# ІИ ЅФVІЭТ ЯŲSSIД ЅМДЯТСДЯD НДСКЅ ЧФЏ

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2018

X41 D-SEC GmbH



#### whoami


- Eric Sesterhenn
- Principal Security Consultant
- Pentesting/Code Auditing at X41





## Disclaimer

- The issues presented here have been reported and fixed!
- These are open source projects help them!
- I am not interested in testing / debugging proprietary stuff in my spare time.



## **Targets**

MOBILEPHONE ATM LOGIN ACCESSCONTROL COPYPROTECTION PAYPHONES HEALTHCARE PAYMENT SIGNATURES PASSPORTS TRANSPORTATION TRANSPORTATION SIGNATURES ACCESSCONTROL DISKENCRYPTI LINUX IN PAYPHONES HEALTHCARE ATM MOBILEP LOGIN DYPROTECTION PASSPORTS HEALTHCARE PAYMENT PAYPHONES PASSPORTS MOBILEPHONE DISKENCRYPTION TRANSPORTATION LOGIN ATM COPYPROTECTIONACCESSCONTROL SIGNATURES PASSPORTS TRANSPORTATION MOBILEPHONE COPYPROTECTION LOGIN SIGNATURES PAYMENT ACCESSCONTROL PAYPHONES HEALTHCARE DISKENCRYPT


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# Why?

- Smartcards control authentication!
- Authentication runs as root!
- Users and programmers subconsciously trust the smartcard!



## **Smartcards**



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## What is a Smartcard?

- Physical, tamper-proof device
- Designed to keep information secret
- Contains memory and a processor



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart\_card#/media/File:SmartCardPinout.svg

## **Application Protocol Data Unit**

- APDUs form the protocol to talk to smartcards
- ISO/IEC 7816-4 Identification cards
   Integrated circuit cards
- T=0 is character oriented / T=1 is block-oriented
- Verify: 00 20 00 01 04 31323334

CLA	INS	P1	P2	$L_{C}$	Data
1	1	1	1	0-3	$N_{C}$

# PC/SC API

- PC/SC API can be used on win and \*nix
- Other libraries have a similar interface

```
LONG WINAPI SCardTransmit(
  SCARDHANDLE
                       hCard.
  LPCSCARD_IO_REQUEST
                       pioSendPci,
  LPCBYTE.
                       pbSendBuffer,
  DWOR.D
                       cbSendLength,
  PSCARD_IO_REQUEST
                       pioRecvPci,
  LPBYTE
                       pbRecvBuffer,
                       pcbRecvLength
  L.PDWOR.D
);
```

#### PKCS11

- PKCS11 is a platform independent API for cryptographic token
- Supported by OpenSSL, browsers,...
   (eg. via libp11)
- Windows uses smartcard Minidriver now
- Driver for each card, uses ATR to match

```
CK_RV C_FindObjectsInit(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK_ULONG ulCount
);
```

# Smartcard Stack Summary

Application (pam)

PKCS11

PC/SC


**APDU** 

**Physical Card** 

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## Smartcard for Sign-On



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#### Trust the Smartcard

- Driver developers trust the smartcard!
- Let's abuse that
- Mess with the card responses



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Project	# Bugs		
libykneomgr	1		
OpenSC	Over 9000 ;-)		
pam_pkcs11	1		
smartcardservices	2		
Yubico-Piv	2		

No, I did not fuzz the \$#?@! out of it... but guess which one I fuzzed the most ;-) Thanks to Frank Morgner for fixing!

## **Apple Smartcardservices**

```
do {
  cacreturn = cacToken.exchangeAPDU(command, sizeof(command), result,
     resultLength);
  if ((cacreturn & 0xFF00) != 0x6300)
    CACError::check(cacreturn):
. . .
  memcpy(certificate + certificateLength, result, resultLength - 2);
  certificateLength += resultLength - 2;
  // Number of bytes to fetch next time around is in the last byte
  // returned
  command[4] = cacreturn & OxFF;
} while ((cacreturn & 0xFF00) == 0x6300);
```

# OpenSC - CryptoFlex

```
u8 buf [2048], *p = buf;
size_t bufsize, keysize;
sc_format_path("I1012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, &file);
if(r)
  return 2:
bufsize = file->size:
sc_file_free(file):
r = sc_read_binary(card, 0, buf, bufsize, 0);
```

### Popping calcs...

```
snakebyte@smartcard:~$ cryptoflex-tool
Usage: cryptoflex-tool [OPTIONS]
Options:
 -l, --list-keys
                                Lists all keys in a public key file
 -c. --create-kev-files <arg> Creates new RSA key files for <arg> keys
 -P, --create-pin-file <arg> Creates a new CHV<arg> file
  -q, --generate-key
                                Generates a new RSA key pair
  -R. -- read-key
                                Reads a public key from the card
                               Verifies CHV1 before issuing commands
 -V. --verify-pin
                                Selects which key number to operate on [1]
 -k, --key-num <arg>
  -a. --app-df <arg>
                                Selects the DF to operate in
 -p, --prkey-file <arg>
                                Private key file
  -u, --pubkey-file <arg>
                                Public key file
  -e, --exponent <arg>
                                The RSA exponent to use in key generation [3]
 -m. --modulus-length <arg>
                                Modulus length to use in key generation [1024]
 -r. --reader <arg>
                                Uses reader <arg>
                                Wait for card insertion
                                Verbose operation. Use several times to enable debug output
  -v. --verbose
snakebyte@smartcard:-$ cryptoflex-tool -R
Using reader with a card: libfuzzy
Using card driver: Schlumberger Multiflex/Cryptoflex
Unable to read public key file: Card command failed
bc 1.06.95
Copyright 1991-1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY.
For details type warranty'.
3+4
```

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## Basic Smartcard Exploitation in 2018

- Basiccard gives you nice control,... yes BASIC!
- Example exploit (Kevin) will be released to the public at beVX
- Other methods would be SIMtrace or certain Javacards



#### YUBICO PIV

```
if(*out_len + recv_len - 2 > max_out) {
 fprintf(stderr,
   - "Output buffer to small, wanted to write %lu, max was %lu.",
   *out_len + recv_len - 2, max_out);
}
if(out_data) {
 memcpy(out_data, data, recv_len - 2);
 out_data += recv_len - 2:
 *out_len += recv_len - 2:
```

# Logging in...

```
Debian GNU/Linux 9 smartcard tty3
Hint: Num Lock on
smartcard login: _
```

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## Challenges in fuzzing a protocol


- Most modern fuzzers are file-oriented
- Radamsa: Generates a corpus of files
- Hongfuzz: passes a file (filename different each run)
- libfuzzer: passes a buffer and length
- AFL: passes a file

## Challenges in fuzzing a protocol

- SCardTransmit() tells us how much data it expects
- Read this from a file on each call and error out if EOF
- No complicated poll handling like for network sockets required

## How to fuzz - OpenSC

- reader-fuzzy.c
- Implements a (virtual) smartcard reader interface
- Responds with malicious data read from file (OPENSC\_FUZZ\_FILE)
- Have fun with AFL



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## How to fuzz - Winscard and PC/SC

- Winscard(.dll) on Linux and Unix
- For proprietary code
- Preload the library
- Have fun with non-feedback fuzzers (e.g. radamsa) or AFL in qemu mode



#### How to fuzz - Winscard 2

- Tavis loadlibrary
- Extended to support Winscard drivers
- Fuzz the windows drivers on linux without all the overhead




# Smartcard fuzzing

- Released now!
- https://github.com/x41sec/x41smartcard-fuzzing



# pam\_pkcs11: Replay an Authentication



#### Roadblocks

- Channel back to card is quite limited
- Might need to use revocation list check for information leaks
- Interaction during exploitation not possible with basiccard, get SIMtrace for that
- But: A single bitflip from false to true during login can be enough :)

## Takeaways / Conclusions

- Think about trust models!
- Some security measures increase your attack surface big time!
- Fuzz Everything!
- Limit attack surface by disabling certain drivers.
- Do not write drivers in C ;-)

### **Thanks**

- Q & A
- https://github.com/x41sec/x41-smartcardfuzzing
- eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de
- Sorry no Twitter... stalk me on LinkedIn if you must ;-)





