The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe

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Drawing on recent insights in the nationalism and citizenship regime literatures, this article develops a macrotheoretical framework for understanding cross-national variations in tolerance of ethnic minorities. Specifically, it tests the hypothesis that the degree to which the dominant ethnic tradition or culture is institutionalized in the laws and policies of a nation-state affects citizen tolerance of ethnic minorities. Employing a multilevel regression model, it systematically tests the framework, as well as competing individual and country-level explanations, for all member states of the European Union in 1997. Results confirm a strong relationship between the laws governing the acquisition and expression of citizenship, that is, citizenship regime type, and individual tolerance judgments. Moreover, citizenship regime type has a strong mediating effect on three individual-level variables previously shown to predict tolerance: ingroup national identity, political ideology, and satisfaction with democracy.

Western Europe has experienced a rapid influx of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers over recent decades. Despite often filling an important need for unskilled labor in their host countries, Europe's new minorities have experienced considerable resistance from native populations. The most visible manifestations of this opposition are the resurgence of right-wing nationalist parties (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995) and a general increase in violence toward ethnic and racial minorities (Koopmans 1996). These extreme responses have received significant attention from political leaders, the media, and scholars alike. Yet, at a more basic level, ethnic minorities regularly face prejudice and intolerance from native populations. Tolerance, like liberty and equality, is a fundamental principle of the liberal democratic creed. It requires citizens to uphold and secure the rights of groups, even those they find objectionable, to participate fully in political, social, and economic life. This study enriches our understanding of tolerance for ethnic minorities through a cross-national, multilevel analysis of Western Europe.

While scholars traditionally have focused on individual-level theories of tolerance and prejudice, this study contributes to a growing list of research that examines how the social and institutional context shapes such judgments (Duch and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Gouws 2000, 2002; Marcus et al. 1995; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Sniderman et al. 2000). Specifically, I draw on recent scholarly debates about multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor and Gutmann 1994) and the emerging citizenship regime literature (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Brubaker 1992; Koopmans and Statham 2000) to develop and test a macrotheoretical framework for understanding social and political tolerance toward ethnic minorities. As the "new institutionalism" indicates (Lijphart 1999; March and Olsen 1989; North 1990), the organization of political life has important consequences for the nature of politics generally and interethnic group relations specifically. Institutions shape political conflict by creating opportunities and incentives for elites to mobilize citizens; moreover, they help structure the nature of political discourse. In terms of tolerance for ethnic

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minorities, institutions, specifically citizenship laws and government policies, define and embody cultural traditions regarding who is a legitimate member of the nation-state. The study's central hypothesis is that there is a strong relationship between citizen tolerance for ethnic minorities and the degree to which the dominant ethnic tradition is institutionalized in the laws, rules, norms, and policies of a nation-state.

The starting point for the analysis is a discussion of the social identity perspective in social psychology, which indicates that in order to understand fully the nature of tolerance judgments, we must also understand the *context* of intergroup relations. I then turn to the macrotheoretical framework and examine a key aspect of that context for ethnic majority-minority relations—the institutions relating to the acquisition and expression of citizenship. Based on the citizenship regime and multiculturalism literatures, I adopt a three-fold typology of ideal tolerance regimes. Employing data from a 1997 Eurobarometer survey, I then test the typology, as well as competing individual and country-level explanations, for 15 West European democracies. I first examine its independent effects on tolerance, and then, in a fully integrated, multilevel regression model, examine how citizenship regime type and other country-level control variables mediate the effects of individual-level factors previously shown to predict tolerance of ethnic minorities.

The Nature of Tolerance and the Social Identity Perspective

Despite the importance of tolerance in democratic theory, empirical studies have consistently shown that democratic publics do not hold such values very deeply. Citizens are often willing to take away the most basic rights from disliked groups, prompting some to suggest that *intolerance* is, in fact, the natural disposition of individuals (e.g., Stouffer 1955). While I do not agree with this strong conclusion, it is clear there are many obstacles to developing tolerant attitudes and, as an extension, a tolerant society. Social-psychological research on intergroup relations, most notably the social identity perspective (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979), serves as a starting point for understanding these difficulties. The basic premise of social identity theory is that humans are fundamentally social animals, and as such, our social environment and group memberships have a strong influence on how we view ourselves. Indeed, humans define themselves, as well as others, largely in terms of the social groups to which they belong. Yet, group identification is not simply a one-sided process; it only has meaning when "we associate ourselves with certain groups and contrast ourselves with others" (Turner 1982, 18).

Cognitive categorization is necessary and not inherently harmful. However, social psychologists also have shown that it can have important effects on human behavior in the context of intergroup relations. In a groundbreaking series of studies, Tajfel (1970, 1978, 1981) demonstrated that simply assigning subjects randomly to groups "reliably produced a number of impressive outcomes, such as the exaggeration of between-group differences, the attenuation of withingroup differences, the differential allocation of resources favoring the ingroup, and evaluative preferences for ingroup members" (Sherman, Hamilton, and Lewis 1999, 86). Known as the minimal group paradigm, Tajfel's initial work has spawned myriad studies on the ingroup/outgroup bias phenomenon.[1] Here, we simply want to lay out the ideas relevant to outgroup discrimination and our specific interest, tolerance of ethnic minorities.

According to the social identity perspective, the emergence of intergroup discrimination first requires a "cognitive representation of the social situation in which a particular categorical distinction is highly salient" (Brewer and Gaertner 2004, 303). As the categorization becomes more salient, the effects of ingroup/outgroup bias are likely to be more pronounced. There are an infinite number of potential social groupings in a society, but those based on basic cleavage lines, including race, religion, language, culture, and class, are of particular concern to students of intergroup conflict and tolerance. These social groups are enduring because they are also the primary vehicles for childhood and cultural socialization. They help shape individuals' worldviews, and they often are the basis for social relations in every day human interaction.

Once there is a salient social group categorization, individuals *may* adopt discriminatory behavior. Social categorization and ingroup identity alone are not sufficient to cause outgroup discrimination (Brewer 1999; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Hogg 2003). It also depends on individual psychological motivations, as well as the specific comparison being made, the relative status of the groups, and the impermeability of group boundaries—that is, the context of intergroup relations (Turner and Reynolds 2004, 264).

The psychological motivations of ingroup/outgroup bias constitute one of the most fervent research areas in the social identity tradition. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), the primary motivations for adopting

[1] For a more detailed review of this literature, see Abrams and Hogg (1999) or Hogg (2003).

discriminatory behavior are to enhance *positive distinctiveness* and *self-esteem*. Positive distinctiveness refers to the individual affirmation that comes from being a member of a group that either society as a whole or the group members themselves value in a positive manner. Intergroup discrimination contributes to the positive distinctiveness of the group, and this, in turn, may enhance individual self-esteem. Scholars often have taken this to mean that individuals who hold strong, dogmatic identities and have low self-esteem are more likely to discriminate against outgroups—although subsequent experimental research has tended to support only a correlation, not causation (Brewer 2003).

An alternative explanation is that individuals discriminate in order to reduce *social uncertainty* (Hogg and Abrams 1993). This may include uncertainty about one's own belongingness in a group, suggesting that individuals whose ingroup status is most tenuous, ironically, are most likely to discriminate on behalf of that group. Yet, it also may involve uncertainty about the relative status of one's ingroup as a whole. Ingroup members, for example, may believe an outgroup poses a *threat* to the ingroup. This provides a connection to the common finding in conventional tolerance studies that fear of outgroups is an important predictor of intolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Marcus et al. 1995).

Some recent political studies of tolerance and prejudice have begun to incorporate the microlevel insights of the social identity perspective (Gibson and Gouws 2000, 2002; Sniderman et al. 2000). This research confirms that strong ingroup identities, low self-esteem, and perceptions of threat play a significant role in tolerance judgments. In an especially noteworthy study, Gibson and Gouws apply the ideas of the ingroup/outgroup paradigm to tolerance among ethnic groups in South Africa. Specifically, they test and verify the hypotheses that "strong ingroup positive identities create strong outgroup negative identities, which are in turn connected to antipathy toward one's political opponents, perceptions that those opponents are threatening, and, ultimately, to political intolerance" (2000, 278). Moreover, in an ambitious attempt to integrate realistic-group conflict, psychological, and social identity theories, Sniderman and his colleagues (2000) find ingroup identities affect tolerance judgments toward immigrants and ethnic minorities in Italy. Yet, notably, they also conclude that personality characteristics influence individuals' willingness to categorize strongly into ingroup and outgroups.

These studies have helped us make significant leaps in our understanding of political tolerance and prejudice. Yet, as early social identity theorists pointed out (Tajfel and Turner 1979), individual psychological processes are only half the puzzle. The *context* of intergroup relations is equally if not more important in shaping tolerance judgments. Strong ingroup identities do not always lead to outgroup discrimination. Moreover, the "creation" of ingroup/outgroup bias among *randomly* assigned subjects indicates that the context largely triggers psychological processes of human behavior. Why is ethnicity a salient basis of categorization? Why does it become so important that individuals are willing to deny basic political liberties to members of other ethnic groups? Similarly, why are there cross-national differences in levels of tolerance? To answer these questions, we need to move to a more macrolevel of analysis that complements and builds on the microlevel insights of the social identity approach.

Macrotheoretical Framework: Citizenship Regimes and Cultural Policy

Although many recognize the relevance of macrolevel factors, scholars rarely analyze them in actual studies (see, however, Duch and Gibson 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Sullivan et al. 1985). Given that most tolerance studies are of a single country, this is understandable. Yet, as Sullivan and his colleagues argue: "we are certain that regime level differences, and differences in historical and political traditions, are important in understanding political culture and attitudes generally and attitudes of tolerance and intolerance specifically" (1985, 207). This section focuses on how institutions relating to the acquisition and expression of citizenship—that is, citizenship regime types—shape the context of ethnic majority-minority relations, and ultimately, I propose, the majorities' political and social tolerance judgments toward ethnic minorities. The central hypothesis is that the salience of ethnic difference, and as a consequence tolerance for ethnic minorities, partially depends on the degree to which a dominant ethnic tradition or culture is institutionalized in the laws, rules, norms, and policies of a state.[2]

In recent years, scholarship on ethnic difference and citizenship has experienced a vigorous revival among

[2] A valid argument also can be made that causality runs in the opposite direction. That is, the reason a state has less institutionalization of the dominant ethnic tradition is precisely because the native population is more open and tolerant in the first place. Ultimately, it is not possible to establish causality with cross-sectional data, the type of data used in this study. However, there are good reasons to believe institutions have a significant impact on tolerance judgments. Most importantly, policies that link ethnicity to government status presumably make ethnicity salient—much like mere labeling in Tajfel's minimal group paradigm.

political philosophers (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor and Gutmann 1994). This revival is rooted in debates about group rights and multiculturalism. In terms of citizenship, the central question is whether some individuals, because of their membership in a specific group, should have different rights, privileges, and duties to the state. This may involve special privileges for cultural or religious groups, for example, granting military duty exemptions to members of pacifist religious sects. At a greater extreme, it may entail ceding formal political power to territorially concentrated ethnic groups. The important point is that nation-states vary in terms of the responsibilities and duties expected of citizens. Citizenship may be exclusionary, categorically denying membership to ethnic minorities. It may allow ethnic minorities to become citizens, but require strict assimilation to the same rights, duties, and cultural orientations as the dominant ethnic tradition. Alternatively, it may take a multicultural form where ethnic minorities are able to maintain many of their distinct traditions and retain specific group rights.

While political philosophy debates have been primarily normative and prescriptive, the burgeoning literature on nationalism has treated these issues with greater analytical focus (Brubaker 1992; Calhoun 1997; Hechter 2000). Brubaker's (1992) comparative historical study of nationalism and citizenship in Germany and France has served as an important impetus for the renewed scholarly focus on the politics of ethnic relations. Following a common distinction in the literature, Brubaker identifies two types of nationalist images: *ethnic* and *civic*. Yet, this simple distinction has proven insufficient in that it "largely ignores the cultural rights dimension that has been central to the multiculturalism debate" (Koopmans and Statham 2000, 18). In addressing this weakness, recent studies have combined the cultural rights dimension with the legal requirements for citizenship, thereby creating a more fruitful analytical distinction (Castles 1995; Greenfeld 1998; Kleger and D'Amato 1995; Safran 1997). Generally, these authors identify three ideal citizenship regime types, which, as Greenfeld labels them, are *collectivistic-ethnic*, *collectivistic-civic*, and *individualistic-civic*.

First, the collectivistic-ethnic type is the same as the traditional *ethnic* distinction. It holds that "the world is naturally, or primordially, divided into objectively different *ethnic* units, and that it is this objective difference between them, or their *ethnicity*, which underlies national divisions and gives rise to national identities" (Greenfeld 1998, 50). The nation-state is viewed as a collective entity with a unique spirit or ethos that transcends its members, and individuals are assumed to have a natural sense of *intra*ethnic solidarity and *inter*ethnic difference. The essential point from this perspective is that citizenship is inherently exclusive—it is a reflection of one's ethnic identity and self, not just membership in a political community.

The *jus sanguinis* citizenship principle, which requires citizens to be of the same ethnic bloodline as the "native" population, embodies this relationship between nation and ethnicity. Individuals cannot acquire (or lose) citizenship at a whim, because ethnicity is not a matter of choice. While scholars often cite Germany as the prototypical example, Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Belgium also share this tradition (Castles 1995). In these countries, historically it has been very difficult for ethnic minorities to attain citizenship and gain the same political and civil rights as the native populations. Although migrants may enter the country, their status has been traditionally that of "guest workers."

Second, the collectivistic-civic regime type, also called the "assimilationist" or "republican" model, shares the view that the nation-state is a collective entity, but it rejects the notion that ethnicity is its defining feature. Instead, it defines the nation-state in political and secular terms, and citizenship means being loyal to the nation as a *political* community. This, in fact, is intended to transcend cultural and ethnic differences. France and the old "melting pot" approach in the United States exemplify this model. In such systems, ethnic minorities and immigrants can attain citizenship, but they also are expected to assimilate into the native population and give up their distinctive cultural characteristics. Moreover, the state's role is to facilitate ethnic assimilation. It aims "to create conditions favorable to individual adaptation and transferal of majority culture and values, through insistence on use of the dominant language and attendance at normal schools for migrant children" (Castles 1995, 298). Ethnic minorities may maintain their cultural and religious traditions, but only in private. France's prohibition on Muslim girls wearing headscarves in public schools illustrates this principle well.[3]

The collectivistic-civic regime type, thus, seeks to remove ethnicity and cultural difference as public bases of societal and political competition. Yet, this has proven untenable, because "the cultural group differences that are denied as legitimate policy categories do form the basis of discrimination and racism from the side of the

[3]In February 2004, France's lower house of parliament passed a law forbidding students in public schools from wearing any sign or dress that "conspicuously shows" their religious affiliations. This includes headscarves, as well as Jewish skullcaps, but only "large" Christian crosses.

majority population" (Koopmans and Statham 2000, 27). In France, for example, it manifests in the claims of some that ethnic minorities are "inassimilable" immigrants or "false Frenchmen." That is, they are "French by nationality, but not by culture—culture understood, of course, not in the *thin* sense of adherence to republican values such as democracy, liberty, and equality, but in the *thick* sense of folk traditions, Catholicism, and sometimes plainly race" (Koopmans and Statham 2000, 27). In short, the image of a nation-state as solely political, and hence culturally neutral, is problematic. It often means that ethnic minorities are the only ones not permitted to express their cultural traditions, while the dominant ethnic tradition masquerades as the political community.

Finally, the individualistic-civic regime type, also termed the "pluralist" or "civic pluralism" model, combines the *jus soli* citizenship principle with an acceptance of ethnic and cultural difference. It views the nation-state not as an holistic entity; rather, it assumes "the moral, political, and logical primacy of the human individual, who is seen not simply as a physical unit of society, but as its constitutive element, in the sense that all qualities of the latter have their source in the nature of the former" (Greenfeld 1998, 50). Ethnicity and cultural orientation are viewed as a personal choice, and hence, minorities are not required to give up their ethnic identity in any sphere of public life. In fact, the state explicitly protects the right to ethnic difference and expression, and it may even take an active role in supporting minority traditions. This comes from the view that individuals not only should accept ethnic difference, but that "multiculturalism also means recognition of special laws, institutions and social policies to overcome barriers to full participation in society" (Castles 1995, 302). Moreover, immigrants may enjoy some political rights before becoming citizens. In Sweden and the Netherlands, for example, immigrants can vote in local elections. While many individualistic-civic countries apply multicultural policies to specific sectors of society, it is a more general policy in Canada, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

Hypotheses, Data, and Measurement

Citizenship Regime Types and Tolerance

How do citizenship regime institutions affect individual tolerance judgments? It is difficult to identify a clear causal pathway from institutions to individual attitudes and behavior, but several research traditions hypothesize a general process of democratic learning—most notably, political culture theory (Almond and Verba 1963). Citizenship regimes are the legal institutionalization of prevailing understandings about the rights, duties, and expectations of legitimate members of a nation-state. Individuals learn these values through socialization processes in the family, education system, and workplace. Moreover, government policies, in many ways, serve as a starting point for public discourse on ethnic minorities. Political parties and elites take positions, and citizens learn tolerance issues in a more dynamic way through the media (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). This learning process helps citizens answer questions about ethnic minorities' role and responsibilities in society.

In terms of attitudes toward ethnic minorities, the learning process likely operates at two levels. At one level, it refers to basic political liberties, such as freedoms of speech and association, as well as the right to vote and run for political office. At another level, it refers to the content of that expression—that is, the right to express cultural difference and the acceptance of this by the native population. The former is *political tolerance*, whereas I define the latter as *social tolerance*. Should ethnic minorities be denied citizenship and its accompanying political rights, because the nation-state is understood in ethnically exclusive terms? Alternatively, should minorities be granted full political rights as citizens but be expected to relinquish their cultural traditions and assimilate into the majority culture? Or, finally should they be granted citizenship and equal political rights, while being allowed to maintain their distinct cultural traditions?

Based on the above discussion, several hypotheses emerge regarding the relationship between citizenship regime types and political and social tolerance:

H1—Collectivistic-ethnic countries should have relatively low levels of both political and social tolerance for ethnic minorities.

H2—Collectivistic-civic countries should show a high level of political tolerance but a low level of social tolerance.

H3—Individualistic-civic countries should have the highest levels of both political and social tolerance.

Data and Measurement

The analysis employs a unique data set—a 1997 Eurobarometer Survey that administered a module of questions intended to tap the extent and depth of prejudice and intolerance across the (then) 15 European Union member

states (Melich 1997).[4] Separate surveys were conducted in the states making up former East and West Germany. I present the two cases separately, making 16 cases for analysis.

As discussed above, I am interested in both political and social tolerance, and hence, I created indices for both types. The political tolerance index taps the majority population's principled recognition that ethnic minorities are entitled to the same basic political rights as the native population. Respondents were asked to state whether certain rights and freedoms "should apply equally to people from [the ethnic minority group] and to the rest of the population, or only to the rest of the population:"[5]

1. Freedom of speech;
2. Freedom of association;
3. Religious liberty and freedom of consciousness;
4. Equality before the law; and
5. The right to vote and be a candidate in political elections.

Social tolerance, in contrast, refers to tolerating the content of that expression and an actual willingness to accept ethnic difference. The questions comprising the social tolerance index are:

1. If people from this [ethnic group] lived in your neighborhood, would you find this difficult to accept, or not?
2. If a suitably qualified person from this [ethnic group] became your boss, would you find this difficult to accept, or not?
3. If you had a child who wanted to marry a person from this [ethnic group], from the same socioeconomic background as yours, would you find it difficult to accept him or her in your family, or not?
4. Members of this [ethnic group] are so different they can never be fully accepted as members of (nationality) society.
5. In order to become fully accepted members of (nationality) society, they must give up their own culture.

Summing across the five equally weighted questions gives scores for both types of tolerance. In order to minimize missing cases, I included all respondents who answered at least three of the five questions for each index. It was thus necessary to standardize the scores, that is, to divide a respondent's total score by the number of questions answered. The standardized tolerance scales run from "0" to "100" and from intolerant to tolerant.

The survey employed the content-controlled method (see Sullivan et al. 1982: chapter 2), and thus, not all respondents were asked the tolerance questions. Respondents had to first identify an ethnic minority group that they *personally* found "disturbing."[6] However, as a control group, tolerance questions also were administered to those who stated that there is an ethnic minority group *other people* in the country sometimes find disturbing. Since we want to understand cross-national variations in tolerance levels, as well as minimize missing data, I merged both groups to form the respondent population for the analysis.[7] To ensure the respondent population was representative of the population as a whole, I ran difference of means tests for all individual-level independent variables in each country, comparing the respondent populations with those who failed to answer either question positively. No significant differences were found, suggesting that the respondent population is, in fact, representative of the population as a whole.[8] Finally, the focus in this article is on the majority population's tolerance for ethnic

[4]I would like to thank the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan for use of this study (ICPSR Study No. 2089). I also examined data from a 1995 ISSP Survey on National Identity that tapped attitudes toward immigrants. The 1995 survey has the advantage of including more geographically diverse countries; however, it inquires much less into specific attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities. Preliminary analysis of this data set showed findings similar to those from the Eurobarometer survey used here.

[5]The Cronbach's alpha was .771 for the political tolerance scale and .706 for the social tolerance scale. The scales were also analyzed using nonparametric item-response theory (Mokken 1996; Sijtsma and Molenaar 2002). This tests the degree to which the questions provide successively more difficult tests of a single underlying trait, thus approximating a Gutmann scale. Using the program from McGann (2003), scalability coefficients were calculated. The coefficients were 0.66 for the political tolerance scale and 0.40 for the social tolerance scale. Given that a coefficient of 0.30 is considered acceptable and 0.50 very strong (Sijtsma and Molenaar 2002, 60), this confirms that both scales are appropriate.

[6]The specific wording of the question was: "Amongst the groups of people who live in (OUR COUNTRY) and who are not of the same race, religion, or culture as yourself, which one group strikes you as being particularly different from yourself and which you find sometimes disturbing?" The named group is not available in the data set. However, previous exploratory work (Eurobarometer 30, 1988) indicates that respondents think of recent non-European immigrants, especially when the cue "race" is provided (see McLaren 2002, 919).

[7]Ideally, all respondents would have been asked the tolerance questions. If I presented results on just those that identified a group they personally found disturbing, we would not have an accurate picture of aggregate tolerance levels. Such an approach would assume that all respondents that failed to identify such a group were completely tolerant. This is a highly dubious assumption and one that analysis of the control group fails to bear out. Combining the two respondent groups is appropriate, as long as the merged group is representative of the population as a whole in each country.

[8]I also replicated the analyses for just the respondents who personally found an ethnic minority group disturbing. The results fit the same general pattern, especially for the contextual level variables.

Table 1 Classification and Hypotheses by Citizenship Regime Type

Regime Type	Countries	Hypotheses
Collectivistic-ethnic	Germany (former East and West are presented separately)	Low Social Tolerance Low Political Tolerance
	Austria	
	Belgium	
	Luxembourg	
Collectivistic-civic	France	Low Social Tolerance
	Portugal	High Political Tolerance
	Greece	
	Denmark	
Individualistic-civic	Great Britain	High Social Tolerance
	Ireland	High Political Tolerance
	Italy	
	Spain	
	The Netherlands	
	Sweden	
	Finland	

minorities. Those who self-identified as a member of an ethnic minority group were excluded from the analysis.

Classification of Nation-States

It is important to recognize that the citizenship regime models discussed above are ideal types. Countries may have special policies toward immigrants from specific countries, family members of current citizens, and asylum seekers or refugees. Furthermore, there are competing discourses in every country on the proper understanding of the nation-state and expectations of citizenship. Yet, nation-states do have prevailing cultural understandings and official legal policies regarding citizenship acquisition and ethnic difference. Employing these criteria, I classify the countries as approximating one of the ideal citizenship regime types for 1997—the year of the survey data. Table 1 summarizes the classifications and hypotheses for each regime type, while a more detailed discussion can be found in the appendix.

Levels of Social and Political Tolerance

Before moving to the multivariate analyses, we first examine the levels of political and social tolerance across countries. Table 2 shows the standardized mean tolerance scores. The most obvious finding is the relatively low level of tolerance across Europe.[9] The level of political tolerance is quite a bit higher than that for social tolerance, but a number of citizens in all countries are still willing to deny the most fundamental political rights to ethnic minorities. Although not presented in the table, but perhaps better evidence for the claim of a general attitude of intolerance, only 40% of the respondents were willing to grant all five political liberties to ethnic minorities and only 12% for the five items comprising the social tolerance index.

The differences between each type of tolerance reveal an interesting picture. The collectivistic-ethnic countries have the lowest levels of tolerance, followed by the collectivistic-civic, and finally, the individualistic-civic countries have the highest levels. Yet, looking more closely, we see that while the findings closely fit our hypotheses for social tolerance, this is not the case for political tolerance. We expected the collectivistic-civic countries would more closely resemble the collectivistic-ethnic countries for social tolerance and the individualistic-civic countries for political tolerance. For social tolerance, this is indeed the case. However, political tolerance appears to increase monotonically across the three regime types. This is noteworthy, because it suggests that multicultural *social* policies may have an added effect of further enhancing political tolerance.

[9] Albeit, the levels are certainly higher than is typically found for extremist groups.

TABLE 2 Social and Political Tolerance Levels by Regime Type

Regime Type	Country	Social Tolerance	Political Tolerance
Collectivistic-Ethnic	Belgium (n = 598)	40.2	57.8
	W. Germany (n = 532)	48.3	72.2
	E. Germany (n = 507)	49.4	74.9
	Austria (n = 498)	50.5	69.8
	Luxembourg (n = 159)	62.0	76.0
	AVG	**50.1**	**70.1**
Collectivistic-Civic	France (n = 647)	55.3	72.0
	Greece (n = 739)	49.2	81.5
	Portugal (n = 402)	57.2	81.0
	Denmark (n = 797)	51.3	79.2
	AVG	**53.2**	**78.4**
Individualistic-Civic	Ireland (n = 257)	52.3	84.4
	G. Britain (n = 517)	60.8	83.9
	Italy (n = 486)	59.0	79.0
	Spain (n = 532)	67.8	89.8
	Netherlands (n = 766)	72.6	86.1
	Finland (n = 571)	67.8	87.2
	Sweden (n = 564)	53.1	87.1
	AVG	**62.0**	**85.4**

Note: Entries are the respective mean index scores for social and political tolerance.

Alternative Microlevel Explanations

The next step is to test the framework more rigorously against alternative explanations of tolerance. In this section, I review conventional microlevel approaches. I do not intend to give a comprehensive review of the literature;[10] rather, I simply want to highlight the relevant control variables for this study. These factors can be broken down into three types: (1) *demographic* characteristics, (2) *psychological* dispositions, and (3) *political* orientations.

First, several demographic characteristics, primarily related to socioeconomic status, have been shown to correlate with tolerance. A fairly clear consensus has developed on two of these variables: education and working class status. Education is a principal vehicle in modern societies for transmitting social and cultural values, including those of tolerance and social acceptance. Moreover, higher education often provides greater opportunities for individuals to learn about groups different from their own. Here, I measure education as age at which the respondent left school. In terms of the working class, it is the group most directly in competition with immigrants and ethnic minorities for jobs (Castles 1984). Realistic group conflict theory (Bobo and Kluegel 1993) argues that individuals are more likely to develop prejudiced and intolerant attitudes toward groups with which they believe they are in competition or conflict. Another demographic variable found in some studies to predict tolerance is age.

Second, psychological approaches constitute the most fervent area of research within the tolerance literature. Scholars have long thought intolerance is the product of certain personality and emotional traits largely beyond the control of individuals. Early research in this vein, heavily influenced by Freud, focused on the psychopathological tendencies that result from early childhood experience. Adorno (1950), for instance, posited that an upbringing characterized by strict obedience and deference to authority leads to resentment in adulthood and, what they termed, an *authoritarian personality*. Despite criticisms on both theoretical and methodological grounds, empirical studies have consistently shown a link between authoritarianism, measured in a variety of ways, and hostility toward outgroups.[11] In the current study, I tap this

[10] For a thorough review, see Marcus et al. (1995; chapter 2).

[11] For an overview and criticisms, see Sniderman et al. (2000; chapter 3).

concept with a measure of support for democracy as a form of government versus a dictatorship—specifically those who failed to endorse the former.

In recent decades, psychological research has focused less on a general authoritarian orientation and more on specific traits that influence tolerance judgments. This research traces intolerance to traits of dogmatism, personal insecurity, and most importantly, the displacement of fear or anxiety because of a perceived "threat" from disliked groups (Marcus et al. 1995; Sullivan et al. 1982). Notably, this research tradition identifies many of the same key factors as the social identity literature. Unlike the social identity perspective, however, it hypothesizes that personality characteristics are the underlying causal mechanism for tolerance judgments. Taken together, the two perspectives indicate that low self-esteem, strong ingroup identities, and perceptions of threat are important factors affecting tolerance. In the survey used here, there was no direct measure of self-esteem; however, as the next best option, I attempt to control for the concept with a similar variable, *personal efficacy*.[12] This is measured as one's belief that she has control over what is happening in her life. I measure the strength of ingroup identity as identification with the nation-state as opposed to Europe. This is measured on a 4-point scale. Respondents could identify with the nation-state only, the nation-state then Europe, Europe then the nation-state, or Europe only. Perception of threat is measured as the belief that the minority group's religion or culture poses a threat to the way of life in the country.

Finally, political orientations and values also may affect tolerance judgments, especially toward ethnic minorities. The most important of these is left-right ideology, where the expectation is that conservatism tends to diminish tolerance. Although the working class may be less tolerant, the Left in general has been a stauncher advocate of equality for ethnic minorities. This is especially true for Left-Libertarian and Green parties in Western Europe. A second attitudinal factor is dissatisfaction with the democratic process. The status of immigrants and ethnic minorities as "foreigners" makes them convenient targets for many who are dissatisfied with democratic functioning in their country. The final political values variable included in the analysis is materialist/post-materialist value orientation (Inglehart 1990, 1998). While not commonly employed in tolerance studies, post-materialism has been shown to correlate reliably with a host of attitudes and behaviors, including tolerance. Post-materialists tend to be more accepting of difference and more concerned about protecting individual expression.

Alternative Macrolevel Explanations

In addition to the individual level variables, it is also necessary to consider alternative country-level factors. There has been little systematic research in this area; nonetheless, there are solid theoretical reasons, and some empirical evidence for examining other factors. For example, in a cross-national study of Western Europe, Quillian (1995) found that the state of the economy strongly influenced prejudice levels. Public discussion of immigration issues often is tied closely to the state of the economy. Since jobs are more plentiful in prosperous times, the recruitment of foreign workers is likely to be less contentious. During a sluggish economy, in contrast, natives may be quick to blame immigrants and ethnic minorities. In fact, the state of the economy as a whole may influence citizens' attitudes more than their own personal situations (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). Accordingly, tolerance should rise in prosperous times and decline when the economy is in a slide. I measure the state of the economy as the rate of GDP growth in the three years before the survey.[13]

A second country-level factor relates to the role political actors play in shaping the social and political environment of ethnic relations. Political elites and the media affect public discourse, and this may influence citizen attitudes toward ethnic minorities. In recent years, far-right nationalist parties have emerged as key actors in this process. Their electoral success has given them a public platform to espouse critical and often plainly racist views of ethnic minorities. A central strategy is to fuel natives' fears about threats immigrants and ethnic minorities pose to both physical security and cultural dominance. Claims that ethnic minorities are more often involved in

[12] Self-esteem and personal efficacy (also termed self-efficacy) are interrelated, but conceptually distinct elements of the self (Gecas 1989). People who have a high sense of personal worth also are more likely to believe they have control over their environment and that outcomes depend on one's choices and actions, not external forces. The latter, in fact, may be more closely linked to attitudes toward others, since self-esteem depends more on one's intimate relationships, whereas personal efficacy derives more from interactions with the larger social environment.

[13] Quillian (1995) also found that the size of the immigrant population relates to prejudice levels. Yet, I expect this is a spurious relationship—the size of the immigrant population largely depends on the citizenship regime laws for naturalizing citizens. That is, in ethnic-collectivistic countries, the immigrant population remains higher, precisely because ethnic minorities cannot attain citizenship. Preliminary analyses confirmed a strong correlation between the two factors (0.59, $p < .05$), and immigrant size was not a significant predictor of tolerance once controlling for the latter. Thus, theoretical concerns and multicollinearity led me not to include size of immigration population in the final analyses.

crime or abuse the social welfare system are a staple of the far-right's propaganda. At the same time, they encourage natives to emphasize the ethnic or more exclusionary aspects of their national identity. Thus, as a proxy for antiminority rhetoric, I examine the far-right party electoral strength in each country. While recognizing that the relationship is likely mutually causal, we expect that countries with stronger right-wing parties will have less tolerant citizens (see, however, Duch and Gibson 1992).[14]

Despite identifying country-level factors, the existing literature remains speculative on exactly how these variables affect tolerance judgments. This is significant because macrolevel factors may act in two distinct ways. They may have direct effects, but they also may act as intermediary variables, mitigating the role of individual-level factors. A central goal of the article is to bridge this theoretical gap and develop a clearer understanding of the complex relationship between macro- and microlevel determinants of tolerance. Our discussion of social identity theory, for example, indicates that ingroup, national identities more strongly affect tolerance judgments in collectivistic-ethnic states, which inherently exclude ethnic minorities from membership in the political community. Yet, it is also quite possible that regime type, as well as the state of the economy and far-right party strength, interact with other microlevel variables. Thus, the limitations of existing theory and the large number of potential cross-level interactions require us to adopt a more inductive, yet at the same time, parsimonious approach for this part of the analysis (see below).

Analytical Strategy

The data for the analysis occur at two levels—the individual and the country. Ignoring the multilevel structure of the data is problematic, as would be the case if one used conventional OLS regression. It may substantially underestimate the standard errors and overestimate the coefficients of the country-level variables, which would lead to the impression that these variables are significant when in fact they are not. In order to overcome this problem, I employ hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).[15] This technique allows us in a single, comprehensive model to isolate the independent effects of both individual and country-level variables, while also testing for interaction effects between the two levels. Moreover, it better represents the true structure of the data and gives country-level coefficients that are more precise than conventional approaches (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).

To illustrate, I present the steps in constructing the multilevel model for political tolerance. The first step is to run a baseline model with just the individual-level variables. This gives an initial gauge of the variables' strength and significance; moreover, HLM allows us to determine whether the variables have significantly different effects across countries. In preliminary analyses, four factors were found to have varying effects: *perceptions of threat*, *national identity*, *ideology*, and *satisfaction with democracy*. A central goal of the study, as well as the primary reason for using HLM, is to attempt to account for these varying effects as a function of the country-level factors. I do this in the final step, but first I present the baseline model and then the equation for the direct, independent effects of the country-level variables. The individual-level model is:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} = {} & \beta 0_j + \beta 1_j * (\text{EDUCATION})_{ij} + \beta 2_j * (\text{WORKER})_{ij} \\ & + \beta 3_j * (\text{AGE})_{ij} + \beta 4_j * (\text{AUTHORITY})_{ij} \\ & + \beta 5_j * (\text{EFFICACY})_{ij} + \beta 6_j * (\text{THREAT})_{ij} \\ & + \beta 7_j * (\text{IDENTITY})_{ij} + \beta 8_j * (\text{IDEOLOGY})_{ij} \\ & + \beta 9_j * (\text{DEMSAT})_{ij} + \beta 10_j * (\text{POSTMAT})_{ij} + R_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

Where Y_{ij} is political tolerance for an individual *i* in country *j*, and $\beta 0_j$ is the individual level intercept. EDUCATION_{ij} is years of education (10-point scale); WORKER_{ij} is a dummy variable differentiating those who work in manual labor jobs; AGE_{ij} is the age of the respondent; AUTHORITY_{ij} is a dummy variable reflecting support for a more authoritarian political system (or more appropriately the non-endorsement of democracy); EFFICACY_{ij} is a dichotomous measure of one's belief that she has control over what is happening in her life; THREAT_{ij} is a dichotomous measure of the belief that the minority group's culture or religion poses a threat to the way of life in the country; IDENTITY_{ij} is the respondent's national versus European identification (4-point scale); IDEOLOGY_{ij} is left-right ideological self-placement

[14] The longevity of democratic rule and the degree to which a political system is federalist versus unitary are two other country-level variables previously hypothesized to affect tolerance for *fascists* (see, Duch and Gibson 1992 and Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). In preliminary analysis, I found no relationship, and more importantly, it is not clear how they are related to attitudes toward ethnic minorities specifically.

[15] I use HLM to refer to the general method of hierarchical linear modeling and the program HLM 6.0 developed by Raudenbush, Bryk, and Congdon. For a detailed discussion of the HLM approach, see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and Kreft and de Leeuw (1998). For a recent discussion of its application to political science, see Steenbergen and Jones (2002).

(10-point scale);[16] $DEMSAT_{ij}$ is satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in one's country (4-point scale); and $POSTMAT_{ij}$ is the materialist/post-materialist value orientation (3-point scale). Finally, R_{ij} is the error term, assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ^2.[17]

The next step is to introduce the country-level variables just for the model intercept—that is, their direct, independent effects on political tolerance. Citizenship regime type is entered as two dummy variables, corresponding to its two dimensions: *legal* (ethnic versus civic) and *cultural* (collectivistic versus individualistic).[18] The country-level equation for the model intercept is:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{LEGAL}_j) + \gamma_{02}(\text{CULTURAL}_j) + \gamma_{03}(\text{GDPGROWTH}_j) + \gamma_{04}(\text{FARRIGHT}_j) + U_{0j}$$

where γ_{00} is the country level intercept, and γ_{01}, γ_{02}, γ_{03}, and γ_{04} are the respective effects of the two regime type dimensions, GDP growth, and far-right party strength on the model intercept (β_{0j}).

Finally, I attempt to explain the varying effects of the four individual-level factors: perceptions of threat, national identity, ideology, and satisfaction with democracy. As discussed above, the literature remains primarily speculative on how country-level factors affect individual predictors of tolerance, and hence, I adopt a more inductive approach. This makes it possible to control more rigorously for alternative explanations of tolerance while also isolating the effects of the chief theoretical interest, citizenship regime type. However, cross-level interaction terms can introduce instability into the model, due primarily to multicollinearity (see, Aiken and West 1991); therefore, one must also be parsimonious. To be included in the final model, the interaction terms had to satisfy two conditions: statistical significance and improved overall fit of the model.[19] Country-level variables were able to explain part of the varying effects for three of the four individual-level variables: identity, ideology, and democratic satisfaction. Thus, the cross-level interaction equations are:

$$\beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70} + \gamma_{71}(\text{LEGAL}_j) + \gamma_{72}(\text{FARRIGHT}_j) + U_{7j}$$

$$\beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80} + \gamma_{81}(\text{LEGAL}_j) + \gamma_{82}(\text{GDPGROWTH}_j) + U_{8j}$$

$$\beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90} + \gamma_{91}(\text{LEGAL}_j) + U_{9j}$$

$$\beta_{kj} = \gamma_{k}$$

where γ_{70} is the intercept for the *identity* slope (β_{7j}), and γ_{71} and γ_{72} are the effects of the legal dimension and far-right support. γ_{80} is the intercept for the *ideology* slope (β_{8j}), and γ_{81} and γ_{82} are the respective effects of the legal dimension and growth in GDP. γ_{90} is the intercept for the *democratic satisfaction* slope (β_{9j}), and γ_{91} is the effect of the legal dimension. γ_k are the remaining individual-level variables, which did not have significantly different effects across countries.

The model for social tolerance is similar. It includes all the same individual-level predictors and the country-level variables for the model intercept. The difference lies in the cross-level interaction terms. Only two variables, *identity* and *perceptions of threat*, had significantly different effects across countries. As was the case for political tolerance, I was unable to account for the variance in threat perceptions. In fact, the only cross-level interaction term in this model is that between identity and the civic dimension of regime type.

Empirical Results

Tables 3 and 4 present the respective results for political and social tolerance. In each case, the analysis proceeds in the same fashion. The first step is the baseline model with just the individual-level variables (Model 1). Next, we introduce the country-level variables for only the model intercept (Model 2). Then, the full model examines the interaction effects between the individual and country-level variables (Model 3). The reported numbers for the independent variables are unstandardized coefficients. Finally, multilevel diagnostic tests were conducted for each of the random effects equations to ensure that influential

[16] This variable is centered at its grand mean. It is necessary to do this, because individuals are not dispersed evenly across the left-right spectrum; rather, they cluster toward the center. It is standard to grand mean center such variables. It does not change the overall model fit, however, it does affect the model intercept and the country-level coefficients (for a discussion of this see Kreft and de Leeuw 1998, 108). The intercept of the model is interpreted as the predicted score of an individual whose value for ideology is equal to the grand mean (that is, the mean of the entire sample population), rather than zero.

[17] Higher values for the independent variables correspond to: (1) greater education, (2) working class status, (3) older respondents, (4) a preference for a more authoritarian political system, (5) higher efficacy, (6) a perception of cultural threat from the minority group, (7) stronger identification with Europe than the nation-state, (8) more rightist ideology, (9) higher levels of democratic satisfaction, and (10) post-materialist value orientation.

[18] Values of "0" correspond to ethnic and collectivistic, whereas "1" corresponds to civic and individualistic.

[19] A statistically significant coefficient that fails to improve the overall fit of the model is a telltale sign of multicollinearity (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998).

TABLE 3 Multilevel Model of Political Tolerance

	Model 1 Microlevel Only	Model 2 Country-Level Intercept Effects	Model 3 Full Model with Interaction Effects
Intercept	91.71** (4.66)	90.20** (4.37)	77.33** (5.44)
Individual-Level			
Education	0.40** (.12)	0.39** (.11)	0.45** (.10)
Working Class	−1.50 (.73)	−1.36 (.78)	−1.36 (.78)
Age	−0.01 (.02)	−0.01 (.02)	−0.01 (.02)
Preference for Authoritarian System	−4.28** (.87)	−4.41** (.87)	−4.51** (.86)
Personal Efficacy	1.86** (.73)	1.74** (.70)	1.81** (.70)
Threat	−18.18** (1.46)	−17.72** (.67)	−17.68**(.67)
Nation vs. European Identity	3.28** (.90)	3.21** (.93)	5.04** (1.39)
LEGAL DIMENSION			*−4.04** (1.53)*
FAR-RIGHT PARTY SUPPORT			*0.18** (.07)*
Left-Right Ideology	−1.19** (.38)	−1.18** (.41)	−3.24** (.64)
LEGAL DIMENSION			*1.42* (.65)*
GDP GROWTH			*0.41* (.18)*
Democratic Satisfaction	2.80** (.69)	2.88** (.71)	4.99** (1.20)
LEGAL DIMENSION			*−2.95* (1.41)*
Post-materialism	1.29** (.52)	1.35** (.51)	1.40** (.51)
Country-Level Intercept Effects			
Legal Dimension of Regime Type		4.48** (1.04)	20.87** (5.86)
Cultural Dimension of Regime Type		4.42** (.87)	4.21** (.88)
Growth in GDP (1995–97)		−0.91 (.47)	−0.67 (.36)
Far-Right Party Support		−0.34** (.05)	−0.68** (.15)
Variance Components: (Remaining between-country variance)			
Intercept	202.47**	156.61**	85.67**
Percent explained		22.7	57.7
Identity	9.86**		4.92**
Percent explained			50.1
Ideology	1.87**		1.04**
Percent explained			44.4
Democratic Satisfaction	2.49**		1.92**
Percent explained			22.9

Note: Entries are restricted maximum likelihood unstandardized coefficients estimated with HLM 6.0. For a detailed explanation of coding, see the "Analytical Strategy" section. N = 5730.
*p < .05; **p < .01.

observations were not driving the results. The tests confirmed that the results are robust across countries.[20]

[20]Specifically, I examined the Empirical Bayes (EB) residuals for each random effects equation (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 268). The only residual that stood out as potentially problematic was the *national identity* coefficient for Belgium. However, the interaction effect of regime type on identity remained strong and significant when controlling for this case.

Political Tolerance Model

Looking at Model 1 in Table 3, the predicted level of political tolerance is 91.71 for an individual with the mean level of ideology (see footnote 17) and scores of zero on all other variables. Among our three types of variables, the demographic characteristics are the weakest predictors of political tolerance. Working class status and age are not significant, and the coefficient value for education, which is on a 10-point scale, indicates the average

Table 4 Multilevel Model of Social Tolerance

	Model 1 Microlevel Only	Model 2 Country-Level Intercept Effects	Model 3 Full Model with Interaction Effects
Intercept	80.07** (4.22)	73.86** (5.00)	67.88** (5.34)
Individual-Level			
Education	0.68** (.14)	0.68** (.14)	0.78** (.14)
Working Class	−1.68 (.90)	−1.66 (.90)	−1.71 (.90)
Age	−0.12** (.02)	−0.12** (.02)	−0.12** (.02)
Preference for Authoritarian System	−4.17** (1.07)	−4.19** (1.07)	−4.13** (1.07)
Personal Efficacy	2.55** (.90)	2.56** (.90)	2.58 (.90)
Threat	−26.02** (1.50)	−26.03** (1.54)	−25.76** (1.56)
Nation vs. European Identity	3.10** (.80)	3.09** (.81)	6.68** (1.03)
LEGAL DIMENSION			*−4.83** (1.20)*
Left-Right Ideology	−1.46** (.19)	−1.45** (.19)	−1.46** (.19)
Post-materialism	3.90** (.64)	3.86** (.64)	3.86** (.64)
Democratic Satisfaction	1.85** (.52)	1.87** (.52)	1.90** (.52)
Country-Level Intercept Effects			
Legal Dimension of Regime Type		5.08 (3.18)	12.61** (3.68)
Cultural Dimension of Regime Type		5.68* (2.73)	5.83* (2.75)
Growth in GDP (1995–97)		0.26 (.74)	0.12 (.74)
Far-Right Party Support		−0.10 (.16)	−0.08 (.16)
Variance Components (Remaining between-country variance)			
Intercept	75.71**	35.70**	21.50**
Percent Explained		39.7	71.6
Identity	2.60**		0.92**
Percent Explained			64.6

Note: Entries are restricted maximum likelihood unstandardized coefficients estimated with HLM 6.0. For a detailed explanation of coding, see the "Analytical Strategy" section. N = 5636.
*p < .05; **p < .01.

political tolerance score for the most educated is only four points higher than that for the least educated. In contrast, the psychological and political orientation variables are better predictors. Consistent with recent studies, *perception of threat* and ingroup *national identity* are the strongest predictors in the model. Indeed, the belief that ethnic minorities pose a threat to the native culture diminishes political tolerance levels 18 points. Identity is on a 4-point scale, which indicates that those with strong national identities have tolerance scores that, on average, are 10 points lower than those who identify with Europe as a whole. These findings lend support to the social identity perspective. Yet, it is also clear that personality traits and political values play an important role. Individuals who prefer an authoritarian political system appear less tolerant, as do conservatives and those dissatisfied with the democratic process. Taken together, the results support the findings of Sniderman and his colleagues (2000) that while social identity theory is important, it is not sufficient to explain fully tolerance judgments. Attitudes toward ethnic minorities also are a function of more ingrained psychological processes.

The bottom of Table 3 presents the variance components. These are used to assess whether the inclusion of country-level variables in Models 2 and 3 improves our ability to explain cross-national variations in tolerance levels. The components in Model 1 serve as baseline measures, indicating the amount of between country variance that remains unexplained. As we add the country-level variables in Models 2 and 3, the change in size of the components tells us how much variance is explained. The components at the bottom of Model 1 show that the intercept and the effects of *identity*, *ideology*, and *democratic satisfaction* vary significantly across countries.

Model 2 adds the four country-level variables for the model intercept—the legal (ethnic versus civic) and

cultural (collectivistic versus individualistic) dimensions of regime type, growth in GDP, and far-right party support. The two regime type dimensions and far-right party support are statistically significant and in the expected direction. The effect of GDP growth is not in the expected direction, but this relationship is not significant. Notably, the two dimensions of regime type have similar effects on political tolerance. Again, this contradicts our theoretical discussion, which suggested the legal dimension would have a stronger effect; yet, as we found in Table 2, political tolerance increases monotonically across the three regime types. Finally, as the variance component for the intercept indicates, the country-level variables substantially improve the explanatory power of the model. There is a 23% reduction in the unexplained cross-national variance over the baseline model.

The final step is to introduce the cross-level interaction terms for *national identity*, *ideology*, and *satisfaction with the democratic process*. As Model 3 shows, these terms have several substantial impacts. First, let us consider national versus European identity. The coefficient increases 50% over the baseline model (from 3.28 to 5.04); however, the legal dimension of regime type (ethnic vs. civic) has a strong mediating effect on this variable (−4.04). This means that the ethnic versus civic distinction accounts for over 80% of national identity's effect on political tolerance. In other words, close identification with one's nation-state strongly diminishes political tolerance in ethnic regimes, but not in civic regimes. Thus, it appears that certain institutional cues provide a mechanism by which ingroup identity translates into the political rejection of outgroups. In ethnic regimes, the rules themselves may send signals indicating that ingroup identification is synonymous with outgroup rejection, but in civic regimes, the rules provide no such connection. This is, in fact, consistent with the philosophies behind the two regimes. Ethnic regimes define the nation-state in ethnically exclusive terms whereas civic regimes define it as a political community. The second factor, *far-right party support*, also has a significant controlling effect (0.18) on national identity. The effect is minor, but it appears national identities more readily transfer to intolerance when the Far-right has a stronger electoral presence.

Turning to left-right *ideology*, its effects also increase considerably (−1.19 to −3.24) with the addition of country-level control variables. Again, the legal regime type dimension plays a critical role in this change. The results show ideology's effect on political tolerance is 45% stronger in ethnic regimes. A possible explanation is that conservatism has as a central element the preservation of traditional practices and institutions. In the early to mid 1990s, the collectivistic-ethnic countries came under both domestic and international pressure to liberalize naturalization laws (Koopmans and Statham 2000). It is likely this spurred conservatives to express even greater support for the existing social order, which included the formal exclusion of ethnic minorities from the political community. Yet, ideology's effect on political tolerance also appears to be the function of a more temporal factor, the state of the economy. Because it has no direct effect on political tolerance, this suggests that the state of the economy affects primarily the tolerance judgments of conservatives. In good times, conservatives appear more willing to extend basic political rights, but they also are quick to exclude ethnic minorities and immigrants during economic downturns. This may result from a rational calculus of advantage—that is, natives view minorities as competition for scarcer resources, such as jobs or government benefits. Alternatively, a sinking economy may simply bring to the surface and provide justification for preexisting prejudices.

Finally, *democratic satisfaction* also has a stronger effect (4.99), but, again, the legal regime type dimension significantly mediates it (−2.95). Since democratic satisfaction is on a 4-point scale, this indicates that in ethnic regimes, the very *dissatisfied* have political tolerance scores that, on average, are 15 points lower than the very *satisfied*. Yet, in civic regimes, the difference is only six points. Thus, the results suggest that citizenship laws strongly affect natives' willingness to single out ethnic minorities and immigrants when they are dissatisfied with the democratic process.

The importance of citizenship regime type, especially the legal dimension, becomes readily apparent when looking at the coefficients for the model intercept. The independent effect of the legal dimension increases five-fold over Model 2 to 20.87. The cultural dimension remains unchanged from the baseline model; however, its effect is statistically significant, indicating political tolerance is yet higher in individualistic-civic countries. Far-right party support also has a significant independent effect. The coefficient value signifies that a 10% increase in far-right vote relates to a near 7-point decrease in individual political tolerance.[21] Lastly, GDP growth has no significant effect on the model intercept.

[21] I avoid use of causal terminology here, because although, as discussed in the literature review, far-right parties may fan fears of ethnic minorities and immigrants, thereby decreasing tolerance, the causal story in the other direction is equally plausible. That is, the success of far-right parties is at least partially a function of the intolerance of their voters.

Thus, the cross-level interaction terms reveal citizenship regime type to be the best predictor of individual political tolerance in the model. The changes in the variance components further support this conclusion. In terms of the model intercept, the unexplained cross-national variance decreases from 202.47 with just the individual-level variables to 85.67 in the full model, a 57.7% increase in the overall explanatory power of political tolerance. The interaction terms also significantly reduce the unexplained varying effects for the three microlevel factors.

Social Tolerance Model

Table 4 presents the social tolerance model. The results follow the same basic pattern as those for political tolerance, and hence, I will not discuss them in as much detail. In general, all of the individual-level variables are stronger predictors than they were for political tolerance. The demographic variables, again, are the weakest predictors, while psychological traits and political values remain stronger. Age is now statistically significant, but its effect is minimal. The most notable change between the social and political tolerance models is the impact of threat perceptions. The perception that ethnic minorities pose a threat to the "way of life" in the country is a much stronger predictor of social tolerance (−25.89 versus −18.17). This reinforces the notion that some are willing to accept minorities into the political community, even if they fear minorities pose a threat, but, at the same time, they expect minorities to assimilate and do not accept them as social equals.

There is less unexplained cross-national variance in the baseline model; hence, introducing the country-level variables has less impact than it did for political tolerance. Nonetheless, it is clear that citizenship regime type also plays a role in social tolerance judgments. As Model 2 shows, the only country-level variable that has a significant independent effect is the *cultural* dimension of regime type (collectivistic versus individualistic). This supports the theoretical discussion, as well as the findings from Table 2 on aggregate tolerance levels. Initially, the *legal* dimension does not appear to affect social tolerance, but we see in Model 3 that it has a significant interaction effect with national *identity*. In fact, it is the only significant cross-level interaction for social tolerance. It is somewhat surprising that, here, the legal and not the cultural dimension interacts with national identity. It shows foremost that in collectivistic-ethnic countries, strong national identities robustly translate into both political and social intolerance of ethnic minorities. Finally, looking at the variance components, we see that the inclusion of country-level variables significantly improves our ability to explain cross-national variation in individual social tolerance judgments.

Conclusion

In recent years, citizenship has emerged as an important analytical tool for understanding interethnic group relations. This is because "it brings within its orbit three fundamental issues: how the boundaries of membership within a polity and between polities should be defined; how the benefits and burdens of membership should be allocated and how the identities of members should be comprehended and accommodated" (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001, 3). The article's central finding supports these claims. Drawing on the citizenship regime and multiculturalism literature, I have offered a macrotheoretical framework for understanding cross-national differences in tolerance toward ethnic minorities. Should ethnic minorities be entitled to the same political rights as the native population? Should they be required to give up their own cultural traditions and assimilate into the majority culture? Each of the citizenship regime types provides different answers to these questions and, as the analysis reveals, citizenship regime policies have strong implications for political and social tolerance of ethnic minorities. Natives in collectivistic-ethnic countries are less tolerant than those in more inclusive regimes. The analysis also shows that citizenship laws mediate the explanatory power of three key variables previously shown to predict tolerance: ingroup national identity, ideology, and satisfaction with democracy. In fact, it is citizenship regime type, especially the ethnic/civic dimension, which largely determines whether these individual-level factors affect tolerance. In collectivistic-ethnic regimes, they strongly predict tolerance, but in civic regimes, the relationship is weak.

Do inclusive institutions lead to tolerant citizens or is the causal relationship in the other direction? This question arises naturally from studies working at the intersection of political behavior and institutions. On the one hand, the social identity literature has shown that the context of group relations largely determines members' attitudes and behavior, and it is the same sort of processes at work in terms of regime types. The findings on the varying effects of several individual-level variables also seem to support this argument. On the other hand, personality characteristics and political values, which remain unexplained by country-level factors, also play an important role in tolerance judgments. There is certainly some mutual causality between citizen attitudes and the type

of citizenship regime policies, but at minimum, we now know that there is a strong relationship between the two. Moreover, there is much evidence to suggest that institutions do shape attitudes toward ethnic minorities.

The issue of causality could be better addressed in a future study, which closely examines a nation-state that changes its citizenship and cultural policy laws. Looking at tolerance levels both before and after the change would give a better gauge of the exact role institutions play. The findings also point to other avenues for future research. This study was partially limited in the number of cases by the lack of available survey data. An important step in this vein would be to extend the number of cases, while possibly developing better empirical data on citizenship and cultural policies. This would give a much better assessment of the relationship between citizenship regime types and tolerance. Finally, along with other recent contributions to the tolerance literature (Gibson and Gouws 2000, 2002; Sniderman et al. 2000), the findings indicate a need to rethink our approaches to understanding tolerance, focusing more on contextual factors. Specifically, individuals experience competing influences on tolerance judgments. Tolerance is often treated as an ideal value, and variability among individuals is assumed to result from factors that facilitate or impede the social learning process. Yet, this study indicates that not all system level factors reinforce tolerant attitudes. Thus, in order to understand fully the nature of tolerance, it is necessary to understand the political and social context in which people are required to make tolerance judgments.

Appendix

Classification of Countries by Citizenship Regime Type

In classifying the cases, I rely on several different sources. First, scholars have done previous case studies on citizenship regime policies for several European countries—including, Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden (e.g., Castles 1995; Greenfeld 1998; Kleger and D'Amato 1995; Safran 1997). Second, I employ data from Patrick Weil (2001) on formal requirements for naturalization. Finally, I draw on detailed case studies from the European Migration Center (EMZ) on integration and citizenship policies in each of the EU member states.[22] Again, one should bear in mind that classifications are for 1997, the year of the survey. Based on present policies, I would classify Germany, Belgium, and possibly Italy differently.

The first step is to identify the collectivistic-ethnic regimes. These countries either explicitly prohibit minorities from citizenship, Germany (pre-2000) and Austria, or have other requirements that, in effect, eliminate this possibility, Belgium (pre-1999) and Luxembourg. Belgium is a particularly complicated case. Its *formal* naturalization laws were quite liberal in 1997; however, it had another set of laws and requirements that, in effect, excluded most ethnic immigrants from citizenship. One requirement was that citizenship applicants had to produce a birth certificate from their native country, yet few nonwestern democracies actually certify births. Thus, following Castles (1995), I classify Belgium as collectivistic-ethnic. In 1999, it reformed its naturalization laws, abolishing all informal constraints. Luxembourg curbs naturalization in a different manner. It requires applicants to demonstrate verified fluency in the official state language, *Luxembourgish*. Moreover, Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg were the only EU countries in 1997 that had no provisions for naturalizing second- and third-generation immigrants.[23]

The second step is to distinguish between the two types of civic regimes: collectivistic and individualistic. Both formally define the nation-state in political terms; however, the collectivistic-civic type expects immigrants to give up their distinctive cultural traditions and fully assimilate into the native population. France, the prototypical case, as well as Denmark, Greece, and Portugal, fit this type. These countries do not exclude ethnic minorities, but they have a variety of measures intended to preserve cultural homogeneity and "force" immigrants to assimilate into the native culture. France, for example, forbids the public expression of ethnic minorities' cultural and religious traditions, and it requires children to attend French-teaching public schools. The other three countries require immigrants to demonstrate a high degree of assimilation *before* becoming citizens. Their naturalization requirements include long periods of residency, working knowledge of the native language, a large monetary deposit, or "good" character (Weil 2001). Moreover, they seek to preempt the assimilation problem with policies that directly or indirectly limit the initial immigration of ethnic minorities. Greece and Portugal explicitly favor immigrants from Eastern Europe (as well as western democracies), and Denmark severely restricts the immigration of

[22] The project, *An Overview of Immigration, Integration, Asylum and Refugee Policies in all EU Member States*, was an EU commissioned report in 2002. The case studies can be found at the EMZ website: http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/IntPol.htm.

[23] Greece is the only other country that did not automatically grant citizenship to second-generation immigrants; however, Greece does consider their status in the naturalization process (Weil 2001).

low-skilled workers—disproportionately affecting those from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Individualistic-civic countries, in contrast, do not require immigrants to give up their cultural traditions in any sphere of public life. In fact, the state explicitly protects the right to ethnic difference and, in some cases, even funds the reproduction of minority traditions and languages. Empirically, I distinguish these countries in two ways. Italy and Spain require relatively long periods of residency (10 years) before immigrants can become citizens; however, unlike the collectivistic-civic countries, there are no additional conditions (Weil 2001). Indeed, they are the only EU countries where residency was the sole formal requirement for attaining citizenship in 1997. The other individualistic-civic countries, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland, require only five years of residency. They have additional conditions, which vary among the countries, but these are not strictly enforced in the naturalization process. These countries also seek to facilitate societal integration, while not forcing minorities to give up their distinctive cultural traditions. Great Britain and Ireland encourage the formation of minority community associations, which not only ease integration but also give voice to minorities' political concerns. The state plays an even more active role in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland, directly funding the integration of ethnic minority groups, as well as their cultural traditions.

Individual-Level Variables: Question Wording

EDUCATION: How old were you when you stopped full-time education?

AGE: How old are you?

AUTHORITARIANISM: Here are three opinions about political systems. Which comes closest to your own opinion?

1. Democracy is the best political system in all circumstances.
2. In certain circumstances a dictatorship can be preferable to a democracy.
3. Living in a democracy or under a dictatorship makes no difference to people like me.

PERSONAL EFFICACY: I have control over what is happening in the world around me.

1. Tend to agree
2. Tend to disagree

THREAT: The cultural and religious practices of people from these minority groups threaten our way of life.

1. Tend to agree
2. Tend to disagree

NATIONAL IDENTITY: In the near future do you see yourself as . . .?

1. (Nationality) only
2. (Nationality) and European
3. European and (Nationality)
4. European only

LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY: In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale?

DEMOCRATIC SATISFACTION: Would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (our country)?

(POST)MATERIALISM: There is a lot of talk these days about what (OUR COUNTRY)'s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you, yourself, consider to be most important in the long run?

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