

DNA: Differential Privacy Neural Augmentation for Contact Tracing

Learning on Graphs - Amsterdam, 26 Nov

github.com/RobRomijnders/DNA

Rob Romijnders, Christos Louizos, Yuki M. Asano, Max Welling



Brain, Behavior, and Immunity Volume 89, October 2020, Pages 531-542



Review Article

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Nina Vindegaard, Michael Eriksen Benros 2 🖂

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Best Practice & Research Clinical Anaesthesiology
Volume 35, Issue 3, October 2021, Pages 293-306



2

Economic impact of COVID-19 pandemic on healthcare facilities and systems: International perspectives

Alan D. Kaye MD. PhD (Provost & Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs).

Chikezie N. Okeagu MD (Assistant Professor).

S. Alex D. Pham MD (Resident Physician).

Rayce A. Silva (Medical Student).

Brett L. Arron MD (Associate Professor).

Noeen Sarfraz MD MPH (Resident Physician).

Noen Sarfraz MD MPH (Resident Physician).

Covid-19: Cities fear 'huge' economic impact of restrictions

© 29 September 2020

BBC, Sept 2020

Covid had negative impact on children's reading - Estyn


3 4 May

BBC, May 2023

This interactive tool tracks covid-19 travel restrictions by country


Skyscanner's detailed travel map is color-coded in stoplight-style green, yellow and red

Washington Post, December 2020



Privacy is important

"The top reasons against app use were as follows: mistrusting the government, concerns about data security and **privacy**, and doubts about efficacy." Jones et al. 2021



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"The most cited reasons for not downloading were related to **data** (...) **concerns**" Gao et al. 2022



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"The most cited reasons for not downloading were related to **data** (...) **concerns**" Gao et al. 2022


"The main reasons for not downloading and using the app were (...) worries about privacy" Walrave et al. 2022




Attack Scenario on contact tracing apps

Privacy with respect to released risk score

V is victim, A is attacker







Attack Scenario

Privacy with respect to released covidscore

V is victim, A is attacker Green phones, A' are co-attackers




Example of graphical model of 4 users in 6 days




Statistical model for contact tracing

Susceptible - Exposed - Infected - Recovered




$$f(z_{N(u)}) = (1 - p_0)(1 - p_1)^{|\{z \in z_{N(u)}: z = I\}|}$$




Modular view

Do approximate inference by either Belief Propagation or Factorized Neighbors

$$b_{u}(z_{u}) = \sum_{z_{N(u)}} P(z_{u}|z_{N(u)}, \mathcal{O})B_{N(u)}(z_{N(u)})$$
$$= E_{B_{N(u)}(z_{N(u)})}[P(z_{u}|z_{N(u)}, \mathcal{O})].$$




Predict



Practical use of Differential Privacy

- Emoji suggestions at **Apple**
- QuickType suggestions at Apple
- US Census releases data under DP
- Executive order US gov. mentions Differential Privacy multiple times
- Governments releasing birth rate data
- Facebook releases mobility data of users during covid pandemic
- Google GBoard language next word prediction
- LinkedIn user analytics
- Telemetry on **Windows**




Differential privacy


Definition of (ε, δ) differential privacy (Dwork and Roth 2014): for every $\varepsilon > 0$, $\delta \in [0, 1)$, a mechanism $f(\cdot)$, for any outcome Φ in the range of $f(\cdot)$, and any two adjacent data sets D, D' that differ in at most one element, satisfies the constraint:

$$p(f(D) \in \Phi) < e^{\varepsilon} p(f(D') \in \Phi) + \delta$$


Gaussian Mechanism:

$$\sigma > \frac{\Delta}{\varepsilon} \left(2\log(\frac{1.25}{\delta}) \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$$





Rob Romijnders, Learning on Graphs, 26-Nov-24



Privacy bound, definition of adjacent datasets


Dataset:

$$D = \{(\mu_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^C$$

Sensitivity:

$$\Delta = \max_{\mu_1, \mu_1' \in [0, \gamma_u]} |F((\mu_1, t_1) \cup D) - F((\mu_1', t_1) \cup D)| \le p_1 \gamma_u \quad \forall D.$$


p1 around 0.05, and gamma around 0.7



Neural Augmentation

Neural augmentation known from:

- MRI reconstruction (Lønning et al. Medical image analysis, 2019)
- Enhanced belief propagation (Satorras et al., AISTATS 2021)
- Fast sparse coding (Gregor et al. ICML 2010)



Lipschitz-bounded Neural Network

$$\phi = G_{\theta}(\{(\mu_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^{C_T}) = g_{\theta}^{(2)}(\frac{1}{C} \sum_{i} g_{\theta}^{(1)}([\mu_i, t_i]^T))$$

During training: estimate Lipschitz constant with power iterations O(p^2) During testing: calculate Spectral norm exactly once O(p^3)

Make Lipschitz function DP with Gaussian noise

Algorithm 1 DNA: Differentially private Neural Augmentation


Require: Dataset
$$D = \{(\mu_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^{C_T}$$
, constants $p_1, \gamma_u \in (0, 1)$;

$$\mu_i \leftarrow \min(\mu_i, \gamma_u)$$

$$\bar{\phi} \leftarrow F(\{(\mu_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^{C_T}) + p_1 \times G_{\theta}(\{(\mu_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^{C_T})$$


$$\phi \leftarrow \bar{\phi} + \mathcal{N}(0, \frac{2}{\varepsilon^2}(\gamma_u p_1(1 + \frac{1}{C_T}))^2 \log(\frac{5}{4\delta}))$$

Privacy hierarchy



Different algorithms to compare on simulator

- Traditional contact tracing (Baker et al. 2021)
- Per-message, level 1 (Romijnders et al. 2023)
- Per-day, DPFN, level 2 (Romijnders et al. 2024)
- Per-window, DPFN-S, level 3 (Ours)
- Per-window, DNA, level 3+ (Ours)




Simulator for experiments


Need simulator as better predictions interact with agents


OpenABM (Hinch et al. 2021)

- Stratifying for
 - 9 age categories
 - 3 occupations
 - 6 household types
- In total 150 parameters calibrated against a typical city in the UK





Experimental results





What does DP mean?







DNA has better utility under various noise scenarios

Even when up to 50% of the agents don't follow the protocol, or when the tests become more noisy, the DNA method **achieves lower infection rate**, compared to the same method without neural augmentation

	DPFN-S (‰)	DNA (‰)
Follow protocol		
100%	$52.7_{\pm 10.9}$	$6.4_{\pm 2.6}$
80% 50%	$60.4_{\pm 9.6}$	$6.4_{\pm 2.2}$
	$100.1_{\pm 4.4}$	$27.2_{\pm 8.6}$
Noisy tests		
FPR 1%, FNR .1% FPR 10%, FNR 1%	$52.7_{\pm 10.9}$	$6.4_{\pm 2.6}$
FPR 25%, FNR 3%	$\begin{array}{c c} 81.3_{\pm 2.6} \\ 130.4_{\pm 1.5} \end{array}$	$19.5_{\pm 2.5}$ $81.3_{\pm 1.8}$
111120 /0 /111110 /0	1.5	$0.1.0\pm1.8$

Units are number of infections per thousand agents, ± standard deviation

FPR/FNR = False Positive/Negative Rate



Conclusion

 Novel view of Lipschitz Neural Augmentation as providing Differential Privacy w.r.t. input


 Neural augmentation increases sensitivity, but compares favourably with better predictions

- Future work:
 - Decentralized reinforcement learning, partial adoption



DNA: DP Neural Augmentation for Contact Tracing

Questions



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