

I skipped some steps here.

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```

query ( )
w ← {0,1}^λ
b ← {0,1}^2
return b || w
    
```

∴ as w ~~was~~ had pseudorandom distribution.
Xoring all the bits of w produced b which
was pseudorandom. Hence we replace b
 $Xor(w)$ with random distribution as both are
indistinguishable

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```

query ( )
z ← {0,1}^{λ+1}
return z
    
```

∴ Just combined them. Independently selecting
 λ bits and 1 bit is same as selecting
 $\lambda+1$ bits.

\rightarrow q'
 $L_{Prg} \sim \text{rand}$

Hence q'
 $L_{Prg-real} \approx L_{Prg-random}$

Advantage of A if it tried to distinguish these libraries will be

$$\epsilon = \Pr[A \diamond L_{Prg-real}^{q'}] - \Pr[A \diamond L_{Prg-random}^{q'}]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2^\lambda} - \frac{1}{2^{\lambda+1}}$$

$$= \frac{2-1}{2(2^\lambda)}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2(2^\lambda)}$$

Using def 4.2 from "Joy of Cryptography"

$$f(\lambda) = \frac{1}{2(2^\lambda)}$$

$$\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow \infty} P(\lambda) \cdot f(\lambda) = 0$$

$$\lim_{\lambda \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\lambda^c}{2(2^\lambda)} = 0$$

Hence $f(\lambda)$ or $\frac{1}{2(2^\lambda)}$ is negligible
The advantage is negligible

Problem 2

To prove

$$L_{\text{prog-real}}^{\bar{q}} \approx L_{\text{prog-real}}^{\bar{q}}$$

Note

$$|w| = 1$$

given

$$L_{\text{prog-real}}^q \approx L_{\text{prog-real}}^q$$

Note

$$|S| = 1$$

$L_{\text{prog-real}}^{\bar{q}}$

```

query():
w ← q(s)
w̄ = 1 - w
return(w̄)
    
```

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L

```

query():
w ← query()
w̄ = 1 - w
return(w̄)
    
```

◇

$L_{\text{prog-real}}^q$

```

query():
w ← q(s)
return(w)
    
```

~

L

```

query():
w ← query()
w̄ = 1 - w
return(w̄)
    
```

◇

$L_{\text{prog-real}}^q$

```

query():
w ← {0,1}^n
return w
    
```

∴ Given

$$L_{\text{prog-real}}^q \approx L_{\text{prog-real}}^q$$

$$= \Pr[A \diamond L_{\text{prog-real}}^{\bar{q}} \rightarrow 1] -$$

$$\Pr[A \diamond L_{\text{prog-real}}^q \rightarrow 1]$$

~

L

```

query():
w ← {0,1}^n
w̄ = 1 - w
return(w̄)
    
```

∴ Just moving the code

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$L_{\text{prog-real}}^q$

```

query():
w ← {0,1}^n
w̄ ← {0,1}^n
return(w̄)
    
```

∴ as w was random. w̄ would be like coin toss selecting a side opposite of the thing you get on the toss. For instance coin has head when toss select tail.

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$L_{\text{prog-real}}^q$

```

query():
w̄ ← {0,1}^n
return(w̄)
    
```

∴ w was not used in selecting w̄. So useless code was renamed

Hence $L_{\text{prog-real}}^{\bar{q}} \approx L_{\text{prog-real}}^{\bar{q}}$

Problem 3

~~Goal~~

To prove

$$L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^3} \approx L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^3}$$

Given

$$L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^1} \approx L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^1}$$

$$\& L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^2} \approx L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^2}$$

$L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^3}$

```

query():
  (s1, s2) := Sg
  w1 ← q(s1)
  w2 ← q(s2)
  return(w1, w2)
    
```

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```

query():
  (s1, s2) := Sg
  Z ← query'()
  return Z
    
```

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$L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^3}$

```

query()
  Z ← {0, 1}^{2l+2l}
  return(Z)
    
```

Random

```

query'():
  Z ← {0, 1}^{2l+2l}
  return(Z)
    
```

- ∴ meaning code +
- q_1 is indistinguishable from Random.
- q_2 is indistinguishable from Random.
- Hence replace them with Random distribution.
- After ~~selecting~~ ~~selecting~~ selecting $2l+2l$ bits randomly twice is same as selecting $2l+2l$ bits randomly once

$$\Pr[A \triangleleft L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^3}] - \Pr[A \triangleleft L_{\text{Prng-real}}^{q^3}]$$

$$= \Pr\left[\frac{1}{2^{2l}} - \frac{1}{2^{2l+2l}}\right]$$

$$= \frac{2^{2l} - 1}{2^{2l} (2^{2l})}$$

← This is negligible
Hence, A's advantage is negligible

4a)

$$\bullet \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1] = \frac{q-1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-reads-but-not}^q \rightarrow 1] + \frac{1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1]$$

from DDH assumption

— (4)

$$\Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1] \approx \frac{q-1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-reads-but-not}^q \rightarrow 1]$$

So plugging this ~~in~~ our (4) gives us

$$\Rightarrow \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1] \approx \frac{q-1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-reads-but-not}^q \rightarrow 1] + \frac{1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1]$$

Subtracting both side by $\frac{1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1]$

$$\Rightarrow \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1] \approx \frac{q-1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-reads-but-not}^q \rightarrow 1]$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{q-1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1] \approx \frac{q-1}{q} \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-reads-but-not}^q \rightarrow 1]$$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{\Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-real}^q \rightarrow 1] \approx \Pr[A \diamond L_{dn-reads-but-not}^q \rightarrow 1]}$$

So they are "approximately" same. Their advantage is close to zero or negligible

$$\text{Thus } \boxed{L_{dn-real}^q \approx L_{dn-reads-but-not}^q}$$

4)
6)

Claim 2

for a fixed $a, b, c \neq_{\mathbb{Q}} ab$

$$\Pr[(x, y) = (d + be, ad + ce)] =$$

$$\Pr[(x, y) = ad^2 + bce + adb + bce^2]$$

$$= \frac{1}{q^2} \quad \text{as there is only two variables } d \text{ and } e. \\ \text{all other variables are fixed.}$$

Hence (x, y) is also from uniform distribution when $c \neq_{\mathbb{Q}} ab$

(30)

from previous Homework we know if we have a cyclic group and prime q elements in the set G .

We can do,

$$x \equiv_{\mathbb{Q}} y \Leftrightarrow g^x \equiv_{\mathbb{Q}} g^y \quad (1)$$

we can use this fact to create \mathcal{L} that exploits this

\mathcal{L}^q multi DH-real

Query():
 $(x_1, \dots, x_k) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^k$
 $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $y_i := x_i^a, \dots, y_k := x_k^a$
return $(x_1, \dots, x_k, y_1, \dots, y_k)$

\approx

Query'():
 $(A, B, C) \leftarrow \text{Query}()$
 g is public
 $(d_1, \dots, d_k) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $(e_1, \dots, e_k) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $\forall i := 1 \dots k$
 $x_i = (B)^{e_i} (g)^{d_i}$
 $y_i = (A)^{d_i} (C)^{e_i}$
return $(x_1, \dots, x_k, y_1, \dots, y_k)$

random

Pseudorandom
as $C = ab$

\mathcal{L}^q dh-real

Query'':
 $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $c := ab \bmod q$
return (g, g^a, g^b, g^c)

◇

using (1)

$$\therefore x = ad + ce$$

$$g^x = (g^a)^d (g^c)^e$$

$$g^x = X_i = (A)^{d_i} (C)^{e_i}$$

Same way

$$y_i = (A)^{d_i} (C)^{e_i}$$

X_i can be pseudorandom if $C = ab$

$\approx \approx L \diamond$

L^q
Ldh-random-but-not-real

Query^u():
 $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q - \{ab\}$
 $\text{return}(g^a, g^b, c)$

from (4. a)

$\approx \approx$

Query():
 $(A, B, C) \leftarrow \text{Query}^u()$
 g is public
 $(d_1, \dots, d_k) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $(e_1, \dots, e_k) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 $\forall i = 1 \dots k$
 $x_i = (B)^{e_i} (g)^{d_i}$
 $y_i = (A)^{d_i} (C)^{e_i}$
 $\text{return}(x_1, \dots, x_k, y_1, \dots, y_k)$

\diamond L^q
Ldh-random-but-not-real

\approx both X and Y have random dis as $C \neq ab$

$\approx \approx$

L^q multi DH-random

Query():
 $(X_1, \dots, X_k) \leftarrow G^k$
 $(Y_1, \dots, Y_k) \leftarrow G^k$
 $\text{return}(X_1, \dots, X_k, Y_1, \dots, Y_k)$

\therefore as X and Y both were random we can replace L^q Ldh-random-but-not-real with L^q multi DH-random

Hence

L^q multi DH-real $\approx \approx L^q$ multi DH-random