

Minority Status and Support for Supranational Integration*

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Abstract

This article proposes a novel theory of minority status and support for supranational integration. We argue that the gap in status and opportunities between majority and minority individuals affects the evaluation of international institutions. Individuals whose socioeconomic status and opportunities are restricted because of minority traits are more dissatisfied with national institutions and more favorable toward supranational integration than their majority counterparts. We test our theory on the European Union, the most advanced case of regional integration. Using different operationalizations of minority status and an exact matching strategy we demonstrate a robust positive association between minority status and support for supranational integration. Testing the mechanisms, we present evidence that integration in the host country and discrimination drive these effects.

Keywords: Ethnic politics, Supranational integration, Minority groups.

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1 Introduction

Do individuals with minority traits hold distinctive attitudes toward supranational institutions? Prior research on international institutions has focused on utilitarian explanations or feelings of cultural threat, without considering how the ethnic background of individuals affects the development of political attitudes (Dellmuth et al., 2022; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). However, understanding how minority traits affect support for supranational institutions is a pressing concern in light of the growing diversity of societies, and the increasing contestation of international institutions (e.g., De Vries, Hobolt, & Walter, 2021; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2006).

This article seeks to fill this gap by introducing a new theory of support for international institutions that accounts for the different experiences of minority and majority individuals in their country of residence. We posit that the exposure to different status and opportunities in the country of residence leads majorities and minorities to evaluate international institutions differently. Because of their lower status relative to majority individuals, minorities tend to be less attached to domestic institutions and less likely to perceive delegations of national sovereignty to supranational organizations as an identity threat. Hence, we expect minority individuals to be more supportive of supranational institutions. Moreover, we expect that the factors influencing the status of minorities, such as cultural integration and discrimination, also moderate the opinion gap between majority and minority individuals.

We apply our theory to the European Union, which provides an ideal case study for our analysis. The EU is arguably the “most advanced IO in terms of the depth and scope of rule-based integration among its member states” (De Vries, Hobolt, & Walter, 2021, p. 4), as well as the most ambitious attempt to develop a continental-scale and multi-national political system beyond the nation-state (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Additionally, Europe has a rich history of nation-states with clear ethno-cultural majorities, yet most EU member states are not ethnically homogeneous (Pan, Pfeil, & Videsott, 2018). Both historical and recent migration flows across Europe have increased the share of individuals that do not identify or are not recognized as members of a country’s ethnic majority. Therefore, by focusing on Europe we are able to explore the opinion of different types of minorities about supranational integration, and how these opinions compare with those of majorities.

Using data from the European Social Survey (Gedeshi et al., 2020; Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway, 2018) we demonstrate the existence of an opinion gap between majorities and minorities regarding supranational integration. To operationalize minority status, we use survey items that ask respondents about parental origins, spoken language and minority

self-identification. We also zoom in on specific minority subsamples, namely first- and second-generation migrants as well as regional minorities. Regardless of the operationalization, we find that minority status correlates positively with support for European integration. To ensure that our results are not biased by common confounders in the literature on public opinion toward IOs, we match majority and minority individuals with exactly the same sociodemographic characteristics and further adjust our regression models for several individual-level and country-level covariates. Our results are robust to the use of different survey data, to another measure of EU support, and to several alternative estimation strategies.

In the final part of the analysis, we present several additional tests that explore the mechanisms of our theoretical framework. The results highlight the importance of cultural integration and discrimination in the host society. Recent first-generation migrants are generally more enthusiastic about both international and domestic institutions than majorities, but this gap shrinks with the time spent in the country and with integration indicators such as getting citizenship. By contrast, second-generation migrants and historical minorities tend to be less satisfied with national government and democracy than majorities, which suggests that support for supranational integration among these groups might be rooted in negative experiences with the nation-state. We thus provide suggestive evidence that perceptions of discrimination and political exclusion drive support for supranational integration and dissatisfaction with national institutions.

The paper contributes to the literature on public opinion toward international organizations by demonstrating a divide between domestic majorities and minorities. Current theories link international attitudes to a broad array of individual and societal factors, such as economic evaluations (Anderson & Reichert, 1995; Gabel & Palmer, 1995), cultural considerations (Hooghe & Marks, 2004), social trust (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2018), and political cues (Hobolt, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2005). Instead, our theory highlights the behavioral and attitudinal implications of descent-based characteristics. Moreover, while prior studies have recognized the importance of “national identity” in shaping support for supranational integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2005), they have typically treated identity-formation as exogenous to the status of individuals in the society. Instead, we link the formation of political preferences to negative experiences with the nation-state that characterize minority populations (Fouka, 2019; Gehring, 2020).

Finally, we relate to the literature on the political and socioeconomic integration of marginalized populations in multi-ethnic societies (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006). These studies demonstrate that the status gap between majority and minority individuals has important attitudinal and behavioral implications (Chong & Kim, 2006; Gaikwad & Nellis, 2017; Kuo, Malhotra, & Mo, 2017). Notably, research has shown that minorities feel less attached to the state (Elkins & Sides,

2007), and that political exclusion drives this relationship (Wimmer, 2017). We contribute to this literature by highlighting the implications of minority status for political opinions beyond the state level.

This paper is structured as follows. We start by describing the data used in the analysis. Section 3 then introduces the theoretical and empirical puzzle and provides comparative evidence of the majority-minority gap in supranational attitudes. Section 5 lays out the theoretical argument, whereas Sections 7 and 8 test our theory and provide suggestive evidence of the causal mechanism. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings and suggest avenues of further research.

2 Case and Data


We mainly use data from the European Social Survey for the analysis (Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway, 2018). We study Europe because it is combines high variation in minority traits across states with the most advanced project of supranational integration to date. Moreover, studying minority attitudes in the European setting is a least-likely case since ethnicity is rarely thought of playing a major role in EU politics. The ESS contains multiple measures of ethno-linguistic and migratory background that proxy for minority status, as well as an item on individual support for European integration. Therefore, it allows us to compare support for supranational integration between domestic majorities and minorities across various minority traits for a large sample of European states and over a decade. Each ESS survey round is sampled to represent country populations, and offers post-stratification and population weights for researchers to improve the representativeness of derived statistics.

We restrict the integrated longitudinal ESS file by removing the first and fifth waves because they do not include the EU support item. Moreover, since our distinction between majority and minority individuals only applies to mostly homogeneous nation-states with clear majorities, we remove Belgium which has a system of ethnic power-sharing, and Luxembourg which is a principality.¹ We also restrict the sample to EU member states, and remove Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania because they host a large Russian minority.² Next, we delete country-rounds where

¹In our view, the difference between nation-states and dynastically-governed states when it comes to the status of minorities lies in the legitimacy of nation-states being clearly linked to representing one cultural group, whereas dynastic states rule by the principle of loyalty to the crown.

²We argue that for ethnic Russians the EU does not provide the same geopolitical alternative to the nation-state, a role that might be better fulfilled by a stronger and more assertive Russian motherland. Hence minority status for states with large Russian populations does not follow the same logic outlined by this paper.

Figure 1: Shares of domestic minority population by country and trait.



Note: Population shares are computed by averaging ESS responses by country using the included analysis weights. The colored countries are included in the main analyses, whereas the light gray ones are not. Population data come from the ESS, and state border polygons from CShapes 2 ([Schvitz et al., 2021](#)).

there is no variation in either treatment status or in the outcome.³ Appendix B.1 provides descriptive information on the country-rounds used in the analysis and the relative sample sizes.

We construct three binary measures of minority status based on socio-demographic and attitudinal variables in the ESS. First, a binary item codes whether respondents have at least one parent who was born in a country other than the one the respondent currently resides in. We refer to this variable as *migration background*. The indicator variable *language minority* captures whether the respondent speaks any language other than the country's majority language at home.⁴ A third indicator codes whether the respondent considers themselves a member of an *ethnic minority*. Figure 1 shows the proportions of a country's population bearing minority traits according to the three measures of minority status. According to ESS data, individuals with mi-

³For instance, in Croatia, the majority of ESS respondents report speaking an “other” language and zero to speak Croatian. In some country-rounds, the EU question is simply not asked.

⁴The variable takes value 1 if the respondent's first language spoken at home is the country's majority language and no other language is spoken in the household, or if both the first and the second household languages are the country's majority language. Otherwise, the indicator takes value 0. We require that all languages spoken in the household are the country's majority language because there is evidence that ascriptive characteristics – which are likely not captured by survey items – are targets of discrimination even when individuals assimilate in the local majority language ([Choi, Poertner, & Sambanis, 2020](#)).

gration background represent 15.5 percent of the resident population in these countries, whereas language minorities and ethnic minorities each represent 14.3 and 5.3 percent. Therefore, Figure 1 suggests that, despite some cross-country variation, there are large minority populations across Europe. Moreover, the plots indicate that variables measuring minority status with observable traits, such as migration background and spoken language, capture a broader population than the one relying on respondents' self-identification.


Our main dependent variable is a 10-point Likert item that captures individual attitudes relative to the nation-state of residence and to supranational integration. *Support for EU integration* asks respondents whether they believe EU integration has gone too far (0), or whether it should continue further (10). We interpret this variable as measuring the extent to which individuals support the process of European integration, and thus the delegation of state sovereignty to supranational institutions. Appendix B.2 and B.3 provide descriptive statistics of ESS data, as well as additional information on trends in support of supranational integration over ESS rounds.

3 Minority Status and European Attitudes: An Empirical and Theoretical Puzzle

We start by empirically illustrating the variation of interest. Figure 2 displays average majority-minority differences in EU support for the main sample of European countries. It is striking that minority individuals show more positive attitudes toward European integration than majorities, regardless of the operationalization of minority status. How can we explain this pattern?

There is an established literature concerned with the drivers of support for supranational integration in the European context. However, the bulk of this literature is color-blind, in the sense that individual minority traits are never considered to explain variation in supranational attitudes. Overall, explanations of support for international institutions can generally be grouped into several theories (see Hobolt & de Vries, 2016). *Cultural* explanations predict citizens attached to the nation-state to oppose supranational integration because they perceive it as a threat to their national culture. Empirically, scholars have shown that individuals with inclusive national identities show more support for supranational integration than those with exclusive identities (Carey, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Risse, 2010). *Utilitarian* theories expect supranational attitudes to be the result of an individual cost-benefit evaluation of integration. The classic version of the utilitarian argument links individual support for integration to judgments of egotropic or

Figure 2: Minority-majority differences in support for supranational integration across Europe.



Note: Squares indicate average differences in support for supranational integration between respondents with an without a minority trait in a country over all ESS rounds in the data. Averages computed with analysis weights to improve their representativeness.

sociotropic benefits of a more developed EU (Anderson & Reichert, 1995; Colantone & Stanig, 2018; Gabel & Palmer, 1995). According to the benchmarking version, individuals evaluate supranational institutions based on their knowledge of domestic politics, and on the comparison of aggregate European and domestic economic performances (Anderson, 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). Finally, another strand of literature points at *cues* from politicians as drivers of individual support for supranational integration (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Hobolt, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Wratil & Wäckerle, 2022).

We believe that the mainstream literature on supranational integration neglects the role of inherited traits, and in particular the political and cultural identities that distinguish majority and minority individuals. Even when cultural theories argue that attachment to “the nation” matters for supranational attitudes (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Risse, 2010), the discussion glosses over the different meaning that “nationality” takes when individuals have a migration background or hold any minority identity. This neglect is striking considering the large research showing that minority populations have distinct preferences (e.g., Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Gaikwad & Nellis, 2017; Karakoç & Wang, 2021), and that much of these differences derive from processes that systematically expose minority individuals to disadvantaged interactions with domestic political institutions (e.g., Choi, Poertner, & Sambanis, 2020; Hemker & Rink,

2017; Olsen, Kyhse-Andersen, & Moynihan, 2021; Wimmer, 2017). Moreover, domestic populations in Europe and elsewhere in the world are increasingly diverse, thanks to globalization and crisis-induced migration flows.

Despite the growing understanding of majority support for supranational institutions, research on minority attitudes is underdeveloped. Not only is mainstream scholarship of supranational integration unable to explain the majority-minority gap, but previous research that considers minority attitudes lacks clear empirical support, especially when it comes to the mechanisms linking minority status and supranational attitudes. Previous studies suggest that minority individuals are motivated by either the direct benefits from supranational integration (Dowley & Silver, 2011), or by a cognitive association between domestic and supranational institutions (Isani & Schlipphak, 2017). In the rest of the paper, we demonstrate that these explanations are incomplete and at best valid for specific minority categories, while introducing a new theory that emphasizes the domestic status of minority individuals.

4 Testing the Gap in Supranational Attitudes

We first demonstrate the claim that minority individuals have higher support for supranational integration, and that the association exists across a variety of dichotomous measures of minority status. Therefore, the goal is to estimate the average difference in attitudes toward supranational integration that can be solely attributed to bearing a minority trait.⁵ Obviously, majority and minority populations are often different along many socioeconomic and cultural dimensions that might bias our estimates. Hence, our populations of interest exacerbate the common problem of finding appropriate counterfactuals in cross-sectional survey data.

While previous studies confronted this inferential challenge by simply regressing individual attitudes on minority traits and individual control variables, we propose a more rigorous approach that relies on a matching strategy to select a comparable sample of individuals according to major observable socio-economic indicators (e.g., Deole, 2019). More precisely, we use exact matching, which consists in restricting comparisons of mean outcomes to subclasses of two or more individuals with exactly the same covariate profile (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012; King &

⁵We do not claim that it is any inherited or visible trait that causes distinctive attitudes among minority individuals. As we show in the next sections, these differences are likely to be rooted into individual experience, socialization, and interaction with majority individuals and institutions. It is only through these experiences that minority individuals develop specific political preferences or opinions. From this background, we reject any essentialist position on ethnicity and attitudes.

Nielsen, 2019). Compared to matching methods based on Mahalanobis distances and propensity scores, exact matching reduces the dependence of estimation results on the researchers' arbitrary decisions, and provides a sample whose characteristics are exactly balanced rather than on average (King & Nielsen, 2019). The samples produced with exact matching approximate a fully-blocked experimental design, which has interesting properties such as being more efficient and comparable than traditional matching (King & Nielsen, 2019). Nevertheless, we provide estimates from samples matched on the propensity score as a robustness test (see Appendix C.2). Another major advantage of exact matching is not to rely on balance diagnostics for model evaluation because the samples have *exactly the same covariate distributions* (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012). However, to illustrate the differences in covariate balance before and after matching, Appendix E provides comparisons of covariate balance across treated and control groups for all matching exercises (Ali et al., 2014; Ho et al., 2011).


We build matched samples for each minority trait variable. We match majority and minority respondents strictly on country and survey round, gender, age, level of education, economic background, and on the type of their settlement. This provides a comprehensive set of “hard” demographic characteristics and baseline attitudes that are correlated with more specific divides on political issues.⁶ After matching minority individuals we run linear regressions to estimate differences in mean outcomes (Ho et al., 2007).⁷ We do not match nor control for individual political attitudes in our main specification for two reasons. First, we are concerned that controlling for attitudinal items might introduce simultaneity and post-treatment biases in our estimates. With the exception of the declared ethnic minority status variable, our treatment indicators are reasonably prior to the attitudinal outcomes. Second, given the limited size of the original dataset, an exact matching on too many variables produces exceedingly small samples. However, we demonstrate that the main results are robust to the inclusion of additional attitudinal controls.

The results in Figure 3 confirm the existence of a majority-minority gap in support for supranational integration. White dots represent point estimates from OLS regressions on the matched samples (see Table C1 in the Additional Materials for coefficient estimates). The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the level of matching groups (subclasses) and observations are weighted by the probability of being selected into a subclass, as suggested in the MatchIt package

⁶Other variables of interest such as income are sadly not available for most observations in the ESS.

⁷All analyses are performed with R (R Core Team, 2020). Regressions are run with the `fixest` package (Bergé, 2018) and type S and M statistics computed with `retrodesign` (Timm, 2019). Tables produced with `texreg` (Leifeld, 2013), plots with `ggplot2` (Wickham, 2016), and matching is implemented with the `MatchIt` package (Ho et al., 2011).

Figure 3: Effect of minority status on support for supranational integration.



Notes: *EU support* measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10). Data from the ESS. Observations always exactly matched on survey round, country, gender, age, educational achievement, unemployment history and settlement type. All models contain matching weights. Standard errors clustered by subclass. The thick bars are 90 percent confidence intervals and the thin bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

instructions ([Ho et al., 2011](#)). Our results suggest that conditional on identical socioeconomic characteristics, minority individuals are more supportive of supranational integration under the EU. Respondents with migration background display a higher support for EU integration by ca. 0.39 points. Linguistic minority individuals have higher support for the EU by 0.24 points, and ethnic minority respondents by 0.11. The results are more noisy and less precisely estimated for ethnic minorities because of the smaller matched sample of around 21 thousand respondents as opposed to 62 thousand for linguistic minorities and 104 thousand for individuals with migration background. The main results in Figure 3 are statistically significant and unlikely to lead to wrong inferences about the association between minority status and EU support, as demonstrated by tests for type M and type S errors ([Gelman & Carlin, 2014](#)) reported in Table C1.⁸

Robustness of the Empirical Strategy and Alternative Explanations

In the Additional Materials we present extensive evidence of the robustness of the previous results and rule out alternative explanations of the gap. We start by probing the robustness of the results to our modeling choices. In Section C.2 we show that our results are robust to alternative estimation strategies to exact matching. Namely, we present estimates from regressions run

⁸Type M error refers to how many times the coefficient might overestimate the true effect given the statistical significance of the coefficient. According to this statistic, our results are very unlikely to exaggerate the true estimate. Instead, type S error refers to the probability that a coefficient is of the opposite sign than the true effect given a certain standard error. Our results indicate that the type S error probability are extremely low.

without matching but with fixed effects, then on samples matched within sub-state political units, and finally on samples matched on the propensity score. Moreover, in Section C.3, we test the robustness of the gap to the use of an alternative outcome. Namely, we present estimates for the majority-minority gap in the support for Eurosceptic parties. Finally, in Section C.4, we replicate the analysis with completely different survey data, namely the International Social Survey Program, which provides a new sample and alternative measures of minority status and EU support (ISSP Research Group, 2012, 2015). Across all different robustness tests, we are able to consistently replicate the majority-minority gap for respondents with migration background and minority language speakers, whereas estimates for ethnic minorities are less stable.

In Section C.5, we demonstrate that alternative explanations from the literature on support for international organizations cannot explain our results. We run several tests controlling for socio-economic characteristics (Anderson & Reichert, 1995; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001), political attitudes such as left-right and GAL-TAN position and political interest (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006; Noël & Thérien, 2008), and trust in domestic institutions (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2018; Harteveld, van der Meer, & Vries, 2013). Estimated differences between majority and minority support for supranational integration remain large and statistically significant when controlling for alternative explanations, with the exception of the ethnic minority indicator. The inability of alternative explanations to account for the majority-minority gap suggests that the status divide caused by observable minority traits is independent of other factors.

We interpret these results as evidence of a strong association between domestic minority status and higher support for supranational integration. Contrary to previous studies, we demonstrate that this association holds across different minority traits, suggesting a general pattern that goes beyond the idiosyncrasies of specific minority groups. Having demonstrated the existence of a majority-minority gap in supranational attitudes that previous theories cannot explain, the next section presents a theory of how the different status of majority and minority individuals within European nation-states shape their attitudes toward supranational institutions.

5 A Theory of Minority Status and Supranational Attitudes

We start from the general notion that individuals are more supportive of institutions through which they feel represented. Because modern nation-states derive their legitimacy from the political expression of a nation associated to specific linguistic and racial traits, individuals that are perceived to belong to this nation tend to hold more positive attitudes toward domestic

institutions and stronger identification with the state (Staerklé et al., 2010), whereas individuals with visible minority traits tend to be suffer a lower social status and more discrimination. Accordingly, research shows that minorities feel less attached to the state (Elkins & Sides, 2007), and that political exclusion and the perception of inequality drive this relationship (Levin et al., 1998; Wimmer, 2017).

Unlike nation-states, supranational institutions are usually associated with more cosmopolitan ideas of political membership, and as such have looser ethno-cultural connotations. EU institutions are a case in point, as they are designed to represent both the European population at large through the Commission and the European Parliament, and the Member States through the Council. Therefore, supranational institutions are inherently more inclusive to ethnic and cultural traits, and easier to identify with for domestic minorities than the constituent member states.

Moreover, supranational institutions can be perceived as a threat to national sovereignty (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). In the pursuit of cosmopolitan values such as international peace and human rights, supranational institutions limit the policy autonomy of their member states. For example, the EU has promoted the respect of minority rights and non-discrimination laws (Ahmed, 2015; Sasse, 2008), and acted to reduce nationality problems in post-communist states (Bieber & Bieber, 2021). While the loss of sovereignty implicit in supranational integration can spur backlash among majority individuals, minorities are less likely to perceive integration as an identity threat. Hence, we argue that conditional on similar personal benefits from deeper integration, minority individuals are more positive about supranational institutions than majority individuals.

By extension, we expect to observe two sets of empirical patterns. First, we expect a gap of opposite sign when it comes to attitudes toward domestic institutions, with minorities being generally more negative than majorities. While supranational and domestic institutions are not substitutes, minorities should display more negative evaluations of domestic institutions because of their lower opportunities in (and attachment to) the state. Second, we expect integration and discrimination in the state of residence to moderate the opinion gap between majorities and minorities. With integration we refer to the process whereby minorities socialize into the host society, building local networks and acquiring local culture and values. As minority individuals integrate into the host society, we expect their political attitudes to converge toward the majority mean. Instead, with discrimination we refer to experiences of unequal treatment from state actors or civil society members (Oskooii, 2016). We predict such negative experiences to reduce minority attachment to the state and to amplify the opinion gap relative to the majority.

6 Three European Minority Populations


In Section 3 we illustrated the puzzling gap in support for supranational integration with both observable and subjective indicators of minority status. These admittedly broad measures help maximize the generalizability of the puzzle and can be replicated using data from most social science surveys. At the same time, the populations captured by these general minority indicators are considerably heterogeneous and overlap with one another to some extent.

Therefore we test our theory on specific minority populations instead. ESS data allows us to identify more socially and politically relevant populations based on respondents' country of birth, parents' origins, and languages spoken at home. Specifically, we focus on first- and second-generation migrants, as well as historical linguistic minorities. We classify respondents as *first-generation* migrants if both they and their parents were born abroad. Meanwhile, we define as *second generation* migrants those individuals who were born in the state of residence, but having at least one parent who was born abroad. Individuals are coded as *historical linguistic minorities* if they have no migration background and speak a historical language of the state other than the one spoken by the majority in the country.⁹ Hence, historical minority language speakers are a sub-population of linguistic minorities, but without a migration background.

This more fine-grained definition of minorities has several advantages. First, it increases the transparency of the results because we are able to rule out overlaps between different minority groups in the data. Second, both first- and second-generation migrants, as well as historical language minorities are well-studied populations. Therefore our findings relate to established literatures in political science and economics. Third, each of the minority populations we identify has a distinctive relationship to the state and the society of residence, which allows us to test different implications of our theory. On the one hand, first-generation migrants are the least similar population to natives in terms of their socio-demographic profiles and political values (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006). However, their time of residence in the country and assimilation efforts introduce variation in the level of integration. Instead, second-generation migrants have similar political values and expectations toward the state compared to majority individuals, but they also carry inherited minority traits that make them susceptible to discrimination (Dancygier et al., 2015; Eriksson & Vernby, 2021). Finally, historical language minorities tend to live in areas where they constitute a regional majority. Therefore, their experiences of discrimination and

⁹Historical linguistic minorities are populations that either remained unassimilated during the process of European state-building, or were created through the formation of nation-states whose borders split ethnolinguistic communities across multiple countries. For more information on historical minority populations and to see the complete list of historical minority languages in the data, see Appendix A.2.

Figure 4: Shares of population speaking historical minority languages by NUTS region.



Note: Population shares are computed by averaging ESS responses from the fifth to the eighth round by country using the included analysis weights. Population data from the ESS, and NUTS region border polygons from GiscoR.

exclusion concern the access to national politics and regional autonomy rather than day-to-day relations with majority members (Wimmer, 2017).


The coding of historical minority languages is subject to some measurement error because it is based on the language list in the ESS questionnaire. To probe the face validity of our measure, Figure 4 shows the share of individuals speaking historical minority languages in Italy and Spain at the level of NUTS 2 regions according to ESS data.¹⁰ The plots indicate that historical minority language speakers are settled in regions with traditionally strong minority identities such as Sardinia, Tirol and Valle d’Aosta in Italy, or the Asturias, Basque countries, Catalonia and Galicia in Spain.

7 Supranational and Domestic Attitudes Among European Minorities

According to our theory, we expect these three minority populations to display higher support for supranational integration, as well as more negative attitudes toward domestic institutions. We use two variables to measure domestic attitudes. *Satisfaction with national democracy* captures

¹⁰The plots are produced with data from the fifth to the eighth ESS rounds and spatial data of NUTS regions from the `giscoR` package (Hernangómez, 2022).

Figure 5: Effect of minority status on domestic and supranational attitudes.



Note: *EU Support* measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10). *Satisfaction with democracy* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with how democracy works in the country (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied). *Satisfaction with government* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with the country's government (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied). Data from the ESS. Observations always exactly matched on survey round, country, gender, age, educational achievement, unemployment history and settlement type. All models contain matching weights. Standard errors clustered by subclass. The thick bars are 90 percent confidence intervals and the thin bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

respondents' evaluation of how democracy works in the state, ranging from being extremely dissatisfied (0) to extremely satisfied (10). Similarly, *satisfaction with national government* captures respondents' evaluation of the national government's performance, from extremely dissatisfied (0) to extremely satisfied (10). As in the previous analysis, we match majority and minority individuals with exactly the same socio-demographic characteristics (see balance descriptives in Appendix E). We create three separate matched samples for each minority population. It is important to note that, conditional on having the same covariate profile, the comparison group of majority individuals is the same for all minorities.

Figure 5 displays the estimated differences in attitudes toward European integration and domestic political institutions relative to majority individuals for the three minorities. The estimates for EU support replicate the findings of the main analysis. Both first- and second-generation migrants, as well as historical minority individuals display significantly higher support for integration relative to domestic majorities. Estimates are robust to the inclusion of state-level control variables (see Appendix C.1 for full regression output).

As predicted by our theory, the positive effect of minority status on supranational attitudes corresponds to a negative association with domestic attitudes among second-generation migrants and historical minorities. This suggests that higher support for supranational integration among minorities goes hand-in-hand with consistent dissatisfaction with domestic institutions.

However, first-generation migrants do not fully conform to this pattern. We find evidence that first-generation migrants have consistently higher satisfaction for all types of political institutions. We interpret these results as reflecting the different expectations toward the state among first-generation migrants. The latter are likely to perceive themselves as better off in the host country and therefore see domestic institutions in a more positive light ([Alba & Nee, 2003](#); [Dancygier & Saunders, 2006](#)). Moreover, they are likely to be less informed about domestic politics, and to know less about the flaws of the state. Previous studies found a similar pattern among recent migrants such as European Muslims ([Isani & Schlipphak, 2017](#)).


8 Mechanisms: Minority Integration and Discrimination

In the final analysis section we provide suggestive evidence for the causal pathways implied by our theory. We report results in coefficient plots (Figure 6), but more details and tables can be found in the additional materials.


First, we explore if the opinion gap between majorities and minorities decreases with the level of integration of minority individuals. We proxy the level of integration of first-generation migrants with the time spent in the country and with host state citizenship. Although subject to endogeneity issues, these variables capture the extent to which migrants have been socialized to the host society's norms and political culture. We compare support for domestic and supranational institutions among first-generation migrants conditional on the number of years spent in the country. Our estimates in Plot (a) indicate that the longer migrants reside in a state, the less they support European integration, and the less satisfied they are with domestic institutions. Because natives generally have more negative evaluations of both types of institutions than first-generation migrants, the results suggest that over time and through integration the opinions of first-generation migrants converge to the mean attitudes among natives. Similarly, we compare the attitudes of natives to first-generation migrants with and without citizenship of the country of residence. Coefficients in Plot (b) indicate that the opinion gap between natives and first-generation migrants also shrinks with citizenship.

Second, we explore the moderating effect of discrimination, measured with respondents' reported perception of discrimination along ethnic, linguistic or racial lines. We compare natives to second-generation migrants who report feeling discriminated, and to those who do not. Results in Plot (c) indicate that second-generation migrants who perceive to be discriminated present generally higher support for supranational integration (p-values between 12.9 and 13.8 percent) and significantly lower satisfaction with domestic institutions compared to majority respondents.


Figure 6: Mechanisms.



(a)




(b)



(c)

Figure 7: Mechanisms continued.



(d)

Instead, second-generation migrants who do not perceive to be discriminated have generally higher support for European integration, but they do not display significantly different attitudes toward state institutions.

Finally, we look at political exclusion from government to explore the effect of discrimination among historical language minorities. Models in Plot (d) compare support for domestic and supranational institutions between three groups, that is members of the state's majority, members of minorities with access to the government, and members of minorities without access to the government. We find that groups with no access to the government are, on average, more supportive of supranational integration and less satisfied with domestic institutions than majority individuals (see also Table D4). Moreover, the opposite relationship does not seem to apply to included historical minority groups, which display more positive attitudes toward both domestic and supranational institutions than majorities.

Taken together, the results provide suggestive evidence of the hypothesized causal pathways. In particular, we find that the status of minority individuals in a country affects their evaluation of political institutions. Hence, the factors that influence individual and group-level minority status, such as integration and discrimination, also affect minority support for different types of governance within and beyond the state.

9 Conclusion

In times of growing politicization of international politics, scholars have devoted much attention to the sources of public support for international organizations. Within such rich literature, this paper identifies a largely neglected trend: Minority individuals hold more favorable views about supranational integration than their majority counterparts. We provide unprecedented comparative evidence of majority-minority gaps in support of international institutions, and develop a new theoretical framework to explain these patterns. Unlike previous research, which sparsely looks at the attitudes of selected minorities such as recent migrants or Muslims, our study is the first to systematically theorize why bearing any visible minority trait can affect the evaluation of international institutions.

From a theoretical perspective, the most important contribution of this paper is to bring together research on public opinion toward international organizations with studies of ethnic politics. Our overarching argument is that individuals evaluate supranational institutions based on the status and opportunities they enjoy in the nation-state. Because existing studies strongly suggest that minorities with visible ethnic and racial traits face systematic socio-economic disadvantages in the country of residence, we expect minorities to look more favorably at supranational institutions that set limits on the nation-state and are perceived as not discriminating along visible minority traits. As such, our theory applies to a potentially vast set of minority populations that might face systematically lower status within nation-states.

The analysis yields several interesting findings. First, focusing on the case of the European Union, we uncover a robust positive association between minority status and support for supranational integration. This pattern holds across different data sources, outcome definitions and estimation methods. Importantly, results are also robust to different operationalizations of minority status. Using ESS data, we first identify minority individuals based on their parental origin, spoken language, and minority self-identification. We then zoom in on specific minority populations, namely first- and second-generation migrants, as well as historical language minorities, uncovering once again a positive association with support for supranational integration. These findings speak in favor of theorizing the effect of minority status in general, rather than looking at selected minorities in isolation. Second, we explore attitudes toward domestic institutions and find that second-generation migrants and regional minorities are less satisfied with democracy and government in the state of residence than majorities. This is consistent with our theory which predicts that positive views about supranational integration are driven by negative feelings toward the nation-state. Third, we provide suggestive evidence that the lack

of social integration and negative experiences with the nation-state, such as discrimination and political exclusion, moderate the relationship between minority status and support for political institutions.

Our study suggests a number of promising areas for future research. First, although ESS data allows to operationalize minority status in multiple ways, it is not designed to be representative of minority groups, like most social science surveys. Therefore, future research on minority attitudes would benefit from original surveys that specifically target otherwise underrepresented minority groups. Second, while our empirical strategy makes the most of the available information on survey respondents, it is impossible to exclude that some unobserved factors might partly explain our findings. Moreover, because we only observe respondents once, there is little information about how attitudes toward supranational integration form over time and in response to life events. Therefore, longitudinal and experimental research might help explore the causal pathways implied by our theoretical framework. Finally, our results only speak to how minorities evaluate the European Union. Future work might investigate whether the patterns we observe are valid for other regional integration projects, such as the Mercosur in Latin America or the African Union.

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Additional Materials to:
Minority Status and Support for Supranational Integration

November 3, 2023

Contents

A Minorities in Europe	29
B Descriptive Information	33
C Additional Results: Figure 3	37
D Additional Results: Mechanisms	49
E Balance Information	57

A Minorities in Europe

A.1 The Origins of Ethnic Diversity in Europe

Ethnic diversity in Europe is the result of various historical processes predating the emergence of the nation-state and more recently reinforced by migration flows from within and outside the European continent (Bartolini, 2005; Dancygier & Saunders, 2006).

The first source of ethnic diversity are the groups who settled in the territories of today's nation-states before their emergence. Until the territorial consolidation of states, Europe had been populated by a variety of ethnically distinct populations, which gradually settled through migration and conquest. This diversity was preserved within the large and loose territorial possessions of pre-modern empires, such as the Holy Roman Empire, and the later Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian ones. With the introduction of mass schooling (Paglayan, 2020; Weber, 1976) and the diffusion of nationalist policies of cultural assimilation (e.g. Almagro & Andrés-Cerezo, 2020; Guo, 2020), populations developed into more standardized "national cultures." Together with ethnic cleansing and border changes pursued in the name of national popular sovereignty, cultural assimilation produced the relatively homogeneous political units of today's Europe (Mann, 2004; Tamir, 2019). After WWII, the "nationality problems" around which European politics had developed in the previous century were considered to be solved by a handful of human rights conventions (Pan, Pfeil, & Videsott, 2018). However, the reality of minority groups and their demands for self-determination emerged once again with the Yugoslavian civil war and the return of autonomy claims across the historical European nation-states (Hierro & Queralt, 2021).

The second source of ethnic diversity is migration. Mass movements of people have long existed in European history. However, the migrations prompted by the processes of globalization and European integration have increased the internal diversity of European states once again, questioning the validity of claims to cultural homogeneity. Economic migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, and the more recent migration inflows from the African continent and the Middle East have all increased the diversity of European nation-states. These processes have also resulted in an additional hierarchy of "old" and "new" minorities (Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013).

A.2 Quantifying Ethnic Diversity

All European states embrace within their borders population groups that do not identify with, or are not recognized as the country's titular nation. However, quantifying this diversity is a challenging task. Concepts such as nation or ethnicity refer to a sense of belonging to a group that cannot be extrapolated from "objective" ethno-cultural traits. Additionally, official statistics in Europe – and in Western countries in particular – tend to be color-blind and to actively hinder the measurement of ethnic diversity ([Simon, 2012](#)). Domestic protection laws usually count ethnic and racial data as sensitive, and therefore subject its collection to restrictions and special procedures.

Hence, there is currently no reliable and comparable source of ethnic population distributions in Europe based on official censuses. The most straightforward alternative are social science surveys that include items about migration background, language and perceived ethnic membership. The ESS ([Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway, 2018](#)) represents for our purposes the most comprehensive source for Europe as it provides information on respondents' country of birth, parents' origins, ethnic minority self-identification, and up to two languages used at home. The survey's sampling is not targeted specifically at minorities, but is representative of the country's population with stable residence.

ESS data for European countries indicates that between 1.4 (Poland) and 22.1 percent (Montenegro) of the resident populations in European states consider themselves an ethnic minority, and that 1.4 (Poland) to 74.3 (Switzerland) percent of the population speaks a language at home other than the country's largest. Obviously, not all individuals and groups with a minority trait consider themselves political minorities because these differences are not necessarily politicized. Nevertheless, following the literature on nationalism we contend that these traits have the potential for becoming a dimension of social structuring and division. In addition to the above cultural traits, we further consider whether individuals have a migration background. The rationale for including non-native status among minority indicators is that while migrants and descendants thereof might be perfectly integrated, they might bear visible markers that expose them to stigmatization.

Table A1 breaks down the shares of individuals with ethnic or linguistic minority status by their migration background. Unsurprisingly, minority status is considerably more frequent among first and second generation migrants.¹ Nevertheless, ESS data shows that sizable minorities

¹We code as first generation individuals who are not born in the country where they reside. We code as second generation the individuals who are born in the country, but at least one parent did not. Finally, we code as native

Table A1: Shares of residents with minority status by immigration background.

Sample:	ESS			ISSP		
	Natives	First gen.	Second gen.	Natives	First gen.	Second gen.
Ethnic minority	0.04	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.27	0.61
Language minority	0.11	0.34	0.29			

Values represent simple averages for ISSP data, and averages weighted by analysis weights for ESS data.

remain among individuals with no immigration background. Table A2 describes the relationship between various minority traits through correlations. Overall, these descriptives indicate that minority populations in Europe are more sizeable than often presumed, and that they do not always map onto the native-migrant dichotomy.

Table A2: Correlations between measures of minority status

	Minority traits		
	Migration background	Ethnic minority	Language min.
Migration background	1		
Ethnic minority	0.313	1	
Language minority	0.384	0.304	1

Also, we argue that among minority populations without migration background, historical language minorities are a salient population with distinctive political attitudes relative to majority individuals. Historical language minority individuals descend from minorities which have resided in the state for generations, but did not assimilate in the dominant national category. Table A3 reports the historical minority languages in ESS data by country.

individuals who are born in the country, and have both parents born in the state as well.

Table A3: Historical minority languages in sample

Country	Historical minority language
Austria	Croatian, Hungarian, Italian, Slovenian
Bulgaria	Armenian, Greek - modern, Romany, Russian, Turkish
Czechia	German, Romany, Slovak
Denmark	Faroese, German, Hebrew
Finland	Russian, Swedish
France	Alemannic, Alsatian, Basque, Breton, Castilian, Catalan, French - middle, French - old, German, Hebrew, Low German, Occitan, Saxon, Spanish, Swiss German
Germany	Alemannic, Alsatian, Danish, Germanic, Low German, Saxon, Swiss German
Hungary	Croatian, German, Romanian, Romany, Russian, Serbian, Slovak
Italy	Albanian, French, Friulian, German, Neapolitan, Sardinian, Sicilian
Netherlands	Eastern Frisian, German, Northern Frisian, Western Frisian
Poland	German, Romany
Slovakia	Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, Romany
Slovenia	Croatian, German, Hungarian, Italian, Romany
Spain	Asturian, Basque, Catalan, Gallegan, Romany
Sweden	Finnish, Finno-Ugrian, Sami languages
United Kingdom	Scots


Notes: The languages listed in this table do not cover all minority languages in each state, nor they follow any theoretically-inspired definition of language. Rather, we coded the original categories in ESS data.

B Descriptive Information

B.1 Country-Rounds in ESS Data

Figure B1 summarizes the ESS rounds and countries that we keep for the analysis. The black dots indicate available country-rounds, while the thickness of the dots indicates the sample sizes.

Figure B1: Country-rounds from ESS data.



Notes: The plots represent the availability and size of data for each country and round of the ESS. Note that this plot represents the data before matching.

B.2 Overall Sample Statistics

Table B1: Descriptive statistics of full survey samples.


<i>Statistic:</i>	Share NAs	Observations	Min	Mean	Median	Max	SD
Age	0.00	223223	13.00	48.97	49.00	123.00	18.56
Male	0.00	223986	0.00	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.50
Ever unemployed	0.01	222925	0.00	0.28	0.00	1.00	0.45
Citizenship	0.00	224069	0.00	0.97	1.00	1.00	0.18
Left-right ideology	0.13	195154	0.00	5.07	5.00	10.00	2.21
GAL-TAN ideology	0.00	224197	-7.50	-0.01	-0.05	6.75	1.33
Political interest	0.00	223658	1.00	2.63	3.00	4.00	0.92
Satisfied government	0.03	216893	0.00	4.15	4.00	10.00	2.47
Satisfied democracy	0.04	216236	0.00	5.19	5.00	10.00	2.50
EU support	0.08	205598	0.00	5.12	5.00	10.00	2.64
Migration background	0.00	223116	0.00	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.33
Native	0.00	224197	0.00	0.87	1.00	1.00	0.34
First-gen. migrant	0.00	224197	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.24
Second-gen migrant	0.00	224197	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.23
Language minority	0.01	222578	0.00	0.12	0.00	1.00	0.32
Ethnic minority	0.01	221579	0.00	0.04	0.00	1.00	0.20

Notes: These population statistics describe the full sample used in the analyses before matching.


B.3 Distribution of EU Support Across ESS Rounds

Even though this paper's analysis uses individual cross-sectional variation to estimate majority-minority differences, rather than variation over time, Figure B2 describes the variation in EU attitudes over time. Each plot summarizes average EU support among majority and minority respondents for a specific trait over ESS rounds. The plots suggest that despite a substantial variation over time, majority-minority differences persisted across minority traits.


Figure B2: Average support for European integration over ESS rounds and by minority trait.



(a) By migration background.



(b) By language minority status.



(c) By ethnic minority status.

Note: Population shares are computed by averaging ESS responses by country-round using the included analysis weights.

C Additional Results: Figure 3

C.1 Full Regression Results for Figure 3

Table C1 displays the output in tabular form of the regression coefficients plotted in Figure 3, as well as the results of the same regressions with state-level covariates.

Table C1: Full regression output for Figure 3 (ESS, matched samples).

Outcome:	EU support					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	5.03*** (0.016)	5.59*** (0.063)	5.22*** (0.020)	6.19*** (0.078)	5.41*** (0.041)	7.01*** (0.144)
Migration background	0.389*** (0.022)	0.390*** (0.022)				
Language minority			0.241*** (0.028)	0.235*** (0.028)		
Ethnic minority					0.109* (0.058)	0.061 (0.059)
Observations	103,658	103,312	62,493	61,671	21,344	20,578
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
M statistic	1	1	1.44	1	1	2.40
S statistic	0	0	0	0	0	0.007

Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by subclass. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

EU support measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10).

State-level covariates include EU membership, years since democratic transition, per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita, far-right vote share in last elections. All models contain matching weights.

Observations always matched exactly on survey round, country, gender, age, educational achievement, unemployment history and settlement type.

Type M error refers to how much the estimate can exaggerate the true effect given that it's statistically significant. Instead, Type S error refers to the probability of the sign being the opposite of the true effect, given significance.

C.2 Alternative Estimators

This section describes alternative estimation methods and their implications for the estimates of the majority-minority gap in EU support. We propose three alternative empirical strategies: Fixed effects regressions without matching, matching within sub-state regions, and propensity score matching. Overall, the results reported in Table C2 closely mirror our preferred estimates and strengthen our confidence in the robustness of the minority status effects in Figure 3.

Non-Matched Main Results

We follow a common practice and estimate majority-minority differences in outcomes with linear regressions and without matching. We regress EU support on indicators of minority status, fixed effects for country-ESS round interactions, a set of individual socio-demographic controls, as well as state-level time-varying controls. This approach resembles how previous studies on European minorities' attitudes have used cross-country survey data (e.g. [Dowley & Silver, 2011](#); [Erisen, 2017](#)). Each model is fitted on the whole ESS sample – except for observations with missing explanatory or outcome variables.

Panel A in Table C2 reports the coefficients from non-matched models. Coefficients for minority status indicate a positive and significant gap between majority and minority support for supranational integration across all three minority traits. In common with the main results in Table C1 the inclusion of state-level covariates does not affect estimates significantly. If anything, coefficient magnitudes suggest that matching majority and minority individuals leads to more conservative estimates. Indeed, estimated differences in support for supranational integration in Panel A are consistently larger than in the main results (Table C1). Especially the coefficient magnitude for language and ethnic minority are considerably larger than in matched models.

Sub-State Matching

In order to increase the precision of the matching, we provide separate results obtained by matching respondents strictly within the lowest sub-state units available in the data. This is possible because the ESS provides information on the regions where the interviews were conducted. The size and type of region can vary between states and rounds, with the most recent rounds (from Round 4 onward) using NUTS regions as a reference. Nevertheless, not all states were sampled in a way that is suitable for statistical inference, as indicated on the ESS'

website.²

Panel B in Table C2 shows results from linear regressions, where minority individuals are matched to similar majority individuals living in the same region within the state and year. This should help reduce unobserved cultural differences that might be spatially correlated. Balance statistics are found in Appendix E.2.

When it comes to migration background and language minority status, results in Panel B provide a very similar picture to that of the main results in Figure 3. The sample sizes are generally smaller because of the overall more demanding matching requirements. Nevertheless, the estimates are consistent with those from the samples matched within country-rounds.

However, the results for ethnic minority status are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Models in Columns 5 and 6 report that the matching exercise returned very small samples below 4000 observations. This indicates that matching individuals who identify or not as ethnic minority within the smaller geographical units proves to be excessively demanding on the data.

Propensity Score Matching

We finally provide estimates from samples matched on the propensity score, a very common matching strategy. Propensity score matching relies on modeling the probability of being a minority as a function of individual covariates, and then on selecting sets of treated and control individuals that have a similar propensity to be treated. On average, comparisons of treated and control individuals should be unbiased if the propensity score function is correctly specified.

We follow the common practice of estimating the propensity score with a logit-link generalized linear model. We regress minority status on the same individual socioeconomic characteristics used in the main exact matching strategy. On top of the propensity score, respondents are matched exactly on ESS round and country to ensure reasonable comparisons. Also, respondents are matched including sampling weights as recommended by the documentation of the `MatchIt` package (Ho et al., 2011). As demonstrated in Section E.3, propensity score matching produces less balanced samples than exact matching (see Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012; King & Nielsen, 2019).

Panel C reports estimated coefficients from the same linear regression specification of the main analysis, yet this time fitted on the samples matched on the propensity score. Coefficients for migration background is once again highly significant and similar in size to the main estimates.

²Details on the NUTS level and whether the sampling is recommended for statistical inference can be found here: <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/multilevel/guide/essreg.html>.

Table C2: Robustness test: Minority status effect on support for supranational integration across estimation strategies (ESS data).

<i>Outcome:</i>	EU support					
<i>Minority:</i>	Migration background		Language minority		Ethnic minority	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Non-matched estimates						
Minority status	0.3839*** (0.0660)	0.3834*** (0.0660)	0.3085*** (0.0583)	0.3061*** (0.0582)	0.3756*** (0.0721)	0.3699*** (0.0723)
Female	0.0576* (0.0295)	0.0575* (0.0296)	0.0510* (0.0303)	0.0511* (0.0304)	0.0537* (0.0296)	0.0537* (0.0296)
Age	-0.0123*** (0.0013)	-0.0123*** (0.0013)	-0.0124*** (0.0013)	-0.0124*** (0.0013)	-0.0126*** (0.0013)	-0.0126*** (0.0013)
Education	0.0265** (0.0109)	0.0266** (0.0110)	0.0262** (0.0112)	0.0264** (0.0112)	0.0268** (0.0111)	0.0269** (0.0112)
Ever unemployed	-0.2189*** (0.0268)	-0.2203*** (0.0267)	-0.2147*** (0.0285)	-0.2159*** (0.0284)	-0.2189*** (0.0281)	-0.2201*** (0.0280)
Settlement type	-0.1349*** (0.0134)	-0.1364*** (0.0133)	-0.1451*** (0.0131)	-0.1464*** (0.0130)	-0.1478*** (0.0130)	-0.1492*** (0.0129)
Democracy age		0.0315 (0.0457)		0.0386 (0.0458)		0.0405 (0.0467)
GDP growth		0.0587*** (0.0213)		0.0545** (0.0218)		0.0618*** (0.0223)
GDP		$-8.9 \times 10^{-5}**$ (3.62×10^{-5})		$-8.01 \times 10^{-5}**$ (3.57×10^{-5})		$-9.49 \times 10^{-5}**$ (3.78×10^{-5})
Far-right voteshare		0.0367*** (0.0109)		0.0409*** (0.0128)		0.0397*** (0.0115)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	202,173	200,399	201,635	199,856	201,154	199,388
Panel B: Matching within NUTS regions						
Minority status	0.3918*** (0.0341)	0.3931*** (0.0341)	0.2389*** (0.0489)	0.2296*** (0.0491)	0.0453 (0.0930)	0.0067 (0.0944)
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	29,694	29,658	13,743	13,643	3,914	3,811
Panel C: Propensity score matching						
Minority status	0.3753*** (0.0230)	0.3763*** (0.0230)	0.3003*** (0.0306)	0.2963*** (0.0309)	0.1116* (0.0656)	0.0856 (0.0677)
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	49,116	49,036	27,364	26,972	6,234	5,899

Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by country-round in Panel A, and by subclass in B and C. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

EU support measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10).

State-level covariates include EU membership, years since democratic transition, per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita, far-right vote share in last elections. Models in Panel A use ESS analysis weights, whereas models in Panels B and C use matching weights.


In Panels B and C observations are matched on survey round, country or region, gender, age, educational achievement, unemployment history and settlement type.

Estimates for language minority status are highly significant, yet have a much larger magnitude relative to the main estimates. Instead, coefficients for ethnic minority status are less robust, being significant at the 10 percent level without state-level covariates, and insignificant at conventional level when controlling for state covariates. Once again, the sample sizes for ethnic minority suggest that individuals with ethnic minority identity are harder to match to majority individuals.

C.3 Minority Status and Support for Euroskeptic parties

We evaluate the robustness of the main results to an alternative outcome that proxies for EU support. In particular, we create a dichotomous variable that codes whether respondents feel the closest to a Euroskeptic party. We rely on the PopuList dataset to code Euroskeptic parties (Rooduijn et al., 2019). In the whole ESS data ca. 45 percent of respondents declared which party they feel the closest. 37.6 percent of the total declared to support a non-Euroskeptic party, and 6.9 percent to support a Euroskeptic party. For each individual responding to the question we create an indicator of whether the favorite party is Euroskeptic. We follow the same empirical strategy as in the main analysis: For every minority trait we select samples that are complete in the outcome, minority variable, and socio-economic characteristics. These samples are then matched to create the most meaningful comparisons between majority and minority individuals. We estimate differences in mean attitudes with linear probability models and cluster the standard errors by subclass.

Figure C1: Effect of minority status on Euroskeptic party support (ESS, matched samples).



Support for euroskeptic party measures whether the political party to which a respondent feels the closest is euroskeptic (1) or not (0).

Data from the ESS. Observations always exactly matched on survey round, country, gender, age, educational achievement, unemployment history and settlement type. All regressions use matching weights. Standard errors clustered by subclass. The thick bars are 90 percent confidence intervals and the thin bars are 95 percent confidence intervals.

Results in Figure C1 and Table C3 suggest that on average, individuals bearing minority traits are less supportive of parties with Euroskeptic positions. On average, individuals with migrant background are ca. 1.2 percent less likely than majority individuals to support Euroskeptic parties,³ linguistic minorities 1.4 percent less likely, and ethnic minorities 2.1 percent less likely.

³In each of these matched samples the exact share of supporters of Euroskeptic parties varies slightly. In the

Moreover, all results are robust to the inclusion of state-level control variables.

Table C3: Robustness test: Minority status effect on support for euroskeptic parties (ESS, matched samples).

Outcome:	Support euroskeptic party					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	0.133*** (0.003)	0.049*** (0.017)	0.157*** (0.005)	0.052*** (0.015)	0.154*** (0.009)	-0.008 (0.026)
Migration background	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.004)				
Language minority			-0.014** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)		
Ethnic minority					-0.021** (0.010)	-0.020* (0.011)
EU only	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	31,918	31,862	20,185	19,943	5,687	5,466

Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by subclass. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

Support for euroskeptic party measures whether the political party to which a respondent feels the closest is euroskeptic (1) or not (0).

State-level covariates include EU membership, years since democratic transition, per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita, far-right vote share in last elections. All models contain matching weights.

Observations always matched exactly on survey round, country, gender, age, educational achievement, unemployment history and settlement type.

migrant-background sample ca. 13 percent of voters support Euroskeptic parties, 13.2 percent in the language minority sample, and 13.1 among ethnic minority individuals.

C.4 ISSP

In order to test the robustness of the main findings to the specific variables and sampling of the ESS, we run a similar analysis on entirely different data from the International Social Survey Program ([ISSP Research Group, 2012, 2015](#)). Beside the ESS, the ISSP’s “national identity” battery is the only repeated international survey with items on both minority traits and support for supranational integration.

The ISSP provides several indicators of attitudes toward the EU. We focus on three of them that best capture attitudes toward supranational integration as well as the tension between the EU and national sovereignty. The first is a five-point Likert item that captures whether one believes that the EU should have more power over the Member States (5) or vice versa (1). The second item also takes five levels and measures the extent to which respondents believe that membership to the EU greatly (5) benefits the state of residence, or not at all (1). The third item is an indicator of whether respondents would vote in favor of remaining in the EU in a hypothetical national referendum.

As for minority status, we are able to create two dichotomous variables. The first is an indicator that takes value 1 if any of the respondent’s parents is not born in the country. The second indicator takes value 1 if the respondent declared their first ethnic group to be the country’s largest. The majority ethnic group is constructed by ranking country-specific ethnic categories by survey round and state.⁴ Individuals declaring not to belong to a majority group are coded as minorities. Moreover, ISSP includes a similar set of individual control variables to the ESS, including age, gender, educational achievement, self-evaluation of own economic position in society (from top to bottom) and settlement type.

The ISSP data for the 2003 and 2013 rounds on national identity originally contains ca. 61 thousand observation. Because of the much smaller sample size we use a coarsened exact matching strategy where we match respondents on grouped age and socio-economic variables ([Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012](#)). After matching on parental migration background and ethnic minority status, the samples count 5962 and 4000 observations respectively. Balance descriptives before and after matching for both samples are plotted in Figures E7 and E8 (Appendix E).

⁴ESS and ISSP contain different questions that capture support for the EU from other angles, and the minority indicators are also slightly different. Language minority status is not measured by ISSP data, and ethnic minority status in ESS is based on individual perception of belonging to a minority ethnicity, whereas the one in ISSP is based on our rank-based coding of majorities. Therefore we believe that consistent results across measures speak in favor of an association that is robust to reporting bias and measurement error.

Table C4 shows estimates from linear regressions on the matched sample, suggesting that minority indicators available in the ISSP also tend to be associated with positive attitudes toward the EU across the various outcomes. Minority status effects are generally positive and significant across all items and for both individuals with migration background and those with minority ethnic identities. Results are also robust to the inclusion of state-level covariates, which slightly shrinks coefficient estimates.

Table C4: Robustness test: Minority status effect on support for supranational integration on ISSP data.

Outcome:	EU power		EU benefits		Vote remain	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Migration background						
(Intercept)	2.55*** (0.026)	3.51*** (0.323)	3.40*** (0.033)	6.07*** (0.550)	0.719*** (0.014)	0.421** (0.198)
Minority status	0.132*** (0.040)	0.127*** (0.040)	0.151*** (0.046)	0.149*** (0.046)	0.036** (0.018)	0.036** (0.018)
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3,352	3,352	2,967	2,967	3,124	3,124
Panel B: Ethnic minority						
(Intercept)	2.49*** (0.033)	2.99*** (0.204)	3.30*** (0.046)	2.89*** (0.283)	0.719*** (0.018)	0.392*** (0.127)
Minority status	0.187*** (0.054)	0.185*** (0.053)	0.205*** (0.061)	0.194*** (0.061)	0.043* (0.025)	0.041* (0.025)
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,928	1,928	1,620	1,620	1,787	1,787

Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by subclass. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

EU power measures on a 5-point Likert scale whether in the interaction between the European Union and member states the EU should have more power (5) or vice versa (1). *EU benefits* measures on a 5-point Likert scale whether the EU benefits the respondent's state of residence. *Vote remain* is a dichotomous measure of whether, in a hypothetical referendum on their state of residence's membership to the EU, respondents would choose to remain (1) or not (0).

Data is limited to EU member states. Observations matched exactly on country, ISSP round, education achieved, gender, and settlement type, and matched coarsely on age, and economic self-perception.

State-level covariates include EU membership, years since democratic transition, per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita, far-right vote share in last elections. All models contain matching weights.

C.5 Alternative Mechanisms

In this section we test whether factors that are commonly expected to drive individual attitudes toward supranational integration can also explain the majority-minority gap in EU support observed in the paper. More specifically, we look into three factors: economic status, political values, and domestic attitudes.

Economic status is often thought to influence individual benefits from a more globalized world, since wealthier and more educated individuals tend to disproportionately benefit from open markets and exchanges. We control for individual age, gender, educational achievement, past unemployment and the type of settlement in which respondents reside during the matching step.

As for political values, existing research affirms the relevance of at least two dimensions: left-right and GAL-TAN. Left-right ideology refers to one's attitudes on questions of economic organization and redistribution, where extreme left positions give a central role to the state and extreme right positions favor encompassing economic freedoms and individual initiative. Instead, the GAL-TAN dimension refers to attitudes falling between the green, alternative and liberal (GAL) extreme on the one hand, and the traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist (TAN) extreme on the other ([Kriesi et al., 2006](#)). Moreover, we also include a measure of political interest.

We construct the GAL-TAN index with four six-point Likert items capturing how much importance respondents give to preserving the environment, behaving properly, traditions, and to government strength, as well two 10-point items measuring whether immigrants enrich or undermine national culture, and whether immigrants make the country better or worse. We take the average scores for TAN and GAL items separately, i.e. we separate items that indicate more TAN attitudes for higher values from those whose higher values indicate GAL attitudes. We then standardize the scores and create an additive index by subtracting GAL items to TAN items, such that the final GAL-TAN index takes higher values for generally more conservative attitudes and lower values for more progressive ones. The index is nearly normally distributed and takes values between -5 and 5.

Trust and satisfaction with domestic institutions are often used interchangeably in the literature, depending on data availability. We control for these attitudes with three items that capture satisfaction with national democracy and government, as well as trust in the parliament. Moreover, we control for “generalized trust” ([Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2018](#)) with an item measuring trust in people.

To investigate whether alternative hypotheses explain away the majority-minority gap in EU support, we run linear models on the same matched samples used in the main analysis and gradually include the three sets of variables explained above. We report the results in Table C5. The coefficient of interest is *minority status* (bold in the table), which we expect to become statistically indistinguishable from zero if all the variation in EU support is driven by one or multiple confounding factors. Panels A and B show that adding the groups of variables somewhat reduces the coefficient of migration background and language minority, but the association with the outcome remains substantively and statistically significant. Instead, Panel C shows that the coefficient for ethnic minority becomes statistically insignificant as soon as any attitudinal variable is added to the regression. We interpret this result as an indication that ethnic minority self-identification might be endogenous to unobserved traits that are associated with political attitudes.

Table C5: Robustness test: Alternative hypotheses (ESS, matched samples).

Outcome:	EU support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Migration background				
(Intercept)	5.026*** (0.0158)	5.980*** (0.0505)	3.311*** (0.0404)	4.243*** (0.0654)
Minority status	0.3893*** (0.0222)	0.2093*** (0.0229)	0.2777*** (0.0219)	0.1594*** (0.0226)
Left-right ideology		-0.0666*** (0.0063)		-0.0941*** (0.0062)
GAL-TAN ideology		-0.3155*** (0.0092)		-0.2185*** (0.0094)
Political interest		-0.2355*** (0.0138)		-0.1074*** (0.0140)
Satisfaction with democracy			0.0902*** (0.0070)	0.0777*** (0.0072)
Satisfaction with government			0.0542*** (0.0072)	0.0589*** (0.0074)
Trust in people			0.0819*** (0.0059)	0.0665*** (0.0061)
Trust parliament			0.1287*** (0.0064)	0.1151*** (0.0066)
Observations	103,658	93,469	99,106	90,691
Panel B: Language minority				
(Intercept)	5.218*** (0.0204)	6.450*** (0.0629)	4.071*** (0.0626)	5.315*** (0.0873)
Minority status	0.2409*** (0.0283)	0.1966*** (0.0288)	0.2445*** (0.0280)	0.2095*** (0.0288)
Left-right ideology		-0.1019*** (0.0078)		-0.1158*** (0.0081)
GAL-TAN ideology		-0.3563*** (0.0125)		-0.3075*** (0.0132)
Political interest		-0.2842*** (0.0177)		-0.1854*** (0.0185)
Satisfaction with democracy			0.0621*** (0.0095)	0.0532*** (0.0097)
Satisfaction with government			-0.0002 (0.0093)	0.0056 (0.0094)
Trust in people			0.0738*** (0.0080)	0.0585*** (0.0080)
Trust parliament			0.0988*** (0.0085)	0.0755*** (0.0088)
Observations	62,493	56,398	59,995	54,849
Panel C: Ethnic minority				
(Intercept)	5.407*** (0.0414)	6.031*** (0.1119)	4.934*** (0.1103)	5.621*** (0.1576)
Minority status	0.1089* (0.0576)	0.0533 (0.0604)	0.0837 (0.0582)	0.0348 (0.0615)
Left-right ideology		-0.0048 (0.0135)		-0.0112 (0.0138)
GAL-TAN ideology		-0.3975*** (0.0237)		-0.3801*** (0.0249)
Political interest		-0.2354*** (0.0326)		-0.2037*** (0.0344)
Satisfaction with democracy			0.0457** (0.0197)	0.0313* (0.0179)
Satisfaction with government			0.0191 (0.0184)	0.0126 (0.0176)
Trust in people			0.0337** (0.0148)	0.0384*** (0.0149)
Trust parliament			0.0163 (0.0157)	0.0005 (0.0160)
Observations	21,344	18,612	20,362	18,050

Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by subclass. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

EU support measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10).

Observations always matched exactly on survey round, country, gender, age, educational achievement, unemployment history and settlement type.

D Additional Results: Mechanisms

D.1 Full Regression Tables

In this section we report the full regression tables for the results displayed in Figures 5. In addition to the plotted coefficients, we also present estimates with state-level control variables.

Table D1: Full regression output for Figure 5 (ESS, matched samples).

Outcome:	EU support		Satisfaction democracy		Satisfaction government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: First generation migrants						
(Intercept)	5.03*** (0.020)	5.74*** (0.085)	5.23*** (0.020)	3.31*** (0.086)	4.05*** (0.019)	2.38*** (0.081)
Minority status	0.565*** (0.031)	0.565*** (0.031)	0.792*** (0.027)	0.793*** (0.027)	0.720*** (0.027)	0.719*** (0.027)
Observations	61,085	61,085	65,244	65,244	64,682	64,682
Panel B: Second generation migrants						
(Intercept)	5.03*** (0.020)	5.53*** (0.082)	5.30*** (0.020)	2.95*** (0.088)	4.20*** (0.019)	2.45*** (0.081)
Migration background	0.185*** (0.030)	0.185*** (0.030)	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.088*** (0.026)	-0.087*** (0.026)
Observations	62,274	62,274	66,582	66,582	66,175	66,175
Panel C: Historical language minorities						
(Intercept)	5.32*** (0.030)	7.02*** (0.136)	4.98*** (0.033)	1.54*** (0.103)	4.02*** (0.032)	1.44*** (0.105)
Minority status	0.191*** (0.041)	0.192*** (0.041)	-0.174*** (0.035)	-0.177*** (0.035)	-0.130*** (0.036)	-0.136*** (0.036)
Observations	31,014	31,014	33,761	33,761	33,869	33,869

Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by subclass. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

EU support measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10). *Satisfaction with democracy* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with how democracy works in the country (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied). *Satisfaction with government* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with the country's government (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied).

State-level covariates include EU membership, years since democratic transition, per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita, far-right vote share in last elections. All models use matching weights.

Data is limited to EU member states. Observations always matched exactly on survey round, country, gender, age, educational achievement, unemployment history and settlement type.

D.2 1st Generation Migrants and Integration

Panel A in Table D2 compares average support for supranational and domestic institutions among first-generation migrants by duration of residence. Coefficients are estimated by regressing the outcomes on dummies for whether migrants lived in the state less than five years (reference group), between six and ten, between eleven and 20, or more than 20, as well as on country-round fixed effects and individual and state-level covariates.

The results broadly indicate that the longer migrants reside in a state the less they support European integration, and the less satisfied they are with domestic institutions. The inclusion of individual and state-level controls only slightly affects results. Without control variables (in Columns 1, 3 and 5) the difference in EU support and in satisfaction with national government between migrants who spent less than five and those that spent between 6 and 10 years is smaller and less precisely estimated. Instead, when we include the control variables, all differences are statistically significant.

Next, we test whether first-generation migrants who have obtained the state's citizenship display smaller attitude gaps relative to native individuals. To test this expectation, we restrict the matched data to first-generation migrants and domestic majorities. We run linear regressions with fixed effects for country-rounds and the set of sociodemographic control variables. Our explanatory variable in this case is a categorical variable distinguishing between natives and migrant individuals with and without citizenship. The resulting coefficient estimates indicate the average differences in attitudes between natives and the two groups of migrants.

Panel B in Table D2 shows the estimated differences in support for the EU and in satisfactions with domestic institutions between native individuals and first-generation migrants. Estimates in the first row suggest that migrant respondents who have the country's citizenship tend to display both higher support for the EU and for domestic political institutions relative to natives. However, migrants without citizenship display much larger differences relative to majority individuals. In fact, across the various specifications and outcomes, the attitude gap between natives and migrants without citizenship is around twice as large as that between natives and first-generation migrants with citizenship. These estimates are robust to the inclusion of additional state-level controls and individual political attitudes.

Table D2: First-generation migrant attitudes and integration in host country.

Outcome:	EU support		Satisfaction democracy		Satisfaction government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Time of residence						
<i>Reference: Less than 5 years</i>						
6 to 10 years	-0.2613 (0.1738)	-0.3245** (0.1211)	-0.3704** (0.1349)	-0.4090*** (0.1061)	-0.2626 (0.1632)	-0.3187** (0.1428)
11 to 20 years	-0.4553*** (0.0990)	-0.5222*** (0.0638)	-0.7588*** (0.1635)	-0.7484*** (0.1522)	-0.7296*** (0.1748)	-0.7562*** (0.1752)
More than 20 years	-0.6596*** (0.0654)	-0.7053*** (0.0906)	-1.244*** (0.0945)	-1.317*** (0.1075)	-1.263*** (0.1386)	-1.381*** (0.1159)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Individual covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	10,347	12,196	10,622	12,660	10,472	12,439
Panel B: Citizenship						
<i>Reference: Native</i>						
Migrant citizen	0.3050* (0.1489)	0.2543* (0.1463)	0.6670*** (0.0682)	0.6055*** (0.0643)	0.5705*** (0.1137)	0.5326*** (0.1007)
Migrant non citizen	0.7350*** (0.1454)	0.6965*** (0.1272)	1.165*** (0.0649)	1.192*** (0.0776)	1.132*** (0.0848)	1.123*** (0.0701)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Individual covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	172,318	154,224	181,250	159,936	181,660	159,842

Notes: Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by country. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

EU support measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10). *Satisfaction with democracy* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with how democracy works in the country (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied). *Satisfaction with government* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with the country's government (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied). *Citizen* measures if respondents hold citizenship in the country of interview.

Data is limited to EU member states and first generation migrants.

Individual political controls include *political interests* (1 = very interested, 4 = not at all interested), and *left-right self-placement* (0 = left, 10 = right). State-level covariates include EU membership, years since democratic transition, per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita, far-right vote share in last elections. All models contain matching weights.

D.3 2nd Generation Migrants Analysis

To explore the moderating role of discrimination we regress EU support and satisfaction with national institutions on a categorical variable coding whether a respondent is native of the state, is a migrant who does not perceive to be discriminated on the base of ethnicity, race or language, or a migrant who perceives to be discriminated. We further include country-round fixed effect and individual and state-level covariates. The estimated coefficients capture the average difference between natives and the two groups of migrants. We report the results in Table D3.

Coefficient estimates in the first row indicate that second-generation migrants who do not perceive to be discriminated have generally higher support for European integration, whereas they do not display significantly different attitudes toward state institutions relative to majority individuals. Instead, migrant respondents who perceive to be discriminated against present generally higher support for supranational integration (p-values between 12.9 and 13.8 percent) and significantly lower satisfaction for domestic institutions compared to majority respondents. While the estimates for EU support are not significant at the conventional 5 percent level, they suggest that discriminated migrants have two to three times the gap with natives in attitudes toward supranational integration than non-discriminated migrants. A major reason for the weak estimate has to do with the low number of respondents who declare to feel discriminated on the base of ethnicity, race or language in ESS data. Hence, we take these results as indicative of an attitude pattern that at least does not openly contradict Hypothesis 2.

Table D3: Second-generation migrant attitudes and perceived discrimination.

Outcome:	EU support		Satisfaction democracy		Satisfaction government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Reference: Native</i>						
Non discr. migrant	0.1153*** (0.0359)	0.0716** (0.0266)	0.0475 (0.0457)	0.0570 (0.0443)	0.0068 (0.0277)	0.0183 (0.0261)
Discriminated migrant	0.2354 (0.1484)	0.2152 (0.1388)	-0.3661** (0.1547)	-0.3986* (0.1912)	-0.3219*** (0.1099)	-0.2767* (0.1415)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Individual covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	180,218	163,001	188,819	168,582	189,236	168,521

Notes: Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by country. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

EU support measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10). *Satisfaction with democracy* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with how democracy works in the country (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied). *Satisfaction with government* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with the country's government (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied). *Citizen* measures if respondents hold citizenship in the country of interview.

Data is limited to EU member states and second-generation migrants.

Individual political controls include *political interests* (1 = very interested, 4 = not at all interested), and *left-right self-placement* (0 = left, 10 = right). State-level covariates include EU membership, years since democratic transition, per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita, far-right vote share in last elections. All models contain matching weights.

D.4 Historical Language Minorities

In order to measure the political power access of historical language minority groups, we match them to the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Vogt et al., 2015) containing information on yearly access to government for ethnic groups. EPR codes two levels of power access for groups that are alone in government (monopoly and dominant), two for groups sharing power (senior and junior partner), two for excluded groups (powerless and discriminated) and one for politically irrelevant groups. To explore the moderating role of political exclusion from government we regress EU support and satisfaction with national institutions on a categorical variable that codes if a respondent is member of the state's majority, of a group with junior partnership, of a powerless group, or of a politically irrelevant group.⁵ We further include country-round fixed effect and individual and state-level covariates. The estimated coefficients capture the average difference between natives and the three groups of minorities. We report the results in Table D4.

Table D4: Historical language minorities: Mechanisms

Outcome:	EU support		Satisfaction democracy		Satisfaction government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Reference: Majority</i>						
Junior partner	0.5102*** (0.0393)	0.5735*** (0.0148)	0.1385 (0.0806)	0.1101*** (0.0296)	0.1288* (0.0701)	0.1168*** (0.0185)
Powerless	0.1944*** (0.0302)	0.0756* (0.0420)	-0.5214*** (0.1055)	-0.5666*** (0.0876)	-0.3034*** (0.0821)	-0.2846*** (0.0695)
Country-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	148,895	133,994	155,905	138,558	156,222	138,489

Notes: Standard-errors in parentheses clustered by subclass. Significance codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1.

EU support measures on a 10-point Likert scale whether European integration went too far (0) or should continue further (10). *Satisfaction with democracy* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with how democracy works in the country (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied). *Satisfaction with government* measures to what extent respondents are satisfied with the country's government (0 = Extremely dissatisfied, 10 = Extremely satisfied).

Data is limited to EU member states. State-level covariates include EU membership, years since democratic transition, per capita GDP growth, GDP per capita, far-right vote share in last elections. All models contain matching weights.

We find that groups with no access to government (powerless) are on average more supportive

⁵In the sample of interest we do not find historical minorities with senior partner status or discriminated.


of EU (columns 1 and 2) and less satisfied with domestic institutions (columns 3 to 6) than majority individuals. Instead, historical language minorities with access to government tend to be generally more pro-European and also more satisfied with domestic institutions. Speakers of politically irrelevant minority languages show limited or no attitudinal differences relative to majority individuals. These results supports the existence of a mediating effect of political status on EU support along the hypothesized lines. Moreover, it confirms that supranational attitudes display opposite patterns to domestic attitudes for disadvantaged minorities, and that political status matters for one's assessment of domestic institutions ([Elkins & Sides, 2007](#); [Wimmer, 2017](#)).

E Balance Information

This section represents balance statistics for each matching procedure in the paper. We proceed by showing standardized mean differences in covariates before and after matching following the guidelines of the `MatchIt` and `cobalt` packages ([Greifer, 2022](#); [Ho et al., 2011](#)).

For each matched dataset we present the differences for the covariates used in matching plus their interactions. We drop the interactions between covariates and state and round variables to prevent too verbose an output.


E.1 Minority Traits and Support for Supranational Integration: Figure 3




(a) Balance of migration background treatment.

Figure E1: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Figure 3 (ESS data).

Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.




(a) Balance of language minority treatment.



(b) Balance of migration background treatment.


Figure E2: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Figure 3, continued (ESS data). Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.

E.2 Sub-State Matching: Table C2, Panel B




(a) Balance of migration background treatment.

Figure E3: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Panel B in Table C2 (ESS data). Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.



(a) Balance of language minority treatment.




(b) Balance of migration background treatment.

Figure E4: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Panel B in Table C2, continued (ESS data).


Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.

E.3 Propensity Score Matching: Table 10




(a) Balance of migration background treatment.

Figure E5: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Panel C in Table C2 (ESS data). Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.



(a) Balance of language minority treatment.




(b) Balance of migration background treatment.

Figure E6: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Panel C in Table C2, continued (ESS data).

Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.


E.4 ISSP data: Table C4



(a) Balance of migration background treatment.

Figure E7: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Figure 6 (ISSP data).


Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.




(a) Balance of ethnic minority treatment.

Figure E8: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Figure 6, continued (ISSP data). Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.

E.5 Migrant-Background Populations: Figure 5



(a) Balance of first-generation migrants.




(b) Balance of second-generation migrants.

Figure E9: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Figure 5 (ESS data).

Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.

E.6 Historical Language Minorities: Figure 5



(a) Balance of historical language minorities.

Figure E10: Balance plots of standardized mean differences for Figure 6, continued (ISSP data). Standardized mean differences represent the difference in mean covariate value for treated and control group divided by the pre-treatment standard deviation of the control group. The closer to 0 (dashed line in upper plot), the better the balance. Differences are only computed for variables that can be treated as continuous.