

# Privacy-Preserving Mobile Phone Localization with Cryptographic Authorization in 5G Networks

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# Problem Statement

- **Motivation:** 5G networks enable sub-meter localization accuracy, creating unprecedented surveillance capabilities that lack constitutional safeguards and judicial oversight mechanisms.
- **Problem Statement:** Current 5G positioning systems process location data in plaintext through centralized Location Management Functions (LMF), enabling potential mass surveillance without authorization controls or privacy protections.

## Objectives

- Design cryptographic multi-party authorization framework for 5G positioning
- Implement privacy-preserving localization using homomorphic encryption
- Develop secure network slicing for authorized positioning services
- Integrate judicial oversight mechanisms with threshold cryptography

## Metrics

- **Positioning Accuracy:** Maintain  $\leq 3m$  accuracy with security controls
- **Authorization Latency:**  $< 5$  minutes for judicial approval workflow
- **Baseline:** Standard 3GPP 5G positioning (TS 38.305) without security enhancements

- **Threat Model:** Rogue government agencies or compromised network operators attempting unauthorized mass surveillance using 5G's sub-meter positioning capabilities to track citizens without judicial oversight.
- **Assumptions:**
  - 5G network infrastructure is operational and follows 3GPP standards
  - Cryptographic primitives (threshold signatures, homomorphic encryption) are secure
  - Judicial authorities maintain secure key management systems

## Attack Scenario Illustration:

Compromised AMF credentials → Bulk location requests → Precise coordinates  
→ Movement profile construction

**Simulation-Based Approach:** Deploy complete 5G network simulation to demonstrate privacy-preserving localization

- **5G Simulation Environment:**

- **Core Network:** Open5GS with AMF, SMF, UPF, and custom secure LMF implementation
- **Radio Access:** srsRAN-based gNB simulation with multiple base stations for positioning
- **User Equipment:** Simulated mobile devices with realistic mobility patterns
- **Positioning Methods:** Implementation of Cell-ID, E-CID, OTDOA, and Multi-RTT techniques

- **Privacy Enhancement:** Demonstrate attack scenarios on standard 5G localization and show how multi-party authorization and encrypted processing prevent unauthorized surveillance

## Hardware Requirements

- **Development Machine:** Ubuntu 22.04 LTS with 16GB RAM, multi-core CPU
- **Docker Environment:** Container orchestration for 5G core components
- **Network Virtualization:** Virtual interfaces and network namespaces for isolation
- **Storage:** 50GB+ for simulation data, logs, and container images

**Key Advantage:** Pure software simulation eliminates hardware dependencies while enabling comprehensive 5G privacy-preserving localization testing

## Simulation Software Stack

- **5G Simulation:** Open5GS (core network), srsRAN (RAN simulation)
- **Cryptography:** Python libraries (cryptography, pycryptodome), OpenSSL
- **Network Simulation:** Docker Compose, Linux network namespaces
- **Mobility & Testing:** Python scripts for UE movement simulation, performance measurement tools

# Timeline & Milestones

- **Week 1:** Deploy 5G simulation environment (Open5GS + srsRAN), implement basic localization methods (Cell-ID, E-CID), demonstrate standard positioning workflow
- **Week 2:** Develop attack simulation scenarios, implement unauthorized surveillance demonstrations, design and integrate cryptographic authorization framework
- **Week 3:** Implement privacy-preserving localization with encrypted processing, integrate multi-party authorization, develop secure LMF with threshold signatures
- **Week 4:** Complete simulation testing with multiple attack/defense scenarios, performance benchmarking (accuracy vs. security), documentation and demonstration preparation

- **Mid-term deliverables (for 11 Nov):**

- **5G Simulation Environment Setup:** Basic 5G core network (Open5GS) with gNB and UE simulation infrastructure
- **Standard Localization Implementation:** Working 5G positioning using Cell-ID, E-CID, and OTDOA methods in simulated environment
- **Vulnerability Demonstration:** Proof-of-concept showing how unauthorized localization requests can be executed in standard 5G
- **Cryptographic Security Framework:** Initial implementation of threshold signature scheme and multi-party authorization protocol

- **Final deliverables (for 24 Nov):**

- **Complete 5G Network Deployment Simulation:** Software-based 5G core (Open5GS) with multiple gNBs and UE mobility simulation
- **Privacy-Preserving Localization Demo:** Live demonstration showing standard vs. secure localization with multi-party authorization
- **Attack Simulation & Defense:** Mass surveillance attack simulation and privacy protection effectiveness demonstration
- **Performance Analysis:** Quantitative evaluation of positioning accuracy, authorization latency, and security overhead in simulated environment
- **Deployment Package:** Complete simulation setup with documentation for reproducible 5G privacy-preserving localization testing



# Privacy-Preserving Workflow Demonstration

## Standard 5G Localization (Vulnerable)

- ❶ **Client Request:** Law enforcement sends location request to AMF
- ❷ **Direct Processing:** AMF forwards request to LMF without authorization checks
- ❸ **Position Calculation:** LMF collects measurements from gNBs in plaintext
- ❹ **Result Delivery:** Precise coordinates returned immediately to client
- ❺ **Privacy Risk:** No audit trail, no judicial oversight, potential for mass surveillance

## Privacy-Preserving 5G Localization (Secure)

- ❶ **Authorization Request:** Client submits court order with digital signatures
- ❷ **Multi-Party Validation:** Threshold signature verification (3-of-5: judicial, law enforcement, operator, privacy officer, oversight)
- ❸ **Encrypted Processing:** LMF performs positioning calculations on encrypted measurement data using homomorphic encryption
- ❹ **Secure Communication:** All data exchanges use secure network slice with end-to-end encryption

# References

- 3GPP TS 38.305: "Stage 2 functional specification of User Equipment (UE) positioning in NG-RAN"
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- Shamir, A.: "How to share a secret." Communications of the ACM 22.11 (1979): 612-613.
- Gentry, C.: "Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices." STOC 2009.
- Open5GS Project: <https://open5gs.org/>
- srsRAN Project: <https://www.srslte.com/>
- Microsoft SEAL Library: <https://github.com/Microsoft/SEAL>
- RELIC Cryptographic Toolkit:  
<https://github.com/relic-toolkit/relic>