

Carry trade and transmission

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Abstract

Hyman Minsky argued that financial instability would increase with an evolution that ran from caution through increasing speculation into one of precarious instability, from one characterised by *hedge financing* into successively more fragile regimes of *speculative financing* and *Ponzi financing*. Though this process is not directly observable, there are financial market outcomes that are more likely to be prevalent in each of these regimes. *Carry-trade* returns, the payment from deviations from *uncovered interest parity* (UIP), are used to identify the stages of increasing financial fragility. Return characteristics change as financial instability develops so that the process can be modeled as a Hidden Markov Model where the states are unobserved but the probability of being in a particular regime is conditional on the carry-trade return observed. The evolution of financial stability is investigated. The parameters of a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) can be used to aid understanding of the evolution in the vulnerability of the financial system, greater knowledge of the factors that can influence the level of instability and may also provide real-time indicators about the level of financial risk.

1 Introduction

As the size of international capital flow has increased in absolute terms and relative to expansion of the trade in goods and services, it has also become subject to less regulatory constraint and countries have faced repeated struggles with financial instability that has an international source. An inflow of capital from abroad can appear superficially attractive but its arrival can

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shape institutions, economic development and political opinion, most importantly, the portfolio flows can disappear even more swiftly than they arrive. Transition and emerging economies have been particularly affected by international financial crises.

International financial conditions following the 2007-08 crisis have fuelled the growth of investments in transition and emerging economies by providing large amount of funding-currency liquidity and relatively attractive investment opportunities. However, the indication from Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke on May 22nd 2013, that the central bank would cut back its pace of liquidity inject by gradually reducing its monthly bond purchase triggered a sharp sell-off in emerging bond and equity markets as well as their currencies. This market reaction has drawn attention to the immediate risk from international capital flows as well as the relationship between US monetary policy and the flow of capital to transition and emerging economies. Amongst the debating points are questions about the how US monetary policy, international liquidity and the appetite for risk amongst international investors affect financial conditions in transition and emerging economies.

[Ceruttie et al. \(2014\)](#) ask three questions: what drives global liquidity; where does the global liquidity cycle originate; and, how can the borrowing country manage its exposure to global liquidity? Their focus is on cross-border banking flows. They find that global liquidity is affected by uncertainty and risk aversion and that uncertainty and risk-aversion are highly correlated across countries. However, their research shows that bank conditions and monetary policy actions in countries outside the US can also exert influence. They have three specific findings: cross-border bank-lending falls when international risk aversion, as measured by the VIX index¹, increases, when US dealer bank leverage falls or there is an increase in term premia; there is a small interest rate effect on capital flows; US and European domestic credit conditions and monetary policy affect lending to other regimes, US monetary policy is important and European leverage and credit conditions are important. They conclude that while the US drives the global liquidity cycle through its monetary policy, other financial centres (particularly European) affect the financial cycle through the conditions of their banks. Their work suggests that global liquidity is affected by global financial conditions rather than monetary policy.

Flight-to-Safety (FTS) is the term used to describe the sharp move of capital towards international financial centres and relatively safe assets.[Baele](#)

¹The VIX index is an index of implied volatility on options from the S&P 500 index. It is commonly used as a measure of international risk aversion as it signals increased demand by fund managers for option protection. See [Chicago Board of Trade \(2009\)](#), ? and [Diamond \(2012\)](#) for fuller details.

et al. (2014) find that FTS are relatively rare events. Their study of 23 countries finds that FTS represent less than 3% of the sample of daily data that runs from January 1980 to January 2012. In a contrast to other work, they find that most of the events are country specific and are associated with an increase in the VIX index and the TED spread.²

US monetary policy actions are important for international risk. However, the actions vary in their effect on asset class and, US policy can influence different countries in a variety of ways. Using daily data on exchange rates, stock prices and emerging market bonds, Mishra et al. (2014) finds that exchange rates and bonds are less affected by international liquidity shocks than stock markets. They also find that stronger domestic macroeconomic fundamentals, more prudent financial policy and deeper financial markets provide some insulation against US monetary policy shocks.

Consistent with the evidence of an interplay between monetary policy and international risk, Ahmed and Zlate (2014) finds that economic growth, interest rate differentials and the level of global risk appetite are all important determinants of private capital flows to emerging markets. They find that capital flows have been more sensitive to interest rate differentials since the financial crisis of 2007-08. There is also some evidence that quantitative easing has had some effect on capital flows.

Alexander Klemm and Sosa (2014) use a panel VAR method to assess the effect of US monetary policy since 1990 on capital flows to 38 emerging economies, finding evidence that Fed tapering while not necessarily leading to capital outflow, could generate *new risk premium shocks*. If investors require a higher return, asset price falls are required.

One specific part of the range of international capital flows that has attracted particular attention and one that can represent all the other portfolio flows is the *carry-trade*. This is the attempt to take advantage of the break down in *uncovered interest parity* (UIP)³ by funding an investment in relatively high yielding transition currencies with a low interest base. UIP is the theory that interest rate differentials between currencies should be matched by an equal expectation that the low rate currency will appreciate against the higher rate until expected returns from the activity are reduced to just a compensation for taking risk. The base currencies are the US dollar, the Euro, the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen. These are the safe-haven currencies used in Habib and Stracca (2012), and they are base units that are found to appreciate during periods of FTS in Baele et al. (2014).

²The TED spread is the spread between the treasury bill and the Euro-dollar rate. It is used as a market measure of perceived credit risk of financial institutions as it records the risk premium that investors require to lend to banks relative to the risk-free rate.

³See xxx for an overview of the breakdown in UIP and for more on the carry trade

There is wide spread evidence that UIP does not hold on average but this does not mean that excess returns are possible. These returns disappear with a more multifaceted assessment of risk is taken. Most notably, the small risk of a large loss, so-called *crash risk*, is either something that is to be avoided by most investors who are willing to pay to transfer this risk to other entities or is something that misperceived by myopic, over-confident economic agents suffering behavioural biases.

For example, [Brunnermeier et al. \(2008\)](#) analyses a sample of carry trades and find that the returns are characterised by negative skew and a larger than normal risk of extreme loss; [Jurek \(2007\)](#) assess the cost of purchasing option protection against crash-risk and finds that it covers a proportion of the excess returns that seem to be generated by the carry-trade; [Hayward \(2013\)](#) compares carry returns in period of calm and periods of crisis (as measured by elevated levels of the VIX index) and finds that carry returns a negative, skewed and fat-tailed when international risk aversion is heightened.

[Groen and Peck \(2014\)](#) assesses changes in global risk aversion on the carry-trade. They find that the initial signal from the US central bank in Fed Chairman Bernanke's May 22 2013 testimony to Congress coincide with an increase in global risk aversion which affected global asset prices. By identifying the performance of exchange rates without a change in risk aversion, they find that nearly half of the depreciation of a basket of 45 carry-trade currencies with the largest one-month interest rate relative to a basket of the US dollar and other equally low rate currencies is explained by the increased risk aversion. They find that nearly all the decline in Emerging market equities is attributable to the increase in risk aversion.

There is evidence that the international financial cycle is increasingly global [Rey \(2013\)](#), ? and [Bruno and Shin \(2014\)](#). For example, there is evidence the correlation of cross-border credit growth has increased since the 1990s and that, funds increasingly flow from the financial centres to the rest of the world. As such [Ceruttie et al. \(2014\)](#) find that credit and liquidity contractions in the US, Euro zone, UK and Japan affect the rest of the world. Credit supply in financial centre economies affect the provision of cross-border credit. This is what they call *global funding liquidity*, a feature that affects financial conditions globally.

1.1 The evolution of financial instability

There are three main ways that the evolution of the financial system can be modelled. The first is through a one-off transition from calm to crisis. This represents a world there has been some major event that has transformed the system and where there has been a permanent adjustment from one regime

to another. This is a one-off regime switch that may be a function of political or policy changes that are permanent.

The second is a two-regime model where there is a switch between periods of calm and crisis. This is a relatively simple system where the interest is in the factors that can trigger an adjustment from one regime to another. A more sophisticated version of this is the third model where there is an evolution of the system from a position of calm, through a time when speculative positions are built and then into a crash.

The relatively simple model that switches between periods of calm and crisis has been extensively discussed. [Dornbusch and Werner \(1995\)](#), [Calvo \(1998\)](#) and [Krugman \(2000\)](#) have written about international financial crises. The term *sudden stop* emphasises the importance of the inflow of international capital that takes place before the disruptive effects of reversal.

Expand.

Minsky's *Financial Instability Hypothesis* (FIH) presents a model of endogenous financial crisis where a period of economic calm creates the conditions for more adventurous and risky financial behaviour that increases the fragility of the system [Minsky \(1975, 1986, 1992, 1995\)](#). Minsky identified three phases of financing: hedge, speculative and Ponzie.

In the first of these the system is stable as lending is not excessive, borrowers are cautious and revenues are generally sufficient to ensure that repayments of principal and interest can be made from current income. This period may be framed by memories of past financial crisis and the economic hardships that are associated with it. Violent economic shocks are among the range of possible outcomes that can readily be envisaged by creditors and debtors, encouraging them to be cautious and risk-averse.

However, in the absence of economic shocks these memories of hardship fade further into the background and all parts of the economic and financial system become more prepared to take risks. Lending becomes more speculative; decision-making gives less weight to the possibility of extreme outcomes and more weight to the immediate experience of economic calm. The increase in lending tends to improve immediate economic conditions: business investment and consumer spending rise if lending is broad-based; asset prices will appreciate where lending is directed towards financial investment. The increase in economic activity that comes from this expansion in credit will feedback to improve immediate economic conditions, exacerbating the sense of well-being and undermining the arguments of those preaching more cautious behaviour. Positive feedback effects cause a non-linear relationship between credit growth and economic activity and between credit and asset prices.

[Bernanke et al. \(1999\)](#), [Bernanke et al. \(1996\)](#) and [Azaraidis and Smith](#)

(1998) present models where there is a non-linear relationship between the provision of credit and the level of economic activity. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show how balance sheet dynamics can affect the business cycle through a reduction in the agency cost of business investments and Balke (2000) has a non-linear model of credit shocks. Avdjiev and Zeng (2014) use a three regime Threshold-Vector-Auto regression (TVAR) to identify the non-linearities in credit market shocks. They find that credit shocks have the greatest impact when output growth is above its long-term trend.

While credit becomes more plentiful, household and business managers become more optimistic. There is evidence that decision-making tends to favour outcomes that are more recent, apparent or those that can be more easily envisaged (see for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) and Schwartz and Simons (1991) for some evidence on the *availability heuristic* and related literature.

In this way, the repayment of loans becomes increasingly dependent on the continuation of above-normal economic conditions or the appreciation of asset prices. If this process is allowed to continue a speculative frenzy can take hold. Economic agents are dragged into the euphoria as households compete with the conspicuous consumption of their neighbours, businesses investment expands to increase capacity and market share in the face of booming demand and endeavour, while property and financial market speculators redouble their bets. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show how the link between the availability of credit for investors and the level of liquidity in financial markets can create *liquidity spirals*. They note, that the capital of speculators can drive market liquidity, risk premia and asset prices. The ability to be able to borrow against collateral is particularly important here. As asset prices increase, the ability to borrow against their value increases the amount of trading credit that is available.

The conditions are now in place for the bubble to burst in a violent reversal. Fisher (1932, 1933) explained the way that *debt-deflation* could create a ricochet between the financial and real sectors of the economy with a decline in the availability of credit exacerbating the financial strain on households and business, helping to reduce household and business spending thereby raising the quantity of bad loans and the sense of caution at financial institutions. In financial markets, credit and liquidity disappear and the decline in asset values affect the ability of institutions to raise funds. Fire sales in illiquid markets exaggerates the fall in prices. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show how credit booms help to explain the breadth and depth of post-boom recessions. The catalyst for the collapse is difficult to pin down as the build up to the excess is fragile. See Gorton (2012) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) again for financial market effects. However, the economic

consequences are profound.

1.2 International portfolio flows and financial stability

As the financial system evolves from a position of caution into one where risk is being built and finally into a precarious state where conditions are ripe for a collapse, the nature of the returns to the carry-trade will change. During the period of caution returns are close to normal and there may be just a compensation for taking risk, as financial institutions start to increase the weight of transition and emerging market assets, the returns will tend to increase to reflect the perception that this is a profitable investment, with the building of carry positions adding a capital appreciation in the exchange rate to the interest rate carry. During the crash, there are losses and extreme risk.

The probability a particular type of return depends on the nature of the financial regime. However, the financial regimes are not observed. Nonetheless, the returns to the carry-trade will change as the regime changes. This study aims to assess the evolution of international financial instability by using the returns to the carry-trade.

2 A Markov model of financial instability

The evolution of financial regimes can be seen as a first-order Markov process that moves from state to state depending only on the previous state. The likelihood of a transition from one state to another can be assigned a probability called a *state transition probability*. These can be collected into a *state transition matrix*. Each element of the matrix shows the probability that regime will be in a particular regime in the next period.

The first order Markov process has three elements:

1. states
2. π vector showing the probability of beginning in each state.
3. state transmission matrix

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0.7 & 0.2 & 0.1 \\ 0.4 & 0.4 & 0.2 \\ 0.5 & 0.3 & 0.2 \end{pmatrix} \quad (1)$$

Equation 1 shows a possible transition matrix for the three-regime model. The rows represent from calm, from build and from crash respectively, the

columns are to caution, to build and to crash. There is a 70% chance of staying in the caution regime if that is already in place; there is a 20% chance of switching to a regime where speculative positions are build and a 10% chance that there is a crash. The diagonals represent no change in regime. The matrix is not necessarily symmetrical.

However, in stations like this where the underlying financial regimes are not observable, the Markov model is not sufficient to fully describe the process. It may nonetheless be possible to identify a probabilistic relationship between the carry-trade returns and the underlying financial regime and to use this to uncover the parameters of a *Hidden Markov Model (HMM)*.

2.1 The HMM model

Figure 1 gives an overview of the system. The HMM is a triple (π, A, B) where,

1. π Vector of initial state probabilities
2. $A = (a_{ij})$ the state transition matrix $Pr(x_{it}|x_{jt-1})$
3. $B = (b_{ij})$ the confusion matrix $Pr(y_i|x_j)$

The unobserved financial regimes are modelled as a Markov chain that runs from a period of *caution* through a speculative regime when positions are *built* and finally into the *crash*. The returns to the carry-trade are more likely to take particular characteristics according to the underlying regime.

It is assumed that the carry-trade returns can be characterised as a *mixture model*, each observation of the carry-trade profit is assumed to be drawn from a number of distinct sub-populations. These can be called *component distributions*. The distribution from which the component is drawn is not immediately observable and is therefore represented as a *latent state*. Here the latent state is the unknown financial regime. The financial regime determines the likelihood of observing the given carry-trade return.

A mixture distribution is defined as

$$p(Y_1 = y) = \sum_{i=1}^N p(Y_t = y|S_t = i)P(S_t = i) \quad (2)$$

where,

- Y is the vector of carry-trade returns
- y is the particular carry-trade return that is observed

- $S_t \in 1, \dots, N$ is the regime of observation t . One of either cautious, building or crash.
- $P(S_t = i)$ denotes the probability that the regime is equals to i
- $p(Y_t = y|S_t = i)$ denotes the density of observation of Y_t conditional on regime being $S_t = i$.

$f(y_{it}|z_t)$ is assumed to have a multivariate normal density function. This distribution is characterised by $\theta_k = (\mu_k, \sigma_k^2)$. Once the number of regimes is given, the parameters of the states are estimated.

[Visser and Speekenbrink \(2010\)](#) call this a *dependent mixture model* where the regimes are assumed to be statistically dependent on the observed carry-trade returns.

The transition matrix is estimated from the data.

The process underlying the state transitions is assumed to be a *homogeneous first order Markov process*. Therefore, this process is completely defined by the initial state probabilities. This is an assumption that is used to simplify the estimation of the parameters. Once a starting point is given, a most likely path can be determined.




Figure 1: Hidden Markov Model (HMM)

2.2 Estimation of the parameters

The dependent mixture model is made up of three sub models.

1. The prior model: $P(S_1|x, \theta_{prior})$
2. The transition model: $P(S_t|x, S_{t-1}, \theta_{trans})$
3. The response model: $P(Y_t|S_t, x, \theta_{resp})$

The prior states the probability of being in each of the financial regimes; the transition model is the probability of moving from one financial state to another; the response model is the relationship between the carry returns and the financial state.

The starting point of the system is given by

$$P(S_1 = 1), \dots P(S_1 = N)$$

and the state transition matrix is,

$$\begin{pmatrix} P(S_t = 1|S_{t-1} = 1) & P(S_t = 2|S_{t-1} = 1) & P(S_t = 3|S_{t-1} = 1) \\ P(S_t = 1|S_{t-1} = 2) & P(S_t = 2|S_{t-1} = 2) & P(S_t = 3|S_{t-1} = 2) \\ P(S_t = 1|S_{t-1} = 3) & P(S_t = 2|S_{t-1} = 3) & P(S_t = 3|S_{t-1} = 3) \end{pmatrix}$$

Outline the response model?

The parameters to be estimated are the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution for each of the categories of carry-trade returns, the initial state probabilities, that assess the likelihood of being in a particular regime at the start of the time period, the transitional probabilities, that show the likelihood of moving from one regime to another, and the conditional probabilities that a particular return will be seen given a particular financial state have to be estimated.

This estimation is done by Maximum Likelihood using the log-likelihood function $l(\varphi, y) = \sum_{i=1}^n \log f(y_i; \varphi)$. This is a problem that can be solved with the *Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm* [Dempster et al. \(1977\)](#). The Expectation step computes the joint conditional distribution of the latent variables given the data and the current provisional estimates of the model parameters. In other words, given a financial regime to begin the process, probabilities of forming from this starting regime to another and the likelihood of observing the carry-trade return given a particular regime, the most likely sequence of regimes can be uncovered.

The Maximisation step updates the parameters using the estimated densities of the projected hidden regimes as weights. For hidden Markov models, as special variant of the EM algorithm is proposed (called *the forward-backward* or *Baum-Welch* algorithm [Baum et al. \(1970\)](#)). The Baum-Welch algorithm will find the parameters that maximize the probability of observing the sequence of carry-trade returns.

In other words, using a set of parameters for a HMM ($\theta = (\pi, A, B)$) estimate the probability of obtaining the sequence of carry-returns; now

3 Literature

A common problem in estimating economic models is that the parameters do not tend to be stable over time. A HMM can be used to model a range of cases that can span a simple transition from one state to another, switching between multiple regimes with varying parameters towards the extreme where the number of regimes mean that system is close to having time-varying parameters (TVP).

[Hamilton \(1989\)](#) uses a two regime model to assess the performance of postwar US GNP with adjustments from periods of positive to negative growth. The parameters of an ARIMA representation of US GNP shift between the two regimes so that there is a 3% decline in the US growth rate during a recession.

Other GNP examples. Stock market examples....

Standard Markov models are typically used to model the evolution of credit risk. A firm with a particular credit rating has a given probability of maintaining that rating or moving to another. This can be used to estimate probability of default and value corporate bonds (reference needed). [Frydman and Schuermann \(2008\)](#) use a mixture model against the alternative of a pure Markov chain. The observed rating changes relate to two different underlying Markov chains representing the evolution of credit ratings. There is a heterogeneity that seems to depend upon the industry. For example, ratings of firms in the retail and wholesale trade sectors tend to be more dynamic than the others.

4 Analysis of Results

4.1 Data

The data are a sample of CEE carry-trades that have been compiled from exchange rate and interest rate data for the period from January 2000 to

December 2013. They show a sample of possible carry-trades that could have been conducted.

The data are calculated as follows

$$P1MEURHUF_t = \frac{(1 + HUF1M_t)^{\frac{1}{12}} \times EURHUF_t}{(1 + EUR1M_t)^{\frac{1}{12}} \times EURHUF_{t+1M}} \quad (3)$$

where $HUF1M_t$ is the 1 month Hungarian Forint deposit rate at time t , $EUR1M_t$ is the 1-month euro denominated deposit rate at time t , $EURHUF_t$ is the exchange rate in terms of Hungarian Forint required for one euro at time t and $EURHUF_{t+1M}$ is the spot rate in 1 month's time. This is fundamentally the same as (Brunnermeier et al., 2008). The forward rate is calculated as

$$EURHUF_t^{f1m} = \frac{(1 + HUF1M_t)^{\frac{1}{12}} \times EURHUF_t}{(1 + EUR1M_t)^{\frac{1}{12}}} \quad (4)$$

where $EURHUF_t^{f1m}$ is the 1 month forward rate for euro in terms of Hungarian Forint at time t , $HUF1M_t$ is 1 month Hungarian Forint deposit rate, $EUR1M_t$ is the 1 month Euro deposit rate and $EURHUF_t$ is the current rate of Euro in terms of Hungarian currency.

The parameters of the 3 regime model are given in Table 1. They show the mean and standard deviation of the carry-trade returns for each of the 3 regimes against each of the main funding currencies. There are a number of general characteristics that can be taken from the average figures in the final column that are consistent with the evolution of financial instability along the lines set out by Minsky. The While the crash has the smallest return by construction, this is associated with the largest risk as measured by the standard deviation. The average loss during the crash for carry-trade funded by Euro is a little more than 4% the regime where carry trade

Funding	Regime		HUF	PLN	CZK	RON	RUB	TRY	BGN	NOK	ISK	UAH	HRK	Mean
EUR	Caution	Mean	0.9952	1.0004	0.9953	1.0008	0.9957	1.0071	1.0074	1.0028	1.0033	1.0028	1.0030	1.0021
		S-Dev	0.1119	0.0398	0.0873	0.0341	0.0782	0.0328	0.0426	0.0469	0.0100	0.0372	0.0201	0.0559
	Build	Mean	1.0225	1.0731	1.0460	1.0573	1.0375	1.0222	1.0130	1.1187	1.0106	1.0140	1.0187	1.0390
		S-Dev	0.0490	0.0342	0.0441	0.0403	0.0212	0.0667	0.0217	0.0206	0.0572	0.0215	0.0512	0.0454
	Crash	Mean	0.9719	0.9672	0.9786	0.9956	0.9933	0.8915	1.0028	0.9020	0.9386	0.9671	0.9971	0.9583
		S-Dev	0.0518	0.1109	0.0389	0.0874	0.0233	0.1057	0.0860	0.0669	0.1791	0.1132	0.0823	0.0843
USD	Caution	Mean	0.9934	1.0093	1.0017	1.0077	1.0012	0.9996	1.0045	1.0004	0.9743	1.0025	1.0006	1.0000
		S-Dev	0.0271	0.0290	0.0475	0.0063	0.0043	0.0788	0.0190	0.0049	0.0226	0.0044	0.0120	0.0311
	Build	Mean	1.0297	1.0665	1.0354	1.0085	1.0060	1.0213	1.0190	1.0078	1.0130	1.0119	1.0194	1.0215
		S-Dev	0.0223	0.0218	0.0060	0.0252	0.0109	0.0282	0.0353	0.0308	0.0290	0.0128	0.0282	0.0231
	Crash	Mean	0.9918	0.9450	0.9942	1.0012	1.0004	0.9990	0.9712	0.9378	0.9558	0.9788	0.9773	0.9782
		S-Dev	0.0727	0.0543	0.0194	0.0518	0.0407	0.0296	0.0340	0.0332	0.1136	0.0737	0.0359	0.0515
CHF	Caution	Mean	1.0025	0.9907	1.0017	1.0019	NA	0.9956	1.0005	0.9925	0.9949	1.0023	1.0004	0.9983
		S-Dev	0.0161	0.0164	0.0230	0.0107	NA	0.0173	0.0012	0.0441	0.0202	0.0335	0.0102	0.0245
	Build	Mean	1.0383	1.0217	1.0050	1.0261	NA	1.0396	1.0015	1.0090	1.0153	1.0063	1.0134	1.0150
		S-Dev	0.0131	0.0193	0.0103	0.0182	NA	0.0201	0.0096	0.0118	0.0313	0.0105	0.0122	0.0194
	Crash	Mean	0.9946	0.9817	0.9910	0.9854	NA	0.9943	0.9941	0.9851	0.9750	0.9817	0.9885	0.9842
		S-Dev	0.0491	0.0504	0.0425	0.0362	NA	0.0735	0.0345	0.0142	0.0801	0.0916	0.0388	0.0472
CHF	Caution	Mean	1.0119	1.0101	1.0108	1.0100	1.0030	1.0041	1.0023	1.0092	0.9688	0.9984	1.0021	1.0028
		S-Dev	0.0440	0.0330	0.0235	0.0226	0.0651	0.0858	0.0147	0.0382	0.1037	0.0215	0.0131	0.0400
	Build	Mean	1.0149	1.0626	1.0555	1.0671	1.0102	1.0460	1.0307	1.0115	1.0128	1.0311	1.0315	1.0364
		S-Dev	0.0225	0.0150	0.0274	0.0189	0.0193	0.0213	0.0144	0.0074	0.0361	0.0329	0.0089	0.0205
	Crash	Mean	0.9985	0.9638	0.9837	0.9632	0.9610	0.9886	0.9977	0.9266	0.9471	0.8649	1.0019	0.9636
		S-Dev	0.0671	0.0768	0.0505	0.0454	0.0041	0.0287	0.0491	0.0530	0.0038	0.0684	0.0482	0.0491

Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of 3 Regime Model

Table 2 shows the estimated probability of switching from one state to another in the three state model. This is the estimation of Equation 1. The first column is the the starting regime (either "Caution", "Build" or "Crash"), each element of the vector is the estimated probability of switching from one regime to another. In the top left corner it is the estimated probability of staying in the regime of "Caution" when the system is already in the "Caution" regime. This is 85%. The element adjacent to the right would show the estimated probability that the carry trade funded by EUR for Hungarian Forint switches from a regime of caution to one where speculative positions are being build. This is estimated at 15%. It is not considered likely that the system will switch from caution to crash.

Looking at the details of the transition matrix, the estimate of the Hungarian system suggests that things remain cautious or in the building phase for most of the time. However, there is a small probability of a crash once building has taken place. once the crash is in place, it will last a while before moving back to caution. This is consistent with the 3-stage FIH evolution of financial regimes.

For Poland there is a similar system to Hungary. However, the crash comes from the position of caution. A crash can jump back to the building of speculative positions. This is less consistent with the FIH hypothesis. For Czech, there is a small chance of a switch from caution to the building of speculative positions and a small chance that this will spillover into a crash. Once in a position of building speculative positions, the crash is quite likely. For Romania, the crash is a rare event that may evolve out of a period of caution. This is a case where the two stage regime may be a better representation of what is going on.

What else is needed in results.

- An assessment of whether the parameters of the system are consistent with the model of three stages in the evolution of financial risk. This can be a table that notes relevant characteristics (transition probabilities, proportion of time in each state, carry return characteristics).
- An assessment of those countries that are not consistent with the three regime model. Are they two-regime or transition? Do the different groups have characteristics?
- A comparison of the dates for the crash.
- Some analysis of crash dates and interest rate, liquidity or risk factors.

The parameters of the 2 regime model are given in Table 4.1. They show the returns to a two-regime model for the range of European currencies

		Proportion	To Caution	To Build	To Crash
HUF	From Caution	0.41	0.85	0.15	0.00
	From Build	0.29	0.00	0.96	0.04
	From Crash	0.30	0.27	0.00	0.73
PLN	From Caution	0.14	0.75	0.19	0.06
	From Build	0.79	0.75	0.25	0.00
	From Crash	0.07	0.00	0.22	0.78
CZK	From Caution	0.36	0.97	0.03	0.00
	From Build	0.56	0.02	0.72	0.26
	From Crash	0.08	0.00	0.60	0.40
RON	From Caution	0.21	0.74	0.24	0.02
	From Build	0.64	0.72	0.28	0.00
	From Crash	0.15	0.00	0.03	0.97
TRY	From Caution	0.43	0.89	0.00	0.11
	From Build	0.27	0.07	0.93	0.00
	From Crash	0.30	.00	0.23	0.77
BGN	From Caution	0.48	0.09	0.09	0.82
	From Build	0.39	0.00	0.99	0.01
	From Crash	0.13	1.00	0.00	0.00
NOK	From Caution	0.03	0.91	0.07	0.03
	From Build	0.77	1.00	0.00	0.00
	From Crash	0.20	0.00	0.47	0.53
ISK	From Caution	0.05	0.35	0.60	0.06
	From Build	0.09	0.09	0.91	0.00
	From Crash	0.86	0.21	0.00	0.79
UAH	From Caution	0.03	0.14	0.00	0.86
	From Build	0.72	0.00	0.91	0.09
	From Crash	0.25	0.97	0.01	0.02
HRK	From Caution	0.57	0.26	0.73	0.02
	From Build	0.32	0.86	0.00	0.14
	From Crash	0.11	0.78	0.00	0.22

Table 2: Transition probabilities funded with EUR

funded against the EUR, the US dollar, the Swiss Franc and the Japanese yen respectively. The mean and the standard deviation of an estimate of the normal distribution of returns for each regime is reported for the periods of *Calm* and *Crash*. The average for each funding currency shows that, during the period of calm, an average monthly risk-neutral return of just over 1% is achieved for Euro-funded carry-trade positions. These range from an average

of 1.65%, 1.73% and 1.59% for Hungary, Poland and Romania to just below 1% for Norway, Iceland and Croatia.

Returns for carry investments funded by US-Dollars, Swiss-Francs and Japanese Yen tend to be a little lower.

During the crash, a monthly loss of about 1.0% is experienced on average with a Euro-funded position. This compares to average losses of just 0.5% for investments funded by the US dollar and 1.5% and 2.0% for those funded by the Swiss-Franc and Japanese Yen respectively. The risk, as measured by the standard deviation of the returns, is much greater in the crash.

Funding	Regime		HUF	PLN	CZK	RON	RUB	TRY	BGN	NOK	ISK	UAH	HRK	Mean
EUR	Calm	Mean	1.0165	1.0173	1.0129	1.0150	1.0098	1.0151	1.0075	1.0092	1.0091	1.0094	1.0091	1.0119
		St-Dev	0.0519	0.0486	0.0542	0.0433	0.0310	0.0460	0.0381	0.0693	0.0532	0.0295	0.0251	0.0446
	Crash	Mean	0.9905	0.9862	0.9963	0.9969	0.9962	0.9969	1.0053	1.0008	0.9427	0.9673	1.0082	0.9897
		S-Dev	0.1085	0.1026	0.0886	0.0878	0.0779	0.1028	0.0826	0.0303	0.1871	0.1116	0.0737	0.0958
USD	Calm	Mean	1.0103	1.0123	1.0072	1.0091	1.0044	1.0087	1.0041	1.0045	1.0065	1.0055	1.0054	1.0071
		S-Dev	0.0307	0.0297	0.0305	0.0080	0.0095	0.0314	0.0189	0.0050	0.0318	0.0078	0.0187	0.0202
	Crash	Mean	0.9925	0.9845	0.9983	1.0052	1.0004	1.0034	1.0016	1.0034	0.9691	0.9932	1.0036	0.9959
		S-Dev	0.0707	0.0641	0.0493	0.0389	0.0407	0.0792	0.0413	0.0364	0.0998	0.0635	0.0390	0.0566
CHF	Calm	Mean	1.0052	1.0097	1.0040	1.0085	1.0033	1.0099	1.0012	1.0033	1.0048	1.0029	1.0031	1.0051
		S-Dev	0.0181	0.0235	0.0161	0.0179	0.0234	0.0313	0.0083	0.0162	0.0286	0.0307	0.0116	0.0205
	Crash	Mean	0.9994	0.9838	0.9934	0.9959	0.9373	0.9952	0.9958	0.9904	0.9760	0.9834	0.9916	0.9857
		S-Dev	0.0477	0.0459	0.0380	0.0387	0.0592	0.0792	0.0327	0.0420	0.0804	0.0900	0.0384	0.0538
JPY	Calm	Mean	1.0149	1.0157	1.0125	1.0149	1.0074	1.0111	1.0092	1.0125	1.0095	1.0094	1.0091	1.0115
		S-Dev	0.0348	0.0359	0.0241	0.0291	0.0226	0.0401	0.0191	0.0226	0.0381	0.0307	0.0210	0.0289
	Crash	Mean	0.9843	0.9727	1.0012	0.9972	0.9983	1.0061	1.0002	0.9985	0.9658	0.8539	1.0028	0.9801
		S-Dev	0.0767	0.0764	0.0525	0.0580	0.0628	0.0889	0.0487	0.0510	0.1033	0.0667	0.0493	0.0668

Table 3: Mean and Standard Deviation of 2 Regime Model

Some particular cases stand out. The carry-trade returns for investments in Hungary, Poland the Romania, funded by the Swiss-Franc, tend to be rather modest in nature whether in a period of calm or crash. This is a little surprising given the publicity that has been given to this activity.

However, the the Russian rouble carry-trade funded by the Swiss-Franc shows an exceptional loss in the crash, reflecting the effects of the likelihood that the Swiss currency will appreciate at the times when there is a crisis in Russia. This may reflect the effect of capital flows or the more central position of the Russian economy in international affairs.

This suggests that the crash is pretty rare as are the periods of caution.

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5 Conclusions

There are a number of ways that these methods can be used.

Does the system evolve according to the three-regimes? What are the characteristics of those cases where three-regime system does not work?

What are the dates of the crash? Which data are very similar for different currencies and which are unique. What are the characteristics of the common crashes? Do they relate to monetary, liquidity or risk shocks? What are the characteristics of the unique crashes? Do they relate to the international shocks. It is more likely that they are domestic.

What are the extensions and next steps. A sophisticated model could allow the parameters to change over time. One example would be to increase the probability of a crash as the time in the building phase or to relate the probability of a crash to some outside variables.

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Figure 2: PLN and CZK 1m EUR funded carry profit

