Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2003. 29:167–207
doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100002

First published online as a Review in Advance on June 4, 2003

THE DYNAMICS OF RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

Camille Zubrinsky Charles
Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6299; email: ccharles@pop.upenn.edu

Key Words race, race relations, urban/racial inequality, stratification

■ **Abstract** The publication of *American Apartheid* (Massey & Denton 1993) was influential in shifting public discourse back toward racial residential segregation as fundamental to persisting racial inequality. At the end of the twentieth century, the majority of blacks remained severely segregated from whites in major metropolitan areas. Due to the persistence of high-volume immigration, Hispanic and Asian segregation from whites has increased, although it is still best characterized as moderate. This review examines trends in the residential segregation of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians and recent research focused on understanding the causes of persisting segregation. This discussion is organized around two broad theoretical perspectives—spatial assimilation and place stratification. After detailing the consequences of segregation for affected groups, I identify gaps in our understanding and goals for future research.

INTRODUCTION

Sociologists and policymakers have long viewed racial residential segregation as a key aspect of racial inequality, implicated in both intergroup relations and in larger processes of individual and group social mobility. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Du Bois (1903) recognized the importance of neighborhoods—the "physical proximity of home and dwelling-places, the way in which neighborhoods group themselves, and [their] contiguity"—as primary locations for social interaction, lamenting that the "color line" separating black and white neighborhoods caused each to see the worst in the other (1990, pp. 120–21). Indeed, students of racial inequality, from Myrdal (1944) to Taeuber & Taeuber (1965), believed that segregation was a major barrier to equality, asserting that segregation "inhibits the development of informal, neighborly relations," "ensures the segregation of a variety of public and private facilities" (Taeuber & Taeuber 1965, p. 1), and permits prejudice "to be freely vented on Negroes without hurting whites" (Myrdal 1944, p. 618). Moreover, residential segregation "undermines the social and economic well-being" irrespective of personal characteristics (Massey & Denton 1993, pp. 2–3). Whether voluntary or involuntary, living in racially segregated neighborhoods has serious implications for the present and future mobility opportunities of those

who are excluded from desirable areas. Where we live affects our proximity to good job opportunities, educational quality, and safety from crime (both as victim and as perpetrator), as well as the quality of our social networks (Jargowsky 1996, Wilson 1987).

By the late 1960s, unrest in urban ghettos across the country brought residential segregation—and its implication in racial inequality—to the public's attention, leading to the now famous conclusion of the Kerner Commission that America was "moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal" (U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1988) and the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968. In addition to ending legal housing market discrimination, passage of the Fair Housing Act marked the end of public discussion of residential segregation, as many believed that antidiscrimination legislation was the beginning of the end of residential segregation. With legal barriers to educational, occupational, and residential opportunities removed, blacks could finally achieve full-fledged integration, and social scientists, politicians, and the general public ignored this dimension of the color line for the next two decades (Massey & Denton 1993, Meyer 2000). By the late 1970s, conditions in the nation's urban areas—where the majority of blacks were still concentrated—had declined precipitously. Social scientists scrambled to explain the emergence of a disproportionately black urban underclass, paying little or no attention to persisting residential segregation by race.

In *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987), Wilson outlined the most widely accepted theory of urban poverty: Geographically concentrated poverty and the subsequent development of a ghetto underclass resulted from structural changes in the economy combined with the exodus of middle- and working-class black families from many inner-city ghetto neighborhoods. The shift from a goods- to a service-producing economy saw huge declines in the availability of low-skilled manufacturing jobs that paid enough to support a family; owing to past discrimination, blacks were disproportionately concentrated in these jobs and therefore suffered massive unemployment. Having benefited more substantially from civil rights gains that included affirmative action policies as well as antidiscrimination legislation, Wilson argued, middle- and working-class blacks were able to take advantage of residential opportunities outside of the ghetto. The impact of these events was an "exponential increase" in the now well-known social dislocations associated with sudden and/or long-term increases in joblessness—under- and unemployment, welfare dependence, out-of-wedlock births, and a blatant disregard for the law. The emigration of nonpoor blacks, Wilson argued, removed an important "social buffer," leaving poor blacks in socially isolated communities that lacked material resources, access to jobs and job networks, exposure to conventional role models, and therefore "generate[d] behavior not conducive to good work histories" (Wilson 1987, pp. 56–60).[1]

[1]For an overview of other popular theories of the underclass, see Wilson (1987) and Massey & Denton (1993); for detailed discussions of the characteristics of concentrated poverty neighborhoods, see Wilson (1987), Massey & Denton (1993), and Jargowsky (1996).

Massey & Denton (1993) show, however, that without residential segregation, these "structural changes would not have produced the disastrous social and economic outcomes observed in inner cities . . . Although rates of black poverty were driven up by the economic dislocations Wilson identifies, it was segregation that confined the increased deprivation to a small number of densely settled, tightly packed, and geographically isolated areas." Retooling existing theories of urban poverty, they argue, resolves unanswered questions regarding the disproportionate representation of blacks and Puerto Ricans in the ranks of the underclass, as well as the concentration of underclass communities in older, larger cities of the Northeast and Midwest. In the largest urban areas, blacks and Puerto Ricans were the only groups to experience extreme residential segregation and steep rises in poverty at the same time, the latter stemming from the fact that areas of black concentration were also hit especially hard by the economic reversals of the 1970s (Massey & Denton 1993, pp. 146–47).[2] Emphasizing the interaction of segregation and rising poverty also furthers our understanding of the inability of nonpoor blacks to escape segregation and its consequences, despite increasing class segregation within black communities (Jargowsky 1996; Massey & Denton 1993, pp. 146–47). Focusing on a black middle-class exodus, they argue, detracts attention from the devastating consequences of residential segregation for all blacks, irrespective of socioeconomic status.

The publication of *American Apartheid* (Massey & Denton 1993) was singularly influential in shifting public discourse "back to issues of race and racial segregation" as "fundamental to . . . the status of black Americans and the origins of the urban underclass." The book argued persuasively that "the missing link" in each of the underclass theories prevalent at the time was "their systematic failure to consider the important role that segregation has played in mediating, exacerbating, and ultimately amplifying the harmful social and economic processes they treat" (Massey & Denton 1993, p. 7). As a result, social scientists have rediscovered racial residential segregation as a constituent factor in persistent racial inequality in the United States. Recent research addresses several key issues, including the following: (*a*) trends in the residential segregation of racial/ethnic groups, (*b*) factors that influence the spatial distribution of groups, and (*c*) the social and economic consequences of segregation.

This review addresses each of these issues. I begin with a summary of trends in the residential segregation of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians from whites since 1980. Despite declines in black-white segregation, blacks remain severely segregated in the majority of U.S. cities. As a result of massive immigration, Hispanic and Asian segregation from whites is on the rise; but except for a small number of cases among Hispanics, both groups still remain only moderately segregated from whites. Following the discussion of trends in segregation, I review recent literature dedicated to understanding the causes of residential segregation. Two

[2]Massey & Denton (1993) and others (see, for example, Logan et al. 1996) argue that groups with obvious African phenotype are similarly disadvantaged, explaining the divergence between black and white Hispanics.

broad theoretical perspectives shape this discussion and are indicative of ongoing sociological—indeed, societal—debates regarding the relative importance of race and class in determining social outcomes. The spatial assimilation model posits that objective differences in socioeconomic status and acculturation across racial/ethnic groups are primarily responsible for residential segregation, squarely addressing the issue of social mobility in its suggestion that increased education, occupational prestige, and income will lead to greater racial residential integration. This explanation adequately describes the residential mobility of both phenotypically white Hispanics and of Asians. Alternatively, the place stratification model emphasizes the persistence of prejudice and discrimination—key aspects of intergroup relations—that act to constrain the residential mobility options of disadvantaged groups, including supraindividual, institutional-level forces.[3] Available evidence suggests that this model better characterizes the inability of those who are phenotypically black (both African Americans and black Hispanics) to escape segregation. At first glance, these perspectives may appear oppositional. Upon closer inspection, however, these seemingly oppositional explanations complement one another. Race still matters; however, its relative importance—and that of socioeconomic status—depends on group membership. Finally, I end with a discussion of the consequences of residential segregation, followed by a discussion of the current state of knowledge regarding the dynamics of racial residential segregation, including suggestions and/or efforts to alleviate segregation and its consequences.

TRENDS IN RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION, 1980–2000

Blacks in 16 metropolitan areas were hypersegregated from whites in 1980, exhibiting extreme isolation on at least four of five standard measures of residential distribution (Massey & Denton 1989).[4] By 1990, that number had nearly doubled:

[3]The role of the federal government in the emergence and maintenance of racially segregated neighborhoods, from FHA mortgage guarantees to discriminatory zoning practices, is well documented (see most recently Meyer 2000). More than 30 years since these discriminatory practices were banned, however, their effects are evidenced by massive black-white disparities in accumulated wealth (Oliver & Shapiro 1995).

[4]Studies of residential segregation generally rely on one or more of five measures, each of which captures a different dimension of the spatial distribution of groups. Evenness—measured as the index of dissimilarity—describes the degree to which a group is evenly distributed across neighborhoods or tracts. A score over 60 is interpreted as extreme segregation between two groups, indicating the percentage of either group that would have to move to another tract to achieve within-tract population distributions that mirror that of the metro area. Isolation—measured as (P^*_{xx})—is interpreted as the percent that is the same race in the average group member's neighborhood or tract; scores of 70 and over are considered extreme (indicating that the average person lives in an area that is 70% the same race). The inverse of isolation is Exposure (P^*_{xy}), interpreted as the average probability of

In 29 U.S. metropolitan areas—containing 40% of the total black population—blacks experienced "extreme, multidimensional, and cumulative residential segregation" (Denton 1994, p. 49). Blacks are unique in this experience, which contrasts sharply with the limited and temporary segregation experienced by other groups (Denton 1994, Massey & Denton 1993). Hispanics and Asians are only moderately segregated from whites, although their levels of segregation and isolation are increasing as a result of continuous, high-volume immigration since 1970.[5] Preliminary data from the 2000 Census (Logan 2001a) documents nationwide increases in the relative size of the Hispanic and Asian populations since 1980 and declines in the relative size of the white population; the relative size of the black population changed little (an average of 1.5%).[6] With no end to immigration in sight, non-Hispanic whites are projected to become a numerical minority in the United States some time during this century (Edmonston & Passel 1992, Massey 1995), and the trend is well underway: 8 of the 50 largest metro areas are already majority-minority (whites are less than half the total population) and two others will be majority-minority by the 2010 Census.[7]

These compositional shifts influence residential segregation in meaningful ways. Isolation is generally low for small groups but is expected to rise with increasing

contact with a person-of-another-race comparison group (usually whites). These are the most commonly reported measures. Three other measures—concentration, clustering, and centralization—address a group's degree of density, proximity to the central business district, and the contiguity of their neighborhoods, respectively. A group is hypersegregated if it scores over 60 on at least four of the five measures (Denton 1994; Massey & Denton 1989, 1993).

[5]According to official estimates, nearly 85% of the 15.5 million immigrants to the United States between 1971 and 1993 are of Latin American or Asian origin (roughly 50% and 35%, respectively); including estimates of undocumented or illegal immigrants pushes the total up by at least another 3 million, the majority of which are largely Mexican (Massey 1995).

[6]Data are for the 50 largest metropolitan areas. Due to space limitations, these data are not presented here but are available from the Lewis Mumford Center at www.albany.edu/mumford/census. The relative share of the Hispanic and Asian populations increased an average of 6.8% and 3.8%, respectively. Eleven regions—Los Angeles, Riverside-San Bernardino, Orange County, and San Diego in California; Houston and Dallas in Texas; Phoenix-Mesa in Arizona; Miami, Orlando, and Fort Lauderdale in Florida; and Bergen-Passaic in New Jersey—saw their Hispanic populations increase between 10% and 22%. Increases for Asians topped 10% in four areas in California (Orange County, Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose), and five other areas increased between 6% and 10% (Los Angeles-Long Beach and Sacramento, Seattle-Bellvue-Everett in Washington, New York City, and Bergen-Passaic). On average, the relative size of the white population declined by 12.4%. For blacks, the pattern is more varied; there is little or no growth in many areas and others show slight declines.

[7]Regions that are currently majority-minority are: Los Angeles, Riverside-San Bernardino, Oakland, and San Jose; Houston and San Antonio; Miami; and New York City. Two other regions—Orange County and San Francisco—are currently just over 51% white.

group size even if the group's level of segregation remains constant. Moreover, the larger the relative size of an out-group's population, the greater exposure to that group is likely to be. Both exposure and isolation are influenced by group settlement patterns. Specifically, chain migration patterns common among both Hispanic and Asian immigrants concentrate rapidly growing groups in a small number of metropolitan areas—and within a small number of neighborhoods within an area—increasing their isolation and decreasing exposure to out-groups (Logan 2001a, Massey & Denton 1987).

Table 1 reports black, Hispanic, and Asian segregation from whites (dissimilarity), isolation, and exposure to whites for the 50 largest metropolitan regions in 2000 (and parenthetically, the change between 1980 and 2000).[8] Both Hispanics and Asians show increasing segregation and isolation, along with declining exposure to whites. These patterns are consistent with their rapid population growth, settlement patterns, and declining white population share. Over the same period, blacks show declines in both segregation and isolation; trends in exposure to whites are mixed, but overall reflect a slight increase. These patterns are consistent with the shifts in population composition outlined above and their anticipated effects on spatial distribution. These changes also contributed to declining black isolation: In many instances, Hispanic settlement patterns concentrate them in areas of traditional black settlement, increasing black-Hispanic contact (Alba et al. 1995).[9]

Nearly half of the metro regions experienced declines in black-white segregation of at least 10 percentage points over the 20-year period.[10] Still, the degree of black-white segregation remains extreme (over 60) in 28 regions. More than half of these are Eastern and Midwestern regions, where black-white segregation has been most resistant to change (Farley & Frey 1994, Massey & Denton 1993), and many of the most segregated regions saw little or no change in black-white segregation over the two decades. At the same time, segregation declined enough in some mid-sized regions with sizable black populations to be characterized as moderate (under 50). Areas with the largest declines (15% or more) tend to be multiethnic (an above-average presence of at least one other nonwhite group) and/or have relatively small black populations (between 5% and 10%); these metro areas are located in

[8]These data use tract-level data, the most commonly used level of Census geography. Census tracts typically have between 2500 and 8000 residents and are closest in size to what most consider a neighborhood. Some researchers (e.g., Farley & Frey 1994) report segregation measures based on smaller, block-group data. This unit of geography usually contains only a few hundred residents and is, on average, more homogeneous. As a result, calculating segregation indices at the block-group level yields higher results (Ellen 2000, p. 14).

[9]Data for minority-minority group exposure are not shown here, but are available from the Lewis Mumford Center (www.albany.edu/mumford/census).

[10]Changes in segregation are usually interpreted as follows: changes of 10 or more points in a decade represent significant change; change between 5 and 10 points over a decade represent moderate change; changes of less than 5 points in a decade are interpreted as little or no change (Logan 2001a,b,c). Based on these benchmarks, nearly half of the areas experienced moderate declines in segregation.

TABLE 1 Black, Hispanic, and Asian segregation from whites in the 50 largest metropolitan regions, 1980–2000

	Blacks			Hispanics			Asians		
Metro area	**Dissimilarity (80–00 Δ)**	**Isolation (80–00 Δ)**	**Exposure (80–00 Δ)**	**Dissimilarity (80–00 Δ)**	**Isolation (80–00 Δ)**	**Exposure (80–00 Δ)**	**Dissimilarity (80–00 Δ)**	**Isolation (80–00 Δ)**	**Exposure (80–00 Δ)**
Western areas									
Los Angeles/Long Beach	68 (−14)	34 (−26)	16 (0)	63 (+6)	63 (+13)	17 (−17)	48 (+1)	29 (+14)	31 (−17)
Riverside/San Bernardino	46 (−9)	15 (−5)	38 (−17)	43 (+4)	50 (+17)	36 (−23)	38 (+7)	11 (+8)	46 (−27)
Orange County	37 (−9)	3 (−2)	48 (−17)	56 (+13)	54 (+21)	31 (−28)	40 (+12)	26 (+19)	46 (−29)
San Diego	54 (−10)	15 (−12)	38 (−6)	51 (+9)	44 (+16)	38 (−20)	47 (+1)	22 (+11)	45 (−17)
Seattle/Bellevue/Everett	50 (−18)	14 (−15)	59 (+4)	31 (+11)	8 (+6)	70 (−16)	35 (−5)	19 (+7)	65 (−8)
Oakland	63 (−11)	35 (−21)	26 (−2)	47 (+11)	30 (+12)	36 (−25)	42 (+4)	29 (+17)	41 (−22)
Portland/Vancouver	48 (−21)	16 (−16)	67 (+7)	35 (+14)	15 (+12)	74 (−17)	32 (+3)	9 (+6)	78 (−12)
San Francisco	61 (−7)	23 (−18)	31 (−3)	54 (+8)	34 (+12)	36 (−17)	49 (−2)	40 (+10)	38 (−12)
San Jose	41 (−8)	4 (−3)	38 (−18)	52 (+6)	41 (+9)	30 (−23)	42 (+9)	38 (+27)	37 (−28)
Sacramento	56 (−3)	18 (−4)	44 (−13)	40 (+5)	21 (+7)	52 (−17)	49 (+1)	20 (+7)	48 (−19)
Western area average	52 (−11)	18 (−12)	41 (−7)	47 (+9)	36 (+13)	42 (−20)	42 (+3)	24 (+13)	48 (−19)
Southwestern areas									
Houston	68 (−9)	47 (−19)	22 (−1)	56 (+5)	49 (+13)	31 (−19)	49 (+6)	15 (+9)	45 (−26)
Dallas	59 (−19)	42 (−26)	33 (+9)	54 (+5)	45 (+21)	37 (−23)	45 (+6)	11 (+9)	60 (−22)
Phoenix/Mesa	44 (−18)	9 (−14)	51 (+4)	53 (0)	46 (+12)	44 (−13)	28 (+1)	4 (+3)	70 (−13)
Denver	62 (−7)	24 (−19)	47 (+4)	50 (+1)	38 (+9)	50 (−13)	30 (+4)	5 (+3)	70 (−9)
Fort Worth/Arlington	60 (−18)	35 (−28)	40 (+10)	48 (0)	37 (+11)	46 (−17)	42 (+5)	8 (+6)	61 (−25)
San Antonio	50 (−12)	20 (−15)	34 (+1)	51 (−7)	66 (−1)	27 (−2)	32 (+2)	4 (+2)	49 (−13)
Las Vegas	43 (−20)	19 (−31)	48 (+7)	43 (+20)	34 (+23)	49 (−30)	30 (+9)	9 (+6)	62 (−20)
Salt Lake City/Ogden	37 (−20)	3 (−6)	74 (−1)	43 (+8)	22 (+12)	70 (−15)	30 (+5)	6 (+4)	76 (−13)
Austin/San Marcos	52 (−13)	21 (−22)	40 (+5)	47 (0)	40 (+4)	45 (−7)	41 (+6)	9 (+7)	63 (−13)
Southwestern area average	53 (−15)	24 (−20)	43 (+4)	49 (+4)	42 (+12)	44 (−15)	36 (+5)	8 (+5)	62 (−17)
Midwestern areas									
Chicago	81 (−8)	73 (−10)	16 (+5)	62 (−2)	48 (+10)	38 (−13)	44 (−3)	15 (+6)	63 (−12)
Detroit	85 (−3)	79 (0)	17 (−2)	46 (+4)	19 (+12)	62 (−13)	46 (+5)	8 (+6)	76 (−8)
Minneapolis/St. Paul	58 (−10)	23 (−6)	58 (−4)	47 (+10)	10 (+6)	67 (−20)	43 (+13)	12 (+10)	68 (−25)
St. Louis	74 (−9)	65 (−9)	32 (+8)	29 (0)	4 (+2)	77 (−4)	43 (+1)	5 (+3)	80 (−8)
Cleveland/Lorain/Elyria	77 (−8)	71 (−7)	25 (+5)	58 (0)	17 (+4)	65 (−9)	38 (+3)	5 (+3)	80 (−7)
Kansas City	69 (−9)	53 (−14)	38 (+9)	46 (+5)	17 (+7)	64 (−13)	35 (+1)	4 (+2)	77 (−7)
Cincinnati	75 (−4)	58 (−6)	39 (+4)	30 (−1)	2 (+1)	81 (+1)	42 (+2)	4 (+3)	82 (−5)
Indianapolis	71 (−9)	53 (−12)	41 (+7)	44 (+15)	7 (+6)	70 (−14)	39 (0)	3 (+2)	79 (−8)

(*Continued*)

TABLE 1 (*Continued*)

Metro area	Blacks			Hispanics			Asians		
	Dissimilarity (80–00 Δ)	Isolation (80–00 Δ)	Exposure (80–00 Δ)	Dissimilarity (80–00 Δ)	Isolation (80–00 Δ)	Exposure (80–00 Δ)	Dissimilarity (80–00 Δ)	Isolation (80–00 Δ)	Exposure (80–00 Δ)
Columbus	63 (−10)	48 (−9)	47 (+6)	38 (+9)	6 (+5)	71 (−12)	42 (−3)	7 (+5)	78 (−10)
Milwaukee/Waukesha	82 (−2)	67 (−2)	25 (−2)	60 (+4)	33 (+17)	51 (−20)	41 (+10)	5 (+4)	65 (−25)
Midwestern area average	74 (−7)	59 (−8)	34 (+4)	46 (+4)	16 (+7)	65 (−12)	41 (+3)	7 (+4)	75 (−12)
Southern areas									
Washington, DC	63 (−7)	59 (−8)	28 (−1)	48 (+16)	20 (+15)	45 (−25)	39 (+7)	14 (+9)	57 (−18)
Atlanta	66 (−11)	63 (−10)	28 (+2)	53 (+21)	20 (+18)	49 (−27)	45 (+9)	8 (+7)	59 (−27)
Baltimore	68 (−7)	66 (−7)	29 (+4)	36 (+3)	4 (+2)	66 (−7)	39 (+1)	7 (+5)	71 (−10)
Tampa/St. Petersburg/Clearwater	65 (−14)	43 (−16)	42 (+7)	45 (−5)	23 (+4)	61 (−9)	34 (0)	4 (+3)	75 (−12)
Miami	74 (−7)	62 (−5)	11 (−7)	44 (−9)	71 (+13)	18 (−16)	31 (+3)	3 (+2)	29 (−29)
Orlando	57 (−17)	41 (−21)	41 (+5)	41 (+10)	27 (+21)	55 (−30)	36 (+4)	5 (+4)	62 (−26)
Ft. Lauderdale	62 (−22)	53 (−18)	31 (+6)	32 (+4)	23 (+17)	55 (−29)	28 (+1)	4 (+3)	59 (−30)
Norfolk/Virginia Beach/Newport News	46 (−13)	52 (−9)	42 (+5)	32 (+1)	5 (+2)	60 (−11)	34 (−4)	6 (+2)	63 (−14)
Charlotte/Gastonia/Rock Hill	55 (−8)	45 (−10)	44 (+2)	50 (+18)	13 (+12)	55 (−18)	43 (−4)	4 (+3)	65 (−19)
New Orleans	69 (−2)	71 (0)	24 (−2)	36 (+9)	8 (+2)	61 (−10)	48 (−3)	11 (0)	51 (−7)
Greensboro/Winston-Salem/High Point	59 (−8)	49 (−11)	41 (+3)	51 (+19)	11 (+10)	58 (−16)	46 (+3)	4 (+3)	67 (−19)
Nashville	57 (−9)	46 (−10)	48 (+5)	46 (+23)	9 (+8)	68 (−12)	42 (−1)	4 (+3)	75 (−12)
Raleigh/Durham/Chapel Hill	46 (−6)	43 (−11)	46 (+1)	43 (+19)	12 (+11)	55 (−19)	41 (0)	7 (+5)	70 (−14)
Southern area average	61 (−10)	53 (−10)	35 (+2)	43 (+10)	19 (+10)	54 (−18)	39 (+1)	6 (+4)	62 (−18)
Eastern areas									
New York	82 (0)	60 (−3)	11 (−4)	67 (+2)	46 (+6)	21 (−10)	51 (+1)	27 (+11)	40 (−15)
Philadelphia	72 (−6)	62 (−7)	28 (+2)	60 (−3)	27 (+5)	43 (−7)	44 (+3)	10 (+7)	66 (−12)
Boston	66 (−11)	39 (−14)	40 (+4)	59 (+3)	21 (+9)	54 (−13)	45 (−3)	13 (+1)	71 (−7)
Nassau/Suffolk	74 (−3)	41 (−8)	34 (−8)	47 (+10)	23 (+13)	56 (−22)	36 (+5)	8 (+6)	75 (−14)
Pittsburgh	67 (−6)	47 (−7)	50 (+6)	30 (−1)	1 (0)	84 (−3)	49 (+3)	5 (+4)	85 (−7)
Newark	80 (−3)	67 (−3)	17 (−4)	65 (−2)	36 (+9)	36 (−11)	35 (+4)	9 (+7)	69 (−11)
Bergen/Passaic	73 (−7)	36 (−10)	27 (−6)	58 (−3)	39 (+11)	38 (−13)	36 (+2)	16 (+13)	65 (−20)
Providence/Fall River/Warwick	59 (−13)	13 (−10)	56 (−5)	68 (+18)	32 (+24)	48 (−31)	43 (+10)	6 (+5)	69 (−20)
Eastern area average	72 (−6)	46 (−8)	33 (−2)	57 (+3)	28 (+10)	48 (−14)	42 (+3)	12 (+7)	68 (−13)
Overall average	62 (−10)	41 (−12)	37 (+1)	48 (+6)	27 (+10)	51 (−16)	40 (+3)	11 (+6)	62 (−16)

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census and The Lewis Mumford Center for Comparitive Urban and Regional Research.

Notes: Due to space limitations, indices and changes are rounded to the nearest whole number.

the newer cities of the West and Southwest (Farley & Frey 1994, Frey & Farley 1993, Logan 2001a). Finally, approximately half of the areas show double-digit declines in isolation, although in many cases, exposure to whites either declined or remained constant. Thus, for the 50 regions, black isolation declined by an average of 12%, but exposure to whites increased by only 1%, on average. As indicated previously, the majority of the decline in black isolation is due mainly to their increasing exposure to Hispanics (Alba et al. 1995, Frey & Farley 1993, Logan 2001a).

Trends in Hispanic and Asian segregation are the opposite of those observed for blacks. In most areas, Hispanic-white segregation remains moderate, isolation low, and exposure to whites meaningful, despite explosive population growth. Overall, increases in segregation range from small to moderate. Hispanic-white dissimilarity never exceeds 68 (and only five areas exceed 60, compared to 28 for blacks) and averages a low of 43 in the South and a high of 57 in the East. Isolation increased more substantially, yet the average Hispanic resides in a neighborhood that is between 16% and 42% same-race (compared to the average black person, whose neighborhood is between 18% and 59% same-race). Exposure to whites declined more substantially. Finally, Asians remain the least-segregated nonwhite group. Increases in dissimilarity and isolation (except for the West, where Asians are most concentrated) are generally less than 10% (the average increase for the 50 regions was 3%), and declines in exposure to whites are comparable to those experienced by Hispanics, once again reflecting the rapid population growth of these largely immigrant groups, concentrated settlement patterns, and declining white population share. In contrast to the residential patterns of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, whites' exposure to minorities increased steadily over the past two decades: In 2000, the minority percentage in the average white person's census tract was a nontrivial 20%, and research by Alba & colleagues (1995) documents sharp declines in the number of all-white neighborhoods since 1970. In short, although segregation persists or increases for minority group members, the average white person experiences modest integration.[11]

Finally, a brief mention of trends in suburban segregation is warranted.[12] In 2000, nearly 60% of Asians, 50% of Hispanics, and 40% of blacks lived in the suburbs, compared to 71% of whites. These percentages represent substantial increases in minority representation; however, they have not been accompanied by meaningful declines in suburban residential segregation. Patterns of suburban segregation mirror those of the larger metropolitan area of which they are a part, indicating that new minority residents are moving to suburbs where coethnics were already present in 1990. Where groups are smallest in number, they are least segregated and least likely to establish suburban enclaves; however, in the regions

[11]Data for non-Hispanic white-minority group exposure are not shown here but are available from the Lewis Mumford Center (www.albany.edu/mumford/census).

[12]Suburbs are defined as residential areas within metropolitan areas that are outside of central cities (Ellen 2000, Schnore 1963, Timberlake 2002).

where the majority of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians live and are, therefore, a larger share of the suburban population, "segregation is higher, more unyielding over time, and minority population growth is more likely to be associated with the creation or intensification of ethnic enclaves" (Logan 2001b). Increasing minority suburbanization within the context of persisting segregation helps to explain the rising economic segregation among both blacks and Hispanics documented by Jargowsky (1996). Minority suburbs—although better off than poor minority neighborhoods—tend to be less affluent, have poorer quality public services and schools, and experience more crime and social disorganization compared to the suburbs that comparable whites reside in (Alba et al. 1994; Logan et al. 2002; Pattillo-McCoy 1999).

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

A large body of research attempts to explain the persistence of residential segregation—particularly among blacks—despite the passage of antidiscrimination legislation, more favorable racial attitudes among whites, and the dramatic expansion of the black middle class. This section summarizes three competing explanations for persisting racial residential segregation that garner the most research attention—objective differences in socioeconomic status, prejudice, and housing-market discrimination—and reviews major research findings circa 1980. Explanations emphasizing group differences in social class status are consistent with the spatial assimilation model, whereas the place stratification model includes explanations placing primacy on persisting prejudice and/or discrimination. Where appropriate, I consider alternative explanations that do not fit neatly into either theoretical perspective.

Spatial Assimilation

Racial group differences in socioeconomic status characteristics are well documented. On average, blacks and Hispanics complete fewer years of school and are concentrated in lower-status occupations, earn less income, and accumulate less wealth compared to whites (Farley 1996a, Oliver & Shapiro 1995). The persistence and severity of these differences lead easily to the conclusion that residential segregation by race is simply the logical outcome of these differences in status and the associated differences in lifestyle (Clark 1986, 1988; Galster 1988; see also Jackman & Jackman 1983 on class identities as involving lifestyle considerations). This assumption is the basis of the spatial assimilation model, which asserts that individuals convert socioeconomic gains into higher-quality housing, often by leaving ethnic neighborhoods for areas with more whites; for immigrants, it also involves acculturation—the accumulation of time in the United States and English language fluency. It should also be noted that spatial assimilation is influenced by

the metropolitan-area characteristics discussed in the previous section (i.e., group size, rates of group population change, and suburbanization) (Alba & Logan 1993, Farley & Frey 1994, Massey & Denton 1985).[13]

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS DIFFERENCES Tests of this hypothesis dominate segregation research over the past two decades, and findings consistently show that Asians and Hispanics are always substantially less segregated from whites than blacks are. As Asian and Hispanic socioeconomic status improves and generations shift from immigrant- to native-born, segregation from whites declines substantially. Conversely, objective differences in socioeconomic status explain only part of blacks' residential outcomes (Alba & Logan 1993; Denton & Massey 1988; Logan & Alba 1993, 1995; Logan et al. 1996; Massey & Denton 1987, 1993; Massey & Fischer 1999). Moreover, studies distinguishing among white, black, and mixed-race Hispanics find that black and mixed-race Hispanics' residential patterns mirror those of African Americans. The exceptional experience of groups with black skin leads Massey & Denton (1989, Denton & Massey 1989) to conclude that blacks pay a "higher constant penalty" for their race that is not explained by socioeconomic status disadvantage.

Until recently, the bases for these conclusions were aggregate-level analyses, primarily from the Massey-Denton segregation research project that culminated in the publication of *American Apartheid*.[14] Modeling aggregate-level studies suffer from several potentially important limitations, however. In particular, modeling individual-level processes at the aggregate level (either tract- or metropolitan-area

[13]Due to space limitations, I limit my discussion of the spatial assimilation model to group differences in socioeconomic status and acculturation. The majority of multivariate analyses of the spatial assimilation model include one or more measures of metropolitan context (generally group size, rate of population growth, region, and/or new housing supply) and find associations between contextual effects and segregation consistent with those outlined in the previous section (see, for example, Alba & Logan 1993; Massey & Denton 1987; Massey et al. 1994; Logan et al. 1996; South & Crowder 1997a,b, 1998; South & Deane 1993). Older, larger cities, located primarily in the Northeast and Midwest are more segregated than the newer cities of the West and Southwest. Older cities have ecological structures more conducive to segregation: densely settled cores, thickly packed working-class neighborhoods, and older housing stock built prior to the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act (for a detailed discussion, see Farley & Frey 1994).

[14]Two types of aggregate-level analysis are common. In the first, a population is separated into categories of a socioeconomic indicator (e.g., education, occupation, or income) and segregation indices are recalculated within categories of the selected indicator. If segregation within categories of the indicator is similar to the overall level, researchers conclude that socioeconomic status is not influential in residential outcomes for that group (see, for example, Darden 1995, Denton & Massey 1988, Massey & Fischer 1999). In the second type of aggregate-level analysis, multivariate models predict residential outcomes (e.g., probability of contact with whites) using the average characteristics of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians for a set of metropolitan areas (Massey & Denton 1987, Denton & Massey 1988).

level) risks problems of ecological inference and introduces multicollinearity that limits the number of explanatory measures (Alba & Logan 1993, Massey et al. 1987, see also Massey & Denton 1987). Particularly problematic, homeownership is never included in aggregate-level studies, despite its obvious implications for residential outcomes (Alba & Logan 1993, Charles 2001b, Oliver & Shapiro 1995, Yinger 1995).[15] Finally, these studies measure and/or predict segregation or, less frequently, central-city versus suburban location across metropolitan areas. At least as important, however, is to understand variations in the characteristics of the neighborhoods—both central-city and suburban—where various racial/ethnic groups actually live. For example, suburban blacks tend to live in older, inner suburbs that are less affluent, less white, and experience more crime and social disorganization compared to the suburbs where comparable whites live (Alba et al. 1994, Logan & Schneider 1984, Pattillo-McCoy 1999); thus, not all suburbs are equal, and aggregate analyses cannot detail these important experiential differences.

Individual-level analyses address these limitations and substantially enhance our knowledge of residential outcomes by race; locational attainment models (Alba & Logan 1991, 1992) have been particularly influential in this regard.[16] An innovative method introduced by Alba & Logan (1991, 1992) transforms aggregate-level Census data (mainly STF3 and STF4 files) into the functional equivalent of individual-level Public Use Microdata Sample data with characteristics of each person's community of residence appended, eliminating issues of ecological inference and multicollinearity [Logan et al. 1996, p. 858; for a detailed explanation of the method, see Alba & Logan (1991, 1992)]. Models employ a broad range of social class indicators, most notably homeownership and family status to predict neighborhood-level outcomes (e.g., median income and exposure to crime, as well

[15]In fairness, it should be emphasized that, until recently, obtaining Census data with both individual- and aggregate-level data was extremely difficult. Massey et al. (1991), Massey & Denton (1985), and Villemez (1980) are exceptions to the type of analysis noted here; all are individual-level analyses (special editions of the 1970 and/or 1980 Public Use Files that the Census Bureau appended neighborhood racial composition to) that do not suffer from problems of ecological inference. Results are consistent with those of aggregate-level studies; Massey & Denton (1985, p. 94) conclude, therefore, that any errors of substantive interpretation (of aggregate-level analyses) are conservative in nature. Still, these exceptions, like their aggregate-level counterparts, rely on a limited number of indicators (see Alba & Logan 1993).

[16]Residential mobility studies are similar in that they consider the influence of individual-level characteristics on the likelihood of moving as well as the locational returns to individual characteristics; they differ in that mobility studies limit analysis to movers, and data are from national panel studies (e.g., the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics or the Annual Housing Survey; see Massey et al. 1994; South & Crowder 1997a, b, 1998; South & Deane 1993). I focus here on individual-level analyses of Census data because their results are more broadly generalized; however, the pattern of results is consistent for the two types of studies.

as percent non-Hispanic white and suburban versus central-city residence). Analyses compare the characteristics of suburbs inhabited by whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians rather than aggregate-level segregation.[17]

These improvements have yielded interesting and important information. Most interesting, perhaps, is that at the individual-level, blacks exhibit a positive association between socioeconomic status and residential outcomes, although their returns to education and income are significantly lower than for other groups. Especially troubling is the negative effect of homeownership on blacks' residential outcomes. Counter to the benefits typically associated with owning a home (rather than renting), black homeowners reside in neighborhoods that are more segregated and less affluent than their renting counterparts—they are the only group that is consistently penalized for owning a home (Alba et al. 2000a, Logan et al. 1996). Together, these differences keep blacks from reaching parity with whites at any level of affluence—blacks live in neighborhoods that are, on average, 15% to 20% less affluent than other groups with comparable status. Additionally, contrary to the assertion that black residential segregation is unchanged by increasing socioeconomic status, Alba et al. (2000a) find that middle-class and affluent blacks in the most segregated U.S. cities live in areas with substantially more whites than their poor, inner-city counterparts do. This is counterbalanced, however, by the generally lower status of their white neighbors. Thus, the suburban areas where middle-class and affluent blacks live are significantly less white and less affluent than those of comparable whites.

Patterns for Asians and Hispanics, on the other hand, are more similar to those observed in the aggregate. Both show substantial residential gains with improved socioeconomic status, and effects for homeownership are mixed (often nonsignificant and occasionally negative, although less so than for blacks); effects of education and income are large enough, however, that average and affluent native-born Hispanics and Asians live in communities that are roughly equivalent to those of comparable whites (Logan et al. 1996, Alba et al. 1999). A comparison of 1980 and 1990 data suggests a weakening of the traditional spatial assimilation model regarding the importance of acculturation. Being native-born and speaking only English still improves Hispanics' locational attainment, but the latter is less important in 1990 compared to 1980; by 1990, neither characteristic disadvantaged Asians. The emergence of ethnic suburban enclaves may account for this apparent weakening of the traditional spatial assimilation process by making residence in high-status, suburban communities an option for recently arrived non-English speakers with at- or above-average social class characteristics (Alba et al. 1999, 2000b; Logan et al. 2002). Furthermore, "perceptible African ancestry" costs black

[17]They focus on suburban residents because (*a*) segregation is lower in the suburbs compared to the central city for all groups (see Massey & Denton 1989), suggesting that the influence of individual-level characteristics is different for the two locations, and (*b*) it reveals the process that determines location within suburbia and elaborates differences in the characteristics of suburban neighborhoods across racial/ethnic groups (Alba & Logan 1993, p. 1400).

Hispanics between $3500 and $6000 in locational returns, placing them in neighborhoods that are comparable to those of black Americans (Alba et al. 2000b, p. 613).

Much of the research discussed to this point focuses heavily on the use of statistically convenient, but homogenizing, racial categories. Considering characteristics specific to immigration may account for some intragroup diversity, and it is certainly a step in the right direction; however, an important body of research documents meaningful differences among national-origin groups within the same broad racial category, suggesting the importance of analyses that are sensitive to these differences (see, for example, Portes & Rumbaut 1996; Waldinger & Bozorgmehr 1996; Waters 1990, 1999). At the aggregate level, Massey & Bitterman's (1985) comparison of Mexicans in Los Angeles and Puerto Ricans in New York—demonstrating that differences in segregation are attributable to the latter group's generally lower socioeconomic status and "blackness"—represents both an important exception to this general tendency and evidence of potentially important intragroup variation.

A final advantage of the individual-level analyses detailed above is the serious attention several studies have paid to national-origin differences within each of the four major racial categories. Consistent with assimilation hypotheses, for example, Logan & Alba (1993) find that the more recently settled Irish-, Italian-, and Polish-origin whites tend to reside in lower-income neighborhoods than the earlier-arriving (e.g., British, French, and German) and other white ethnic groups, net of individual-level characteristics. For "blacks," results are consistent with those detailed above: Afro-Caribbean blacks experience more favorable outcomes and see better returns to their human capital than African Americans do (Alba et al. 1999; Crowder 1999; Logan & Alba 1993, 1995).[18]

National-origin differences are most pronounced among Asians and Hispanics, the two most heterogeneous and rapidly growing groups. Logan & Alba (1993) find that Asian Indians, Filipinos, and Vietnamese tend to reside in less affluent neighborhoods than Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and other Asian groups do, suggesting that this effect may be tied to the extreme poverty circumstances of their home countries compared to those of other Asian groups. Alternatively, Asian Indians and Filipinos are not at all disadvantaged by poor English skills; in this case, the researchers suggest that this is because English is widely used in both India and the Philippines. As a result, these groups arrive with more exposure to English; therefore, the "census self-assessment of English ability has a different meaning for them" (Alba et al., 1999 p. 457; see also Jasso & Rosenzweig 1990).

[18]It has also been suggested that important differences in socioeconomic status among West Indian immigrants may influence residential outcomes. Black immigrants from the British West Indies (mainly Jamaica) have significantly higher incomes, educational levels, employment and homeownership rates, and are more concentrated in high-status occupations than French West Indians (mainly Haitians) are; Dutch West Indians fall in between (Crowder 1999, p. 103).

The disadvantage associated with poor English skills, moreover, declined considerably between 1980 and 1990 for the Chinese and Koreans, but increased among the Vietnamese.[19] None of the Asian groups is meaningfully disadvantaged by recent arrival (Alba et al. 1999).

Both national-origin and racial classification matter for Hispanics. Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and all black Hispanics reside, on average, in lower socioeconomic status neighborhoods relative to other Hispanics, net of other individual characteristics (Alba & Logan 1993, pp. 260–64). Poor English skills negatively impact the likelihood of suburban (versus central-city) residence for Mexicans and Cubans, but not for Dominicans and Salvadorans. Also, in sharp contrast to the Asian groups, recent immigration to the United States is detrimental to the likelihood of suburban residence for all Hispanic groups (Alba et al. 1999). Although limited in number, these analyses highlight important variation in residential outcomes and in the factors that influence those outcomes that are hidden by the use of broad, analytically convenient racial categories; future research should continue to expose the complicated social realities hidden by this social science convention.

On the whole, conclusions of aggregate-level studies remain intact. The experiences of Hispanics and (for the most part) Asians are largely consistent with the spatial assimilation model; blacks (African Americans and black Hispanics) on the other hand, do not see the same payoff for improved social class status. This is best illustrated by the negative effect of homeownership. Alba and colleagues suggest that this represents the operation of a dual housing market that restricts black homeowners—but not black renters—to black neighborhoods, making it difficult for them to enter some neighborhoods and adding to the cost they pay for housing. Mixed effects of homeownership among Asians and Hispanics suggest that a dual housing market may operate to a lesser extent for them as well (Alba & Logan 1993, Alba et al. 1999, Logan et al. 1996, Massey & Denton 1993). Finally, non-Hispanic whites live in largely white and generally more affluent neighborhoods irrespective of their social class characteristics. The oppositional experiences of blacks and whites contradict the tenets of spatial assimilation and suggest the persistence of an enduring system of racial stratification.

Place Stratification

The emergence of racially separate neighborhoods resulted from a combination of individual- and institutional-level actions. Scholars generally agree that all levels of government, as well as the real estate, lending, and construction industries, played critical roles in creating and maintaining a dual housing market that constrained the

[19]Alba et al. (1999) suggest that the countertrend among the Vietnamese is attributable to their refugee status during the 1970s. In this period, housing location was determined largely by resettlement agencies; more recently (1980s), housing decisions are made more on the basis of household needs. Alba and colleagues conclude the Vietnamese may be entering a settlement phase comparable to the earlier phases of nonrefugee groups (Alba et al. 1999, p. 457).

mobility options of blacks (for detailed discussions, see Massey & Denton 1993, Meyer 2000, Yinger 1995). It was assumed by many, however, that passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act marked the beginning of the end of segregation. This, however, has not been the case: residential segregation persists, and substantial evidence points to continued resistance to more than token numbers of black (and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic) neighbors (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2000, 2001b; Farley et al. 1993, 1994; Meyer 2000; Zubrinsky & Bobo 1996) and discriminatory practices in the real estate and lending markets (Massey & Lundy 2001, Galster 1990, Yinger 1995). The place stratification model punctuates the centrality of these issues, arguing that "[r]acial/ethnic minorities are sorted by place according to their group's relative standing in society, [limiting] the ability of even the socially mobile members to reside in the same communities as comparable whites" (Alba & Logan 1993, p. 1391). Whites use segregation to maintain social distance, and therefore, present-day residential segregation—particularly blacks' segregation from whites—is best understood as emanating from structural forces tied to racial prejudice and discrimination that preserve the relative status advantages of whites (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996, Logan et al. 1996, Massey & Denton 1993, Meyer 2000).

Despite general agreement regarding the role of prejudice and discrimination (both individual and institutional) in the emergence of racially segregated neighborhoods, the extent to which these factors are implicated in the persistence of segregation remains contested. Alternative explanations downplay the continuing salience of prejudice and/or discrimination in favor of other race-related attitudes and perceptions. The in-group preference hypothesis argues that all groups have "strong desires" for neighborhoods with substantial numbers of coethnics (Clark 1992, p. 451) that reflect a simple, natural ethnocentrism rather than outgroup hostility or an effort to preserve relative status advantages. A stronger version contends blacks' own preference for self-segregation explains current levels of black-white segregation (see, for example, Patterson 1997, Thernstrom & Thernstrom 1997). According to the racial proxy (Clark 1986, 1988; Harris 1999, 2001) and the race-based neighborhood stereotyping hypotheses (Ellen 2000), it is the collection of undesirable social class characteristics associated with blacks or the neighborhoods where they are concentrated—joblessness, welfare dependence, proclivity to criminal behavior—not race per se, that motivates aversion to black neighbors, not only among out-groups, but among blacks themselves. Still, race is central to each of these alternatives, and direct assessments of the role of prejudice often include one or more of these alternative explanations. As such, I address these alternative explanations within the context of stratification-based explanations.

NEIGHBORHOOD RACIAL COMPOSITION PREFERENCES A well-established literature details black-white differences in preferences for integration. In their classic article, "*Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs*," Farley and colleagues (1978) introduced an innovative and highly regarded method for measuring views on residential



Figure 1 Farley-Schuman neighborhood cards for black and white respondents from the 1992–1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.

segregation. In the experiment, white respondents are asked about their comfort with and willingness to enter neighborhoods with varying degrees of integration with blacks; black respondents receive a similar experiment: rating neighborhoods of various racial compositions from most to least attractive and indicating their willingness to enter each of the areas. In both cases, scenarios represent realistic assumptions regarding the residential experiences and options of both groups; neighborhood cards similar to those used by Farley and colleages are presented in Figure 1 (for details, see Farley et al. 1978, 1993).[20]

Results revealed substantial resistance by Detroit-area whites to even minimal levels of integration: 25% said the presence of a single black neighbor would make them uncomfortable, 40% said they would try to leave an area that was one-third black, and nearly twice as many would leave the majority black neighborhood (Farley et al. 1978). Blacks, on the other hand, showed a clear preference for integration. Eighty-five percent chose the 50-50 neighborhood as their first or second choice; when asked to explain their selection, two thirds stressed the importance of racial harmony (Farley et al. 1978, p. 328). Virtually all blacks were willing to enter all three integrated neighborhoods, and 38% of Detroit-area blacks said they would move into an otherwise all-white neighborhood.

As part of the 1992–1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), the Farley-Schuman showcard methodology was replicated in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles; to enhance our understanding of preferences in multiethnic

[20]The 1976 Detroit area study introduced an innovative way of measuring views on racial residential segregation that has influenced important general assessments of the status of African Americans (e.g., Jaynes & Williams 1989, pp. 141–44; Bok 1996, p. 182) as well as two important treatises on racial residential segregation (Massey & Denton 1993, Yinger 1995).

contexts, the experiment was modified to include Hispanics and Asians.[21] Analyses of neighborhood racial composition preferences based on the MCSUI data highlight the influence of both respondent- and target-group race on attitudes toward residential integration (Charles 2001b; Clark 2002; Farley et al. 1993, 1997; Zubrinsky & Bobo 1996). Relative to the 1970s, whites express greater comfort with higher levels of integration and fewer said they would be unwilling to enter racially mixed areas. Although a sizeable majority of whites express comfort with a one-third out-group neighborhood, a rank ordering of out-groups is evident: whites feel most comfortable with Asians and least so with blacks (Hispanics fall in between), and comfort declines as the number of out-group members increases. The pattern of responses regarding whites' willingness to enter racially mixed neighborhoods is similar, except that the decline in willingness to enter begins earlier and is never as high as comfort with neighborhood transition; thus, 60% of whites are comfortable with a neighborhood that is one-third black, but only 45% of whites are willing to move into that same neighborhood (Charles 2001b). Although reflecting meaningful improvements in whites' attitudes, Detroit-area whites stand out as more resistant to integration compared to whites in the other cities (Farley et al. 1997).

Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians all appear to want both meaningful integration and a substantial coethnic presence. The relative importance of these competing desires, however, depends on both the respondent- and target-group race. The overwhelming majority of blacks selected one of the two most integrated alternatives irrespective of out-group race, although the one with 10 black and 5 out-group households is slightly more attractive than the one that best approximates a 50-50 neighborhood. For Hispanics and Asians, on the other hand, target-group race is especially important: when potential neighbors are white, their most attractive neighborhoods are the same as those of blacks (Cards 2 and 3), although the order is reversed. When potential neighbors are black, however, between 60% and 80% of both Hispanics and Asians find one of the two least-integrated alternatives most attractive (Cards 1 and 2). Across respondent racial categories, the all-the-same-race alternative is least attractive when potential neighbors are white; however, Hispanics and Asians generally find this neighborhood more attractive than blacks do.[22] Both groups are also twice as likely as blacks to select the all-white

[21]Using a split-ballot technique, one third of each respondent racial category in Los Angeles (whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) and Boston (whites, blacks, and Hispanics) was randomly assigned to one of three out-groups (e.g., one third of Hispanics completed the Hispanic-white experiment, one third completed a Hispanic-black experiment, and the remaining one third of Hispanics considered integration with Asians). Except for differences in target groups, black, Hispanic, and Asian respondents all completed the same version of the experiment. For details, see Charles (2001b) or Zubrinsky & Bobo (1996).

[22]Research suggests important differences by immigrant status and acculturation. The foreign-born, particularly those with 5 years or less in the United States and/or those with limited English proficiency, prefer substantially more same-race neighbors compared to their native-born and long-term-immigrant counterparts, and those who communicate effectively in English (Charles 2000, 2001b, 2002).

neighborhood as their first or second choice (approximately 10% for Hispanics and Asians, compared to 5% of blacks), although for all three groups, the all-out-group alternative is the least attractive. Patterns of willingness to enter neighborhoods mirror those for attractiveness. For blacks, these patterns suggest a slight shift away from a preference for 50-50 neighborhoods and a significant decline in willingness to be the only black family in an otherwise all-white area since 1976 (Charles 2001b; Farley et al. 1993, 1997).

Other multiethnic studies of preferences yield similar results. Bobo & Zubrinsky (1996) analyze multiracial data but measure attitudes toward one group at a time using a single forced-choice item. Consideration of a single target group is a limitation of the Farley-Schuman methodology in multiethnic contexts as well, as are differences between white and nonwhite experiments that make direct comparisons difficult. Charles (2000) presents a major innovation on the Farley-Schuman experiment that allows the simultaneous consideration of whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians as potential neighbors, using a single item in which all respondents are asked to draw their ideal multiethnic neighborhood. Regardless of the measure, the pattern of results is the same. All groups exhibit preferences for both meaningful integration and a substantial presence of same-race neighbors, although preferences for same-race neighbors are not uniform across groups: whites exhibit the strongest preference for same-race neighbors and blacks the weakest. Moreover, preferences vary by the race of the target group and demonstrate a racial rank ordering of out-groups in which whites are always the most desirable out-group and blacks are always the least desirable. Finally, preferences for integration decline as the number of out-group members increases. These bivariate patterns make it clear that race is influential in the residential decision-making process (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2001b; Farley et al. 1993, 1997; Zubrinsky & Bobo 1996). Therefore, the next logical question is how does race matter?

PREJUDICE VERSUS THE ALTERNATIVES Although suggestive, the patterns detailed above are not conclusive evidence of the primacy of racial prejudice; however, several multivariate analyses detail whether and how race matters at the individual level. Using the MCSUI data for Detroit, Farley and colleagues (1994) showed that antiblack stereotypes are strongly associated with whites' discomfort with black neighbors, their likelihood of fleeing an integrating area, and their willingness to enter mixed neighborhoods. Similarly, Timberlake (2000) concludes that negative racial stereotypes and perceptions of group threat from blacks are the strongest predictors of whites' resistance to integration, based on analysis of MCSUI data for Atlanta. For Atlanta blacks, negative racial stereotypes and (to a lesser extent) the perception of whites as tending to discriminate against other groups contribute to their integration attitudes. Bobo & Zubrinsky (1996) and Charles (2000) analyzed multiracial data from Los Angeles, concluding that negative out-group stereotypes reduce openness to integration across racial categories and influence preferences for both out-group (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996, Charles 2000) and same-race neighbors (Charles 2000).

TABLE 2 Summary statistics, multiethnic neighborhood showcard experiment, 2000 General Social Survey

	Respondent race		
Target group race	**Whites**	**Blacks**	**Hispanics**
Whites			
Mean %	57.11%	30.40%	31.50%
No whites	0	9.21	1.28
All whites	20.28	0	0
Blacks			
Mean %	16.80%	42.01%	18.77%
No blacks	24.71	0.66	17.95
All blacks	0	6.58	0
Hispanics			
Mean %	12.82%	14.47%	33.61%
No Hispanics	32.17	27.63	2.56
All Hispanics	0	0	1.28
Asians			
Mean %	13.27%	13.11%	16.11%
No Asians	32.75	32.24	19.23
All Asians	0	0	0
Number of cases	858	152	78

Notes: The percentage of each racial group in a respondent's ideal neighborhood is the sum of each group included in the experiment, divided by the total number of houses (14), excluding the respondent's.

$p < .001$ except: all Hispanics ($p < .01$), no Asians ($p < .05$), and mean percent Asian ($p < .10$).

Each of these analyses includes a measure of respondents' perceptions of the social class positions of out-groups relative to their own group as a test of the racial-proxy argument; Bobo & Zubrinsky (1996), Charles (2000), and Timberlake (2000) also include measures of in-group attachment to assess the relative importance of ethnocentrism. In all instances, racial stereotypes are the most powerful predictors of preferences. Effects for both perceived social class disadvantage and in-group attachment are always smaller and often nonsignificant; indeed, this pattern persists across respondent racial categories for both out-group and same-race neighbors (Charles 2000). Nationally representative data from the 2000 General Social Survey both confirm and strengthen the results of these single-city analyses.

Table 2 summarizes preferences for white, black, and Hispanic respondents and reveals a pattern of preferences similar to those found by both Bobo & Zubrinsky (1996) and Charles (2000).[23] Compared to the data from Los Angeles, however,

[23]The measure of preferences used in the 2000 General Social Survey is identical to that used by Charles (2000). Respondents are shown a neighborhood card similar to those in Figure 1, except that the houses are blank. They are then instructed as follows: "Now I'd like you to imagine a neighborhood that had an ethnic and racial mix you personally would

both whites and blacks prefer more same-race neighbors (8% and 5%, respectively), but the opposite is true for Hispanics.[24] Nationally, whites are much more likely to exclude an out-group entirely: 25% of whites want no blacks in their ideal neighborhood (compared to one fifth in Los Angeles) and as many as one third exclude Hispanics and Asians (compared to 16%–17% in Los Angeles).[25] Blacks are also substantially more exclusionary at the national level, exhibiting rates of Hispanic and Asian exclusion between three and five times higher than for Los Angeles.

Finally, Table 3 presents correlations between neighborhood racial composition preferences and each of the race-related attitudes outlined above—perceived social class difference, racial stereotyping, and in-group attachment. In addition to preferences for various out-group neighbors, the bottom panel of Table 3 reports correlations between the selected racial attitudes and preferences for same-race neighbors. The perceived social class difference and racial stereotyping measures are scaled from -6 to $+6$. High (positive) scores indicate unfavorable ratings of out-groups relative to one's own group, low (negative) scores indicate favorable ratings of out-groups, and a score of zero indicates no perceived difference.[26] In-group attachment captures the extent to which respondents "feel close" to members of their racial group; scores range from 0 (not at all close) to 8 (very close). This item was only asked of white and black respondents.

Consistent with Bobo & Zubrinsky (1996), racial stereotyping is the race-related attitude or perception most correlated with preferences, irrespective of respondent or target-group race. As stereotypes of out-groups become increasingly unfavorable, preferences for those groups as neighbors decline and preferences for

---

feel most comfortable in. Here is a blank neighborhood card, which depicts some houses that surround your own. Using the letters A for Asian, B for Black, H for Hispanic or Latin American and W for White, please put a letter in each of these houses to represent your preferred neighborhood where you would most like to live. Please be sure to fill in all of the houses."

[24]In 2000, respondents were asked whether they were Hispanic in addition to being racially identified as white, black, or other. For Tables 2 and 3, anyone providing a Hispanic identity is treated as Hispanic; those unidentified "others" who remained were dropped from the analysis. Due to the small number of Hispanic respondents (this group is not intentionally sampled), results for this group should be treated as exploratory.

[25]I suspect that differences in rates of inclusion/exclusion—particularly as they relate to Hispanic and Asian neighbors—are a consequence of the population composition of Los Angeles compared to the country as a whole. Unlike the country as a whole, Los Angeles is heavily populated by both Hispanics and Asians; these groups may not be on the "cognitive maps" of residents in cities that do not attract large numbers of immigrants.

[26]Internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) among the five traits included in the racial stereotyping measure (intelligence, laziness, violence-prone, committed to strong families, committed to fairness and equality for all) vary by target group as follows: for whites $\alpha = .62$, for blacks $\alpha = .67$, for Hispanics $\alpha = .57$, and for Asians $\alpha = .64$. In the same-race preference block, measures of perceived social class difference and racial stereotyping are combined for all out-groups (e.g., for black respondents, these measures reflect perceptions of/attitudes toward whites, Hispanics, and Asians).

TABLE 3 Correlations of race-related attitudes and perceptions and neighborhood racial composition preferences, 2000 General Social Survey

	Respondent race			
Target group race	**Whites**	**Blacks**	**Hispanics**	**Total**
Percentage of white neighbors				
Perceived social class difference	—	−.108	−.077	−.095
Racial stereotyping	—	−.148^{+}	−.192^{+}	−.167*
In-group attachment[a]	—	.119	—	.109**
Percentage of black neighbors				
Perceived social class difference	−.056	—	−.302**	−.082*
Racial stereotyping	−.390***	—	−.454***	−.390***
In-group attachment[a]	−.091*	—	—	−.037
Percentage of Hispanic neighbors				
Perceived social class difference	−.034	−.019	—	−.065*
Racial stereotyping	−.319***	−.104	—	−.305***
In-group attachment[a]	−.150*	−.095	—	−.141***
Percentage of Asian neighbors				
Perceived social class difference	−.051	.003	.048	−.051
Racial stereotyping	−.285***	−.204*	−.202^{+}	−.269***
In-group attachment[a]	−.105*	.040	—	−.082*
Percentage of same-race neighbors				
Perceived social class difference[b]	.041	.074	.285*	.208***
Racial stereotyping[b]	.429***	.162^{+}	.500***	.421***
In-group attachment[a]	.142**	−.064	—	.104**

Notes: Figures are Pearson correlations with preferences for the corresponding group as neighbors. The perceived social class difference and racial stereotyping measures are scaled from −6 to +6. High (positive) scores indicate unfavorable ratings of out-groups relative to one's own group; low (negative) scores indicate favorable ratings of out-groups; 0 indicates no perceived difference. Internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) among the traits included in the stereotype difference score (intelligence, laziness, violent, committed to strong families, committed to fairness and equality for all) vary by target group as follows: for whites, $\alpha = .6217$; for blacks, $\alpha = .6736$; for Hispanics, $\alpha = .5719$; and for Asians, $\alpha = .6384$.

[a]In-group attachment questions ask about feelings of closeness to whites and blacks only.

[b]In the panel of correlations between racial attitudes and preferences for same-race neighbors, measures of perceived social class difference and racial stereotypes are combined for all out-groups (e.g., for Hispanic respondents these measures reflect perceptions of/attitudes about whites, blacks, and Asians).

$^{+}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$.

same-race neighbors increase. This is especially true among whites, where correlations between racial stereotyping and preferences are between two and four times larger than for in-group attachment and those for perceived social class difference are both weak and nonsignificant. Correlations among these variables are weakest for blacks. Of 12 figures, 3 barely meet the most-liberal limits of statistical significance acknowledged in the social sciences. Hispanics are in between these extremes, exhibiting the highest correlation between both perceived social class difference and racial stereotyping, and preferences for black neighbors; stereotyping

is only marginally correlated ($p < .10$) with preferences for white and Asian neighbors. Despite some differences, preliminary evidence from the 2000 General Social Survey substantiates prior findings from single-city analyses and highlights the primary importance of racial prejudice relative to both concerns about social class disadvantage and/or ethnocentrism in understanding neighborhood racial composition preferences.

More recently, Krysan & Farley (2002) supplement quantitative analyses with an examination of black MCSUI respondents' open-ended explanations of their integration attitudes. Contrary to proponents of both the ethnocentrism and racial proxy hypotheses, they find that belief in the principle of integration and/or a desire to improve race relations drives blacks' preferences for integration: This was the most common explanation for the attractiveness of the two most popular (and most integrated) neighborhoods (see Figure 1, Cards 2 and 3). Moreover, strong desires for a substantial coethnic presence are "inextricably linked" to fears of discrimination and white hostility (Krysan & Farley 2002, pp. 968–69); the latter is consistent with other descriptive analyses detailing an inverse association between perceived white hostility and overall neighborhood desirability (Charles 2001b, Farley et al. 1993, Zubrinsky & Bobo 1996). They find virtually no support for either the ethnocentrism or the racial-proxy hypothesis. Few blacks invoke ethnocentric attitudes, even when favoring the all-black over the 50-50 neighborhood; contrary to the assertion that blacks (and whites) use race as a proxy for negative neighborhood characteristics, only 10% of black respondents cite negative neighborhood characteristics as the primary reason to avoid all-black areas.

A similar analysis examines open-ended elaborations from "whites who say they'd flee" (Krysan 2002). Once again, evidence of ethnocentrism is spare when considering integration with blacks. Concerns about cultural differences were more salient for whites in Los Angeles contemplating integration with Asians and Hispanics, and are expressed mainly in terms of language differences. Consistent with the racial-proxy and race-based neighborhood stereotyping hypotheses, whites offer race-associated reasons most often (e.g., concerns about crime and/or property values); however, meticulous analysis of the characteristics of whites offering clearly racial versus race-associated responses finds that education makes the difference. More educated whites are both less willing to negatively stereotype out-groups and more likely to offer race-associated explanations for their decision to flee an integrated area. Krysan (1998) suggests that because better-educated respondents are both more susceptible to social desirability pressures and more adept at articulating their racial group's interest in more subtle ways (Jackman & Muha 1984), the difference between explicitly racial and so-called race-associated explanations is semantic: "[I]n the end, each of the reasons is an articulation of a racial stereotype" (Krysan 2002).

The analyses discussed to this point represent important methodological, empirical, and substantive contributions to our understanding of integration attitudes. Especially insightful are those analyses that elaborate preferences in multiethnic contexts and those that employ multiple methods to gain leverage on the

complexities of racial attitudes. Nonetheless, critics aptly point to important limitations associated with studies that rely on measures of expressed preferences. In particular, because it is clear to respondents that their racial attitudes are at issue, responses are susceptible to social desirability pressures and the difficulty of distinguishing between the direct effect of the racial composition of the neighborhood and the indirect effect of the neighborhood characteristics that respondents may associate with the racial composition of the neighborhood. Although preference studies include a measure of perceived social class difference, other unmeasured aspects of the proxy argument (e.g., crime, school quality) are left uncontrolled. Each of these limitations can bias results (Ellen 2000, Emerson et al. 2001, Harris 1999). Alternatively, tests of the racial-proxy hypothesis that use respondents' actual residential location and the value of their homes as indicators of neighborhood desirability are confounded by the fact that "[e]ven if people prefer to live in racially mixed neighborhoods, they may not end up in such neighborhoods" because of discrimination or a shortage of housing (Emerson et al. 2001, p. 924).

A recent analysis by Emerson et al. (2001) stands out for creatively and effectively addressing these limitations using a factorial experiment to assess whites' attitudes toward integration with blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Respondents are asked to imagine that they have two school-aged children and are looking for a house; they have found a house they like better than any other (it has everything the respondent is looking for) that is both close to work and within their price range. Before asking whites if they would buy the home, they are offered a set of randomly generated neighborhood characteristics—public school quality, crime level, direction of property value change, home value compared to others in the neighborhood, and racial composition (between 5% and 100% Asian, black, or Hispanic). They find that the presence of Hispanics and Asians does not matter to whites, but black neighborhood composition matters significantly even after controlling for proxy variables. Whites are neutral about buying a home in a neighborhood between 10% and 15% black and are unlikely to buy the home in a neighborhood over 15% black. This pattern is especially pronounced among families with children.[27]

[27]Ellen (2000) argues that the heightened sensitivity of white homeowners and/or families with children to racial composition (whether it is actual or measured as change over time) is evidence that pure prejudice is less important than race-based neighborhood stereotyping; pure prejudice should not vary, she argues by these statuses among whites. The presence and strength of these differences among whites, she argues, indicates that whites are expressing concerns about property values and school quality. It is also possible, however, that these differences simply reflect the increased salience of particular aspects of black stereotypes—welfare dependence and intellect, for example—for white homeowners and/or parents. To test this, I compared whites' racial stereotypes of blacks by housing tenure and parenting status using data from the 1993–1994 Los Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality (results are not shown, but are available upon request). Owners express significantly more negative stereotypes of blacks relative to whites ($p < .001$); a similar pattern emerges when comparing white parents to nonparents, although the difference is not statistically significant. Differences in perceptions of blacks' social class status by tenure and parenting status

The overall conclusion to be drawn is that active racial prejudice is a critical component of preferences for integration, and therefore, the persistence of racially segregated communities. Whites' racial prejudice is a double whammy: influential not only for its effect on their own integration attitudes, but also for its implications for minority group preferences and residential search behavior. Areas perceived as hostile toward particular minority groups are also perceived as less attractive, even when other aspects of the communities should be desirable (Charles 2001b). Indeed, blacks openly admit that fears of white hostility motivate desires for more than a handful of coethnic neighbors (Krysan & Farley 2002). Although the influence of racial stereotyping is the same for all groups, all three nonwhite groups want substantially more integration than whites do. Contrary to the popular adage that "birds of a feather flock together," ethnocentrism plays a minimal role at best; moreover, with respect to blacks, the most thorough and detailed analyses to date suggest that whites move out because blacks move in—black density matters because the presence of too many blacks (and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics and Asians) suggests a change in "traditional status relations of relative dominance and privilege" (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996, p. 904; see also Charles 2000, Krysan 2002).[28] In sum, the attitudes, preferences, and (potential) behaviors of whites alone cannot fully account for actual residential patterns; all groups express some desire for coethnic neighbors, and these preferences play a role in shaping actual outcomes (Clark 2002). A much more sizable share of available evidence, however, points to the influential role of racial prejudice, both as a motivating factor in the avoidance of particular out-groups and as a motivator of minority group preferences for same-race neighbors.

HOUSING MARKET DISCRIMINATION The institutional practices that created and maintained residential segregation represent the translation of white prejudice into "systematic, institutionalized racial discrimination" in the housing market (Massey & Denton 1993, p. 51; Meyer 2000; Yinger 1995). A growing body of empirical evidence points to the persistence of discrimination in the housing market, although the form that present-day discrimination takes is markedly different than in previous eras (Bobo 1989; Cutler et al. 1999). Although formal barriers to integration have been eliminated, discriminatory white tastes remain; segregation persists, it is argued, through a process of decentralized racism, in which "whites pay more" to live in predominantly white areas (Cutler et al. 1999, pp. 445). As such,

were nonsignificant. These results are consistent with a pure prejudice interpretation: for whites, these statuses increase the salience of widely held negative stereotypes of blacks and (potentially) increase the motivation and/or likelihood of acting on these attitudes.

[28]Negative racial stereotypes capture two variants of prejudice: simple out-group hostility and "a sense of group position" that members of one group have about (an)other group(s); the latter is a collective process where groups define their social positions vis-à-vis each other and the socially learned commitments to maintaining group status or relative status position. What matters is the magnitude of difference that in-group members perceive between their own group and particular out-groups (Blumer 1958, pp. 3–4; Bobo 1999).

discriminatory behavior has become more subtle and therefore more difficult to detect even by its victims (Galster 1990, 1992; Yinger 1995). Since the mid-1950s, audit studies have proven useful in detecting these subtle forms of discrimination. In an audit study, pairs of trained testers—one white and the other either black or Hispanic—with similar economic and family characteristics successively inquired about housing, carefully detailing their experiences with the real estate agent or landlord. After a visit, each auditor completes a detailed report of her experiences; discrimination is defined as systematically less favorable treatment of the black or Hispanic tester and is documented by direct observation during the interaction (Ondrich et al. 1998). Housing units are sampled randomly from metropolitan-area newspapers; examples of experiences detailed by auditors range from seemingly race-neutral aspects of interaction such as the promptness of returning phone calls or volunteering to show an audit pair additional units, to the obviously racial act of steering minority auditors toward mixed or segregated areas.

Despite its advantages, the audit methodology is not without critics, most notably Heckman & Siegelman (1993) (see also Heckman 1998). By sampling housing units only from major newspapers, for example, audit studies likely underestimate the incidence of discrimination. Other aspects of the method run the risk of overstating the frequency of discrimination. As part of the training process, auditors are fully informed of the purpose of the study and as a result may be unintentionally motivated to find it; similarly, it has been suggested that other characteristics of the individual auditors may influence agent behavior (i.e., the presence or absence of facial hair and/or an accent). There is also concern about the use of gross measures of discrimination that count "all errors made" by agents/landlords as unfavorable or discriminatory treatment, arguing that this inaccurately assumes that firms never make race-neutral errors, and confounds random and systematic effects. Heckman & Siegelman (1993, p. 272) suggest beginning with a net measure of discrimination experienced by minority testers relative to their white teammates because (*a*) it takes race-neutral errors into account, and (*b*) if the net measure reveals evidence of discrimination, the gross measure will as well.

In response, Yinger (1993, 1995, 1998) agrees that audit studies measure discrimination in a major segment of the housing market—units advertised in major newspapers—that is accessible to all homeseekers, irrespective of race or ethnicity; although results cannot be generalized to all housing transactions, they do account for a large share of the action. Conceding the potential benefits of blind audits for avoiding experimenter effects, proponents of full disclosure argue for deliberately informing auditors of the nature and purpose of the study while at the same time emphasizing the importance of accurate, complete reporting avoids other kinds of "experimenter effects." Specifically, some minority auditors may be upset by blatant mistreatment and unable to accurately complete their evaluations, invalidating the audit. Moreover, both members of an audit team must receive identical training to minimize behavioral differences. Bringing teammates together without full disclosure opens the door for (inaccurate) speculation among the auditors about the purpose of the study and/or appropriate behavior. With respect to aspects of

auditors' appearances or behavior—aside from race—that could influence agents' behavior, more recent audit studies are more careful in the selection of testers, particularly with respect to the presence or absence of an accent (Yinger 1995).

Finally, although simple gross measures of discrimination almost certainly overestimate the frequency of systematic discrimination and should be interpreted as upper-bound estimates of discrimination, net measures subtract both random and systematic differences in treatment and probably underestimate the frequency of discrimination. As a consequence, net measures underestimate the gross incidence of discrimination (Yinger 1995, pp. 45–46). Analyses of audit studies generally present net measures followed by gross measures. Yinger points out that the "story told by the simple net measure is bleak enough . . . in some ways the story may be even worse" (1995, p. 46). In light of such intense scrutiny, research on housing market discrimination based on audit studies is highly regarded in both the research and legal communities and is now widely accepted for use both as enforcement tools and as evidence of discrimination in U.S. courts (Metcalf 1988, Yinger 1998).

Both national- and local-level studies find evidence of substantial discrimination that has not changed meaningfully over time (Yinger 1995, 1998). In a review of 50 local audit studies completed throughout the United States during the 1980s, Galster (1990) concluded that racial discrimination is a dominant feature of the housing market, conservatively estimating that (*a*) housing discrimination against black and Hispanic home and apartment seekers occurs in roughly half of their interactions with agents or landlords, (*b*) the discrimination is subtle and difficult for the individual to detect, and (*c*) the frequency of discrimination had not changed over time (Galster 1992, p. 647). These figures are confirmed by evidence from the 1989 Housing Discrimination Study (HDS), the most recent national audit study. In *Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost*, Yinger (1995) delivers a comprehensive and influential discussion of housing market discrimination, using HDS data to detail the incidence and severity of discrimination. At the beginning of a transaction, an individual inquires about an advertised unit and then asks about the availability of other, similar units, at which time an agent may withhold information or limit the number of units shown to the client. In the second stage, the actions taken by agents to facilitate the transaction are considered. These would include the discussion of terms and conditions, the agent's sales effort, and/or assistance in securing financing; at this point, an agent may offer less assistance to minority clients. The third aspect of the interaction involves the geographic location of units other than the advertised unit that opened the interaction. Access to housing is constrained if a client is only shown housing in neighborhoods with particular racial/ethnic make-ups (Yinger 1995, pp. 31–33).

During the first stage of the interaction, Yinger found that blacks and Hispanics are denied access to housing between 5% and 10% of the time—information is completely withheld. More often, minority access to housing was constrained: Black and Hispanic testers learned about 25% fewer units than comparable whites. Whites were also significantly more likely to receive other forms of favorable treatment, including follow-up calls, positive comments about an available unit,

and special rental incentives (e.g., one month's free rent or a reduced security deposit). Minority auditors suffered many minor inconveniences, including waiting longer to be served, inattention to their housing needs but overemphasis on their incomes, and less assistance with obtaining financing. Racial/ethnic steering is also common. Yinger estimates that black and Hispanic homeseekers visiting four real estate agents will encounter steering 40% and 28% of the time, respectively, whereas whites are more likely to hear negative comments about integrated areas. Racial/ethnic steering of this sort is prohibited by fair housing legislation; however, steering through marketing practices is completely legal, and evidence suggests that real estate agencies do much of their steering through their marketing practices. Units in black neighborhoods are not advertised as often, have fewer open houses, and are more likely to be represented by firms that are not part of a Multiple Listing Service. This may also be an issue for units in predominantly Hispanic areas. These practices are the exact opposite of those employed for units in white neighborhoods (Yinger 1995, pp. 55–59).

A growing body of evidence documents racial discrimination in lending as well (Dedman 1988, 1989; Jackson 1994). The Boston Fed Study compares conventional loan denial rates for whites, blacks, and Hispanics in Boston using 1990 data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act supplemented with other variables known to influence credit decisions. Together, these data offer "the most comprehensive set of credit characteristics ever assembled" (Yinger 1995, p. 71, for details, see Munnell et al. 1996). Results from the Boston Fed Study indicate that controlling for "the risk and cost of default and for loan and personal characteristics," blacks and Hispanics are 56% more likely than whites to be denied a conventional mortgage loan, which amounts to a minority denial rate of 17%, compared to a white rate of 11%. Analysis of the Boston Fed data by Carr & Megbolugbe (1993) found that minorities receive systematically lower credit ratings. This means that a "slow paying" white applicant, for example, would be considered creditworthy, but a similar black applicant would not. There is evidence of racial bias in nearly every other aspect of the lending process, including private mortgage insurance, redlining by home insurance companies, methods of advertising and outreach (Yinger 1995, p. 83–85), and bank branch locations and closing patterns (Caskey 1992), in addition to evidence of an association between the likelihood of blacks' loan approval and the racial composition of the financial institution workforce (Squires & Kim 1995). The latter confirms evidence that prejudice and economic interests motivate biased behavior (Yinger 1995, Ondrich et al. 1998).

More than a decade has passed since the collection of the 1989 HDS. To remedy this, researchers at the Urban Institute are back in the field for HDS 2000. This updated study promises to be the most ambitious and thorough analysis to date. In addition to black/white and Hispanic/white tests replicated from the 1989 HDS for comparative purposes, HDS 2000 will ultimately include tests of housing market discrimination against both Asians and Native Americans (Turner et al. 2002). Newly released Phase I results offer mixed messages about changes in the incidence of housing market discrimination against blacks and Hispanics since the

1989 study, revealing both improvement and persistent discrimination. Improvements in the sales market are encouraging; in 2000, both blacks and Hispanics were significantly less likely than they were in 1989 to receive consistently unfavorable treatment relative to whites. For blacks, the overall incidence of white-favored treatment dropped to 17% in 2000, down 12 percentage points over the 10-year period. Despite this overall improvement, blacks are now more likely to be steered away from predominantly white neighborhoods than they were 10 years ago. The overall incidence of discrimination against Hispanics declined by 7.1 percentage points over the decade (to 19.7%) and saw no significant change in the likelihood of geographic steering (Turner et al. 2002). The experience of black and Hispanic renters, however, offers little optimism. Blacks are significantly less likely to receive unfavorable treatment than in the previous decade; however, the decline is much smaller (9%) than in the sales market. More troubling is that Hispanic renters show no significant change in their likelihood of receiving unfavorable treatment relative to whites, and they now experience a higher incidence of discrimination (26%) than their black counterparts (Turner et al. 2002).

In preparation for the Asian and Native American audits, Phase I of the 2000 HDS includes pilot studies for both groups—Chinese and Koreans in Los Angeles, Southeast Asians in Minneapolis, and Native Americans in Pheonix. In Los Angeles, results suggest that Chinese and Korean renters "may face different patterns of adverse treatment" than their black and Hispanic counterparts do (Turner et al. 2002, p. 4.18). Results indicate that both groups are told about and shown more units than their non-Asian minority counterparts; on the other hand, black and Hispanic testers received better service from agents than either Asian group. Discrimination against Chinese and Koreans in the sales market, however, is similar to that of blacks and Hispanics—indeed, Korean homebuyers have the highest overall net estimate of discrimination (22.2%) for any of the minority groups studied in Los Angeles (Turner et al. 2002).

Turner and colleagues (2002) reported that local organizations had difficulty recruiting and retaining Southeast Asian and Native American testers because (*a*) little testing has been conducted with these groups in the past and (*b*) few of these testers had any experience with homeownership and found it especially difficult to complete sales audits. These challenges help to inform subsequent tests. As a result, pilot-test results are only available for the rental market, where both groups appear to experience significant discrimination (Turner et al. 2002, p. 2.6). Southeast Asian renters in Minneapolis face more adverse treatment than either of the Asian groups in Los Angeles, and their experiences more closely mirror national results for black and Hispanic renters, particularly in the areas of housing availability and inspections. Native American renters experience adverse treatment at levels slightly above those found at the national level for blacks and Hispanics (Turner et al. 2002). These exploratory results illustrate the value of full-fledged multiethnic/multiracial analyses of residential processes; we look forward to the completion and dissemination of results from Phases II and III of the 2000 HDS.

The important information provided by national audit studies comparable to both the 1989 and the 2000 HDSs is juxtaposed by significant challenges involved in utilizing the method (e.g., training, recruiting, and maintaining minority testers); chief among these challenges is, no doubt, the substantial expense of these studies. Recent research by Massey & Lundy (2001) offers a lower-cost alternative to the in-person audit method used in the 1989 and 2000 HDSs: conducting a telephone-based audit study of racial discrimination in the Philadelphia rental housing market. Citing evidence that individuals "are capable of making fairly accurate racial attributions on the basis of linguistic cues," the authors argue that a good deal of discrimination is likely to occur before a personal encounter can take place (Massey & Lundy 2001, p. 454). They find that this is, in fact, the case: Compared to whites, blacks were significantly less likely to speak to the rental agent and, if they spoke to a landlord, significantly less likely to be told of a unit's availability. Alternatively, blacks were more likely than whites to have their credit worthiness mentioned as a potential obstacle in qualifying for a lease (Massey & Lundy 2001, p. 466).[29]

Thus, in one way or another, and to a greater or lesser degree, discrimination in the housing market constrains the ability of nonwhites to rent and/or purchase housing. Access to housing is constrained, the search process is more unpleasant (i.e., more visits, more waiting, etc.), homeseekers receive far less assistance from lenders in the mortgage application process and are more likely to have their applications denied, and their moving costs are higher. Yinger estimates that every time that black and Hispanic households search for housing—whether they encounter discrimination or not—they pay a "discrimination tax" of approximately $3,000. Cumulatively, he estimates that blacks and Hispanics pay $4.1 billion per year in higher search costs and lost housing opportunities. Included in this

[29]This approach—using the telephone rather than face-to-face interaction—addresses the possibility that differences in treatment between pairs of testers result from unmeasured differences in their personal characteristics and is similar to research conducted by Purnell and colleagues (1999) with respect to both the methodology employed and the overall results. Similarly, a recent study of racial discrimination in the Chicago and Boston labor markets employed the audit methodology to respond to advertised positions by mail. Matched pairs of resumes manipulated the perception of race using either an obviously African American (e.g., Tamika, Jamal) or a white-sounding name (e.g., Kristen, Brad), eliminating possible bias in treatment resulting from other experimenter characteristics. Bertrand & Mullainathan (2002) reported that this manipulation produces a significant gap in the rate of callbacks for interviews. Specifically, white names received roughly 50% more callbacks than African American names. Moreover, an additional manipulation of qualifications found that, for whites, higher-quality resumes increase callbacks by 30%; for blacks, resume quality has no effect on the likelihood of callback. Results of this study, and of Massey & Lundy (2001), support the reliability of face-to-face audit studies as evidence of discrimination because both find ample evidence without face-to-face contact.

estimate is the decision of 10% of blacks and 15% of Hispanics not to look for housing because they anticipate discrimination (Yinger 1995, pp. 95–103; for more on the impact of anticipated discrimination on search behavior, see Farley 1996b). By making it more difficult for minorities to purchase housing, discrimination contributes to racial disparities in homeownership and wealth accumulation, which in turn foster persisting suburban residential segregation.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

A voluminous body of research documents the powerful influence of place on individual life chances. Concentrated poverty neighborhoods exhibit high rates of long-term joblessness, out-of-wedlock births, school drop-out, crime and social disorder, and lower average wages for those who work (Cutler & Glaeser 1997, Jargowsky 1996, Krivo & Peterson 1996, Massey & Denton 1993, Wilson 1987). Without sufficient resources, public services—particularly public schools—deteriorate as well. Residential segregation is, as detailed at the outset, deeply implicated in the concentration of poverty in black communities. Yet, even after accounting for the social and economic disadvantages associated with residential segregation, Cutler & Glaeser (1997, p. 865) found that "a one-standard-deviation reduction in segregation (13 percent) would eliminate one-third" of white-black differences in rates of high school completion, single parenthood, and employment as well as earnings.

The neighborhoods where poor blacks are concentrated are characterized by extreme levels of disadvantage, and middle-class and affluent blacks are exposed to higher levels of neighborhood disadvantage than their status would imply (Alba et al. 1994, Massey & Fischer 1999, Pattillo-McCoy 1999, Wilson 1987). Suburban blacks are as segregated as their central-city counterparts; their suburbs are part of a contiguous set of black neighborhoods that are, collectively, the ghetto, differentiated only by their status as the "best, mixed, and worst areas" (Galster 1991, Jargowsky & Bane 1991, Logan 2001a, Morenoff & Sampson 1997, Pattillo-McCoy 1999). Indeed, the well-known perils associated with ghetto life documented by quantitative researchers (Jargowsky 1996, Cutler & Glaeser 1997, Wilson 1987) and ethnographers like Anderson (1990, 1999) and Venkatesh (2000) are found, albeit to a lesser degree, in the neighborhoods of middle-class blacks (see, for example, Alba et al. 1994, Pattillo-McCoy 1999, Timberlake 2002). In a study of Philadelphia, Massey and colleagues (1987) documented rates of welfare dependence, out-of-wedlock births, and below-average educational outcomes several times higher than those of comparable whites, and the experience of middle-class blacks is only marginally improved over that of poor blacks.

The clustering of blacks within an expansive ghetto undermines black homeownership, either because housing in these areas is unattractive to residents or because of difficulties associated with securing lending; segregation also undermines

Hispanic home ownership (Flippen 2001, pp. 354–5).[30] The dwellings occupied by blacks (and black Hispanics) are older, of poorer quality, and depreciated in value relative to similar whites (Massey & Denton 1993; Rosenbaum 1994, 1996), and differences in home values and rates of ownership are implicated in persisting black and Hispanic wealth disparities—$414 billion and $186 billion, respectively, relative to whites (Oliver & Shapiro 1995, Yinger 1995). Exposure to crime is also a persistent concern because "even the most affluent blacks are not able to escape from crime, for they reside in communities as crime-prone as those housing the poorest whites (Alba et al. 1994, p. 427). Thus, whites' worst urban contexts are better than "the average context of black communities" (Sampson & Wilson 1995, p. 42).

Thus, as a consequence of residential segregation, the vast majority of blacks experience residential circumstances that are—to a greater or lesser degree—detrimental to their future social mobility because "any process that concentrates poverty within racially isolated neighborhoods will simultaneously increase the odds of socioeconomic failure within the segregated group" (Massey & Denton 1993, p. 179). Indeed, in-depth interviews with employers reveal that space is used as a mechanism for discriminating against minority job applicants (Kirschenman & Neckerman 1991, Wilson 1996). A recent study of participants in the Gautreaux program—one of the first scattered-site, low-income housing programs—details substantial improvements in the educational and employment outcomes of those who moved with their families from segregated urban housing projects to predominantly white suburban communities. Compared to their city-dwelling counterparts, Gautreaux participants were significantly more likely to be in high school, in a college-prep track, enrolled in a four-year college, employed with benefits, and not outside either the educational or employment systems. Many of the suburban participants said that safety contributed a great deal to their success (Rubinowitz & Rosenbaum 2000).

Ongoing research by Massey, Charles, and colleagues (Massey & Fischer 2002, Charles et al. 2002) finds a similar relationship between neighborhood violence and the educational outcomes of middle-class and affluent students at selective colleges and universities. For both blacks and Hispanics, growing up under segregated circumstances significantly lowers later academic performance. The negative effect holds after controlling for socioeconomic status and is not attributable to differences in school quality or variations in intellectual, social, or psychological preparation among students from integrated and segregated neighborhoods. Apparently, segregation matters because it results in exposure to unusually high levels of violence while growing up. These students are also more likely to experience stressful life events that lead to greater family stress, poorer health, and

[30]For Hispanics, however, the central issue is a shortage of housing due to large population growth under conditions of segregation. Unlike blacks, however, clustering in barrios facilitates ownership because there is greater access to information and coethnic real estate and lending agents that buffer homeseekers from discrimination in the larger market.

greater family involvement while in college—all of which negatively impact academic performance (Charles et al. 2002). Although substantially better off than their poor counterparts, residential segregation limits black and Hispanic students' ability to reach their full potential.

CONCLUSION

The past decade has seen a remarkable increase in our understanding of the processes that maintain racially segregated neighborhoods in the United States. Increasing attention to the multiethnic character of many metropolitan areas—and of our nation—has improved our understanding of group differences in locational returns to human capital and how the racial attitudes of the four major racial groups contribute to residential patterns. Indeed, with so little information regarding the racial attitudes of nonwhites or of whites toward Hispanics and Asians, this alone is a boon to the study of race relations. The use of audit methodology has forever altered the landscape of discussion regarding discrimination in the housing and lending markets, detailing widespread, current discrimination against blacks, Hispanics, and preliminarily Asians and Native Americans that occurs at virtually every point in the search process. The expansion of much of this work to include the four major racial categories is an advance that cannot be underscored enough. As our nation becomes increasingly "prismatic," understanding the dynamics of race relations and processes of social mobility becomes both more complicated and more important.

Logan and colleagues (2002, p. 320) recently lamented that "we are near the limit of what can be accomplished through the analysis of publicly available census data." Their research is particularly illustrative of the benefits of highlighting the nation's increasing multiethnicity; still, locational attainment models that rely solely on census data cannot adequately assess the effect of massive disparities in accumulated wealth, nor can they account for the manner in which respondents' attitudes influence their residential outcomes. The major limitation to research of this sort, then, is its inability to capture the dynamic nature of residential segregation. This is a monumental task at the national level, but seems possible in selected metropolitan areas.

Future research should continue to actively engage this complexity. To date, much of what we know regarding the racial attitudes of Hispanics and Asians is limited to analyses of Los Angeles (and, to a lesser extent, Boston). Regional differences in settlement patterns and the vast heterogeneity within these broad racial categories make it imperative that we continue to pursue information on these groups and push past the convenience of broad racial classification schemes. In the area of individual-level racial attitudes, the factorial experimental design introduced recently by Emerson and colleagues (2001) presents a substantial improvement on prior methods and should be pursued. Future research should vary factors that they did not (e.g., the presence of children), consider the importance of the characteristics of surrounding neighborhoods, move beyond biracial

neighborhoods and offer the full, multiethnic complement of neighbors, and incorporate nonwhite respondents (Emerson 2001, p. 932).

Qualitative analyses—whether from elaborations to closed-ended questions or in-depth interviews—represent another direction for future research. The next logical step in this case is to explore the attitudes, perceptions, and justifications of Hispanics and Asians for their neighborhood racial composition preferences; this is particularly important for capturing the importance of immigration-related characteristics. Ongoing research by Charles (unpublished observations), for example, details important differences in the motivations behind preferences for same-race neighbors based on immigrant status and English language ability. Results from Phases II and III of the 2000 HDS, moreover, will provide new and much-needed information on the housing market experiences of Asians and Native Americans, and for the first time, the ability to make comparisons among nonwhite groups. What we have already learned from the Phase I results provides valuable information about changes in the experiences of blacks and Hispanics since the 1989 study. Periodic follow-ups of nationwide housing market audit studies similar to the 2000 HDS would continue to keep us abreast of the extent to which discrimination in the housing market persists. Similarly, updated analysis of nationally representative, multiracial lending market data, preferably at regular intervals, would provide crucial and complementary information on this aspect of the residential sorting process.

Finally, as is characteristic of social science research, the tendency has been to focus on the problem—segregation. Without doubt, this has been justified, given the deleterious effects of segregation on intergroup relations, social mobility, personal safety, and ultimately, efforts to reduce racial inequality in America. Relative to the body of research on segregation, however, far too little attention is paid to understanding the processes that produce and maintain the small but meaningful number of stably integrated neighborhoods. Although not discussed at length in this review, efforts to understand racial residential patterns that focus on the comparatively small but critically important number of success stories rather than our well-known failures are a much-needed breath of fresh air, reminding us that, although fragile and few and far between, "racially integrated neighborhoods are not, as once thought, inevitably doomed to rapid resegregation" (Ellen 2000, p. 152).

To wit, a study of 14 stably integrated urban communities estimates that as many as 10 million Americans reside in racially/ethnically diverse communities, areas defined as having racial/ethnic compositions closest to city racial/ethnic averages in both 1980 and 1990, although most have been integrated for longer (Nyden et al. 1998, p. 6). More recently, Ellen (2000) examines the characteristics of stably integrated neighborhoods and their residents, analyzing data for 34 U.S. metropolitan areas. She estimates that nearly 20% of all U.S. neighborhoods were racially mixed in 1990; these neighborhoods were home to 15% of whites and roughly one third of blacks. Moreover, more than 75% of neighborhoods that were integrated (between 10% and 50% black) in 1980 remained so a decade later (Ellen 2000, p. 1).

Both studies find that stably integrated communities tend to be economically diverse, including middle-class, college-educated homeowners with professional occupations, as well as low-income families in entry-level, service-sector jobs. This economic diversity tends to reflect the presence of varied housing opportunities, including rental housing constituting at least 25% of housing units. Integrated communities also tend to have attractive physical characteristics (e.g., good location, architecturally interesting homes, and a secure set of neighborhood amenities), places where cross-racial interaction takes place as part of day-to-day life (e.g., grocery stores, schools, parks, or neighborhood festivals), and strong community-based organizations and social institutions committed to maintaining diversity—either directly or indirectly by addressing communitywide, nonracial service issues (largely schools and safety, but also neighborhood preservation) and/or promoting cross-group dialogue (Ellen 2000, Nyden et al. 1998). Stable integration is also more likely in communities that are more distant from an area's central minority concentration and in areas with smaller overall black populations without an intense racial competition for housing and widespread neighborhood change (Ellen 2000, pp. 153–54). Whether by design or by circumstance, residents of these communities are both aware of and value the diversity of their communities and work to promote and maintain it (Nyden et al. 1998), and they are likely to have more tolerant racial attitudes. Clearly then, future research should increase and expand analyses of the "substantial and increasing minority of neighborhoods that are currently integrated and likely to stay that way for many years" (Ellen 2000, p. 176). The central consideration of Hispanics will be crucial here. Given both the size and heterogeneity of this group, their residential trajectory will have a large effect on overall residential patterns. Their ability to integrate—particularly those who are phenotypically black—may introduce new options for increasing the residential integration of non-Hispanic blacks.

In the dawn of the new millennium, a color line more complex than the one Du Bois described continues to separate our neighborhoods, maintaining our tendency "to see commonly the worst of each other" (Du Bois 1990, p. 121) and thwarting the upward social mobility of a substantial portion of our population. Recent efforts to understand the causes of persisting residential segregation highlight the complexity of our emerging multiethnic world at the same time that they remind us, matter-of-factly, that race still matters. As the dominant group, whites have the luxury of living in relatively affluent, safe neighborhoods with high-quality schools and services, even when their own financial resources are limited. Although recent immigrants may be initially disadvantaged by low socioeconomic status and limited English proficiency, they can be assured of gradually making their way into neighborhoods comparable to those of whites. As has been the case for much of our history, however, groups racially defined as black continue to face profound barriers to their quest for the American dream.

The agenda for both social science and public policy should also include the articulation of policy responses that are both economically feasible and likely to have wide public appeal. Yinger (1995) offers a set of responses of this type that

involve attacking racial disparities through policies that address social and economic outcomes "for which the minority-white disparities are greatest" but are available to all qualified applicants regardless of race. Programs that support and encourage low-income homeownership and/or assist public schools in poor communities are good examples of this. Moreover, given the large number of minorities and the increasing number of whites who are willing to enter integrated communities, programs that support stable integration at all levels of social class should also be pursued. This could include (*a*) the expansion of Gautreaux-type programs as an alternative to traditional public housing programs, (*b*) aggressive public relations campaigns and community betterment projects that promote the general attractiveness of integrated neighborhoods, and (*c*) affirmative marketing and pro-integrative mortgage incentives that encourage blacks to enter predominantly white areas and whites to enter racially mixed neighborhoods (Ellen 2000, Yinger 1995).

The past three decades have witnessed meaningful improvement in whites' racial attitudes and unparalleled expansion of the black middle class. Nonetheless, black-white segregation remains so extreme and its consequences so severe that Denton (1994, p. 74) forcefully concluded "[w]hatever we are now doing to combat residential segregation is not nearly enough and in many cases is not working at all" (see also Glazer 1980, Massey & Denton 1993, Yinger 1995). In places where Hispanics are heavily concentrated, they may soon confront similar circumstances. We have learned a great deal about the dynamics of racial residential segregation during this period and documented significant declines in the degree of residential separation. Continued improvement is crucial if we are to realize our full national potential, and future research should advance the achievement of this most important goal.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank Richard D. Alba, Lawrence D. Bobo, Reynolds Farley, and Douglas S. Massey for their insightful comments. The author also wishes to thank Kimberly Torres and Jessica Welburn for their invaluable research assistance.

The *Annual Review of Sociology* is online at http://soc.annualreviews.org

LITERATURE CITED

Alba RD, Denton NA, Leung SJ, Logan JR. 1995. Neighborhood change under the conditions of mass immigration: the New York City region, 1970–1990. *Int. Migr. Rev.* 31(3):625–56

Alba RD, Logan JR. 1993. Minority proximity to whites in suburbs: an individual-level analysis of segregation. *Am. J. Sociol.* 98(6):1388–427

Alba RD, Logan JR. 1991. Variations on two themes: racial and ethnic patterns in the attainment of suburban residence. *Demography* 28:431–53

Alba RD, Logan JR. 1992. Analyzing locational attainments: constructing individual-level regression models using aggregate data. *Sociol. Methods Res.* 20:367–97

Alba RD, Logan JR, Bellair PE. 1994. Living

with crime: the implications of racial/ethnic differences in suburban location. *Soc. Forces* 73(2):395–434

Alba RD, Logan JR, Stults BJ. 2000a. The changing neighborhood contexts of the immigrant metropolis. *Soc. Forces* 79(2):587–621

Alba RD, Logan JR, Stults BJ. 2000b. How segregated are middle-class African Americans? *Soc. Probl.* 47(4):543–58

Alba RD, Logan JR, Stults BJ, Marzan G, Zhang W. 1999. Immigrant groups in the suburbs: a reexamination of suburbanization and spatial assimilation. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 64:446–60

Anderson E. 1990. *Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Community.* Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press

Anderson E. 1999. *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City*. New York: Norton

Bertrand M, Mullainathan S. 2002. *Are Emily and Brendan More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination*

Blumer H. 1958. Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *Pacific Soc. Rev.* 1(1):1–7

Bobo L. 1989. Keeping the linchpin in place: testing the multiple sources of opposition to residential integration. *Int. Rev. Soc. Psychol.* 2(3):305–23

Bobo L. 1999. Prejudice as group position: micro-foundations of a sociological approach to racism and race relations. *J. Soc. Issues* 55(3):445–72

Bobo L, Zubrinsky C. 1996. Attitudes toward residential integration: perceived status differences, mere in-group preference, or racial prejudice? *Soc. Forces* 74(3):883–909

Bok D. 1996. *The State of the Nation: Government and the Quest for a Better Society.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press

Carr JH, Megbolugbe IF. 1993. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study on mortgage lending revisited. *J. Housing Res.* 4(2):277–313

Caskey J. 1992. Bank representation in low-income and minority urban communities. Work. Pap., Res. Div. Fed. Reserve Bank Kansas City

Charles CZ. 2000. Neighborhood racial-composition preferences: evidence from a multiethnic metropolis. *Soc. Probl.* 47(3): 379–407

Charles CZ. 2001a. Socioeconomic status and segregation: African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians in Los Angeles. In *Problem of the Century: Racial Stratification in the United States*, ed. E Andersen, DS Massey, pp. 271–89. New York: Russell Sage

Charles CZ. 2001b. Processes of residential segregation. In *Urban Inequality: Evidence From Four Cities*, ed. A O'Connor, C Tilly, L Bobo, pp. 217–71. New York: Russell Sage

Charles CZ. 2002. *Comfort zones: immigration, assimilation, and the neighborhood racial-composition preferences of Latinos and Asians*. Paper presented at Annu. Meet. Amer. Soc. Assoc., Chicago

Clark WAV. 1986. Residential segregation in American cities: a review and interpretation. *Popul. Res. Policy Rev.* 5:95–127

Clark WAV. 1988. Understanding residential segregation in American cities: interpreting the evidence, a reply to Galster. *Popul. Res. Policy Rev.* 8:193–97

Clark WAV. 1992. Residential preferences and residential choices in a multiethnic context. *Demography* 29(3):451–66

Clark WAV. 2002. Ethnic preferences and ethnic perceptions in multi-ethnic settings. *Urban Geogr.* 23(3):237–56

Crowder KD. 1999. Residential segregation of West Indians in the New York/New Jersey metropolitan areas: the roles of race and ethnicity. *Int. Migr. Rev.* 33:79–113

Cutler DM, Glaeser EL. 1997. Are ghettos good or bad? *Q. J. Econ.* 112(3):827–72

Cutler DM, Glaeser EL, Vigdor JL. 1999. The rise and decline of the American ghetto. *J. Polit. Econ.* 107(3):455–506

Darden JT. 1995. Black residential segregation since the 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer decision. *J. Black Stud.* 25(6):680–91

Dedman B. 1988. The color of money. *Atlanta*

Journal, Atlanta Journal Constitution, May 1–4

Dedman B. 1989. Blacks turned down for home loans from S&Ls twice as often as whites. *Atlanta Journal, Atlanta Journal Constitution*, Jan. 22

Denton NA. 1994. Are African Americans still hypersegregated? In *Residential Apartheid: The American Legacy*, ed. R Bullard, C Lee, JE Grigsby, pp. 49–79. Los Angeles: UCLA Cent. Afr. Am. Stud.

Denton NA, Massey DS. 1988. Residential segregation of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians by socioeconomic status and generation. *Soc. Sci. Q.* 69:797–817

Denton NA, Massey DS. 1989. Racial identity among Caribbean Hispanics: the effect of double minority status on residential segregation. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 54:790–808

Du Bois WEB. 1990 (1903). *The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches*. New York: Vintage Books

Edmonston B, Passel JS. 1992. Immigration and immigrant generations in population projections. *Int. J. Forecast.* 8(3):459–76

Ellen IG. 2000. *Sharing America's Neighborhoods: The Prospects for Stable Racial Integration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press

Emerson MO, Yancey G, Chai KJ. 2001. Does race matter in residential segregation? Exploring the preferences of white Americans. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 66(6):922–35

Farley R. 1996a. *The New American Reality: How We Are, How We Got There, Where We Are Going*. New York: Russell Sage

Farley R. 1996b. Racial differences in the search for housing: Do whites and blacks use the same techniques to find housing? *Hous. Policy Debate* 7:36786

Farley R, Fielding EL, Krysan M. 1997. The residential preferences of whites and blacks: a four-metropolis analysis. *Hous. Policy Debate* 8(4):763–800

Farley R, Frey WH. 1994. Changes in the segregation of whites from blacks during the 1980s: small steps toward a more integrated society. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 59:23–45

Farley R, Schuman H, Bianchi S, Colasanto D, Hatchett S. 1978. Chocolate city, vanilla suburbs: Will the trend toward racially separate communities continue? *Soc. Sci. Res.* 7:319–44

Farley R, Steeh C, Jackson T, Krysan M, Reeves K. 1993. Continued racial segregation in detroit: chocolate city, vanilla suburbs. *J. Hous. Res.* 4(1):1–38

Farley R, Steeh C, Krysan M, Jackson T, Reeves K. 1994. Stereotypes and segregation: neighborhoods in the Detroit area. *Am. J. Sociol.* 100(3):750–80

Flippen CA. 2001. Residential segregation and minority home ownership. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 30(3):337–62

Frey WH, Farley R. 1993. Latino, Asian, and black segregation in multi-ethnic metro areas: findings from the 1990 Census. Res. Rep. Popul. Stud. Cent., Univ. Mich.

Galster GC. 1988. Residential segregation in American cities: a contrary review. *Popul. Res. Policy Rev.* 7:93–112

Galster GC. 1990. Racial steering in housing markets during the 1980s: a review of the audit evidence. *J. Plan. Educ. Res.* 9:165–75

Galster GC. 1991. Black suburbanization: Has it changed the relative location of races? *Urban Aff. Q.* 26:621–28

Galster GC. 1992. Research on discrimination in housing and mortgage markets: assessment and future directions. *Hous. Policy Debate* 3(2):639–83

Glazer N. 1980. Race and the suburbs. In *The Work of Charles Abrams*, ed. OH Koenigsberger, S Groak, B Bernstein, pp. 175–80. Oxford: Pergamon Press

Harris DR. 1999. Property values drop when blacks move in, because. . .: racial and socioeconomic determinants of neighborhood desirability. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 64:461–79

Harris DR. 2001. Why are whites and blacks averse to black neighbors? *Soc. Sci. Res.* 30(1):100–16

Heckman JJ. 1998. Detecting discrimination. *J. Econ. Perspect.* 12(2):101–16

Heckman JJ, Siegelman P. 1993. The Urban Institute Audit Studies: their methods and

findings. In *Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America*, ed. M Fix, RJ Struyk, pp. 187–258, 271–76. Washington, DC: Urban Inst. Press

Jackman MR, Jackman RW. 1983. *Class Awareness in the United States*. Berkeley, CA: Univ. Calif. Press

Jackman MR, Muha MJ. 1984. Prejudice, tolerance, and attitudes toward ethnic groups. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 6:145–69

Jackson WE III. 1994. Discrimination in mortgage lending markets as rational economic behavior: theory, evidence, and public policy. In *African Americans and the New Policy Consensus: Retreat of the Liberal State*, ed. ME Lashley, MN Jackson, pp. 157–78. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Jargowsky PA. 1996. *Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City.* New York: Russell Sage

Jargowsky PA, Bane MJ. 1991. Ghetto poverty in the United States, 1970–1980. In *The Urban Underclass*, ed. C Jencks, PE Peterson, pp. 235–73. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst.

Jasso G, Rosenzweig M. 1990. *The New Chosen People: Immigrants in the United States.* New York: Russell Sage

Jaynes GD, Williams RM Jr. 1989. *A Common Destiny: Blacks in American Society*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press

Kirschenman J, Neckerman KM. 1991. 'We'd love to hire them, but. . .': the meaning of race for employers. In *The Urban Underclass*, ed. C Jencks, PE Peterson, pp. 203–32. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst.

Krivo LJ, Peterson RD. 1996. Extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods and urban crime. *Soc. Forces* 75:619–48

Krysan M. 1998. Privacy and the expression of white racial attitudes: a comparison across three contexts. *Public Opin. Q.* 62:506–44

Krysan M. 2002. Whites who say they'd flee: Who are they, and why would they leave? *Demography* 39(4):675–96

Krysan M, Farley R. 2002. The residential preferences of blacks: Do they explain persistent segregation? *Soc. Forces* 80:937–80

Logan JR. 2001a. Ethnic diversity grows, neighborhood integration lags behind. Rep. Lewis Mumford Cent. Comp. Urban Reg. Res.

Logan JR. 2001b. The new ethnic enclaves in America's suburbs. Rep. Lewis Mumford Cent. Comp. Urban Reg. Res.

Logan JR. 2001c. Living separately: segregation rises for children. Rep. Lewis Mumford Cent. Comp. Urban Reg. Res.

Logan JR, Alba RD. 1993. Locational returns to human capital: minority access to suburban community resources. *Demography* 30(2):243–68

Logan JR, Alba RD. 1995. Who lives in affluent suburbs? Racial differences in eleven metropolitan regions. *Sociol. Focus* 28(4): 353–64

Logan JR, Alba RD, Leung S-Y. 1996. Minority access to white suburbs: a multiregional comparison. *Soc. Forces* 74(3):851–81

Logan JR, Alba RD, Zhang W. 2002. Immigrant enclaves and ethnic communities in New York and Los Angeles. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 67:299–322

Logan JR, Schneider M. 1984. Racial segregation and racial change in American suburbs, 1970–1980. *Am. J. Sociol.* 89(4):874–88

Massey DS. 1995. The new immigration and ethnicity in the United States. *Popul. Dev. Rev.* 21(3):631–52

Massey DS, Bitterman B. 1985. Explaining the paradox of Puerto Rican segregation. *Soc. Forces* 64(2):306–31

Massey DS, Condran GA, Denton NA. 1987. The effect of residential segregation on black social and economic well-being. *Soc. Forces* 66:29–57

Massey DS, Denton NA. 1985. Spatial assimilation as a socioeconomic outcome. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 50:94–106

Massey DS, Denton NA. 1987. Trends in the residential segregation of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970–1980. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 52(6):802–25

Massey DS, Denton NA. 1989. Hypersegregation in U.S. metropolitan areas: black and

Hispanic segregation along five dimensions. Demography 26(3):373–91

Massey DS, Denton NA. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press

Massey DS, Fischer MJ. 1999. Does rising income bring integration? New results for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in 1990. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 28:316–26

Massey DS, Fischer MJ. 2002. *The Long Term Consequences of Segregation*. Paper presented at Ann. Meet. Popul. Assoc. Am., Atlanta

Massey DS, Gross AB, Eggers M. 1991. Segregation, the concentration of poverty, and the life chances of individuals. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 20:397–420

Massey DS, Gross AB, Shibuya K. 1994. Migration, segregation and the geographic concentration of poverty. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 59(4):425–45

Massey DS, Lundy G. 2001. Use of black English and racial discrimination in urban housing markets: new methods and findings. *Urban Aff. Rev.* 36(4):452–69

Metcalf GR. 1988. *Fair Housing Comes of Age*. New York: Greenwood

Meyer SG. 2000. *As Long as They Don't Live Next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American Neighborhoods*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield

Morenoff JD, Sampson RJ 1997. Violent crime and the spatial dynamics of neighborhood transition: Chicago, 1970–1990. *Soc. Forces* 76:31–64

Munnell AH, Tootell GMB, Browne LE, McEneaney J. 1996. Mortgage lending in Boston: interpreting HMDA data. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 86(1):25–53

Myrdal G. 1972 (1944). *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. New York: Random House

Nyden P, Lukehart J, Maly MT, Peterman W, eds. 1998. Racially and ethnically diverse urban neighborhoods. In *Cityscape* 4(2):1–28, 261–69. Washington, DC: US Dep. Hous. Urban Dev.

Oliver ML, Shapiro TM. 1995. *Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality*. New York: Routledge

Ondrich J, Stricker A, Yinger J. 1998. Do real estate brokers choose to discriminate? Evidence from the 1989 housing discrimination study. *South. Econ. J.* 64(4):880–902

Patterson O. 1997. *The Ordeal of Integration: Progress and Resentment in America's Racial Crisis.* Washington, DC: Civitas

Pattillo-McCoy M. 1999. *Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril Among the Black Middle Class.* Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press

Portes A, Rumbaut RG. 1996. *Immigrant America: A Portrait.* Berkeley, CA: Univ. Calif. Press

Purnell T, Idsardi W, Baugh J. 1999. Perceptual and phonetic experiments on American English dialect identification. *J. Lang. Soc. Psychol.* 18(1):10–30

Rosenbaum E. 1994. The constraints on minority housing choices, New York City 1978–1987. *Soc. Forces* 72(3):725–47

Rosenbaum E. 1996. The influence of race on Hispanic housing choices, New York City, 1978–1987. *Urban Aff. Rev.* 32(2):217–43

Rubinowitz LS, Rosenbaum JE. 2000. *Crossing the Class and Color Lines: From Public Housing to White Suburbia*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press

Sampson RJ, Wilson WJ. 1995. *Toward a Theory of Race, Crime and Urban Inequality*. In *Crime and Inequality,* ed. J Hagen, RD Peterson, pp. 37–54. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press

Schnore LF. 1963. Some correlates of urban size: a replication. *Am. J. Sociol.* 69(2):185–93

South SJ, Crowder KD. 1997a. Residential mobility between cities and suburbs: race, suburbanization, and back-to-the-city moves. *Demography* 34(4):525–38

South SJ, Crowder KD. 1997b. Escaping distressed neighborhoods: individual, community, and metropolitan areas. *Am. J. Sociol.* 103(4):1040–84

South SJ, Crowder KD. 1998. Leaving the 'hood: residential mobility between black,

white, and integrated neighborhoods. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 63:17–26

South SJ, Deane GD. 1993. Race and residential mobility: individual determinants and structural constraints. *Soc. Forces* 72(1):147–67

Squires GD, Kim S. 1995. Does anybody who works here look like me?: mortgage lending, race, and lender employment. *Soc. Sci. Q.* 76(4):823–38

Taeuber KE, Taeuber AF. 1965. *Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change*. West Hanover, MA: Atheneum

Thernstrom S, Thernstrom A. 1997. *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible.* New York: Simon & Schuster

Timberlake JM. 2000. Still life in black and white: effects of racial and class attitudes on prospects for residential integration in Atlanta. *Sociol. Inq.* 70(4):420–45

Timberlake JM. 2002. Separate, but how unequal? Ethnic residential stratification, 1980 to 1990. *City Community* 1(3):251–66

Turner MA, Ross SL, Galster GC, Yinger J. 2002. Discrimination in metropolitan housing markets: national results from Phase I HDS 2000. US Dep. Hous. Urban Dev., Washington, DC.

US Natl. Advis. Comm. Civil Disord. 1988. *The Kerner Report.* New York: Pantheon Books

Venkatesh SA. 2000. *American Project: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press

Villemez WJ. 1980. Race, class, and neighborhood: differences in the residential return on individual resources. *Soc. Forces* 59(2):414–30

Waldinger R, Bozorgmehr M. 1996. The making of a multicultural metropolis. In *Ethnic Los Angeles*, ed. R Waldinger, M Bozorgmehr, pp. 3–37. New York: Russell Sage Found.

Waters MC. 1990. *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley, CA: Univ. Calif. Press

Waters MC. 1999. *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities*. New York: Russell Sage Found.

Wilson WJ. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press

Wilson WJ. 1996. *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Knopf

Yinger J. 1993. Audit methodology: comments. In *Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America*, ed. M Fix, RJ Struyk, pp. 259–70. Washington, DC: Urban Inst. Press

Yinger J. 1995. *Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination.* New York: Russell Sage Found.

Yinger J. 1998. Evidence on discrimination in consumer markets. *J. Econ. Perspect.* 12(2):23–40

Zubrinsky CL, Bobo L. 1996. Prismatic metropolis: race and residential segregation in the city of the angels. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 25:335–74

Annual Review of Sociology
Volume 29, 2003

CONTENTS