Relocation choice for different homophily preferences: hybrid scenarios for Schelling Model

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Annex A2: Asymmetric conditions: ß secondary as function of ß dominant

The aim is to observe what difference occurs if liberal majority or liberal minority group hold ß secondary (ethnic similarity preference) as function of ß dominant (value similarity preference). ß secondary is calculated as

$\beta\ secondary = \beta\ dominant * w$

with $w \in [0, 1]$. For $w = 0$, ß secondary is equal 0; for $w = 1$, ß secondary is equal to ß dominant.

Model: e_v_rum_secfdom.nlogo. Experiments in Behaviorspace secfdom_asm_ethlibmaj for ß ethnic liberal majority, secfdom_asm_ethlibmin for ß ethnic liberal minority. This option would expand/substitute what now is now Fig. 11 in the manuscript (Fig: 5 in the end): for each group-type, it compares baseline ß ethnic = 0 for both liberals majority and liberals minority (equivalent to w = 0 in the new model), to either liberals majority holding ß ethnic = ß value (w = 1 in the new model), or liberals minority holding ß ethnic = ß value (w = 1 in the new model)

Figg: from 1 to 4 here are from the new model (ß ethnic = ß value * w) showing for each group-type the effects of change in liberals majority preference (on the left, with ß ethnic liberal minority = 0), and change in liberals minority (on the right, with ß ethnic liberal majority = 0)

Figure 1: Effect of ß ethnic liberal majority (left) and ß ethnic liberal minority (right) on conservative majority


Figure 2: Effect of ß ethnic liberal majority (left) and ß ethnic liberal minority (right) on conservative minority

Figure 3: Effect of ß ethnic liberal majority (left) and ß ethnic liberal minority (right) on liberal majority


Figure 4: Effect of ß ethnic liberal majority (left) and ß ethnic liberal minority (right) on liberal minority

Current Fig. 11 in the manuscript we might change, equivalent to w = 0 or w = 1



Figure 5: Ethnic asymmetric: effect of ß ethnic of liberals (secondary) equal to ß value liberals (dominant. x-axis: increase dominant preference for all agents (global parameter). Each panel reports segregation patterns of each group-type (ethnicXvalue). Linetype represents conditions compared: baseline: liberals of both ethnic groups hold only to dominant preference (ß secondary = 0); ß liberal majority = liberals majority hold same ethnic and value preference (liberals minority hold only to value preference), ß liberal minority = liberals minorty hold same ethnic and value preference (liberals majority hold only to value preference)