

Matthew Blake

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Hamilton versus Paine: Direct Democracy in the United States

What are the causes and effects of the variations in forms and degrees of direct democracy present between the various fifty American States? Although there is no mechanism for direct democracy (that is, a way to vote directly on policy) in the American Federal Government, all states have some mechanism by which the populace can directly vote on political issues.

We will begin with a brief overview of the forms of direct democracy we will consider, and we will provide a survey of arguments for and against them. We will then examine the different systems of direct democracy, quantifying and comparing different states' approaches. Next, we will compare this data to other characteristics of states, to try to find which characteristics have significant correlations with the degrees of direct democracy. Finally, we will explore the ramifications of our findings.

I: Introduction and Literature Review

Direct democracy occupies an interesting position relative to the American founding mythology. On one hand, the Enlightenment-inspired founders believed and espoused strong ideals of liberty and self-determination, most famously in the Declaration of Independence, where many of the specific qualms with Britain involved the imposition of taxes and laws without the consent of the governed colonists. However, these same men, when writing the US

Constitution, were cautious about the dangers of majoritarian rule, delegating only to the Lower House of the Legislative branch representation of the populace, and leaving nothing, besides the Guarantee Clause, to assure that the other parts of the government represent the citizenry. Although the United States has grown increasingly democratic in the decades since its founding, a skepticism of pure democracy dating back to Socrates still persists to this day.

Although much of the research to date deals with the empirical impacts of direct democracy in the United States and around the world, there are some who use political theory to make broader, normative arguments about what states should do, rather than focusing on case studies. One example is John Matsusaka's article *Direct Democracy Works*, in which he describes the increasing popularity of ballot initiatives and other forms of referendum, and makes the case that access to direct democracy should continue to expand to other governments (Matsusaka, 2002). However, Lucas Leeman and Fabio Wasserfallen criticize Matsusaka's argument here, arguing that the empirical evidence does not clearly show an association between the availability of direct democracy in a particular jurisdiction, and greater alignment between the policy opinions of the electorate and the policies enacted by the government (Leeman and Wasserfallen, 2016).

However, much of the research of direct democracy in the contemporary United States focuses on local or regional issues, taking a granular look at what distinguishes successful from unsuccessful ballot measure attempts. Some are related to the environment: in Melissa Kreye's article on watershed protection, she shows that broad and vague wording of measure text is associated with increased odds of passage (Kreye et al., 2019); Erik Nelson's article on open-space conservation areas showed that ballot initiatives to establish these areas were most likely to be successful in areas with fast-growing, affluent, and highly-educated populations

(Nelson et al., 2007); Kate Lowe's piece on railroad referendums links the success of these ballot measures to a specific delineation of the project, and "broad stakeholder involvement" (Lowe et al., 2014). Interestingly, there is a tension between Kreye's and Lowe's pieces regarding the level of detail that is optimal for a ballot measure, suggesting that the specific issue may affect whether voters will react more favorably to more or fewer specifics.

Other ballot measures are localised referendums on national issues being discussed at the time. For example, an article by Tarun Banerjee argues that corporations which produce genetically modified food collaborate with one another to work as an industry to defeat ballot initiatives which seek to mandate labelling of genetically modified foods (Banerjee & Murray, 2015). Another article, by Bayliss Camp, examines the spate of "DOMA referendums"-- that is, initiatives to legally codify the restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples around 2005-2006. Camp argues that these ballot initiatives were used by both parties to attempt to bring out their own voters, depress turnout for the other parties', and to increase the salience of gay marriage in races where it could function as a "wedge issue", taking advantage of the opposition to gay marriage found within large sections of the Black and Hispanic communities, which were otherwise reliable Democratic voters. This article used the "DOMA referendums" as a case study, but also attempted to generalise the result to other referendums and ballot initiatives strategically advanced by political parties hoping to gin up favorable turnout.

Beyond case studies, other authors have looked at the wider effects which direct democracy has on states and countries themselves. For example, Uwe Wagschal examined direct democracy in Australia, the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, and concluded that the primary function of direct democracy was as a check against excessive spending which the populace could wield against the government (Wagschal, 1997); perhaps Wagschal's conclusion

is more typical of the 1990s, when neoliberalism was stronger, than it might be today, when economic populism incentivises measures which purport to offer economic relief. A similar, but more recent, article by Matt Qvortrup, examines Switzerland and the United States, and argues that direct democracy (referendums and initiatives) is associated with lower deficits, but also lower economic inequality and a higher GDP per capita (Qvortrup, 2019). Finally, in *Educated by Initiative*, Daniel Smith and Caroline Tolbert argue that direct democracy plays a vital role in educating citizens about the political process and promoting civic engagement, resulting in a communal benefit from even the majority of ballot initiatives that fail (Smith & Tolbert, 2009).

While there is substantial literature discussing the practice of ballot initiatives or referendums in the US states, or in other countries, less attention has been paid to the effects of recall and judicial elections. However, Yanina Welp and Laurence Whitehead's book *The Politics of Recall Elections* surveys and analyses recall election provisions which have been set up in countries around the globe since the end of the Cold War (Welp & Whitehead, 2020). The authors argue that the spread of recall elections will continue, and offer guidance on how to mitigate its risks. In contrast, the literature regarding the direct election of judges is more pessimistic about its impacts on a government. Canes-Wrone looked at abortion cases in state-level Supreme Courts from 1980-2006, and concluded that, after accounting for judge- and state-specific effects, that state Supreme Courts whose justices were chosen by partisan elections were more likely to experience public pressure to rule a particular way, compared to non partisan-elected judges, or judges in other systems, such as retention (Canes-Wrone et al., 2012). In a similar vein, a paper by Elliott Ash and W. Bentley MacLeod found that having nonpartisan judicial selection processes, such as retention or nonpartisan elections, was significantly (and

positively) correlated with judicial quality, measured by number of positive citations (Ash & MacLeod, 2021).

II: Problematic and Hypotheses

Although ballot initiatives, recall elections, and judicial elections have each been studied individually, we want to study them together, as manifestations of direct democracy. In particular, we want to examine what has caused the divergent degrees and forms of democratic institutions across the states. The first step in this process is to gather data about the current state of direct democracy institutions in the States. In particular, we gathered data about judicial selection methods from the Brennan Center for Judicial Elections, information on amendment popular vote thresholds from the Council of State Governments “Book of the States” online database, on referendums and initiatives from the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the state codes as linked on the Ballotpedia websites for recall and other ballot initiatives. Next, we decided to create a metric for each of four categories, Recall, Amendment, Ballot Initiative, and Judicial elections, which would rank each state’s policy in that domain with a score from 0 to 1, representing increasing amounts of direct democratic participation. These will be the dependent variables in our analysis.

After this, we gathered data on state characteristics which we thought could be associated with degrees of direct democracy. The hypotheses of this study correspond to each of these variables, and so it should be noted that our hypotheses are restricted to those causes for which we could find data to test. The first hypothesis regards Daniel Elazar’s classification of states’ political culture as either traditional, or moral, or individualistic. Because this characterizes the

ways in which citizens are said to engage with their government, we hypothesize that there will be an association between this classification and the amount of direct democracy a state has.

Our second hypothesis, similar to the first, regards instead geographic region as a possible predictor of the amount of direct democracy. Different parts of the country have different cultures, and it would be expected that states may be more influenced by the political environments of geographically nearby states than more remote places.

Our third hypothesis regards the placements of people. In contrast to a more urban state, where people live close together and feel more connected, it may be that more rural, less densely inhabited states have populations which feel less connected to their state representatives in their capitol, or indeed to the Federal government in Washington, D.C. We operationalize this by comparing the democracy metrics to the population density, expressed both cardinally and ordinally, in one case in persons per square mile, and in the other as the ranking of its population density among the fifty states. Measuring the population density in these two ways accounts in part for the immense variation (almost three orders of magnitude) in the numerical population density among the states. Additionally, we also consider the percentage of federal land, as this adds a geographic dimension, favoring newer, more westernly states.

In this vein, our fourth hypothesis regards the age of a state, expressed by the date on which they joined the United States. We hypothesize that the older states might have less direct democracy, as their constitutions were written well before the Progressive Era, when democratic participation was more limited and the governance of the populace much more scrutinized, during or perhaps even before the Founding Fathers convened to write a Constitution which sought to insulate the federal government from the impulses of the populace.

Our final hypothesis is the hardest to measure: We believe that the presence of political progressivism in the early 1900s will be a strong predictor of modern institutions of direct democracy. We measure this as a combination of presidential election results: We started with the 1912 election's Progressive Party candidate President Theodore Roosevelt, as his candidacy was strongly supported by the Republican party's progressive voters, whereas the party's conservative voters tended to vote for Republican nominee President William Howard Taft. However, we wanted to make this metric a little less biased by including other election results. We decided to use the votes for Socialist candidate Eugene V. Debs for this purpose, as his strong support for labor causes meant that he received the most support from progressives, though not nearly as much as President Roosevelt did in 1912. In particular, we used Debs' vote totals from his 1912 and 1904 bids for office, as WWI and Theodore Roosevelt's death, among other factors, had led to a decline in the Progressive Era's momentum by the time of Deb's 1920 presidential bid. Adding these three vote totals gave us our Progressive Support index, which we will compare to our direct democracy metrics.

To test these hypotheses, we will calculate the correlation between each of the metrics of direct democracy and each of the variables in question. The overall significance of a variable will be determined by assessing the correlation between it and a metric which combines the direct democracy metrics, and our hypotheses will be rejected or not on those grounds. We decided to look at each of the predictors individually, because there is significant correlation between the variables, so a linear regression which sought to incorporate all of them would not give much meaningful information. Finally, we ought to clarify that, for the purpose of our analysis, a "metric" is a dependent variable measuring (some aspect of) direct democracy, while the variables, or predictors, are independent variables which measure some other aspect of a state.

III: Methods and Analysis

We are interested in examining the state of the different forms of direct democracy of the United States, and to explore what may have caused these changes. To decide how to measure the presence and degree of something as nebulous as “direct democracy”, we identify four of the most salient manifestations of direct democracy for measure: a mechanism for recall of elected officials, the mechanism by which state Supreme Court judges are chosen, any mechanisms for ballot initiatives, and the popular vote thresholds required for the passage of state constitutional amendments.

Next, for each of these categories, we survey the differences between the States, and we establish a scale, from 0 to 1, representing increasing degrees of “direct democracy”. For example, for the Recall metric, we assigned increasing values to states with options to recall more types of statewide elected officials.

0	0.35	0.6	0.8	1
None	Governor	Executive Branch	Executive and Legislative Branches	All Branches

Figure 1: Key for Recall Metric

For the Judges metric, we ranked states by the increasing amount of popular participation in the selection of judges. It was decided to rank gubernatorial above legislative appointments, as the former requires approval of the legislature, which increases popular accountability relative to the legislature appointment, which do not require gubernatorial input. Secondly, it was decided to rank partisan elections above nonpartisan elections, as the nature of a partisan election causes increased popular interest, as well as the ability for partisan cues to make it easier for voters to make informed decisions.

0	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.9	1
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Legislative Appointment	Gubernatorial Appointment	Appointment with Popular Vote Retention	Missouri Plan	Nonpartisan Elections	Partisan Elections
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Figure 2: Key for Judges Metric

The third metric, Ballot Initiative, is calculated as the weighted sum of the types of ballot initiatives a state allows. A state's score is calculated as the sum of the weights of the types of ballot initiatives it allows.

0	+0.05	+0.15	+0.2	+0.3	+0.3	1
None	Statute Affirmation	Legislative Referred Statute	Statute Veto (Referendum)	Citizen Initiated (CI) Statute	CI Constitutional Amendment	All

Figure 3: Key for Ballot Initiative Metric

The final metric, Amendments, measures how difficult it is for a state constitutional amendment to pass by popular vote. In this category, Delaware gets a 0, as the only state to not allow (or even not require) popular consent for a state constitutional amendment. States which require a majority of all casted votes in an election get a score of 0.8, as this is a significantly harder threshold to clear than a majority of votes on the referendum itself. We wanted to score states lower for having higher thresholds for passing an amendment, or for requiring multiple elections to pass an amendment. Thus, a state that has a 50% threshold will have a score of one, a state that requires a supermajority will be penalized by the proportion by which the ballot must win (for example, Florida's requirement of a 60% approval rate penalizes its score by $0.6-0.4=0.2$). Finally, states which require two consecutive popular passages have their score reduced by a factor of two.

0	0.8	$2(1 - \text{Threshold } \%)$	$\div 2$
No popular participation (Delaware)	Majority of Election Votes	All other states	Multiple (2) election votes required to pass.

Figure 4: Key for Amendment Metric

After creating these metrics, we want to combine them into one metric, creating a more

continuous and informative measure. First, we naïvely took an average of the four metrics, to produce MetricSum. However, some of these metrics are more informative than others; for example, the Amendment metric simply returns a value of 1 for the majority of states which require a majority in a single election to pass a constitutional amendment. Others, like the Ballot Initiative, have much more information, and are highly salient. Therefore, we also created a biased WeightedSum, with weights of 0.15 for Amendment, 0.35 for Ballot Initiative, and 0.25 for the Recall and Judicial Elections.

One limitation of this approach is the subjective nature of the scales that we created. Even when there is a more or less clear ordering to the different systems which states have in place regarding one of these metrics (for example, judicial elections), choosing how to space out the different systems on the 0 to 1 line segment required a kind of quantification that I was not able to ground in anything more rigorous or objective than my own intuition. Yet having made these judgments, to the best of our ability, allows us to easily combine the different metrics, and to compare to other potential predictors.

After this, we examine the dependent variables, representing the potential causes, or correlates, of a state's direct democracy. We measured each of these, though we faced a challenge in capturing a state's Progressive Support. We decided to gauge this by adding states' support for Progressive Party candidate Roosevelt in the 1912 election, to the Socialist party Debb's (much smaller) support in 1904 and 1912, two years where he received notable support. This was done to try to offset idiosyncratic factors in Roosevelt's 1912 performance. If a state did not exist during one of these elections, the average state support for that election is used, and added alongside the other elections.

Variable	Options	Description
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Elazar	Individual, Moral, Traditional.	Represents the classification of the political culture made by Daniel Elazar.
Region	Northeast, South, Midwest, Mountain, Pacific, Southwest.	Region of the state.
Population Density	Numeric, positive.	Persons per square mile.
Population Density Rank	Numeric, integers 1-50	Ordinal rank of persons per square mile.
Admission Date	Date from 7 December 1787 to 21 August 1959.	Date on which state joined the USA / ratified the Constitution.
Fed Land %	Number from 0-100.	Percentage of land owned by Federal Government.
Progressivism	Number from 0-200.	Metric of Progressive support during Progressive Era.

Figure 5: List and Description of Variables

As discussed earlier, the first thing we tried to answer our question was to make a linear model of MetricSum and WeightedSum. These models had Multiple R^2 values of 0.5648 and 0.5816, respectively, indicating that the combination of all of these variables is a significant predictor of the weighted and unweighted metric sums. However, beyond this measurement, the models produced little else of use, since these variables are far from independent. A better way to measure this is by measuring the correlation between each pair of metric and variable.

R² Coefficient	Elazar	Region	PSqM	PSqM_Rank	AdmissionDate	FedLandPercent	SupportProg
MetricSum	0.1367	0.3374	0.1256	0.2045	0.1906	0.1547	0.2715
WeightedSum	0.1327	0.3654	0.1233	0.2091	0.1998	0.1808	0.3062
RecallMetric	0.1975	0.2385	0.0073	0.0536	0.0985	0.1824	0.219
JudgesMetric	0.0839	0.2151	0.1684	0.0568	0.008	0.0031	0.0254
BallotMetric	0.0808	0.2968	0.0644	0.1715	0.1859	0.156	0.2557
AmendMetric	0.1035	0.1262	0.0659	0.1444	0.1307	0.0083	0.0395

Figure 6: Metric / Variable Correlation Coefficients

As we can see from Figure 6, the two metric sums tend to have the highest correlations overall. We also calculated the p-values of each of these relationships.

Corr. p-values	Elazar	Region	PSqM	PSqM_Rank	AdmissionDate	FedLandPercent	SupportProg
MetricSum	0.031583	0.002188	0.01155	0.000978	0.001524	0.004712	0.000105
WeightedSum	0.035242	0.000939	0.012412	0.000842	0.001139	0.002084	0.000031
RecallMetric	0.00568	0.02993	0.554044	0.105625	0.026458	0.001978	0.000611
JudgesMetric	0.12751	0.051165	0.003074	0.095602	0.536588	0.701251	0.269305
BallotMetric	0.138016	0.006854	0.075276	0.002789	0.001775	0.004535	0.00018
AmendMetric	0.076819	0.293491	0.071922	0.006481	0.009906	0.53002	0.166279

Figure 7: Metric / Variable Correlation (raw) p-values

One problem for the interpretation of these tests is that performance of many significance tests increases the chances of receiving at least one significant result. One (conservative) adjustment to account for this is the Bonferroni adjustment, whereby we divide the required p-value by the number of total observations: in this case, 42. Using a baseline significance level of 0.05, this would give us a new significance threshold of 0.00119. In Figure 7 above, **insignificant results** are shown in yellow, **significant results** in blue, and results which are **insignificant only after the Bonferroni adjustment** are in green. Note that, because this is a very conservative adjustment, it is likely that some of the green relationships are still significant; conversely, we can be very confident that the blue relationships are significant.

From Figure 7, we can reach several conclusions about the relationship between our variables and the metrics of direct democracy. First, the variables do a better job approximating the combined metrics than the individual metrics. This is an encouraging sign that the combined metrics are viable, with the different metrics balancing out each others' idiosyncrasies. Second, the weighted metric is generally more closely correlated to our variables than the unweighted metric, which justifies my decision to make it in the first place, especially considering the lack of significant correlation with the Amendment metric.

IV: Conclusion

Of the variables we have chosen to examine, the Progressive Support variable has the clearest correlation with the Democracy metrics. Each of the other six variables appear to have some correlation with the metrics, and of these Region is the most significant. Therefore, we have evidence (of various strengths) of a correlation between each of these factors and increased levels of direct democracy at the state level, progressive support in the early 1900s being the strongest predictor.

In particular, examining our hypotheses, it would appear that the Elazar classification is the least significant predictor of direct democracy. This is perhaps not surprising, given that the classification scheme only had three distinct categories, and it is attempting to predict a continuous variable.

Two of the continuous predictors for population density, namely PSqM and Federal Land Percentage, perform only marginally better. However, the third, PSqM Rank, performs much better than either of the other two, more significant than any other predictor besides Progressive Support. Although I hypothesized that there may be some distinction between the two, because of the population density range of almost three orders of magnitude, I did not imagine the difference would be this stark.

The Admission Date and Region variables straddle the boundary of sufficiency, with marginally insignificant results for the unweighted and significant results for the weighted metric after the Bonferroni correction. However, because of the degree to which the Bonferroni correction errs on the side of overcorrecting, it is quite likely that there is some relationship between these predictors and direct democracy, even if it is not as strong as PSqM Rank or Progressive Support.

Progressive Support proved to be by far the strongest metric; the p-values of its correlations fell below the Bonferroni-corrected threshold by more than a factor of ten. This gives us extremely strong evidence that, insofar as our constructed Progressive Support metric accurately gauges support for the Progressive Era agenda, that such support is closely associated with institutions of direct democracy today.

V: Bibliography

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VI: Appendix




Figure 8: Unweighted MetricSum Map




Figure 9: WeightedSum Map




Figure 10: Progressive Support Map

Metrics Correlation	RecallMetric	JudgesMetric	BallotMetric	AmendMetric
RecallMetric	1	0.3242619	0.2657297	0.2518016
JudgesMetric	0.3242619	1	0.1352409	0.3929013
BallotMetric	0.2657297	0.1352409	1	0.4008185
AmendMetric	0.2518016	0.3929013	0.4008185	1

Figure 11: Correlations of Metric Measurements

State	Metric Sum	Recall Metric	Judges Metric	Ballot Metric	Amend Metric	Elazar	Region	PSqM	PSqM_Rank	AdmissionDate	FedLandPercent	SupportPr og	% Federal Land
AL	0.5	0	1	0	1	Traditional	South	101	24	1819-12-14	2.7	22.58	2.70%
AK	0.675	0.8	0.4	0.5	1	Individual	Pacific	1.3	1	1959-01-03	60.9	34.412273	60.90%
AZ	0.8375	1	0.4	0.95	1	Traditional	Southwest	65	19	1912-02-14	38.6	45.701136	38.60%
AR	0.7125	0	0.9	0.95	1	Traditional	South	59	16	1836-06-15	9.4	25.38	9.40%
CA	0.7875	1	0.2	0.95	1	Moral	Pacific	250	40	1850-09-09	45.4	62.41	45.40%
CO	0.8125	1	0.4	0.95	0.9	Moral	Rocky Mountains	57	14	1876-08-01	36.2	35.01	36.20%
CT	0.2125	0	0.1	0	0.75	Individual	Northeast	747	47	1788-01-09	0.3	25.58	0.30%
DE	0.0625	0	0.1	0.15	0	Individual	South	529	45	1787-12-07	24.7	19.72	24.70%
FL	0.375	0	0.4	0.3	0.8	Traditional	South	422	44	1845-03-03	12.9	24.45	12.90%
GA	0.725	1	0.9	0	1	Traditional	South	192	34	1788-01-02	12.9	19.12	12.90%
HI	0.15	0	0	0	0.6	Individual	Pacific	223	37	1959-08-21	20.2	34.412273	20.20%
ID	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.5	1	Moral	Rocky Mountains	24	7	1890-07-03	61.9	42.27	61.90%
IL	0.65	0.35	1	0.45	0.8	Individual	Midwest	226	39	1818-12-03	1.2	47.24	1.20%
IN	0.225	0	0.4	0	0.5	Individual	Midwest	192	35	1816-12-11	1.7	32.15	1.70%
IA	0.225	0	0.4	0	0.5	Moral	Midwest	57	15	1846-12-28	0.3	39.37	0.30%
KS	0.55	0.8	0.4	0	1	Moral	Midwest	36	10	1861-01-29	0.5	45.04	0.50%
KY	0.5125	0	0.9	0.15	1	Traditional	South	115	27	1792-06-01	4.3	25.88	4.30%
LA	0.7	0.8	1	0	1	Traditional	South	106	25	1812-04-30	4.7	20.2	4.70%
ME	0.4375	0	0.1	0.65	1	Moral	Northeast	45	12	1820-03-15	1.5	41.54	1.50%
MD	0.3875	0	0.2	0.35	1	Individual	South	637	46	1788-04-28	3.2	27.63	3.20%
MA	0.3875	0	0.1	0.95	0.5	Individual	Northeast	898	48	1788-02-06	1.2	34.78	1.20%
MI	0.9125	0.8	0.9	0.95	1	Moral	Midwest	178	32	1837-01-26	10	44.88	10.00%
MN	0.675	1	0.9	0	0.8	Moral	Midwest	72	21	1858-05-11	6.8	49.88	6.80%
MS	0.55	0	0.9	0.3	1	Traditional	South	63	18	1817-12-10	5.1	9.47	5.10%
MO	0.5875	0	0.4	0.95	1	Individual	Midwest	90	23	1821-08-10	3.8	23.89	3.80%
MT	0.9625	1	0.9	0.95	1	Moral	Rocky Mountains	7.8	3	1889-11-08	29	50.58	29.00%
NE	0.5875	0	0.4	0.95	1	Individual	Midwest	26	8	1867-03-01	1.1	36.49	1.10%
NV	0.85	1	0.9	1	0.5	Individual	Rocky Mountains	29	9	1864-10-31	80.1	52.05	80.10%
NH	0.1917	0	0.1	0	0.6667	Moral	Northeast	157	30	1788-06-21	14	23.69	14.00%
NJ	0.4125	0.8	0.1	0	0.75	Individual	Northeast	1263	50	1787-12-18	3.6	39.51	3.60%
NM	0.3875	0	0.2	0.35	1	Traditional	Southwest	17	6	1912-01-06	31.7	25.771136	31.70%

NY	0.15	0	0.1	0	0.5	Individual	Northeast	415	43	1788-07-26	0.8	30.83	0.80%
NC	0.5	0	1	0	1	Traditional	South	223	38	1789-11-21	7.8	28.82	7.80%
ND	0.9625	1	0.9	0.95	1	Moral	Midwest	11	4	1889-11-02	3.9	40.63	3.90%
OH	0.7375	0	1	0.95	1	Individual	Midwest	288	41	1803-03-01	1.2	34.46	1.20%
OK	0.5875	0	0.4	0.95	1	Traditional	Southwest	59	17	1907-11-16	1.5	44.531136	1.50%
OR	0.9625	1	0.9	0.95	1	Moral	Pacific	44	13	1859-02-14	52.3	45.63	52.30%
PA	0.375	0	1	0	0.5	Individual	Northeast	290	42	1787-12-12	2.2	45.17	2.20%
RI	0.425	0.6	0.1	0	1	Individual	Northeast	1060	49	1790-05-29	0.7	25.69	0.70%
SC	0.125	0	0	0	0.5	Traditional	South	179	33	1788-05-23	4.5	5.981136	4.50%
SD	0.5875	0	0.4	0.95	1	Moral	Midwest	12	5	1889-11-02	5.4	57.66	5.40%
TN	0.2	0	0.4	0	0.4	Traditional	South	173	31	1796-06-01	4.8	23.42	4.80%
TX	0.5	0	1	0	1	Traditional	Southwest	117	28	1845-12-29	1.9	18.3	1.90%
UT	0.5125	0	0.4	0.65	1	Moral	Rocky Mountains	42	11	1896-01-04	63.1	35.21	63.10%
VT	0.15	0	0.1	0	0.5	Moral	Northeast	70	20	1791-03-04	7.8	38.36	7.80%
VA	0.125	0	0	0	0.5	Traditional	South	221	36	1788-06-25	9.3	16.65	9.30%
WA	0.8375	0.8	0.9	0.65	1	Moral	Pacific	118	29	1889-11-11	28.6	54.56	28.60%
WV	0.475	0	0.9	0	1	Traditional	South	74	22	1863-06-20	7.4	35.76	7.40%
WI	0.6	1	0.9	0	0.5	Moral	Midwest	109	26	1848-05-29	5.3	30.35	5.30%
WY	0.425	0	0.4	0.5	0.8	Individual	Rocky Mountains	6	2	1890-07-10	46.7	31.85	46.70%

Figure 12: Final Dataset