

## LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Juhhwllqjv/Greetings,

Zh dv wkh phpehuv ri wkh Hahfxwlyh Erdug zhofrph doo wkh ghohjdwhv wr wkh Mrlqw Fulvlv Frpplwwhh ehlqj vlpwodwhg lq wkh MSKV PXQ' 23 Frqihuhqfh. Wkh djhqgd ri wklv Frpplwwhh zrxog eh wkh 1971 Lqgr-Sdn zdu. Wkh frpplwwhh zrxog eh glylghg lqwr 2 fdelqhwv, rqh ehlqj wkh Lqgldq Zdu Fdelqhw dgg wkh rwkhu ehlqj Sdnlvwdql Zdu Fdelqhw, khqfh, **wkh iuhhch gdwh ri wkh frpplwwhh lv 25 Pdufk 1971**. Vllqfh lw lv wkh vlpwodwlrq ri d uhdo klvwrulf hyhqw, prvw ri wkh fulvlv zrxog uhvhpeoh wkh dfwxdo vlxwdwlrq gxulqj wkdw wlp, krzhyhu lw fhuwdlqob pdb qrw eh hadfw uhshwlvwrq ri zkdw kdsshqhg wkhq. Wkh fulvhv dgg ixwxuh uhvxowv zrxog eh frpsohwhob edvhg rq wkh ghflvlrqv wdnhq eb wkh fdelqhw zklfk zrxog eh hqdfwhg wkurxjk gluhfwlyhv, frppxqltxhv dgg rwkhu irupv ri grfxphqvw zklfk wkh phpehuv vkdoo eh doorzhg wr suhvhq w lq wkh frpplwwhh.

Wkh frpplwwhh uhtxluhv hawhqvlyh uhvhdufk, lq ghswk dgdobvlv dgg eudlqvwruplqj wr wdfnoh wkh fulvlv dw kdqg, wkhuhiruh wklv edfnjuxqg jxlgh zloo surylgh wkh ghohjdwhv zlwklqirupdwlrq dgg phwkrqv wr eh xqghuvwrrg iru wkh frpplwwhh. Wkhuhiruh lw lv qhfhvvdub wr jr ehbrqg wklv edfnjuxqg jxlgh dgg uhvhdufk rq wkh plolwdub dvshfwv dgg hfrqrplf dvshfwv uhodwhg wr wkh djhqgd, dgg nqrz pdmru Plolwdub ghsorbphqvw dgg krz wkh plolwdub ixqfwlrqv dv lw pljkw eh xvixio lq wkh gluhfwlyhv.

Zkdw zh hashfw rxw ri wkh frpplwwhh lv wkdw wkh ghohjdwhv vkrxog nhhs lq plqg wkh srzhuv ri wkhlu sruwirolr dgg wkhlu mxulvglfwlrq. Wklv zrxog khos wkhp irupxodwh qhfhvvdub rshudwlyhv wkdw gr qrw jr ehbrqg wkh olplwv ri wkhlu sruwirolr, wkhuhiruh pdlqwdlqlqj d edodqfh lq wkh frpplwwhh. **Zh dovr hashfw wkh ghohjdwhv wr kdyh wkrurxjkob uhvhdufkhg derxw wkh pdsv gxulqj wkdw wlp dgg zklfk plolwdub ru flyloldq hvwdeolvkphqw halvwhg dgg zkhuh. Wklv fdq pdnh wkh frpplwwhh zdb pruh lqwhuhvwlqj dgg dgg wr wkh ohyho ri ghedwh dgg fulvlv.**

Zh zlvk doo wkh ghohjdwhv wr gr wkhlu ehvw lq wkh frpplwwhh dgg kdyh d juhdw ohduqlqj hashulhqfh iurp wklv edfnjuxqg jxlgh dv zhoo dv wkh hqwlh frqihuhqfh. Gr ihho iuhh wr frqwdfw wkh hahfxwlyh erdug ru wkh vhfuhwduldw iru dqb txhulhv ru grxewv.

SH. V.V. GIRI  
President of India

GEN YAHYA KHAN  
President of Pakistan

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### **I. HISTORY**

To truly understand the 1971 War, we must retrace it to its Historical origins. British Raj executed a territorial reorganisation of the Bengal Presidency, during the first Partition of Bengal (1905) which was overseen by Viceroy Lord Curzon. During the 1947 India-Pakistan Partition, East Bengal was declared a province of Pakistan. West Pakistan and East Pakistan had linguistic, racial, cultural, and ethnic differences. People in West Pakistan spoke Urdu and Punjabi whereas people in East Pakistan spoke Bangla. Religion was the common ground between the regions, otherwise 1600 kms apart.

Jinnah decreed in 1948 that Urdu would become the state language of East Pakistan. East Pakistan, ethnic Bengali Speakers, protested as a result of this. 55% of Pakistan's population was located in East Pakistan. Nevertheless, West Pakistan considered itself to be the dominant power. As a result of this, Muslim League was unpopular in East Pakistan.

Regional parties appeared as a result, and they referred to this announcement as an endeavour by West Pakistan to turn East Pakistan into a far-off colony. In 1954, provincial elections were held between the Muslim League and a “united front” of the Krishak Sramik party, led by Fazlul Haq, and the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in which the Muslim League was faced with defeat. Before Fazlul Haq could form the government, riots broke out

in factories in the capital of East Pakistan, Dhaka. The central government reinstated the governor's rule in the province, overriding the united front's electoral triumph, using instability as a pretext.

Iskander Mirza, a civil servant and central government minister, was dispatched to East Pakistan to establish stability and manage the region. The Constituent Assembly completed the long-awaited constitution of Pakistan in 1956 and proclaimed it an Islamic republic. Ten more seats for women, half from each area, would be added to the 300-member chamber of the national parliament, which will represent both the east and west of Pakistan equally.

In 1966, Mujibur Rahman led the "6 Point Movement" which demanded more autonomy for East Pakistan.

Six demands were made by a coalition of Bengali nationalist parties:

1. Federal state
2. All subjects to state, apart from defence and foreign affairs
3. Separate currency and fiscal policy
4. Taxation powers
5. Trade with foreign nations and separate forex reserve
6. Separate military and navy

The proposal was rejected by politicians from West Pakistan and non-Awami League politicians from East Pakistan. It was rejected by the president of the All Pakistan Awami League, Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan. It was also rejected by the National Awami Party, Jamaat-i-Islami, and Nizam-i-Islam. The movement had support from the majority of the population of East Pakistan.

With growing dissatisfaction with the Pakistani central government, East Pakistan furthered its secessionist agenda and decided to look to India for help in liberating East Pakistan. West Pakistan responded by arresting 35 famous political figures from the Awami league, including Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, also known as *Agartala Shorajontro Mamlā*

In 1968 Mujibur and educator Mohammad Ali Reza travelled to Agartala to enlist India's assistance in their bid for independence from West Pakistan. Sheikh was charged by West Pakistan with sedition and conspiring with India.

In December 1970, Pakistan's first national elections were held. Awami League won 160 of the 162 seats in the national assembly that had been allocated to East Pakistan, making Mujib eligible to form the national government. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who led the PPP, had won the majority of seats in West Pakistan, with 81 of the 300 constituencies voting.

Fearing that the East would decide the country's fate unilaterally, the military establishment refused to recognise this outcome. They argued that Rahman had no seat in West Pakistan, insisted on adopting a different system to set up the civilian government, and proposed power sharing. The Admiral Ahsan Mission was established to offer suggestions for resolving the conflict. With the exception of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the head of the Pakistan Peoples Party, its results were well received by West Pakistan's political elite. The Pakistani army and West Pakistan's establishment were set on a strategy of ongoing hostility against India, and India's MEA and prime minister's office believed that a breakthrough in Indo-Pak relations might be achieved by the Awami League taking power in Islamabad.

In order to return West Pakistan to its original heterogeneous state of four provinces, as defined at the time of the foundation of Pakistan in 1947, President Yahya Khan introduced one unit programme that disestablished its position as a single province in 1970. The Awami League demanded that everyone in the nation strike. The Awami League and their followers in East Pakistan became disenchanted when President Yahya Khan delayed the National Assembly's inauguration. As a result, dissidents in the East started to attack the ethnic Bihari minority, which predominantly backed West Pakistan, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for nationwide strikes that ultimately shut down the administration. About 300 Biharis were killed in riots by Bengali mobs in Chittagong alone at the beginning of March 1971. On March 25, when it began its military operation, the Pakistani government cited the "Bihari massacre" as justification for sending troops into East Pakistan. After accepting Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan's resignation as chief of staff of the East Pakistani military, President Yahya Khan urged the military, which was predominantly dominated by West Pakistanis, to quell discontent in the East.

After many days of strikes and resistance, the Pakistani military, under the command of Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, cracked down on Dhaka on the evening of March 25, 1971. Mass arrests of dissidents had already started. The Awami League was banned by the government, which prompted many of its members to leave and take refuge in Eastern India. Operation Searchlight followed by Operation Barisal attempted to kill the intellectual elites of the east.

## II. ROLE OF MUKTI BAHINI

The start of the creation of the Mukti Bahini was the announcement on 11 April by Tajuddin Ahmed, the Prime Minister of the provisional government of Bangladesh that a liberation army was being created. The liberation army, Ahmed said, was being created from the elements of the EBR, EPR, police, Ansars, Mujahids and thousands of volunteers. He also ordered the creation of eight regional commands to fight the Pakistani forces, each headed by a Major or a Captain of the EBR or EPR. Colonel MAG Osmani, a retired Pakistan Army officer and member of the National Assembly was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Liberation Army. The Mukti Bahini was initially around 2.5 lakh strong and drawn from the ranks of young men who had fled their homes in East Pakistan.

The creation of the Mukti Bahini had the explicit if not overt political backing of the government of Mrs Indira Gandhi.<sup>6</sup> The Mukti Bahini were raised through an operational directive issued by army chief, General SFHJ Maneckshaw to Eastern Army Commander Lt General Aurora on 1 May. General Maneckshaw directed Lt General Aurora to raise, equip and train the East Bengal cadres for guerilla operations in their own native land so as to immobilise and tie down the East Pakistan forces to protective tasks in East Bengal and subsequently, by gradual escalation of the guerilla operations, sap and corrode the morale of the Pakistan forces to impair their offensive capability against India.

The Mukti Bahini were hobbled by the lack of effective training—just three weeks as opposed to at least three months of training that would be needed to turn raw cadres into guerillas. They also had a shortage of experienced officers because of which they undertook only easy tasks. Their raids on Pakistani Border Outposts were ineffective. Where they succeeded however was in the gathering of intelligence which helped the Indian forces that were to move in.

Mukti Bahini operations also tied down a large number of Pakistani forces into static guard duties. This was especially the case with the maritime wing's sabotage operations which began on the night of 15 August 1971.

Every barge with ammunition sunk, meant the Pakistani army had fewer bullets to shoot at civilians and the Indian Army. Every attack by the naval commandos—whether successful or not—meant the Pakistan army had to pull its forces away from the borders into guarding the

ports and waterways. The biggest contribution of the naval guerillas was to take pressure away from the land forces element of the Mukti Bahini. The guerilla camps were disbanded on the Indian side but the cadres went on to form the nucleus of the Bangladeshi armed forces after their War of Liberation. 'Left unstated was the fact that the Indian state had proved it was not entirely a stranger to irregular warfare, which it had been at the receiving end of since 1947'.

### **III. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT**

India's diplomatic outreach registered a positive outcome with the USSR, when Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny wrote to President Yahya Khan on April 2, 1971 denouncing 'Operation Searchlight' and calling for a "peaceful settlement" in East Pakistan. This demand was deflected by Yahya Khan, and enabled India's Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh during his visit to Moscow in June 1971 to discuss and negotiate the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The Treaty was signed on August 9, 1971 during Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's visit to New Delhi.

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's personal leadership of India's diplomacy in 1971 was evidenced by her outreach to all four major powers. She visited Moscow at the end of September 1971 to coordinate views on how to implement the Treaty with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, resulting in the visit of two high-level delegations from the USSR to India from October 22, 1971 led by Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin and Chief of the Soviet Air Force Marshal Pavel Koutakov. These visits opened the door for mutual coordination and support on the battlefield and in the UNSC, where the diplomatic endgame of the war would play out in December 1971.

PM Indira Gandhi visited the US to negotiate on the crisis but in her 2 meetings with president Nixon, it was evident the US and India would be on the opposing sides of the war. The humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan had aroused the voice of prominent French intellectuals led by Andre Malraux. Public opinion forced the French government to impose sanctions on Pakistan in July 1971. During PM Indira Gandhi's visit to Paris, the convergence of priorities for a political settlement in East Pakistan, including the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from custody, was apparent.

The UN as well couldn't come out with any solution as this South Asian conflict had again divided the Bipolar world with the major superpowers being allies to the involved parties. The ongoing war in Vietnam was a more urgent issue in the eyes of the international community as the entire west was seeing its efforts in vain as the communist guerillas started taking over major establishments in the West supported South Vietnam. The UNSC resolution 307 was passed in December 1971 which put an indefinite halt on the discussion over the issue and as of 2023, the crisis still hasn't been discussed or recognised as a humanitarian catastrophe.

## **IV. INTERESTS OF BOTH THE CABINETS**

### **1. PAKISTAN**

The unrest and dissent being faced by the central government of Pakistan by the East-Pak population was evidently a strong signal towards the so to come instability in the entire nation. The process had begun right after independence in 1947 and only aggravated in subsequent years and peaked in 1971. Therefore, the government had to carry out some form of repressory measures. The first steps taken were

- a. Detention of Awami league leader Mujib-ur-Rahman
- b. Detention and interrogation of other people involved in riots
- c. Suppression of Bengali Intelligentsia
- d. Enactment of Unitary, Unification policies like common currency and language.

The East Pakistanis demanded a great amount of autonomy, almost making it a sovereign state, however the central government established in Islamabad wouldn't have let that happen. The apex aim for any sovereign government is to establish and maintain its geographical integrity which was certainly at stake due to the secessionist elements in the East. It had become very explicit that the Indian government was providing Mukti Bahini with the resources they required for insurgency and militancy and therefore it had become important for Pakistan to prevent any foreign power from doing so.

Admiral Syed Mohammed Ahsan was appointed to lead a mission in early 1971 to study the demands of East Pakistan and set forth a feasible solution to the grave problem. He suggested the following solutions based on the 6-point programme put forth by Awami league in 1969.

- Centre would control the defence, military, foreign, national security, and the currency.<sup>[1]:102</sup>
- Province(s) would have the authority to raise revenue and would fund the subject of the federation.<sup>[1]:102</sup>
- Repatriation of Western Pakistanis citizens and bureaucrats to Pakistan with Eastern Pakistanis stationed back to the East.
- Equal divisions of national assets between Pakistan and East Pakistan based on population census.

However the military leadership and the newly elected democratic government weren't so keen on offering any major form of autonomy.

Considering the given situation, the cabinet shall seek to find a feasible solution to the issue while maintaining the similar stance in internal and foreign policy. The major goals of this cabinet can be pointed towards—

- INTEGRITY OF THE NATION
- ACCUMULATION OF MOST OF THE POWER BY WEST PAKISTAN
- SUPPRESSION OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT
- PREVENTION OF INDIA'S INTERFERENCE IN THE CRISIS

## **2. INDIA**

The crisis in India during the same period was somewhat a by-product of the East-Pakistan crisis. Millions of people started migrating to bordering areas of India like West Bengal, Bihar, Meghalaya and even to United Provinces. The situation of 1947 partition was re-emerging with a similar sort of Refugee crisis. The Indian Economy was also at one of its lowest points with staggering growth and growing poverty. The internal politics of India was also changing with the formation of a new ruling party and other ongoing internal disturbances and dissent. The Indian government was also worried that a prolonged civil war might ameliorate the influence of maoists and guerilla militia which would overshadow the Pro-India Awami league and might also join hands with the naxalite movement in India.

India had made its stance clear however, Pakistan was able to muster support from big powers like USA, China and Islamic Republics in the middle east. Various diplomatic efforts



were ongoing during the entire crisis and India had warned Pakistan of ending the suppression of East Pakistan. The issue was raised in the UN as well however the diplomatic efforts were proving to be inconclusive. India had kept using the Military as the last option, however as the crisis prolonged, India was inching closer to launching some form of Military operation.

The newly established intelligence organisation of India, R&AW was active all over East and West Pakistan, providing the government with essential information regarding the operations and future plans of Pakistan which would have threatened India in various ways, therefore the necessity of planning some counter action was necessary for the government.

The Indian Military still had fresh wounds from the 1962 and 1965 wars, however, it was widely recognised within the four walls of the government that India had become capable of countering any external threat with its improvised Military strategy and weaponry. The relations with other nations also improved which led to formation of mutual partnerships and sharing of military resources. Thus, the Indian government had certain aspirations and wished to counter and end all the threats being faced from an external crisis.

## **v. DOCUMENTATION**

### **1. DIRECTIVES**

Directive is the most significant document of any crisis committee. It is meant to execute any action such as operations, blockades, espionage missions, etc. The delegates can make certain types of directives which fall under their jurisdiction. For example, the Chief of R&AW can launch an espionage mission in any state other than India, therefore he/she can make a directive regarding the entire process of this mission.

Directives are of 2 types-

- a. **COVERT**- These are given directly to the executive board and not revealed to the entire committee as these are meant to be unilaterally executed and without the knowledge of the entire cabinet.
- b. **OVERT**- These directives are presented by the delegate to the entire committee and are voted upon. The consent of the committee is necessary on

these directives and the information in the directive is also shared.

The directives can be Unilateral or Joint (when more than one delegate formulates a directive).

## **FORMAT-**

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### **DIRECTIVE- 'DIRECTIVE NAME'**

Status: COVERT/OVERT

OBJECTIVE- {BODY}

PERSONNEL INVOLVED- {NAMES OF ESTABLISHMENTS/GROUPS WITH WEAPONS AND VEHICLES}

PLAN OF ACTION- {BODY}

AUTHORS- PORTFOLIOS

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## **SAMPLE-**

### **DIRECTIVE- DESERT TSUNAMI**

Status- Covert

Operation Name- Desert Tsunami

#### **OBJECTIVES-**

1. To counter-attack the ECOMOG Forces
2. To counter US 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment, Delta Forces, and the 75th Ranger Regiment working with the Liberian government
3. To call for assistance from Libya and Iraq against the US troop deployment
4. To call the USSR for intervention and assistance against the increasing involvement of the US in the Liberian Civil War
5. Deter the movement of forces from Ghana into Liberia
6. Put a blockade around Montrovia and protect the capital from foreign forces
7. Take control of Montrovia

## PERSONNEL INVOLVED

Burkina Faso's Foreign Envoy to Ivory coast, Iraq and Libya

12000 Burkina Faso's Militia sent as reinforcement to NPFL from Ivory Coast after approval.

- a. 10 ACMAT Bastion Armoured Vehicles
- b. 60 transport Trucks
- c. 6000 AK-47 rifles (Disguised)

200 Medical Staff including 20 war-time Doctors

50 official soldiers from 1st Infantry Battalion, Burkina Faso's Army

- a. 30 SIG SG Assault Rifles
- b. 10 M2 Borrowing (5 with each group)
- c. 2 Gila armoured vehicles
- d. 4 PANTHARD M3 vehicles
- e. 4 L42A1 sniper rifles

4000 NPFL soldiers at the outskirts of East Monrovia

4000 NPFL soldiers at the outskirts of West Monrovia

Iraq and Libyan Troops, with naval support according to the agreement established by envoys of both nations with Burkina Faso.

## PLAN OF ACTION

1. Reach out to Ivory Coast to provide access to the North Atlantic ocean via Tabou and request for using their Le Valeureux class fast attack missile craft and Patrol ships to following drop points:

a. Transfer of 5000 combined troops of NPFL, Burkinabe Militia, paramedic and First infantry battalion's 1 platoon of 25 members (2 snipers each and 5 handling machine guns), merged as NPFL rebels, to sasstown once the United States' Delta Forces and Ranger Regiment move towards Caldwell. The transport Trucks to be mounted on Ferries provided by Ivory coast upon agreement and disguised as civil trucks.

b. Second destination would be Monrovia, coordinates 6.3156° N, 10.8074° W where the capital would be sieged as a swift moving attack towards the presidential estate.

2. The NPFL forces already laying siege on Montrovia would, with a combined troop of 4000 on each front, after joining forces with Burkinabe, Iraqi, Libyan, and all other forces which arrive for their aid due to the envoys would block off all foreign forces from entering Monrovia by creating a blockade around it. The blockade would comprise of a total of 10,000 combined troops laying seige around Monrovia, with another troops entering

3. Another troop of NPFL allied forces would also drive out other Doe backed forces from Montrovia completely by charging in the city, taking complete control of the capital, and surrounding the parliament building and Doe's Residence.

4. NPFL forces, after fighting off AFL guards around the parliament, would enter the

parliament building, and establish NPFL as the legitimate government of Liberia.

5. No attack on US forces must be initiated, unless they attack first, therefore once sasstown airport is vacant, the attack will take place

6. The time would be synced as the common point of contact is the same, Monrovia. The time of initiation would be 0100 hrs, of the night, after sasstown vacancy is confirmed.

- a. The first group of forces would reach there by 0300 hrs and take control of the port and airport.
- b. The second group would further travel via sea to reach Monrovia by 0800 hrs and take control of the city. The coast guard of Liberia to be tackled with
- c. For prevention of American attacks, blockades would be erected to cut off the city.
- d. The NPFL groups in east Monrovia would escort the 1st group once they raid armouries and camps in midway and possess logistics.
- e. The first group's half team would reach Monrovia by 0900 hrs, the other half group would take over Sasstown itself.
- f. At 1000 hrs, Liberia will be declared as a democratic state and Samuel K Doe will be arrested and taken into custody.

7. A Naval base would be established at 6.2585451156710885, -10.71561045853311, Greater Monrovia, to receive foreign envoys and troops which come to the aid of the NPFL-Burkina Faso- Cote D' Ivoire cooperative.



DATE: Day after vacancy of Sasstown and approval by Libyan and Iraqi government, estimated- 25 Sept, 1990

**Signed-** Burkina Faso, National Patriotic front of Liberia

## 2. COMMUNIQUE

Communiques are tools used to contact entities outside of your committee in order to involve them with the crisis in a certain way. They are written as formal correspondence to outside actors as a way of enticing them to take action, even though they aren't under your direct control. They can be used to request some sort of information or some agreement with someone who is not part of the committee. For example, The Chief of Pakistan's military could request information on any operation being conducted under the surveillance of the U.S. Navy admiral of 7th fleet. Since the Navy admiral might not be present in the committee directly, the crisis board would reply on their behalf and this would add to the crisis situation in the committee.

### TYPES

**A. PRIVATE COMMUNIQUE-** Sent by one delegate without the knowledge of any other member of the committee.

**B. PUBLIC COMMUNIQUE-** Can be sent by one or more delegates and the entire committee could know about it or some select members of the committee.

### FORMAT-

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#### 'TYPE OF COMMUNIQUE'

TO: 'Name of External individual or entity'

FROM: 'Portfolio'

{BODY}

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### SAMPLE-

#### PRIVATE COMMUNIQUE 1.0

TO: PRESIDENT OF STATE OF LIBYA, GEN. MUAMMAR GADDAFI

FROM: BURKINA FASO, NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA

Burkina Faso, as your true ally, condemn the actions taken by the US agents and the motive of your assassination. We wish a safe environment for you to live in, therefore, present a deal

in order to maintain good ties as well as security in the 2 great nations. Burkina Faso has a specially trained infantry battalion with special firearms. We wish to send 100 soldiers as a token of friendship with Libya. We see that Liberia is being drawn into a civil war and the administration is committing serious crimes, therefore we wish to seek your cooperation in supporting the NPFL and some militia sent by Burkina Faso, covertly to help them. This would require some amount of equipment and soldiers who will be helping them in the pursuit against the current government. We would be committed to our partnership and conveying information regarding the actions of American agencies against General Muammar Gaddafi.

CONFIDENTIAL

### 3. PRESS RELEASE-

Official declaration given by one or more members or the entire committee to the external world. It is basically a statement given to the press which is then broadcasted to the rest of the world. It can be used as a method to inform the media about any victory or outcome from any diplomatic discussion, etc.

#### SAMPLE-



PRESS RELEASE

BURKINA FASO

The sanctions levied on Burkina Faso by the United States are highly condemned. There is no argument supporting the presence of Burkina Faso's transfer of arms to the rebels. The SIG SG Assault rifles found are Swiss made Weapons and can be owned by any nation. AK-47s are used by most terror organisations and military outfits, which cannot be determined as Burkinabe weapons because their origin is in the USSR. FN MAG Guns are produced by France and are used by Mali Forces as well. There is no solid proof regarding the origin of these weapons, except where they are manufactured. Burkina Faso has kept out from the conflict and feels betrayed by the United States as an Ally. The trade sanctions imposed are a sign of severing relations and therefore even the US will have to face serious consequences.

May Unity, Labour and Justice Prevail

Gen Blaise Campaore

President, Burkina Faso

## **VI. TIPS FOR THE DELEGATES**

1. understand the Sequence of major political Events that took place before and during 1971.
2. research on your portfolio and its relation with the Agenda and how it can be used.
3. go to the depth of every event and understand how the military and diplomatic strategies were formulated and implemented, and their Ramifications.
4. analyse how some alteration in any event could have Changed the course of History and how some failed mission or operation could have been reformed and made a successful one.
5. Learn to encode and decode certain Important ciphers which are easily available on google, although just a very basic understanding is important. Some important ciphers are- Caesar, Morse, Alphanumeric substitution. Check these out on deciphering websites.
6. *use maps*. Get to know How maps can be used during any crises and formatted while sending directives and Tracking the updates geographically.

## **VII. REFERENCES**

The information in these links would be enough to prepare for the conference. Please go through them and prepare as per your comfort.

1. <https://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplate/frmTempSimple.aspx?MnId=Vj9Z9/K834HmI0uYEV/ZkA==&ParentID=a2y46LwK1cGTIGGa7M5m2g==>
2. [https://nios.ac.in/media/documents/military\\_history\\_375/Book-2/Chapter-19.pdf](https://nios.ac.in/media/documents/military_history_375/Book-2/Chapter-19.pdf)
3. [https://idsa.in/system/files/book/Book\\_Indo-Pak%20War\\_1971.pdf](https://idsa.in/system/files/book/Book_Indo-Pak%20War_1971.pdf) (ch- 1,2, 5, 7, 8, 9,10, 13, 14)
4. <https://indiancc.mygov.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/mygov-9999999991378101176.pdf>