LQGame, ILQGame Derivation

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1 LQGame Derivation using value iteration

Suppose we have an N person discrete linear dynamic game:

$$x_{t+1} = f(x_t, u_t^1, u_t^2, ..., u_t^N) = A_t x_t + \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j \tag{1}$$

Where x_t is the joint state of all agents, and u_t^i is the control input of each agent i.
A quadratic cost function for agent i given by:

$$c_i(x_t, u_t^1, ..., u_t^N) = x_t^\mathsf{T} Q_t^i x_t + \sum_{j=1}^{N} u_t^{j\mathsf{T}} R_t^{ij} u_t^j \tag{2}$$

Where Q_t penalizes state error and R_t penalizes actuation effort. Note that without loss of generality, R_t^{ij} is included and can be interpreted as the penalty of player j's control onto player i's cost function.

We can then formulate the Bellman Equation for player i as the current cost + cost to go,

$$J_i^*(x, t) = \min_{u_i} [c_i(x_t, u_t) + J^*(x_{t+1}, t+1)] \tag{3}$$

We then solve it in a backward induction fashion since we know the value function at the terminal state, which is given as,

$$J_i^*(x_{T-1}, T-1) = \min_{u_i} [c_i(x_{T-1}, u_{T-1})] \tag{4}$$

At the terminal state, the cost is only associated with the state (want to drive the actuation to 0),

$$J_i^*(x_{T-1}, T-1) = x_{T-1}^\mathsf{T} V_{T-1}^i x_{T-1} \tag{5}$$

Where the value matrix is defined as:

$$V_{T-1}^i = Q_{T-1}^i$$

At the second to last time step, $T-2$, the value function is,

$$J_i^*(x_{T-2}, T-2) = \min_{u_i} [c_i(x_{T-2}, u_{T-2}) + J_i^*(x_{T-1}, T-1)] \tag{6}$$

Substituting in the quadratic cost function

$$J_i^*(x_{T-2}, T-2) = \min_{u_i} [x_{T-2}^\mathsf{T} Q_{T-2}^i x_{T-2} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} u_{T-2}^{j}{}^\mathsf{T} R_{T-2}^{ij} u_{T-2}^j + x_{T-1}^\mathsf{T} V_{T-1}^i x_{T-1}] \tag{7}$$

Substituting in the linear dynamics and setting $t = T-2$ for notation simplicity,

$$J_i^*(x_t, t) = \min_{u_i} [x_t^\mathsf{T} Q_t^i x_t + \sum_{j=1}^{N} u_t^{j\mathsf{T}} R_t^{ij} u_t^j + (A_t x_t + \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j)^\mathsf{T} V_{t+1}^i (A_t x_t + \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j)] \tag{8}$$

We then take the derivative of the value function wrt the control input of player i, set to zero, and solve for the optimal control,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial u^i} J_i^*(x_t, t) = 0 \tag{9}$$

$$0 = 2R_t^{ii} u_t^i + 2B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i B_t^i u_t^i + 2B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i A_t x_t + 2B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j \tag{10}$$

Simplifying and rearranging,

$$(R_t^{ii} + B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i B_t^i) u_t^i + B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j = -B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i A_t x_t \tag{11}$$

Notice the form of the control input that minimizes the objective, which is a linear function of the state,

$$u_t^{i*} = -P_t^i x_t \tag{12}$$

Where P_t^i is analogous to an optimal proportional gain

Substituting equation 12 into 11:

$$(R_t^{ii} + B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i B_t^i) P_t^i x_t + B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j P_t^j x_t = B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i A_t x_t \tag{13}$$

Crossing out the x_t, we obtain the system of linear equations,

$$(R_t^{ii} + B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i B_t^i) P_t^i + B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j P_t^j = B_t^{i\top} V_{t+1}^i A_t \tag{14}$$

For instance, in an N player game, equation 14 can be written in matrix form as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} R_t^{11} + B_t^{1\top} V_{t+1}^1 B_t^1 & B_t^{1\top} V_{t+1}^1 B_t^2 & \cdots & B_t^{1\top} V_{t+1}^1 B_t^N \\ B_t^{2\top} V_{t+1}^2 B_t^1 & R_t^{22} + B_t^{2\top} V_{t+1}^2 B_t^2 & \cdots & B_t^{2\top} V_{t+1}^2 B_t^N \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ B_t^{N\top} V_{t+1}^N B_t^1 & B_t^{N\top} V_{t+1}^N B_t^2 & \cdots & R_t^{NN} + B_t^{N\top} V_{t+1}^N B_t^N \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} P_t^1 \\ P_t^2 \\ \vdots \\ P_t^N \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} B_t^{1\top} V_{t+1}^1 A_t \\ B_t^{2\top} V_{t+1}^2 A_t \\ \vdots \\ B_t^{N\top} V_{t+1}^N A_t \end{bmatrix}$$

To solve for P_t^i, we substitute the optimal control input , u_t^{i*}, into the value function (equation 8) to obtain a recursive relation for the value matrix V_t,

$$J_i^*(x_t, t) = x_t^\top Q_t^i x_t + \sum_{j=1}^{N} (P_t^j x_t)^\top R_t^{ij} (P_t^j x_t) + (A_t x_t - \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j (P_t^j x_t))^\top V_{t+1}^i (A_t x_t - \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j (P_t^j x_t)) \tag{15}$$

$$J_i^*(x_t, t) = x_t^\top (Q_t^i + \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_t^{j\top} R_t^{ij} P_t^j + (A_t - \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j P_t^j)^\top V_{t+1}^i (A_t - \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j P_t^j) x_t \tag{16}$$

$$J_i^*(x_t, t) = x_t^\top V_t^i x_t \tag{17}$$

The value matrix is updated recursively as,

$$V_t^i \leftarrow Q_t^i + \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_t^{j\top} R_t^{ij} P_t^j + (A_t - \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j P_t^j)^\top V_{t+1}^i (A_t - \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j P_t^j) \tag{18}$$

2 ILQgame Backup derivation

Still work in progress

Suppose we have an N person discrete nonlinear dynamic game:

$$x_{t+1} = f(x_t, u_t^1, u_t^2, ..., u_t^N) \tag{19}$$

Using a first order Taylor series expansion around a proposed trajectory $(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t)$:

$$\begin{aligned} f(\hat{x}_t + \delta\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t + \delta\hat{u}_t, ...,) &\approx f(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t) + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x}|_{\hat{x}_t,\hat{u}_t}(x_t - \hat{x}_t) + \frac{\partial f}{\partial u}|_{\hat{x}_t,\hat{u}_t}(u_t - \hat{u}_t) \\ x_{t+1} - \hat{x}_{t+1} &= A(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t)(x_t - \hat{x}_t) + B(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t)(u_t - \hat{u}_t) \\ \delta x_{t+1} &= A_t \delta x_t + B_t \delta u_t \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

Where δx_t and δu_t are changes to the state and control input trajectories, respectively.

A non-quadratic cost function for each agent i, is approximated using a second order Taylor expansion:

$$\begin{aligned} c(\hat{x}_t + \delta\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t + \delta\hat{u}_t) \approx c(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t) + \nabla_{x_t,u_t} c(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t) \begin{bmatrix} x_t - \hat{x}_t \\ u_t - \hat{u}_t \end{bmatrix} \\ + \frac{1}{2} \begin{bmatrix} x_t - \hat{x}_t \\ u_t - \hat{u}_t \end{bmatrix}^\intercal \nabla^2_{x_t,u_t} c(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t) \begin{bmatrix} x_t - \hat{x}_t \\ u_t - \hat{u}_t \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

Where the gradient of the cost function is defined as,

$$\nabla_{x_t,u_t} c(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial c}{\partial x} & \frac{\partial c}{\partial u} \end{bmatrix} \tag{22}$$

and the hessian,

$$\nabla^2_{x_t,u_t} c(\hat{x}_t, \hat{u}_t) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial x^2} & \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial x \partial u} \\ \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial u \partial x} & \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial u^2} \end{bmatrix} \tag{23}$$

Rearranging:

$$c(\delta x_t, \delta u_t) = \frac{1}{2}\delta x_t^\intercal (Q_t \delta x_t + 2 l_t^\intercal) + \frac{1}{2}\delta u_t^\intercal (R_t \delta u_t + 2 r_t^\intercal) + \frac{1}{2}\delta x_t^\intercal H_t \delta u_t + \frac{1}{2}\delta u_t^\intercal H_t \delta x_t \tag{24}$$

Where:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_t &= \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial x^2} \\ l_t &= \nabla_x c \\ R_t &= \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial u^2} \\ r_t &= \nabla_u c \\ H_t &= \frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial u \partial x} \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

Ignoring the mixed partials,

$$c(\delta x_t, \delta u_t) = \frac{1}{2}\delta x_t^\intercal (Q \delta x_t + 2 l_t) + \frac{1}{2}\delta u_t^\intercal (R \delta u_t + 2 r_t) \tag{26}$$

The problem can now be formulated as an LQGame problem with an affine term due to the gradients in the cost function. For a dynamic game, the cost function 27, can be rewritten as for agent i,

$$c_i(\delta x_t, \delta u_t^1, ..., \delta u_t^N) = \frac{1}{2}\delta x_t^\intercal (Q_t^i \delta x_t + 2l_t^i) + \frac{1}{2}\sum_{j=1}^{N} \delta u_t^{j\intercal}(R_t^{ij}\delta u_t^j + 2r_t^{ij}) \tag{27}$$

For notation simplicity, assume $x_t = \delta x_t$ and $u_t =$

At $T-1$,

$$J_i^*(x_{T-1}, T-1) = \min_{u_i}[c_i(x_{T-1}, u_{T-1})] \tag{28}$$

At the terminal state, the cost is only associated with the state,

$$J_i^*(x_{T-1}, T-1) = x_{T-1}^\intercal V_{T-1}^i x_{T-1} \tag{29}$$

Where the value matrix is defined as:

$$V_{T-1}^i = Q_{T-1}^i$$

At the second to last time step, $T-2$, the value function is,

$$J_i^*(x_{T-2}, T-2) = \min_{u_i}[c(x_{T-2}, u_{T-2}) + J_i^*(x_{T-1}, T-1)] \tag{30}$$

Substituting in the quadratic cost function

$$J_i^*(x_{T-2}, T-2) = \min_{u_i}[\frac{1}{2}\delta x_t^\intercal (Q_t^i \delta x_t + 2l_t^i) + \frac{1}{2}\sum_{j=1}^{N} \delta u_t^{j\intercal}(R_t^{ij}\delta u_t^j + 2r_t^{ij}) + x_{T-1}^\intercal V_{T-1}^i x_{T-1}] \tag{31}$$

Substituting in the linear dynamics and setting $t = T-2$ for notation simplicity,

$$\begin{aligned} J_i^*(x_t, t) = \min_{u_i}[&\frac{1}{2}\delta x_t^\intercal (Q_t^i \delta x_t + 2l_t^i) + \frac{1}{2}\sum_{j=1}^{N} \delta u_t^{j\intercal}(R_t^{ij}\delta u_t^j + 2r_t^{ij}) \\ &+ (A_t x_t + \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j)^\intercal V_{t+1}^i (A_t x_t + \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j)] \end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

We then take the derivative of the value function wrt the control input of player i, set to zero, and solve for the optimal control,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial u^i} J_i^*(x_t, t) = 0 \tag{33}$$

$$0 = R_t^{ii} u_t^i + r_t^{ii} + B_t^{i\intercal} V_{t+1}^i B_t^i u_t^i + B_t^{i\intercal} V_{t+1}^i A_t x_t + B_t^{i\intercal} V_{t+1}^i \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j \tag{34}$$

Simplifying and rearranging,

$$(R_t^{ii} + B_t^{i\intercal} V_{t+1}^i B_t^i) u_t^i + B_t^{i\intercal} V_{t+1}^i \sum_{j=1}^{N} B_t^j u_t^j = -B_t^{i\intercal} V_{t+1}^i A_t x_t \tag{35}$$

Notice the form of the control input that minimizes the objective, which is a linear function of the state,

$$u_t^{i*} = -P_t^i x_t - \alpha_t^i \tag{36}$$