

(A) A description of all noncompliant materials found in the F-35 aircraft program since the inception of the program.

(B) A description of efforts to qualify compliant suppliers and encourage domestic suppliers to participate in the F-35 aircraft program, including any plans for investments in domestic suppliers through the Office of Industrial Base Policy to address requirements for materials used in the program that were previously subject to a waiver.

SA 3035. Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mr. SANDERS, Ms. WARREN, and Mr. HEINRICH) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title XV, add the following:

SEC. 1526. STATEMENT OF POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

It is the policy of the United States to maintain a human “in the loop” for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President with respect to nuclear weapon employment.

SA 3036. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title XV, add the following:

SEC. 1526. REPORT ON DANGERS POSED BY NUCLEAR REACTORS IN AREAS THAT MIGHT EXPERIENCE ARMED CONFLICT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator for Nuclear Security shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report assessing the following:

(1) The dangers posed to the national security of the United States, to the interests of allies and partners of the United States, and to the safety and security of civilian populations, by nuclear reactors and nuclear power plants in existence as of such date of enactment or scheduled to be completed during the 10-year period beginning on such date of enactment and located in the following areas:

(A) Regions that have experienced armed conflict in the 25 years preceding such date of enactment.

(B) Areas that are contested or likely to experience armed conflict during the life span of those reactors and plants.

(C) Areas that would be involved in any of the following hypothetical conflicts:

(i) An attack by the Russian Federation on the eastern European countries of Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Lithuania, or Poland.

(ii) A conflict between India and Pakistan.

(iii) A conflict over Taiwan.

(iv) An attack by North Korea on South Korea.

(2) Steps the United States or allies and partners of the United States can take to

prevent, prepare for, and mitigate the risks to the national security of the United States, to the interests of allies and partners of the United States, and to the safety and security of civilian populations, posed by nuclear reactors and power plants in places that may experience armed conflict.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

SA 3037. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 4638, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title XV, add the following:

SEC. 1526. HASTENING ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS ACT OF 2024.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the “Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act of 2024” or the “HALT Act of 2024”.

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat to humanity, a fact that led President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, a sentiment affirmed by the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States in January 2022.

(2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 people attended the largest peace rally in United States history, in support of a movement to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that helped to create the political will necessary for the negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and former Soviet Union, and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties contributed to strategic stability through mutual and verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions.

(3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, millions of people around the world have stood up to demand meaningful, immediate international action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet.

(4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” or the “NPT”), entered into force, which includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon states (commonly referred to as the “P5”), among other things, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disarmament”.

(5) Bipartisan United States global leadership has curbed the growth in the number of

countries possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall vertical proliferation among countries already possessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more than 90 percent reduction in the United States nuclear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 31,255 in 1967.

(6) The United States testing of nuclear weapons is no longer necessary as a result of the following major technical developments since the Senate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the “CTBT”) in 1999:

(A) The verification architecture of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (commonly referred to as the “CTBTO”)—

(i) has made significant advancements, as seen through its network of 300 International Monitoring Stations and its International Data Centre, which together provide for the near instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives tests, including all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea between 2006 and 2017; and

(ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

(B) Since the United States signed the CTBT, confidence has grown in the science-based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms the basis of annual certifications to the President regarding the continual safety, security, and effectiveness of the United States nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to remark in 2015 that “lab directors today now state that they certainly understand much more about how nuclear weapons work than during the period of nuclear testing”.

(7) Despite the progress made to reduce the number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a qualitative global nuclear arms race is now underway with each of the countries that possess nuclear weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each year to maintain and improve their arsenals.

(8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the development of destabilizing types of nuclear weapons that are not presently covered under any existing arms control treaty or agreement and the People’s Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have each taken concerning steps to diversify their more modest sized, but nonetheless very deadly, nuclear arsenals.

(9) President Joseph R. Biden’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review was right to label the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile as “no longer necessary”, as that missile, if deployed, would have the effect of lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use.

(10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden preserved binding and verifiable limits on the deployed and non-deployed strategic forces of the largest two nuclear weapons powers through the five-year extension of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly referred to as the “New START Treaty”).

(11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons employment strategy of the United States submitted under section 492 of title 10, United States Code, determined that it is possible to ensure the security of the United States and allies and partners of the United