


## DNA: Differentially private Neural Augmentation for contact tracing


Rob Romijnders<sup>1</sup>, Christos Louizos<sup>2</sup>, Yuki M. Asano<sup>1</sup>, Max Welling<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>University of Amsterdam, <sup>2</sup>Qualcomm Al research


Concerns about privacy are the main reason for low adoption of contact-tracing algorithms, even though they are shown to be effective [1,2,3]. We present a **Differentially Private (DP)** version of Neural Augmentation to improve predictions in decentralized contact tracing.



In the **attack scenario**, the Attacker can reconstruct the score of the Victim — even in the presence of multiple contacts. Our method reveals the score under DP.



The reveal of the risk score is a DP function (DPFN), but the predictions can be improved with Neural Augmentation.



In the **trade-off** between privacy and the peak infection rate [4], our method achieves a significantly lower infection rate at the crucial setting of  $\varepsilon = 1$  DP.

## **DP** definition

For  $\varepsilon>0,\ \delta\in[0,1]$ , a function  $f(\cdot)$ , for any outcome  $\Phi$ , and any two adjacent data sets D,D', satisfies [6]:

$$p(f(D)\in \Phi)\leq e^arepsilon p(f(D')\in \Phi)+\delta$$

## Sensitivity

Maximal change with respect to one message, score  $\mu$ :

$$\Delta = \max_{\mu_1,\mu_1'} \left| fig( \left\{ (\mu_1,t_1) 
ight\} \cup D \, ig) - fig( \left\{ (\mu_1',t_1) 
ight\} \cup D \, ig) 
ight| \leq p_1 \gamma_u \ orall \ D.$$

## **Neural Augmentation**

The Lipschitz-constrained model has a bounded sensitivity [5]:

$$\phi = G_{ heta}(\{(\mu_i,t_i)\}_{i=1}^{C_T}) = g_{ heta}^{(2)}(\;rac{1}{C}\sum_i g_{ heta}^{(1)}([\mu_i,t_i]^T)\;).$$

Algorithm 1 DNA: Differentially private Neural Augmentation

**Require:** Dataset 
$$D = \{(\mu_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^{C_T}$$
, constants  $p_1, \gamma_u \in (0, 1)$ ;  $\mu_i \leftarrow \min(\mu_i, \gamma_u)$   $\bar{\phi} \leftarrow F(\{(\mu_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^{C_T}) + p_1 \times G_{\theta}(\{(\mu_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^{C_T})$   $\phi \leftarrow \bar{\phi} + \mathcal{N}(0, \frac{2}{\varepsilon^2}(\gamma_u p_1(1 + \frac{1}{C_T}))^2 \log(\frac{5}{4\delta}))$ 

The neural augmentation (operations in green) increases the sensitivity, but the required additional noise compares favorably in predictions.

romijndersrob@gmail.com github.com/RobRomijnders/dna [1] "Epidemic mitigation by statistical inference from contact tracing data," Baker et al. PNAS 2020
[2] "CRISP: A Probabilistic Model for Individual-Level COVID-19 Infection Risk Estimation Based on Contact Data," Herbrich et al. 2020
[3] "Protect Your Score: Contact Tracing With Differential Privacy Guarantees," Romijnders et al. AAAI 2024
[4] "OpenABM-Covid19—An agent-based model for non-pharmaceutical interventions against COVID-19...," Hinch et al. PLOS 2021

The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy," Dwork et al. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science 2014





