

Chasm: Fault-Tolerant, Information-Theoretic Secure Cloud Backup

I'm sure there are plenty of existing "secure" back-up solutions...so why?

- Existing secure backup Solutions:
 - Mozy, Carbonite, Crashplan, Backblaze
- Bad usability, no fault-tolerance, and confidentiality:
 - Passwords lost/leaked, easy to brute force
 - Password-based keys same low entropy problem, same lost password problem
 - Local AES keys: computer crashes? no recovery
 - Long-lived ciphertexts under weak keys
- What is a good threat model?

Threat model

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Adversaries:

- 1. Cloud storage service is curious, wants to gather information to sell
- 2. Nation state compels cloud service to reveal user data by means of law
- 3. Hackers break into a cloud service and steal user data

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Threats:

- Cloud services are computationally powerful!
- Can brute force passwords or password-derived encryption keys
- Denial-of-service by removing access to encrypted/ plaintext data

How does Chasm work?


- 1. You specify ≥ 2 cloud stores like:
 - Dropbox
 - Google Drive
 - iCloud Drive
 - Microsoft One Drive
 - **#** AWS
- 2. **Chasm** creates a "secure" **chasm folder** in your home directory
- 3. You can now simply drag & drop files into the folder


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
- Chasm listens for file-system events on the chasm folder
- When a new file is added to the chasm folder, the file is secret shared using the K-out-of-N Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme
- Each share is sent to a different cloud store
- N = # of cloud stores
- K = recoverability threshold (by default N)




 $bank_accounts.pdf$











System Guarantees

 Information-Theoretic Confidentially of data if less than K-out-of-N cloud services collude

 Fault-tolerance lost data is recoverable if at least K-out-of-N cloud services available

 Integrity of data if at least K-out-of-N cloud services are honest (achieved by taking majority)

Win on usability

No passwords to remember

Easy setup & restore

Drag & drop to secure

 Most user's already have existing cloud services like Dropbox, Drive, iCloud, etc...

Vulnerabilities (& how we can fix some of them)

 Cloud stores can determine the number of files and the size of each file

 A network adversary can potentially combine outbound shares as they are being sent

I use the same password for everything?

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- I use the same password for everything?
 - Turn on 2FA.

Related Systems

- "Simulating cloud environment for HIS backup using secret sharing." (Kyoto University Hospital)
 - Hospitals can secret share data to backup to different remote sites
- "Responsive Security for Stored Data." (Georgia Institute of Technology)
 - A secure system that improves on replicated state machines with secret sharing schemes
- No consumer cloud backup services using secret sharing

Questions?