## H. R. 1157

## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

September 10, 2024

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

## AN ACT

To provide for the authorization of appropriations for the Countering the People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

## 1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

| 2  | This Act may be cited as the "Countering the PRC        |
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| 3  | Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act of 2023".       |
| 4  | SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUN-       |
| 5  | TERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA                   |
| 6  | MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.                                  |
| 7  | (a) Countering the People's Republic of                 |
| 8  | CHINA MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.—                           |
| 9  | (1) In general.—There is authorized to be               |
| 10 | appropriated \$325,000,000 for each of fiscal years     |
| 11 | 2023 through 2027 for the Countering the People's       |
| 12 | Republic of China Malign Influence Fund to counter      |
| 13 | the malign influence of the Chinese Communist           |
| 14 | Party and the Government of the People's Republic       |
| 15 | of China and entities acting on their behalf globally.  |
| 16 | (2) AVAILABILITY; AMOUNTS IN ADDITION TO                |
| 17 | OTHER AMOUNTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant            |
| 18 | to the authorization of appropriations under para-      |
| 19 | graph (1)—                                              |
| 20 | (A) are authorized to remain available                  |
| 21 | until expended; and                                     |
| 22 | (B) shall be in addition to amounts other-              |
| 23 | wise authorized to be appropriated for the pur-         |
| 24 | poses described in paragraph (1).                       |
| 25 | (b) Consultation Required.—The obligation of            |
| 26 | funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of ap- |

- 1 propriations under subsection (a) or otherwise made avail-
- 2 able for the purposes described in subsection (a)(1) shall
- 3 be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with
- 4 section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22)
- 5 U.S.C. 2394–1), the regular notification procedures of—
- 6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
- 7 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
- 8 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
- 9 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
- 10 resentatives.
- 11 (c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Ap-
- 12 PROVAL.—
- 13 (1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State
- shall designate an existing senior official of the De-
- partment of State to provide policy guidance, coordi-
- nation, and approval for the obligation of funds ap-
- propriated pursuant to the authorization of appro-
- priations under subsection (a).
- 19 (2) Assistant coordinator.—The Adminis-
- trator of the United States Agency for International
- 21 Development shall designate an existing senior offi-
- cial of the United States Agency for International
- Development to assist and consult with the senior
- official of the Department of State designated pur-
- suant to paragraph (1).

- (3) Duties.—The senior official of the Department of State designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—
  - (A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific strategic priorities for using funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a), such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming that funds are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this section;
  - (B) the coordination and approval of all programming conducted using such funds, based on an assessment that such programming directly counters the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China, including specific activities or policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China and entities acting on their behalf globally, pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States, as established in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and

| 1  | other relevant national and regional strategies     |
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| 2  | as appropriate;                                     |
| 3  | (C) ensuring that all programming ap-               |
| 4  | proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such    |
| 5  | activities of the Chinese Communist Party or        |
| 6  | the Government of the People's Republic of          |
| 7  | China described in subsection (d) and adheres       |
| 8  | to the requirements outlined in subsection (e)      |
| 9  | and                                                 |
| 10 | (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and           |
| 11 | evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-     |
| 12 | ming conducted using such funds to ensure that      |
| 13 | it advances United States interests and de-         |
| 14 | grades the ability of the Chinese Communist         |
| 15 | Party or the Government of the People's Re-         |
| 16 | public of China, to advance activities that align   |
| 17 | with subsection (d) of this section.                |
| 18 | (4) Interagency coordination.—The senior            |
| 19 | official of the Department of State designated pur- |
| 20 | suant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and   |
| 21 | approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2)     |
| 22 | seek—                                               |
| 23 | (A) to conduct appropriate interagency              |
| 24 | consultation; and                                   |

| 1  | (B) to ensure, to the maximum extent                        |
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| 2  | practicable, that all approved programming                  |
| 3  | functions in concert with other Federal activi-             |
| 4  | ties to counter the malign influence of the Chi-            |
| 5  | nese Communist Party or the Government of                   |
| 6  | the People's Republic of China.                             |
| 7  | (d) Malign Influence.—In this section, the term             |
| 8  | "malign influence", with respect to the Chinese Com-        |
| 9  | munist Party or the Government of the People's Republic     |
| 10 | of China, shall be construed to include acts conducted by   |
| 11 | the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the        |
| 12 | People's Republic of China, or entities acting on their be- |
| 13 | half that—                                                  |
| 14 | (1) undermine a free and open international                 |
| 15 | order;                                                      |
| 16 | (2) advance an alternative, repressive inter-               |
| 17 | national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist          |
| 18 | Party's or the Government of the People's Republic          |
| 19 | of China's hegemonic ambitions and is characterized         |
| 20 | by coercion and dependency;                                 |
| 21 | (3) undermine the national security or sov-                 |
| 22 | ereignty of the United States or other countries; or        |
| 23 | (4) undermine the economic security of the                  |

United States or other countries, including by pro-

- 1 moting corruption and advancing coercive economic
- 2 practices.
- 3 (e) Countering Malign Influence.—In this sec-
- 4 tion, countering malign influence through the use of funds
- 5 appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
- 6 tions under subsection (a) shall include efforts—
- 7 (1) to promote transparency and accountability,
- 8 and reduce corruption, including in governance
- 9 structures targeted by the malign influence of the
- 10 Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the
- 11 People's Republic of China;
- 12 (2) to support civil society and independent
- media to raise awareness of and increase trans-
- parency regarding the negative impact of activities
- related to the Belt and Road Initiative, associated
- initiatives, other economic initiatives with strategic
- or political purposes, and coercive economic prac-
- 18 tices;
- 19 (3) to counter transnational criminal networks
- that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of
- the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of
- the People's Republic of China;
- 23 (4) to encourage economic development struc-
- tures that help protect against predatory lending
- schemes, including support for market-based alter-

- 1 natives in key economic sectors, such as digital econ-2 omy, energy, and infrastructure; 3 (5) to counter activities that provide undue in-4 fluence to the security forces of the People's Republic of China; 5 6 (6)misinformation to expose and 7 disinformation of the Chinese Communist Party's or 8 the Government of the People's Republic of China's 9 propaganda, including through programs carried out 10 by the Global Engagement Center; and 11 (7) to counter efforts by the Chinese Com-12 munist Party or the Government of the People's Re-13 public of China to legitimize or promote authori-
- 14 tarian ideology and governance models. 15 (f) Annual Summary.—Not later than September 30, 2023, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the senior 16 17 official of the Department of State designated pursuant 18 to subsection (c)(1) shall submit to the congressional committees specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection 19 20 (b), a summary identifying each activity or program ap-21 proved pursuant to subsection (c), and shall include— 22

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| 1 | (2) for each program or activity, whether the      |
|---|----------------------------------------------------|
| 2 | program or activity was ongoing prior to receiving |
| 3 | support from funds from the Countering People's    |
| 4 | Republic of China Malign Influence Fund, or any    |
| 5 | predecessor resource intended for the same or sub- |
| 6 | stantially similar purpose;                        |
| 7 | (3) for each program or activity an identifica-    |

- (3) for each program or activity, an identification of the acts described in subsection (d) that such program or activity is intended to counter; and
- 10 (4) a table identifying the respective allocation 11 of all programs or activities approved during that 12 fiscal year across accounts and regional or functional 13 bureaus.

Passed the House of Representatives September 9, 2024.

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,

Clerk.

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