




ZeroDay  
(Slogan tim)



**ID-Networkers**  
Indonesian IT Expert Factory



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## Introduction Team

Nama Team : ZeroDay

Anggota : Muhammad Rizki Maulana, farrel, (づ￣ 3￣)づbRizzzY (rizaldisakims@gmail.com)



### Members

User Name	Score
Muhamad Rizki Maulana <span>Captain</span>	100
farrel	270
(づ￣ 3￣)づbRizzzY	180

Point : 550



## Summary Findings Each Category

Category	Soal Selesai / Dari Soal yang ada	Point
Web Exploit	13/13	130
Other	1/2	10
Welcome Flag	1/1	10
Web 303	7/7	70
Cryptography	6/7	60
Log Analysis	9/9	90
USB Forensic	6/8	60
Browser Forensic	10/10	100
Windows Forensic	0/15	0
Forensic	2/2	20

Pengurangan Nilai : 0 Point



## Detail Challenge Solved

Welcome Flag

### Forgot Encode

Deskripsi :

sesorang menggunakan encoding untuk menyimpan rahasianya tapi dia melakukanya sambil berbincang dengan orang lain sehingga dia lupa.

bantu orang tersebut untuk menemukan rahasianya:

```
Vm0wd2VHUXhUWGhYV0d4VIYwZG9iMVJRU2pSVIZsbDNWMnQwYUZKc2NGW1
ZWM1IzWVRBeFdHVkVSbHBoTVZwUVZrUkdXbVF5U2tWWGJHUnBWa1phTmxav
VNqUlRNRFZ6VjI1V1ZXSlZXbFZWYWs1dlVsWmtjbFp0Um10TIYxSllWbTAxVTJGR
1NsbfJiRkpWVm0xb1ExUldXbXRXTvdsMFpFWmtUbUpGY0ZsWFZFSlhWVEZSZU
ZOWWJGWmlSa3BoV1d0a2IyUnNiSEZTYlhSc1ZqQTFTbFl5TVVkvWJGcFZWbXhvV
jJKSFVqWIViRnByVm1zeFzsZHJPVmRpU0VKWVYxZDRVMVp0VVhoaVJtUllZbX
MxV1ZadGVFdE5SbkJXVmxFV2FGSXdjRWRaTUDoVFYwWmFjMk5JUmxWV2JIQX
pxWHBLUzFJeVJrZFdiV2hvVFVoQ01sWnRNREZrTWsxM1RWWmtZVkpXV2xWW1
ZFNVRWREZhY1ZKcmRGUINiRVl6Vmxkek5WZEEdXbFZSYWxKV1RXcFdjbFl5TVV
0VFJsWnpZVWRHVjJWcldtOVdiR1EwVVRGYVZrMVZWazVTUkVFNQ==
```

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran :



**BASE64**

**Decode**

**Decode and Encode** **Encode**

Language: English Español

Do you have to deal with **Base64** format? Then this site is perfect for you! Use our super handy online tool to encode or **decode** your data.

**Decode from Base64 format**

Simply enter your data then push the decode button.

```
V2VsY29tZSB0byB5b3VylG5ldyBtZXRhIGZyaWVuZC4gRmxhZzogSUROX0NURntiYXNINjRfaW5fYWNoaW9uX2J1dF83X3RpWVzfQ==
```

For encoded binaries (like images, documents, etc.) use the file upload form a little further down on this page.

Source character set: UTF-8

Decode each line separately (useful for when you have multiple entries).

Live mode OFF Decodes in real-time as you type or paste (supports only the UTF-8 character set).

< DECODE > Decodes your data into the area below.

Welcome to your new meta friend. Flag: IDN\_CTF{base64\_in\_action\_but\_7\_times}

Solusi :

“ Terlihat dari Deskripsi bahwa ini adalah pesan encoding, dan dia lupa sampai berapa dia encoding.. terlihat bahwa yang dia gunakan juga base64 dengan ciri “==”, maka dari itu saya mencoba untuk melakukan decoding beberapa kali”

Flag : IDN\_CTF{base64\_in\_action\_but\_7\_times}

## Forensic

## QRIS

Deskripsi:

2 kali

**Author : Mohamad Fattyr**

Lampiran: forensic.jpeg

Langkah yang dilakukan:

1.Scan QR

pertama Ketika QR code discan pertama kali menggunakan QR scanner biasa menggunakan hp, hasilnya bukan flag, melainkan code yang di encode seperti berikut:

**1VST1gwWk1RVWQ3VmpOU04xOWxORk0zWDFJaE9VaFVmUT09**

### 2. decode

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Kami decode menggunakan base64

```
[kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ echo U1VST1gwWk1RVWQ3VmmpOU04xOWx0Rk0zWDFJaE9VaFVmUT09 | base64 -d
```

Outputnya: SUROX0ZMQUd7VjNSN19lNFM3X1IhOUhUfQ==

Dan hasilnya masih code encode , sesuai dengan deskripsi yaitu harus 2 kali di decodenya.kita decode yang ke-2 kalinya.

```
[kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ echo SUROX0ZMQUd7VjNSN19lNFM3X1IhOUhUfQ== | base64 -d
```

Dan flag finalnya yaitu:

IDN\_FLAG{V3R7\_e4S7\_R!9HT}

Web 303

## Unsafe Deserialization

Deskripsi:

- Flagnya Di Encode Dengan Encoder yang sama dengan bitcoin dan solana

Lampiran: [https://ctf.solusiber.com/web\\_101/lab8/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/web_101/lab8/)

Langkah yang dilakukan:

1. analisis halaman web

Lab 8: Unsafe Deserialization

Paste serialized data to load user preferences (JSON):

Paste JSON here...

Load Data

tampilan utama berupa form input bertuliskan:

Paste serialized data to load user preferences (JSON):



Terdapat kotak teks dan tombol "Load Data". Hal ini mengindikasikan bahwa data dalam bentuk JSON akan diproses dan ditampilkan.

## 2. Lihat Source Code / Inspect

```
function _0x50ef(){const _0x3adffbe[ 'output' , '4398tkUrEg' , 'textContent' , '2440668hwBdtZ' , '158824hAaAk0' , 'aData\20loaded:\x20' , 'userData' , 'message' , 'light' , 'stringify' , '615YI51QW' , '12zD0BPL1' , '301161QjDGea' , '3069225FmJmV' , '3522250vUXIW' , '4e9THmJfgagHkvXRC2T99EoKiSvisvU8PqSyvB3Fz3hnbKxJCNNeEYk' , 'run' , 'getElementById' , '2388065o08hBh' , '217RHjACM' ];_0x50ef=function(){return _0x3adffbe[ 'run' ]};const _0x50ef=_0x3adffbe[ 'run' ];function _0x3fb6(_0x197a89 , _0x249e49){const _0x50ef3a=_0x50ef();return _0x3fb6=function(_0x3fb623 , _0x3cca71){_0x3fb623=_0x3fb623-\0xfb;let _0x25a3b3=_0x50ef3a[_0x3fb623];return _0x25a3b3},_0x3fb6(_0x197a89 , _0x249e49)};function _0x40e67a(_0x3c571e){const _0x7797db8=_0x3fb6 , _0x1c995d=_0x40e67a();while(![]){try{const _0x19e65b=_0x19e65b+parseInt(_0x7797db8(0x101))/0x2*(parseInt(_0x7797db8(0x10a))/0x3)+parseInt(_0x7797db8(0x103))/0x4+parseInt(_0x7797db8(0x10e))/0x5+(-parseInt(_0x7797db8(0x10f))/0x7*(-parseInt(_0x7797db8(0x104))/0x8)+-parseInt(_0x7797db8(0x10d))/0x9+parseInt(_0x7797db8(0x10e))/0xa;if(_0x19e65b==_0x3c571e)break;else _0x1c995d['push'](_0x1c995d['shift']);}catch(_0x5899eb){_0x1c995d['push'](_0x1c995d[_0x3cc9f9]);const FLAG=_0x58a49e(0xfb);function unsafeDeserialize(_0x3cc9f9){const _0x4086b2=_0x58a49e;let _0x20cf4a=JSON['parse'](_0x3cc9f9);return _0x20cf4a&&typeof _0x20cf4a[_0x4086b2(0xfc)]==='string'&&eval(_0x20cf4a[_0x4086b2(0xfc)]),_0x20cf4a;let userPrefs={'theme':_0x58a49e(0x108),'language': 'en'};function loadData(){const _0x5cee44=_0x58a49e,_0x5c19a0=document[_0x5cee44(0xfd)](_0x5cee44(0x100)),_0x50da0d=document[_0x5cee44(0xfd)](_0x5cee44(0x106))['value'];try{let _0xe9de80=unsafeDeserialize(_0x50da0d);_0x5c19a0[_0x5cee44(0x102)]=_0x5cee44(0x105)+JSON[_0x5cee44(0x109)];_0xe9de80;catch(_0x216ea5){_0x5c19a0[_0x5cee44(0x102)]= Error:\x20+_0x216ea5[_0x5cee44(0x107)];}}}}}};
```

Pada bagian javascript saya menemukan code acak mencurigakan yaitu:

```
3522250vUXIW' , '4e9THmJfgagHkvXRC2T99EoKiSvisvU8PqSyvB3Fz3hnbKxJCNNeEYk' , 'run' ,  
4e9THmJfgagHkvXRC2T99EoKiSvisvU8PqSyvB3Fz3hnbKxJCNNeEYk
```

Karena disebutkan flag di-encode menggunakan metode sama seperti Bitcoin & Solana, kita coba menggunakan python3 untuk mendecodenya :

```
[kali㉿ kali) ~]# python3 -c "import base58; print(base58.b58decode('4e9THmJfgagHkvXRC2T99EoKiSvisvU8PqSyvB3Fz3hnbKxJCNNeEYk').decode())"
```

Dan flag akhirnya yaitu:

**IDN\_CTF{unsafe\_deserialization\_executed}**

## JWT Token Manipulation

Deskripsi:

Flagnya Di Encode Dengan Encoder yang sama dengan bitcoin dan solana

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran: [https://ctf.solusiber.com/web\\_101/lab4/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/web_101/lab4/)

Langkah yang dilakukan:

### 1. Analisis halaman web



## Lab 4: JWT Token Manipulation

Paste a JWT token to decode. Tokens are unsigned and can be forged.

Paste JWT token here...

Decode Token

Tampilan awal menampilkan form input dengan petunjuk:

“Paste a JWT token to decode. Tokens are unsigned and can be forged.”

Terdapat textarea dan tombol "Decode Token".

### 2. Inspect Element dan cari ‘javascriptnya’

```
function _0x5314(_0x1d66ca,_0x46b201){const _0x380dab=_0x380d();return _0x5314=function(..._0x5314a=_0x5314a-0x11b;let _0x428c63=_0x380dab[_0x5314a];return _0x428c63);,_0x5314(_0x1d66ca,_0x46b201);}(function(_0x398988,_0x2b8f80){const _0x34bac7=_0x5314,_0x541a8f=_0x398988() ;while(![]){try{const _0xd27f1f=parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x122))/0x1+parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x121))/0x2*(parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x129))/0x3)+parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x11d))/0x4+parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x127))/0x5*(parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x124))/0x6)+parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x12f))/0x7*(parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x11e))/0x8)+parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x127))/0x9*(parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x12d))/0xa)+parseInt(_0x34bac7(0x125))/0xb;if(_0xd27f1f===_0x2b8f80)break;else _0x541a8f['push'](_0x541a8f['shift']);}catch(_0x36655c){_0x541a8f['push'](_0x541a8f['shift']);}})}(_0x380d,_0xca009);const FLAG='FgUreh9sJv91wCs9a98YnG7VDuumwf96zBUnieQzY';function _0x380d(){const _0x1808c=['8035280MmQsQD','Invalid\x203WT','jihwaza','output','2VRCFLA','5yNKKV','getElementById','470644QWNUc','1696561etXjY','\x2cn\x5cnUser\x20access\x20only','parse','371538eQfXe','stringify','7110078NUeqCQ','78345525FlzFK','\x2cn\x5cnPayload\x2cn','18CFZZc0','textContent','2324598QVplFd','\x5cn\x5cnAdmin\x20access\x20granted!\x20flag:\x20','Invalid\x20token\x20Format','jwtToken'],_0x380d=function(){return _0x1808c};return _0x380d();}function parseJwt(_0x327c3a){const _0xd1485=_0x5314;try{const _0x546c4a=_0x327c3a['split'][0];if(_0x546c4a[_0x1d1485(0x120)]!=0x3)throw new Error(_0xd1485(0x120));const _0x181a51=JSON[_0xd1485(0x121)](atob(_0x546c4a[0x0])),_0xe4e403a=JSON['parse'](atob(_0x546c4a[0x1]));return{'header':_0x181a51,'payload':_0x4e403a};}catch(_0x58159a){throw new Error('0xd1485(0x12e)');}}function decodeToken(){const _0x54431c=_0x5314,_0xec70a=document[_0x54431c(0x11c)](_0x54431c(0x130)),_0x10ecc5=document[_0x54431c(0x11c)](_0x54431c(0x12c))['value']['trim'];try{const _header:_0x5a154f,_payload:_0x8ad96e=parseJwt(_0x10ecc5);let _0x1c0d7f=_header['header'].split'+3SON[_0x54431c(0x123)](_0x54431c(0x123))(_0x54431c(0x126)+3SON[_0x54431c(0x123)])_0x8ad96e,null,0x2);_0x8ad96e['role']=='admin'?_0x1c0d7f=_0x54431c(0x12a)+FLAG:_0x1c0d7f=_0x54431c(0x11f),_0x5ec70a[_0x54431c(0x128)]=_0x1c0d7f;}catch(_0xb0322){_0x5ec70a[_0x54431c(0x128)]=Error:_x20+'_0x2b0322['message']);}}
```

Ditemukan kode obfuscated, namun setelah diperhatikan, terdapat variabel:

```
const FLAG='FgUreh9sJv91wCs9a98YnG7VDuumwf96zBUnieQzY';
```

Ini menandakan bahwa flag-nya sudah hardcoded dalam script, hanya di-encode.

### 3. decode



Berdasarkan deskripsi challenge, disebutkan bahwa flag di-encode menggunakan metode yang sama seperti Bitcoin dan Solana. Saya menggunakan python3 lagi untuk mendapatkan hasil akhirnya, seperti:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ python3 -c "import base58; print(base58.b58decode('FgUreh9sJv91wCs9a98YnG7VDuumwf96zBUnieQzY').decode()")"
```

Dan flag nya yaitu:

**IDN\_CTF{jwt\_token\_manipulated}**

## Prototype Pollution Demo

Deskripsi:

Flagnya Di Encode Dengan Encoder yang sama dengan Bitcoin dan Solana

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran: [https://ctf.solusiber.com/web\\_101/lab3/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/web_101/lab3/)

Langkah yang dilakukan:

### 1. Analisis halaman web

Halaman menampilkan form input untuk memasukkan JSON data dengan label:

"Submit JSON data to update the app config (e.g. {"theme":"dark"})"

Terdapat tombol "Update Config" yang mengindikasikan bahwa data JSON akan dimasukkan ke dalam objek konfigurasi.

### 2. Inspect elemen

Analisis code nya

```
const _0x323d89=_0x47df;(function(_0x10a409,_0x292dfc){const _0x1839df=_0x47df,_0x4e904d=_0x10a409();while(!_1[]){try{const _0x36f012=_parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x83))/0x1*(parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x8b))/0x2)+parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x88))/0x3*(parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x96))/0x4)+parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x97))/0x5*(parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x89))/0x6)+parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x91))/0x7*(-parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x93))/0x8)+parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x90))/0x9*(parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x8f))/0xa)+parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x82))/0xb+parseInt(_0x1839df(_0x99))/0xc;if(_0x36f012==_0x292dfc)break;else _0x4e904d['push'](_0x4e904d['shift']);}catch(_0x5edbd2){_0x4e904d['push'](_0x4e904d['shift']);}})(_0xccce,0xb1890);const FLAG=_0x323d89(0x86);let appConfig={theme:_0x323d89(0x94),secure:_1[],admin:_1[]};function merge(_0x8f18ef,_0x51be34){const _0x4b608d=_0x323d89;for(let _0x4ff426 in _0x51be34){if(typeof _0x51be34[_0x4ff426]==_0x4b608d(0x84)&&_0x51be34[_0x4ff426]==null){if(_0x8f18ef[_0x4ff426])_0x8f18ef[_0x4ff426].merge(_0x8f18ef[_0x4ff426]);}else _0x8f18ef[_0x4ff426]=_0x51be34[_0x4ff426];}}function _0x47df(_0x206659,_0x26dc78){const _0xccce7d=_0xccce;return _0x47df=function(_0x47df86,_0xd69584){_0x47df86=_0x47df86-0x82;let _0x38ea1f=_0xccce7d[_0x47df86];return _0x38ea1f;},_0x47df(_0x206659,_0x26dc78);function _0xccce(){const _0x5ca91=[{"ZGW9mAgck8zohQPm4DeKSaKYAFRft9nPpb88Hj7nWrDtPcgyS","message","3EBrghy","6564dbe1Sw","output","38qFssj","Invalid:x2050NVx20or:x20error:\x20","No\x20admin\x20rights\x20detected.",'Config\x20updated:\x20','201Mj0Up','2616849eVvCvL','63QVALqm','value','949448h8giJA','light','admin','1513956VvDeo','480qNMqYS','getElementById','27831936JkNoun','textContent','904365shijsm','28411RqLoaZ','object','Admin\x20privilege\x20escalated!\x20flag\x20'];_0xccce=Function()(return _0x5ca91);return _0xccce();}function updateConfig(){const _0xa00427=_0x323d89,_0x3aac91=document['getElementById'](_0xa00427(_0x8a));try{const _0xfa0a0a1=JSON['parse'](_document._0xa00427(_0x98))['jsonInput'][_0xa00427(_0x92)];merge(appConfig,_0xfa0a0a1);let _0x3c731d=_0xa00427(_0x8d),_0x3aac91[_0xa00427(_0x9a)]=_0x3c731d;}catch(_0x5cdb2){_0x3aac91['textContent']=_0xa00427(_0x8c)+_0x5cdb2[_0xa00427(_0x87)];}}
```

ditemukan kode JavaScript dengan nama variabel dan fungsi yang di-obfuscate. Namun, terdapat bagian penting seperti:

```
["ZGW9mAgck8zohQPm4DeKSaKYAFRft9nPpb88Hj7nWrDtPcgyS",
```

Dan kemungkinan code acak tersebut adalah flag yang di encode



### 3. Decode flag

Berdasarkan deskripsi challenge, disebutkan bahwa flag di-encode menggunakan metode yang sama dengan Bitcoin dan Solana. Berarti kita menggunakan python3 lagi untuk mendecodenya.

```
[kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]$ python3 -c "import base58; print(base58.b58decode('ZGW9mAgck8zohQPm4DeKSaKYAFRft9nPpb88Hj7nWrDtPcgys').decode())"
```

Dan untuk flag finalnya yaitu:

**IDN\_CTF{prototype\_pollution\_success}**

**Unsafe eval()**

Deskripsi:

Flagnya Di Encode Dengan Encoder yang sama dengan bitcoin dan solana

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran: [https://ctf.solusiber.com/web\\_101/lab2/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/web_101/lab2/)

Langkah yang dilakukan:

1. Analisis halaman web

The screenshot shows a web-based challenge interface. At the top, it says 'Lab 2: Unsafe eval()'. Below that, there's a text input field with the placeholder 'Enter some JavaScript code to evaluate:' and 'Enter JS code' inside. Below the input field is a blue 'Run' button. Below the button is a large, empty rectangular area where the results of the code execution would be displayed.

Tampilan web memperlihatkan:

- Sebuah textbox dengan placeholder: Enter JS code
- Tombol Run
- Fungsi JavaScript runCode() akan mengeksekusi isi input menggunakan eval().
- Ini indikasi klasik dari unsafe eval(), yang biasanya rawan disalahgunakan.



## 2. Inspect element

```
(function(_0x384b11,_0x47f0a0){const _0x3e68ed=_0x27e6,_0x4f8372=_0x384b11();while(!!![]){try{const _0x5460fa=-parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x17f))/0x1*(parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x17d))/0x2)+-parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x172))/0x3+parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x181))/0x4+-parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x178))/0x5+parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x17c))/0x6*(parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x182))/0x7)+parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x17a))/0x8+-parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x177))/0x9*(-parseInt(_0x3e68ed(0x17e))/0xa);if(_0x5460fa===-_0x47f0a0){break;}else{_0x4f8372['push'](_0x4f8372['shift']());}catch(_0x34f187){_0x4f8372['push'](_0x4f8372['shift']());}}}_0x5d37,_0x8542f));const FLAG='8K1iQbpVVMPdiYxaREW9wJvvCmBnKZnNn9VguPSy71veTjEc';function runCode(){const _0x9c922c=_0x27e6,_0x3b2dce=document['getElementById'](_0x9c922c(0x173))[_0x9c922c(0x180)],_0x3fd49c=document[_0x9c922c(0x176)]._0x9c922c(0x17b));try{let _0x3bc687=eval(_0x3b2dce);_0x3fd49c[_0x9c922c(0x179)]=_0x9c922c(0x175)+_0x3bc687;}catch(_0x1c7c4e){_0x3fd49c[_0x9c922c(0x179)]=`Error: \x20'+_0x1c7c4e[_0x9c922c(0x174)];}}function _0x27e6(_0xb1b2e9,_0x5a07e4){const _0x5d375b=_0x5d37();return _0x27e6=function(_0x27e64e,_0x304cc6){_0x27e64e=_0x27e64e-0x172;let _0x36499e=_0x5d375b[_0x27e64e];return _0x36499e;},_0x27e6(_0xb1b2e9,_0x5a07e4);}}function _0x5d37(){const _0x54d05f=['244639dPbyev','value','4199984KeIDRc','78191dczIc','320151668rQP1','codeInput','message','Result':\x20+', getElementById,'998CUkHq','2102405ftaDVA','textContent','6096936Nvswga','output','1686RdUkwj','2zQBSXH','138310CH5nND'];_0x5d37=function(){return _0x54d05f;};return _0x5d37();}}
```

Ditemukan baris penting yang besar kemungkinan adalah flagnya , yaitu

```
FLAG='8K1iQbpVVMPdiYxaREW9wJvvCmBnKZnNn9VguPSy71veTjEc';function runCode()
```

## 3. Decode flag

Berdasarkan deskripsi bahwa encoding-nya sama dengan Bitcoin dan Solana.jadi kita menggunakan python3 lagi

```
[kali㉿kali]-[~/Downloads]
$ python3 -c "import base58; print(base58.b58decode('8K1iQbpVVMPdiYxaREW9wJvvCmBnKZnNn9VguPSy71veTjEc').decode())"
```

Dan flag finalnya yaitu:

**IDN\_CTF{you\_used\_eval\_successfully}**

## DOM-Based XSS

Deskripsi:

Flagnya Di Encode Dengan Encoder yang sama dengan bitcoin dan solana

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran: [https://ctf.solusiber.com/web\\_101/lab1/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/web_101/lab1/)

## Client-Side Privilege Escalation

Deskripsi :

Website

Flagnya Di Encode Dengan Encoder yang sama dengan bitcoin dan solana



\*\*Author: Rafly Permana \*\*

Lampiran : [https://ctf.solusiber.com/web\\_101/lab5/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/web_101/lab5/)

Key	Value
broadcast	{"id":0.7264734879029314,"type": "broadcast"}
unread_notifications	0
user_role	admin

## Encoder Decoder

Base64

Base32

Base58

URL

HTML

IDN\_FLAG{client\_side\_privilege\_escalation}

Encode

Decode



The tool uses UTF-8 charset.

Solusi :

Mengubah User Role lalu melakukan decode

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{client\_side\_privilege\_escalation}



## Web Exploit

# Code Analysis

Deskripsi:

Tanjiro terus berlatih tanpa henti untuk menguasai Hinokami Kagura demi mengalahkan iblis Bulan Atas. Bantu dia membuka kekuatan sejatinya dengan menganalisis kode yang diberikan. Kunci untuk tingkat kekuatan berikutnya terletak pada pemahaman alur kerjanya kode.

Lampiran: [https://ctf.solusiber.com/tanjiro\\_code/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/tanjiro_code/)

```
$input = $_GET["secret"] ?? "";
$clean_input = strtolower(str_replace(" ", "", $input));
$result = preg_replace("/".preg_quote($keyword, '/')."/", "", $clean_input, 1);

if ($result === "tanjiro") {
    echo $flag;
}
```

Langkah yang dilakukan:

Tools : VsCode

### 1.Analisis:

- Input dibersihkan: lowercase dan hapus semua spasi.
- Fungsi preg\_replace() hanya menghapus 1 kali keyword dari string.
- Flag hanya akan keluar jika \$result === "tanjiro" setelah 1 kali hapus.

### 2.Identifikasi Masalah:

Supaya \$result bisa menjadi tanjiro, kita harus memastikan setelah penghapusan keyword pertama, sisa string tetap tanjiro.

Dengan clue yang ada dan hasil praktis yang ditemukan (tanjirotanjiro berhasil), kita asumsikan bahwa '\$keyword' = "tanjiro".

Jadi , Payload yang dipakai:

?secret=tanjirotanjiro

### Proses:

- 1.Input tanjirotanjiro dimasukkan.



2. Setelah dibersihkan jadi:

Tanjirotanjiro -> (lowercase + hapus spasi tetap tanjirotanjiro).

3. Jalankan preg\_replace() satu kali:

preg\_replace('/tanjiro/', '', 'tanjirotanjiro', 1) -> hasilnya: tanjiro.

Karena hasil akhirnya tanjiro, flag keluar.

Flagnya:


**IDN\_CTF(d0ub!e\_t4njiro\_m4ke\_u\_H4ppy?)**

## Circle Clicker

Deskripsi:

- Click Sampai 1000 kali!

Lampiran: [https://ctf.solusiber.com/circle\\_clicker/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/circle_clicker/)



**Langkah yang dilakukan:**

Tools : VsCode ,python3

### 1. Menganalisis code ‘javascript’ yang ada di dalam inspect elemen

Dalam code ini , ada beberapa hal yang menarik ya.



```
const _0x29d5cb=_0x4910;(function(_0x506ef4,_0xac128){const _0x26b33e=_0x4910,_0x35c114=_0x506ef4();while(![]){try{const _0x36e50e=parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x16c))/0x1+parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x171))/0x2+-parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x16b))/0x3)+parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x170))/0x4*(-parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x182))/0x5)+-parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x189))/0x6+-parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x179))/0x7+-parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x18a))/0x8+-parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x17f))/0x9*(-parseInt(_0x26b33e(0x16d))/0xa);if(_0x36e50e==_0xac128)break;else{_0x35c114['push'](_0x35c114['shift']());}}}_0x2650,0xlabbf);function _0x4910(_0x5bf19c,_0xb1b4f1){const _0x26509d=_0x2650;return _0x4910=function(_0x491010,_0x4fec78){_0x491010=_0x491010-0x164;let _0x4cad16=_0x26509d[_0x491010];return _0x4cad16};_0x4910=_0x5bf19c,_0xb1b4f1});function _0x2650(){const _0x4425db=['1258754FpkIMF', 'Petunjuk: \x20coba\x20ketik\x20revealSecret()\x20di\x20console', 'addEventlistener', 'floor', '%Untuk\x20bagian\x20kedua', '\x20coba\x20berfikir\x20sambil\x20bermain\x20click!', 'color:\x20purple;', '35658ZKovph', '%Bagian\x20pertama\x20flag:\x205WJoJxz5CCVWDSE', 'clientWidth', '585yFtq', 'log', 'textContent', 'click', 'Warna\x20berubah!', 'green', 'background', '99648UXPhAp', 'color:\x20green;\x20font-size:\x2014px;', 'translate()', 'color:\x20green;\x20font-size:\x2016px;', 'querySelector', 'color:\x20red;\x20font-size:\x2016px;\x20font-weight:\x20bold;', '%Flag\x20lengkap', '224240MFCRQU', 'color:\x20blue;\x20font-size:\x2014px;', 'fontWeight', '19218AxtNky', '148212VIBNNA', '1380kAmwU', 'game-container', 'style', '598428OnQWfe', '66whiAa', 'Selamat! \x20datang\x20di\x20circle\x20Clicker!\x20game\x20sederhana\x20atau...?', 'clientHeight', 'bold', 'linear-gradient(145deg,\x20gold,\x20orange)', 'target', 'random', 'linear-gradient(145deg,\x20ff7eb9,\x20#ff65a3)';_0x2650=function(){getScore=_0x4250();let score=0x0,clickCount=0x0,secretUnlocked=![];const target=document[_0x29d5cb(0x167)](_0x29d5cb(0x176)),scoreDisplay=document[_0x29d5cb(0x167)]('score'),messageEl=document[_0x29d5cb(0x167)]('message');target[_0x29d5cb(0x170)](_0x29d5cb(0x185),function(){const _0x123bed=_0x29d5cb;score++,clickCount++,scoreDisplay[_0x123bed(0x184)]=score;const _0x89a8a2=document[_0x123bed(0x186)](_0x1a605e-_0x89a8a2[_0x123bed(0x181)]-0x78,_0x3575a3-_0x89a8a2[_0x123bed(0x173)])-0x96,_0xa7d77c=Math['floor'](_Math[_0x123bed(0x177)]())-_0x1a685e,_0x298643=Math[_0x123bed(0x17c)](_Math[_0x123bed(0x177)])*_0x3575a3;target[_0x123bed(0x16f)][_0x123bed(0x183)]['transform']=_0x123bed(0x18c)+_0xa7d77c+'px',_0x20'+_0x298643+'px',clickCount==0x5&&!secretUnlocked&&console[_0x123bed(0x183)]('Atau\x20hanya\x20permainan\x20lik\x20biasa?'),clickCount==0x8&&!secretUnlocked&&console[_0x123bed(0x183)](_0x123bed(0x17a)),score==0x1488(target[_0x123bed(0x16f)]-_0x123bed(0x188))=_0x123bed(0x178),messageEl[_0x123bed(0x184)]=_0x123bed(0x186),setTimeout(()=>messageEl[_0x123bed(0x184)]=''),_0xd0));});function revealSecret(){const _0x1a2725=_0x29d5cb;secretUnlocked=![],console[_0x1a2725(0x18d)],console[_0x1a2725(0x181)](_0x1a2725(0x180),_0x1a2725(0x168)),console['log'](_0x1a2725(0x17d),_0x1a2725(0x17e));setInterval(function(){const _0x1faaeef=_0x29d5cb;score=0x3e8&&!secretUnlocked&&console['log']('Luar\x20biasa!\x20Kamu\x20mendapatkan\x20bagian\x20kedua\x20flag:\x20master'),_0x1faaeef(0x18b),console['log'](_0x1faaeef(0x165),_0x1faaeef(0x164)),secretUnlocked!=[],target[_0x1faaeef(0x16f)][_0x1faaeef(0x188)]=_0x1faaeef(0x175),messageEl[_0x1faaeef(0x184)]=_0x1faaeef(0x166),messageEl['style'][_0x1faaeef(0x169)]=_0x1faaeef(0x187),messageEl['style'][_0x1faaeef(0x16a)]=_0x1faaeef(0x174),_0x3e8),console[_0x123bed(0x172)];});}
```

Kode ini menunjukkan ada clue di console setelah jumlah klik tertentu, yaitu:

```
clickCount === 0x5 && !secretUnlocked && console.log('Hmm, ini hanya permainan klik biasa?');
clickCount === 0xa && !secretUnlocked && console.log('Atau mungkin ada sesuatu yang tersembunyi... 🤔');
clickCount === 0xf && !secretUnlocked && console.log('Petunjuk: coba ketik revealSecret() di console');
```

Nah di bagian ketiga ada petunjuk ‘ketik revealSecret()’ di console. Setelah kita mengklik ‘revealSecret’ akan muncul seperti ini:

```
revealSecret()
Selamat! Kamu menemukan fungsi rahasia!
Bagan pertama flag: 5WJoJxz5CCVWDSE
untuk bagian kedua, coba berfikir simbol bernam click!
```

Dari gambar tersebut kita menemukan flag pertama yaitu:

**5WJoJxz5CCVWDSE---**

Setelah itu kami menemukan flag keduanya di code javascript:

```
]('%cLuar\x20biasa!\x20Kamu\x20mendapatkan\x20bagian\x20kedua\x20flag:\x20master}',_0x1faaeef(0x18b)),
```

Flag kedua:

**Master**

Setelah semua flag terkumpul , mari kita gabungkan dari flag pertama dan kedua:

**5WJoJxz5CCVWDSEmaster**

Ini belum selesai, karena deskripsi menyebutkan bahwaa "Di Encode Dengan Encoder yang sama dengan bitcoin dan solana", maka saya menggunakan python3 untuk mendecode nya.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ python3 -c "import base58; print(base58.b58decode('5WJoJxz5CCVWDSEpH4E1n77BT5Fec')).decode()"
```



Dan flag final nya yaitu:

**IDN\_CTF{click\_master}**

## ID-Networkers

Deskripsi :

Sebuah situs publik baru saja diluncurkan ID-Networkers. Tampilannya sederhana dan tidak mencurigakan—hanya halaman beranda dengan ucapan “Selamat Datang di ID-Networkers” dan beberapa tambahan lainnya.

Namun, informasi mengatakan bahwa developer situs ini terlalu percaya pada "aturan" yang ditulis untuk mesin pencari. Mereka menyembunyikan direktori rahasia dengan harapan crawler tidak akan melihatnya...

Tapi kamu bukan crawler, kamu seorang penyusup yang teliti.

Website

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran : [https://ctf.solusiber.com/robots\\_dashboard/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/robots_dashboard/)

The image shows two screenshots of a web browser. Both screenshots display the URL [https://ctf.solusiber.com/robots\\_dashboard/robots.txt](https://ctf.solusiber.com/robots_dashboard/robots.txt).  
Screenshot 1 (Top): The page content is:  
`User-agent: *  
Disallow: /asdsa024nsfd01372021.html`  
Screenshot 2 (Bottom): The page content is:  
`User-agent: *  
Disallow: /asdsa024nsfd01372021.html`

**IDN\_CTF{@W\*\_FOuN&\_th@\_#|\*\*\$N\_F|@&}**

Solusi :

Membaca robots.txt lalu mengikuti path yang ada

Flag : IDN\_CTF{@W\*\_FOuN&\_th@\_#|\*\*\$N\_F|@&}



## Konoha Breach

Deskripsi :

Desa Konoha baru saja meluncurkan sistem data tabel internal untuk para ninja tingkat tinggi. Sistem ini hanya bisa diakses setelah login dengan kredensial resmi admin.

Namun, rumor menyebutkan bahwa sistem ini dibangun tergesa-gesa oleh seorang Chuunin yang baru belajar PHP. Konon, ada celah klasik yang memungkinkan siapa pun melewati sistem login dan mengakses dashboard rahasia tanpa kredensial!

Bocoran pertama yang muncul berisi daftar shinobi aktif dan lokasi markas Anbu. Keamanan Konoha kini dalam bahaya...

Bisakah kamu menyusup ke sistem tanpa login dan menemukan yang tersembunyi?

Website

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran : [https://ctf.solusiber.com/login\\_bypass/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/login_bypass/)

The screenshot shows a two-column interface. On the left, there's a 'Login' form with fields for 'Email' (containing '123'OR'1=1') and 'Password' (containing '\*\*\*\*\*'), and a blue 'Login' button. On the right, there's a table titled 'Daftar Data PII' (PII Data Register) with columns: Nama Lengkap, Email, No. Telepon, NIK, and Alamat. The table lists 15 entries of shinobi data, such as Naruto Uzumaki, Sasuke Uchiba, Sakura Haruno, Kakashi Hatake, Hinata Hyuga, Shikamaru Nara, Ino Yamanaka, Choji Akimichi, Rock Lee, Tenten, Neji Hyuga, Might Guy, and Tsunade Senju. Below the table, a black bar displays the flag: <!-- IDN\_CTF{c0NRats\_you\_goin\_tohe\_insideee} -->

Solusi :

SQL Injection

Flag : IDN\_CTF{c0NRats\_you\_goin\_tohe\_insideee}

## Support Force

Deskripsi :

Ini klub eksklusif buat agen rahasia. Brower biasa? Maaf, Anda tidak terdaftar. Tapi kalau kamu bisa pura-pura jadi "Agent hackme", pintu rahasia mungkin bakal terbuka buatmu.



Website

Author : Rafly Permana

Lampiran : [https://ctf.solusiber.com/support\\_force/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/support_force/)

The screenshot shows the NetworkMiner interface with the 'Network conditions' tab selected. Under 'User agent', the 'Custom...' dropdown is set to 'hackme'. To the right, a browser window displays a challenge titled 'Access Filtering' with the flag 'IDN\_CTF{r7x9\_uaSwitch\_delta44}' and a hint: 'Hint: Check your browser headers. Something isn't quite right...'. The browser's developer tools Network tab is also visible.

Solusi :

Menangani User Agent

Flag : IDN\_CTF{r7x9\_uaSwitch\_delta44}

## IDN Education

Deskripsi :

Siapa sangka file-file tersembunyi di balik input sederhana? Coba kamu buka celahnya, biar file yang terpendam itu bisa keluar. Siapa tahu ada kejutan!

Website

Author : Rafly Permana

Lampiran : [https://ctf.solusiber.com/idn\\_edu/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/idn_edu/)



The screenshot shows a browser window with the URL [https://ctf.solusiber.com/idn\\_edu/?page=../../var/www/html/flag.txt](https://ctf.solusiber.com/idn_edu/?page=../../var/www/html/flag.txt). The page content is mostly obscured by a large black redaction box, but a small white box in the bottom right corner contains the flag: IDN\_CTF{l@tisec\_r29-loadr}

Solusi :

Menemukan flag dengan payload ../../var/www/html/flag.txt

Flag : IDN\_CTF{l@tisec\_r29-loadr}

## Beyond Way

Deskripsi :

Mungkin kamu nggak pernah diajari buat berjalan keluar dari jalan yang benar... tapi kalau kamu bisa, kamu bakal dapetin sesuatu yang terlarang. Ayo jalanin manipulasi path-nya! 🚶‍♂️ ➡️

Website

Author : Rafly Permana

Lampiran : [https://ctf.solusiber.com/search\\_free/](https://ctf.solusiber.com/search_free/)



Red Mist Technologies  
company security

About Contact

IDN\_CTF{tvec-resolver\_41}

Red Mist Technologies - Leading the Charge in Innovation & Security

Solusi :

Mencari file flag.txt

Flag : IDN\_CTF{tvec-resolver\_41}

Other

## User Guide

Deskripsi:

FLAG

Lampiran : User Guide CTFd IDN Cyber Security.pdf

Solusi: diakhir lampiran ada flagnya , cuman disamarkan dengan warna putih

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{makasih\_sudah\_baca\_guide}

Log Analysis

## Log Analysis 1

Deskripsi :

pada file pcap dibawah, hacker mencoba untuk melakukan sesuatu yang berhubungan dengan recon



pada service, silahkan cari...

Format Flag : IDN\_CTF{jawaban}

Author : Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : incident\_response\_.pcapng

The Wireshark interface shows a capture file named "incident\_response\_.pcapng". A green status bar at the top indicates a search filter: "frame contains \"IDN\_CTF\" or frame contains \"IDN\_FLAG\"". Below this, a table lists two captured frames:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
99255	52.665309	192.168.10.244	192.168.10.153	HTTP	567 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
99256	52.665313	192.168.10.244	192.168.10.153	TCP	567 [TCP Retransmission] 80 → 46542

A detailed view of the selected HTTP request (Frame 99255) is shown in the bottom pane. The request is a GET to the root URL. The response body is displayed as follows:

```
> Frame 99255: 567 bytes on wire (4536 bits), 567 bytes captured (4536 bits) on interface
> Ethernet II, Src: Intel_8a:b2:72 (28:7f:cf:8a:b2:72), Dst: Intel_8a:b2:72 (28:7f:cf:8a:b2:72)
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.10.244, Dst: 192.168.10.153
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 80, Dst Port: 46542, Seq: 1, Ack: 93, Len: 567
> Hypertext Transfer Protocol
-> Line-based text data: text/html (11 lines)
    <!DOCTYPE html>\r\n    <html lang="en">\r\n        <t><head>\r\n            <t><meta charset="UTF-8" />\r\n            <t><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />\r\n        </t></head>\r\n        <t><body>\r\n            <t><p>IDN_CTF{Re30N3C}</p>\r\n        </t></body>\r\n    </html>\r\n
```

Solusi :

Melakukan filter kata

Flag : IDN\_CTF{Re30N3C}

## Log Analysis 2

Deskripsi :

awas, hati-hati, pelan-pelan, ada .....



Format Flag : IDN\_CTF{jawaban}

Author : Aditya Firman Nugroho

## Lampiran : incident\_response\_2.pcapng

Solusi :

Melakukan filter kata

Flag : IDN\_CTF{M4lWre\_S3ReM}

# Log Analysis 3

## Deskripsi :



analisis log acces.log ini, file ip yang dimasukan pada system ?

Format Flag : IDN\_CTF{jawaban}

Author : Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : access.log

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /charge HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /charges HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /chart HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /charts HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /chat HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /chats HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /check HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /checking HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /checkout HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:29 +0000] "GET /checkout_iclear HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:31 +0000] "POST /upload/malware.py HTTP/1.1" 200 4313 "-" "curl/8.12.1"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /randomfile1 HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /frand2 HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.bash_history HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.bashrc HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.cache HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.config HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.cvs HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.cvignore HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.forward HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.git/HEAD HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

```
192.168.18.6 - - [27/Apr/2025:12:55:33 +0000] "GET /.history HTTP/1.1" 404 436 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4453.125 Safari/537.36"
```

Solusi :

POST merupakan suatu perintah untuk mengirim file, oleh karena itu mencari keyword POST

Flag : IDN\_CTF{malware.py}

## Log Analysis 4

Deskripsi :

analisis log auth.log, user apa yang sukses masuk ke dalam system ?

Format Flag : IDN\_CTF{user}

Author : Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : auth.log

```
Apr 27 13:05:10 test sshd[19014]: Accepted password for ghxyss from 192.168.18.6 port 52320 ssh2
Apr 27 13:05:10 test sshd[19014]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user ghxyss(uid=1000) by (uid=0)
Apr 27 13:05:10 test systemd-logind[872]: New session 4 of user ghxyss.
```

Solusi :

Mencari kata kunci yang menandakan user berhasil login



Flag : IDN\_CTF{ghxyss}

## Log Analysis 5

Deskripsi :

"dengan service ... file ... di dalam server " - administrator

Format Flag : IDN\_CTF{service:file}

Author : Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : log\_analysis\_5.pcapng

ftp						
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
17099	75.042842	192.168.18.230	192.168.18.17	FTP	60	Request: PASV
17101	75.043896	192.168.18.17	192.168.18.230	FTP	105	Response: 227 Entering
17103	75.044211	192.168.18.230	192.168.18.17	FTP	68	Request: STOR malware
17113	75.045625	192.168.18.17	192.168.18.230	FTP	76	Response: 150 Ok to se
17119	75.046935	192.168.18.17	192.168.18.230	FTP	78	Response: 226 Transfer

Solusi :

Melakukan filtering pada protocol dan menemukan request pada file malware

Flag : IDN\_CTF{ftp:malware}

## Log Analysis 6

Deskripsi :

Seseorang mencoba mengeksplorasi endpoint dengan teknik SQL Injection, menghasilkan internal server error. Apa nama file yang ditargetkan dalam eksplorasi tersebut?

IDN\_CTF{jawaban}

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran : log1.txt

```
198.51.100.23 - - [21/Apr/2024:08:19:45 +0700] "GET /ring.php?id=1 UNION SELECT password FROM users HTTP/1.1" 500 1234 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"
```

Solusi :

Menemukan log yang berisi meminta akses kepada file ring.php



Flag : IDN\_CTF{ring.php}

## Log Analysis 8

Deskripsi :

Pada tanggal 22 April, salah satu user berhasil mendapatkan akses root melalui SSH. Berdasarkan log, berikan IP address asli dari user tersebut.

IDN\_CTF{jawaban}

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran : log3.txt

```
Apr 22 12:01:40 server1 sshd[2347]: Accepted password for user1 from 198.51.100.23 port 51432 ssh2
Apr 22 12:01:42 server1 sshd[2347]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user user1 by (uid=0)
Apr 22 12:02:01 server1 sudo:      user1 : TTY=pts/1 ; PWD=/home/user1 ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/cat /etc/passwd
Apr 22 12:02:05 server1 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by user1(uid=0)
Apr 22 12:02:07 server1 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
Apr 22 12:02:10 server1 kernel: [UFW BLOCK] IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=00:0c:29:68:22:db:00:50:56:c0:00:01:08:00 SRC=192.0
URGP=0
```

Solusi :

Mencari keyword yang mengindikasikan login

Flag : IDN\_CTF{192.51.100.23}

## Log Analysis 9

Deskripsi :

Pengguna manakah yang berhasil mendapatkan akses root, mencoba membaca file shadow menggunakan curl, namun ditolak oleh AppArmor? Sebutkan IP-nya dan hash publik RSA yang digunakan saat login.

pisahkan jawaban dengan koma (,) Contoh: user,10.10.10.9,BASE64:Jinasidn023nnandd

IDN\_CTF{jawaban}

Author: Rafly Permana

Lampiran : log4.txt

```
2024-04-23T14:05:12Z server1 sshd[1523]: Accepted publickey for alice from 192.168.0.5 port 58922 ssh2: RSA SHA256:AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUVwXyZ1234567890
2024-04-23T14:05:15Z server1 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by alice(uid=0)
2024-04-23T14:06:01Z server1 kernel: [12345.67890] audit: type=1400 audit(1682251561.123:45): apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" profile="/usr/bin/curl" name="/etc/shadow" pid=1567 comm="curl" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=1001 ouid=0
2024-04-23T14:06:03Z server1 curl[1567]: curl: (13) Permission denied reading key from file /etc/shadow
2024-04-23T14:07:12Z server1 sshd[1579]: Failed password for invalid user guest from 203.0.113.77 port 43122 ssh2
2024-04-23T14:07:14Z server1 sshd[1579]: Received disconnect from 203.0.113.77 port 43122:11: Bye Bye [preauth]
2024-04-23T14:07:15Z server1 sshd[1581]: Failed password for root from 203.0.113.77 port 43123 ssh2
2024-04-23T14:07:18Z server1 sshd[1581]: Failed password for root from 203.0.113.77 port 43124 ssh2
2024-04-23T14:07:20Z server1 sshd[1581]: Connection closed by 203.0.113.77 port 43125 [preauth]
```



Solusi :

Menemukan bahwa user alice membuka session root dan melakukan curl pada /etc/shadow namun akses ditolak

Flag : IDN\_CTF{alice,192.168.0.5, BASE64:AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUvWxYz1234567890}

## Browser Forensic

Tools : DB Browser SQLite

### Browser Forensic 1

Deskripsi :

Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!

Tools apa yang di cari oleh user ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal}

Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip

[github.com/ParrotSec/mimikatz](https://github.com/ParrotSec/mimikatz)

Solusi :

Melihat user mengunjungi repositori github pada file History

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{mimikatz}

### Browser Forensic 2

Deskripsi :

Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!

(Filanya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

Website apa yang dicari oleh user berkaitan dengan Teknik Persistence, Privilage Escalation, DLL Injection etc ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal}



Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip

	normalized_url	url_for_display
3	https://www.netflix.com/id-en/	netflix.com/id-en/
4	https://www.google.com/search?...	google.com/search?...
5	https://www.fimela.com/relationship...	fimela.com/relationship/re...
6	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid...	muslima.com/en/lp/paid-sea...
7	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid...	muslima.com/en/lp/paid-sea...
8	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid...	muslima.com/en/lp/paid-sea...
9	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid...	muslima.com/en/lp/paid-sea...
10	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid...	muslima.com/en/lp/paid-sea...
11	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid...	muslima.com/en/lp/paid-sea...
12	https://www.cermati.com/artikel/...	cermati.com/artikel/cara-ar...
13	https://www.cnnindonesia.com/gaya-...	cnnindonesia.com/gaya-hidup...
14	https://www.google.com/search?...	google.com/search?...
15	https://chromewebstore.google.com/...	chromewebstore.google.com/...
16	https://www.google.com/search?...	google.com/search?...
17	https://lolbas-project.github.io/	lolbas-project.github.io
18	https://www.google.com/search?...	google.com/search?...

Solusi :

Melihat user mengunjungi repositori github pada file History

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{https://lolbas-project.github.io/}

## Browser Forensic 3

Deskripsi :

Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!

(Filennya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

Streaming Website yang ditonton oleh user ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal}



Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip

parent_score	url_for_deduping	normalized_u
3	https://netflix.com/	https://www.netflix.com/
4	https://www.google.com/search?...	https://www.google.com
5	https://fimela.com/	https://www.fimela.com
6	https://muslima.com/	https://www.muslima.cc
7	https://muslima.com/	https://www.muslima.cc
8	https://muslima.com/	https://www.muslima.cc
9	https://muslima.com/	https://www.muslima.cc
10	https://muslima.com/	https://www.muslima.cc
11	https://muslima.com/	https://www.muslima.cc
12	https://cermati.com/	https://www.cermati.cc
13	https://cnnindonesia.com/	https://www.cnnindonesia.com/
14	https://www.google.com/search?...	https://www.google.com
15	chromewebstore.google.com/	https://chromewebstore.google.com/
16	https://www.google.com/search?...	https://www.google.com
17	https://lolbas-project.github.io/	https://lolbas-project.github.io/
18	https://www.google.com/search?...	https://www.google.com

Solusi :

Melihat user mengunjungi web streaming pada file History

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{https://netflix.com/}

## Browser Forensic 4

Deskripsi :

Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!

(Filennya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

Vpn apa saja yang diinstall oleh user ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{VPN\_1-VPN\_2} example : IDN\_FLAG{IPSEC\_SECURITY-L2TP\_SECURITY}

Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho



Lampiran : browser.zip

	<u>id</u>	url	title
1	1	https://www.google.com/search?...	vpn browswer - Google Search
2	2	https://chromewebstore.google.com/...	Browsec VPN - Free VPN for Chrome -...
3	3	https://accounts.google.com/...	Browsec VPN - Free VPN for Chrome -...
4	4	https://chromewebstore.google.com/...	Browsec VPN - Free VPN for Chrome -...
5	5	https://chromewebstore.google.com/...	Browsec VPN - Free VPN for Chrome -...
6	6	https://www.google.com/search?...	netflix - Google Search
7	7	https://www.netflix.com/	Netflix Indonesia - Watch TV Shows ...
8	8	https://www.netflix.com/id-en/	Netflix Indonesia - Watch TV Shows ...
9	9	https://www.google.com/search?...	bagaimana mencari pasangan - Google...
10	10	https://www.fimela.com/relationship...	7 Cara Menemukan Pasangan Hidup yan...
11	11	https://www.googleadservices.com/...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
12	12	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid-...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
13	13	https://sso-terra.clickocean.io/?...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
14	14	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid-...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
15	15	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid-...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
16	16	https://www.googleadservices.com/...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
17	17	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid-...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
18	18	https://sso-terra.clickocean.io/?...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
19	19	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid-...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
20	20	https://www.muslima.com/en/lp/paid-...	Muslim Matrimonials at Muslima.com
21	21	https://www.cermati.com/artikel/...	Cara Ampuh Temukan Pasangan bagi ...
22	22	https://www.google.com/search?...	extension vpn - Google Search
23	23	https://chromewebstore.google.com/...	Free VPN for Chrome - VPN Proxy ...

Solusi :

Melihat user melakukan pencarian tools VPN pada file History

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{BROWSEC\_VPN-VPN\_PROXY\_VEEPN}



## Browser Forensic 5

Deskripsi :

Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!

(Filanya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

Visit Duration di Website yang berkaitan dengan Persistence, Privilage Escalation, DLL Injection ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal} example : XX:XX:XX.XXX

Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip

```
visit time : 13390724280712417
visit duration : 32509459
last visit time : 13390724280712417
duration since last visit : -1000000
```

Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!

(Filanya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

Visit Duration di Website yang berkaitan dengan Persistence, Privilage Escalation, DLL Injection ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal} example : XX:XX:XX.XXX

□ ↻ < 4 / 4 >

Solusi :

Mencari data yang diperlukan seperti berikut pada SQLite, lalu melakukan konversi waktu

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{00:00:32.509}

## Browser Forensic 6

Deskripsi :



Ada Violation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!  
(Filanya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

Email yang digunakan pada browser ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal}

Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip

name	value	value_lower	date_created	date_last_used	count
1 identifier	ghxyssforunfun@gmail.com	ghxyssforunfun@gmail.com	1746250363	1746250363	1

Solusi :

Menemukan email pada file Web Data menggunakan SQLite

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{ghxyssforunfun@gmail.com}

## Browser Forensic 7

Deskripsi :

Ada Violation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!

(Filanya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

date\_created pada email menggunakan tools DB Browser SQLite ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal}

Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip



	<u>name</u>	<u>value</u>	<u>value_lower</u>	<u>date_created</u>	<u>date_last_used</u>	count
Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter
1	identifier	ghxyssforunfun@gmail.com	ghxyssforunfun@gmail.com	1746250363	1746250363	1

Solusi :

Menemukan email beserta tanggal pembuatan pada file Web Data menggunakan SQLite

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{1746250363}

## Browser Forensic 8

Deskripsi :

Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!

(Filennya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

url favicon, di website yang dicari oleh user ? ( tidak berkaitan dengan hacker !!! )

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal}

Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip



DB Browser for SQLite - C:\Users\Farrel Aditya\OneDrive\Documents\SMKN 1

	<u>id</u>	<u>url</u>	<u>icon_type</u>
1	1	<a href="https://ssl.gstatic.com/chrome/">https://ssl.gstatic.com/chrome/...</a>	1
2	2	<a href="https://assets.nflxext.com/us/ffe/">https://assets.nflxext.com/us/ffe/...</a>	1
3	3	<a href="https://www.muslima.com/lp/paid-search/terra-assets/images/favicon-8b7d9ccfa1-3.ico">https://www.muslima.com/lp/paid-...</a>	1
4	4	<a href="https://github.githubassets.com/">https://github.githubassets.com/...</a>	1
5	5	<a href="https://www.google.com/favicon.ico">https://www.google.com/favicon.ico</a>	1
6	6	<a href="https://lolbas-project.github.io/">https://lolbas-project.github.io/...</a>	1

Solusi :

Menemukan data berisi situs favicon yang dikunjungi pada file Favicons

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{ <https://www.muslima.com/lp/paid-search/terra-assets/images/favicon-8b7d9ccfa1-3.ico>}

## Browser Forensic 9

Deskripsi :

Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!


(Filennya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

extension id dengan icon salah satu vpn yang diinstal V.. !

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal}

Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip



Solusi :

Mencoba ID Extensions yang ada

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{majdfhpaihoncoakbjgbdhglocklcgno}

## Browser Forensic 10

Deskripsi :


Ada Volation yang dilakukan oleh user di satu laptop, coba bantu forensic browsernya dong !!  
(Filennya ada di pertanyaan pertama)

Version vpn V.. yang diinstal oleh user ?

format flag : IDN\_FLAG{Jawaban yang disoal}

Auhtor: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran : browser.zip



Solusi :

Memasukan versi ekstensi yang sebelumnya

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{3.4.3\_0}

Usb Forensic

Cryptography

jadi gini lgi...

Deskripsi:

mau coba-coba aja terus, coba maen dino

Author: Aditya Firman Nugroho

Lampiran: jhlzhy.zip

Tools: Stegseek

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ stegseek jhlzhy.jpg /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```



Ouputnya :

```
StegSeek 0.6 - https://github.com/RickdeJager/StegSeek  
[i] Found passphrase: "jhlzhy"  
[i] Original filename: "flag.txt".  
[i] Extracting to "jhlzhy.jpg.out".
```

Setelah menemukan passphrase, file diekstrak lagi menggunakan `steghide`

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]  
$ steghide extract -sf jhlzhy.jpg
```

Masukkan passphrase yang sudah ditemukan, lalu dapat file `flag.txt`.

Isi file `flag.txt`:

PKU\_JAM{ZalNhU0\_Jv0sly}

Flag hasil ekstraksi ini ternyata masih dalam bentuk encode menggunakan cipher tertentu, dan setelah didekode, flag akhirnya adalah:

**IDN\_CTF{SteGaN0\_Co0ler}**

## Rot1Aoka

Deskripsi :

Clue nya udah jelas kan?

VQA\_SYNT{C3Z4A4F4A\_QH1H\_94F1u}

Author : Mohamad Fattyr

Lampiran :

x cryptii

The screenshot shows the cryptii interface with three main sections: Ciphertext, Variant, and Plaintext. The Ciphertext section contains the string 'VQA\_SYNT{C3Z4A4F4A\_QH1H\_94F1u}'. The Variant section has a dropdown menu with options: ROT5 (0-9), ROT13 (A-Z, a-z) (which is selected), ROT18 (0-9, A-Z, a-z), and ROT47 (!-~). The Plaintext section shows the decoded string 'IDN\_FLAG{P3M4N4S4N\_DU1U\_94S1h}' and a note indicating 30 characters were decoded.

Solusi :



“ Terlihat dari Deskripsi bahwa ini adalah pesan encoding, dan dia lupa sampai berapa dia encoding.. terlihat bahwa yang dia gunakan juga base64 dengan ciri “==”, maka dari itu saya mencoba untuk melakukan decoding beberapa kali”

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{P3M4N4S4N\_DU1U\_94S1h}

## Might Guy's Secret

Deskripsi :

Suatu hari, Might Guy mengirimkan sebuah pesan rahasia ke Konoha HQ. Namun, pesan tersebut dicegat di tengah jalan.

Ini isi pesannya: QGA\_OTS{v067j1723qk40f5v33z656afwse60kdf67u9606}

Bersama dengan pesan itu, kamu menemukan secarik kertas bertuliskan: "Giovan Battista Bellaso: 1553M: idnmantab"

Tampaknya Might Guy menggunakan teknik enkripsi klasik namun ampuh

Authtor: Nur Cholis Majid

Lampiran :

The screenshot shows the dCode website interface for the Vigenere cipher. On the left, there's a search bar and a results section displaying the decrypted message: IDN\_CTF{c067j1723pc40c5i33n656asd60cas67i9606}. On the right, the 'VIGENERE CIPHER' section is active, showing the ciphertext QGA\_OTS{v067j1723qk40f5v33z656afwse60kdf67u9606}, the plaintext language set to English, and the alphabet set to ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ. A large button labeled 'AUTOMATIC DECRYPTION' is visible.

Solusi :

Vigenere Cipher dari GPT

Flag : IDN\_CTF{c067j1723pc40c5i33n656asd60cas67i9606}

XSS



The screenshot shows a browser window with a search bar containing "Type something suspicious...". Below it is a search button labeled "Search". A results section displays the message "Showing results for: test". At the bottom, a note says "Try to steal the flag using document.cookie". Below the browser window is a screenshot of the developer tools' Network tab, showing two cookies: "flag" and "session".

Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expires / Max-Age	Size	HttpOnly	Secure	SameSite	Last Accessed	Partition Key
flag	IDN_FLAG{XSS_C00K13_ST34L3R}	ctf.solusiber.com	/super_click	Session	32	false	false	None	Sun, 11 May 2025 10:38:42 GMT	
session	78d34209-9a20-4b62-b07d-4e823de5285f.WraNUsMPY7gGdXk6bzmrpx5aM	ctf.solusiber.com	/	Mon, 12 May 2025 09:44:51 GMT	71	true	false	Lax	Sun, 11 May 2025 10:38:01 GMT	

Solusi :

Input kata apa saja, lalu cek flag di Cookies melalui Inspect yang terdapat flag langsung.

Flag : IDN\_FLAG{XSS\_C00K13\_ST34L3R}

## Hidden Buy Flag

The screenshot shows a browser window for "Toko Benderaku". It features a "Premium Product" section with a logo for "CTF CAPTURE THE FLAG" and a price of "Rp10.000.000.000". A "Beli Flag" button is present. Below the product details, a note says "IDN\_FLAG{h3ader\_wh1telist\_4nd\_p4r4m3ter\_t4mp3rlng\_v3ryy\_3zzz}". The developer tools' Network tab is open, showing the source code of the page. A specific line of code is highlighted:

```
<input type="hidden" name="saldo" value="100">
```

Solusi:

Inspect di bagian type="hidden", lalu menggantikannya dengan "show". Maka, flag akan muncul.

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{h3ader\_wh1telist\_4nd\_p4r4m3ter\_t4mp3rlng\_v3ryy\_3zzz}



## I'm Not Me, You Are Me

### Search User Information

0

Search

```
{  
    "id": 0,  
    "username": "rafly",  
    "role": "admin",  
    "bio": "Aku ingin menjadi hacker!",  
    "flag": "IDN_CTF{Y0u_FF0D_the_heN_admin}"  
}
```

Solusi:

Dikarenakan id tidak dapat ditemukan dalam bentuk String, maka saya coba menggunakan angka dimulai dari 1 hingga 5, lalu diinput dengan 0.

Flag: IDN\_CTF{Y0u\_FF0D\_the\_heN\_admin}

### Kue Monster

```
user@ctf-web:~$ whoami  
guest  
user@ctf-web:~$ cat /flag  
permission denied: you're not admin  
# Hint: Inspect your cookies. Something's not what it seems ☺
```

Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expires / Max-Age	Size	HttpOnly	Secure	SameSite	Last Accessed	Partition
flag	IDN_CTF{XSS_COOKIES}	ctfsousiber.com	/super_click	Session	32	false	false	None	Sun, 11 May 2025 10:36:42 GMT	1
PHPSESSID	4b22921845c7e996cad82e0bb0151	ctfsousiber.com	/	Session	41	false	false	None	Sun, 11 May 2025 10:58:53 GMT	
session	78e34209-9e20-4e62-9b7d-4e823de5285tWhaNUsMPYP7gGdXLkEbzmfpx5eM	ctfsousiber.com	/	Mon, 12 May 2025 09:44:51 GMT	71	true	false	Lax	Sun, 11 May 2025 10:58:53 GMT	
user	%7B%23%7D%22%3A%23%7D%22%7D	ctfsousiber.com	/kue_monster	Sun, 11 May 2025 11:57:57 GMT	34	false	false	None	Sun, 11 May 2025 10:59:08 GMT	



```
user@ctf-web:~$ whoami
admin
user@ctf-web:~$ cat /flag
IDN_CTF{Y0u_@rE_TH@_C00K|e_M@st$r}

# Hint: Inspect your cookies. Something's not what it seems 😊
```

Name	Value	Domain	Path	Expires/Max-Age	Size	HttpOnly	Secure	SameSite	Last Accessed
flag	IDN_CTF{Y0u_@rE_TH@_C00K e_M@st\$r}	ctfsolusiber.com	/super_click	Session	32	false	false	None	Sun, 11 May 2025 10:38:42 GMT
PHPSESSID	4b229210457ef695a2ed82ab0c9151	ctfsolusiber.com	/	Session	41	false	false	None	Sun, 11 May 2025 11:00:09 GMT
session	7bd34209-9e20-4b6b-bb7d-4eb23d5285f1WraNUmPyP7gGxLk8bzmfpxSaM	ctfsolusiber.com	/	Mon, 12 May 2025 09:44:51 GMT	71	true	false	Lax	Sun, 11 May 2025 11:00:09 GMT
user	%7B%22role%22%3A%22admin%22%7D	ctfsolusiber.com	/kue_monster	Sun, 11 May 2025 11:57:37 GMT	34	false	false	None	Sun, 11 May 2025 11:00:09 GMT

Solusi:

Memeriksa melalui Inspect pada tab Cookies, lalu di tabel “user” terdapat nilai %7B%22role%22%3A%22**guest**%22%7D, diganti dengan %7B%22role%22%3A%22**admin**%22%7D, lalu refresh ulang halaman tersebut.

Flag: IDN\_CTF{Y0u\_@rE\_TH@\_C00K|e\_M@st\$r}

jadi gini...

Chromaticity Channel 1	0.64 0.33
Chromaticity Channel 2	0.3 0.60001
Chromaticity Channel 3	0.14999 0.06
Pixels Per Unit X	11811
Pixels Per Unit Y	11811
Pixel Units	meters
Comment	IDN_CTF{W0W_wh4T_K03NC1D3CE}
Image Size	720x720
Megapixels	0.518

Output from file command:

```
file.png: PNG image data, 720 x 720, 8-bit/color RGBA, non-interlaced
```

ImageMagick identify output:

Solusi:

Data pada gambar material.png diekstrak menggunakan EXIF dan flag bisa ditemukan di bagian Comment.

Flag: IDN\_CTF{W0W\_wh4T\_K03NC1D3CE}

## Simple Substitution Cipher

ORF\_EZY{ziol.ol\_g\_yqsx\_wxz\_lg\_tq\_ln}

### Solusi:


mathematica Copy Edit

Plain : A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  
Cipher: Q W E R T Y U I O P A S D F G H J K L Z X C V B N M

Mengganti soal tersebut mengikuti sesuai urutan cipher ke plain di setiap huruf.

Flag: IDN CTF{this is falu but so ea sy}

# Casino 777



Solusi:

Setelah memanipulasi nilai menjadi angkat di setiap slot, tetap sama saja gagal. Maka saya mencari flagnya langsung di Inspect dan menemukan script flag.

Flag: IDN\_CTF{M4st3r\_0f\_H77P\_R3qu3st\_M4n1pul4t10n!}

## Timing Attack



## Lab 6: Timing Attack

Guess the secret password. The slower the response, the closer your guess.

password123

Guess

**Correct! Flag:**

NmMm6LByWzRL5zYUYocFN2qt1Lv7WDhkiLf6zqN2mVLuA

Solusi:

Mencoba bentuk password yang paling umum digunakan, mengikuti lamanya waktu proses. Semakin lama waktu, maka semakin dekat kita menemukan hasil password yang sesuai.

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{NmMm6LByWzRL5zYUYocFN2qt1Lv7WDhkiLf6zqN2mVLuA}

## Pramuka

DATA BORDER

Morse Code Sound & Vibration Listener

This is javascript only morse code listener. Use it with something that emits Morse code as sound or vibrations

Audio Input	Decoder Settings & Info...
Microphone: <input type="button" value="Listen"/> <input type="button" value="Stop"/>	Minimum volume <input type="text" value="-60"/> WPM <input type="text" value="20"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Manual
Pre-Recorded Audio File <input type="button" value="Upload"/> <input type="button" value="Play"/> <input type="button" value="Stop"/> File: "morse.wav"	Maximum volume <input type="text" value="-30"/> Farnsworth WPM <input type="text" value="20"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Manual
	Volume threshold <input type="text" value="200"/> Frequency (Hz) <input type="text" value="689"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Manual

Received Data

M0RS3C0D3R19HT

Range: 172.265625 to 22050 Hz



Solusi:

Mengunduh file Morse.wav dan upload file tersebut ke website <https://databorder.com/transfer/morse-sound-receiver/>. Setelah itu, maka isi flag akan muncul.

Flag: IDN\_CTF{M0RS3\_C0D3\_R19HT}

## USB Forensic 2

The screenshot shows a Windows Registry Explorer window titled "Values". The table lists various registry keys with their names, types, and data values. The data column contains some redacted values represented by green hex boxes. The columns are: Value Name, Value Type, Data, Value Slack, Is Deleted, and Data Record Reallocated. The table includes entries for DeviceDesc, Capabilities, Address, ContainerID, HardwareID, CompatibleID, ClassGUID, Service, Driver, Mfg, FriendlyName, and ConfigFlags.

Value Name	Value Type	Data	Value Slack	Is Deleted	Data Record Reallocated
DeviceDesc	RegSz	@disk.inf,%disk_devdesc%\\Disk drive	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Capabilities	RegDword	16		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Address	RegDword	6		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ContainerID	RegSz	{11775948-7a76-52b3-9bc7-19cb3d487774}	00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HardwareID	RegMultiSz	USBSTOR\\Disk\\JetFlashTranscend_8GB_____8.07 USBSTOR...	00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CompatibleID	RegMultiSz	USBSTOR\\Disk USBSTOR\\RAW GenDisk		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ClassGUID	RegSz	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}	00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Service	RegSz	disk	00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Driver	RegSz	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\\0001	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mfg	RegSz	@disk.inf,%genmanufacturer%\\(Standard disk drives)	00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FriendlyName	RegSz	JetFlash Transcend 8GB USB Device		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ConfigFlags	RegDword	0		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Solusi:

Menggunakan tool Registry Explorer untuk ekstrak data file HIV dan load file USBSTOR.hiv, lalu di bagian direktori XRVZQBFR&0, terdapat di tabel Value Name yang memiliki data sesuai.

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}

## USB Forensic 3



Values					
Drag a column header here to group by that column					
Value Name	Value Type	Data	Value Slack	Is Deleted	Data Record Reallocated
DeviceDesc	RegSz	@disk.inf,%disk_devdesc%:Disk drive	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Capabilities	RegDword	16		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Address	RegDword	6		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ContainerID	RegSz	{11775948-7a76-52b3-9bc7-19cb3d487774}	00-00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HardwareID	RegMultiSz	USBSTOR\Disk\JetFlashTranscend_8GB_8.07 USBSTOR...	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CompatibleID	RegMultiSz	USBSTOR\Disk\USBSTOR\RAW\GenDisk		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ClassGUID	RegSz	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\0001	00-00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Service	RegSz	disk	00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Driver	RegSz	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\0001	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mfg	RegSz	@disk.inf,%genmanufacturer%:(Standard disk drives)	00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FriendlyName	RegSz	JetFlash Transcend 8GB USB Device		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ConfigFlags	RegDword	0		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Solusi:

Masih menggunakan tabel dari direktori XRVZQBFR&0, identitas kontainer dapat ditemukan.

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{11775948-7a76-52b3-9bc7-19cb3d487774}

## USB Forensic 1

Values					
Drag a column header here to group by that column					
Value Name	Value Type	Data	Value Slack	Is Deleted	Data Record Reallocated
DeviceDesc	RegSz	@disk.inf,%disk_devdesc%:Disk drive	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Capabilities	RegDword	16		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Address	RegDword	6		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ContainerID	RegSz	{11775948-7a76-52b3-9bc7-19cb3d487774}	00-00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HardwareID	RegMultiSz	USBSTOR\Disk\JetFlashTranscend_8GB_8.07 USBSTOR...	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CompatibleID	RegMultiSz	USBSTOR\Disk\USBSTOR\RAW\GenDisk		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ClassGUID	RegSz	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\0001	00-00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Service	RegSz	disk	00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Driver	RegSz	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\0001	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mfg	RegSz	@disk.inf,%genmanufacturer%:(Standard disk drives)	00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FriendlyName	RegSz	JetFlash Transcend 8GB USB Device		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ConfigFlags	RegDword	0		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Solusi:

Masih menggunakan tabel dari direktori XRVZQBFR&0, nama device dapat ditemukan di bagian value Friendly Name.

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{JetFlash\_Transcend\_8GB\_USB\_Device}



## USB Forensic 4

Decoded USB Device Info	
Field	Value
Vendor	JetFlash
Product	Transcend 8GB
Revision	8.07
Device Name	JetFlash Transcend 8GB USB Device
Hardware ID	USBSTOR\DiskJetFlashTranscend_8GB__8.07
Compatible IDs	USBSTOR\Disk , USBSTOR\RAW , GenDisk
Device Class	Disk Drive
Class GUID	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}
ContainerID	{11775948-7a76-52b3-9bc7-19cb3d487774}
DiskId	{a4aaa1f8-27d0-11f0-a0ac-000c2979b63d}

Solusi:

Mengkopi isi hex code dari USBT0R.hiv dan prompt di ChatGPT.

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{a4aaa1f8-27d0-11f0-a0ac-000c2979b63d}

## USB Forensic 5



The screenshot shows a Windows Registry viewer window titled 'Values'. It displays a table of registry entries for a disk device. The columns are: Value Name, Value Type, Data, Value Slack, Is Deleted, and Data Record Reallocated. The data table includes entries like DeviceDesc, Capabilities, Address, ContainerID, HardwareID, CompatibleID, ClassGUID, Service, Driver, Mfg, FriendlyName, and ConfigFlags. The 'FriendlyName' entry shows the value 'JetFlash Transcend 8GB USB Device'.

Value Name	Value Type	Data	Value Slack	Is Deleted	Data Record Reallocated
DeviceDesc	RegSz	@disk.inf,%disk_devdesc%:Disk drive	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Capabilities	RegDword	16		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Address	RegDword	6		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ContainerID	RegSz	{11775948-7a76-52b3-9bc7-19cb3d487774}	00-00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HardwareID	RegMultiSz	USBSTOR\DiskJetFlashTranscend_8GB_8.07 USBSTOR...	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CompatibleID	RegMultiSz	USBSTOR\Disk USBSTOR\RAW GenDisk		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ClassGUID	RegSz	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}	00-00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Service	RegSz	disk	00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Driver	RegSz	{4d36e967-e325-11ce-bfc1-08002be10318}\0001	00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mfg	RegSz	@disk.inf,%genericmanufacturer%,(Standard disk drives)	00-00-00-00-00	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FriendlyName	RegSz	JetFlash Transcend 8GB USB Device		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ConfigFlags	RegDword	0		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Solusi:

Masih menggunakan tabel dari direktori XRVZQBFR&0, tetapi ini sudah menunjukkan ID serial.

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{XRVZQBFR&0}

## USB Forensic 6

Solusi:

Menggunakan file NTUSER.dat lalu mengekstrakkan datanya menggunakan ChatGPT. Sehingga hasilnya adalah sebagai berikut.

Flag: IDN\_FLAG{4fu284428u5984-8308848.txt}

## Log Analysis 7



File Edit View  
x q ↴ ↵ ↲ ↳ ↸  
10.10.10.1 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:14:21 +0700] "GET /home HTTP/1.1" ^ ././.  
10.10.10.2 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:14:25 +0700] "POST /login HTTP/1.1" -  
203.0.114.10 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:14:30 +0700] "GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1" - - [FUZZING\_JAVA\_COMPILER\_OUTPUT] "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64)"  
198.51.101.15 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:15:01 +0700] "GET /admin HTTP/1.1" 403 720 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64)"  
198.168.100.5 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:15:35 +0700] "GET /api/v2/item?id=5678 HTTP/1.1" 200 1924 "http://example.com/api" "curl/7.70.0"  
18.10.10.1 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:16:08 +0700] "GET /docs/user\_guide.pdf HTTP/1.1" 200 254321 "http://example.com/docs" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
203.51.101.23 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:16:45 +0700] "POST /wp-login.php HTTP/1.1" 200 5500 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36"  
203.0.114.10 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:17:22 +0700] "GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.1" 200 70 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; bingbot/2.0; +http://www.bing.com/bingbot.htm)"  
198.168.100.5 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:17:55 +0700] "GET /search?query=sample HTTP/1.1" 200 1287 "http://example.com/search" "curl/7.70.0"  
10.10.10.2 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:18:29 +0700] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 3500 "http://example.com" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_15\_7)"  
203.0.114.10 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:19:10 +0700] "GET /index.php?user=guest; DROP TABLE users;-- HTTP/1.1" 500 6000 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64)"  
198.51.101.15 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:19:45 +0700] "GET /config.php,bal HTTP/1.1" 404 220 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
10.10.10.1 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:20:12 +0700] "GET /admin/dashboard.php HTTP/1.1" 403 710 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
198.51.101.23 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:20:50 +0700] "GET /cpanel.php HTTP/1.1" 404 128 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
198.168.100.5 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:21:15 +0700] "GET /api/v2/dataId?.../.../.../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1" 403 280 "-" "curl/7.70.0"  
203.0.114.10 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:21:50 +0700] "GET /uploads/.../.../.../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1" 403 220 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64)"  
198.51.101.15 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:22:28 +0700] "GET /sqltest.php?id=1 UNION SELECT password FROM users HTTP/1.1" 500 1300 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
10.10.10.1 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:22:55 +0700] "GET /admin.php HTTP/1.1" 403 715 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
198.51.101.23 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:23:33 +0700] "POST /login.php HTTP/1.1" 200 910 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)"  
198.168.100.5 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:24:05 +0700] "GET /test.php?param=<script>alert('test')</script> HTTP/1.1" 200 1250 "-" "curl/7.70.0"  
10.10.10.2 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:24:38 +0700] "GET /hidden-env.php HTTP/1.1" 404 215 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_15\_7)"  
203.0.114.10 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:25:12 +0700] "GET /wp-admin/ HTTP/1.1" 403 305 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64)"  
198.51.101.15 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:25:45 +0700] "GET /backup.zip HTTP/1.1" 404 185 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
10.10.10.1 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:26:20 +0700] "GET /admin/HTTP/1.1" 403 715 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
198.51.101.23 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:26:55 +0700] "POST /upload.php HTTP/1.1" 500 950 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
198.168.100.5 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:27:26 +0700] "GET /api/v2/datafile?.../.../.../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1" 403 280 "-" "curl/7.70.0"  
203.0.114.10 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:27:58 +0700] "GET /admin/config.php HTTP/1.1" 403 795 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64)"  
198.51.101.15 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:28:28 +0700] "GET /app/config\_oak.php HTTP/1.1" 404 225 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
10.10.10.2 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:28:59 +0700] "GET /search?q=admin+panel HTTP/1.1" 200 1240 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_15\_7)"  
203.0.114.10 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:29:33 +0700] "GET /login.php HTTP/1.1" 200 1350 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64)"  
198.51.101.23 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:30:04 +0700] "POST /comment.php HTTP/1.1" 200 1300 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
198.168.100.5 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:30:33 +0700] "GET /search?q=<script>evil\_code()</script> HTTP/1.1" 200 1310 "-" "curl/7.70.0"  
10.10.10.1 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:31:05 +0700] "GET /admin/debug.php HTTP/1.1" 403 725 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"  
198.51.101.15 - - [22/Apr/2024:09:31:36 +0700] "GET /test.php?debug=true HTTP/1.1" 200 920 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)"

Solusi:

Unduh file log2.txt dan cari serangan path traversal pada log dan mencari salah satu parameter lengkap yang memenuhi kriteria dalam permintaan ke endpoint API.

Flag: JDN-CTF{../../../../etc/passwd}

# Awesome Website

# Welcome to Our Amazing Website

We create beautiful and functional websites that help you grow your business

### Solusi:

Mengakses website “Awesome Website” dan flag dapat ditemukan pada script token API.

Flag: IDN FLAG{SUROX0ZMQUd7VzNCXzNOO29kM183UjFjazF9}

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