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Source: *Social Problems*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (November 2007), pp. 434-453

Published by: [University of California Press](#) on behalf of the [Society for the Study of Social Problems](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/sp.2007.54.4.434>

Accessed: 21/06/2014 16:38

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Europeans' Preference for Ethnic Residential Homogeneity: Cross-National Analysis of Response to Neighborhood Ethnic Composition

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This article examines Europeans' preference to reside in neighborhoods without ethnic minorities. The analysis is based on data from 20 countries obtained from the 2003 European Social Survey (Jowell and the Central Coordinating Team 2003). The data show that in most countries very few Europeans report living in areas with some or with many ethnic minorities, and that in most countries a substantial number of respondents consider their ideal neighborhood one that does not have residents who are ethnic minorities. Multilevel regression analysis reveals that preference for place of residence as a response to its ethnic composition is significantly affected by both individual-level and country-level characteristics. At the individual level, preference for ethnically homogeneous residence tends to be more pronounced among socioeconomically weak and vulnerable populations, conservative populations, and individuals who reside in communities without ethnic minorities. The country-level analysis demonstrates that preference to live in neighborhoods without ethnic minorities tends to increase with the relative size of the non-European ethnic population and to decrease with economic prosperity. Further analysis reveals that in Europe, preference for residing in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods is influenced by three major social psychological factors: social distance, perceptions of the negative impact of foreigners, and preference for cultural homogeneity. The findings are discussed and evaluated in light of the general literature on structural sources of threat, prejudice, and choice of community, and are compared to findings revealed by research in the United States. Keywords: residential segregation, residential preferences, prejudice, ethnic relations, European societies.

Sociologists have long viewed residential segregation as a major dimension of social stratification and as a significant indicator of social inequality. The literature on residential segregation has repeatedly demonstrated that racial and ethnic minorities rarely live in the same neighborhoods as the majority group, and that minorities tend to reside in the poorer neighborhoods of metropolitan areas while members of the majority population live in more affluent and prestigious neighborhoods. In the United States, residential segregation has significant negative consequences for blacks, including consequences for life chances, opportunities to acquire quality education, employment opportunities, occupational mobility, and

The article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on Social Stratification and Mobility, Brno, The Czech Republic in May 2007. An earlier version was presented at the 11th International Metropolis Conference, Lisbon, Portugal in October 2006. Work on this article was supported by German Israel Foundation Grant # I-769-241. The authors would like to thank the reviewers for insightful and constructive suggestions. Direct correspondence to: Moshe Semyonov, Department of Sociology, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. E-mail: moshes@post.tau.ac.il.

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access to social, medical, and cultural amenities (e.g., Collins and Williams 1999; Hart et al. 1998; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Polednak 1993).

A number of factors contribute to the development and persistence of racial residential segregation (Yinger 1995), but scholars typically focus on three main causes: economics, discrimination, and preferences. The economic explanation posits that because of racial differences in economic status, and because of economic segregation in housing, whites and blacks in the United States live in different areas simply because blacks cannot afford to live in the same kinds of neighborhoods that whites can. Early studies (1960–1980) refuted this hypothesis, but the evidence is more mixed in recent years (Alba, Logan, and Stults 2000; Darden and Kamel 2000; Krivo and Kaufman 1999; Massey and Fischer 1999; St. John and Clymer 1999). The second explanation is that segregation is the outcome of persistent discriminatory practices in the housing market (Goering and Wienk 1996; Munnell et al. 1996; Ross and Yinger 2002; Turner and Wienk 1993; Turner et al. 2002; Yinger 1995).

A third explanation is that segregation persists because of the preferences people hold about the racial composition of the neighborhoods in which they want to live. There has been considerable scholarly debate about *whether* preferences matter (Clark 1986; Fossett 2006; Galster 1986), *whose* preferences matter (Patterson 1997; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997), and what factors *underlie* those preferences (Charles 2000a, 200b; Clark 1982, 1991, 2002; Farley et al. 1994; Harris 1999, 2001; Krysan and Farley 2002). However, there is a general consensus that the incompatible preferences of the majority and minority group play some role in shaping patterns of segregation.

Whereas the body of literature on residential ethnic segregation and preferences related to neighborhood ethnic composition in American society is substantial, very little research has been done on residential preferences in the context of European cities. This neglect is unfortunate and somewhat surprising in light of the recent increase in studies on the influx of non-European immigrants into European cities and the emergence of ethnic communities and patterns of ethnic residential segregation in European cities (e.g., Logan 2006; Musterd 2005; Musterd and De Vos 2007; Musterd, Ostendorf, and Breebart 1998; Peach 1999). These studies reveal high levels of ethnic residential segregation in European cities with patterns that are somewhat different from those observed in American cities (e.g., Logan 2006; Musterd 2005; Musterd et al. 1998; Peach 1998). Although patterns of ethnic residential segregation in Europe also vary across cities and across ethnic groups, the data leave no doubt that ethnic immigrants in Europe are residentially, socially, and culturally segregated from the majority population. While a handful of studies have established the growing patterns of residential inequality in several European countries, there have been fewer investigations into the causes of segregation in these cities, and to our knowledge, no studies that have looked specifically at the preferences of Europeans to either live with, or avoid living in, neighborhoods with these new residents or at the structural and social psychological factors that relate to these preferences.

In this article, we seek to remedy part of this neglect by examining preferences for residential ethnic homogeneity in 20 European countries. Using data from the European Social Survey (Jowell and the Central Coordinating Team 2003), we first provide a basic description of housing preferences for neighborhood homogeneity. We then use multilevel models to assess the factors that underlie these preferences, focusing on the influence of individual- and country-level attributes. The goals of our article are four-fold: (1) to describe the structure of preferences for ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods in Europe; (2) to explore the economic and demographic predictors of preferences for ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods; (3) to assess the degree to which social psychological predictors shape preferences for homogeneous neighborhoods; and (4) to provide a comparative cross-national perspective by examining the extent to which structural characteristics of countries explain cross-national variations in preferences for residential homogeneity.

Background

Patterns of Segregation in Europe and the United States

Racial segregation in American cities has long been a major topic of interest for both social scientists and policy makers. Since the development of the Chicago school “human-ecological” model and the publication of *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (Zorbaugh 1929) and *Negroes in Cities* (Taeuber and Taeuber 1965), researchers have systematically studied patterns of residential segregation between racial and ethnic groups in the United States (e.g., Massey and Denton 1987, 1989, 1993). Research on the topic consistently reports high levels of residential segregation between whites and blacks, particularly in older cities and those outside the western United States (Denton 1994; Farley and Frey 1994; Krivo and Kaufman 1999; Massey and Denton, 1989) and somewhat lower, yet still high segregation between whites and Hispanics and between whites and Asians (Clark 1992, 2002; Denton 1994; Denton and Massey 1988). Curiously, despite Civil Rights legislation, the high levels of racial residential segregation observed half a century ago still prevail in contemporary America (Charles 2003; Emerson, Chai, and Yancey 2001). Indeed, residential segregation is a structural feature of American society—a feature that denies to racial and ethnic minorities equal access to cultural, educational, occupational, and economic opportunities.

Ethnic and racial segregation in European cities is a recent phenomenon. The influx of guest workers, migrant laborers, ex-colonials, refugees, and immigrants to European countries in recent decades has dramatically changed the ethnic composition and ethnic structure of most European cities. Metropolitan centers like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Brussels, Antwerp, Paris, London, Manchester, Leicester, Bradford, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Vienna, Lisbon, Oslo, and Stockholm are characterized by substantial numbers of non-European ethnic and racial minorities that are over-concentrated in distinct ethnic neighborhoods (e.g., Logan 2006; Malheiros and Vala 2004; Musterd 2005; Musterd et al. 1998).

Cities across Europe differ considerably in the ethnic and racial makeup of their non-European populations. For example, London and other large English cities have become home to black Caribbeans and Asians (mostly Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi) while German cities have become home to large numbers of Turks and Yugoslavs. Whereas Paris and Brussels are heavily populated by North Africans, Dutch cities have attracted residents from the former colonies in the Caribbean (e.g., the Surinamese) as well as immigrants from Morocco and Turkey. Scandinavian cities have become a destination for immigrants and refugees from the former Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and Ethiopia while the Greek cities of Athens and Thessalonica have become a major destination for Albanian immigrants. Likewise, Lisbon has attracted substantial numbers of immigrants from Africa, South Asia, and China (Hatziprokopiou 2003; Karsten et al. 2006; Logan 2006; Mahheiros and Vala 2004; Musterd 2005; Musterd et al. 1998).

Notwithstanding cross-city differences in the ethnic and racial composition of the non-European populations, students of spatial segregation have arrived at a twofold conclusion. First, residential segregation is a widely spread phenomenon in European cities regardless of the ethnic population. Second, the rate of segregation in most cities has increased over the years (e.g., Karsten et al. 2006; Musterd 2005; Van Kempen and Van Weesep 1997). Yet, patterns and rates of residential segregation are highly dependent on both the country of residence and on the ethnic or racial groups involved. For example, segregation rates in most German, Austrian, French, Greek, and Scandinavian cities are lower than the rates observed in most Dutch, United Kingdom, or Belgium cities. Likewise, the residential segregation of the Bangladeshi population in U.K. cities is much more pronounced than the segregation of Caribbean blacks (e.g., Musterd 2005), and the spatial segregation of Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam is more intensive than the segregation of Surinamese (Logan 2006).

Racial residential segregation in most European cities is very similar to that observed in the United States, with one important exception. Rates of residential segregation for blacks in American cities are considerably higher than rates of ethnic or racial segregation in European cities. However, when ethnic spatial segregation in European cities is compared to nonblack ethnic minorities in U.S. cities (e.g., Hispanics, Asians) levels of segregation between ethnic minorities and the European populations do not differ much. In fact, they are very similar to those observed in the United Kingdom, Amsterdam, and other cities in continental Europe (Logan 2006; Musterd 2005).

The Structure of Racial Residential Preferences

A large number of studies investigate the role that preferences for residential location play in driving spatial segregation (e.g., Clark 1992; Farley et al. 1978; Fossett 2006; Krysan 2002; Schelling 1971). The data most often brought to bear on this question examine racial residential preferences by asking respondents to consider and react to hypothetical neighborhoods with a variety of racial compositions. These studies reveal that in general, over time, whites in the United States have become increasingly comfortable with token numbers of black neighbors, but they remain consistently reluctant to live in neighborhoods that have more than about 20 percent African American residents (Farley et al. 1994). For the most part, whites in the United States are more comfortable sharing neighborhoods with Asian Americans and Hispanics than with African Americans (Charles 2000a, 2006), although both of these groups—and especially Hispanics—are still viewed as undesirable neighbors. To our knowledge, there have been no studies that detail the structure of racial residential preferences outside of the United States.

The Social, Economic, and Demographic Sources of Racial Residential Preferences

In addition to documenting and debating the structure of racial residential preferences as a contributor to patterns of persistent segregation, a rather substantial body of research in the United States has also tackled the question of the social, economic, demographic, and social psychological factors that drive racial residential preferences.

Insofar as racial residential preferences can be construed as one dimension of racial attitudes, then we have at our disposal a well-established body of knowledge that allows us to formulate theoretical expectations regarding how individual-level and contextual variables influence preference for residence in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods. The research on prejudice has long suggested that discriminatory attitudes toward out-group populations are shaped and formed in part by the sociodemographic attributes of individuals. More specifically, individuals with low education and low socioeconomic status, the unemployed, older populations, and those holding a conservative ideological orientation are more likely than others to hold negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities (e.g., Case, Greeley, and Fuchs 1989; Quillian 1995; Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003; Scheepers, Gijberts, and Coenders 2002; Semyonov et al. 2004; Semyonov, Raijman, and Yom-Tov 2002). The effect of some of these socioeconomic factors has been interpreted as an expression of the effects of the direct competition generated by ethnic minorities. Following this literature we expect preference for ethnically homogenous neighborhoods to be more pronounced among socioeconomically vulnerable and weak populations, and also among older people and individuals with a conservative orientation.

A series of studies also point to the significant effect of contextual-structural factors on attitudes toward minorities, particularly those that tap the competitive threat posed by these groups (e.g., Kunovich 2004; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al.; 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006). The two structural attributes most often used as determinants of attitudes toward minority

populations are the relative size of the ethnic group population and the economic conditions that prevail in the host society. Specifically, the larger the size of the minority population and the more depressed the economic conditions are, the greater the threat and fear of competition over scarce social resources and economic rewards. Competitive threat, in turn, is likely to produce greater hostility and prejudice toward minority populations (e.g., Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006).

Cross-national studies that have examined the effect of structural sources of competitive threat on attitudes toward foreigners in European societies lend firm support to these theoretical expectations. They reveal that anti-foreigner sentiment tends to rise with the size of the foreign population residing in the country and to decrease with economic prosperity, as measured by either by the gross national product (GNP) per capita or the unemployment rate (e.g., Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006). Following this body of literature we expect that preference for residence in an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood would tend to increase with the proportion of non-European minorities in the country but to decrease with economic prosperity.

The Social Psychological Underpinnings of Racial Residential Preferences

In the United States, there is considerable debate about the social psychological foundations of racial residential preferences. The research tends to focus on whether racial residential preferences reflect ethnocentrism, racial prejudice, or something else. For example, some (e.g., Clark 1986, 1992; Patterson 1997; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997) maintain that individuals prefer to live in “homogenous” communities because they wish to live with “their own kind” (with whom they share a cultural background and values). In essence, it is the attitudes one holds about one’s own group, and a desire to maintain cultural homogeneity, that drives residential preferences. An alternative view holds that white (majority group) preferences for homogeneous neighborhoods are an expression of racial prejudice toward racial and ethnic minorities, where this prejudice can be construed as either traditional prejudice or prejudice as a sense of group position (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2001; Farley et al. 1994; Krysan, 2002). Still, a third perspective maintains that preferences for residential homogeneity are a response to social and economic factors that individuals associate with race in general and, therefore, neighborhoods populated by particular racial groups (e.g., Frey 1979; Harris 1999, 2001; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Skogan 1990).

Almost all of the research on the social psychological foundations of racial residential preferences has focused on the attitudes of and about whites and blacks in the United States. It is only recently that researchers have turned their attention to measuring and analyzing the racial residential preferences of whites toward recent immigrants who are of different races/ethnicities. A recent example is Camille Zubrinsky Charles (2006), who examined, among other things, whites’ residential preferences for living with African Americans, Asians, and Latinos in Los Angeles. In models predicting whites’ preferences for having black, Asian, and Latino neighbors, she reports that racial stereotyping, social distance, and racial group threat were all significant predictors of a desire to avoid living in neighborhoods with particular groups. However, attachment to one’s in-group, but not the perceived social class differences between racial/ethnic groups, influence preferences for neighborhood segregation (Charles 2006).

Existing research on the social psychological foundations of racial residential preferences can be loosely grouped into two categories: an attraction to one’s own group versus an aversion to a group that is racially or ethnically different from one’s own (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996). For example, one’s desire for a homogenous neighborhood may be largely driven by the sense that a neighborhood—or country for that matter—is best served by cultural and ethnic homogeneity. This is less about any negative perceptions or feelings about any out-groups and more about a general sense that one’s own culture and group are the preferred

state of affairs. In essence, ethnocentrism may drive a desire to prefer living in neighborhoods with people of the same cultural background. This is most parallel to what researchers in the United States have referred to as ethnocentrism (Clark 1986, 1992).

Another perspective is that individuals prefer ethnic homogeneity because they want to avoid sharing residential space with out-group members; that is, rather than being drawn to their "own kind," such a preference is shaped by a desire to avoid "the other kind." One type of avoidance is based on traditional racial prejudice (Allport 1954; Katz 1991). Expressions of traditional racial prejudice generally take the form of negative stereotypes and antipathy toward members of the out-group (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996). Studies of the residential preferences of whites in the United States show a significant effect for racial stereotyping (Farley et al. 1994) and social distance (Charles 2006): Whites who hold negative racial stereotypes or express greater degrees of social distance from African Americans are significantly more likely to prefer fewer African Americans in their neighborhoods.

Research discussed above that focuses on objective measures of competitive threat (Kunovich 2004; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006) is related to the second kind of racial prejudice proposed to shape racial residential preferences. However, the emphasis here is on the *perception* of competitive threat as opposed to objective measures of threats. This perspective is derived from Herbert Blumer's (1958) theory of prejudice as a sense of group position and is articulated most recently by Lawrence Bobo (1999). Applying this theoretical perspective to residential preferences, Charles (2006) showed that whites who viewed a particular racial/ethnic group as posing threats to the security of jobs and political influence of whites were more likely to oppose living in neighborhoods with that group.

The Present Study

We use data obtained from the European Social Survey (Jowell and the Central Coordinating Team 2003) to first describe the patterns of preferences for residence in an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood, and then examine the impact of individual-level and country-level variables on such preferences across 20 European countries. Guided by the large body of research in the United States on preferences, as well as the body of research on racial prejudice more generally, we address two different kinds of predictors of racial residential preferences. We first assess the nonattitudinal bases of preferences for residence in homogeneous neighborhoods. Following the literature on sources of prejudice and on racial residential preferences, we expect preference to reside in communities without ethnic minorities to be more pronounced among vulnerable and socioeconomically weak populations and among populations with a conservative ideological orientation. Notwithstanding the impact of individual-level attributes, we also expect preference for residence in ethnically homogeneous places to vary across countries. That is, we expect cross-country variation in preference for residence in homogeneous neighborhoods to be systematically associated with sources of structural threat net of the social composition of countries. Specifically, we expect preference for residential homogeneity to increase with the relative size of the ethnic population residing in the country and to decrease with economic prosperity.

In the second stage of our analysis, we construct models that test three different expectations about the social psychological factors underlying preferences for residence in homogeneous neighborhoods. One taps a preference for cultural homogeneity, which we interpret as one dimension of ethnocentrism. Specifically, we include a scale that measures the degree to which individuals believe that similarity of culture, religion, and language is better for a country. A second is closest to a dimension of traditional racial prejudice in that it taps the degree to which majority group members prefer to maintain a particular level of social distance from a minority group—in this case, avoidance of marriage by their close relatives or friends to a member of the minority group. Finally, the degree to which people believe that

the arrival of immigrants creates social problems for a nation is used as a second dimension of out-group avoidance; this one is rooted more in prejudice as a sense of group position (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999).

Data and Variables

Data for our analysis were obtained from the European Social Survey conducted in 2002 in 22 countries.¹ Face-to-face interviews were conducted with nationally representative samples (age 15 and older) in the respondent's home and include sociodemographic and economic characteristics of respondents plus a variety of questions on attitudes toward foreign populations residing in Europe. Following previous researchers (e.g., Coenders and Scheepers 2003), we restrict our analysis only to respondents who are members of the majority population—European citizens.² This procedure resulted in 35,141 cases in 20 European countries.³

The dependent variable—preference for residence in an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood—was measured by respondents' answers to the following question: "Suppose you were choosing where to live, which of the three types of areas on this card would you ideally wish to live in? An area where almost nobody was of a different race or ethnic group from most (country) people; some people were of a different race or ethnic group from most (country) people; many people were of a different race or ethnic group; or it would make no difference." For the purpose of this analysis we distinguish between those who prefer to live in an area where almost nobody was of a different race or ethnicity as against all others. This classification provides, perhaps, the most conservative distinction between those who prefer living in a homogeneous area and all others.

The individual-level independent variables utilized in the analysis as predictors of preference for residential homogeneity are those traditionally used in models predicting attitudes toward minority populations. They include: household income per capita (in 12 categories in Euro), education (in formal years), employment status (distinguishing among three dummy categories: employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force), age (in years), marital status (married = 1), type of locality (rural = 1), political orientation (on ten ordinal categories from left to right, (left = 0), gender (men = 1), and the ethnic composition of neighborhood of residence (defined by three dummy variables distinguishing among neighborhoods without any residents of non-European ethnic origin, neighborhoods where some residents are of different ethnic origin, and neighborhoods where most residents are of non-European ethnic origin). The last variable not only captures ethnic composition of current neighborhood but can also serve as a proxy of interethnic contacts and interactions at the individual level.⁴

In order to delineate the social-psychological mechanisms underlying preferences for residence in an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood and to examine alternative theoretical explanations, three variables (measured at the individual level) were added to the analysis. The three variables pertain, respectively, to social distance (traditional racial prejudice), perceptions of threat (i.e., perceptions of the negative impact of foreigners—prejudice as group

1. Israel and Hungary are excluded from the analysis. Hungary was excluded because one of the preference options for segregation was erased by mistake, making comparison with other countries problematic. Israel was excluded because of the unique meaning of the concept "immigrant" in this society.

2. The same analysis was performed on a smaller group—European native citizens. The results of this analysis were virtually the same to those reported here.

3. The weight we use takes into account the proportion of different groups in the country and the proportion of each country's population in Europe.

4. We are aware that preferences may affect place of residence but at the same time, according to contact theory, residence in ethnically mixed communities may affect attitudes toward outsiders through (positive) social contacts and interactions. Thus, we use ethnic composition of current neighborhood mostly for control purpose without any claim for causality.

position), and attitudes toward cultural, national, and religious homogeneity (ethnocentrism).⁵ More specifically, social distance as an indicator of prejudice toward the non-European population was captured by one's willingness to accept marriage of a close relative to members of ethnic minorities (on a 0 to 10 scale). Views regarding the threat posed by ethnic minorities were measured by respondents' attitudes toward the impact that foreigners exert on jobs, health, and welfare, the economy, cultural life, levels of crime, and the overall life of the country. Perception of threat was measured through an average score of the six items on an 11-point scale (ranging from 0 to 10 for each item). Preference for cultural and ethnic homogeneity (ethnocentrism) is measured through use of an average score (on scales ranging from 1 to 5) of responses to three items that pertain, respectively, to whether a country would be better or worse if people share similar values and traditions, variety of different religions, and at least one common language. For detailed definitions, wording, and measures of these variables see the Appendix.

The country-level variables, selected to represent structural and contextual sources of the preference for residence in ethnically homogeneous neighborhood, include: size of the non-European foreign population residing in the country, size of the Muslim population residing in the country, and economic conditions. Whereas the size of the non-European population and economic conditions have long been used as indicators of structural threat (e.g., Kunovitch 2004; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006), size of the Muslim population may also capture the degree of cultural differences between the native and the foreign population (e.g., Halliday 1999; Strabac and Listhaug forthcoming). Muslims, who constitute a significant proportion of immigrants in Europe, share many similar problems with other immigrant populations. Yet, a series of recent events have singled out Muslims as a salient, unique, and maladapted cultural minority within European societies. Therefore, relative size of the ethnic population in the country was measured using two indicators. The first is the proportion of the population from non-European countries residing in the country (Eurostat 2003)⁶. The second is the size of the Muslim population measured by the percentage of respondents who defined their religious affiliation as "Islam" (obtained directly from the ESS 2002).⁷ Economic conditions in the country were defined in terms of gross domestic product per capita (GDP) for the years 2000–2002 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002). GDP is considered a better proxy than either GNP or unemployment rates because it is constructed using the "purchasing power parity method," an approach that takes into account the living standard in each country. For detailed definitions of all the variables used in the analysis and their mean values see the Appendix.

Results

Table 1 displays a descriptive overview of the characteristics of the 20 countries included in the study. Specifically, column one lists the percentage of the population that prefers residence in an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood (an area without ethnic minorities) and

5. The variable "ethnocentrism," as defined and operationalized here, is somewhat different from conventional definitions of in-group preference and ethnocentrism as used in U.S. studies of racial residential preferences. The operational definition of the variable ethnocentrism (with the absence of any other measure) captures, in effect, preferences for cultural and ethnic homogeneity and is viewed as a proxy of European ethnocentrism.

6. In light of the complexity in defining foreigners in Europe, we followed previous researchers on this issue (Coenders, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2004; Lahav 2004; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006) and used estimates of the proportions of non-European residents provided by Eurostat (2003). The Eurostat is a highly reputable and recognized international institution that maintains high standards in data collection and standardization of definitions (e.g., Coenders et al. 2004; Semyonov et al. 2006).

7. We also used data reported by Strabac and Listhaug (forthcoming) and received similar results to those reported here.

Table 1 • Descriptive Statistics (Percent or Mean) of the Country-level Characteristics

Country	Percent of Population Preferring Residence in Homogeneous Areas	Percent Who Report Residing in Homogeneous Area	Percent Non-EU Foreigners	Percent Muslim	GDP per Capita	N
Austria	34.7	47.9	8.40	1.10	24255.63	2154
Belgium	42.7	64.0	2.85	1.70	22702.50	1803
Czech Republic	36	45.5	2.10	.00	5804.81	1354
Denmark	37.8	64.4	3.85	.80	30521.48	1464
Finland	31.7	67.4	1.40	.00	23972.00	1969
France	23.5	30.2	3.50	3.30	22861.83	1439
Germany	23.3	37.9	6.65	.70	23104.06	2774
Greece	45.9	19.7	6.50	1.80	11389.25	2429
Ireland	34.6	61.3	1.15	.00	27450.81	1978
Italy	26.8	39.0	2.10	.10	19359	1203
Luxemburg	26.1	51.9	5.10	.20	45698.30	1023
Netherlands	32.2	58.2	2.90	1.80	24377.10	2319
Norway	24.7	55.7	2.30	.40	38919.43	1982
Poland	34.1	85.8	.10	.00	4645.65	2110
Portugal	40.3	54.7	1.20	.00	11007.12	1476
Slovenia	34.6	52.6	2.20	1.30	10197.20	1514
Spain	32.7	41.1	1.75	.20	14712.4	1684
Sweden	20.4	64.5	3.40	1.00	26211.78	1941
Switzerland	18	36.4	8.30	.10	34709.25	1828
UK	25.5	49.4	2.75	1.70	25026.03	1994

Sources: Eurostat 2002, 2003; Jowell and the Central Coordinating Committee 2002; OECD 2001, 2002

in column two, the percentage of the population that reports that they reside in a neighborhood without ethnic minorities (homogeneous neighborhood).⁸ Columns three, four, and five of the table display percent non-European foreigners, percent Muslim, and GDP per capita, respectively.

The data reveal considerable variation across countries in the preference for residence in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods. Such preference is highest in Greece, Belgium, and Portugal (where over 40 percent prefer residence in areas without ethnic minorities) and lowest in Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, and France (where under 25 percent of the population wish to reside in homogeneous communities). Other countries such as Slovenia, Poland, Holland, Finland, and Spain fall in between, with about one-third of the respondents indicating that they wish to reside in a neighborhood without ethnic minorities.

The data also reveal high levels of reported residence in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods. It is highest in Poland, where 86 percent of the respondents indicate that they live in areas where there are almost no residents of another ethnic or racial origin. Residence in homogeneous communities is also high in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Ireland (where over 60 percent of respondents indicated that they reside in neighborhoods with no ethnic minorities) and lowest in Greece (19.7 percent), France (30.2 percent), Switzerland (36.4 percent), and Germany (37.9 percent).

8. Since we do not have access to census data to compute measures of actual segregation such as the conventional index of dissimilarity, our measure of segregation is based on self-reported data regarding the ethnic composition of current neighborhood. We have to keep in mind, however, that the distribution of the foreign population across neighborhoods is also affected by their proportion in the population. The smaller the relative size of ethnic minorities residing in the country, the lower are the odds of residence in integrated neighborhoods.

Countries not only differ by preference for residence and by patterns of residential segregation but also by other structural characteristics such as size of the minority population, size of the Muslim population, and economic conditions as well as by the social and demographic composition of their populations. Therefore, it is essential to examine cross-national variation in preference for residence in a homogeneous neighborhood while taking into consideration cross-country variation in both the composition of the populations and the characteristics of the countries. Consistent with this logic, the analysis in Table 2 reports results from a series of multivariate logistic regression models in which we predict the odds for preferring an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood as a function of individual-level and country-level attributes.

Table 2 lists the estimated coefficients of two logistic regression equations predicting (log) odds for preference for residence in an area without ethnic minorities. In Equation 1, preference for residential homogeneity is predicted as a function of the following individual-level attributes: gender, marital status, age, rural-urban residence, education, household income per capita, employment status, political orientation, and ethnic composition of area of residence. In Equation 2 a series of dummy variables representing the 20 countries are added to the individual-level predictors. While the individual-level coefficients provide estimates of the net effect of each variable on the relative odds of preference for residence in homogeneous neighborhoods across Europe, the coefficients representing countries indicate differences in preferences across countries net of the social and demographic composition of their populations.

The data presented by Equation 1 lend firm support to the hypothesis that a preference for homogeneous residence tends to be more pronounced among socioeconomically weak and vulnerable populations and among individuals with conservative political views. While the effects of education and income on residential preference are negative and statistically significant, the effects of age, right-wing political orientation, and unemployment status are all positive and statistically significant. That is, the net odds of preferring residence in homogeneous neighborhood tend to decrease with education and income and increase with age and right-wing political orientation. It also tends to be more pronounced among the unemployed and among men. The data also reveal that marital status and rural residence do not exert significant influence on residential preferences.

Although the analysis reported here is not aimed at examining the "contact theory," the findings revealed by Table 2 are consistent with the theory. The coefficients for the variables representing the ethnic composition of current place of residence suggest that, net of other socioeconomic and demographic attributes, those who live in a neighborhood without any ethnic minorities are more likely to view such places as an ideal residential location than either those living in a neighborhood with some ethnic minorities ($b = -1.272$) or than those living in a neighborhoods where most residents are ethnic minorities ($b = -.789$). More specifically, the odds that residents of a neighborhood without ethnic minorities would wish to live in an area with ethnic minorities are 3.5 times lower than among residents of areas with some ethnic minorities and 2 times lower than among residents of areas where most residents are ethnic minorities. It is possible that interethnic contacts and interactions enhance positive views among members of the majority group population toward living with minority groups.

When a set of dummy variables representing countries of origin is added as predictors of preference for residential homogeneity in Equation 2, the effects of the individual-level variables observed in Equation 1 hardly change. The dummy variables representing countries, however, reveal considerable cross-country variation in a preference for residence in ethnically homogeneous areas. In general, the data indicate that, net of the social and demographic composition of the population, preference for homogeneous residence is highest in Greece and Belgium and lowest in Switzerland and Sweden. Preference for homogeneous residence is relatively low in Norway, Poland, Italy, France, and Germany and relatively high

Table 2 • Coefficients (S.E.) of Logistic Regression Predicting Preferences for Residential Ethnic Homogeneity

Variables	Equation 1			Equation 2		
	B	S.E.	Exp. (B)	B	S.E.	Exp. (B)
Intercept	−.688	.084		−.105	.122	
Men	.091*	.028	1.095	.094*	.029	1.098
Married	.012	.031	1.012	−.003	.031	.997
Age	.015*	.001	1.015	.016*	.001	1.016
Rural	.033	.030	1.033	.013	.031	1.013
Education	−.091*	.004	.913	.089*	.004	.915
Income per capita ^a	−.099*	.018	.905	−.056*	.021	.946
<i>Employment status^b</i>						
Not in the labor market	−.050	.033	.951	−.051	.033	.951
Unemployed	.204*	.063	1.226	.248*	.063	1.281
Political orientation	.122*	.007	1.130	.120*	.007	1.128
<i>Current neighborhood^c</i>						
Neighborhood where some residents are of different ethnic origin	−1.272*	.032	.280	−1.329*	.034	.265
Neighborhood where most residents are of different ethnic origin	−.789*	.047	.454	−.831*	.049	.436
<i>Country^d</i>						
Austria	—	—	—	−.158	.135	.854
Czech Republic	—	—	—	−.158	.123	.854
Denmark	—	—	—	−.231	.142	.795
Finland	—	—	—	−.680*	.145	.507
France	—	—	—	−.710*	.096	.492
Germany	—	—	—	−.678*	.092	.508
Greece	—	—	—	.307*	.124	1.359
Ireland	—	—	—	−.351*	.174	.704
Italy	—	—	—	−.741*	.097	.477
Luxemburg	—	—	—	−.505	.598	.604
Netherlands	—	—	—	−.454*	.109	.635
Norway	—	—	—	−.823*	.162	.439
Poland	—	—	—	−.772*	.098	.462
Portugal	—	—	—	−.402*	.127	.669
Slovenia	—	—	—	−.359	.227	.699
Spain	—	—	—	−.270*	.099	.764
Sweden	—	—	—	−1.241*	.134	.289
Switzerland	—	—	—	−1.082*	.152	.339
UK	—	—	—	−.751*	.095	.472

Sources: Eurostat 2002, 2003; Jowell and the Central Coordinating Committee 2002; OECD 2001, 2002

Notes:

^aincome per capita divided by 1000

^bomitted category = employed

^comitted category = neighborhood where almost no residents are of different ethnic group

^domitted category Belgium

**p* < .05 (one-tailed tests)

in the Czech Republic, Austria, Spain, and Denmark. To illustrate the extent of the cross-country net differences in such preferences, the odds that a citizen of Belgium would prefer living in an area without ethnic minorities are double those of a German citizen and about three times higher than citizens of Switzerland or Sweden.

Although interesting, these regression equations do not tell us whether and to what extent residential preferences vary systematically with characteristics of the countries. More specifically, the data do not tell us whether and to what extent cross-country variations in preference are affected by size of the non-European population, Muslim population, and by economic conditions. Nor do they provide us with accurate estimates of the extent to which the impact of individual-level characteristics on residential preferences varies across countries. Thus, in the analysis presented in Table 3, we replace the dummy variables representing countries by a series of country-level structural characteristics (i.e. percent foreigners, percent Muslims, GDP). The coefficients obtained from the hierarchical logistic regression models represent estimated country-level effects while controlling for variations in individual-level characteristics.⁹

Three models are presented in Table 3. In Model 1 we include only sociodemographic individual-level characteristics. In Model 2 we add the three country level variables that represent structural threat, namely, size of the non-European population, size of the Muslim population, and GDP per capita.¹⁰ In Model 3 we add to the individual-level attributes indicators of social distance, views on foreigners' impact on society, and a desire for cultural homogeneity. The inclusion of these three intervening variables in Model 3 enables us to obtain deeper insights into the social mechanisms that lead to such preferences, above and beyond the structural, demographic, and economic characteristics included in the first two models.

The data displayed by Model 1 (for individual-level characteristics) reveal that preference for residence in an area without ethnic minorities is likely to decrease with education and income and to increase with age and right-wing political orientation and to be higher among men, the unemployed, and those who are not in the labor market. Preference for a homogeneous neighborhood is also influenced by the ethnic composition of current place of residence. That is, preference for residence in an "all European neighborhood" is much lower among those who currently live in neighborhoods where some or most residents are members of ethnic minorities than among residents of neighborhoods where almost all residents are European.

9. In the two-level models estimated here the dependent variable is preference for residence in ethnically homogeneous neighborhood, the individual level variables are the set of sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents, nested in the country-level variables (e.g., size of the out-group population and economic conditions). The two-level model with a vector of individual-level variables and one country-level variable can be represented by the following equations:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{1j} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ij} is the preference for segregated residence of individual i in country j , β_{0j} is the intercept for country j , X is a vector of individual characteristic, β_{1j} is a vector of its coefficients, and ε_{ij} is the error term. Note, that the coefficients of education, political orientation, and ethnic composition of current area allowed to vary across countries, while the effects of the remaining sociodemographic variables are constrained to be equal across countries. The intercept serves as dependent variable in the country-level equations:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}Z_j + v_{0j} \quad (2)$$

where γ_{00} is the grand across-country intercept, Z is a vector of country-level characteristics, γ_{01} is the vector of its coefficients, and v_{0j} is an error term referring to country differences in preference for segregated residence that are not attributable to the specific country-level variable. Equations 1 and 2 are estimated simultaneously, producing maximum-likelihood estimates of the variance components, which are then used to generate the β and γ coefficients.

10. It is important to note that we also estimated the models controlling for two additional country-level variables: percent vote for extreme right wing parties as a measure of the political context of the country and distinction between Eastern European and Western European countries. The analysis did not alter any findings and conclusions and the findings are available from the authors upon request.

Table 3 • *Coefficients (SE) of Bi-Level Regressions Predicting Preferences for Residential Ethnic Homogeneity on Individual-Level and Country-Level Variables*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	-.439* (.100)	-.437* (.090)	-.537* (.106)
<i>Individual-level variables^a</i>			
Men	.076* (.038)	.076* (.037)	.034 (.029)
Married	.002 (.038)	.002 (.037)	-.005 (.030)
Age	.013* (.001)	.013* (.001)	.008* (.001)
Rural	.077 (.049)	.077 (.047)	.009 (.031)
Education	-.091* (.006)	-.090* (.006)	-.036* (.007)
Income per capita	-.059* (.023)	-.059* (.023)	-.013 (.019)
Political orientation	.126* (.017)	.124* (.016)	.066* (.015)
<i>Employment status^b</i>			
Not in the labor market	-.064* (.033)	-.064* (.032)	-.072* (.033)
Unemployed	.151* (.060)	.150* (.059)	-.014 (.073)
<i>Current neighborhood^c</i>			
Neighborhood where some residents are of different ethnic origin	-1.133* (.057)	-1.128* (.056)	-1.131* (.076)
Neighborhood where most residents are of different ethnic origin	-.812* (.074)	-.816* (.077)	-1.045* (.090)
Social distance	—	—	.149* (.005)
Perceived threat (negative impact of foreigners)	—	—	.364* (.011)
Cultural homogeneity (ethnocentrism)	—	—	.694* (.026)
<i>Country-level variables^d</i>			
Percentage non-EU	—	.062* (.030)	.075 (.039)
Percentage Muslims	—	.070 (.079)	-.099 (.099)
GDP*1000	—	-.014* (.006)	.005 (.010)
Country-level random effects – u ₀	.16296	.16420	.19285

Notes:
^aThe slopes of the education, political orientation, and the ethnic composition of current neighborhood have been allowed to vary across countries, while the rest of individual-level variables are constrained to be identical across 20 countries. Education and political orientation have been centered around group means. Country means of these variables have been returned at country level equations (the coefficients are not presented). Age, income, and the social psychological variables have been centered around their grand means. The dummy variables are uncentered.
^bomitted category = employed
^comitted category = neighborhood where almost no residents are of different ethnic group
^dThe level-2 predictors have been centered around their grand mean
**p* < .05 (one-tailed tests)

The inclusion of the country-level variables in Model 2 provides support for the thesis that, similar to other studies of prejudice and anti-minority sentiment, objective competitive threat increases the preference for homogeneous residence. The effect of size of the ethnic population on preference for residence in an ethnically homogeneous area is positive and significant and the effect of GDP per capita is negative and significant. Apparently, the wish to reside in neighborhoods without any ethnic minorities is less pronounced in countries with fewer ethnic minorities and in countries with prosperous economic conditions. Since percent Muslim does not exert significant effect on residential preferences, the data do not lend support for the argument that such preferences are motivated by fear of cultural differences (as represented by the presence of Muslims in the country) at the structural level.

The inclusion of the three intervening variables (i.e., social distance, perceived threat, and a desire for cultural homogeneity) in Model 3 changed some effects of the individual as well as of the country-level variables on residential preferences (as observed in the previous two equations). The most notable change in the individual-level effects is the decline in the impact of unemployment status, income, and of gender to statistical insignificance and the decline in the size of the impact of political orientation and education. The most notable change at the country-level is that of GDP per capita and size of the non-European population. In Model 3, GDP does not significantly influence preferences for residence in an ethnically homogeneous neighborhood and the effect of the relative size of the non-Europeans declines below conventional level of statistical significance. Apparently, since social distance, perceived threat, and desire for cultural homogeneity all increase preferences for homogeneous residence (their net effects are positive and highly significant) they mediate some of the relations of socioeconomic status, political orientation (at the individual level) and economic conditions and size of the non-European population (at the country level) with the preference to live in ethnically homogeneous communities.

The data provide support for the hypothesis that preferences for ethnic residential homogeneity are motivated by some traditional prejudices. Net of sociodemographic attributes of individuals and net of characteristics of their countries, individuals who object to interethnic marriage are more likely to prefer residence in ethnically homogeneous areas ($b = .149$). Likewise, the findings lend support to prejudice as a sense of group position perspective in that residential preferences are motivated by fears about the impact of foreigners on a range of domains—from jobs to health care to crime to culture. The net effect of the measure of “foreigners” impact on society is positive and highly significant ($b = .364$) implying that those who believe a range of negative consequences grow out of the presence of foreigners in their country are more likely than others to want to live in neighborhoods that do not have any such individuals living in them.

And, finally, while attitudes toward the out-group (in the form of traditional racial prejudice and prejudice as group position) importantly shape European racial residential preferences, the findings also suggest a role for ethnocentrism. The strong and positive effect of a desire for cultural homogeneity (ethnocentrism) ($b = .694$) on residential preferences suggests that individuals who consider national and cultural homogeneity to be important also prefer to live in neighborhoods with their “own kind”—that is, with those who share their national and cultural identity. Thus, ethnocentrism and prejudice coexist and interplay in Europe in shaping individuals’ preference to live apart from ethnic minorities. Indeed, a single theoretical explanation for the social psychological underpinnings of preferences for residential ethnic homogeneity is inappropriate.

Conclusions

The data presented by this research reveal, with only a few exceptions, that Europeans tend to live in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods. In most countries, very few Europeans report living in areas in which most of the residents (or even some of the residents) are of

non-European origin. In addition, this is what Europeans say they want: that is, in substantial numbers, Europeans report that they wish to reside in areas without ethnic minorities. There is, however, considerable variation across European countries in the levels of preference for residential homogeneity. While in some countries (e.g., Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, France) under one-quarter of the citizens wish to reside in places without any ethnic minorities, in others (e.g., Greece, Belgium, Portugal) over 40 percent of the citizens view areas without ethnic minorities as an ideal place for residence.

The analysis reveals that residential preference as a response to the ethnic composition of the neighborhood can be viewed at least in part as an outgrowth of racial prejudice. As with other indicators of racial prejudice, the data demonstrate that, at the individual level, preference for residence in areas without ethnic minorities is likely to be more pronounced among the unemployed, and to decrease with education and income and to increase with age and right-wing political orientation. Apparently, similar to prejudice, preference for ethnic residential homogeneity is likely to be more intense among socioeconomically weak and vulnerable populations and among individuals with conservative political orientation. In addition to these demographic, social, and economic characteristics, our analysis of the social psychological predictors of preferences for residence in ethnically homogenous neighborhoods also lends support to the role of racial prejudice. Disapproval of interracial marriage and perceptions of the negative consequences of “foreigners” on the quality of life in their country both predict significantly and strongly a desire for ethnic neighborhood homogeneity. However, attitudes toward the out-group are not the only interpretation to fit the data; a preference for cultural homogeneity—our indicator of individual’s in-group preferences—also exerts an independent and strong effect on residential preferences.

In many ways, preferences to reside apart from ethnic and racial minorities among Europeans are similar to preferences among whites in the United States. In both places a considerable number of persons belonging to the superordinate majority population do not live and do not wish to live in places where ethnic/racial minorities reside. However, unlike the United States, our measure of “ethnocentrism” plays a major role in the determination of residential preferences in Europe. Although in the United States there is considerable controversy surrounding the question of the importance of ethnocentrism, statistical models that have attempted to test the specific effect of ethnocentrism on residential preferences have generally found little support. This may very well be due to the very different measures used in this study for ethnocentrism or to the quite different racial/ethnic context in Europe versus the United States. It may also be because most of the studies in the United States focus on black-white relations as against other racial/ethnic groups and immigrants. Consistent with studies in the United States, however, the European data also show a substantial role for racial prejudice in shaping residential preferences.

The analysis at the country level provides us with an opportunity to examine structural-level determinants of cross-country variations in preferences for ethnic residential homogeneity, hence, with a comparative framework and perspective. The data reveal that cross-national variations in preferences for ethnic residential homogeneity are neither trivial nor random. Preferences to reside in an area without ethnic minorities are systematically associated with the proportion of the minority population and with economic conditions providing support for the thesis that structural sources of competitive threat increase preference for residential homogeneity. That is, the wish to live apart from ethnic minorities is more pronounced in countries with large proportions of ethnic minorities and in countries with suppressed economic conditions. On the basis of these findings we can conclude, therefore, that the desire of members of the majority population to live apart from minority groups tends to be more pronounced in countries where competition and threat of competition in the labor market and in the housing markets are more intense. It should be noted, however, that most of the cross-country differences in residential preferences are mediated, in effect, through sociopsychological mechanisms. Specifically, views of social distance, perceived threat, and the desire for

cultural homogeneity mediate the relations between structural sources of threat and preference to reside apart from ethnic minorities.

The data presented by this article clearly demonstrate that preferences for ethnic residential homogeneity in Europe are affected by both individual-level and country-level variables. The effects of both the individual-level and the country-level were found to be similar, in many ways, to the effects of these factors on other traditional measures of prejudice. In light of the rising levels of ethnic residential segregation and the rising levels of anti-foreigner sentiment across European societies, it seems essential that issues related to spatial ethnic segregation, and residential preferences and choices as well as their potential implications for social conflict and ethnic antagonism be further pursued and examined by both social scientists and policy makers.

Appendix • Definition, Percent, or Mean (Standard Deviation) of the Individual-Level and Country-Level Variables Included in the Analysis

Variables	Definition	Percent or Mean (SD)
<i>Individual-level variables</i> (n = 35,141 persons)		
Gender	Men = 1	47.7%
Marital status	Married = 1	57.7%
Age	In years	46.65 (18.15)
Type of locality	Rural = 1	35.6%
Education	In years	11.80 (4.13)
Left-right political orientation	“Where would you place yourself on this scale?” Scale: 0 = left, 10 = right	4.91 (2.14)
Monthly income per capita	In EURO: Means of 12 categories of household income were standardized by number of persons in household. The categories were created for each country in Euro.	861.47 (838.78)
Employed	Economically active = 1	48.7%
Not in labor force	Not in the labor force = 1	45.7%
Unemployed	Unemployed = 1	5.6%
Type of current living area	“How would you describe the area where you currently live?”	
Neighborhood where almost no one is of different ethnic origin	An area where almost no one is of a different race or ethnic group from most (country) people = 1	46.5%
Neighborhood where some residents are of different ethnic origin	Some people are of a different race or ethnic group from most (country) people = 1	41.8%
Neighborhood where most residents are of different ethnic origin	Many people are of a different race or ethnic group = 1	11.8%
Social distance	“Thinking of people who have come to live in (country) from another country who are of a different race or ethnic group from most (country) people, how much would you mind or not mind if someone like this married a close relative of yours?” 0 = not mind at all, 10 = mind a lot	3.48 (3.35)

(Continued)

Appendix • (Continued)

Variables	Definition	Percent or Mean (SD)
Perceived threat— perceptions of the negative impact of foreigners	Mean score of six 0 to 10 scale items: “Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in (country), or generally help to create new jobs?” “Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?” “Would you say it is generally bad or good for (country)’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?” “Would you say that (country)’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” “Is (country) made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? ” “Are (country)’s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?” 0 = positive, 10 = negative	5.49 (1.66)
Desire for cultural homogeneity (ethnocentrism)	Mean score of three 1 to 5 scale items: “It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions?” “It is better for a country if there are a variety of different religions?” “It is better for a country if almost everyone is able to speak at least one common language?” 1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly	3.54 (0.67)
Type of ideal living area	“Suppose you were choosing where to live. Which of the three types of area would you ideally wish to live in?” An area where almost nobody is of a different race or ethnic group from most (country) people = 1	28.4%
Country-level variables (n = 20 countries)		
Size of minority	Mean of percentage of non-EUR foreigners in 2000 and 2001	3.42 (2.37)
GDP per capita	RGDPL: Real gross domestic product per capita (constant price: Laspeyers), unit \$, mean of 2000, 2001, 2002	22350.82 (10631.50)
Percent of Muslims	Aggregate variable, based on percent of respondents that define their religion denomination as Islam	0.81 (0.90)

Sources: Eurostat 2002, 2003; Jowell and the Central Coordinating Committee 2002; OECD 2001, 2002
“In this question the scale was reversed.

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