Exercise 4.6 For a second-order discrete system given by


$$x_t + a_1 x_{t-1} + a_2 x_{t-2} = 0,$$


show that the following inequalities constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergency of the system:


$$\left. 
 \begin{array}{l}
 1 + a_1 + a_2 > 0, \\
 1 - a_2 > 0, \\
 1 - a_1 + a_2 > 0.
 \end{array} \right\} 
 \tag{4.51}$$


and illustrate the above inequalities in the  $a_1$ - $a_2$  plane.

$$J=\begin{pmatrix}0&1\\-a_2&-a_1\end{pmatrix} \qquad |\lambda 2-J|= \begin{vmatrix}\lambda&-1\\a_2&\lambda+a_1\end{vmatrix}.$$









Exercise 4.11 In a dynamical duopoly game, two firms X and Y produce a homogeneous product with
output $x_t$ and $y_t$ , respectively. The inverse market demand is $p_t = 1/(x_t + y_t)$ , where $p_t$ is the market
price, and the cost function is identical for both firms: $C(q_t) = \frac{\sigma^2}{2}q_t^2$ , $q = x, y$ . X is a price-taker who determines its output by equating its marginal cost to the last period's price level. Y maximizes its profit
determines its output by equating its marginal cost to the last period's price level. Y maximizes its profit with full-knowledge of X's current production.
i) Verify that the output trajectory $\{x_t, y_t\}$ follows the following recursive relationship:
$x_t = f(x_{t-1}, y_{t-1}) = \frac{1}{\sigma^2(x_{t-1} + y_{t-1})}$

$$x_t = f(x_{t-1}, y_{t-1}) = \frac{1}{\sigma^2(x_{t-1} + y_{t-1})}$$
  
 $y_t = g(x_t),$ 

MCx = 
$$P_{t-1}$$
.  
MCx =  $\frac{dC(x)}{dx} = \delta^2 x = P_{t-1}$ .  

$$\delta^2 x_t = \frac{1}{x_{t-1} + y_{t-1}}$$

$$y_t$$
: max profit  $II_y = P_t y_t - C(y_t)$ 

$$= \frac{y_t}{x_{t+}y_t} - \frac{\delta^2}{z_t^2}$$

$$\frac{d T y}{d y^t} = \frac{x_t + y_t - y_t}{(x_t + y_t)^2 - 0} = \frac{x_t}{(x_t + y_t)^2 - 0}$$

where g is an implicit function solved from the identity

at(x, y)

$$\frac{x_t}{\left(x_t + y_t\right)^2} = \sigma^2 y_t.$$

ii) Show that the system has an unique equilibrium  $(\bar{x}, \bar{y})$  such that  $0 < \bar{y} < \bar{x}$ .

(iii) Show that the equilibrium 
$$(\bar{x}, \bar{y})$$
 is always stable regardless of the value  $\sigma$ :

(iii)  $Xt = \frac{1}{C^2(X+1+Y_0+1)}$ 
 $C^2(X+1+Y_0+1)$ 
 $C^2(X+1+Y_0+1)$ 
 $C^2(X+Y_0+Y_0)$ 
 $C^2(X+Y_0)$ 
 $C^2(X+Y_0)$ 

$$\frac{\partial y_t}{\partial x_{t-1}} = \frac{\partial y_t}{\partial x_t} \cdot \frac{\partial x_t}{\partial x_{t-1}} = -0.088 \times (-0.0838)$$

$$|J| = -0.618 - 0.088$$

$$|J| = -0.618 - 0.088$$

$$|J| = -0.618 \times (-0.0838)$$

$$|J| = -0.0512$$

- iV) Verify that at the equilibrium  $(\bar{x}, \bar{y})$ , X makes higher profit than Y.
- v) How will the above conclusions be changed if Y does not know the output  $x_t$  and makes its production decision basing on the assumption of  $x_t^e = x_{t-1}$ ?

$$\begin{array}{lll} \overline{\mathsf{IV}}): \ \mathsf{at}(\overline{\mathsf{x}},\overline{\mathsf{y}}). & \overline{\mathsf{II}}\mathsf{x} = P\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \widehat{\mathcal{O}}^{2}\overline{\mathsf{x}}^{2}. & = \overline{\mathsf{x}} + \overline{\mathsf{y}} - \widehat{\mathcal{O}}^{2}\overline{\mathsf{x}}^{2}. \\ & \overline{\mathsf{II}}\mathsf{y} = P\overline{\mathsf{y}} - \widehat{\mathcal{O}}^{2}\overline{\mathsf{y}}^{2} & = \overline{\mathsf{y}}^{2}\overline{\mathsf{y}} - \widehat{\mathcal{O}}^{2}\overline{\mathsf{y}}^{2}. \\ & \overline{\mathsf{y}} = \frac{\overline{\mathsf{y}}^{2}}{2}\overline{\mathsf{x}}. \\ & \to \overline{\mathsf{II}}\mathsf{x} - \overline{\mathsf{II}}\mathsf{y} = -\overline{\mathsf{x}}^{2}\overline{\mathsf{y}} - \widehat{\mathcal{O}}^{2}(\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}}). & \overline{\mathsf{x}} + \overline{\mathsf{y}} = \widehat{\mathsf{o}}\overline{\mathsf{x}}. \\ & = (\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}})(\sigma^{2}\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \widehat{\mathcal{O}}^{2}(\overline{\mathsf{x}} + \overline{\mathsf{y}})). \\ & = \overline{\mathsf{x}}(\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}})(\sigma^{2}\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \widehat{\mathcal{O}}^{2}(\overline{\mathsf{x}} + \overline{\mathsf{y}})) \\ & = \overline{\mathsf{x}}(\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}})(\sigma^{2}(\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}}). = \widehat{\mathcal{O}}^{2}(\overline{\mathsf{x}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}})^{2}. \\ & = \overline{\mathsf{y}}(\overline{\mathsf{y}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}})(\sigma^{2}\overline{\mathsf{y}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}})(\sigma^{2}\overline{\mathsf{y}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}})(\sigma^{2}\overline{\mathsf{y}} - \overline{\mathsf{y}})^{2}. \end{array}$$

V).

Exercise 4.12 In Fuu (1991), a duopoly model is established

$$x_{t} = f(y_{t-1}) = \sqrt{y_{t-1}/a} - y_{t-1},$$
  

$$y_{t} = g(x_{t-1}) = \sqrt{x_{t-1}/b} - x_{t-1},$$

where  $a \neq b$ .

- i) Please identify the stability regime in terms of parameters.
- ii) Show that, when the system is unstable, it can always be stabilized through adaptive adjustment:

$$x_{t} = \alpha x_{t-1} + (1 - \alpha) f(y_{t-1})$$
  

$$y_{t} = \beta y_{t-1} + (1 - \beta) g(x_{t-1})$$

with suitable choice of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ , where  $0 \le \alpha, \beta \le 1$ .

i) 
$$X_{1} = f(y_{1}) = |Y_{1}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_{1} = |X_{1}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_{2} = |Y_{2}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_{3} = |Y_{3}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_{4} = |Y_{4}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_{5} = |Y_{5}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_{7} = |Y_{5}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_{7} = |Y_{5}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_{7} = |Y_{5}| - y_{2}$$

$$y_{8} = |Y_{5}| - y_{1}$$

$$y_$$

$$\lambda^{2} - \frac{(a+b)(b-a)}{4ab} = 0.$$

$$|\lambda| = \frac{|a+b|}{2\sqrt{ab}} = 1.$$

ii) Show that, when the system is unstable, it can always be stabilized through adaptive adjustment:

$$x_{t} = \alpha x_{t-1} + (1 - \alpha) f (y_{t-1})$$
  

$$y_{t} = \beta y_{t-1} + (1 - \beta) g (x_{t-1})$$

with suitable choice of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ , where  $0 \le \alpha, \beta \le 1$ .

(A+bal-d) (1-d). =(0+bal-d)-(1-d)

$$J = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{(b-a)(1-a)}{2a} \\ \frac{(a-b)(1-b)}{2b} \end{pmatrix}$$

when original unstable

X = b 10+62 4=10+62

| NIX 2 | when (a-b) 2,4 ab.

held [1-d)(1-b) to be small. 2>1 P>1.

by selecting 2 B close to 1, can adjust for stability.