existing technique.

3.1 General Covert Channel or Anomaly Detection Research

All of the work in this section is aimed at detection of general covert channels, and does not specifically focus on DNS tunnel detection. Because of the non-specificity of these

approaches, a direct realtion to the method proposed in chapter 5 is not appropriate.

(Browne, 1994)[13] establishes an entropy conservation based approach for testing the completeness of general (that is, not specific to DNS) covert channel analysis and detection methodologies. (Shaffer, 2008)[48] Proposes a Security Domain model for assessing the surface of a piece of software for exploitable covert channels.

(Ray, 2008)[43] proposes a protocol for use in a covert channel that incorporates stealth, low overhead, data integrity, data confidentiality, and data reliability. The protocol can be used on top of any other covert channel transport method (ICMP, IP, HTTP, DNS, etc...)

(Horenbeeck, 2006)[29] discusses, briefly, DNS tunnels and their implications. A short mention of proxying DNS requests is given as a potential solution but without examining the multitude of ways that a DNS tunnel could still operate in such an environment. The rest of the paper discusses the risk management and policy based mitigations that can be applied to covert channels in general.

(Moskowitz, 2003)[36] investigates the link between anonymity and covert channels. It identifies several linking factors such as covert channel capacity and the properties of anonymizing networks, and investigates how these affect the anonymity of participants in a communication.

(Newman, 2007)[37] discusses covert channels in a broad sense, examining the various types of covert channels along with the relationship between covert communication, cryptography, steganography and secrets.

(Okamura, 2010)[38] discusses a fascinating type of covert channel for communication between virtual machines that share a physical host. The paper proposes that virtual machines can manipulate their CPU core load, which is peripherally visible to other virtual machines on the host, in order to send and receive information.

Tunnel Hunter[22] is an application that aims for general covert channel detection over a variety of tunnelling communication channels.

3.2 Non-DNS Related Research

Since these approaches do not target DNS tunnels specifically, comparisons to the method given in chapter 5 do not apply.

(Bauer, 2003)[6] discusses a new type of HTTP-based covert channel that adds the unwitting web browser application to the anonymity set.

(Borders, 2004)[7] discusses a method of detecting data egress using HTTP-based covert channels.

(Cabuk, 2004)[15] and (Cabuk, 2009)[16] discuss the design and detection of IP (Internet Protocol) based covert timing channels. (Gianvecchio, 2007)[26] discusses an entropy-based approach to detecting covert timing channels on the Internet based on their effect on the original process' entropy properties.

3.3 DNS Covert Channel Research

The SANS Institutes's InfoSec Reading Room published a report on the design and detection of DNS tunnels[24]. The report covers a very wide variety of topics including background information, tunnel-specific information, technical information, existing applications, detection techniques, detection implementations, and a sample detection scenario. This report is exceptionally good reading as a primer on the topic.

The sample detection scenario employs an analysis technique very similar to the technique that will be outlined in chapter 5.

(Karasaridis, 2006)[32] proposes and evaluates mechanisms that use network flow data¹ to detect DNS anomalies including cache poisoning and tunnels. Their detection of DNS tunnels involves estimating average packet size distributions over a given time interval (in

¹Flow data is a way of digesting network packet data into information per communication, stream, or (in the case of UDP since there is no inherent concept of a stream of interrelation of packets) temporally contiguous collection of packets.

the paper hourly distributions were produced), and then comparing the actual distributions with a baseline distribution using cross-distribution entropy computation. The authors are able to observe considerable changes in their cross-distribution entropy measurement during the onset of the Sinit virus in their real-world data. This approach is discussed in additional detail in (Roolvink, 2008)[46].

Because this technique makes use of flow-level data instead of packet level data, it is inherently less able to make distinctions based on information contained in the packets. Information that typically gets removed in the process of digesting the packets into a flow includes query/response information as well as burst and timing information from within the interval over which the flow spans.

(Born, 2010)[8] discusses a way of using javascript in a web browser to exfiltrate data from a network, while [10] discusses a novel way of crafting a DNS tunnel that exploits the nature of a DNS packet and the ability to create unused space in the packet in which arbitrary data can be stored. [11] discusses a method of detecting DNS tunnels by examining character and n -gram frequencies in the names that are being queried for. [12] demonstrates the effectiveness of data visualization when attempting to detect a DNS tunnel using a custom visualization engine using the character frequency analysis proposed in [12]. If a DNS tunnel can be crafted such that its character frequencies are distributed sufficiently close to those of legitimate DNS names, then it is possible to hide a DNS tunnel from this type of analysis.

A weakness of the approach proposed by Born is that it relies on the assumption that DNS tunnel traffic *necessarily* has a character frequency distribution that is different from that of normal DNS queries. This assumption is not necessarily true, and a proof-of-concept application was developed that demonstrates this fact. The tool performs a *probabilistic encoding* that takes an arbitrary data source and encodes it into a stream of characters that conforms to a given distribution. This tool can be used to modify the output of

any DNS tunnel application so that their output conforms to the distribution that Born found for normal DNS traffic (or any other distribution, for that matter). By utilizing this transformation, Born’s approach fails to detect the DNS traffic as it becomes, from the viewpoint of his algorithm, indistinguishable from normal DNS traffic. Details of proof-of-concept tool are given in appendix B and a demonstration of its effectiveness in this situation is given in section 6.1.3.

The method proposed in chapter 5 does not suffer from this vulnerability, which is demonstrated through empirical tests in section 6.1.3.

(Butler, 2011)[14] demonstrates a way of quantitatively analyzing covert communication channels with particular focus on DNS covert channels. It proposes a *codeword mode* of communication over DNS where a specific lexicon is chosen that allows the two endpoints to communicate with each other. Each word in the dictionary has a particular meaning² that is understood by both endpoints. This lexicon must be chosen *a priori* and must be common to all endpoints wishing to communicate using this method. Butler also discusses the concept of perfect stealth of a covert channel based on DNS, and proposes a deep packet inspection based countermeasure that utilizes the *Jensen-Shannon divergence* measure.

This method relies on an assumption very similar to that in Born’s character frequency analysis where the tunneled traffic uses DNS names with a measurably different character distribution than that of legitimate DNS traffic. Because of this similarity of assumption this approach suffers from the same vulnerability as Born’s.

(Romana, 2007)[45] discusses their analysis of DNS data on a large campus network. They use the output of a DNS resolver’s query logging as their input, but the process works just as well on other inputs even though they aren’t discussed. Digestion of the large query log file is done with standard Unix utilities and logic available on almost all Unix-based systems. The authors estimate the entropy of the source IP address (of the DNS query)

²The words can represent binary information, or can represent higher level constructs such as commands in the context of a botnet or piece of malware.

and the queries themselves, and perform analysis based on that output. The scalability of this approach is not discussed in detail, nor is an adaptation of it proposed to consider more refined sets of queries since this approach only takes all parts of all queries together for analysis. Adaptation of this approach for real-time analysis is not discussed either. Because this approach does not discriminate with respect to finely grained slices of time, nor to domain or subdomain information, it necessitates that all of the query data be kept around for postmortem analysis. The approach is able to alert to the fact that something was detected, but it cannot indicate precisely when, alert in a timely fashion, nor can it give any indication as to what caused the alert. These details must be ascertained from the raw query data after the proposed approach throws an alert which increases response time and the manpower required to investigate an alert.

In essence the approach given by Romana is very similar to that given in chapter 5 albeit far more coarsely applied. The implementation details, however, are vastly different and represent the most significant drawbacks of Romana’s approach. The method in chapter 5 is able to alert within seconds of the triggering event as well as include contextual information that facilitates fast response and low manpower requirements.

(Thomas, 2011)[51] proposes and evaluates the efficacy of an Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based solution for detecting malicious DNS packets on a high throughput network link. The work extends prior work to include more flexible detection and to support more current-generation network infrastructure (the previous work was limited to 100Mbit network connections, with the new work operating on 1000Mbit network connections). The fact that this approach makes use of specialized hardware makes it prohibitively complex for smaller companies to implement and use. The analysis performed on the DNS packets in order to determine their validity is done via a signature-based system where the DNS query is hashed, and the hash is compared to a blacklist of domains that are disallowed based on the network policies. Because this is signature and blacklist based, this approach

suffers from the standard problems such as weakness against zero-day situations and the inability to be agile in the face of an adaptive attacker³. The tests of this system use highly synthetic testing methods that do not involve real-world data or synthetic data that attempts to resemble real-world data.

(Dietrich, 2011)[20] examines the use of DNS for command and control of botnets based on the reverse engineering of the *Feederbot* botnet application. Based on the lessons learnt from Feederbot, the authors applied their methods to other real-world traffic and detected other botnets that also use DNS as their command and control medium. The authors make use of two different approaches for classifying malicious DNS traffic from benign and legitimate traffic. The first approach makes use of entropy calculated over the DNS queries, very similar in theory to the character frequency analysis proposed by Born[11] and is vulnerable to similar methods of circumvention⁴. This portion of their approach operates on a single packet at a time, and does not consider aggregate information. The authors also propose the use of behavioural analysis on data and statistics gathered from the aggregate of several packets to estimate the persistence of DNS queries as well as the amount of data moved over DNS by each host on the network. The persistence of the connection is estimated by considering the maximum time between DNS packets whereas the throughput over DNS is measured by counting the bytes in all of the data segments of response packets and summing over time. The persistence analysis can be countered by a botnet that models its communication with the command-and-control server based on a Poisson distribution with inter-packet times imitating that of legitimate traffic. Similarly, the throughput analysis can be countered by employing codewords and rate limiting to utilize a high-level protocol compression to reduce the amount of data that needs to be

³In this case, if the attacker chooses to use a new domain the tunnel will succeed since the system does not have the new domain on its blacklist yet. Similarly, if an attacker is using a publicly available domain for their tunnel, the blacklist can affect other legitimate traffic on that domain.

⁴That is, if the botnet architected the data in the examined fields to conform to the author's model of benign traffic, then the botnet could effectively masquerade as benign traffic and become invisible to this method of detection.

sent, and to reduce the amount of data actually transmitted in a given time period to reduce the footprint of the bot on the network.

This approach makes use of techniques that rely on having host-level identification on the network. Applying these techniques at an upstream location that may only be looking at network traffic through a Network Address Translation (NAT) would be difficult due to the compression of many different hosts behind a much smaller number of addresses (typically one). It may still be possible for this to operate effectively, however this was not investigated by the authors. The approach proposed in chapter 5 does not suffer in this situation.

(Paxson, 2011)[39] is a slide deck that discusses the author’s searches through large campus networks for DNS tunnels in the wild. The author proposes an approach for detecting DNS tunnels that is very similar to the method proposed in this work in that it examines the approximate amount of data transferred per domain and/or subdomain. The author, instead of utilizing entropy measures, makes use of the utility *gzip*⁵ to estimate the amount of data moved under a domain in a given collection of queries. The author’s assumption is that gzip already is optimized for compressing data, which can be thought of as measuring the amount of unique data that is contained in the input stream. The author also mentions the codebook/codeword method of embedding information into DNS queries, similarly as to what was discussed in [14]. The author successfully applies this approach to real-world data and identifies DNS tunnels that were previously unknown.

The author defines absolute thresholds for use in detecting which domains classify as being a tunnel as opposed to comparing the data moved from each domain to its peers and performing a more relative and context-aware analysis. The utilization of the gzip algorithm reduces the scalability of the approach due to the computational overhead incurred, limiting the applicability to smaller networks or postmortem (as opposed to real-time) analysis.

⁵gzip is a compression utility that is used to compress input streams such as archives or other files.

jhind[31] gave a presentation at DefCon 17 that discusses the use of artificial neural networks to identify DNS tunnel traffic. The author proposed that the neural network operate on the euclidean distance between the various queries to a particular subdomain, treating the queries as vectors in higher dimensional Euclidean space. The author successfully detected DNS tunnels as produced by several software packages (Iodine, Ozymandns and Dns2tcp) using the described approach. The approach outlined by the author suffers from the normal training problems associated with neural networks, such as over or under fitting to the training data, which may or may not prove to be problematic in the real world. The author does not go into detail about the accuracy and precision of the neural network which is very important for real-world applications where false alarms and false negatives are costly errors. Additionally, it is theoretically possible for a DNS tunnel to encode its outputs using a codebook where every word has a distance from every other code word that is within a desired range. Such a codebook could be constructed by including all words that, when treated as vectors in n dimensional Euclidean space, lie within a ball of radius r where r is the maximum desired distance. By doing this, it is possible for a tunnel to fit within the neural network's definition of normal and to pass by undetected. It is demonstrated in section 4.2 that by bounding the output distribution of the queries both in character frequency and in length, the queries span a bounded ball in higher dimensional Euclidean space.

Jeffrey Guy[27] blogged in 2009 about visualization as an aid for detecting DNS tunnels by looking at frequency and request/DNS name length plotted together. In the concluding portions of the article the author mentions briefly, and in passing, that the count of the number of different host names per domain could be of value - this piece of information is precisely the foundation of the solution proposed in chapter 5. The author provides no further discussion of this topic, however, and leaves it as an anecdote to the article.

Static signatures exist for at least three common network anomaly detection engines

(Snort[17], Proventia[42], and TippingPoint⁶) engines, with others likely offering similar functionality. It is important to note that these filters and rules do not trigger on all DNS tunnelling applications and may not be robust in the face of a zero-day situation or version update.

Due to limitations of various platforms, the existence of a signature for one does not imply the ability for a signature on all platforms. For example, HP's TippingPoint platform utilizes regular expression matching to perform its operations, and so any signatures that rely on stateful analysis will not be implementable on a TippingPoint.

3.4 DNS Tunnel Detection Landscape

Taken together as a collective body of work, the detection approaches for DNS tunnels can be summarized as follows, with the weaknesses and strengths of each general approach outlined.

- Signature based approaches exist for several popular detection platforms.

Strength: The fact that the platforms are common and already deployed makes it very easy to deploy these signatures to a large number of existing networks.

Weakness: The static nature of the signatures means that they are not flexible enough to effectively identify more than a small portion of the available tunnelling tools.

- A detection method based on flow data, which offers a more scalable approach due to the reduced amount of information that needs to be processed, is proposed which examines average packet length and statistical deviations thereof compared to a normal

⁶TippingPoint does not make information about its filters available as public information, however a personal correspondence with a TippingPoint user revealed that filters 9932 and 9938 trigger on the application data contained in DNS packets generated by Ozymandns.

baseline.

Strength: This approach is flexible in that it is not limited to looking at characteristics of particular applications, but rather at patterns of behaviour that may be exhibited by any DNS tunnel.

Weakness: This approach assumes that DNS tunnel software will exhibit longer packet and query lengths than normal traffic which is not necessarily true. DNS tunnels can use carefully constructed encodings to ensure that their queries stay small enough so as not to stand out against benign and legitimate traffic. Simply limiting the size of their queries will not suffice, since the proposed detection algorithm relies on comparing the distribution to a known normal distribution, however carefully choosing the length of the queries such that they satisfy the normal distribution will allow the tunnel to remain undetected. Further, since this approach relies on identifying a baseline, it is not necessarily suitable for links with a high variability of traffic patterns (perhaps due to time-of-day variability, or where it is not feasible to determine if the chosen normal baseline contains malicious traffic or not) where false alarms and false negatives may become common.

- The use of artificially created slack space in a packet is a novel approach with a great deal of flexibility for creating a DNS tunnel.

Strength: The slack space requires application aware inspection that performs deep packet inspection to determine the existence of, and then the contents of, the slack space.

Weakness: This type of DNS tunnel has a crucial weakness in that this slack space is not processed by recursive resolving DNS servers, and such will not persist past the first resolver in a chain in such an environment. If these packets are not sent directly to the DNS tunnel server endpoint, the payload will not survive and the

tunnel will not operate. Because of this, no special detection or analysis mechanisms are required, and a simple DNS proxy will suffice in preventing these types of tunnels.

- A form of character frequency analysis is used in several approaches to detect the existence of DNS tunnels.

Strength: This approach makes use of the assumption that DNS tunnels produce queries and/or responses with a measurably different character distribution than that of benign traffic. Since this assumption is quite general, it applies to any DNS tunnelling application.

Weakness: Because this approach relies on the assumption that the distributions are measurably different, if a DNS tunnel were able to construct its queries such that its character distribution matched the expected distribution, then it would be able to evade this type of detection. A proof-of-concept approach and software application are presented in appendix B that is able to perform a loss-less two-way coding from a high entropy source (such as compressed or encrypted data) to a stream whose character frequency matches any⁷ given distribution.

- Hashes and blacklists are used along with an FPGA based implementation for analyzing DNS traffic and blocking packets deemed to be malicious.

Strength: This approach, due to its fast hashing algorithm and FPGA based implementation, scales to very high throughput.

Weakness: Due to the blacklist nature of this approach, it suffers from the same vulnerabilities as other signature based methods; inability to react intelligently to a zero-day situation or clever adversary. Further, since it is built on highly custom hardware requirements, it is not always practical for smaller network operators to deploy.

⁷There are some small caveats that are explained in detail along with the rest of the algorithm.

- A few approaches examine the behaviour of DNS tunnels and their effects on the statistical properties of the queries themselves over time. These approaches consider very similar techniques to the one given in this work, explained in detail in section 5.

Strength: These approaches are considering the most fundamental source of information for a DNS tunnel; the queries themselves. Because DNS tunnels use the queries as their communication, it makes the most sense to attempt to examine these queries for the keys to detecting the tunnels.

Weakness: The weaknesses of the techniques proposed in the existing literature include cleverly constructed queries (such that they sit within a ball of a desired radius in n dimensional Euclidean space), they are not suitable for real-time analysis (such as the use of higher overhead measuring mechanisms like gzip), they do not discriminate between different domains or subdomains, or they do not offer temporal resolution that enables adequate response times.

Chapter 4

Problem Statement and Evaluation Criteria

4.1 Brief Statement

The purpose of this work is to investigate the feasibility of real-time DNS tunnel detection that does not suffer the common weaknesses of existing techniques as outlined in section 3.4

4.2 Detailed Problem Description

DNS tunnel detection is a complicated task made worse by the fact that DNS tunnel traffic can appear to be completely legitimate network traffic that conforms to all standards and restrictions. It need not violate any established standards or conventions, which makes it difficult to detect against the background of normal DNS traffic based on testing for violations.

This property of DNS tunnels makes them a particularly effective transport mechanism

when data exfiltration or network control circumvention is the end goal. For this reason an efficient method of detecting DNS tunnels is required that can effectively detect a DNS tunnel against normal DNS traffic with a low false-positive rate and that must not be susceptible to existing methods of circumvention.

From chapter 3 it is evident that there are currently several approaches to detecting DNS tunnels that are not signature based as well as signature based approaches of varying flexibility. There is only one mention of performing real-time analysis at the domain/subdomain level, and it is anecdotal in nature with no clear analysis of its merits or validity. The only other similar approach involves aggregating all domains together and taking their queries together for analysis which obliterates any per-domain statistics that could have been gathered.

Looking at this landscape, it becomes evident that there is a highly advanced theoretical DNS tunnel that could evade all of the proposed real-time detection techniques. Any detection that may occur postmortem would not be able to alert to the threat in an adequate time frame to stop the attack in progress. This tunnel would have the following traits:

1. All of its DNS packets would conform to all appropriate DNS RFCs.
2. Its queries would be chosen such that the character frequency distribution matches benign DNS queries (to evade [11] and similar approaches).
3. Its queries would be chosen such that they have a distribution of lengths that matches benign DNS queries (to evade [32] and [24]).
4. Its queries are chosen such that they do not span too great a space when taken as vectors in higher dimensional Euclidean space (to evade [31]).

Item one is already demonstrated in practise by most of the tunnelling applications available, and item two is shown to be possible in appendix B. Item three is easily accom-

plished by splitting queries based on a statistical model of the desired lengths, and item four can be shown to approximately follow from items two and three as follows.

4.2.1 Theoretical Proof of Satisfaction of Item Four for Higher Dimensions

Part I Consider two n -dimensional Euclidean vectors, \mathbf{p} and \mathbf{q} , such that every component is non-negative and \mathbf{p} and \mathbf{q} are chosen from a set of vectors with a finite maximum norm of N . Since every component of $\mathbf{p} = \{p_i\}$ and $\mathbf{q} = \{q_i\}$ is non-negative $|p_i - q_i| \leq \max(p_i, q_i) \leq |p_i + q_i|$. This together with the triangle inequality show that

$$N \geq \|\mathbf{p}\|, N \geq \|\mathbf{q}\| \Rightarrow 2N \geq \|\mathbf{p}\| + \|\mathbf{q}\| \geq \|\mathbf{p} + \mathbf{q}\| \geq \|\mathbf{p} - \mathbf{q}\| \quad (4.1)$$

This result indicates that if vectors with nonnegative components have an upper bound on their norm, then there is an upper bound on the diameter of the space spanned by those vectors. Since DNS queries can be thought of as vectors satisfying the above conditions when considering the characters as having values according to the ASCII character code table[30], the result applies.

Part II By further restricting that the queries follow a prescribed character distribution, there are statistical properties that the norms of the queries treated as vectors in \mathbb{E}^n will have.

For this discussion, let χ be the random variable that chooses symbols from the set \mathcal{C} with probability distribution $\forall c \in \mathcal{C}, 0 \leq P(c) = p_i \leq 1$ satisfying $\sum p_i = 1$.

By observing that queries can be considered Independent Identically Distributed (IID) observations of χ , the notion of a typical set and the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) can be applied. Note that for this discussion, the dimension of the vector and the length of

the query have the same value and which one is being discussed depends how the object is being interpreted. If the object is being treated as a vector in \mathbb{E}^n , then its components are the ASCII character codes of the characters of the DNS query string.

As the length of the query grows, a typical sequence can be assumed to have each symbol $c \in \mathcal{C}$ appearing approximately $nP(c)$ times. If $v \in \mathcal{C}^n$ is a typical vector with the Euclidean n -norm and $E[\chi]$ being the expected value of the random variable, then asymptotically

$$\exists k \in \mathbb{R} \ni \|v\| \approx k\sqrt{n}E[\chi] \quad (4.2)$$

Further, since the aggregate probability of the typical set approaches unity as the length increases, the probability distribution of norms of vectors in \mathcal{C}^n becomes very tightly packed (having a small variance) around the norm of typical vector as given above.

The above relationships are consequences of the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) since the components of the vectors (characters in the DNS query) are IID with a finite variance. By the CLT, the variance decreases proportionally to $\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}$ and the expected value increases proportionally to $\sqrt{n}E[\chi]$.

Part III By combining part I and part II, it is possible to make statements about the properties of IID observations of χ for large numbers of observations, n .

Part II shows that for large n , it is reasonable to assume that the queries fall into the typical set, and thus will have a norm very close to that of a typical vector which is approximately proportional to $\sqrt{n}E[\chi]$. Part I indicates that if there is an upper bound on the norm of a collection of vectors, then in the case of DNS queries there is an upper bound on the diameter of the ball containing all such vectors. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that vectors will have a norm of approximately that of a typical vector, and thus the ball will have a diameter of approximately twice that, or proportional to $2\sqrt{n}E[\chi]$.

The consequences of these results indicate that by enforcing that DNS queries from a tunnel follow an appropriate character and length distribution, a maximum is placed on the diameter of the space spanned by the resulting queries. Thus, by controlling the target character distribution and query length distributions, it is possible to control the diameter of the resulting query space, thus satisfying item four.

4.2.2 Empirical Demonstration for Smaller Dimensions

Because the results in section 4.2.1 rely on typical sets and the CLT, they only hold for very large query-lengths (dimensionality). It is important to demonstrate that the results apply for more reasonable query lengths and observation counts.

The empirical results were obtained by selecting a probability distribution that matches common DNS domain names. Such a distribution was built from the Alexa top one-million domain names as retrieved in June 2013 and is given in table 4.1.

Character	Count	Character	Count	Character	Count
-	0.0117991	C	0.0366638	P	0.0276835
0	0.0023847	D	0.0321575	Q	0.00204425
1	0.00317953	E	0.0986792	R	0.0635874
2	0.00292606	F	0.0166497	S	0.0654764
3	0.00190129	G	0.0243943	T	0.0611875
4	0.0018249	H	0.0253057	U	0.0328546
5	0.00136287	I	0.0731983	V	0.0129516
6	0.0012152	J	0.0055877	W	0.0127842
7	0.00113832	K	0.0184679	X	0.00655439
8	0.00151475	L	0.0468207	Y	0.0178645
9	0.00124893	M	0.0332358	Z	0.00695053
A	0.091269	N	0.0606199	-	0.000025004
B	0.0240761	O	0.0724148		

Table 4.1: Probability distribution used for DNS character frequency simulation when sampling vectors.

The distribution in table 4.1, when considering the ASCII character code values of the given characters [30], has an expected value of 74.8797 and a mean value (that is, not




Figure 4.1: The computed expected and mean values of the norms of the vectors from higher-dimensional spaces formed by IID observations from the distribution in table 4.1 are shown as points. The variation of the expected value from the best-fit curve is due to the relatively small sample taken from the enormous spaces.

considering the likelihood of a character) of 70.5263.

For dimensions up to $n = 100$, vectors were sampled from the spaces with components chosen IID from the distribution given in table 4.1. From the sampled vectors the expected and mean values were computed and a function of the form $a\sqrt{n}$ was fit to both. The growth of the expected and mean values is shown in figure 4.1 as well as the best-fit curves and curves with coefficients taken from the seed distribution.

It is important to observe how the various functions compare to the sampled data. Observe that the best-fit curve for the mean value of the norms of the sampled data almost perfectly describes the sampled data. The best-fit curve for the mean values is given by $71.8527\sqrt{n}$ while the yellow curve is given by $70.5263\sqrt{n}$. The marked difference is indicative that k (as in equation 4.2) is non-unitary. Similarly, the best-fit curve for the expected value of the norms is given by $74.3039\sqrt{n}$ while the green curve is given

by $74.8797\sqrt{n}$. Note that the best-fit curve in this situation is subject to much higher uncertainty which may be responsible for some of the deviation.

In addition to the above, a cumulative density function (CDF) was built from the sampled vectors and then a function of form given by the CDF of the normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σ

$$\frac{1}{2}\operatorname{erfc}\left(\frac{\mu - x}{\sqrt{2}\sigma}\right) \quad (4.3)$$

was fit to the data where

$$\operatorname{erfc}(n) = \frac{2}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_n^{\infty} e^{-t^2} dt \quad (4.4)$$

is the complementary error function (used in the CDF of the normal distribution). Fitting a function of this form to the data allows for an estimation of the mean and variance of the distribution of the sampled vectors as predicted by the CLT.

These empirical results show that the theoretical results given in section 4.2.1 still hold and are valid for query lengths/dimensionality within the practical ranges.




Figure 4.2: For each n , vectors were sampled from χ^n where χ is given by the distribution in table 4.1 and a normal distribution $N(\mu, \sigma)$ was fit to their CDF. This plot shows the relative error of the best-fit μ compared to $E[\chi]$. The trend toward zero for small dimensions becomes dwarfed by error due to sampling as n grows.




Figure 4.3: For each n , vectors were sampled from χ^n where χ is given by the distribution in table 4.1 and a normal distribution $N(\mu, \sigma)$ was fit to their CDF. This plot shows the trend of the best-fit σ as n increases. The trend toward zero for small dimensions becomes dwarfed by error due to sampling as n grows.

4.3 Solution Evaluation Criteria

The objectives that must be met for an approach to have successfully solved the problem posed in section 4.1 are as follows:

- Successfully discern tunnel traffic generated from existing tunnel applications and theoretical tunnel traffic (built using additional parameters to attempt to hide from known detection methods) from a baseline of normal traffic.
- Be resistant to known obfuscation methods compared to existing detection methods.
- Be able to operate at high speed on general purpose, easily obtainable hardware.

The proposed approach will be evaluated against these criteria to determine whether or not it can be considered an improvement on the state of the art for this type of detection. Items 1 and 3 in the list of criteria require additional quantification, however the quantification criteria are different for each of the classes of tests. Details will be given in sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 on how detection methods will be scored for their respective tests.

Because the implementation of the approaches is built on a Python framework and is not tuned for high performance, it is not reasonable to set absolute performance metrics to measure the success of a detection method. Instead, a relative ranking will be applied that examines the performance of the methods in the context of its peers, all implemented using the same data source and common Python framework. The framework is described in section 6.2.1 and the processing performance of the methods is examined in section 6.2.7.

Chapter 5

Proposed Detection Method

The method proposed in this work examines the information theoretical properties of the DNS queries to each subdomain, thus retaining the flexibility to filter and alert per domain as opposed to more generally on the set of all DNS queries. The tools developed to test this approach utilize full packet data for its analysis, but can be modified to use name server query logs (as were used in [45]) or other sources of query information. The prototype software is easily capable of running at greater than gigabit speed on inexpensive, off the shelf hardware making this approach practical and uncomplicated to deploy on smaller networks or in resource constrained situations. Deployment in large environments is similarly straight forward.

5.1 Theoretical Basis

5.1.1 Assumptions

The detection approach proposed in this work makes certain assumptions about the nature of DNS tunnels in order to effectively detect them. The primary assumption made is that DNS tunnels move more data than a normal DNS subdomain, with a very particular

meaning of *data* that goes beyond simply counting bytes or the number of queries. The concept of the amount of data moved under a DNS domain involves considering the entropy of the queries as a whole, and not the characters that make up a query. The list of assumptions follows:

- DNS tunnel applications use the queries themselves to transport data from the client to server.
- This mechanism will force there to be more unique queries per domain (or subdomain) proportional to the amount of data transferred from the client to the server.
- In a server-to-client transfer of data, there will still need to be acknowledgements sent from the client to the server, with the acknowledgement data encoded in the query string.

The primary assumption, in the language of DNS queries, is that DNS tunnels will cause more unique DNS queries to a domain (or subdomain) than benign traffic. If a DNS tunnel is able to construct its network traffic in such a way that this assumption is no longer true, then the proposed approach will be ineffective in detecting it.

5.1.2 Theory

In a large internet provider network, it is possible that there could be many copies of the same DNS query - say *google.com* - each of which would count towards the total number of bytes transferred to/from that domain. If a naive approach to detection is used, such as counting bytes or queries to/from a domain, then this kind of repetition will have a detrimental effect on the metric calculated for some popular domains.

In order to get around this, the proposed approach takes a different stance on unique data and instead uses entropy to measure the amount of data moved in the queries to a

domain or subdomain. By considering queries as atomic objects, and maintaining a tally of the queries to a domain, and their counts over an interval, a probability distribution function (PDF) is generated. By computing the entropy of this PDF, a basic measure of throughput is achieved. However, since there is value in the capturing the length of the queries that were sent (since longer queries are moving more bytes than shorter ones), the entropy is multiplied by the average query length (in bytes) over that interval.

This metric, which will be referred as the Domain Length-Weighted Entropy (DLWE), is the primary mechanism through which the proposed approach detects DNS tunnels.

With this new measure of data, the approach considers intervals of time and computes the amount of data estimated to be moved by each domain over that interval. By sorting all domains by their data throughput, the heavy-hitters can be examined in each time interval with white-listing allowing many of the top contenders from causing alerts.

As will be shown in chapter 7, this approach is capable of processing packets nearly as fast as a naive approach with equivalent or better detection performance.

5.2 Implementation

5.2.1 General

The implementation specifics of this approach differ slightly between the C++ and Python implementations. The differences come primarily in efficiency and performance of the approach, with the C++ implementaiton designed for very high throughput applications. Both implementations, however, share a common architecture:

- The input is DNS queries and a timestamp at which the query was seen
- The DNS query is broken down into a top-level domain (TLD) - such as *google.com*, *yahoo.ca* or similar - and the rest of the query.

- For each top-level-domain, a data structure is created that maps queries to an integer, which represents the number of times that query was seen.
- At the end of each time interval, the DLWE of each TLD is calculated, and the collection of TLD+DLWE pairs is output.

5.2.2 C++

The C++ implementation ingests raw packet data in the PCAP file format, relying on a network protocol dissector written for this project for the extraction of the DNS query string, TLD, and any response information. The query timestamps are obtained from the packet header which is part of the PCAP format.

The data structure used for storing the query-count mappings for each TLD is a custom high-performance, low memory usage, red-black tree written as part of libodb[25]. Computation of the DLWE for each TLD at the end of each interval is handled asynchronously in a separate thread so as not to block the ingestion of packets on the main thread. This asynchronous behaviour allows the processing to operate on very busy networks and allows for inherent and elegant non-blocking buffering of bursts of traffic beyond the processing rate of the host.

The C++ implementation is capable of processing in excess of four hundred thousand packets per second on commodity quad-core CPUs from 2011. The source code is included in the libodb source code distribution[25].

5.2.3 Python

The Python implementation details are described in section 6.2.5.

Chapter 6

Detailed Testing Methodology

A collection of tests will be run on several detection methods, demonstrating the performance of this work's proposed method when compared to existing methods from the literature. The detection methods chosen for comparison is composed of

- The n -gram detection proposed by Born[11] because it is well defined and was the most prevalent approach found during the literature search.
- The use of *gzip* on domain and subdomain packet data as proposed by Paxson[39] because it involves looking at data that is very similar to the approach outlined in section 5.2, but makes use of different methods for measuring the data throughput.
- A naive approach that simply measures the volume (in number of characters in the query strings) of packets per domain/subdomain to illustrate that simple volume of queries is a highly inadequate approach, and that more sophisticated approaches can perform considerably better.

The collection of methods will be put through several tests in an attempt to demonstrate their performance in average (using existing implementations) and worst case scenarios. All

of the tests involving traffic generation will be performed in a virtual environment of two linux-based virtual guests directly connected via a virtual network on a single physical host.

6.1 Situational Performance Goals

6.1.1 Determining a Baseline

Through cooperation with Merlin, an educational internet service provider (ISP) in Manitoba, DNS traffic was collected over a period from Thursday November 4 2010 until Friday November 26 2010. The hosts responsible for the DNS traffic observed include several dozen school divisions totalling tens of thousands of individual computers. The capture includes just over one billion packets destined to, or sourced from, UDP port 53 (the standard DNS port). Not all packets are valid DNS with more detailed information on the properties of the sample available in appendix A.

This captured traffic will be used to determine a baseline distribution to which the metrics produced on isolated tunnel traffic can be compared. This baseline will provide context in order to determine if a method is able to detect a tunnel with sufficiently low expected false-positive/false-negative rates.

It is assumed that the incidence of tunnels in this baseline traffic is sufficiently low that it can be discounted. Because of this assumption, the approaches will be evaluated on their processing rate of packets from this dataset.

6.1.2 Existing Implementation Detection

This test will involve the two hosts communicating at varying throughput rates using the existing DNS tunnel implementations. The throughput rates will scale from as little as several bytes per second, to several megabytes (or as high as the tunnel applications can

support) per second. The wide range of throughputs used is done to give an indication of how the detection methods scale with tunneled throughput.

The existing implementations chosen for testing in this section are Iodine[19], DNScat[40], and DNS2TCP[18]. Iodine is chosen due to the fact that it provides a full VPN solution without additional work by the user. DNScat is chosen due to being written in Java and so runs on multiple platforms¹ without the need for a compiler or other complex dependencies that the user must obtain. DNS2TCP is chosen since it does not require root access, and is written in C indicating potentially better throughput than other mechanisms.

The detection results of each of the approaches on the existing tunnelling applications is of value to those wishing to identify uses of DNS tunnelling currently in the wild. Because the tests do not involve distinct events that will be detected (or not), but rather a much smaller number of prototypical events, false-alarm and false-negative rates are not necessarily the most instructive indicators. Because of this, each detection method will have a *minimum certainty of detection* assigned to it for each type of tunnel. Details of how this certainty is calculated is given in section 7 as well as the certainty values for each detection method for the various tunnelling applications. Intuitively, however, the certainty can be thought of as, given the distribution of metrics for normal traffic and a new measurement for comparison, the probability of making the correct determination as to whether or not measurement represents a tunnel.

This certainty indicator will give a rough estimate of the effectiveness of the detection algorithms in the various tests. A certainty greater than 0.90 represents a moderate level of success, and a certainty greater than 0.95 indicates a high level of success.

¹DNScat will run on any platform that supports Java 1.4 or later[40]

6.1.3 Demonstration of Existing Weaknesses

The tests in this section will demonstrate that the weaknesses listed in section 3.4 are in fact exploitable by software and are not simply theoretical in nature. For the purposes of this section, a new type of tunnel was simulated using a tool that generates queries according to potentially more complicated rules that would be difficult to integrate into existing solutions. The implementation details for this tool are given in section B.3.

As in section 6.1.2, the certainty indicator will be used to evaluate the efficacy of the detection methods on this more advanced type of traffic.

6.2 Analysis Method Implementations

6.2.1 Common Scaffolding

All implementations of the analysis methods are built on the same basic framework written in Python. The framework has the following basic properties:

- Unlike the C++ implementation of the proposed approach described in section 5.2.2, which ingests raw PCAP formatted data, the Python scaffolding is unable to do so. Instead, the Python scaffolding relies on another tool to process raw packet captures (or other data sources such as DNS server logs) into a comma-separated value (CSV) file with a timestamp and a query on each line.
- The scaffolding takes in two arguments: a file name to read the timestamp/query pairs from, and how long the intervals should be, in seconds.
- At the start of each interval, the main loop initializes an array to hold all of the packets for the upcoming interval. For the duration of the interval, the packets are

added to the end of the array, which is passed to the analysis routine (where the specific detection method details are) at the end of the interval.

- When the packets from the interval are handed off for processing, each packet has its top-level domain (TLD) identified, and then the rest of the query is passed to the specific method. The returned value is then assigned to the TLD that the packet came from.
- Once processing of the interval is complete, the array is cleared in preparation for the beginning of the next interval.

There are some very important differences between the C++ implementation and this Python scaffolding that will cause the performance metrics to not be directly comparable.

Unlike the C++ implementation which is designed for maximum performance and non-blocking ingestion of traffic, the Python implementations are poorly behaved around the ends of intervals where ingestion stops while processing occurs. Additionally, there is a reliance on another tool to produce the appropriate input data. This removes the complexity of parsing and verifying the packet protocols from the performance figures for these implementations.

6.2.2 Naive

The metric returned for each query (stripped of its TLD) is simply the number of characters in the query. After all of the packets are processed, for each TLD, the total of all of the metrics for each query are summed together resulting in a single value that counts all of the characters that appeared in queries to that TLD.

Because the packet capture was done in an environment where a large portion of the clients use one of only a few different DNS servers, the effects of caching will cause the naive approach to have decent detection performance. If this were an environment such as a large

ISP or internet backbone where such DNS caching is not present then the naive approach will have far different detection performance and characteristics. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the network capture obtained for this work, it is not possible to demonstrate how the naive approach performs in a uncached DNS environment.

In order to grant some possible context to the effects that DNS caching has had on the naive method's performance, a simple comparison is offered. Data was taken from a home network serving five computers and smartphones, with DNS traffic logged over a twenty-two day period to match the time frame of the capture for real world data. Over that twenty two day period, *www.google.com* was queried 5645 times compared to the 268842 times the same query was seen in the real world traffic. It is important to modulate this discrepancy by the number of hosts that the real world traffic represents, which is on the order of approximately thirty thousand, or six thousand times the number of hosts the home network was supporting.

Approximately scaling the home network by a factor of six thousand results in an estimated three million queries to *google.com* occurring in the real world traffic, of which only a twelfth of that actually appeared in the capture due to DNS caching. This is only one common domain name, so applying similar logic to other domains, it is easy to see that in these scenarios, the normal curves would take on a far different shape, easily obscuring tunnel traffic for low throughputs.

As can be seen from the other method's underlying mechanisms, the DNS caching actually provides a *more pessimistic* detection environment compared to the uncached environment. Unlike the naive method, whose performance results will not be applicable in an uncached environment, the other three methods can be expected to perform better in an uncached environment than they do in the testing in section 7.1.

6.2.3 Born

Since Born's[11] assumption is that normal DNS queries approximately follow Zipf's Law, and that tunnels produce character distributions that are much closer to uniform, this was used to determine a metric. At the end of each interval, for each TLD all of the queries to that TLD are taken together and joined into a single long string. The character distribution of that string is then calculated, and its standard deviation calculated.

Since it is expected that tunnel traffic is close to uniform, then it is assumed that tunnels will have a very low standard deviation while normal queries will increase very quickly by comparison.

Because the next-gen tunnel used in the tests is designed to circumvent Born's detection method (any any other method that relies on character frequency analysis), it is expected that this approach will have poor detection performance on the next-gen tunnel.

6.2.4 Paxson

Paxson's[39] approach uses the *gzip* utility to compress the queries to domains under the assumption that it will measure approximately the amount of unique data contained in those queries. Because *gzip* is a command line interface to the underlying *zlib* library, in Python this approach was implemented by making calls to Python's *zlib* library and its `zlib.compress()` function.

As with the previous implementations, the queries for each TLD over an interval are accumulated and joined together into a single long string. This string is then passed to the `zlib.compress()` resulting in a string whose length becomes the metric for that TLD in the current interval.

Because Paxson's approach uses very similar assumptions, that DNS tunnels can be detected by measuring the amount of unique data transferred to each domain and/or sub-

domain, it is expected that Paxson’s approach and the proposed approach will have very similar detection performance. However, due to the fact that Paxson’s approach relies on a general-purpose compression library whereas the proposed approach uses a tailored algorithm and optimized data structures, it is expected that the proposed approach will have superior processing performance.

6.2.5 Proposed Approach

In place of the high-performance red-black tree used in the C++ implementation, a Python `dict` was used in the Python implementation. The `dict` is used as a mapping from query strings (with the TLD removed) to integers indicating how many time that string appeared in the interval. At the end of each interval, such a mapping is built for every TLD from the packets seen in the interval, and for each TLD, the DLWE is computed from the obtained distribution. The computed DLWE is then used as the metric for the TLD for that interval.

6.2.6 Tunneling Application Throughput

The tunnelling applications used during the evaluation were subjected to different rates of traffic in both client-to-server and server-to-client directions. For each tunnelling application, sixteen captures were performed at each of the following target throughput rates (in bytes per second):

10, 100, 1000, 10000, 100000, 1000000, 25, 250, 2500, 25000, 250000, 50, 500, 5000, 50000, 500000, 1000000

Due to implementation details of the applications, and of the next-gen tunnel, not all applications were able to transmit traffic at the target rate. Figure 6.1 shows how the various tunnelling applications responded to various input rates, plotting their actual rate of ingestion of input and the observed number of characters of query output they generated




Figure 6.1: Shows the scaling behaviour of DNS tunnelling applications as the input rate is scaled up. Note that not all applications are capable of transmitting data at the rate they given data, which is visible as a plateau on the right-hand-side of each plot.

on the wire. Note that for the lighter coloured graphs showing the observed output, the vertical axis is representing a value equivalent to the naive metric. The next-gen tunnel was not tested in a server-to-client direction.

6.2.7 Detection Method and Python Interpreter Processing Performance

Python has several interpreters available freely in addition to the standard interpreter (for this discussion, the standard interpreter will be referred to as Cython). A notable alternative, called PyPy, is a Python interpreter written in Python itself that contains just-in-time compilation (JIT) mechanisms that Cython does not have. The advantages of JIT compilers and interpreters include being able to dynamically optimize heavily used code paths based on run-time statistics and information that would not otherwise be possible in a static way at compile-time. Because of this advantage, PyPy can offer an order of

magnitude or better speedup[50] in some workloads.

Because of this potential advantage, PyPy was investigated as an alternative to Cython when performing the analysis with the Python-based implementations of the detection algorithms. Figures 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 show the performance of the various detection methods over aggregate tunnel and real-world data.

Figure 6.2 shows that the analysis methods all suffer, to varying degrees, as the amount of data to process per interval increases. The naive and proposed methods suffer the least, while Paxson’s method suffer by far the most, dropping to approximately half of its original processing rate. Note that the Born’s method and Paxson’s method trade places as the slowest performer at a throughput of approximately five kilobytes of data per second. When looking at the PyPy performance, with the exception of a dip around one kilobyte of data per second, performance increases as the amount of data increases in direct contrast to the behaviour of Cython. This increase in performance can be due to the JIT components having enough time to achieve some measurable optimizations of common code-paths. In addition, the general ranking of the algorithms by performance is maintained (with the exception of the swap of Born and Paxson seen under Cython) from Cython to PyPy. Despite this improvement, the average performance is still nearly an order of magnitude below that of Cython in many of the cases.

Figure 6.3 shows the performance over time of the different detection methods and Python interpreters as more packets are ingested. Observe that as the time progresses, the methods get progressively slower, likely due to inefficiencies in the interpreter and/or method. Again, the naive method is the fastest, with the proposed method performing at approximately two thirds of the speed. Unlike with the aggregate tunnel data, no swapping of ranks between Born’s and Paxson’s methods is observed.

Also unlike the aggregate tunnel detection performance, the methods when run under PyPy perform *far* better, even surpassing the Cython counterparts in at least one case.




Figure 6.2: This plot shows the performance of the detection methods and Python interpreters over the aggregate tunnel data. The output is packet processing rate as a function of the target input rate (rate at which the tunnels are transmitting traffic). As the target input rate increases, the structures involved in the methods get larger in a non-linear way, resulting in longer operation times and this slower performance.




Figure 6.3: This plot shows the performance of the detection methods and Python interpreters on real world DNS traffic. The output is packet performance as time progresses and more packets are processed by the script. As more packets are fed into the script, inefficiencies in the methods and the Python interpreters themselves become observable in the degradation of performance.

Note that the Paxson's approach when run under PyPy shows decreasing performance over time while no such decrease for larger times is observed when run under Cython. PyPy out-performs Cython when performing Born's approach by a considerable margin beginning very early on. A much smaller performance difference is witnessed between the two interpreters for the proposed method, with PyPy out-performing Cython by a small margin near the end of the sample data.

Figure 6.4 shows the same data, but with a limited scale allowing early-time behaviour to be examined. Note that the ramp-up of PyPy's JIT components is observed in the very early time followed by a very consistent processing rate. PyPy's processing rate, as shown in 6.3 can be seen to be far more consistent and not subject to the same degradation and spikes as when run under Cython. This difference in behaviour indicates that the issues




Figure 6.4: This plot is identical the above but restricts the time displayed to the first one hundred thousand seconds. The 'spool up' of the JIT portion of PyPy is noticeable in the very early time-scales.

observed under Cython are likely related to Cython and not the implementation, since both PyPy and Cython use the same source code files defining the detection methods.

Figures 6.6, 6.5, 6.7, and 6.8 attempt to represent the performance of the various detection methods and Python interpreters as more tunnel data is moved through them per interval. Their horizontal axes are their data input rate (actual data input rate is used, instead of target input rate, due to the performance characteristics discussed in 6.2.6), and the vertical axes indicate the processing rate (in packets per second) of the approach on the two Python interpreters (Cython and PyPy).

In the above mentioned figures the legend requires some additional context. The plot legends contain labels of the form *dns2tcp c2s Cython* which contains three distinct pieces of information. The first word indicates which tunnelling application being one of DNS2TCP, DNSCat, Iodine, or the application described in 6.1.3 which is indicated by a name of




Figure 6.5: Performance of the naive method on separated tunnelling application data, showing processing rate as a function of input rate.

`next-gen`. The second word indicates whether the data being moved over the tunnel is being transferred from the client to the server (`c2s`) or from the server to the client (`s2c`). The final word indicates which Python interpreter is being used.

There are fourteen lines on each figure, each corresponding to a Python interpreter, tunnel application, and data transfer direction triple. The solid lines correspond to runs made under the Cython interpreter and dashed lines indicate the use of the PyPy interpreter.

The performance of the naive method has very little dependence on the input rate, suffering minimally as the amount of data per interval increases. This is expected behaviour since Python’s string objects allow for efficient computation length, being of $O(1)$ computational complexity[49]. Because the naive method’s implementation must calculate the length of each query, additional queries increase the time complexity of the method linearly with the number of queries that must be processed. The Iodine and DNS2TCP client-to-server transfers show marked drop in performance, potentially due to longer queries being used which would increase the time taken to read the files into the script.




Figure 6.6: Performance of Born’s method on separated tunnelling application data, showing processing rate as a function of input rate.

The PyPy performance figures show similar clustering to the Cython plots, with the notable exception that the DNS2TCP and Iodine server-to-client performance improves drastically for higher throughputs. This is again likely due to the JIT components of PyPy being able to optimize for runtime conditions. Despite this improvement, they still perform at approximately half the rate of their Cython counterparts at the most favourable throughputs.

Born’s approach shows a very high level of variation in performance, with marked decreases in processing rate as the throughput is increased for many of the the tunnel applications. Notable exceptions are the Iodine and DNS2TCP server-to-client transfers which suffer minimal degradation or improve as throughput increases respectively. Again, the same patters as with the naive approach are seen under the PyPy runs, however performance overall is much better from PyPy. This is in part due to the much larger performance hit taken by the Cython implementations. This performance is likely due to the fact that the Python implementation of Born’s approach makes use of a collection of loops and arith-




Figure 6.7: Performance of Paxson’s method on separated tunnelling application data, showing processing rate as a function of input rate.

metic. This type of computation is not well optimized under Cython but can be subject to excellent run-time optimization under PyPy’s JIT components. PyPy is still unable to improve upon, or match, Cython’s performance in these workloads.

Very similar behaviour is again seen in the performance of Paxson’s approach as compared to Born’s, with Cython out-performing PyPy and a general trend of performance degradation with additional throughput.

The proposed approach shows performance characteristics and trends that match the naive approach far more closely than either of the other two approaches. There is minimal degradation in performance for most of the tunnelling applications, and almost all of the samples under the Cython interpreter are above one hundred thousand packets per second. It is noteworthy that only DNS2TCP’s server-to-client remained above that threshold for throughputs beyond five kilobytes per second for Paxson’s approach. For Born’s approach, only DNS2TCP and Iodine’s server-to-client transfers and the next-gen tunnel remained above that threshold for throughputs above five kilobytes per second.




Figure 6.8: Performance of the proposed method on separated tunnelling application data, showing processing rate as a function of input rate.

It is instructive to observe that PyPy’s performance overall is considerably lower than Cython on tunnel data, but as is shown in figure 6.3, this is not the case on real-world data. The reasons for this may involve intricacies of the dataset used, the JIT components of PyPy, and the effects of large amounts of data on Cython’s internal structures in this workload. PyPy is a viable choice for some of the methods on real-world data despite being considerably less optimal than Cython in all cases when working with tunnel application data.

6.2.8 Processing Performance Conclusion

As has been shown, the detection methods were tested on both real world and purpose-generated tunnel application traffic as well as on two different Python interpreters and were instrumented for their processing performance.

In the real world data test, the Cython interpreter performed well with the PyPy interpreter matching or exceeding its performance for both Born and proposed detection methods.

When operating on tunnelling application data, the Cython interpreter is categorically faster in every case than PyPy with performance factors ranging from two to two hundred depending on the application, throughput, and method.

When evaluating the detection methods performance on real-world data, in all cases the naive method is the fastest, followed by the proposed approach, Born’s method, and Paxson’s method in order. Under the Cython interpreter, the naive method is approximately fifty percent faster than the proposed method. The proposed method is approximately twenty five to thirty percent faster than Born and Paxson’s approaches respectively. Under the PyPy interpreter, however, the performance of the proposed method, and the naive method are very close with a difference dropping to less than ten percent and Born’s approach a close third place. Paxson’s method falls to the slowest position under the PyPy interpreter.

When operating on tunnelling application traffic, the average performance of the methods (averaged over all tunnels and cases) can be seen in 6.2 where the naive and proposed methods both perform well, maintaining processing rates in excess of one hundred twenty thousands packets per second. Born and Paxson’s approaches both suffer severe degradation of performance as throughput increases, resulting in final processing rates well below one hundred thousand packets per second. As was mentioned above, when looking at the tunnelling applications individually (and not as an aggregate), only the naive and proposed approaches are able to maintain processing rates above one hundred thousand for all (or most, in the case of the proposed approach) of the tunnelling applications and throughputs. Additionally, only the naive and proposed approaches are able to prevent significant performance degradation (and in fact show very similar trends when their plots are compared directly).

When the ratio of the performance of the naive method to the proposed method, a clustering very close to a fixed value is observed as in figure 6.9. This indicates that much




Figure 6.9: The ratio of the performance of the naive method to the proposed method on separated tunnelling application data, with the vertical axis showing the speedup of the naive method over the proposed method.

of the performance degradation and potentially other performance characteristics of the two methods are dominated by the common scaffolding and not by the underlying methods or their implementation.

Through this examination, it has been shown that the proposed method out-performs both methods from the literature by a considerably margin and comes very close to matching the naive method in performance in many cases. This by itself demonstrates a useful contribution of the proposed method, provided that its ability to detect the tunnelled applications with a sufficiently high certainty.

Chapter 7

Evaluation

The processing performance of the detection methods was examined in the previous chapter which demonstrated that the proposed method is able to process packets at a considerably higher rate than Born and Paxson’s methods. This section will compare the ability of the methods to detect tunnelled application data and compare the detection results of the methods against each other.

Figure 7.1 shows several log-log plots (in order to be able to have adequate resolution for both very small and very large throughputs), one for each detection method, that demonstrates how the metrics generated by the methods scales as the throughput of the tunnel is increased. The expected trends of the detection methods is as follows:

- The naive metric is expected to increase with throughput with a slope dependant on the implementation. In practice, all of the implementations have a slope of approximately one.
- Born’s metric is expected to decrease to zero for tunnels as their character distribution approaches uniform. This is the behaviour seen for most tunnels with the exception of the Iodine and DNS2TCP server-to-client transfers as well as the next-gen tunnel. The next-gen tunnel’s behaviour is precisely as expected due to its construction

specifically to evade character frequency analysis such as is used in Born’s approach.

- Paxson’s metric is expected to increase approximately linearly with a slope that depends on the implementation and on the compressibility of the transferred data. Because the transferred data is pseudorandom, it is nearly incompressible and thus the observed slopes of the lines is derived from the implementation details of the various tunnelling applications.
- The proposed metric is expected to increase approximately logarithmically with additional throughput due to its reliance on entropy, which is a summation of logarithms, as a multiplicative factor in its final metric. This is the behaviour seen, for all except for Iodine’s server-to-client transfer, with varying scaling factors.

As is visible in figure 7.1, tunnels with lower throughput produce categorically smaller metrics, making them more difficult to detect, as will be seen later in figures 7.2, 7.4, 7.6, and 7.8. Because of this, the methods will be tested on their ability to detect the most hidden tunnel of each application, which in practice is the tunnel that transmits only ten bytes per second, against background normal DNS traffic. The assumption, which proves true in practice, is that tunnels that move more data are necessarily easier to detect, and the most dangerous tunnels are those that go undetected. By testing the methods to ensure they detect low-rate tunnels, their ability to detect high-rate tunnels is implicitly demonstrated.

The network traffic, both real-world and the tunnelling application traffic, was bucketed into ten-second wide windows for processing. This window size is much smaller than may be commonly used, but was chosen in order to present the most pessimistic environment possible to the detection methods in order to be able to discern their capabilities.




Figure 7.1: These plots show how the metrics computed by the various detection methods scale per tunnelling application as a function of the tunnel throughput rates. Note that since not all tunnels are capable of a full range of throughputs (some generate a minimum amount of traffic, regardless of how low the throughput is), resulting in some of the shorter plots.

7.1 Detection Performance Against Real World Data

The plots shown here illustrate how the various tunnel application fare when compared to normal traffic. On each plot the vertical axis is "percent of samples with a metric greater than x " with the horizontal axis being the metric produced by the method. The black curve represents normal traffic, with the vertical coloured bars represent the various DNS tunnels. The vertical bars, coloured and dashed/solid according to the legend, mark the target throughput levels given in section 6.2.6, but are not identified otherwise. As can be seen in figure 7.1, in almost all cases, the metric is approximately monotonic with the lowest throughput samples having the smallest metric. Due to the plot ranges on the following figures, not all bars are visible on all plots. Due to the tendency of Born's metric to produce small values for tunnels, most of the tunnel bars are visible on the plot of Born's metric.

Due to the layout of the plots, the approximate detectability of a tunnel is related to the y value of the crossing of the vertical markers with the normal curve. This crossing indicates how near the outliers the marker sits with an intersection at y values very near 0 or 1 representing the best detection probability. The closer to the outliers the tunnel is measured to be, the less ambiguity there is as to whether or not the analyzed traffic represents normal traffic or not. A value of 0 or 1 would indicate a perfectly detectable tunnel, while a value of 0.5 would indicate a tunnel that suffers from a very high ambiguity of classification. This value will be referred to as the *crossing value* in subsequent discussion.

Figure 7.2 shows the performance of the naive metric, with markers visible for the next-gen and DNSCat tunnels. The lowest marker belongs to the next-gen tunnel, and crosses at a value of 0.0799815, followed by a DNSCat server-to-client transfer crossing at 0.0496253. Iodine's client-to-server transfers are the most easily detectable with its lowest transfer rate crossing at 0.00164529 indicating a very low ambiguity when classifying traffic.

The naive method, due to the nature of the the capture involving very few duplicate




Figure 7.2: This visualizes the ability of the naive metric to discern a DNS tunnel from normal DNS traffic.




Figure 7.3: This plot shows the trend of the crossing values for tunnels when compared to real-world data for the naive metric.




Figure 7.4: This visualizes the ability of Born’s metric to discern a DNS tunnel from normal DNS traffic.

queries, performs quite well overall even on the next-gen tunnel traffic. Figure 7.3 shows the trends of the crossing values for the tunnelling applications as a function of the data throughput.

Figure 7.4 shows the performance of Born’s metric with almost all markers visible clustered near the smaller metric values. Since the implementation of Born’s metric produces smaller metrics for tunnels, the highest values are the ones of interest. The highest crossing value of 0.529347 occurs for the next-gen tunnels. It is not easily seen in the plot, but all sixteen of the next-gen tunnel markers are superimposed on each other at that value. This is due to how the tunnel was implemented for the proof-of-concept, as all traffic generated very closely conforms to a specified distribution. This distribution produces a particular metric under the implementation of Born’s approach, independent of the amount of throughput. The next-gen tunnel markers are followed by the DNSCat server-to-client




Figure 7.5: This plot shows the trend of the crossing values for tunnels when compared to real-world data for Born’s metric.

market with a crossing value of 0.367036. Similarly to the naive metric, Iodine’s client-to-server tunnel was the most easily detected tunnel with the lowest throughput samples achieve a crossing value of 0.00133572.

It is easily seen that Born’s metric will not be able to identify the next-gen tunnel with any reasonable certainty due to the ambiguity caused by the tunnel’s traffic generating metrics very near to the median of real-world traffic. It is possible to augment the next-gen tunnel to adhere less tightly to a given distribution in order to spread its metrics over a wider range surrounding the median, further increasing the difficulty of detection. Figure 7.5 shows the trends of the crossing values for the tunnelling applications as a function of the data throughput.

Figure 7.6 shows the performance of Paxson’s metric similar to the plot shown for the naive method. The lowest metric is shown by the DNSCat client-to-server transfer with crossing value of 0.0239753 followed very closely by DNSCat’s server-to-client transfer with




Figure 7.6: This visualizes the ability of Paxson's metric to discern a DNS tunnel from normal DNS traffic.




Figure 7.7: This plot shows the trend of the crossing values for tunnels when compared to real-world data for Paxson's metric.




Figure 7.8: This visualizes the ability of the proposed metric to discern a DNS tunnel from normal DNS traffic.

a crossing value of 0.0239753. The next-gen tunnel produces a crossing value of 0.0212873 and again Iodine is the most easily detected with its client-to-server transfers producing crossing values no larger than 0.00392552.

As is expected, Paxson’s method shows considerable improvement over both the approach proposed by Born and the naive methods in terms of ambiguity of tunnel detection. Figure 7.7 shows the trends of the crossing values for the tunnelling applications as a function of the data throughput.

Figure 7.8 shows the performance of the proposed metric in a fashion similar to the naive method and for Paxson’s method. The first crossing value encountered is from the next-gen tunnel at 0.0184927. This is followed by two of the samples generated by the DNSCat server-to-client transfers, the first of crossing value being at 0.00751152. As has been the case for all metrics thus far, Iodine is the most easily detected tunnel generating crossing




Figure 7.9: This plot shows the trend of the crossing values for tunnels when compared to real-world data for the proposed metric.

values for its lowest throughput client-to-server and server-to-client of 5.19129×10^{-6} and 5.73392×10^{-6} respectively.

The proposed approach produces the lowest crossing values of all approaches, with the figure 7.9 showing the trends of the crossing values for the tunnelling applications as a function of the data throughput.

7.2 Certainty and Ambiguity of Tunnel Classification

It is possible to simplify the above plots and figures into a single chart that plots the minimum detection certainty observed for each method and each tunnelling application. The certainty shown in the following plots is intuitively a measure of how much ambiguity there is when classifying the tunnel sample based on how far the sample lies from 'typical' normal traffic. It is calculated as




Figure 7.10: Comparison of the certainty of classification of a tunnel against real-world traffic for the least certain tunnel in each detection scenario (method/application pair).

$$\text{certainty} = 1 - \text{crossing_value}$$

The following charts only consider the certainty of detecting the tunnel in which the method is least certain. By comparing the methods in their most hostile scenarios more substantial distinctions can be observed with clearer distinction between the best two methods. In all cases, this corresponded to one of the tunnelling applications at the ten bytes per second throughput level, which demonstrates the effectiveness of these methods to solve the *needle-in-a-haystack* problem of low throughput DNS tunnels on a very busy network link.

Figure 7.10 shows the certainties of each method for each tunnelling application, with the certainty in the interval $[0, 1]$. Observe the extremely low certainty of Born's metric on two tunnelling applications (next-gen and DNSCat's server-to-client), with lackluster




Figure 7.11: Figure 7.10 replotted with a reduced range to accentuate small differences.

performances for DNSCat’s client-to-server and both DNS2TCP transfer directions. The only tunnelling application that Born’s method reliably picks out is Iodine, however as was shown earlier Iodine was by far the most easily distinguished tunnel by a large margin for all detection methods. The naive and proposed methods as well as Paxson’s method perform similarly with differences that are not easily distinguished in this chart.

Figure 7.11 shows the same data as in figure 7.10 with a restricted range spanning the interval $[0.80, 1.00]$ as opposed to $[0, 1]$. This restricted charting range makes the the differences between the top performing methods more easily visible. In this chart, it is easily seen that the naive method outperforms Born’s method in all except the Iodine case. The Iodine performance differences are not easily visible due to the very close values. The naive method has a certainty of 0.998355 for both transfer directions while Born’s method has certainties of 0.998664 and 0.998512 for the client-to-server and server-to-client directions respectively. The differences, on the order of 0.0003, are not visible in the charts. The




Figure 7.12: Figure 7.10 replotted with a reduced range to accentuate *very* small differences.

performance of the proposed method and Paxson’s method relative to the naive method is clearly visible in this chart.

The differences between Paxson’s method and the proposed method are visible, but an additional chart further accentuating them is instructive and is shown in figure 7.12. In this final chart which shows a range of certainties in the interval [0.95, 1.00], the differences between the two methods are clearly visible, with the proposed approach achieving a higher certainty in every detection scenario.

7.3 Tunnel Detection Performance Conclusion

It is visible from the detailed plots in sections 7.1 and 7.2 that the proposed method is superior to its peers in its ability to detect tunnels with certainty in excess of ninety eight percent. This extremely high detection rate is achieved at a very short time scale and with very low tunnel throughput. Depending on the tunnelling application, detection

performance rises above ninety nine percent for all except the next-gen application, and above 99.999% for Iodine tunnelling applications.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

In this work, a new method of detecting DNS tunnels was proposed, described, and evaluated. The existing landscape of detection methods was summarized (section 3) and a gap identified indicating a need for a new method (section 4.3) that has both high processing performance on commodity hardware, and robust tunnel detection. A prototypical next-gen tunnel application was postulated (section 4.2) and simulated in order to present a more difficult detection task during evaluation alongside existing detection methods. Several detection methods from the literature as well as the proposed method were selected (section 6) and implemented on a common framework (section 6.2). The implemented methods were tested for processing performance (section 6.2.7) and tunnel detection performance on a large sample of real world DNS traffic as well as existing and next-gen tunnelling application data (section 7).

As is shown in the relevant sections, the proposed method outperforms its peers in both processing performance and tunnel detection in almost every situation. The exception is the naive method which outperforms the proposed method in processing performance by approximately fifty percent at the expense of detection performance. As was mentioned in section 6.2.2 however, the naive method's detection performance is only as good as it is in

this case due to the lack of duplication of DNS queries.

The end product of these results is a contribution to the field comprising a new detection method with superior processing and detection performance. The new detection method falls short of matching the naive method's processing performance in many situations with the tradeoff of far superior detection performance.

8.1 Future Work

Appendices

Appendix A

Properties of the Network Capture

The packet capture used to represent real world data performed in cooperation with Merlin, an ISP in Manitoba for educational institutions.

File name:	data1.udp53.pcap
File type:	Wireshark/tcpdump/... - libpcap
File encapsulation:	Ethernet
Packet size limit:	file hdr: 65535 bytes
Number of packets:	1035425650
File size:	156484681395 bytes
Data size:	139917870971 bytes
Capture duration:	1915055 seconds
Start time:	Thu Nov 4 15:05:58 2010
End time:	Fri Nov 26 18:03:33 2010
Data byte rate:	73062.06 bytes/sec
Data bit rate:	584496.51 bits/sec
Average packet size:	135.13 bytes
Average packet rate:	540.68 packets/sec
SHA1:	6fb043f37e659d9a65a45b5c8074d55eae386600
RIPEMD160:	4aba72d43f5726f0a8576f35d60845f895080a43
MD5:	32956ef8efe5c3873226386e1608561a
Strict time order:	True

Table A.1: Statistics and information as reported by Wireshark's utility *capinfos*.

Appendix B

Probabilistic Encoding

Several detection methods in the literature involve examining the character distribution in the queries, or responses, of DNS packets. These approaches compare the distributions obtained from the traffic being analyzed, and compare them to a known distribution that can be considered normal. If there is a sufficiently significant measurable difference, then the packet is flagged as anomalous.

If it were possible for a DNS tunnel to encode its output in order to match the distribution that these detection methods consider normal, then it would be possible for it to evade detection by masquerading as benign DNS traffic. These detection methods assume that the output of a DNS tunnel will have high entropy (due to compression and/or encryption) and/or span a wide range of character values, whereas normal traffic does not have these features. The solution to this problem becomes one of encoding a high entropy source into a lower entropy encoding in a way that the high entropy stream can be recovered from the low entropy encoding, where the low entropy encoding has a specific distribution of characters.

A proof-of-concept tool was written in C that performs precisely this task. The tool

Character	Count	Character	Count
<space>	0.11965	u	0.0242803
e	0.111823	m	0.0211814
t	0.0797253	w	0.0207765
a	0.0718989	f	0.0196144
o	0.0660886	g	0.0177392
i	0.0613258	y	0.0173783
n	0.0594154	p	0.0169821
s	0.0557003	b	0.013135
h	0.0536491	v	0.00860991
r	0.0527071	k	0.00679637
d	0.0374417	j	0.00134695
l	0.0354345	x	0.00132054
c	0.0244916	q	0.000836341
		z	0.000651466

Table B.1: Probability distribution used for english character frequency in the sample encoding and decoding.

takes, as input, what it assumes to be a high entropy source¹ and a configuration file that describes the desired output distribution.

B.1 Sample Encoding - English Unigrams

A sample encoding is given using the english character frequency distribution with the character distribution table used given in Table B.1. In order to ensure that interested parties can verify this output, the source high-entropy data is contained in Table B.2. A data matrix image of the same base64 encoding is also given in Figure B.1. This can be converted back to the original source via the standard Unix command line tool *base64*. The output of the encoder using english character frequencies and the given input data is shown in Table B.3 which is clearly not english to any human observer or any analysis tool with knowledge of English di- and tri- gram frequency information.

¹Since any source can be used to produce a high entropy source through encryption or compression, this is considered a safe assumption and limitation.

HEzQcP9uxP0zeOB1SfRP+DQ7x3X5dTA1WF3vpcn05kgLQQEP7xnUrnUy7U8ISNbNQd+8da64+Ci
nNBRvu3TR1G0KJvLzb6QDBWqxVfa4VeAU+cSvj+uzoajp2F0jd5/csHxJQ1guoeqT76pq8oStoLG
3k48PZWuebgweZx5KdxAgUfN7/kvzwBzG70+9B7J/08y6BfGz6In0H+LuDCOsFqM1j1jX3SkgJq/
yPka52SDxa3D4GXecj9d

Table B.2: The base64 encoding of the binary data used for the sample encoding.




Figure B.1: The base64 encoding of the binary data used in the sample encoding, represented in a data matrix image.

```
" mfeo hnhaeeeewsa os eewk es fsemroh eeeeewthesdre s sol sreese ea hrzltse  
wesrnyemnpaoonef ht hsheawnfdemue stntleewth home esaiu s feesgealne seaoa  
hlhyp hmb ewaaeesdubotongtnploaanewefochd htugeside s oeesi fptsmr  
hweeeeesoltsnahao esde hgmuo weeeeewyl haoesroo frmehstieest ewad svikefui  
hncestphstestidau eeahl hrosoan wrthaa ft heabpeeses eeeeewrsn hrlucne ewr  
esesooe eeeeeewsqe eewefgeesng est f eeeeewlhhae hgao hiuggnrrancewgmob  
hdreeesgopesuoamyufiolisx esrrsloaeewtse"
```

Table B.3: The encoded form of the binary data according to English character frequencies.

Analyzing the frequencies of the output shows that it closely approximates english character frequencies. A larger sample of random data (one hundred thousand bytes) was also encoded, and its output analyzed as well. The small sample, the large sample, and actual english character frequencies are displayed together in figures B.2 and ???. As is evident from the combined plots of the various distributions, there does not exist a clear distinction between them and thus it becomes very difficult to perform automated classification when information is encoded using this tool.




Figure B.2: The character frequencies of the small and large encoded samples, as well as the English target distribution sorted by character.

B.1.1 Technical Details

The probabilistic encoder is open-source and freely available, licensed under the Mozilla Public License version 2 which is GPL compatible. The source code is available at [28] for download and use under the MPL2 license terms. The source code compiles on Unix and other POSIX based systems such as Cygwin on Windows.

The encoding and decoding processes can be broken up into two steps; probability distribution analysis and then the actual conversion. The analysis of the distribution is the same for both the encoding and decoding operations, however the encoding operation is somewhat more involved than the decoding operation from an algorithmic point of view.

The probability distribution is analyzed in order to map each element of the distribution (character, word, etc...) to a string of bits. An assumption is made that all bit strings of a given length are equally likely to appear in the high-entropy source, and this places a constraint in the output PDF; the most frequent symbol cannot be more frequent than the most frequent symbol in the high-entropy source. That is, no symbol in the output distribution can have a frequency above 50%. This is considered a fair assumption since in English, the most common letter has a frequency of approximately 11%.

The mapping from symbol to bit string is done by sorting the distribution from most to least frequent, and then selecting a shortest available bit string of a length that has an expected occurrence rate not less than the symbol's occurrence rate in the output distribution. For example, the bit string to symbol mapping for the English unigram encoding sample is given in Table B.4 along with the approximate frequency of the letters in English text.

Observe that it is possible to make a tradeoff between encoding accuracy (that is, how accurately the output matches the desired distribution) and encoding efficiency (that is, the ratio between output and input size with higher ratios indicating a less efficient encoding) by tuning the bit string mapping. More accurate mappings result from choosing shorter

bit strings (Table B.4 chooses the shortest possible bit string mappings and achieves an efficiency factor of approximately 3.3) with more efficient mappings sacrificing accuracy for efficiency. Figure ?? shows the frequencies of the English target distribution along with the most efficient encoding and the most accurate encoding. The efficient coding in that figure achieves a factor of

Once the mapping has been built, and the various lookup tables built, the encoding or decoding process can begin. For encoding, a table is maintained that keeps track of how many times each symbol in the desired distribution has been output. The purpose of this table is to facilitate the greedy selection of symbols in order to ensure that one symbol is not chosen more often than is necessary and that those symbols that are farthest from meeting their quota in the output stream get preferential selection when the input bits match their mapping.

The examples given above show the unigram mapping process, however since the theory and implementation are symbol agnostic, the symbol set can be as large as is desired, with each symbol being arbitrarily long. One could potentially use this tool to build a mapping on all words in a language paired with the nominal frequencies if one so desired, however the Markov chain coding portion of the tool may be a better choice.

B.2 Markov Chain Coding

Markov chain support was added

B.3 Custom DNS Tunnel Endpoint Simulator

The next-gen tunnel that was used alongside the existing implementations was built by using standard Unix utilities and the application described in the previous section. The

Character	Bit-String	Count
<space>	1	0.11965
e	0	0.111823
t	11	0.0797253
a	01	0.0718989
o	10	0.0660886
i	00	0.0613258
n	111	0.0594154
s	011	0.0557003
h	101	0.0536491
r	001	0.0527071
d	110	0.0374417
l	010	0.0354345
c	100	0.0244916
u	000	0.0242803
m	0011	0.0211814
w	1101	0.0207765
f	0101	0.0196144
g	1001	0.0177392
y	0001	0.0173783
p	1110	0.0169821
b	0110	0.013135
v	1010	0.00860991
k	0010	0.00679637
j	1100	0.00134695
x	0100	0.00132054
q	1000	0.000836341
z	0000	0.000651466

Table B.4: Bit-string mapping for English characters and their frequency for comparison.

utility was only capable of unidirectional transfer, from server to client, and relied on three standard Unix utilities: *gzip*, *fold* and *nslookup*. The basic flow was as follows:

1. The data to be transferred was piped through *gzip* in order to compress a potentially low entropy stream, reducing its size and guaranteeing a high entropy stream as input to the next stage of the pipeline.
2. The high entropy stream is used as input to the tool described in the previous section which was targeting a character distribution that matched the Alexa top one million domains, as shown in table 4.1. The output of this step is a stream of characters that asymptotically converges to the given domain.
3. Because DNS queries have a maximum length of a token (a string of characters in between periods) at sixty three characters, the Unix utility *fold* is used to insert newline characters in the stream no less often than every sixty-fourth character. Depending on the targeted input rate and desired output parameters, folding could produce queries of any length from one to sixty three characters. If one was looking to target a query length distribution, the use of *fold* could be replaced by another tool that used a more intelligent method of deciding when to insert newline characters. The output of this stage is a stream of lines of equal length, each of which will represent a query that is sent to the server.
4. The Unix utility *nslookup* allows for command-line issuing of DNS queries to a server. The output of *fold* was piped into *nslookup* with the queries directed at the localhost address. This resulted in a relatively high throughput as *nslookup* read a line from its input, issued the query to the localhost, was met with a negative response (specifically, an NXDOMAIN response indicating that the address was not something that the localhost knew about), at which point it would grab a new line of input and repeat.

All traffic used for the analysis of the next-gen tunnelling application involved this flow of information. By combining existing applications with the application in the previous section, it was possible to very quickly, and simply, prototype a unidirectional DNS tunnelling application that runs on any linux or Unix based host.

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