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# Multi-Ethnic Metropolis: Patterns and Policies

by

Sako Musterd, Wim Ostendorf and Matthijs Breebaart



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# **Multi-Ethnic Metropolis: Patterns and Policies**

*by*

**SAKO MUSTERD**

**WIM OSTENDORF**

and

**MATTHIJS BREEBAART**

*Amsterdam Study Center for the Metropolitan Environment,  
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands*



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# Preface

*Multi-Ethnic Metropolis* is based on international comparative research on ethnic segregation patterns and policy reactions at local and national level. The objective was to achieve a broader, European perspective.

For the acquisition of the information on which this book is based, we relied heavily on our colleagues abroad and their network of relations, since a great deal of factual data and information on the policies pursued is usually not available in a freely accessible form and can only be obtained through persons who know their way around. Eventually, information was provided by about seventy people (data administrators, policymakers at local and state level, politicians, academic researchers, representatives of interest groups, etc.). The names of all people that contributed to this study are mentioned in the list of persons who were interviewed. Without wishing to wrong all these people, we especially want to thank the key informants who acted as intermediaries for following contacts. In alphabetical order, these are the following persons:

Dr. Lars-Erik Borgegård (Stockholm), Prof. Chris Hamnett (London), Dr. Hervé Vieillard Baron (Paris), Prof. dr. Chris Kesteloot (Brussels), Prof. dr. Bob Murdie (Toronto), Prof. Ceri Peach (London), Prof. Phil Rees (London and Manchester), Prof. Brian Robson (Manchester) and Prof. Günther Glebe (Düsseldorf and Frankfurt).

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Amsterdam, October 1997

Sako Musterd  
Wim Ostendorf  
Matthijs Breebaart

# 1

## **Ethnic Segregation and Policy: Introduction**

### **1.1**

#### **Segregation and the underclass**

In the early nineties urban social problems figured large on the political agenda in Western Europe. Many people think there has been a growing dereliction of neighbourhoods going on in cities throughout the European Union. Whatever the causes might have been, the root of the problem is regarded as being the dramatic level of unemployment of over 20 million people in 1997. Bearing in mind the nearly full employment of the post-war economy, the increase is staggering. Government seems powerless as the average level of unemployment comes to at a higher level with each business cycle. Moreover, the occurrence of unemployment and associated, wider economic problems is very location specific. Some areas flourish while others are in decay. This uneven development has resulted in a state in which it is no longer sensible to talk about rich versus poor countries, or a north - south division within Europe. Some areas of 'poor' countries actually outperform the weaker parts of 'rich' countries. Besides, the transition from poor to rich can be very sudden. Booming urban areas often lie adjacent to their declining counterparts, with postmodern office workers hidden in glass towers hermetically sealed off from the problems on the streets.

One of the main reasons for the rise in unemployment is supposed to lie in the transition to an information-rich, competitive, global economy. Low skilled industrial jobs are disappearing, either to automation or to low-wage countries. The new service economy requires computer-savvy employees, and those who are unable to adapt or simply too old are the victims of rightsizing, downsizing, or just plain bankruptcy. Although new jobs are created in the service economy, a great many of those who are currently unemployed in the European Union have little chance to re-enter the regular labour market. Some

groups fare worse on the labour market than others. In general, age and education are prime determinants, along with gender and race.

It is self-evident that the high level of unemployment and the lack of prospects involves a grave potential for social stress and even disorder. However, up until now the Western European welfare states have been able to compensate those who lost their jobs. A minimum standard of living could have been more or less guaranteed. Of course, substantial differences have existed between countries with regard to the arrangements that make up the welfare state; large enough for Esping-Andersen (1990) to recognize liberal, social democratic and corporatist versions of the welfare state. In Europe, these welfare states exist alongside each other. In the social democratic model the principle of universalism prevails. An equality of the highest standards is promoted in these type of states. Corporatist states are characterised by their efforts to preserve existing status differentials. Welfare arrangements are not market-led. In this context the separation between those with and those without a job is often strong. Entry to the labour market and (involuntary) exit are strongly regulated. In liberal regimes “means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers and modest social insurance plans predominate” (p. 26). Liberal models seem to provide better opportunities to realise social mobility, in case people should want to move up after their entry at the bottom end of the labour market.

The point to be made here is that most European welfare states did their job of cushioning the harsh realities of global economic competition pressure. However, the European welfare state was obviously unable to cope with the growth in unemployment that followed the oil shocks of the seventies. Since unemployment ultimately endangers the foundations of the welfare state, something has to be done in order to stop the spiral of growing unemployment and out-of-control welfare expenditures. This harsh reality forced itself upon Sweden in the nineties, but other EU members feel the same pressure. There seems to be no way out: generous unemployment benefits are only possible with low overall unemployment. The problem is amplified by the fact that the creation of a single European currency demands a clean-up of government deficits that had been built up earlier. The pay-off is obvious: lower government debts means lower interest payments, which will almost automatically lead to a healthy budget. But first of all, expenditure has to be cut. In effect little room may be left for Western European welfare states. The restrictions of the single European currency and the pressures from globalization point to ‘liberal’ solutions. Although many are aware of their one-sidedness and their broad assumptions, liberalism and the market metaphor provide answers while other ideologies remain silent.

The fact that Western European welfare states seem to gain liberal characteristics does not mean that Esping-Andersen’s typology instantly loses credibility. The legacy of a century of government policy cannot be brushed away in an instant. Still, at first sight the forthcoming reforms could very well damage the prospects of those at the bottom end of the socio-economic ladder. In the past, governments were able to contain the effects of

restructuring on living conditions by spending huge amounts on income transfers and other subsidies. What will happen if the governments unilaterally decide to pull out, mouthing only the phrase of individual responsibility in return? It is very unlikely that unemployment will disappear once welfare states become restructured. If those who are left behind are unable to turn to their governments for help, where will they turn?

Chances are that they will turn to the cities, if they are not already there. In general, cities offer the best prospects for survival, e.g. because of the existence of an informal economy and a compact and large market (UN, Habitat 2 conference, Ankara). Still, it is not easy to adapt to the city, nor to its inhabitants. Many citizens, politicians, journalists and, last but not least, scientists, have thought about the future of our cities. Given the complexity of modern society, inspiration can often be found in real-life examples around the world. In practice, the attention span tends to be limited to the United States. An infamous case of where a worst-case scenario could lead is the Black American ghetto. The picture of violence, drugs, despair, and hopelessness forms a powerful metaphor, and the sense of permanency is gripping. The problems lead to occasional riots, as in Los Angeles in 1992, which only worsens the situation. In effect, it is not easy to escape for those living in the ghetto. To the European proponent of a social democratic welfare state, this situation is obviously unacceptable. In fact, the sensitivity to 'American situations' might even be enhanced by the forceful transition of the European welfare state. Two additional factors could account for the importance of the American ghetto metaphor in Western Europe. First, the long-term dominance of American theories in urban research - e.g. the Chicago school of Burgess and Park - has made Europeans familiar with the urban dynamics in the American metropolises. Second, the penetration of American culture in Europe appears to be unstoppable. Presidential elections are fully covered, television and movies present every aspect of American society, and trends are often copied. Combining the previous two facts with the growing international economic competition and the restructuring of the European welfare state to a more liberal, 'American' version, the widely felt fear of American situations in Europe becomes understandable. It appears that the United States could once again present the road ahead, as with so many trends in science and society.

On the other hand, several factors can be held against the uncritical transplantation of the Black ghetto to Western Europe. No immigrant group in Western Europe has experienced a history similar to that of the Black population in the United States. It could even be said that the amount of racism that the Black population has had to endure is exceptional within the American context. That does not mean that racism does not exist within Europe or that other immigrant groups in the United States were always treated like guests, but the Black experience obviously stands out. Still, despite numerous warnings from social scientists that a comparison rests on shaky grounds, the 'American metaphor' is persistent. Even if we accept the well established fact that an identical copy of the

Black American ghetto will not evolve in Europe, valuable lessons could be learned. After all, ‘Europe’ is going liberal, with the risk of introducing new dynamics that previously were reserved for American cities only. A better understanding of the dynamics that formed the ghetto and grounded its place in the American cityscape might be helpful in judging future developments in European cities.

Extensive attention has been paid to the explanation of Black history and the dynamics of the Black American ghetto. Massey and Denton (1993) cited four directions in explaining persistent Black poverty: Oscar Lewis and the culture of poverty (culture); Alphonso Pinkney and the role of racism in the formation of the underclass (racism); Charles Murray and the negative long-term effects of anti-poverty programs (welfare policy); Julius Wilson and the structural transformation of the inner-city economy (economics). These four factors are not mutually exclusive but operate in conjunction. Accepting the significance of all four factors, Massey and Denton added one crucial component to the mix: segregation, which “played an important role in mediating, exacerbating, and ultimately amplifying the harmful social and economic processes they treat” (1993 p. 7).

Segregation could be loosely defined as the living apart of a population category relative to another population category. Massey and Denton focused on the ethnic Black population category in the United States and calculated indices of segregation from other ethnic groups such as White, Hispanic, and Asian. Despite their focus on ethnic groups, they not only examined possible ethnic causes for segregation but also socio-economic causes. If all members of an ethnic group belong to the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, that fact alone could explain their living together. As housing quality is not equally distributed in a city’s territory, the socio-economic factor leads to clustering of the ethnic group, and this living together is reflected in the ethnic indices of segregation. Obviously, if higher income members of an ethnic group - income being a common indicator of socio-economic status - are still living together with lower-income group members, other factors must be taken into account. For instance, higher segments of the housing market might be closed because of discrimination. Following this line of reasoning, Massey and Denton clearly established a history of racial discrimination that strongly influenced the construction and persistence of the Black American ghetto. Moreover, relatively minor policies, problems, and processes are bound to result in downward spirals that are hard to stop if left without proper attention. At this point segregation comes in, because it tends to concentrate problems spatially. Massey and Denton supplied many examples of the negative consequences of segregation - from cycles of poverty to the deteriorating labour market position of Black males raised with a ghetto slang that is inapplicable outside the ghetto - and in the end their work was quite convincing.

Because of the importance that Massey and Denton attached to segregation, the concept might offer a starting point for a European analysis. Indeed, a number of social scientists

have already taken steps to compare segregation in American and European cities. These comparisons were mainly built around one or more metropolitan areas in one European country and one or more cases in the United States. Three differences are notable in comparison to the approach of Massey and Denton.

First, the European studies found a much higher level of segregation for Black Americans than for any immigrant group in Western Europe, as was illustrated for the Netherlands by Van Praag (1981), for Belgium by Kesteloot (1995), and for Paris by Guillon (1992). It seems that the 90-plus scores in most metropolises in the United States are only matched by South African cities; apparently, it is not coincidental that Massey and Denton's work is called 'American Apartheid'. Some disagreement exists over the consequences of this lower level of segregation. Peach (1996) pointed to the lower scores on the indices of segregation, concluding that no Black American-like ghetto presently exists in Great Britain, while Smith (1989) gave much more weight to the effects of the same British indices and explored whether "residential differentiation in Britain may be an expression of entrenched racial inequalities that are politically and socially, as well as economically, inspired" (1989 p. 17). Since both used identical statistical material, the difference in opinion refers to the question of the inner meaning and deeper implications of segregation. Attention will be paid to that question in this book.

Second, it proved to be impossible, in the Western European context, to replicate the socio-economic analysis that Massey and Denton carried out. The statistical material is simply not available, at least not on a reasonably low geographical level. This does not mean that circumstantial evidence does not exist, but the income-centred analysis that formed an important part of Massey and Denton's work is clearly out of reach.

Third, European analyses often compare European and American cities, but seem to put the American context on a par with the Black experience. Other immigrant groups are simply ignored. As the Black experience is quite exceptional compared to other immigrants, that strategy holds the risk of misrepresentation. In short, comparison with segregation in the United States requires a wider range of American immigrant categories (also Musterd 1996).

It turns out that the study of segregation in Western Europe left several crucial questions unanswered. In fact, as far as we know, an international comparative study aimed at achieving a better understanding of the variety of segregation patterns that can be encountered within Europe does not exist. In other words, how does segregation in London compare to segregation in Paris, or Brussels, or Amsterdam? The main advantage of this approach lies in the fact that instead of always referring to the American metaphor, one could also aim at the construction of a European metaphor. This strategy is more inward looking, and uses indices of segregation within Europe as a benchmark. A first step in such a research programme concerns the question of what is actually known about differences between European cities with regard to the segregation patterns of

immigrants. As it is not easy to compare the previous European studies because of methodological differences - international comparison is notoriously difficult - an explicitly designed study offers greater opportunity for European comparison. The importance of a comparison between European countries should not be underestimated, as national states are not homogenized in a single European Union and are not very likely to be so in the future. First of all, the organization of the welfare state differs between national states. Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguished three types of welfare states within Europe. Although the national housing market was neglected in Esping-Andersen's work, which is unfortunate (Murie 1994), and his categorization could be subjected to criticism, the underlying assumption of national differentiation is persuasive. Second, the immigration history of the national states is diverse (Muus, 1993). Although at first sight the overall picture looks similar, with migration from former colonies (1), guest workers in the sixties and seventies (2), family-related migration after the first oil crisis (3), and refugees in the eighties and nineties (4), substantial differences exist with regard to the immigrants' nationalities, timing, rights of entry and citizenship, and the number of immigrants. Third, the functioning of the national housing system is probably strongly linked to the patterns of segregation. Parameters such as the share of the social housing stock are often assumed to influence segregation. In addition the urban genesis of different cities is far from similar. That will have its repercussions, too. The combined weight of these sources of national variation underlines the importance of a European approach towards segregation.

The second step in constructing a European metaphor involves a more qualitative study. After all, maps and indices are by definition unable to show how segregation is conceived by citizens, professionals and politicians. Answering these questions taps into the perception of segregation in each case. Given the differences between national states, a varying perception of segregation is a possibility we want to explore. Besides, the combination of a quantitative and a qualitative approach gives rise to questions that would be impossible to ask without either one of the components. For instance, perception of segregation might differ in cases with similar quantitative indices, thereby defying a linear equation.

The importance of bringing in both quantitative and qualitative information is also based on the assertion that they need each other. Perception without statistics remains sketchy, while statistics without perception also is of little value. In the remainder of this chapter further attention will be given to the quantitative and qualitative questions and a research design will be presented for use in the casa studies.

## 1.2 Quantitative analysis

As our introduction makes clear, we propose a stepwise research model for the European study of segregation. Methodological difficulties of international comparison and the differences between the European nations force us into such a direction. The first step involves the construction of a database containing statistical material that can be used to present a picture of segregation in Western Europe. The following problem formulation gives a summary:

*Which differences exist with regard to patterns of ethnic segregation in Western European metropolises?*

Several aspects in this problem formulation deserve further elaboration. First, what exactly is meant by Western European metropolises? Musterd and Muus (1995) and SCP (1995) showed that immigrants in the Netherlands are overrepresented in the cities and that this pattern was actually enhanced in the last decade or so. Peach (1996), Kesteloot (1995) and INSEE (1993) showed a similar urban overrepresentation of immigrants in Great Britain, Belgium and France, respectively. Not only do cities show an overrepresentation, but within cities so-called immigrant concentration neighbourhoods are clearly visible. When these neighbourhoods are also characterized as socio-economically weak, a comparison with American ghettos is not far away. Of course, we need to state at the beginning which metropolitan areas are incorporated. Table 1-1 presents the cases that will be used in the next chapters.

The choice of Amsterdam, Brussels, London, Stockholm, and Paris stems from the fact that all are capital cities that have attracted many immigrants. Berlin was omitted because of the major changes after the breakdown of the iron curtain in 1989.

TABLE 1-1 Selected metropolitan areas

City	Country	Chapter
Amsterdam	Netherlands	2
Brussels Capital Region	Belgium	3
Frankfurt am Main	Germany	4
Düsseldorf	Germany	4
London	Great Britain	5
Greater Manchester	Great Britain	5
Stockholm	Sweden	6
Paris and Ile de France	France	7
Toronto	Canada	8

Instead Frankfurt am Main, with the highest share of immigrants in Germany, and Düsseldorf were selected. Manchester is a prime example of a city with a declining industrial base which used to be attractive to immigrants.

Finally, the incorporation of Toronto, Canada, might come as a surprise in the light of our earlier predisposition towards a European approach. In the media and the literature, Canada is often described as a less extreme but nonetheless very similar version of the United States. Although many Canadians loath the comparison with the United States, there is some element of truth in the comparison, seen from the other side of the Atlantic. For one, Canadian cities lack a European-type urban history; the centres of Amsterdam, Brussels or Paris look entirely different from the centre of Toronto. On the other hand, Canadian metropolises are not interchangeable with their similar looking American counterparts. For instance, in Canada there is not as much crime on the streets as in the United States. Canada is also close to the American immigration history. Both countries have offered millions of immigrants a right of entry, many of whom entered as early as the nineteenth century. In Western Europe the major immigration flows started only after the Second World War. However, Canada does not have as numerous a Black population as the United States, and especially that population category fared badly. In short, the intermediate position of Canada offers an interesting extension without falling prey to the extreme position of the United States.

Returning to the problem formulation, one might ask what is intended with the choice for ethnic segregation. After all, do not ethnic and socio-economic segregation work in unison? Indeed, both are strongly linked, but in Western Europe researchers are forced to choose between the two because of data constraints. The relatively recent arrival of immigrants (at least compared to the United States) and privacy legislation are among the reasons that could explain it. However, an implicit link is available if a specific immigrant group fits (almost) entirely either in the upper or the lower socio-economic strata. For instance, Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam are almost entirely part of the socio-economic bottom, while for Japanese immigrants the opposite holds true. This use of circumstantial evidence becomes problematic when a group of immigrants shows a more or less even distribution in socio-economic terms. Brussels is a case in point, because in the eighties guest workers from Northern Mediterranean countries were joined by relatively wealthy compatriots working as EU officials. In this book ethnicity plays a central part and socio-economic characteristics are used, when available, for refinement.

In short, nine metropolitan areas have been selected for a study of ethnic segregation. The first step involves a quantitative analysis to provide a better understanding of patterns of ethnic segregation and the differences between the selected metropolitan areas. In the second chapter attention will be paid to methodological aspects, such as which types of indices are preferred, etc. That elaboration will be combined with the analysis of

the first case: Amsterdam. The next section of this chapter will describe the second step in constructing a European metaphor of segregation - the perception and policy.

### 1.3 Perception and policy

Working with statistical material enables the comparison of different metropolitan areas. Despite some methodological questions that are attached to international comparison, that approach should at least offer a basic, concise picture of segregation in Western Europe. Still, the fundamental question could be raised: what does segregation actually mean in the metropolitan areas? Is a certain level of segregation seen as a reason for concern? In fact, is segregation itself used as a concept in the metropolitan areas? The substantially lower scores on the indices of segregation in Western Europe compared to the situation in many Black American ghettos were already mentioned in this introduction. Social scientists like Peach (1996) referred to these differences to conclude that ghettos do not exist in Western Europe at this moment. However, the perception of these differences may vary between societies. For instance, while the average observer is hardly able to distinguish between German and Dutch inhabitants, they are themselves very aware of the tiny differences and tend to magnify them. The same story could be true for the perception of segregation. In an egalitarian Western Europe the statistically lower scores on the index of segregation might be felt the same way as in the liberal United States. Also, within Western Europe perception might vary between countries or even between metropolitan areas. It is possible that segregation is considered as a major problem in one country while similar scores on the indices of segregation do not provoke a reaction in another country. Maybe the attention towards segregation is based on the occurrence of concentration neighbourhoods, and not so much on the uneven distribution that influences the indices of segregation. These remarks reveal only the tip of the iceberg, but make sufficiently clear that care must be taken when interpreting statistical material.

This study aims to incorporate these notions. That is easier said than done, for different research methodologies could be applied. An approach that was used by Massey and Denton (1993), Smith (1989) and others is a historical, critical appraisal of government policies towards segregation. First and foremost, government policies towards housing stand at the centre of attention. What consequences - either intentional or unintentional - can be ascribed to government housing policies? Second, other policy arenas that affect individual characteristics, such as labour and education, are investigated because ultimately they influence housing mobility and thereby segregation. Obviously, a methodological problem is formed by the delineation of policy arenas and measures; where do you draw the line without leaving important factors aside? A more fundamental problem lies in the stress upon formal policies. It might sound naive to equate the perspective on

segregation in society with actual governmental policies. Informal systems are often important in understanding the dynamics of segregation. For instance, discrimination on the housing market by ‘gatekeepers’ could limit the choice of residential areas for some. However valid this remark may be, informal mechanisms are notoriously difficult to unravel, which is not surprising given the often illegal characteristics. Therefore, in this study our main focus is on formal instances of government policy towards ethnic segregation. This is not as bad as it sounds. As we are talking about long-term issues, one would expect that a democratic government responds to pressures from society. If segregation is seen as a problem by many, then many could try to influence government to act. Analysis of newspapers should enable us to track down such opinions, even if they do not result in governmental action.

It might be hypothesized that local government is more sensitive to these kind of pressures and demands than national government. After all, *the raison d'être* of local government lies primarily in close contact with citizens and knowledge of local processes. However, the exact nature of the relations between local and central government differs between countries. Whereas in Great Britain the principle of *ultra vires* prevents local government from taking too much initiative, continental European systems of governance often give local government more room to manoeuvre. Whether this difference carries any implications for policies towards segregation is the object of our study.

The ideas of the previous paragraph bring us to the following extension of our problem formulation. In addition to the first quantitative part, we propose a second policy oriented question:

*which policies are being administered towards immigrants; both on a local and a national level of government? To what extent could these policies be regarded as urban planning policies?*

The problem formulation explicitly mentions formal policies on local and national levels of government. Even with this limitation, the problem of delineation that was already mentioned lies ahead. In other words, what specification of formal policy is used? An answer to this question is given in the next subsection.

### **Two types of formal policy**

In general, the Western European welfare state did its job of cushioning the harsh realities of pressure from global economic competition. Governments were able to contain the effects of the economic restructuring on the living conditions of the poor by spending huge amounts on income transfers and other subsidies. Many different policies were constructed that attempted to ‘decommodify’ (Esping-Andersen 1990) labour and housing.

The geographical side that comes with our focus on segregation influences the kind of policies that we are primarily interested in. An income transfer policy that is applicable to all citizens with a minimum income is obviously not very geographic, while a policy that directs money specifically to the inner city is. The latter is an example of an area-based policy. As segregation and concentration are calculated at a neighbourhood level, an awareness of one or both of these indices might lead to policy initiatives. Theoretically, a reciprocal relation between pattern and policy is to be expected.

Two types of policy reaction are imaginable. First, policy makers may try to use a spatial dispersal policy. The rationale for this kind of policy is often a reduction or stabilization of the share of population in a certain area. Secondly, an area-based compensating policy could be devised to aid concentration neighbourhoods. The presence of immigrants is accepted and additional means, which are often of financial kind, are devised to tackle problematic situations.

### *Spatial dispersion policy*

Some neighbourhoods are characterized by a high share of immigrants and low scores on socio-economic indices. Proponents of a spatial dispersion policy think that a relationship exists between these two parameters. They expect that a lowering or stabilization of the share of immigrants in these problem neighbourhoods - in other words a spatial dispersion policy - offers a solution to the problems. Of course, this is a somewhat crude summary of the arguments that have been presented in the last two decades, and some aspects are indeed open to serious debate. The underlying assumption in many cases is that the living together of immigrants hampers their opportunities to integrate into mainstream society, and a dispersal might be beneficial to all in the long run. In the Netherlands and Great Britain dispersal strategies were under widespread discussion in the seventies but were discarded because of constitutional or operational failure. However, from time to time the discussion has more or less been reborn. It would be remarkable if Great Britain and the Netherlands were the only countries in which a discussion on spatial dispersion policies has taken place. Therefore, we intend to investigate whether spatial dispersion has formed a topic in all selected metropolitan areas. If so, we are especially interested in the arguments that have been used: has the policy been based on quantitative material of concentration or segregation or have other, more political factors been at work?

The first step that has to be taken is a further specification of the concept of spatial dispersion. Intuitively everyone seems to know what is at stake, but some shades of grey tend to disappear in discussions. The explicit use of the adjective *spatial* clearly distinguishes dispersion policies from other forms of government intervention in society. As this type of policy is often connected to the uneven distribution (either concentration or segregation) of a population category distinguished by ethnic or socio-economic characteristics, the policy instruments are primarily oriented towards regulations that limit ad-

mission to housing stock or municipal administration. Policy measures could aim to prevent settlement of members of a population category that is already seen as concentrated or segregated. A more active strategy could even aim to reduce the presence of the population category in question.

A second strategy to achieve dispersal goals could involve benefiting other areas without a marked presence of a population category to make these areas more attractive for settlement. This strategy is probably difficult to discern in practice. The underlying rationale remains in both cases the intention to influence the level of concentration or segregation in a city.

The study of these dispersal strategies is strongly linked to the question of geographical scale. First of all, the scores on the index of segregation or concentration are often dependent on the geographical scale that has been used. An additional complication lies in the use of administrative boundaries in statistical sources that do not respect 'real' neighbourhood boundaries. Second, the actual operation of a dispersal policy depends on the geographical level that has been chosen in the plan. For instance, a dispersal policy aiming at an equal distribution of a population category on a provincial level leaves the choice of a municipality without constraints. A similar relationship could be defined with the pairs national - regional or municipal - neighbourhood. Third, a fundamental difference in interpretation may exist at the different geographical levels. Does national government force a dispersal policy upon lower tiers of government, although resentment is felt by those who are closest to the citizens? On the other hand, local or regional government may urge national government to legalize a dispersal policy ('bottom-up'). Perception could also vary between individuals: how does one interpret concentration; how does one define a neighbourhood?

### *Compensating policy*

Instead of attempting to control the composition of the neighbourhood population, policy makers could also take up the challenge and aim to improve the living conditions of those living in the area. A (fictional) example is an additional expenditure on education in areas with a higher than average level of unemployment. The difference from a dispersal policy is clear: instead of limiting or reducing the population category, extra financial means are invested to find a solution.

It is important to recognize the area-based nature of compensating policy as we define it. The unemployment rate in the previous example is calculated for an area, and other areas with less unemployment do not receive similar funds. We intend to investigate spatial processes connected to patterns of segregation and concentration. Therefore, a study of universal policy measures from the perspective of the nation-state does not occupy the first place. In other words, attention is focused on finding differentiation between areas (as defined by patterns of segregation) and how these differences find their way into

policies. Both a dispersal policy and a compensating policy could be defined as a form of 'spatial thinking'.

Given the underlying correspondence between the two forms of policy, several remarks that have been made in the text on dispersal policies also apply to compensating policies. First, ethnic criteria form the primary objective selecting instances of compensating policy. In practice an amalgam of ethnic and socio-economic criteria will be found, and an approach directed towards ethnicity only is therefore considered too narrow. The decisive point is that the 'membership' of an ethnic category is taken into account when deciding how to administer the policy. Therefore a distinction has been made between *ethnic specific* and *general* policies. Secondly, the geographical level is assumed to play a central part in the working of instances of compensating policy. It might be hypothesized that compensating policy is created and funded by national government, while lower tiers of government are allowed to propose plans or projects that draw upon the funds. An inverse relation might also be possible when local government is aware of problems at neighbourhood level of which national government is still unconscious. This information gap could lead to bottom-up pressure for policy initiation or modification.

### A framework for policy analysis

In the preceding paragraphs two major points were raised. First of all, it is important to recognize differences in the nature of policy; a distinction was made between spatial dispersal policy and compensating policy. Second, the geographical scale plays an important role when interpreting policies; at what level does the specific policy involved emanate or operate? An additional benefit is the enhanced visibility of differences and interactions between tiers of government thereby dismantling the notion of government as a unified, peaceful entity. Third, in correspondence with a widely felt need, attention is devoted to the organization of policy. That organization may be aimed at producing sectoral policy aimed at improving people's housing conditions or their labour market perspectives, for example; but many are also aimed at integral policy, trying to remove all kinds of barriers between sectors. No framework fully covers reality.

#### 1.4      The case studies

The main problem when working with the nine case studies probably lies in an excess of material - not so much in a shortage. To prevent drowning in the material, an analytical structure should be created before starting. The actual choice of a structure not only enables fieldwork, but at the same time influences the results (by limitation). The three dimensions in the previous paragraph - spatial dispersion versus compensating policy, geographical scale, integral versus sectoral policy organization- should enable a study of ethnic segregation in the different metropolitan areas. Whether an ethnic component is

included in the policies is studied by looking at the criteria for admission: who elects for what measure. A policy is considered 'ethnic' when the membership of an ethnic group plays a part in the admission criteria.

Each individual case study contains a policy chapter. After a short introduction, the institutional context is described, especially of those concerned with segregation. In this part the distribution of formal power and tasks to offices and geographical levels is mentioned. The institutional information is important background information in the following paragraph on the different policy instruments. The analytical structure from the previous paragraph will be used to filter and present information. If possible, an evaluation of the effectiveness will be added to the description.

In the chapters to come we will try to present the information in a more or less identical structure. After the introduction of the case, we will pay attention to the recent immigration history of the country and city (cities) involved. Then a brief sketch will be given of the urban genesis of the city under consideration. Such a description may be relevant to understanding different residential patterns described. That section will be followed by the analysis of ethnic segregation in the city or metropolitan area, based on statistical information - the quantitative section. Subsequently, attention will be paid to the policy section, in which also the institutional context is elaborated upon.

## **2**

# **The Netherlands: Amsterdam and the specification of the conceptual framework**

The first metropolitan area to discuss is Amsterdam. This case is best known to us and therefore is very suitable for explaining which methods, which concepts, and which system were used in the discussions of the cases. We will also use this chapter to show some effects of choice of areas and spatial scale, and we will discuss the consequences of using various definitions of concept. Before we focus our attention on Amsterdam, in the next section we will first give a brief picture of immigration in the Netherlands in the past decades.

### **2.1 Immigrants in the Netherlands**

The Netherlands is considered by many to be an open society. Over the centuries the Netherlands has accommodated large groups of immigrants. When we confine ourselves to the post-war period, we can conclude that the Netherlands even had a continuous immigration surplus over the past 35 years. That surplus is linked to at least five types of migration, four of which have already been mentioned in Chapter 1. These types allow a certain generalization and can be found in many other countries as well. First, migration that is related to the former colonial rule. Here it concerns especially Surinamese and Antilleans, but in the past also people from Indonesia. The independence of Surinam in 1975 can clearly be seen in migration peaks. Second, labour migration: Turks and Moroccans were recruited to provide workers for the booming economy of the sixties and seventies. Third, family reunification and formation, which started afterwards and concerned all categories we mentioned. Fourth, asylum seekers who, especially in recent years, have contributed considerably to immigration from abroad. In public opinion these four categories dominated the picture of the past decades, although they made up for

only about half of the total immigration as it manifested itself over the past years. For, beside the immigration of Dutchmen (a quarter of the total) the immigration of a fifth type also plays a considerable part. Recently, migration that is connected with the internationalization of the economy has sharply increased, leading to a considerable influx of Germans, Britons, other Europeans, Americans and Japanese, who live in the country for a shorter or longer period, generally in connection with the company they work for. Together these immigrants made up about one quarter of the total immigration over the past years. The total development has led to the situation that in 1996 the Netherlands had about 2.5 million inhabitants (15 per cent of the population) who were not born in the Netherlands, or of whom one of the parents was not born there.. The first and second generation inhabitants from Surinam and the Antilles, Morocco and Turkey contain about 375 000, 225 000 and 270 000 persons respectively, but other countries score high too. For example, in 1996 more than 420 000 Germans (1st and 2nd generation) lived in the Netherlands. Of the 2.5 million first and second generation immigrants only about a third do not have the Dutch nationality (CBS 1996).

The spatial or regional orientation of the recent immigrants has become more and more urban or metropolitan. About 40 per cent of the non-Dutch immigrants end up in one of the four large cities. These cities together house only 13 per cent of the total Dutch population; even (much) more than half of the Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese settle in one of these cities. In that regard, Amsterdam beats them all. In 1992 more than 30 per cent of the Surinamese immigrants settled in Amsterdam (Musterd and Muus 1995). Due to the position of the four large cities in the west of the country (the Randstad), and due to the metropolitan orientation of many immigrants a concentration of immigrants has developed in the Randstad. As will be discussed in greater detail further on in this chapter, Amsterdam is at the top of the list concerning immigrant population.

Now the Netherlands considers itself - after a long hesitation - as an immigration country. It has also come to realize that the pluralistic society is not a temporary phenomenon, but has acquired a permanent status. That does not prevent the government from setting ever stricter entry requirements, especially with regard to immigrants from outside the European Union. Many suppose that it will only lead to moving flows from the formal to the informal circuit.

## 2.2 The ‘development’ of Amsterdam

Before we explicitly discuss the ethnic segregation in Amsterdam (and surroundings), we will first pay some attention to the urban, especially the residential, structure as a result of the developments that have occurred in Amsterdam. With the introduction of the Housing Act of 1902 the Netherlands gave an important incentive to the construction of social rented dwellings. In particular after the Second World War the production in-

creased at great pace. It was stimulated by the need to catch up on the housing market, in view of the distressing housing shortage. That development, for its part, was aided by the strongly expanding welfare state. This general and broad context is of major importance to a clear understanding of the urban structures of Dutch cities. Before the development of the social rental sector, Amsterdam already had a sizeable rental sector, but in the private sphere. Together they make up the present housing stock, which for almost ninety per cent consists of rented dwellings. The rental sector is divided about fifty-fifty between private rent and public rent. The private rental sector, for its part, consists of an inexpensive and a more expensive part. Only well over ten per cent of the housing stock belongs to the owner-occupier category. The original composition of the city was characterized by owner-occupied and private rented dwellings in the centre, expensive owner-occupied dwellings in an axis from the centre to the south-west; a circle of private rented dwellings in the 19th century belt and outside it, to an increasing degree, social rented dwellings, which were built chiefly in this century and in particular after the Second World War. Due to all kinds of urban renewal operations, which took place over the past decades, that original picture has altered somewhat. Social rented dwellings were also built on vacant sites in the centre and the 19th century quarters. Besides, from the mid-seventies a gentrification process has occurred, which has caused the upgrading of almost the whole centre. As a result that part of the city has to a large degree ended up in a segment of the housing market that is only accessible to households with a relatively high income.

At first, the suburban area was almost completely in the hands of owner-occupiers. For a long time the growth there was steady and not explosive. That did not change until the sixties and seventies. Then the large construction explosions of social rented dwellings in the cities had, in fact, already taken place. The strong suburban growth in the sixties and seventies concerned mainly owner-occupied dwellings. Only with the development of the expansion policy, which had its heyday around 1980 and disappeared quickly afterwards, considerable numbers of social rented dwellings were planned in suburban areas too.

Summarized briefly, the final result is therefore that a centre has developed that is very much in demand, with many private rented and owner-occupied dwellings, which gradually have come to be found in the somewhat higher price category; besides that, we find a sizeable and inexpensive private rental sector around the centre. That area, though, is now beginning to feel the pressure of the centre too. In the recent post-war quarters, until about 1980, the social rental sector sets the tone, sometimes in a shape that is considered unattractive (monotonous, large-scale, industrial, (medium) high-rise). The most recent attempts (eighties and nineties) in house-building have been aimed more at building owner-occupied dwellings on the outskirts of the city. However, this change has been encountered with difficulties. For quite a long time, the surrounding urban area has been mainly characterized by owner-occupied dwellings, except for the expanded and new towns where considerable numbers of affordable social rented dwellings were built.

## 2.3 Ethnic segregation in Amsterdam

In the spring of 1995 the mayor of Amsterdam predicted that around the year 2000 a majority of the population in that city will be of non-Dutch origin. Figures from the Amsterdam statistical office show that the share of Dutchmen in Amsterdam has been showing a downward trend and at 1 January 1995 had declined to 58 per cent of the population. Therefore the mayor's prediction seems to be fairly certain. A more interesting question, which unfortunately is not always asked, is which definition of ethnic groups he and the local statistical office used. Who belongs to the group of Dutchmen, or more generally, on the basis of which criteria is someone classified as belonging to an ethnic group? The answer to that question seems to be obvious: someone's passport states to which nationality he or she belongs. In practice, however, such a definition turns out to be unsatisfactory for more than one reason. Ethnicity and nationality are often not linked. Recently we therefore switched to a new definition in the Netherlands in which the concept of nationality can no longer be found. Although the number of Dutchmen will not suddenly change by dozens of per cents due to an alteration in the registration, it is nevertheless sensible to make clear what exactly is meant by the various categories. Only with such knowledge there is a point in interpreting the tables and maps.

### Registration of ethnic groups in the Netherlands

In 1993 the development of a national standard classification for the registration of ethnic groups was finished. The municipality of Amsterdam, which worked with its own definition up to that moment, has adopted the national guidelines for its own use.

In the old, specifically Amsterdam, definition, nationality or native country was used for the determination of the, in the Netherlands very large, category of Surinamese and Antilleans; for the determination of the other groups only nationality was used. The classification was family oriented, that is the classification of the head of the family determined to which group the members of that family belonged. However, that method had a few disadvantages. Part of the second generation Surinamese and Antilleans were statistically counted among the category of Dutchmen. Moreover, Dutch spouses of immigrants were counted among the group of immigrants concerned. Demographic predictions showed that these errors would further influence the results in the future.

The new standard classification has been formulated to overcome the problems that were mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The definition registers three items: native country of the person concerned, native country of his father and of his mother. Furthermore, the definition handles a country classification with three categories: the Netherlands (A), Other Rich Countries (A2) and Other Countries that are potentially target groups of policy for deprived groups (B). Per person - the definition is individually oriented - the

ethnic group is determined with the aid of the three registered birth data. However, the three country categories do not count equally heavily in the determination of the ethnic group. Country category B counts heaviest: if one of the three personal details that are needed for the determination contains a country that belongs to category B, it means automatically that the person concerned is counted among that country. Even if a person himself was born in the Netherlands and is the head of a household, but has a father or mother who was born in a B country, the result is that this person is registered with the native country of his father or mother. To complete the example: suppose that this person is married to a wife or husband who was born in the Netherlands and that their children were also born in the Netherlands, then the children will be registered as Dutch. There are a few refinements, such as regulations for the exact allocation of a country when two different B countries are registered.

In practice the new method of classification results in the following relevant categories, or in other words ethnic groups:

- Surinamese
- Antilleans (persons with standard classifications Netherlands Antilles and Aruba)
- Turks
- Moroccans
- South Europeans (persons with standard classifications Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, former Yugoslavia)
- Other non-industrialized; persons with standard classification B (potential target group of policy for deprived groups)
- Other industrialized; persons with standard classification A2 (other rich countries)
- Dutch

With the eight groups it becomes possible to explain what is meant with the pair of concepts of ethnic minorities and immigrants. The concept of ethnic minorities points at the first six ethnic groups of the list. The group of immigrants consists of ethnic minorities, together with the seventh category. For the sake of completeness: the eighth category, the Dutchmen, is also called autochthons.

An advantage of the new standard classification is that it is unrelated to a possible application in target groups for minorities policy. At the moment some of the B countries are regarded as a target group for minorities policy (the so-called B1 group). Due to the set-up of the new classification it remains possible, technically speaking, to change the composition of the B1 group at a later stage.

Apart from the technical possibility, the question of how to determine a target group for policy for deprived groups remains a fundamental problem. The flaw of the new regis-

tion - and as a matter of fact of the last one, too - is the uncertainty about whether all persons who are classified among country category B and B1 actually are in a deprived position. It is beyond the reach of this study to go into such considerations. Here we only point out this dilemma.

### Ethnic groups in Amsterdam

Table 2-1 shows how many inhabitants of Amsterdam must be counted among each of the categories mentioned. The table shows that the share of ethnic minorities (the first six categories) in Amsterdam is well over 32 per cent. The share of immigrants (including other industrialized) is nearly 42 per cent. In view of the preceding section it is interesting to see to what extent the results according to the old definition differ from those according to the new one. Table 2-2 shows the results according to the old and the new method. The table shows that the new method gives rise to a striking difference between the old and the new definition for the categories 'other industrialized' and 'other non-industrialized'. The group of Dutchmen declines accordingly; with the old definition it remains to be seen whether the mayor of Amsterdam would have been proved right in his prediction.

Many state that the standard classification of ethnic groups is an improvement compared to the preceding method. However, from a comparative perspective a number of problems emerge, concerning the comparison between years as well as between countries. To start with the first item, the statistics of 1992 to 1995 inclusive cannot automatically be compared to previous years. Comparison over the years is, strictly speaking, only possible on the basis of the old definition used at that time.

TABLE 2-1 Ethnic groups in Amsterdam on 1 January 1995

Category	Number	%
Surinamese	69011	9.6
Antilleans	10501	1.5
Turks	30992	4.3
Moroccans	47202	6.5
South Europeans	16126	2.2
Other non-industrialized	58404	8.1
Other industrialized	70416	9.7
Dutchmen	419698	58.1
Total	722350	100.0

Source: O+S, Amsterdamse Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek (Statistics Amsterdam)

TABLE 2-2 Population categories / ethnic groups in Amsterdam, 1 January 1993

Category	Old definition		New definition		Difference
	Number	%	Number	%	
Surinamese	63954	8.9	64883	9.0	929
Antilleans	10192	1.4	10694	1.5	502
Turks	27513	3.8	29958	4.2	2445
Moroccans	39716	5.5	44094	6.1	4378
South Europeans	12645	1.8	15328	2.1	2683
Other non-industrialized	21088	2.9	53495	7.4	32407
Other industrialized	28249	3.9	70792	9.8	42543
Dutchmen	516566	71.8	430679	59.8	-85887
Total	719923	100.0	719923	100.0	

Source: O+S, Amsterdamse Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek (Statistics Amsterdam)

Unfortunately, the data for the old definition were only published until 1993. Besides the classification into ethnic groups, a number of tables based on nationality are still published. However, the old definition was not entirely based on nationality and is consequently not completely derivable in that way. Moreover the new definition makes a comparison between countries difficult. There is not much chance that the other countries in our study have adopted a similar registration system. In a way the second problem is less serious than the first. Until a 'European' standardization occurs, it will be almost inevitable that national differences of definition will disturb the comparison between countries. Those differences are an expression of factors such as the immigration history, the perception of ethnicity and the privacy legislation.

### Spatial scale of the data

Just as Amsterdam has an overrepresentation of ethnic minorities in relation to the Netherlands, within the urban area quarters exist that have a larger share of these groups than could be expected on the basis of the urban average. At the moment that the dispersion of the eight ethnic groups across the city comes into the picture, the question becomes interesting if and to what extent there is question of concentration and segregation. The statistical data offer the possibility to study the presence of ethnic groups at smaller scale units. For these purposes the municipality of Amsterdam has been subdivided into districts, neighbourhood combinations and neighbourhoods. Table 2-3 shows the characteristics of the three spatial sublevels.

First it becomes clear that the district level is a little rough, with an average of slightly more than 38 000 inhabitants. Moreover, the average number of inhabitants increases to more than 40 000 when an industrial district with 323 inhabitants, is omitted.

TABLE 2-3 Scale levels in Amsterdam, 1 January 1995

Scale unit	Number	Average no. of inhabitants	Maximum no. of inhabitants	Minimum no. of inhabitants	Standard deviation
District	18	38018	88461	323	23363
Neighbourhood Combination	93	7685	28201	6	5422
Neighbourhood	350	2028	8853	1	1688

Source: O+S, Amsterdamse Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek (Statistics Amsterdam)

For a study of segregation patterns that is no longer worthwhile. With an average number of inhabitants of well over 7 500, the neighbourhood combination level seems more appropriate for a study of segregation patterns. Moreover, the number of 93 units is cartographically easy to handle. When we omit the smallest cases - fewer than 250 inhabitants - and the sailing/moving category, the average number of inhabitants increases from 7 685 to 8 375. A disadvantage of the neighbourhood combination level is the deviant size of a small number of units. For example, more than 28 000 inhabitants live in the Bijlmer Oost neighbourhood combination. The level neighbourhood is slightly more detailed, which makes a more accurate study possible. However, a number of practical considerations count against a choice in favour of the neighbourhood level. First, the finer classification of 350 neighbourhoods is cartographically more difficult to handle. Furthermore there are more data available at neighbourhood combination level than at neighbourhood level, certainly in the field of ethnicity. A third reason is the comparability with the other foreign cities. Although it is, of course, not intended to let the choice of the level completely depend on the roughest level that appears in the cities we selected, there is also no point to using a spatial level of less than 500 inhabitants on average in some cities, while the other cities have an average of (more than) 10 000 inhabitants.

### Measures of segregation

Over the years a great number of measures for segregation have been developed in the scientific literature. However, as with many statistical measures, the exact meaning is not immediately clear. Certainly when the publication is also meant for a non-scientific public one should consider whether the surplus value of a (complex) measure counterbalances the efforts the reader should make to learn to understand the characteristics of the measure in question.

Many authors solve that problem through using the 'mother' of all statistical measures, the percentage. Almost everybody knows what is meant by that measure. The measure is often used for the concentration aspect of dispersion. However, the interpretation depends on the average of the whole area: a score of 40 per cent in a quarter has a different meaning from an urban average of 40 per cent and from an urban average of 4 per cent. Glebe (1995) used a location quotient to class the relationship between the urban and the area average in one figure. That measure gives the same information as when a percent-

age with additional mention of the urban average is used. We have chosen to use the last method, with reproduction of the results in maps. The risk of using percentages, however, is that the number of inhabitants of the areas is not mentioned. In Amsterdam, for example, the Westelijk Havengebied area has only a few hundred inhabitants. Obviously a high percentage in such a quarter means in the absolute sense far less than a high percentage in a quarter with thousands of inhabitants. Moreover, the percentage in quarters with a small number of inhabitants is accordingly more sensitive to statistical errors. The easiest way to prevent such distortions is to remove small areas from the analysis. We draw the line at 250 inhabitants.

The number of inhabitants of an area can be found in the Index of Dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan, 1955). In that measure the share in the total population of group a that lives in a certain quarter is compared to the share in the total population of group b that lives in that same quarter. If group a and b together form the total population, we speak of an index of segregation; if not, then we speak of an index of dissimilarity. The two indices are not suitable for cartographic reproduction, but they are used to state the extent of the segregation of population groups in one number. The measures mentioned have some disadvantages. For example, two different dispersions may have the same index score. Furthermore the measures are scale-dependent. In spite of these disadvantages, the measures are often used in scientific studies. We will join that usage.

The fact that the indices are scale-dependent is of major importance, because the spatial levels that can be used in comparative studies are not always the same. Nevertheless, the effect of differences in scale should not be exaggerated. For example, the index of dissimilarity concerning Turks and Moroccans compared to the category of Dutchmen turned out to lead to a score of 42 at neighbourhood combination level. An adjacent study (Van Daalen *et al.* 1995) showed that that score became 45 at neighbourhood level (four times more detailed, see Table 2-3) and 49 at grid level (ten times more detailed).

The measures mentioned should be avoided when the spatial level becomes too low. Distortions may easily occur when the number of areas is relatively large in relation to the number of members of the group of which segregation is studied.

### **Segregation patterns in Amsterdam**

In the preceding section it was indicated that segregation can be described in different ways. On scientific and practical grounds we chose to use the percentage and the indices of segregation and dissimilarity. In this section we will discuss the segregation in Amsterdam. For the spatial level we have chosen data at neighbourhood combination level. Practical considerations have determined the choice in favour of the new standard classification as registration. An extensive description of the historical development is outside the scope of this study. Another reason for favouring the old definition - the comparability with other countries - was not decisive since, with the old definition, a combination of

native country and nationality was used for Surinamese and Antilleans that cannot be used elsewhere.

A problem we have not discussed so far is the selection of the population categories to be shown in maps. It will be clear that innumerable maps can be produced from the tables in this book. The selection depends on the criteria we have set. We have tried to present categories that evoke recognition in more cities, bearing in mind that the categories to be reproduced are of substantial importance in the metropolitan contexts concerned. Moreover, we have decided to restrict the number of maps to three or four. All this has led to the decision always to start with a very broad main group, which is indicated differently in the various countries and cities. For example it concerns the category 'ethnic minorities' or the 'non-White' or the 'Ausländer'. Furthermore, some important compound categories are distinguished: one for the Caribbean area (Surinamese, Antilleans, Black-Caribbean); one labelled South Mediterranean (Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, but Turks are also counted among this group); and one containing North Mediterraneans (Portuguese, Spaniards, Italians, Greeks, (former) Yugoslavians). Sometimes we have deviated from that main division into three. As often as possible a fourth category has been mentioned. That fourth category concerns the most sizeable and/or the most segregated non-autochthon population category on the site. Since in Amsterdam the largest group, the Surinamese, has been counted among the Caribbean area category, and is dominant there, we will present the category Moroccans in Amsterdam. It is also the most segregated category.

Table 2-1 shows that 32.2 per cent of the Amsterdam population belongs to the ethnic minorities group. However, Map 2-1, which concerns the dispersion of the total group of ethnic minorities, shows that at the level of neighbourhood combinations a considerable variety exists around the urban average.

The neighbourhood combinations Bijlmer Centrum and Bijlmer Oost, situated in Amsterdam Southeast, score highest with a share of 76.4 per cent and 66.7 per cent ethnic minorities of the total population, respectively. Besides Southeast, Amsterdam West and Amsterdam East have concentrations, too. In total 27 of the 93 neighbourhood combinations end up higher than the urban average of 32.2 per cent. The collection of ethnic minorities consists, as already mentioned, of a number of ethnic groups. The Surinamese and the Antilleans can be considered as representatives of the colonial past. The Moluccans that can be counted among them as well are no longer recognizable in the statistics. The Mediterranean categories - Turks, Moroccans and South Europeans - can originally be attributed to labour migration. At this moment the group of South Mediterraneans is no longer considered as a group that needs extra attention as a whole. The Turks and Moroccans still occupy a special position in the minorities policy. The non-industrialized ethnic group is (by definition) heterogeneous and is difficult to lump together.



**Source:** O+S, Het Amsterdamse Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek.

The category ethnic minorities consists of the ethnic groups Surinamese, Antillian, Turkish, Moroccan, Southern Europeans and non-industrialised countries. They form 32.2 per cent of the Amsterdam population.

Percentage ethnic minorities.  
93 areas.

63.3 - 76.4	(2)
47.7 - 63.3	(5)
32.2 - 47.7	(20)
0.0 - 32.2	(59)
less than 250 inhabitants	(7)

MAP 2-1      Ethnic minorities in Amsterdam, 1 January 1995



**Source:** O+S, Het Amsterdamse Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek.

The ethnic group Surinamese consists of 69 011 persons and the ethnic group Antillian of 10 501 persons. Together their share in the Amsterdam population reaches 11.0 per cent.

Percentage Surinamese + Antillian.  
93 areas.

■ 25.8 - 47.4	(3)
■ 18.4 - 25.8	(1)
■ 11.0 - 18.4	(13)
■ 0.0 - 11.0	(69)
□ less than 250 inhabitants	(7)

MAP 2-2 Surinamese and Antilleans in Amsterdam, 1 January 1995



**Source:** O+S, Het Amsterdamse Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek.

The category South-Mediterranean consists of the ethnic groups Turkish (30 992) and Moroccan (47 202). Their share in the Amsterdam population is 10.8 per cent.

Percentage South-Mediterranean.  
93 areas.

29.4 - 40.7	(2)
20.1 - 29.4	(12)
10.8 - 20.1	(15)
0.0 - 10.8	(57)
less than 250 inhabitants	(7)

MAP 2-3      South Mediterraneans in Amsterdam, 1 January 1995



**Source:** O+S, Het Amsterdamse Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek.

The ethnic group Moroccan consists of 45 576 persons.  
Their share in the Amsterdam population reaches  
6.3 per cent.

**Percentage Moroccan  
93 areas**

■ 17.3 - 23.9	(4)
■ 11.8 - 17.3	(11)
■ 6.3 - 11.8	(15)
□ 0.0 - 6.3	(56)
□ less than 250 inhabitants	(7)

MAP 2-4      Moroccans in Amsterdam, 1 January 1995

Important causes for the increase in this ethnic group are the alteration of the registration and the increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers that have entered the Netherlands over the past decade. All in all there are quite a few differences within the sum that results in the category ethnic minorities; reasons enough to see to what extent the picture of Map 2-1 stands up when we analyse the subgroups.

Map 2-2 shows the dispersion of the ethnic groups of Surinamese and Antilleans across Amsterdam. We have chosen to sum both groups, because the Antilleans in particular form too small a group to justify an individual map, and because the indices of segregation that we will present later show that the two groups are hardly segregated in relation to each other at neighbourhood combination level. Moreover, both groups can be considered as representatives of the Dutch colonial past. Their common label is: migration from the Caribbean area. The map shows that Amsterdam Southeast is the main residence of these groups. Especially the Bijlmer Centre and Bijlmer East neighbourhood combinations catch the eye. In these neighbourhood combinations the groups constitute 47 per cent and 38 per cent of the total population, respectively. The concentration of Surinamese and Antilleans is accentuated by the fact that well over 38 per cent of all Surinamese and Antilleans in Amsterdam live in the Southeast quarter, while the quarter contains no more than 12 per cent of the Amsterdam population. Within the Dutch context that is no doubt a high percentage, but it means at the same time that Southeast does not reach the concentration that a ghetto in the United States has. The data show that a larger share of Surinamese and Antilleans than could be expected on the basis of the urban average live in 17 of the 93 neighbourhood combinations.

Map 2-3 shows the dispersion of the group of South Mediterraneans in Amsterdam. South Mediterraneans consists of the ethnic groups of Turks and Moroccans. Persons with the Egyptian, Tunisian or Algerian nationality fall outside this definition, as far as Amsterdam is concerned. There is a remarkable overrepresentation in the western part of Amsterdam (Bos en Lommer) and an absence in the centre. The share of 40.7 per cent in the De Kolenkit neighbourhood combination in the Bos en Lommer quarter is without doubt high compared to the urban average of 10.8 per cent. The next neighbourhood combination on the list - in the Indische Buurt West - has a score that is ten percentage points lower. In total 29 neighbourhood combinations score higher than the urban average of 10.8 per cent. Compared to the 17 neighbourhood combinations of the Surinamese and Antilleans that points at a more even dispersion.

That the spatial patterns of the Turks and Moroccans show a strong overlap at this spatial level is shown in Map 2-4. The resemblance with Map 2-3 is striking. It is true that the common picture is dominated somewhat more by the Moroccans than by the Turks, but the category Turks is sizeable enough to be able to render an own effect visible, if there should be one. Nevertheless, that does not happen. This has much to do with the

functioning of the Amsterdam housing market. The socio-economic position of many Turkish and Moroccan households is comparable and usually not strong. Unemployment among Turks and Moroccans is high. That leads to the situation of their being dependent on similar segments of the housing market. Although both categories started their living career in Amsterdam in boarding houses and later ended up in private rented dwellings, mainly in the nineteenth century quarters, in the meantime both have managed to gain access to the social rental sector. An important part of the neighbourhood combinations that now show concentrations of Moroccans and Turks consists of social rented dwellings. In any case, that the access to that housing sector is not all-determining is revealed in the fact that Amsterdam Southeast - where many Surinamese live - also consists to an important degree of social rented dwellings. Housing preferences, differences in price and the effects of the initial choice in favour of a location of residence seem to play a role here. When the Surinamese came to the Netherlands in large numbers many large private rented dwellings had just become available in Amsterdam Southeast; private rented dwellings in high-rise blocks, which for that reason were not very popular with the autochthonous Dutch population. The dispersion pattern of the Turkish and Moroccan guest workers started its development pattern, by contrast, from the centre and the nineteenth century belt.

The four maps give an idea of the dispersion of ethnic groups across the urban area. However, with the measure we used, the percentage, it is not possible to indicate well how segregated the groups live. For that purpose one should use summarizing measures. First the extent of the segregation of ethnic groups compared to the total population can be indicated with the so-called index of segregation. A current interpretation of the results is that the values indicate which part of the minorities population should move before an even dispersion is reached. Table 2-4 shows the scores of the ethnic groups compared to the remainder of the population at neighbourhood combination level.

TABLE 2-4 Index of segregation of ethnic groups (neighbourhood combinations 1 January 1995)

Category	Index of segregation
Surinamese	35
Antilleans	35
Surinamese and Antilleans	35
Turks	39
Turks and Moroccans	42
South Europeans	17
Other, from non-industrialized countries	18
Ethnic minorities	32
Other, from industrialized countries	20

TABLE 2-5 Segregation between ethnic groups in Amsterdam (neighbourhood combinations, 1 January 1995)

Ethnic groups	Index of dissimilarity
Surinamese versus Antilleans	18
Turks versus Moroccans	13
Surinamese and Antilleans versus Turks and Moroccans	43
Surinamese and Antilleans versus South Europeans	34
Surinamese and Antilleans versus Autochthons	39
Turks and Moroccans versus South Europeans	33
Turks and Moroccans versus Autochthons	42
South Europeans versus Autochthons	22

The table shows that the Turks and Moroccans live most segregated from the remaining population. The Surinamese and Antilleans score almost as high, a phenomenon that is connected with the relative concentration of these groups in Amsterdam Southeast.

The index of dissimilarity can measure, per ethnic group, how segregated that group lives compared to other ethnic groups (rather than the total population, as with the index of segregation). Table 2-5 shows the scores on the index of dissimilarity.

The figures from the table complete the picture given by the maps. Surinamese and Antilleans turn out to show little segregation in relation to each other. The same is true for Turks and Moroccans at neighbourhood combination level. All the groups score considerably higher in relation to the autochthons - Dutchmen. The segregation between Antilleans + Surinamese compared to Turks + Moroccans however is even stronger. The low value for the segregation of the South Europeans compared to the autochthons confirms the assumption that that group is hardly more segregated in Amsterdam.

The values that were calculated for 1995 support the opinion of Van Praag (1981) that in the Netherlands there is no segregation at the level of that of the African Americans in certain ghettos in the United States.

### Conclusion of the quantitative analysis

In this section the dispersion of ethnic minorities in Amsterdam has been described using the most recent data. The purpose of the section, however, was not only aimed at the actual description itself. The presentation was just as much aimed at laying the foundation for the comparison with the other cases. After all, a certain index of segregation in a city has no significance in itself; only after comparing it with other cities according to the same criteria does the figure get a meaning. That does not mean that the comparability between the various cases will be optimal. The Amsterdam example already shows how difficult a choice between sources of data and spatial levels can be. Differences in regis-

tration are inevitable; the only thing we can do is to make them explicit. Concerning the spatial level in Amsterdam we used an average size of 5 000 and 10 000 inhabitants. Such a spatial level is usually also feasible in the other cases.

## 2.4 Policy in Amsterdam

### Introduction

The issues that are related to immigration and integration of ethnic minorities may occasionally touch raw nerves in Dutch society. A recent example is the plea in favour of a dispersion policy by the liberal leader Mr. Bolkestein. These plans were criticized from many sides. It remained unclear, for example, why dispersion would help integration. Nevertheless there is considerable support for an approach aimed at dispersion. A discussion as this one is therefore not an incident, but fits in a tradition of at least twenty years. At the end of the seventies it gradually became clear that the idea of a temporary presence, which had influenced the opinions of autochthons and immigrants, was becoming increasingly less relevant (WRR 1979). In the meantime the share of ethnic groups in the large cities in particular increased rapidly. Of the four large cities Amsterdam is absolutely, as well as in terms of percentages, the main residence of ethnic minorities. In a way the concentration gives extra visibility to the problems that a number of members of these groups have to cope with. The statistics show that situations of deprivation do exist, although improvement seems to have set in on some fronts (SCP, 1994, 1995).

This chapter discusses the policy reaction of the various levels of government with regard to the issue of minorities. We have chosen Amsterdam as the Dutch case-study because of its lead in the statistics, but also because of the activities of the Amsterdam government. The Amsterdam government has attempted to improve the position of ethnic minorities through a number of initiatives. A brief comparison with the three other large Dutch cities will be presented at the end of this chapter.

### Institutional context

The Dutch form of government is characterized by a high degree of centralization. To take Amsterdam as an example, in 1993 only 8.5 per cent of the local budget consisted of local taxes (Amsterdam in Figures, 1994). Of the remaining 91.5 per cent about 35 per cent - an amount of about Dfl. 2 billion (0.9 billion Euro) - could be spent freely by the local government. Nevertheless, from the size of the amount it cannot be concluded that Amsterdam is able to 'spend the money nicely'; at the most, Amsterdam is less dependent than the smaller municipalities. The field of minorities policy is no exception to the rule that there is a high degree of interconnection between policy efforts at the various levels of government. Before we discuss Amsterdam, therefore, it is essential to take a look at the national level.

### The national level

Since the '*Minderhedennota 1983*' (a government report on minorities) the Ministry of the Interior has been responsible for the co-ordination of the minorities policy at the national level. The '*Minderhedennota 1983*' formed a milestone in the opinion on minority groups, because it was now officially acknowledged that the settlement of minority groups was of a permanent nature. From then on the minorities policy has been "aimed at the realization of a society in which the members of minority groups that live in the Netherlands individually and as a group have an equal place and full opportunities to develop themselves" (p. 10). The specific policy for minority groups, which had been the standard up to that moment, would in the future only remain in existence on a temporary basis, and even then only if the general policy were to fail. In the fields of education, housing and employment legal measures were announced to make the general policy function as well as possible for minority groups. The concentrated nature of the problems - quarters with many problems also existed in the early eighties - led to the introduction of the '*Probleem Cumulatie Gebieden*' policy (PCG) (a policy for areas with many problems) in 1983. Within the scope of that policy a local government could submit a request to the Ministry of the Interior for a four-year subsidy for plans for a quarter that, for example, were aimed at employment.

In the early nineties the minorities issue received a new dimension through the publication of the report '*Allochtonenbeleid*' (immigrant policy), produced by the '*Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid*' (WRR) (an academic advisory council on government policy). Taking the view that not only the presence of minority groups in the Netherlands but also immigration are permanent phenomena, the WRR was of the opinion that integration policy should be the core of the policy with regard to minority groups. The advice of WRR to speak of integration policy in the future has actually been adopted by the Ministry of the Interior. The consensus about the term 'integration policy' does not mean that the exact interpretation is clear to everyone. It remains especially a matter of dispute whether integration should be achieved through specific policy or through general policy. Van der Burg *et al.* (1994, p. 5) were of the opinion that integration policy can logically not be combined with general policy and they considered it the first impulse in a revaluation of specific policy. Also in the '*Rapportage Minderheden 1993*' (a report on minorities) the starting point of general policy was clearly abandoned: "the existence of ethnic groups with a social deprivation is a social problem. Reducing that problem to a more general phenomenon of social deprivation, possibly, has a somewhat soothing effect, but it denies the specific character of the position of minority groups and therefore may hinder the search for an effective approach to the deprivation." (SCP 1993, p. 263). However, the '*Contourennota integratiebeleid etnische minderheden*' (a report on integration policy for ethnic minorities) of 1994 differed from it, on the one hand by emphasizing integration and citizenship, but on the

other hand by concluding that from those central concepts "it follows even more emphatically than before, when the minorities policy started, that the general policy for the integration of new citizens is a central issue" (TK, 1993/1994 23684 no. 2 p. 27). However, a nuance was made in the preference for general policy: "if it turns out that general policy patently has no or little effect for ethnic groups, the principle of equal opportunities demands a specific policy, which naturally is only additional and temporary" (idem p. 28). It turns out from the '*Jaaroverzicht Minderhedenbeleid 1995*' (annual report on minorities policy) that specific policy was formulated in a number of cases. In particular in the field of education: "because general policy offers insufficient response to the problems of all pupils from ethnic minority groups,..., additional policy will still remain necessary *for a long time*" (from the educational section of the '*Contourennota*', TK 1993-1994 23684 no. 2 p. 49, our emphasis). In our discussion of the measures attention will be paid to the practical execution of a number of programmes. To paint a picture of the budget for minorities policy at national level, Table 2-6 shows a number of data taken from the '*Jaaroverzicht Minderhedenbeleid 1995*'.

The table shows that by far the largest part of the expenditure on minorities is done by the Ministry of Education. This mainly concerns language courses. The expenditure that is listed in the table is also called 'specific' payments to minorities. A number of projects are implemented by national departments. However, the national government does not implement all projects and tasks itself, but delegates some of them. A corresponding sum is transferred in exchange for the implementation of a certain task.

Besides that system of specific payments, the national government also pays a sum that the municipalities can spend according to their own judgements. On the basis of a calculation system every Dutch municipality receives a payment from the '*Gemeentefonds*', which contains about Dfl. 17 billion (7.5 billion Euro) each year. Recently a drastic readjustment of the calculation method has been implemented by the '*Raad voor de Gemeentefinanciën*'. Traditional criteria such as surface area are less important in the new system, while social variables have become more important. In the old system a minorities component already existed under the denominator 'refining social structure'. The alterations have caused the financial importance of immigrants in a municipality to gain in value. The municipalities are compelled to report the number of immigrants on their books each year, after which a sum is paid per immigrant. At this moment the definition of immigrants is still under discussion, but the most probable basis will be the criterion of nationality. At the total of Dfl. 17 billion in the '*Gemeentefonds*' the general standard immigrants will imply the annual distribution of about Dfl. 400 million (176 million Euro). However, it is not certain that the municipalities will actually spend that sum on immigrants; the sum is not earmarked.

The provincial level hardly has a function in the field of minorities policy. We will not discuss that level. We are more interested in activities at the local level.

TABLE 2-6 Finances minorities policy, 1994

Ministry	Amount in million Dfl (Euro)	
Ministry of Justice	5.3	(2.3)
Ministry of the Interior	25.2	(11)
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science	611.0	(269)
Ministry of Transport, Spatial Planning, Environment	36.8	(16)
Ministry of Economic Affairs	p.m.	
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	56.7	(25)
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports	179.5	(79)
Total	911.5	(401) + p.m.

Source: TK, 1993/1994 23901, no. 1-2, p. 99

### The local level

The municipality of Amsterdam has traditionally been a place of residence for immigrants. Since the sixties and seventies it has become impossible to imagine the Dutch capital without the immigration of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans. Since then, due to the problems these immigrants experienced, in particular on the housing market, the local government has been forced to concern itself with the minorities in the city. The '*concept beleidsnota inzake buitenlandse werknemers in Amsterdam*' (a report on policy with regard to foreign employees) of 1978 stated; "as first starting point for local policy we use the fact that the presence of a considerable number of foreign employees in Dutch society is of a permanent nature" (quoted in *Raamnota Minderhedenbeleid Ontwerp* 1988, p. 3). The timing of that starting point is especially interesting; the municipality was ahead of the national '*Minderhedennota 1983*'. In the early eighties an important component of the policy consisted of improving the participation of minorities in local policy. For that reason three migrant advisory bodies were set up at the end of 1985, which could advise the City Council either at the Council's invitation, or on their own initiative. At the end of the eighties, after a promising start, it turned out that the advisory bodies functioned inadequately (San Canales and Schipperheijn, 1988). A second milestone in the Amsterdam ideas concerning minorities is the '*Raamnota Minderhedenbeleid*', which was published in 1989 after much delay and political pressure. The municipality emphasized the labour market, but at the same time was conscious of the fact that it "could only partly influence the interaction between supply and demand on the labour market" (1989, p. 12). The publication of the '*Raamnota*' is in a way the testament of the municipality of Amsterdam concerning its minorities policy. Due to the intra-municipal decentralization - the creation of districts - which was carried out, except for the city centre, about 1990, the central city lost nearly all powers having to do with minorities policy. The '*Bureau Strategisch Minderhedenbeleid*' is one of the few attempts

at central city level to screen and, ideally, co-ordinate the minorities policy of the central city and the districts. According to the bureau it proved nearly impossible to gain or keep a picture of the activities of the districts. It is the intention that in future the central city will occupy itself (even) more than in the past with directing the minorities policy, albeit at a distance.

The concrete result of this transfer of powers was that the policy fields of welfare, culture and education became the responsibility of the district level. Attempts by the central city, for example, to pool funds for the alleviation of deprivation, as was recently attempted in education with the report 'Naar betere resultaten', break down in the face of the (financial) autonomy of the districts. Moreover, in practice it turns out that the district councils are hesitant to take the place of the (school) boards. According to the researchers Tillie and Wolff (1995) it is remarkable that the district councils tend to withdraw into their district office and cut themselves off from daily practice. They prefer output-financing to intervention; opinions that fit in with the notion of the withdrawal of government. In the housing market the position of the (central) municipal housing department has survived even after decentralization. However, the system of housing distribution - and with that the possibilities of the organization to influence that distribution - was radically altered on 1 January 1996. The third component of the triad education, housing and employment, the labour market, is in the hands of the '*Regionaal Bureau Arbeidsvoorziening*', a tripartite co-operation between municipality, employers and employees' organization. The municipality of Amsterdam has a seat on the board of the RBA Amsterdam / Zaanstad / Waterland, but can take no independent action because of the structure of this organization. Apart from the question of whether influence can be exercised at all, the actual development in the unemployed lines is very alarming. Against the national trend, the unemployed have increasingly come to consist of immigrants, women and the long-term unemployed. About 40 per cent of the Turks and Moroccans are unemployed; the Surinamese and Antilleans have somewhat lower percentages. Next to the RBA, the municipality - the central city as well as the districts - has the opportunity as employer to pursue a personnel policy that is geared to the situation of minorities. For a study it is difficult when a central city is divided into a central city plus seventeen districts. In practice the districts turn out to vary in size, socio-economic characteristics and certainly in professionalism of government. That last point is not odd in view of the fact that nearly all districts have hardly been able to gain experience. In the original plans for intra-urban decentralization an increase in scale in the form of a regional government was also mentioned. However, due to the results of the referendum of 1995 the plans for an urban district government have been considerably delayed.

Besides the various layers of government, a large number of advisory bodies, interest groups and others that are involved in minorities policy exist at national as well as at local level. It is virtually impossible to mention all organizations involved; the municipality of Amsterdam mentioned in its financial statement of the '*actieprogramma gemeentelijk*

*minderhedenbeleid 1990*' as many as 54 interest groups that receive subsidies in Amsterdam.

## Measures<sup>1</sup>

### *Dispersion policy*

In Amsterdam we have found no examples of general dispersion policy, such as refusing to register someone on the municipal register. On the housing market it is the official policy of the municipality and the housing corporations not to pursue a dispersion policy. There are no indications that a dispersion policy is pursued informally. The only measure with a 'dispersion potential' is the '*Rijksvoordeurwoningen-regeling*', according to which the Government itself is allowed to allocate 10 per cent of the council houses and housing units that are to be built to certain categories. In practice it is mainly asylum seekers and refugees who are eligible for these dwellings.

The lack of a dispersion policy in Amsterdam at this moment does not mean that no initiatives were taken in that direction in the past. In Van Praag (1981, Ch. 3) an outline was given of lively polemics and actual examples in the seventies concerning dispersion policy in various Dutch cities. In Rotterdam in 1972 the city council passed an amendment to the housing by-law that enabled them to pursue a dispersion policy in certain concentration quarters. However, the by-law in question was not well grounded in law, and the '*Raad van State*' ('Council of State') intervened in 1974 and reversed the decision of the council. The enthusiasm in Rotterdam did not falter, because in the report '*migrants in Rotterdam*' of 1978 a dispersion policy was still aimed for, although the means were less direct. The Rotterdam ideas developed into a policy of 'combined decentralization', which was presented in the report '*leegloop en toelop*' of 1979. It was intended to create a planned housing of minority groups in small concentrations across the whole city, at which certain (parts of) streets could be indicated as places of residence for minorities. The idea of combined decentralization found also a response in other cities, such as Utrecht. The national government did not forbid that form of dispersion, but emphasized voluntariness.

In the meantime the discussion had changed course in Amsterdam. The reports '*Opvang en begeleiding Rijksgenoten*' of 1974 and the draft version of the '*Raamnota: de buitenlandse werknemers en hun gezinnen*' of 1978 argued explicitly in favour of a dispersion policy. It was not just the municipality that had ideas in that direction; according to Van Praag, the pursuit of a dispersion policy was endorsed by the Amsterdam Federation of Housing Corporations. However, in the definitive version of the '*Raamnota*' the references to a dispersion policy had disappeared. The turn in the Amsterdam PvdA (Social Democrats), at which the conflict between supporters of small and large-scale was won by the first group in 1978, without doubt had to do with it. In 1979 the '*Raamnota*' and the report '*herhuisvestingsbeleid niet in Nederland geboren Amsterdammers*' made it explicitly clear that the supporters of a dispersion policy no longer had

any business in Amsterdam. Finally the opponents of a dispersion policy increasingly gained a footing in Rotterdam and other municipalities as well, and the instrument gradually disappeared from governmental jargon.

There was a discussion on (forms of) dispersion policy in other areas in the eighties. In particular in the field of education the problems of 'white' and 'black' schools were discussed in several cities. An example is the reproduction of a discussion on segregation in education in the report '*minderhedenbeleid in het Amsterdamse onderwijs*' of 1989. From the idea that segregation in education is not wanted and is undesirable for the quality of the urban environment (p. 9) and the factual conclusion that there are schools in which the population is not a reflection of the population of the quarter, the municipality proposed to introduce 'school quarters': pupils from a certain quarter had to choose a school in that quarter. The proposal was attacked from various sides with a plea for the constitutional freedom of choice of school, and it was remarkable that the migrant organizations also stated that they did not want to be forced into a certain school quarter (p. 16). Subsequently the municipality abandoned the idea in the report, but did fix an information policy and an accommodation policy. The first instrument was to make parents more conscious of the options, and the second was meant to ensure that the entry capacity of schools at district level closely fitted the number of pupils in that district. The idea of school quarters has not returned in the nineties. But every now and then concern has been expressed about the distribution of educational quality across the schools; in particular in newspaper articles and on local television the educational performances in the Amsterdam Zuidoost quarter have been considered alarming. From the side of the municipality the usual reaction to such concern has been a reference to the existing organizational and facilitating policy to help concentration schools. In any case, the principle from 1989 has remained unimpaired: that the Amsterdam educational supply should be organized in such a way that it offers equal opportunities to all pupils. To meet that objective policy instruments come into the picture that can be classed as compensating policy.

#### *Compensating policy*

When the municipality abandoned the dispersion policy in the seventies it was emphasized that compensating measures had to be taken to improve the living conditions of ethnic minorities in Amsterdam. From a financial perspective these measures can be classified into three categories. First, the municipality performs tasks that are directly financed by the national government, for instance by means of regular permanent functions in education. Second, other regulations function on the basis of a coupled subsidy, at which an amount of the national government is obligatory supplemented by the municipality. Third, there are projects that the municipality finances itself. It is very difficult to discover the relation between these three sources of financing. The amounts that were mentioned in the report '*minderhedenbeleid in het Amsterdamse onderwijs*' (1989) are

an indication. In the financial basis amounts of Dfl. 66, 22 and 3.4 million (29, 9.6 and 1.5 million Euro) were mentioned for the three categories, respectively. Although that division can not be transferred to other years and other fields of policy, the modest contribution of the municipality (less than 4 per cent) speaks volumes.

It is relatively simple to obtain an outline of the compensating measures that were taken in Amsterdam before 1991. In the '*actieprogramma gemeentelijk minderhedenbeleid*' an annual outline was given of new and existing instruments for the various fields of policy. In the field of education national government financing programmes were used, such as the education priority policy (e.p.p.) and the problem accumulation area (p.a.a) financing. From 1986, 11 e.p.p.-areas existed in Amsterdam, in which schools and welfare organizations co-operated. The national government paid an amount of about Dfl. 10 million (4.5 million Euro), of which, in 1988, Dfl. 1.4 million (0.6 million Euro) was meant for welfare and Dfl. 8.6 million (3.8 million Euro) for education. Although in principle that was general policy, immigrant pupils could obtain a higher multiplier than autochthon pupils. On the basis of the education level of their parents' autochthon pupils could obtain a maximum weight of 1.25, immigrant pupils a maximum of 1.9. That differentiation turned it into specific policy, at least for part of the total amount. After a lengthy journey through the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament the e.p.p. legislation was revised in 1994. In education financing as part of the p.a.a. policy was also used; for example in projects aimed at the training of immigrant teachers and initiatives to relieve the duties of school managers. After 1990 education has become a matter for the districts. Although the districts simply took over the current projects, the extent to which they have started new projects is not clear. A study in the spring of 1993 showed that education projects were running that were specifically aimed at minorities in almost all districts.

In the field of employment the local government realized as early as the eighties that, in order to create and retain jobs, it was very dependent on trade and industry (*Raamnota* 1989, p. 10). However, the municipality itself was a (large) employer as, too. Moreover, as a large consumer of products it could attempt to influence the number of employees of the producers. Through the instrument of affirmative action the municipality gave an interpretation to the first option. The central city and the districts did consider the second instrument, but in practice little or nothing was achieved. The so-called stars policy, in which suppliers that employed 10 per cent immigrants were given priority, and the initiative of the Zuidoost district to introduce contract compliance both failed. A combination of incentives and instruments has been the pool for training in construction, which started early in 1995. The intention is that, in co-operation with construction firms that operate in the Amsterdam region, each year 100 immigrant youngsters will be trained in the building industry. Another example, which happened more in the past, was the creation

of work experience places for the ambulant trade. Briefly, this meant that in the period 1987-1990 the municipality employed a number of immigrant hot dog vendors who were given priority over the autochthons on the waiting list maintained by the department of markets. Berveling (1994) comprehensively described how tricky that priority project was. In the end after a number of legal judgements the project was put on ice. Another project, which even made it to the national press, was the so-called IJ market. After attempts had failed, at the end of the eighties, to attract the '*Beverwijkse Zwarte Markt*' (a semi-legalized black market from an adjacent municipality) to the western dock area, in April 1992 the city council agreed on a proposal by the Burgomaster and Aldermen to start their own Oriental market beside the river IJ. After some delay the market finally opened in October 1993. The result - the market was not a success and was closed after little more than a year - was a hard (and expensive) lesson to the council that good intentions cannot automatically be translated into successful projects.

In particular the fiasco of the IJ market was a great blow to the local government. The aldermen that took office after the local elections in 1994 had to deal with its financial consequences. That experience may have brought the new aldermen to abandon ethnicity with the '*NV Werk*', a new organization aimed at creating all kinds of additional work. A number of current projects, in which ethnicity is included, have been continued by the districts.

In the field of housing we mainly found initiatives such as neighbourhood management, prevention, etc. Most projects do not have a specifically ethnic component; ethnic groups profit just like autochthon inhabitants. An exception was the *NEON West* project, which was carried out in the three districts that together make up *Nieuw West* up to and including 1995. The project started in the early nineties, because prognoses showed that the influx of immigrants in these districts was much higher than the urban average. The three districts tried to anticipate the increase in the share of immigrants in their population with various programmes that were mainly aimed at communication and welfare. The *NEON* programme is an example of a regulation that is difficult to place: it is aimed at housing as well as welfare. The diversity of measures in the field of welfare is enormous. In Amsterdam initiatives vary from a network for Turkish and Moroccan women in one district to prevention of criminality in another. It is outside the scope of this study to discuss in detail all initiatives that have been taken, but it does seem that projects that are aimed at the own culture of the minorities are given a lower priority than projects that are aimed at integration and/or prevention of criminality.

### Evaluation

The minorities policy in the Netherlands - and elsewhere too, as we shall see later - can be summarized in outline by pointing at the contrast between general and specific policy. General policy usually means deprivation policy that is accessible to immigrants as well

as to autochthons. Specific policy means policy that is only accessible to immigrants. Considered linguistically the term general policy is a peculiar invention, because with the application of general policy a selection is actually made on the basis of specific criteria of individuals. From the point of view of people who earn too much, 'general' policy on the basis of income criteria really is specific: they are not eligible for it. As with so many politically delicate matters the exact meaning of the flexible terms 'general' and 'specific' only becomes clear in daily policy practice and then, especially, at the moments when money is being divided.

From the '*Minderhedennota* 1983' the approach in the Netherlands has been dominated by an emphasis on general policy. However, it took to about 1994 before the regulations that were aimed specifically at minorities were cut. Before that moment, due to obvious deprivation situations, in many cases space was found for 'temporary' specific policy. In the municipality of Amsterdam that line of thought resulted in a considerable policy effort. The problems surrounding the IJ market can be considered a climax, but in fact that project was no more than the tip of the iceberg. Due to the great extent of the central city's commitment and the availability of regulations at national level, a great number of specific projects started. Initially the intra-urban decentralization brought about no great changes, although its first result was a decline in co-ordination and information facilities. From 1994 the climate at local level turns out to have changed. Minorities are no longer a political issue and every attempt at specific policy has seemed to be too much trouble. The change, and certainly its radical character, cannot be traced back to a factual basis. In Amsterdam and the rest of the Netherlands minorities are still doing considerably worse than autochthon Dutchmen. In part the deprivation can be traced back to factors that also apply to deprived autochthons. Here the pursuit of a 'general' deprivation policy is called for. However, the question of whether or not, and if so to what extent, belonging to a minority group has an extra effect is no longer being asked. The idea that there is an additional effect has traditionally counted as a reason for specific policy. At this moment, with many policymakers it seems to be more a question of ignoring the problems of minorities, a certain blindness, than that they are deeply convinced that minorities do not experience extra negative effects in society. To show how radical the change was the opinion of the district alderman for welfare in Amsterdam Noord can serve as an example. She is against minorities policy and she would "rather speak about vulnerable groups". It is remarkable that the alderman in question is a member of '*Groen Links*', a party that in Amsterdam has traditionally been in favour of specific minorities policy.

The same change seems to have taken place at national level. Here, too, a reduction in specific regulations can be seen and the concept of immigrant has lost in popularity. It is indicative that in the governmental report on the large cities the presence of minorities was mainly concentrated in the section on criminality. The financial structures do not seem to change so fast as the opinions of the policymakers. In the system of the

‘Gemeentefonds’ as well as in the system of specific payments ample amounts remain reserved for minorities. However, it seems that less money will be available for the culture of the various minority groups and that the main funds are aimed at learning the Dutch language and customs. Moreover, the municipalities can spend the payments from the ‘Gemeentefonds’ freely.

### **Conclusion of the policy section**

The minorities policy in the Netherlands can be characterized as the result of the tension between general and specific policy. A complicating factor is the varying interpretation that is given to both concepts by different persons and at different moments. Recently the policy has been formulated in more general, socio-economic terms. The principle of ‘temporariness’ of specific policy, as stated in the *‘Minderhedennota 1983’* and later reports, is taken literally. The local level seems to react somewhat more extremely than the national one: in the eighties more was done in the field of specific policy, while that is being reduced more drastically at the moment.

The change cannot be justified by considering the statistics. It is true that minorities have been doing better in the Netherlands than before, but in many fields they have not succeeded in catching up with the autochthon population (SCP 1994, 1995). In the eighties a call for specific policy was made repeatedly with reference to statistical material. At such moments a linkage between numbers and policy was visible, although it should be noted that ‘simple’ statistical data were usually involved and not, for example, indices of segregation. As specific policy has declined, statistical data have been used less. It seems that the poor position of, in particular, the South Mediterraneans does not impress the politicians as much as similar statistics did in the eighties. Nevertheless, it remains a question whether in the end ‘general’ policy will offer sufficient opportunities to everybody. At the least a finger should be kept on the pulse, and the lack or the insufficiently consistent implementation of registration of ethnicity (ethnic monitoring) in various fields prevents a correct understanding of the ethnic issue.

## **2.5 Summary and comments**

### *Summary*

In this chapter we have used the description of the ethnic segregation and the policy response of the municipality of Amsterdam to specify the conceptual framework and some choices we made that have also affected the rest of this book. We have comprehensively discussed the definition of minorities, the choice in favour of statistical measures and the issue of the most suitable spatial level. All this was illustrated by maps and tables. Interpretation of the data, among other things, led to the conclusions that in Amsterdam Southeast, West and East a number of neighbourhood combinations have concentrations

of minorities. Clear differences exist between ethnic groups concerning their locations of residence: Surinamese and Antilleans have an overrepresentation in Southeast, while Turks and Moroccans live mainly in the West. To indicate the degree of segregation results on the Index of Dissimilarity and the Index of Segregation were calculated. Compared to the results for African Americans in a number of American ghettos mentioned in the literature, the Dutch score is low. Concerning the policy aimed at integration of 'minorities', we found that a transition has taken place from policy specifically aimed at ethnic groups to policy aimed more generally at deprivation.

### *Comments*


In this chapter we have repeatedly commented on all kinds of choices regarding operational definitions. Definitions of minorities, choices in favour of statistical measures, selections of groups and the like were reviewed. Attention was paid explicitly to the spatial specifications and the related choice in favour of a certain spatial level. However, two subjects have been paid too little attention. The first concerns the restriction of the discussion to the municipality of Amsterdam. The second concerns the representativeness of the cases selected. We will therefore discuss these in the following section.

### **Municipality or region**

The preceding chapter has used data of the municipality of Amsterdam. The attempts to create an urban district, however, show that Amsterdam no longer ends at the municipal boundaries. The question may be asked which patterns of concentration and segregation are visible at agglomeration level. Map 2-5 shows the presence of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans in 47 municipalities / districts.

The map shows a large difference between the municipality of Amsterdam and its suburbs. About three quarters of the persons living in the agglomeration that belong to the four minority groups live in Amsterdam, while not more than 40 per cent of the total population of the agglomeration live in the city. The part that lives outside Amsterdam is concentrated in the former centres of urban growth (new towns), namely Purmerend, Alkmaar, Hoorn, Almere and Lelystad. However, the shares in the populations remain low: no municipality has a share in the population that exceeds the agglomeration average. An explanation for the gap between Amsterdam and its suburbs may be found in the (recent) local regulations for distribution of social rented dwellings. Many municipalities used regulations that gave their 'own' inhabitants priority. In the meantime many regulations have been abandoned.

In the chapter ahead of you - just as in nearly all other publications on minorities in Amsterdam - the situation in Greater Amsterdam will not be discussed. The main reason, of course, is the overrepresentation of minority groups in the municipality of Amsterdam. A limited glimpse thus still catches the greater part of the minorities. On the other hand, that should be proved first.



**Source:** CBS, O+S

The category ethnic minorities consists of persons born in Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and Antillian. In total 1 632 327 persons are living in metropolitan Amsterdam, 11.3 per cent of which is part of the category ethnic minorities.

Percentage ethnic minorities  
47 areas

■ 20.0 - 37.5 (7)
■ 15.0 - 20.0 (3)
■ 10.0 - 15.0 (4)
■ 5.0 - 10.0 (11)
□ 0.0 - 5.0 (22)

**MAP 2-5** Four main minority groups in Greater Amsterdam, 1992

In many cases the question of whether a restriction to the municipality of Amsterdam is correct is not even asked. That may be caused by two (data technical) complications. First, there is some indistinctness about the demarcation of the agglomeration of Amsterdam. Different public bodies use different boundaries, while the urban region in view, the '*Regionaal Overlegorgaan Amsterdam*', as solution for the political fragmentation is already burdened with a tight demarcation of the political administrative area. Second, it turns out to be not so simple to obtain statistical material at agglomeration level. In the municipality of Amsterdam the statistical office provides extensive information. However, there is (still) no authority that collects data, and makes them comparable, for the municipalities of the agglomeration. In Map 2-5 CBS data were used for the agglomeration municipalities and figures of the statistical office were used for the Amsterdam districts. The use of CBS data has the disadvantages that they date back to 1992, that the spatial level is not finer than that of municipalities and that the definition of ethnic groups differs slightly from the definition of the statistical office. An alternative solution to showing the spread of minorities in Greater Amsterdam, however, is not available.

### **Representativeness**

Perhaps an even more important question than that of the size of the area we studied concerns the representativeness of Amsterdam in the Dutch context. In other words: to what extent is the situation in Amsterdam a fair reflection of the problems and opportunities of minorities in Dutch problem quarters. After all, the four large cities each have their problem areas; the Schilderswijk in The Hague appeals as much to one's imagination as the Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam. The answer to that question determines the quantitative as well as the qualitative sections of this project. At first sight, a choice in favour of Amsterdam does not seem unfounded: the city has the largest population of minorities in the Netherlands, in absolute as well as percentage terms, and its Bijlmermeer is an obvious example of a problem quarter. However, the degree of segregation and the possible development of ghettos does not necessarily depend on these variables. It is very well possible that the other large cities have higher scores on the indices of concentration or segregation at intra-urban level. In the supplement '*Ruimtelijke spreiding van allochtonen*' of the '*Rapportage minderhedenbeleid 1994*', the '*Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau*', among other things, calculated indices of segregation for the four large cities, at neighbourhood combination level in Amsterdam and at a comparable spatial level in Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht.

Table 2-7 shows an outline of a number of basic data for the four large cities in the Netherlands. Subsequently Table 2-8 shows a number of indices of segregation that were calculated by SCP. It can be concluded from the table that Amsterdam has the largest share of minorities, in both absolute as well as percentage terms.

TABLE 2-7 Ethnic groups in the four large cities, 1 January 1995

Ethnic groups	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	The Hague	Utrecht
Surinamese	69011	46679	39294	7085
Antilleans	10501	11708	6173	1786
Turks	30992	35598	20752	9612
Moroccans	47202	24550	16781	17519
South Europeans	16126	16350	5750	4509
Other non-industrialized	58404	105265	27457	7881
Other industrialized	70416	*	45302	16482
Dutchmen	419698	358425	280936	235629
Total	722350	598575	442445	300503

Source: Statistics The Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Amsterdam

TABLE 2-8 Indices of segregation in the four large cities

Category	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	The Hague	Utrecht
IS Minorities	32.5	43.7	51.0	35.0
IS Turks	41.1	53.9	60.4	42.8
IS Moroccans	39.0	50.0	53.1	
IS Surinamese	35.9	30.0	42.0	24.6
IS Antilleans	41.5	30.1	26.8	
ID Turks - Autochthons	43.5	62.7	66.1	
ID Turks - Surinamese	44.1	31.9	33.1	
ID Surinamese - Autochthons	38.8	39.4	47.3	

Source: SCP, 1995

The share in Amsterdam (32 per cent) is considerably higher than in The Hague (26 per cent), Rotterdam (25 per cent) and Utrecht (16 per cent).

The data of Amsterdam and Rotterdam refer to the year 1993, for The Hague this is 1992, and for Utrecht 1990/1991. In Amsterdam the level is neighbourhood combination, the level of the other three cities is comparable. In Utrecht the IS value of the Turks was calculated for Turks + Moroccans + South Europeans and the IS value of the Surinamese for Surinamese + Antilleans. There are no ID-values for Utrecht available.

In Rotterdam, and in particular in The Hague, the scores on the indices of segregation are higher than in Amsterdam for the majority of the categories. Utrecht turns out to have similar results to Amsterdam. The situation in The Hague is especially remarkable: a score of 51.0 for the category Minorities versus Other Population is substantially higher than the 32.5 of Amsterdam. That shows in particular that the 'largest' city does not

automatically have the highest scores. Does that mean that the choice in favour of Amsterdam is misplaced? That is true if the attention is focused only on the indices. However, from an internationally comparative perspective the number of inhabitants of The Hague and Utrecht is a little low, because both cities have fewer than half a million inhabitants. Rotterdam and Amsterdam are better in terms of the number of inhabitants. Finally the higher percentage of minorities has decisively influenced the choice. However, the choice in favour of Amsterdam, and consequently the implicit equation of Amsterdam with the Netherlands in an internationally comparative perspective, means that when we compare Amsterdam with foreign cities Amsterdam does not show the highest scores on the indices.

#### Note

<sup>1</sup> This section is based in part on ‘De praktijk van het minderhedenbeleid’, P.H. van der Tang-van Loenen in: Burg, F.H. van der, J.Th.J. van den Berg and P.H. van der Tang-van Loenen (1994) ‘De architectuur van het Minderhedenbeleid’. Research centre Law and Policy, State University Leiden.

### **3      Belgium: Brussels**

In view of the great number of international organizations and companies that have their seats in the capital of Belgium, it is little wonder that Brussels considers itself to be the capital of Europe. Major organizations such as the European Union and NATO give Brussels a place on the map of the world that is larger than would be expected from the physical size of the city. The composition of its population reflects the international orientation of the city. On 1 January 1995, 30 per cent of the population were of a foreign nationality. Moreover, part of the Belgian population has obtained that nationality only recently after successfully completing a naturalization procedure. Compared to the other cities in this study we can see a high degree of heterogeneity in the (immigrant) population. On the one hand there is a substantial presence of immigrants from the former colonial territories, of guest workers from Mediterranean countries who have been reunited with their families in the course of time, and of asylum seekers. This is a pattern that is quite commonly found in Europe. On the other hand, and this is a major difference from the other cities, there is extensive immigration by highly-skilled, highly-educated persons, which is connected with the presence of many international organizations. The result is that the poorly educated Portuguese guest workers who arrived in Brussels in the sixties coexist in the statistics with highly-educated, recently arrived officials who represent Portugal in the EU.

In this chapter we will examine how the unique composition of Brussels' population translates itself spatially. Second, we will examine what the policy-making reaction is to the presence of immigrants in Brussels. However, we will start this chapter with a brief outline of the history of migration and the migration legislation in Belgium, followed by a sketch of the urban (housing) development of Brussels.

### **3.1 Immigrants in Belgium**

In Belgium, as in the other European countries, the fifties and sixties were a period of economic boom. The resulting shortage of workers, in particular for the simplest, least attractive jobs was resolved by recruiting guest workers from the Mediterranean. At the end of the fifties mainly Italians arrived, then Spaniards and from the end of the sixties Moroccans and Turks. The economic problems that followed the first oil crisis in the early seventies caused the Belgian government to introduce an immigration stop that ended the arrival of immigration workers. From that moment on, emphasis has been placed on family reunification and, especially in the last few years, an influx of asylum seekers. The segment of highly-educated persons in the Brussels population is of a more temporary nature: these are usually workers who are registered in Brussels for a certain period, but who return to their country of origin after ending their employment. Nowadays, Belgium has one of the highest shares of immigrants in its population, as compared to other EU countries.

From the eighties onwards it became considerably simpler for immigrants to obtain the Belgian nationality. The automatic right to acquire Belgian nationality exists for the third generation; for children, born in Belgium, whose parents are also born in Belgium. Moreover, the procedure for non-automatic naturalization has been considerably liberalized. For the second generation it is sufficient that - depending on their age - the parents or persons themselves make clear that they want to obtain Belgian nationality. Moreover, a dual nationality is accepted. The naturalization procedure for first generation immigrants examines in more detail the will to integrate of the persons involved. Finally the candidates should receive a definite answer about their request within one year. All in all, compared to its surrounding countries Belgium has ample opportunities for the naturalization of immigrants. However, in the field of registration, modernization has not yet occurred. In the 1991 census a definition of immigrants was used based on nationality. As more children of immigrants go on to live on their own, such a definition will become less viable. Compared to the Dutch definition of ethnic groups there is, consequently, a certain degree of underestimation.

### **3.2 The ‘development’ of Brussels**

As with Amsterdam, we will first pay some attention to the residential structure of Brussels as it evolved over the past century. There is, however, one big and influential difference between Brussels and Amsterdam. In fact that difference has existed for some centuries (Terhorst and van de Ven 1997). Brussels has a much more fragmented political structure, whereas Amsterdam can be put in the category of a ‘consolidated’ politically

structured city. At local governmental level few cities are so complicated as Brussels. The Brussels we mean in ordinary language is formally called the Brussels Capital Region. This area, with nearly one million inhabitants, has the same local governmental status as the two districts Flanders and the Walloon provinces in Belgium. Officially the Brussels Capital Region is bilingual, although it is completely surrounded by the Flemish district. The Brussels Capital Region consists of nineteen communities (municipalities), which have a considerable degree of political and policy autonomy in fields such as welfare and the integration of minorities. The municipality of Brussels, with almost 140 000 inhabitants, is only one of the nineteen municipalities. In this chapter we will adopt the current abbreviation of Brussels Capital Region to Brussels. When we mean the municipality of Brussels we will indicate that explicitly.

The fragmented structure of Brussels, but also the lack of spatial planning and the autonomy of local municipalities as far as housing decisions are concerned are regarded as having had tremendous effects on the socio-spatial structuring of the urban region.

Kesteloot (1994) - from which much of this section has been taken - pointed at a multiple division that developed with respect to Brussels. Especially during the sixties it was the suburbanization of young and relatively affluent people to the urban peripheries, which was accompanied by the influx of guest workers into the dwellings left behind, that triggered the first division, the one between the Capital Region and its surroundings. We should note that, due to the lack of planning and central housing policy, urban sprawl in the Brussels region was much larger than in the Dutch situation. This first division is overlaid by a second one within the Capital Region itself. The Brussels housing stock is characterized by the dominance of a private rental market. While only eight per cent of the total housing stock is labelled social housing, the owner-occupier sector represents 40 per cent of the stock; in addition, about a further 40 per cent of the stock is labelled as the secondary or residual rental sector. This sector lies at the bottom of the quality range of housing. People only apply for housing in this sector, when all other sectors appear to be inaccessible. It is important to know that these dwellings have returned their investment. They are generating additional profits during an extended lifetime. The qualitative housing problem cannot be resolved easily, since public money is spent to support the suburbanization process. Also, landowners are politically stronger than tenants.

The residual housing sector is concentrated in the nineteenth century neighbourhoods of the city, which initially formed a ring around the medieval city - the 'Pentagon'. That ring is now broken, since the eastern and south-eastern part of the ring have been transformed into non-residential functions. The physically poorest areas of Brussels are therefore to be found in the western crescent around the Pentagon. Within these neighbourhoods, a third division can be found. Individual neighbourhoods accumulate all problems one might think of, resulting in a third level of socio-spatial polarization.

**TABLE 3-1 Main foreign groups in Brussels in 1991**

Country	Number	% of total
France	26666	2.8
Italy	31620	3.3
Greece	10435	1.1
Spain	25321	2.6
Portugal	10125	1.1
Turkey	21171	2.2
Morocco	77335	8.1
Zaire	6033	0.6
<b>Total number of Immigrants</b>	<b>271137</b>	<b>28.5</b>
<b>Total number of Belgians</b>	<b>680994</b>	<b>71.5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>952131</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: NIS Census 1991


### **3.3 Ethnic segregation in Brussels**

The 1991 census showed that over 270 000 immigrants were living in Brussels, which is 28.5 per cent of the total number of inhabitants (950 000). Table 3-1 shows an outline of the presence of the main nationalities.

The groups of Table 3-1 do not live evenly distributed across Brussels: just as in Amsterdam there is a relative over- and underrepresentation at the level of the neighbourhoods. To answer the question to what extent there is a concentration of a certain population category, we first have to define what is meant by a concentration. Here, the operational definition chosen is: a situation in which the percentage of inhabitants belonging to a certain group of origin in a certain area is larger than the percentage of that group in the whole area referred to. We applied a subdivision of Brussels in 702 neighbourhoods. A neighbourhood has an average of 1356 inhabitants. A few neighbourhoods with very small numbers of inhabitants were kept out of the analysis to avoid distortion. As a limit a population of 250 was taken. That resulted in a reduction to 587 neighbourhoods with a maximum size of 6038 inhabitants and an average population of 1620 persons. Table 3-1 shows that 28.5 per cent of the population has a foreign nationality. To get a better picture of the deviations in relation to this urban average, Map 3-1 shows the spatial distribution of the immigrants in the Brussels Capital Region. The map shows in the first place that in 386 of the 587 neighbourhoods (66 per cent) there is a smaller than average share of immigrants. Of the 201 neighbourhoods that have a higher share than the urban

average, 31 neighbourhoods have a share of immigrants of more than 65.3 per cent. The cartographic presentation reveals that these neighbourhoods are mainly situated at the outskirts of the centrally situated municipality of Brussels and in the neighbouring municipalities of Anderlecht, St-Gilles, St-Jans-Molenbeek, St-Joost-ten-Noode and Schaerbeek. In various contributions Kesteloot and Van der Haegen have shown that these neighbourhoods can be characterized as weak in socio-economic terms. On average they are characterized by a low income per head of the population, a bad condition of the housing supply and usually also by high unemployment. Although it is not possible to split up these figures into nationality and income, one may derive from the characteristics of the housing supply on the spot that 'poor' immigrants must be concerned here. We have pointed out that the settlement of guest workers in the Brussels neighbourhoods in the sixties was possible due to the suburbanization of the native Belgians to the outskirts of the Brussels Region or even to Flanders and The Walloon provinces in Belgium. In a sense the guest workers enabled the exodus of the Belgians, financially, by buying or renting the houses that were at that time of poor physical quality. Since then the neighbourhoods have deteriorated even further in constructional and social terms. The quarter of Kuregem in the municipality of Anderlecht, for example, shows a picture of decline that is striking. Highly-skilled immigrants with good wages cannot be found here. They mainly live in the outskirts of Brussels.

The insufficient capacity of the statistics to distinguish between rich and poor immigrants especially causes problems when we discuss the situation with respect to the category of North-Mediterraneans. After all, the guest workers from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece were joined by EU officials with high incomes. It is unlikely that the same problem of distinction applies to the category of South-Mediterraneans, or in other words to Turks and Moroccans. Map 3-2 shows the spatial distribution of South-Mediterraneans across Brussels. In the first place it turns out that poorly skilled labour migrants are indeed mainly concentrated in neighbourhoods in the municipality of Brussels and its neighbouring municipalities. Furthermore it turns out that the distribution of South-Mediterraneans across the Brussels Capital Region is more distorted than that of immigrants as a whole: 461 of the 587 quarters (79 per cent) have a share of South-Mediterraneans that is smaller than the urban average, compared to 66 per cent for immigrants as a whole. At the other end of the scale, the high maximum of 68.3 per cent attracts attention; this is a factor 6.3 higher than the urban average. For the individual groups, only the Moroccans in one neighbourhood score above 50 per cent (also Map 3-4). In that neighbourhood, out of a population of 1964 inhabitants 1011 are Moroccans. Map 3-3 shows the spatial distribution of North-Mediterraneans across the Brussels Capital Region. The map shows a less extreme distribution than with the South-Mediterraneans. Not only do 382 of the 587 neighbourhoods (65 per cent) have a smaller share than the urban average, but it also turns out that the neighbourhoods with a higher share are no longer situated in the centre of the agglomeration.




Source: N.I.S. census 1991  
KU Leuven maps

Foreigners do not possess the Belgium nationality; they represent 28.5 per cent of the population of the Brussels Capital Region.

Percentage foreigners.  
702 neighbourhoods.

■ 65.3 - 79.9	(31)
■ 46.9 - 65.3	(57)
■ 28.5 - 46.9	(113)
■ 0.0 - 28.5	(386)
□ less than 250 inhabitants	(115)

MAP 3-1 Immigrants in the Brussels Capital Region, 1991




**Source:** N.I.S. census 1991  
KU Leuven maps

The category South-Mediterranean consists of Turkish (21 182), Moroccan (77 409), Algerian (2 353) en Tunisian (2 895) persons. The category represents 10.9 per cent of the population in the Brussels Capital Region.

Percentage South-Mediterranean.  
702 neighbourhood.

37.4 - 68.3	(39)
24.2 - 37.3	(38)
10.9 - 24.2	(49)
0.0 - 10.9	(461)
less than 250 inhabitants	(115)


MAP 3-2      South-Mediterraneans in the Brussels Capital Region, 1991



**Source:** N.I.S. census1991  
KU Leuven maps

The category North-Mediterranean consists of Spanish (25 367), Portuguese (10 146), Italian (31 648), Greek (10 444) and Former Yugoslavian persons (2 862), totalling 8.4 per cent of the population in the Brussels Capital Region.

MAP 3-3      North-Mediterraneans in the Brussels Capital Region, 1991



**Source:** N.I.S. census1991  
KU Leuven maps

The category Moroccan consists of 77 335 Moroccan nationals,  
8.1 per cent of the population in the Brussels Capital Region.

**Percentage Moroccan.**  
702 neighbourhoods.

■ 28.6 - 51.2	(40)
■ 18.4 - 28.6	(34)
■ 8.1 - 18.4	(61)
□ 0.0 - 8.1	(472)
□ less than 250 inhabitants	(115)

MAP 3-4      Moroccans in the Brussels Capital Region, 1991

The most important explanation for this pattern is probably the more varying socio-economic composition of the group of North-Mediterraneans. The ratio of the maximum value to the urban average is 4.6, which is less extreme than the situation of the South-Mediterraneans.

Map 3-4 presents the spatial distribution of the Moroccans in the Capital Region. The Moroccans are by far the largest category of South Mediterranean people living in Brussels. They comprise 8.1 per cent of the population of Brussels. As in Amsterdam, the maps of Moroccans and South Mediterraneans reveal a strong overlap. In Brussels, however, the share of Moroccans is mostly responsible for the overlap. What can be concluded from a comparison of Maps 3-2 and 3-4 is that the centre of gravity of the Moroccan population is somewhat different from that of the entire category of South-Mediterranean people. Most concentrations of Moroccans are in the neighbourhoods in the poor crescent located West of the old medieval town, including the western part of the 'Pentagon' itself. Although there is a concentration of Moroccans in the northern nineteenth century neighbourhoods too, a relatively larger share of 'other' South-Mediterraneans can be found there, particularly Turks, who reach a 40 per cent share in Schaarbeek, just North of the inner city.

The overall pattern reveals that all categories of guest workers are highly dependent on the cheap housing accomodations in the residual sector surrounding the inner city. The moderate differentiation between the concentrations of Moroccans relative to other categories must be interpreted in terms of other factors, possibly cultural ones, that are also important for an understanding of the patterns shown.

It is evident that immigrants in Brussels are not distributed proportionally across the urban area. The fact that in 31 neighbourhoods over 65 per cent of the total population has a foreign nationality is revealing in this connection. Nevertheless, it is difficult to compare cities on the basis of maps only. To meet this problem we again calculated two indices of segregation for the different nationalities: the Index of Segregation and the Index of Dissimilarity. Table 3-2 shows an outline of the results.

The figures show that the South-Mediterraneans - Turks, Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians - are the most segregated in Brussels. The score of 64.6 on the Index of Dissimilarity between South-Mediterraneans and Belgians is especially striking. Compared to the score of North-Mediterraneans and Belgians that of the South-Mediterraneans gets an extra contrast. Compared with the results of Amsterdam, which were shown in Tables 2-4 and 2-5, it is remarkable that the scores in Brussels are substantially higher. The main category of Immigrants compared to Belgians, with a score of 40, is considerably higher than the category Ethnic Minorities compared to the Rest of the Population (31) in Amsterdam.

TABLE 3-2 Indices of segregation for Brussels, neighbourhood level, 1991

Nationality	Measure	Score
Immigrants versus Belgians	Index of segregation	40
North-Mediterraneans versus Rest of the population	Index of segregation	29
Moroccans versus Rest of the population	Index of segregation	59
South-Mediterraneans versus Rest of the population	Index of segregation	61
North versus South-Mediterraneans	Index of dissimilarity	42
Moroccans versus Turks	Index of dissimilarity	53
South-Mediterraneans versus Belgians	Index of dissimilarity	65
North-Mediterraneans versus Belgians	Index of dissimilarity	37

Source: NIS 1991 census.

Since the Amsterdam figure would be 35 if measured on the much more detailed neighbourhood level, the difference between the Brussels and Amsterdam indexscores cannot be entirely ascribed to differences in scale. The maximum score in Brussels (65) is ten points higher than the Amsterdam maximum. Finally, it is striking that the highest score is found in the relation between Belgians and the category of South-Mediterraneans, in other words autochthonous versus immigrant. In Amsterdam, on the other hand, the highest score was noted for the index of segregation of Surinamese and Antilleans versus Turks and Moroccans, which is an immigrant versus immigrant situation.

### Conclusion of the quantitative analysis

Brussels is a city with relatively sharp patterns of differentiation between population categories. Not only has the limit of 50 per cent Moroccans been exceeded in one neighbourhood, but it is also true that two thirds of the population are immigrants in 31 of the 587 neighbourhoods. The calculation of the indices of segregation shows that relatively high scores are reached in Brussels. The highest value is reached in the segregation between Belgians and South-Mediterraneans.

The concentrations that are visible at neighbourhood level also have an influence on the local level. However, the considerable representation of immigrants has had few electoral consequences up to now, because in Belgium immigrants have no right to vote in local elections. In practice, this means that the council in the municipality of St-Joost-ten-Noode, one of the municipalities of the poor crescent, was elected by a minority of the population. The question of whether immigrants were after all a subject of policy will be dealt with in the next section.

### 3.4 Policy in Brussels

In April 1994 riots broke out in the municipality of Molenbeek after an incident between the police and Turkish youths. In the light of the size and intensity of the riots that ravaged France and the United Kingdom, the visible damage was not too bad. However, the psychological blow that was inflicted on that spring evening was larger. In 1991 there had been riots in the same municipality, after which 'many millions of Belgian francs' had been invested to prevent a recurrence (based on information from the commission for equality of opportunities and racism control). Apparently this policy effort had been unsatisfactory and reality was more recalcitrant. In this section we venture a glance in the direction of the Brussels policy on immigrants in general and segregation in particular.

#### **Institutional context**

Most of the local governmental peculiarities of Brussels can be traced back to the long-standing linguistic conflict between Flanders and the Walloon provinces in Belgium (see e.g. Hooghe 1993). The District of Brussels is a bilingual enclave within Flanders, but is in fact a French-speaking area. The recent constitutional changes in Belgium do not make it easier to describe the ins and outs of the matter succinctly. However, a brief introduction is inevitable to understand the policy with regard to segregation in Brussels.

In Belgium the federal government is less strong than in other West European countries. The three districts of Flanders, the Walloon provinces in Belgium and Brussels have had many powers, in any case since the recent amendments to the constitution. To give just one example of that power, the District of Flanders was allowed to negotiate alone with the Netherlands about the river Scheldt.

In this study it is relevant that naturalisation and access of asylum seekers is dealt with at federal level by the Ministry of the Interior. A step lower in the hierarchy is the regional government. Since October 1989 the Brussels Capital Region has had a Regional Council with 75 seats and a government consisting of five ministers and three secretaries of state. Many politicians of the Capital Region are at the same time mayors at local level. The Region mainly has powers on matters of land and employment. An example of the Regional efforts in the field of planning is the Regional Development Plan, with which the government is attempting to direct the urban development with socio-economic variables in mind. One step down, the municipalities come into the picture. Nineteen municipalities are situated in the Brussels Capital Region. These, as stated above, have a high degree of autonomy. Municipalities are responsible for public order, integration of immigrants and welfare, among other things.

Upto this point the Belgian government is fairly conventional. The complexity stems from the fact that besides the authorities that are based on territorialism, individual authorities also operate in Brussels. Important policy fields, such as education and cul-

ture, are not cared for by the three government levels mentioned, but by the Flemish COCON and the Walloon COCOF. These language communities take their own places within the governmental order and, seen hierarchically, they have no clear position among the territorial layers of government mentioned before. A third language community, COCOC, represents the so-called bi-individual matters, which are not specifically Flemish or Walloon. In the following paragraphs, where concrete measures will be discussed, it will turn out that each authority has its own picture of and approach to concentration and segregation. However, an institutional outline is not complete without referring to the Royal Commission for Migrants Policy. This authority was established in 1989 for a four-year term to find an answer to the questions on immigration and the integration of immigrants. With the publication of a charter in 1989, and a number of studies about integration policy and equality, an attempt was made to formulate a coherent policy with regard to immigration and integration, in which the powers of the various levels of government were an important precondition. In 1993 the Royal Commission was converted into the Centre for Equality of Opportunities and for Racism Control. A second authority that can be mentioned is the Consultation Commission for inhabitants of foreign origin in Brussels. The commission has no formal decision making powers, but it has a warning function, since immigrants have no right to vote in Belgium.

## Measures

### *Spatial dispersal policy*

After the reforms of the nineteen eighties, Belgium has now one of the most tolerant naturalization procedures in Western Europe. Moreover, after they have gone through all the procedures, asylum seekers are not placed in refugee centres spread across the country, as they are in the Netherlands or several other European countries. On the other hand, until May 1995 the municipalities had the legal entitlement to refuse settlement to immigrants from outside the EU. The legislative foundation for this is article 18b of the federal legislation of 1980, which deals with the position of immigrants in Belgium. The procedure was such that a council could decide to submit a request to the federal Ministry of Justice to use article 18b. However, there were no concrete criteria, such as the presence of a certain percentage of immigrants. Then the Ministry of Justice decided whether the municipality was to be given permission, which some six municipalities in the Brussels Capital Region managed to obtain. However, several people we interviewed on this matter consider the article more as window dressing for the autochthonous population than as an actual solution to the problem. There are no studies on the effectiveness of the measures, and through the years it was rumoured that the municipalities that were given permission nevertheless were unofficially admitting immigrants from outside the EU. Family reunification and the settlement of immigrants from outside the EU who did not arrive from outside the EU but from a member state of the EU did not come under

the regulations. So there was some latitude for the individual municipalities when they had reason to exercise it.

Article 18b is an example of an integral spatial dispersal policy because registration in the municipality is refused. No examples have been found of spatial dispersal policies on the housing market or of restraining policies on the labour market or in education. It is interesting that at regional level a spatial dispersal policy is advocated for asylum seekers. Up till now, asylum seekers are allowed to settle freely all over Belgium, when they have gone through the procedure. As a result almost half of the asylum seekers go to Brussels. The municipalities in Brussels receive insufficient financial means to offer aid to these people. In the regional government there is a growing opinion that a proportional distribution over the three districts should be enforced. The scale, according to the Brussels Capital Region, is an important variable because asylum seekers retain their right to choose a municipality within one of the three districts. The pleas from Brussels have not yet resulted in alterations at federal level.

### *Compensating policy*

Over the past few years the problem of integration was an important item on the political agenda. Also on the initiative of the Royal Commission for Migrants Policy the federal government put into effect the Incentive Fund for Migrants Policy in 1991. The object of the fund is to support short-term projects that are aimed at achieving integration. Especially ‘individual’ matters are involved in which projects for (immigrant) youth are the principal part. Most projects in Brussels are carried out by the language communities. Each year this involves an incentive of 7 million Euro for projects in Brussels. The projects are not paid from the fund alone: other partners should contribute before the federal government forks out.

Since 1989 much attention has been paid at regional level to the Special Allowance for Integration and Coexistence. In the most recent circular letter, integration has been defined as the involvement of persons of foreign origin in local economic, social and cultural life. By coexistence is meant an intercultural experience consisting of exchanges and interactions aimed at preventing separation and lack of understanding. At the centre are the municipalities: they select and formulate applications. However, not all municipalities are equally eligible for the allowance. On the basis of five criteria two of them being absolute number of immigrants and share of immigrants in the total population a subdivision is made into eleven A-municipalities and eight B-municipalities. The B-category is considered to be not directly involved by the Regional Government, and can only participate in projects in which an A-municipality is involved. The Regional organization arranges the financing and takes care of project supervision. The projects that are most likely to be financed are projects aimed at integration of the various programmes of the federal government, the communities and other initiatives of the District and the general public. Financing is additional, with a maximum of 25 per cent for the overheads and the

other 75 per cent for the real costs of the project. The budget for 1994 was 3.5 million Euro.

The lowest spatial level in Brussels, the municipality, consists of nineteen units. Eleven of those nineteen have a share of immigrants higher than 20 per cent; seven of the eleven even have a share of above 30 per cent. Moreover, the municipalities in the Belgian form of government have a high degree of autonomy. This results in a practical problem, because a representative outline of the measures remains out of sight due to the great number of municipalities. An exploratory study of the initiatives at municipality level revealed that the emphasis lies especially on projects in the public sphere and on improving the deployment of the police. The policy instruments we mentioned were used in the case we examined (Kuregem in the municipality of Anderlecht). In the apparently promising DSQ (*développement social du quartier*) project an attempt was made to arrive at an improvement of the living conditions in the quarter by means of an integral approach.

In the field of the living situation the possibilities of the government to direct or adjust are much more restricted than in the Netherlands. In Brussels only 8 per cent of the housing stock falls under the category of social rented dwellings. In Amsterdam this category accounts for more than half of the housing stock. With the arrival of a Regional government in 1989 the objective was set to lift the share of social rented dwellings to 10 per cent. In co-operation with the housing associations the sum for renovation and new development has been doubled. In the period 1990-1994 this involved approximately 90 million Euro, while 45 million was set aside in the period 1984-1989. Moreover, since 1990 12 million Euro has been paid to housing associations that housed a relatively large share of households with low incomes. However, the policy is not specifically aimed at immigrants, because underprivileged Belgians should also be eligible for social housing (see e.g. the Royal Commission for Migrants Policy 1993, p. 123). In a more general sense the Regional government tries to get a grip on urban development through a regional development plan. Immigrants could benefit from such a plan, because an important part of it is the protection of the housing function through preventing the other functions, especially employment, from pushing forward. An important cause of displacement of households with lower socio-economic characteristics is the difference in development of incomes between the 'poor' Capital Region and the 'rich' outskirts. To draw the 'richer' population back the municipalities within Brussels are trying to build new, attractive dwellings. The municipality of Molenbeek, for example, has built 'isles' of new, more expensive dwellings in the quarters. However, the demolition of older dwellings in favour of new ones or other projects, such as the new TGV station in St Gilles, is at the expense of the poor, often immigrant, population (Timmerman 1991).

Schools in Brussels have to cope with problems associated with school leavers and absenteeism. According to Leman, who is in the Centre for Equality of Opportunities and Racial Control, the financial problems of the Walloon community are a great obstacle to

a better approach. Over the past few years the Flemish community carried out an (unpopular) reorganization in the field of education. The Walloon community has not yet dared to take the same step. The result is that all parties are awaiting a reorganization in the Walloon community. After the reorganization in the Flemish community there was space to start a new policy (the policy for educational priority). Schools may be eligible for extra money if they are situated in one of the ten underprivileged municipalities that the Flemish community in Brussels has defined and also have a certain percentage of immigrant students. The limit used to lie at a percentage of 30, but a more complex calculation is currently in use. Remarkably, the criterion of 'immigrant' has been replaced by 'foreign origin' plus the level of education of the mother. The policy is still developing and will cost more than 18 million Euro a year in the long term.

The Walloon community in Brussels has conducted a number of experiments in primary education with the assistance of several Mediterranean governments. However, in 1993 the Royal Commission for Migrants Policy concluded: "of a more recent date (within the Walloon community) is the sensitivity to thinking about the socio-economic dimension of education, to which the present financial situation turns out to be a very powerful obstacle in starting large operations. In the struggle against educational failure the personal cultural characteristics of the migrant children remain in the background" (page 105).

The federal Incentive Fund is subsidizing a project to counter absenteeism and early school leaving, which is being carried out by the Flemish and Walloon language communities together.

The situation of immigrants on the labour market is a constant source of concern. According to the persons we talked to, this concern is gradually being converted into policy, but clearly few successes have been achieved at this time. Matters such as equal-opportunities policy and characterization of migrants as a high-risk group have not been realized (yet) in spite of discussions. It appeared from an interview that, for example, the biggest industrial employer of Brussels, Volkswagen, had the policy to recruit explicitly among 'Belgian Belgians' up until two years ago. The result was that unemployed immigrants were displaced from the Brussels municipalities by an army of 'Belgian Belgians' that had to be driven every day in minibuses to far in Flanders. The end of these flows of transport was caused more by the crisis in the car industry than by any amended employment policy.

An example of a positive policy was the establishment, in 1991, of so-called migrant consultants, who address especially (although not exclusively) young migrants (aged 16 to 25) who are no longer in school. However, an evaluation revealed few promising results. Another example is the deployment of young job seekers in the Brussels Region; this deployment has been intensified since 1991. For local projects under this umbrella approximately 2 million Euro was granted in 1992.

### **Conclusion of the policy section**

At the end of the eighties the problem of the minorities in Belgium came up for discussion, with the creation of a Royal Commission for Migrants Policy. The integration of minorities forms an item of attention especially in the field of education. In concrete terms the Flemish community in Brussels has achieved most. Besides, a stronger regional government has started in the capital with the creation of the Brussels Capital Region. The fiscal crisis of the federal government, which also affects the lower tiers of governments, means, however, that there is little space for a new policy. To what extent the initiatives for a specific policy for immigrants can be continued can hardly be estimated at present.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

In the two previous sections a picture has been painted of the quantitative situation of immigrants in Brussels and the policy with regard to segregation and integration in so far as it deals with immigrants. Does a relation exist between the outcomes of the two sections? This question can be asked for Brussels alone, but also for the comparison between Brussels and other cities dealt with in this book.

The quantitative data have shown, and will show in the chapters to come, that Brussels is a relatively segregated city. The problem quarters are mainly situated in the centre of the agglomeration, while the higher socio-economic quarters can now be found in the outskirts of the Brussels Capital Region, or even outside it. Although the availability of socio-economic data leaves much to be desired, it is obvious that many underprivileged can be found especially among South Mediterranean (labour) migrants. These persons score low in the fields of characteristics of education, labour market and housing.

The connected issues of stimulation of integration and prevention of exclusion of immigrants came up for discussion at the end of the eighties. No direct link between figures and policy has been found. The debate has not started because of, for example, a sharply rising segregation of immigrants. It rather appears to be the case that there was a combination of the awakening consciousness that guest workers would stay permanently and of the specific constitutional developments in Belgium (the creation of a Brussels Capital Region and the crystallizing of the regional and federal powers in the various fields of policy).

To implement the policy (simple) statistical data are applied to select the most problematic quarters. In the Allowance policy of the Metropolitan government, for instance, the socio-economic characteristics of the nineteen municipalities are examined. The share of immigrants is one of the variables that plays a part. However, the use of (segregation) measures at neighbourhood level is not found. We can conclude that a small degree of linkage between the quantitative and the qualitative parts can be found. One striking dif-

ference between Amsterdam and Brussels before 1989 should be mentioned: while the scores on the indices of segregation were higher, far less policy was formulated in Brussels than in Amsterdam. In the nineties, in terms of policy, the two cities have moved towards each other: less policy is formulated in Amsterdam and more in Brussels.

## **4**

# **Germany: Frankfurt am Main and Düsseldorf**

No country in Western Europe has encountered so many consequences of the revolutionary geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe as Germany. The fall of the Iron Curtain meant a reunion of Eastern and Western Germany with major social (and financial) consequences. The migration in the period 1987 up to and including 1992 reflected the enormous changes. Over 2 million immigrants arrived in Germany in that period. Furthermore, 1.6 million immigrants with German passports (*Aussiedler*) from Eastern Europe also settled themselves. In all, Germany had to accommodate nearly four million immigrants over a very short period of time. The shock that was created was accompanied by neo-Nazi excrescences. A sad, all-time low was reached in May 1993 with the assault in Solingen.

However, immigration in Germany is not a new phenomenon. The labour migration of the sixties, in particular, led to a large Mediterranean community. In this chapter we will first give a brief outline of the history of immigration. Then we will look at the situation at local level in two cities; Frankfurt am Main and Düsseldorf. Special attention will be paid to the local effect of the period 1987-1992 with the strong growth of the population.

## **4.1              Immigrants in Germany**

Until the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961 the shortages on the labour market were mainly supplemented with the migration of ‘ethnic’ Germans from Eastern Europe. When that became impossible, attention was focused on the Mediterranean territories. Of all countries in Western Europe Germany received the largest number of guest workers.

Originally the idea was - just like in the Netherlands and Belgium and many other countries - that the guest workers would stay temporarily and then return home, as guests are supposed to do. A type of migration characterized by rotation was assumed: migrants received short-term contracts to fill up labour shortages in Germany. However, the practice was more intransigent than the theory of rotation suggests. In the sixties bilateral agreements were made with a number of countries under which, under strict conditions, male workers were eligible for a labour contract in Germany. In 1973, under the influence of the first oil crisis, the recruitment of workers from non-EC countries was ended. In that year 11.9 per cent of the working population was of immigrant origin. The end of the short-term contracts and the end of recruitment did not mean, however, that the total size of the immigrant population declined. In spite of the usually low status of the jobs, some of the guest workers wanted to remain in Germany. Gradually relatives arrived and the average length of stay of the immigrants increased steadily. In 1988 almost 47 per cent of all immigrants had lived in the country for more than fifteen years. The policy of rotation was obviously a failure and the financial incentives for return that were created in 1983 had had little effect.

At the end of the eighties the composition of the flow of immigrants changed. Especially the changing geopolitical situation had some important consequences. First, the flow of 'ethnic' Germans, which had stopped after the construction of the Berlin wall, started again. In 1989 alone 850 000 *Aussiedler* were admitted. Second, the events in Yugoslavia and some Third World countries led to an enormous increase in the number of asylum requests. About half a million asylum requests were granted in the period from 1981 up to and including 1987. In the following six years the number of admissions increased to almost 1.5 million. The tightening up of the asylum legislation in 1993 led to a sharp decrease of nearly 70 per cent within one year. Legally the restriction of the influx of *Aussiedler* is more difficult. Although the number has decreased since 1993, an estimated two or three million *Aussiedler* still live in Eastern Europe.

Figure 4-1 shows how explosive the growth of the number of immigrants in Germany was in the period 1987-1993. The *Aussiedler*, who after all legally have the German nationality, have not even been included in the figure.

The legal status of the *Aussiedler* gives them the same rights as other Germans. The majority of the 'normal' immigrants do not easily obtain similar rights as the German population. Consequently, the number of naturalizations is very low in Germany. According to Heckmann (1994) around 1990 only four in a thousand immigrants a year succeeded in completing a naturalization procedure. In the same year the figures for the Netherlands or France were at least a factor three higher. Not having the German nationality means in practice that one is practically excluded from political rights in Germany. Heckmann stated that the large number of immigrants in Germany and the large number of them who are employed in industry implies that a specific class has been excluded from political rights. He even associated this with nineteenth century conditions.




FIGURE 4-1 Development of the number of immigrants in Germany

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1995, pp. 14 and 15

Incidentally, as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, immigrants in EU countries will obtain voting rights at local level in the near future.

#### The spatial distribution of immigrants across Germany

It is not surprising that the settlement of guest workers was closely connected with the economic possibilities of the regions. There was a concentration of immigrants in regions with much industrial activity. Within regions, as in other countries, a preference of immigrants for urban areas occurred. In 1961 the combined preference for urban-industrial agglomerations resulted in a proportion of 7.6 per cent immigrants in Düsseldorf. Although the total number of immigrants increased, the pattern of spatial segregation of immigrants across Germany did not substantially change, according to Blotevogel (1993, p. 92). Data of the Statistische Bundesamt show that at 31 December 1992 12.9 per cent of the 5.7 million inhabitants of the state of Hessen, in which Frankfurt am Main is situated, had foreign nationalities. With that share Hessen took second place in Germany, after Hamburg (14.1 per cent). In North Rhine Westphalia, in which Düsseldorf is situated, 10.4 per cent of the more than 17 million inhabitants were immigrants. In the whole of Germany 6.5 million of the nearly 80 million inhabitants were immigrants (8.1 per cent) in 1992.

In the seventies the high concentrations of immigrants in various cities led to discussions about whether a further increase would still be acceptable. In 1975 the federal government and the Bundesländer proclaimed that immigration could be stopped in areas where 12 percent of the population were immigrants. In some cases it was even permitted to indicate areas with a percentage of 6. A number of cities regarded themselves as 'full' to

newcomers under the rules. However, this measure was so controversial that it was repealed in 1977.

One of the cities that regarded itself as 'full' was Frankfurt am Main with 17.1 percent immigrants in 1977. In 1994 the share of immigrants had risen to 28.3 percent. With this number the city has the highest share of immigrants in Germany. That fact, combined with the experience the city has with spatial dispersal policy, caused us to look at the city in more detail.

In the next sections we will go into the analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data of Frankfurt first. Subsequently, the Düsseldorf situation will be discussed.

## 4.2 The 'development' of Frankfurt am Main

Frankfurt am Main - henceforth, briefly, Frankfurt - is the key city of the metropolitan region of Rhine-Main, where almost three million people live together. A highly concentrated business centre (CBD) contains one of the most important financial centres of Europe. If some generalization is allowed, we may state that the Frankfurt metropolitan region resembles the Amsterdam metropolitan region in some respects, but certainly not in all. The core area, the city of Frankfurt, has almost the same size in terms of number of inhabitants, and the surrounding suburbs have similar functions for the more affluent parts of the population. In Frankfurt too, we can see a slow transformation process going on from a monocentric to a polynuclear structure, in which criss-cross relations between the constituting parts of the region exist (Blach and Irmens 1994). Consequently, Frankfurt, as well as Düsseldorf - just like many other cities across Europe - experiences large daily commuter flows. Most of the immigrants lack the finances and other means to join that suburbanization process. As in Brussels and Amsterdam, they tend to live in the central parts of the city. As with Amsterdam, we will focus our attention to the central city in particular.

But there are also major differences between Frankfurt and cities such as Amsterdam. Not only does Frankfurt lack an attractive historic inner city area of the character and size we can find in Amsterdam, the city is also characterized by a much more centralized pattern of businesses. At this moment the development of the Central Business District (CBD) and the service sector are still so strong that the housing function in and around the city centre is under constant pressure. Still, the zone surrounding the inner city is a concentration area of households containing the relatively poor and unemployed and consequently also the home for many immigrant households. But the expanding business services are nearby. In addition, there is another threat for some of these population categories, especially those with the lowest incomes: the pressure upon part of the older neighbourhoods from the process of gentrification. That process has been going on in the city centre and some neighbouring quarters for a number of years. The renaissance of the

housing function in these areas can be mainly found in the historically attractive parts. Young, well-earning childless households are the main demand category. A result of this gentrification, among other things, is that the rent in those areas is forced up and households with modest means, among which there are many immigrants, cannot afford to live there anylonger (Gercke, 1994). One of the strategies to be able to stay in these areas under pressure, once income levels become insufficient, is to live in overcrowded situations.

#### 4.3 Ethnic segregation in Frankfurt am Main

Within Germany Frankfurt is not only leader in the field of finance, but also as far as the share of immigrants of the population is concerned. Table 4-1 shows an outline of the main nationalities in the city.

In the introduction we mentioned a rapid increase in the number of immigrants in Germany in the early nineties. Frankfurt is no exception to this rule. On 1 January 1988 still only 20.8 per cent were immigrants, out of a total of 621 379 inhabitants. While the total population has increased by more than 6 per cent, the share of immigrants has risen by 36 per cent. The growth of the immigrant population with over 50 000 persons in the intervening period prevented a decrease in the total population. However, in 1993 and 1994 even immigration no longer offered any comfort; in these years there was a net population loss. These figures do not take illegal immigration into account. It was in 1995 estimated that about 25 000 illegal Bosnians lived in the town.

The statistics of the municipality of Frankfurt distinguish between *Ortsteile* and the more detailed *Stadtbezirke*. Table 4-2 shows an outline of the characteristics of both scales.

TABLE 4-1 Main nationalities in Frankfurt on 1 January 1994

Category	Number	%
Turks	35399	5.4
Moroccans	9527	1.5
Spaniards	6655	1.0
Italians	16433	2.5
Greek	8825	1.3
Former Yugoslavians	48816	7.4
Other nationalities	65098	9.2
Total immigrants	186429	28.3
 Total population	658815	100.0

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch Frankfurt am Main 1994, p. 16

TABLE 4-2 Spatial levels in Frankfurt

Unit	Number population	Average population	Maximum population	Minimum deviation	Standard
Ortsteil	45	14640	32797	380	8562
Stadtbezirke	118	5779	16101	102	3040


Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch Frankfurt am Main 1994, p. 16

At a minimum acceptable size of 250 inhabitants in a territory, one of the 118 units of the *Stadtbezirke* level drops out, but the influence on the values in the table is negligible. The table shows that quite some variation according to population exists within the *Ortsteile* level. Although a choice in favour of *Stadtbezirke* offers more details, the problem is that no data on the various nationalities of the inhabitants are published at this level. It is a fundamental problem, which means that a choice in favour of the level *Stadtbezirke* necessarily has to be abandoned. However, the *Ortsteil* level can be linked to files with the most important nationalities. That is an essential advantage. Even the higher average population and the large variation according to population that exists between a number of *Ortsteile* does not counterbalance the disadvantage of the lack of a subdivision according to nationality.

As in Amsterdam and Brussels it is improbable that the 28.3 per cent of immigrants in Frankfurt are proportionally distributed across the *Ortsteile*. Map 4-1 shows the distribution of persons who do not have German nationality. It turns out that exactly two thirds of the *Ortsteile* have a share of *Ausländer* that lies below the urban average. It is striking that all *Ortsteile* have a share of at least ten per cent *Ausländer*. On the other side of the coin, the *Ortsteil* Bahnhofsviertel especially scores extremely high with 81 per cent. The big difference from number two, Flughafen, is that 5313 persons live in Bahnhofsviertel and only 380 persons in Flughafen. All in all, Map 4-1 clearly shows that *Ausländer* are chiefly present in the central parts of Frankfurt.

The urban average of 28.3 per cent may also conceal differences between the various nationalities. Map 4-2, for the group South Mediterraneans, consisting of Turks and Moroccans, shows where *Ortsteile* with over and underrepresentation are situated. The distribution of this category is flatter than with *Ausländer* as a whole: 58 per cent of the *Ortsteile* have a share of South Mediterraneans that is smaller than would be expected on the basis of the urban average. The extreme values are comparatively low: with *Ausländer* as a whole the maximum score is a factor 2.9 larger than the average, the South Mediterraneans have only a factor 2.2. When looking at the pattern on the map it is striking that the South Mediterraneans draw a line through the city in an east-west direction.

Map 4-3 shows the distribution of the group of North Mediterraneans across Frankfurt.




**Source:** Amt für Statistik, Wahlen und Einwohnerwesen, Stadt Frankfurt.

28.3 per cent of the population of Frankfurt  
am Main does not have the German nationality.

Percentage foreigners.  
45 Ortsteile.

57.0 - 81.0	(2)
42.7 - 57.0	(2)
28.3 - 42.7	(10)
0.0 - 28.3	(30)

MAP 4-1 Ausländer in Frankfurt am Main, 1993 (31/12)




Source: Amt für Statistik, Wahlen und Einwohnerwesen, Stadt Frankfurt

The category South-Mediterranean consists of Turkish (35 399) and Moroccan (9 527) persons. They form 6.8 per cent of the population of Frankfurt am Main.

Percentage South-Mediterranean.  
45 Ortsteile

- 13.3 - 14.8 (2)
- 10.1 - 13.3 (4)
- 6.8 - 10.1 (13)
- 0.0 - 6.8 (25)

MAP 4-2      South Mediterraneans in Frankfurt am Main, 1993




Source: Amt für Statistik, Wahlen und Einwohnerwesen, Stadt Frankfurt.

The North-Mediterranean category consists of Spanish (6 655), former Yugoslavian (48 816), Greek (8 825) and Italian (16 433) persons, 12.3 per cent of the population of Frankfurt am Main.

Percentage North-Mediterranean  
45 Ortsteile.

■	27.8 - 41.3 (2)
■	20.0 - 27.8 (3)
■	12.3 - 20.0 (12)
■	0.0 - 12.3 (27)

MAP 4-3 North Mediterraneans in Frankfurt am Main, 1993



MAP 4-4 Turkish Nationals in Frankfurt am Main, 1993

Just as with the South Mediterraneans, it is striking that the distribution is relatively flat compared to Map 4-1. The highest score is only a factor 2.1 higher than the urban average of 12.3 per cent.

Map 4-4 contains data on people with a Turkish nationality. Since they dominate the South Mediterranean population in Frankfurt, the pattern does not differ very much from the one shown in Map 4-2. Minor variations can be seen in the neighbourhoods in the very center of the city, not far from the central railway station. The largest concentration of Turks is in Bahnhofsviertel, while the largest concentrations of South Mediterranean people are in the adjacent neighbourhoods to the west. In fact, the map that shows the distribution of Turks clearly illustrates that the spatial separation of each immigrant category as such is not of a distinct character. The spatial distribution of Turks in Frankfurt is much less marked than the distribution of Moroccans in Brussels or Amsterdam.

If the information of all maps is combined, we can conclude that the total of 81 per cent *Ausländer* in the *Ortsteil* Bahnhofsviertel and the relatively high percentage of *Ausländer* in the adjacent neighbourhood of Gutleutviertel (61 per cent) can only be reached if more groups of nationalities live together in that place, which are therefore not segregated from each other. A view at the maximum values for the individual nationalities confirms that line of thought. The maximum share that persons from former Yugoslavia take in an *Ortsteil* is 23.5 per cent in Frankfurt am Main. The maximum share for the Greeks is 14.6 per cent, for the Turks 11.3 per cent, for the Italians 8.2 per cent and for the Moroccans as well as the Spaniards a share under 5 per cent. The more or less uniform spatial distribution of the most important categories of immigrants seems to indicate that those who divide the accommodation have used a certain spatial dispersal policy for at least several years.

The extent to which the various nationalities live in segregation has been calculated again using the index of dissimilarity and the index of segregation (Table 4-3).

TABLE 4-3 Indices of segregation of the selected nationalities, Ortsteile 1 January 1994

Groups of nationalities	Index of segregation
Ausländer versus Germans	17
Turks versus Rest of the Population	19
Moroccans versus Rest of the Population	22
South Mediterraneans versus Rest of the Population	19
Yugoslavians versus Rest of the Population	23
Italians versus Rest of the Population	14
Greek versus Rest of the Population	31
Spaniards versus Rest of the Population	21
North Mediterraneans versus Rest of the Population	21

Compared to the other cities in this study, and as expected from the analysis presented above, the scores are rather low. However, it should be noted that the size of the *Ortsteile* varies somewhat. Especially the *Ortsteil* Gallusviertel somewhat throws a spanner in the works with a population of nearly 29 000 and 50 per cent immigrants.

In addition to the index of segregation in which the two groups together make up the whole population, the index of dissimilarity can be calculated with two groups that do not make up the whole population. For the sake of completeness a category of South and North Mediterraneans has also been constructed in addition to a calculation with the assistance of a number of individual nationalities. The category first mentioned consists in this case of Turks and Moroccans, while the Spaniards, Italians, persons from the former Yugoslavia and Greek have been combined in a category of North Mediterraneans.

The scores on the indices of dissimilarity are also rather low. Compared to Amsterdam (table 2-5) and Brussels (table 3-2) it is striking that there are no scores higher than thirty. Even the difficult (geopolitical) relation between Greece and Turkey finds no reflection in a high score. From the maps and the indices of segregation the conclusion can be drawn that the immigrants in Frankfurt live less segregated than in Amsterdam and Brussels. Especially interesting, however, is the mixture of the nationalities: no nationality individually takes a large share in an *Ortsteil*, but all of them together make up a share of 81.0 per cent in the Bahnhofsviertel, and high scores in several other neighbourhoods as well. At first glance there seems to be little difference from a neighbourhood combination such as Bijlmer Centrum in Amsterdam with 76.4 per cent ethnic minorities (see Map 2-1). However, in Bijlmer Centrum the South and North Mediterraneans are almost completely absent, because they have an overrepresentation in other neighbourhood combinations (Map 2-3).

TABLE 4-4 Indices of dissimilarity of selected nationalities, Ortsteile 1 January 1994

Groups of nationalities	Index of dissimilarity
Turks versus Germans	27
Turks versus Moroccans	15
Turks versus Greek	24
Turks versus Italians	12
South Mediterraneans versus Germans	22
South Mediterraneans versus North Mediterraneans	14
North Mediterraneans versus Germans	23
Yugoslavians versus Germans	26
Yugoslavians versus Italians	18
Yugoslavians versus Moroccans	24
Yugoslavians versus Greek	24

In Frankfurt all important nationalities are amply present in the central *Ortsteile*, and that is remarkable. This mixed population of the Bahnhofsviertel, Gutleutviertel, Gallusviertel and other neighbourhoods is one of the differences from a ghetto, because there one group takes up an extreme share of the population.

### **Conclusion of the quantitative analysis, Frankfurt am Main**

Compared to Brussels and Amsterdam Frankfurt am Main has a more limited segregation of immigrants. A striking result, because Frankfurt am Main is very similar to both cities as far as the total number of the population and the share of immigrants of the total population are concerned. Not only is there a limited segregation between autochthonous Germans and immigrants, but also between the various nationalities. Closely connected with this is the fact that the high shares of immigrants in the neighbourhoods considered are the result of a ‘co-operation’ of the various nationalities. Amsterdam and Brussels, more than Frankfurt am Main have a separation between categories of ethnic groups.

#### **4.4 Policy in Frankfurt**

The inflow of immigrants at the end of the eighties meant that German society had to find a way to handle this new development. Questions such as “to what extent is Germany a country of immigration?”, “what is a pluralistic society?” and “does the position of minorities demand a priority policy at certain points?” gradually became subjects of discussion. It is not realistic to expect that a society would be able to find answers to questions of this nature in a short time. To this very day matters that appear to be trivial can lead to heated discussions. In this respect Germany does not differ from the Netherlands or France, where the jargon of the pluralistic society at times stumbles over the daily practice of, for example, the wearing of headscarves at school. In Germany, however, people have long stuck to the idea that the presence of immigrants, and especially of the guest workers, was of a temporary nature. Moreover, Germany has the strictest naturalization legislation of all countries in this study. Gradually the awareness has taken root that the presence of guest workers is permanent, and also the government gives the first policy incentives to react to the presence and the problems of the immigrants. In Germany Frankfurt am Main, the case study in this chapter, is regarded as a forerunner in the field of (thinking about) the integration of immigrants. This does not alter the fact that, occasionally, in this city differences of opinion also come to light.

#### **Institutional context**

Germany, just like the United States, is a federal state in which the different states play an important part. Only one eighth part of the budget of the national government is aimed at domestic expenses. For this project it is important that the German federal gov-

ernment determines guidelines for admittance. Moreover, the federal government determines the naturalization procedure for the immigrants that are present in Germany. Compared to the other countries in this project the naturalization guidelines are extremely strict. Only if someone can prove that he/she has lived in Germany for 10 years, speaks the language, has no police record, has a dwelling of his own, can support himself and wishes to give up another nationality, then it will become *possible* to apply for German nationality. Cohn-Bendit calculated that if Germany were to adopt the French model of naturalization over 3.5 million immigrants would be immediately entitled to the German nationality (Cohn-Bendit 1992, p. 334).

The Bundesländer (federal states), the middle level of government, have a large degree of autonomy. The budget of an average federal state would not cut a poor figure in an international comparison of countries. Also according to job responsibilities the federal state has many authorities. For example the control over urban renewal and road construction rests in fact with the federal states.

Compared to their Dutch colleagues the German municipalities also seem to be considerably more autonomous. In the Netherlands only 10 to 15 per cent of the budget is covered by local taxes, for the German municipalities that share lies above 30 per cent.

In the initial stage of this project the choice of Frankfurt was also based on its comparability, according to population and percentage of immigrants, to, for example, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Brussels. The big difference from a number of other German cities that were potentially eligible, however, lies in the Amt für Multi-Kulturelle Angelegenheiten (AMKA), which was founded in 1989. Frankfurt was the first in then West Germany to found such an organization. While in 1989 the question of whether Germany was a country of immigration was not answered unequivocally by the national politicians, at a local level the effort was undertaken, also without backing of 'big politics', to establish a municipal institution, "which recognizes the reality of immigration" (Cohn-Bendit 1992, p. 284). On the initiative of the Grünen (Green Party) the coalition of that party together with the SPD gave an institutional basis to the existence of immigrants in German society. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a person who considerably influences public opinion in the discussion on immigrants in Germany, does not refrain from pointing to the importance of such an institution in a country where immigrants have hardly any political rights. In the organization of the municipality of Frankfurt the AMKA takes a place right under the responsibility of the Oberbürgermeister (Mayor), with similar rights and duties as the other urban departments. Amtsleiterin Rosi Wolf-Almaesh, together with fifteen employees, tries to achieve a process of readjustment in local government. Although, on her own account, that resembles a struggle of David against Goliath, in the six years since the foundation a number of issues have been achieved, which will be discussed in the course of this chapter.

## Measures

### *Spatial dispersal policy*

In the introduction we mentioned the spatial dispersal measure that was adopted by Frankfurt am Main in 1977. That *Zuzugssperre* (ban on settlement) was issued by the Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung. Quarters with over 12 per cent immigrants could be 'closed' to new immigrants according to that legislation. Refusing entries causes such a measure to fall under the denominator of integral spatial dispersal policy. Although our informants in Frankfurt could well recall the existence of the legislation in the seventies, they consider the actual effect minimal. According to reports, the abolition of the measure after a legal judgement at the end of 1977 was not regretted. Other attempts to create forms of integral spatial dispersal policy have not been reported.

A more selective variety of spatial dispersal policy can be aimed at the housing market. In Frankfurt am Main such a form of spatial dispersal policy has existed under the denominator of *Frankfurter Vertrag* (Frankfurter Treaty) since 1994. The Vertrag is an agreement between the city, the *Wohnungsamt* (Housing Department) and a number of private building contractors (*Wohungsgenossenschaften*). Two aspects characterize the new agreement. First, it is anticipated that the council housing will be delegated to the large building contractors. This not only involves the construction of the dwellings but also the letting, in co-operation with the local housing department which recommends candidate tenants (consecutively three at most) of each vacant dwelling. However, the building contractor is allowed to refuse a recommended household - only rarely and with reasons. In that case the local housing department will recommend another household. If a tenant cannot pay the rent, the authorities will pay it. Thus the building contractor does not run any risk.

Second, a spatial distribution of population categories across the whole city is anticipated in the agreement. For that reason regulations for quotas are included. The distribution of the dwellings (and this applies to newly built houses as well as to vacant existing rented dwellings) should attempt to achieve such a distribution in the quarter that at most 30 per cent of the tenants are immigrants, 10 per cent *Aussiedler* and 15 per cent recipients of social security (*Bezieher von Socialhilfeleistungen*). Moreover, 25 per cent should come from their own quarter. This involves an indication of the maximum levels. This measure, an explicit form of spatial dispersal policy, has been introduced to prevent the development of ghettos and a policy aimed at social mix. They do not want 'quasi amerikanischen Verhältnissen' (a situation as in America), as one of the local SPD politicians said in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (24 Feb. 1994). This opinion is said to be broadly supported. Many hold the opinion that large concentrations of immigrants lead to problems and neglect of the living environment. In conversation, they add that the immigrants themselves do not want concentration either. Neither do the building contractors want it; and the autochthonous Germans prefer spatial dispersal to concentration as well.

Broadly speaking it is true that in Germany the municipalities are responsible for the distribution of social rented dwellings. In principle there could be more municipalities that use such a system of distribution of the types of dwellings. However, our informers pointed out that the regulations for quota with regard to immigrants considered to be an exceptional measure within Germany.

#### *Compensating policy*

The persons interviewed in Frankfurt were not always inclined to speak freely about possible specific policy measures for immigrants. It turned out that in the spring of 1995 - the time of the interviews - there was some uncertainty about the future within the local government. The resignation of *Oberbürgermeister* Andreas von Schoeler had aroused the emotions considerably, also because a number of the members of the governing SPD had voted against their own mayor. The expectation was that relations would become normalized with the election of the new mayor in the summer of 1995.

Compensating incentive measures aimed at quarters that resemble the Dutch social renewal policy were not found in Frankfurt am Main. The same applies for the federal state of Hessen and the federal German government.

In the labour market, the housing market and in education there are no specific compensating measures going on at the moment. According to AMKA a discussion about positive discrimination is going on, but the principal gain of the past few years was the introduction of a number of measures that work more explicitly to the advantage of the immigrants. With regard to the labour market a discussion is going on at the moment about deregulation, which will eventually work to the advantage of immigrants. For some time now the immigrants have been of the opinion that private initiative should receive more room; they often feel patronized. Fewer regulations could contribute to reduction of the share of the population that is dependent on some form of social support. In 1992 nearly 65 000 inhabitants of Frankfurt received *Socialhilfe* (nearly 10 per cent of the total population). The appeal to this social security had increased by over 75 per cent (Klueß 1994) compared to 1982. According to our informers, more private initiative would contribute to a decrease in the number of benefits. However, in practice it is difficult to judge between the preservation of the present regulations or a smaller package. An emotionally charged example is the informal Sunday market. This market is organized by local Poles and attracts many thousands of people. The inconvenience it causes to some Frankfurters leads to heated discussions with supporters of such a deregulated market.

An indirect measure in the housing market is the *Fehlbelegungsabgabe*. This measure was introduced by the federal government and accentuated by the federal state of Hessen. The idea is that the rent of a dwelling should match the income of a household. If the income is too high, it is compulsory to pay a supplement, viz., a *Fehlbelegungsabgabe*. In Frankfurt more than 10 000 households pay such a rent tax. The proceeds are used to build new houses with affordable rents. According to AMKA the measure is an

important tool in improving moves up the housing ladder. The expectation was expressed that immigrants who took a worse position in the housing market would take advantage of this measure. However, within the academic world people were of the opinion that the moving up the housing ladder was hardly improved by the measure. Not only does the necessity of supplementary payment start only when the income limit that belongs to a certain rent level is exceeded by 40 per cent; also the supplementary amount that has to be paid is not very high. On average we are talking about some dozens of marks a month.

### Evaluation

Although the Frankfurter Vertrag had been active for only one year, it was obvious that a number of side effects had been felt. The most important disadvantage is the distribution of the types of dwellings across the various quarters. Not all quarters have characteristics that contribute to the idea of mixture. An example is the situation in the old dilapidated quarters in the centre where 60 to 70 per cent immigrants live. In accordance with the effects of the Frankfurter Vertrag none of the immigrant households is now eligible for a dwelling in these quarters, not even when sufficient suitable dwellings are vacant. Quarters in other parts of the city where the share of immigrants is below 30 per cent do not always have a housing stock that is attractive to immigrant households. The perception is that immigrants do not in general get a good chance on the housing market due to the agreement. That is even more true because the regulations for quota mention a maximum of 30 per cent immigrants in the rented sector. Since that is almost equal to the share of immigrants in the entire city and under the Vertrag and through the municipality only about 70-80 000 rented dwellings are let, this implies that in the other tenures (owner-occupier, private rent) about 30 per cent should also be reached. There is a chance that the measure for quotas again drives the immigrant households into the arms of the private rack-renters. "If an immigrant rents from a private landlord the living conditions are almost always bad", observed one of our informants.

However, problems not only occur on the side of the immigrants who are looking for a dwelling. It turns out that part of the autochthonous population do not want to live in concentration areas of immigrants. The Gallusviertel, a concentration area of the financially weak, containing many immigrants (nearly 50 per cent), provides a clear example. This is a not-yet-renewed, old quarter. The Galluspark was constructed within this quarter, a new-construction project with mainly social council housing, as well as a few private dwellings. Starting point in the attempts to let these dwellings was the pursuit of a mixed population. However, it very soon turned out that the German households did not want these new dwellings, because of the immigrants. Many were not deterred by the rather harsh sanctions of the government; they were placed at the bottom of the list of persons seeking housing. In the end, to avoid vacancies, the municipality was more or less forced to admit a larger share of *Aussiedler* and immigrants than they had intended:

"It is difficult to find German families who want to live among 30 per cent immigrants", an interviewee sighed.

Applying quotas in quarters with a mainly white, well-to-do population turned out to meet with difficulties as well. The discussion about the dwellings of Americans quartered in Frankfurt that are about to become vacant is a case in point. The local authority tries to acquire a number of these dwellings. In most cases these are large and relatively expensive, rented dwellings. This initiative is a great point of contention; many fear that the areas in which these dwellings are situated will become inhabited by the socially weak, immigrants and the like. The NIMBY (*not in my backyard*) effect applies here too.

In both cases the immigrants were very interested. Many of them might be able to pay the rent, after all. But a problem also arises for the landlord. The fact is, the assigning of quotas leads to loss of rent due to prolonged procedures. But some landlords prefer loss of rent to letting to immigrants (above the quota).

### **Conclusion of the policy section, Frankfurt am Main**

An outsider who examines the policy with regard to ethnic minorities in Frankfurt am Main gets the idea that the issue of integration has gradually come to dominate the traditional approach to immigration. AMKA strikes a completely different note, but it is not clear to what extent their ideas are actually converted into policy. It is true that the presence of AMKA has initiated a process of awakening. A conclusion that can be drawn from other case studies is that in general a change in this sensitive policy field cannot be reached in the short term. As far as that is concerned, Frankfurt am Main is still at the starting point.

#### **4.5                  The 'development' of Düsseldorf**

Düsseldorf is situated in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, the most urbanized and industrialized federal state of Germany. The city shows the typical characteristics and developments of a post-industrial city and as such shows a strong resemblance to most of the other cities dealt with in this book. Over the past twenty years the total population has declined, while the number of immigrants has increased, both absolutely and in relative terms. In a way the inflow of immigrants prevented a decline in the total population. Moreover, after a many years' decline in the population the centre of Düsseldorf has shown an increase in the number of inhabitants in recent years. The housing stock in Düsseldorf is increasing and that coincides with a growing share of small households - usually single person households. Düsseldorf resembles Amsterdam in its relatively small and hardly increasing share of the owner-occupied dwellings (in 1987 a little less than 15 per cent). In the rental sector (about 85 per cent) the share of social rented dwellings has

diminished in recent years due to a lack of financial means. In 1987 the share amounted to about 25 per cent, while the most recent figures show about 15 per cent.

The spatial pattern and subsequently also the social pattern of the city is very much shaped by economic developments and office locations. The city centre was almost entirely (85 per cent) destroyed during the Second World War. Redevelopment of offices took place in the central parts of the city and expansion took place only after 1970 on the fringes of the central area along main traffic arteries. Frequently and initially that process implied the removal of residential uses. Another development that took place over the past decades is that of new clusters of offices on recycled former industrial 'brownfield' sites. However, most recently that development was subject to heavy criticism. Many residents and politicians argued that too little space was left for housing purposes (Glebe 1994, p. 130). Possibly the debate was also fuelled by some other developments which occurred over the past two decades. Since the seventies, and especially following the Urban Development Act of 1971, which shifted the attention from new construction to renewal and the improvement of existing stock, the government provided extra money to speed up the process of modernization and quality improvement. The rehabilitation and renewal process had two important effects: quality improvement and the prevention of further physical decline in many inner city residential neighbourhoods was one effect that was highly welcomed. The higher rents and the diminishing stock of cheap housing for rent was not. In fact, another process that we also referred to with regard to Amsterdam, Brussels and Frankfurt is aggravating the situation: the gentrification process and especially the conversion of rented flats into owner-occupier condominiums contributed to what Glebe called the "creeping displacement process of lower income groups by higher income, middle class groups". Since 1989 these processes have run parallel to the migration processes that were triggered by the reunification of both Germanies, involving huge numbers of refugees from the former GDR and the repatriating of Germans, but also by the wars in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the world. Together these processes have resulted in an enormous pressure on the housing market and a great shortage of affordable housing.

In economic terms the city of Düsseldorf succeeded in keeping the number of jobs fairly constant over the last thirty years, but the composition has changed. About 1960 the industrial sector, with a share of 48 per cent, was somewhat smaller than the service sector with 52 per cent. The profile of a service city, which consequently existed in 1960, has been very much reinforced thereafter. About 1990 the industrial sector constituted not more than 23 per cent of employment, against a service sector of over 75 per cent. The industrial employment is mainly concentrated in the other cities in the Ruhr area. Düsseldorf acts as administrative centre for this area: the main offices of industrial companies in the Ruhr area are situated in the city. In this respect Düsseldorf is called the *Schreibtisch* - the 'writing desk' - of the German Ruhr area.

The dynamics in employment we mentioned also has spatial consequences within Düsseldorf: the central quarters, although not losing economic power, have lost employment, while the quarters outside the centre have shown a growth in the number of jobs. When we review these trends in combination with the housing shortage and the development in the population an increase in commuting is to be expected. And that has been true to a large extent: in 1991 almost half of the jobs in Düsseldorf were taken by commuters.

Düsseldorf is an interesting case for this study because there is a striking contrast between the ‘traditional’ guest workers such as the Turks, and the more recent ‘luxury’ guest workers such as the Japanese, who are working for Japanese companies that control most of their German and European interests from Düsseldorf. Glebe (1994, p. 125) reported that 354 Japanese companies operated from the city, and 110 of them have their European headquarters there. In the sections to follow we will first give an impression of the distribution of immigrants across the city. Then we will pay attention to the policy with regard to immigrants.

#### **4.6 Ethnic segregation in Düsseldorf**

Table 4-5 shows an outline of the principal nationalities in Düsseldorf. The table shows that 16.3 per cent of the population of Düsseldorf has a foreign nationality. Within the urban area there are areas with over and underrepresentation. The statistics distinguish between two levels: on the one hand there is an official division into 49 *Stadtteile* and on the other hand there is a less common division into 455 electoral districts.

TABLE 4-5 Principal nationalities in Düsseldorf, 1993

Nationality	Number	%
Turk	16361	2.8
Moroccan	5919	1.0
Greek	10596	1.8
Former Yugoslavian	13336	2.3
Italian	6764	1.2
Spanish	3063	0.5
Japanese	4969	0.9
Other <i>Ausländer</i>	34081	5.8
Total <i>Ausländer</i>	95089	16.3
German	490079	83.7
<b>Total population</b>	<b>585168</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: G. Glebe, Heinrich Heine Universität

Because of the comparability with the *Ortsteile* level in Frankfurt am Main we chose the *Stadtteile* level in Düsseldorf.


Map 4-5 shows the distribution of persons with a foreign nationality across Düsseldorf. The legend shows that the share of immigrants in 29 of the 49 *Stadtteile* (59 per cent) is smaller than would be expected on the basis of the urban average of 16.3 per cent. Compared to Frankfurt am Main the maximum of 38.1 per cent seems low, but compared to the also much lower urban average the difference disappears almost completely. The map shows that the settlement of immigrants - just as in Frankfurt am Main - has been strongly concentrated in the older areas in the centre of the city.

The housing situation of the South Mediterraneans, Turks and Moroccans, shows a deviant picture. Map 4-6 shows a pattern that is less directed towards the centre. Instead, a concentration in the southeast axis is visible. The spatial distribution of the South Mediterraneans across the *Stadtteile* is a little more distorted than that of the immigrants as a whole: 63 per cent of the *Stadtteile* has a smaller share of South Mediterraneans than the urban average against 59 per cent for the immigrants as a whole. The maximum of 13.5 per cent in the *Stadtteil* Reisholz is a factor 3.6 higher than the urban average, while it is 2.3 (38.1 / 16.3 per cent) for the immigrants as a whole.

Map 4-7 shows the distribution of North Mediterraneans across Düsseldorf. Compared to the other two maps the distribution of this group seems even more extreme: 65.3 per cent of the *Stadtteile* has a share of North Mediterraneans that is lower than the urban average of 5.8 per cent. On the other hand the top is less extreme than with the South Mediterraneans: the maximum is a factor 2.8 higher than the urban average. Nevertheless the pattern in the map resembles that of the group of *Ausländer* in total.

Finally, Map 4-8 shows the spatial distribution of the largest immigrant category from non-industrialized countries in Düsseldorf, the Turkish nationals. Although their level of concentration is slightly higher than that of the South Mediterraneans as a whole (map 4-6), the similarity between the patterns shown in both maps is striking. In Düsseldorf, more than in any other city dealt with in this book, the residential patterns of Turks and of Moroccans turn out to be very similar. As in Frankfurt the concentration areas can be found in the vicinity of the central station of the city. In Düsseldorf the pattern has been extended, away from the centre of town towards the Southeastern residential districts.

The spatial patterns of the maps can be explained in the first place by the functioning of the housing market: the availability of cheap dwellings and the distribution of council housing. People have most chances of finding dwellings in areas where the quality of the dwellings is low. German families who lived in these poor dwellings and who could afford to move often moved to suburban areas or to better quality rented dwellings. Immigrants took advantage of these chances on the housing market. However, as stated before, urban renewal reduced the supply of cheap rented dwellings.




Source: Heinrich-Heine Universität.

16.3 per cent of the population of Düsseldorf does not have the German nationality.

Percentage foreigners  
49 Stadtteile.

- 33.1 - 38.1 (2)
- 24.7 - 33.1 (6)
- 16.3 - 24.7 (12)
- 0.0 - 16.3 (29)

MAP 4-5 Ausländer in Düsseldorf, 1993




Source: Heinrich-heine Universität.

The category South-Mediterranean consists of Turkish (16 361) and Moroccan (5 919) nationals. 3.7 per cent of the population of Düsseldorf belongs to this category.

Percentage South-Mediterranean  
49 Stadtteile.

■	10.2 - 13.5 (3)
■	7.0 - 10.2 (1)
■	3.7 - 7.0 (14)
□	0.0 - 3.7 (31)

MAP 4-6      South Mediterraneans in Düsseldorf, 1993




**Source:** Heinrich-Heine Universität.

The category North-Mediterranean consists of Greek (10 596), former Yugoslavian (13 336), Italian (6 764) and Spanish (3 063) persons. They form 5.8 per cent of the population of Düsseldorf.

**Percentage North-Mediterranean  
49 Stadtteile**

- 13.9 - 16.5 (3)
- 9.8 - 13.9 (6)
- 5.8 - 9.8 (8)
- 0.0 - 5.8 (32)

**MAP 4-7      North Mediterraneans in Düsseldorf, 1993**



Source: Heinrich-heine Universität.

The category Turkish consists of 16 361 persons,  
2.8 per cent of the population of Düsseldorf.

Percentage Turkish nationals.  
49 Stadtteile.

■	8,1 - 11,4	(3)
■	5,4 - 8,1	(2)
■	2,8 - 5,4	(14)
□	0,0 - 2,8	(30)

MAP 4-8 Turkish nationals in Düsseldorf, 1993

The result was a further concentration of immigrants in central quarters. Immigrants cannot expect any comfort from the allocation of rented dwellings by the council because of long waiting lists. The demand for cheap housing has increased sharply in the recent period, not only because of the inflow of asylum seekers and *Aussiedler* we referred to, but also because of the family reunification of guest workers and the increase in single and two-person households. The supply of social rented dwellings stayed behind due to a stop in council housing in the eighties and due to selling programmes. On balance, the result is increased mutual competition in the cheap housing sector.

Tables 4-6 and 4-7 show the values that apply for Düsseldorf on the index of segregation and on the index of dissimilarity. The first table shows that Düsseldorf does not have a strong segregation at the *Stadtteile* level. The results resemble the situation in Frankfurt am Main and, consequently, are lower than in Amsterdam. The position of the Japanese in Düsseldorf is remarkable. With a score of 56, Japanese are much more segregated than the other nationality groups. As a matter of fact, that special position resembles the situation in the Amsterdam region. After all, in Amsterdam-Buitenveldert, a neighbourhood in the southern sector of the city and the adjoining municipality of Amstelveen, the Japanese are also highly segregated.

The conclusion that Japanese live in much greater segregation remains the same when we split up the figures according to nationality. It is remarkable that Japanese not only live strongly segregated from South Mediterraneans, which is to be expected in view of the socio-economic differences, but also from Germans (a score of 56). Language, schools and other facilities aimed at the Japanese as a group will be of importance here.

TABLE 4-6 Indices of segregation for selected nationalities, Stadtteile 1 January 1994

Groups of nationalities	Index of segregation
Turks versus Rest of the Population	30
Moroccans versus Rest of the Population	27
South Mediterraneans versus Rest	27
Greek versus Rest	28
former Yugoslavians versus Rest	27
Italians versus Rest	25
Spaniards versus Rest	26
North Mediterraneans versus Rest	23
Japanese versus Rest	56
Other Immigrants versus Rest	16
Total Immigrants versus Germans	19

TABLE 4-7 Indices of dissimilarity for selected nationalities, Stadtteile 1 January 1994

Groups of nationalities	Index of dissimilarity
Turks versus Moroccans	22
South Mediterraneans versus Germans	28
South Mediterraneans versus Other Immigrants	28
South Mediterraneans versus Japanese	64
South Mediterraneans versus North Mediterraneans	18
North Mediterraneans versus Germans	25
North Mediterraneans versus Other Immigrants	18
North Mediterraneans versus Japanese	62
Germans versus Other Immigrants	17
Germans versus Japanese	56
Japanese versus Other Immigrants	52

The other groups have a score that hardly exceeds 30. Compared to other cities we discuss, and compared to many other European cities, there is in general a small degree of segregation.

#### **Conclusion of the quantitative analysis, Düsseldorf**

Just like Frankfurt am Main, Düsseldorf has a lower score on the indices of segregation. The position of the Japanese is exceptional: not only within Düsseldorf but also in Frankfurt am Main no other national group lives in such segregation. The question is whether and if so to what extent the government takes steps in Düsseldorf to influence ethnic segregation. Across the world, ethnic segregation of groups that score socio-economically well is not generally considered to be a problem. It is unlikely that it is a problem in Düsseldorf. However, in Frankfurt am Main it turned out that even with relatively low indices of segregation a considerable policy effort can be exerted. In the next section we will discuss whether the comparable indices for the other groups in Düsseldorf have provoked a similar policy reaction.

#### **4.7 Policy in Düsseldorf**

##### **Introduction and institutional context**

Partly the same social and institutional context applies to Düsseldorf as to Frankfurt am Main. The unification of former East and West Germany meant, among other things, an increasing pressure on the housing market in both cities, while the events in former Yugoslavia led to a growth in the number of refugees. The difference in position, how-

ever - Frankfurt am Main is nearer to Eastern Europe - may partly have caused a less spectacular increase in Düsseldorf. From an institutional perspective it is true that both cities have to operate in a context of *Bundesländer* and a federal government. As far as the second is concerned there should be no difference, but within the federal German order, the *Bundesländer* have ample opportunities to formulate their own policy. At the presentation of the measures it becomes clear that not all measures that are executed in Hessen have also won acceptance in North Rhine-Westphalia. At local level in Düsseldorf we have found no equivalent to AMKA in Frankfurt am Main. On the other hand more attention was paid to *Ausländerbeiräte*. This concept will be discussed in more detail in the 'Measures' section.

## Measures

### *Spatial dispersal policy and compensating policy*

In the seventies in Düsseldorf, just as in Frankfurt am Main, a debate was going on about spatial dispersal policy within the scope of the *Zuzugssperre*. After it failed no other form of spatial dispersal policy was found.

More generally, we did not find a specific immigrant policy. According to the respondents such a policy does not correspond with the principles of equal treatment and equal rights, which are cherished in Düsseldorf and which go well with the generally received opinions. From the side of the federal state of North Rhine Westphalia a special immigrant policy does not exist either, apart from a distribution of the inflow of asylum seekers through the assignment of quotas and the *Ausländerbeiräte* which became compulsory in 1994.

Up to the present Düsseldorf has not had a serious perception of problems: apart from the Japanese Düsseldorf does not have large concentrations of immigrants; the Japanese manage very well and they even count as neighbours that increase the status of the neighbourhood; the presence of the other immigrants does not cause exceptional problems. Only the very small group of gypsies feeds the opinion that immigrants are different and therefore need special attention and treatment.

However, for the time being that rather leads to irritation than to a policy aimed at the gypsies. The starting point of equal treatment and policy on the basis of problems and not on the basis of ethnic characteristics, however, remains firmly in force. The informers do believe in the correctness of that policy, because specific policy would lead to protest from the rest of the (German) population and therefore would be unsuccessful. Fear of the creation of 'an ethnic underclass' is not clearly present.

These starting points are, for example, recognizable in the field of the housing market. The number of dwellings that are eligible for housing allocation by the *Amt für Wohnungswesen der Stadt Düsseldorf* (Housing Department) is declining rapidly. At the moment Düsseldorf has about 310 000 dwellings; 44 000 of them are still eligible for housing distribution as social rented dwellings. There are now 7 150 households on the

waiting list that are eligible for housing allocation, about 3 per cent of the total population of Düsseldorf. Immigrant households make up about 12 per cent of the total number of households (about 15 per cent of the population), but at the moment they make up 33 per cent of the list of persons seeking housing; in other words, a considerable overrepresentation. About ten years ago that overrepresentation did not exist. However, the percentage of immigrants on the list of persons seeking housing increased sharply over the past few years because of the large inflow. The *Amt für Wohnungswesen der Stadt Düsseldorf* supervises on their own accord (i.e. not on the basis of a decision of the council and also without control from the political side) the fair and proportional distribution of the dwellings that become vacant; so, at the moment, the immigrant households are allocated about a third of the dwellings that become vacant, that is to say without assigning quotas. However, the housing shortage in Düsseldorf does not change because of that. In short, care is taken that ethnic groups also get their share, but there is no specific policy, either as regards spatial dispersal or as regards compensation.

The same holds for the policy on the homeless in Düsseldorf. At the moment Düsseldorf has about 1 750 homeless households; about 1 000 of them are single men and women. Of the rest of the households, which are thus families, about half are immigrants, i.e. a relatively high share. The *Sozialamt der Stadt Düsseldorf* ensures that these homeless are attended to on the basis of equal rights. But when homeless immigrants are accommodated in temporary lodgings their nationalities are taken into account to prevent conflicts and to ensure the tolerance that is needed when people have to share accommodation.

In Düsseldorf the largest problem for the immigrant population is considered to be not the working of the housing market but the working of the labour market, the acquisition of qualifications and educational training in order to facilitate entry into the labour market. However, in this field, too, only general policy is found, once again because the German population is also hit by unemployment and therefore a compensating policy specifically aimed at immigrants is considered not correct; it would also meet with insufficient acceptance from the German population. There are language courses for immigrants, but these are not compulsory. Düsseldorf partly pays for language courses, but most of the time they are given on the basis of private initiatives (by churches and the Adult Education Centre, for example). An exception are the *Aussiedler* from Poland, who do not speak German; in their first year they have to follow an intensive language course. Such a regulation does not apply to asylum seekers.

The only item on which a specific policy can be recognized is the election of *Ausländerbeiräte*. Immigrants have no voting rights in German municipalities. A measure to correct this somewhat is that in the municipalities of North Rhine Westphalia with at least 5000 immigrants *Ausländerbeiräte* have to be elected since 1994; the same applies to municipalities with at least 2 000 immigrants, provided at least 200 appeal for it; the other municipalities are free to form such an *Ausländerbeirat*. These are councils consisting of immigrants that make it possible for immigrants to make their interests and

needs known through advice to the city councils, so that immigrants too can influence decisions of these city councils. So they are ‘advisory bodies for immigrant fellow citizens’: “Der *Beirat* vertritt die Interessen der ausländische Einwohnerinnen/Einwohner. Er ist bestrebt, unter Berücksichtigung der einzelnen Nationalitäten die Lebensverhältnisse der ausländische Einwohnerinnen/Einwohner zu verbessern, insbesondere sich der sozialen, schulischen, kulturellen, beruflichen, wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Belange anzunehmen. Der *Ausländerbeirat* kann sich mit allen Angelegenheiten der Gemeinde befassen” (Statistische Informationen Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf 1995, p. 5).

The elections are held about the same time as the ‘real’ council elections. The *Ausländerbeiräte* are elected for five years. In Düsseldorf in 1994 *Ausländerbeirat* elections were held on a voluntary basis with, in principle, proportional representation per group of nationality. In the regulation that the federal state of North Rhine Westphalia passed in 1994, that principle was abandoned and so one nationality group could win all seats.

There was no positive judgement about the functioning of the *Ausländerbeirat* in Düsseldorf. The parties and councillors of the *Beirat* do not have a line of policy; they do not have clear issues to focus on. They only react ritually. Therefore, the *Beirat* has hardly any influence. Moreover, according to the informers the latest, compulsory elections have certainly not shown any improvement compared to those of 1989. The turnout at the elections was even lower (15.9 per cent in 1994 against 23.1 per cent in 1989). Furthermore, the composition of the *Beirat* has become more one-sided: in 1989 the proportional representation provided a broad composition; abandoning that principle in combination with the low, but per nationality different, turnout has led to a dominance of fundamentalist Turks in the *Beirat* that was elected in 1995. That has sharply degraded the status of the *Beirat* among the German as well as the immigrant population.

### **Conclusion of the policy section, Düsseldorf**

Contrary to what was encountered in Frankfurt am Main and in the city of Amsterdam, Düsseldorf has hardly any specific ethnic policy. In accordance with policy, segregation and concentration are not considered a problem. The key informers in Düsseldorf do not expect a change in the near future.

#### **4.8**

#### **Conclusion**

The situation in two German cities has been discussed in this chapter. There are striking similarities between these cities. Both Frankfurt am Main and Düsseldorf have low scores on the indices of segregation. Furthermore, the presence of immigrants is concentrated in or close to the centres in both cities. Nevertheless, there are some differences between the cities, especially in accordance with policy. In Düsseldorf the segregation of

immigrants is not considered a problem. An explanation for this may be found in the mainly good to very good socio-economic position of the immigrants present (Japanese). A comparison with Amsterdam is compelling: the segregation of Japanese in a sector of Metropolitan Amsterdam is not considered a problem, either. Frankfurt am Main, on the contrary, chose for an active approach to the problems that are connected with the presence of immigrants in the city with the creation of AMKA. On the housing market there is intervention at municipal level through the Frankfurter Vertrag. A clear linkage between figures and policy is intended because the housing distribution is compared to the presence of immigrants in the area concerned. However, the evaluation shows that a number of side effects disturb the intended effects.

## 5

# Great Britain: London and Manchester

At the end of the nineteenth century Great Britain was still generally regarded as the most powerful state in the world. The country had to give up a great deal of ground in the twentieth century. At this moment Great Britain has descended to a middle-position in the world economy, with some peaks, such as the financial services in the City of London.

The situation of ethnic minorities in Great Britain is inseparably connected with the (colonial) history of rise and decline. In a direct sense the tables in this chapter show that the largest part of the minorities are related to one of the former colonies. In a more general sense the combination of economic decline and constitutional peculiarities offered a fertile breeding ground for a radical socio-economic experiment during the past fifteen years (Hutton, 1995). With measures such as *Right to Buy*, *Poll Tax*, reorganization of local government and other market-oriented plans, the *New Right* has pursued a policy that in many respects is more related to that of the United States than to that of the geographically closer European countries.

In this chapter we discuss the situation of ethnic minorities in two cities, London and Manchester. The special position of London emerges from the figures of the latest census of 1991. Not only does one in five inhabitants of London belong to an ethnic minority, but the city accommodates nearly half of all minorities in Great Britain as well. In absolute numbers, almost 1.4 million inhabitants of London are counted as ethnic minorities. Manchester will be discussed subsequently. The importance of this city does not lie in an exceptionally large population, the city is much smaller than London but, on the contrary, in its absence. Manchester will allow us to determine in which way a city that, qua size of population, fits better with cities such as Brussels, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Stock-

holm and Amsterdam, manifests itself under a governmental regime that differs fundamentally.

The structure of this chapter, which differs slightly from the former chapter, is as follows. First a description of immigration at a national level is given. The history of immigration of three important groups in British society is briefly described, and some problems with definitions are discussed. What can be found in that source of information and what advantages and disadvantages can be distinguished? Against that background information it will be possible to discuss both cities in more detail. The brief outline of the urban development of each of the cities, followed by the description of ethnic segregation in both cities will be presented for London first and then for Manchester. The policy section will be a joint section for both cities, since policy with regard to ethnic minorities increasingly tends to be formulated in general terms at central government level and then applied to each local situation in very much the same way.

### **5.1 Immigrants in Great Britain**

The colonial history of the British empire is nowadays reflected in the large variety of population groups that live in Great Britain. The 1991 census shows that London has 33 communities with more than 10 000 persons that were born outside Great Britain. The largest groups have come from the Indian subcontinent, from Southeast Asia and from the Caribbean. Although migrants from overseas territories arrived in Great Britain long before the Second World War, the immigration really started in the fifties. The flourishing of British industry in the fifties and sixties created large shortages on the labour market. Male labour migrants from the British Commonwealth filled the spaces that arose, especially at the bottom of the labour market. The Caribbean as well as the Indian presence grew to a hundred thousand before 1960 (Peach, 1991, Ballard, 1994). Free access of inhabitants of Commonwealth countries was curbed in 1962. New migrants had to show a work permit that was issued by their future employer. Legislation was further tightened in 1968, and from the Immigration Act of 1971 the growth has mainly been caused by family reunification and excess of births. However, in recent years the number of asylum applications in the UK has risen rapidly. During the eighties and until 1990 the annual number of asylum applications that were registered never passed 10 000 people, as opposed to the situation in France where the figure never dropped below 10 000. However, from 1990 onwards, the UK figure climbed to almost 58 000 in 1991, whereas the French figure dropped from 60 000 in 1989 (the highest score of this country during the eighties) to 46 500 in 1991 (Champion 1994, p. 661). When compared with other countries in Europe or the US, Great Britain shows moderate immigration figures. In 1991 the net migration gain was 28 000. Almost 80 per cent of over 266 000 immigrants

came from the US, EU or Old and New Commonwealth countries. London accounted for one third of these immigrants.

Over the years the view of the immigrants themselves about an existence in Great Britain has changed. The original idea of return to the native country (*the myth of return*) has become less realistic as gradually women and children have come over and the migrants have simultaneously entered increasingly into social relationships within Great Britain. In the nineties a - further increasing - majority turned out to have British nationality. There were 1.9 million foreigners at that time, but the total population of immigrant origin was put at 4.5 million. With the fact that an ever larger part was born in Great Britain itself the traditional division according to native country has become outdated. With the existence of a Commonwealth the definition based on nationality has little point in it. One of the consequences is the change in the registration of native country/ethnicity in the statistics. In Great Britain a census is carried out every ten years; the latest being in 1991. Traditionally the census contained a question about the native country. As long as the ethnic groups consisted mainly of persons of the first generation, that phrasing was satisfactory. Since immigration in Great Britain started shortly after the war, the necessity to formulate an alternative phrasing was acknowledged in the seventies. A number of experiments were carried out, but in the end the alternatives turned out to be politically infeasible or poorly targeted. The 1981 census subsequently had only a question about native country. However, the discussion continued and in the 1991 census a question on ethnicity on the basis of self-identification was asked for the first time. On that basis about 3 million people labelled themselves as non-White. The question about native country remained in force. In practice that question is only still used by researchers at a comparison with earlier censuses. We will join that custom and present ethnic groups based on self-identification.

Although recent immigration is fairly moderate in terms of the number of people involved, Great Britain has a long history of immigration. Consequently, the first, the second and the third generation are discussed simultaneously, depending on the name of the ethnic group. The literature shows that the problems of the recently arrived Bangladeshis differ strongly from those of the persons from India who came earlier, despite of their for some people comparable background. Ballard (1994) described a process of growing heterogeneity within the ethnic groups that are present for a longer time. In a sense they begin to look like the autochthonous inhabitants. Generalizations about the fate of, for example, Pakistanis say less and less. Greater London is the city to show such developments. Will members of ethnic groups start suburbanizing within the urban area too? Does the heterogeneity becomes visible in the statistics? Do the Bangladeshis, in accordance with Ballard's idea, indeed have high scores on the indices of segregation?

The results of the census are presented for an extensive division into spatial levels, which is fixed for the entire United Kingdom. The lowest level is called an Enumerated District

(ED), with on average about 500 inhabitants. Greater London (6.5 million inhabitants) which is the geographically correct indication of London, is subdivided into 15 300 EDs. A level higher is the ward level of which Greater London has 815 or, if the category *Shipping* is omitted, 782 spacial units (with on average about 10 000 inhabitants). The third level is the borough, which roughly resembles the municipalities. Greater London has 33 boroughs. The fourth level is that of metropolitan areas. Greater London is subdivided into Inner and Outer London. For comparison: the metropolitan area of Manchester consist of 5624 EDs, 224 wards, ten boroughs and one metropolitan area.

In this chapter, after we have recalled a few elements of the development of Greater London, which are regarded as being important for the understanding of the patterns shown, we will give an impression in figures of the situation of ethnic groups in Greater London.

## 5.2 The ‘development’ of Greater London

Greater London takes an exceptional place within Great Britain. On indicators such as size of the population, surface area, economic significance and political power this urban area ranks first. From a comparative perspective the problem arises that Greater London is much larger and more heterogeneous than the other cities. This observation applies within Great Britain, but even more strongly when compared to most of the other cities dealt with in this study. The populations of the Black ethnic group as well as of the Indian Continent ethnic group could on their own fill a fairly large city. The size of the population in Greater London, however, offers the advantage that patterns of spatial sorting are better visible. Not only does Greater London have a very large population of minorities but also the large-scale presence of minorities there, as elsewhere in Britain, is an ‘older’ phenomenon than in cities such as Stockholm, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Amsterdam and Brussels.

However, in large metropolitan areas the distribution of immigrants and certain ethnic groups also depends on the urban development and transformation processes that have occurred in the past. When we look at London, perhaps we should even look beyond Greater London to capture the entire metropolitan area in which relevant interaction and suburbanization takes place. Studies covering the Southeast region may be relevant in this respect. Greater London, however, is a most convenient unit for analysis and has been chosen by many other researchers. Besides, the internal differentiation of Greater London is far from small and in functional terms it is approximately comparable to, for instance, the Brussels Capital Region. Not only is there a traditional contrast in terms of physical structure and people living there between the East End and the West End - roughly paralleled by relatively poor dominating the eastern, and relatively rich domi-

nating the western part of London, respectively - there are also major differences to be found at a more detailed level, within each of the areas distinguished.

Not unimportant in this respect is the fact that Greater London has not in fact existed since the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986. The unit now is scarcely more than a set of 33 local municipalities, the boroughs. Each of them has major responsibilities in the fields of education, road maintenance, waste collection and disposal, local taxes, etc. Only some tasks were transferred to higher political levels, i.e. to the Departments of Environment and of Transport. These tasks comprise strategic planning for the city region and the management of traffic on the main roads.

The fragmentation of London increased as a result of the demise of the GLC. According to Rusk (1993) such fragmentation will reduce the opportunities of the city to balance inequality and finally will result in more segregated structures and concentration of the poor in certain areas. In Rusk's view these poor will almost always be blacks and immigrants.

One of the things which coincided with deregulation in general and the abolition of the GLC in particular was the establishment of the market-oriented London Dockland Development Corporation (LDDC) and the introduction of a free enterprise zone in part of the Dockland area. The purpose was to achieve huge new economic developments in the area that had collapsed due to the dismantling of its former industrial and harbour functions. Although some major setbacks were experienced during the development of Docklands, of which the Canary Wharf projects are best known examples of initial failure, a new elan that started a few years ago seems to have resulted in a situation in which firms are finally on solid ground. So far, however, the economic impulses in the area have not had major effects on the weak socio-economic structure of the 'East End'. In April 1991 the boroughs with the highest unemployment rates were still Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Hackney and Newham in the East End. All experienced rates of unemployment of over 18 per cent. Lowest unemployment rates in the older areas of the city could be found in Camden, Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea, in the West End of London (Clout, 1994, p. 35).

An important element in the socio-spatial pattern that developed in association with the physical and economic changes that occurred, was the change in the nature of the housing market after the Housing Acts of the eighties. The owner-occupier sector was stimulated and increased at the expense of the social (council) housing sector. There were hardly any investments in the social housing stock anylonger, and a large share of local authority housing was sold off. As a result the rents of the remaining, reduced numbers of social rented dwellings increased. Consequently it became very difficult for low income households to find affordable housing. The areas which still have a large share of social housing in their stock are again located in the inner East End boroughs.

### 5.3 Ethnic segregation in Greater London

The figures in Table 5-1 show that the ethnic groups that were distinguished in the 1991 census are obviously overrepresented in Greater London. Especially the concentration of the Black ethnic group - 60 per cent of the total population of Great Britain lives in Greater London - is striking.

From Table 5-1 one can deduce that 20.1 per cent of the population of Greater London does not count themselves among the Whites ethnic group. Column three shows that the ethnic groups are obviously not proportionally divided throughout Great Britain. It is not too risky to assume that within Greater London, too - at a lower scale - there are places with over and underrepresentation of the groups concerned. The results of the 1991 census enable us to have a closer look at the spatial distribution of ethnic groups in London. In the first place we can look at the British equivalent of the German *Ausländer*, the Belgian immigrants or Dutch minorities: the non-White ethnic group as amalgam of the ethnic groups Black, Indian Continent, Chinese and Other that were mentioned in Table 5-1. Map 5-1 shows the spatial distribution of the non-White group across the urban area. Compared to other cities in this study the maximum scores are extremely high. The three highest scoring wards all exceed 75 per cent of non-Whites. This result receives extra emphasis because the set-up of the census excludes distortion by (too) small numbers of the population: the three wards have about 10 000 inhabitants each. Furthermore it is striking that the two highest scores are found in the borough of Ealing, which is situated on the outskirts of the agglomeration. Number three on the list is a ward in the central municipality of Tower Hamlets. Of the 780 wards, 480 (62 per cent) have a share of non-Whites that lies below the urban average of 20.1 per cent. The data also allow us to go a level deeper into them.

Table 5-1 Ethnic groups in the 1991 census

Ethnic groups	in Great Britain	in Greater London (GL)	% living in GL	% ethnic groups in GL
White	51873794	5333480	10	79.9
Black <sup>a</sup>	890727	535216	60	8.0
Indian Continent <sup>b</sup>	1479645	520645	35	7.8
Chinese	156938	56579	36	0.9
Other	487740	233679	48	3.5
Total	54888844	6679699	12	100.0

Source: OPCS 1993, Table 6

<sup>a</sup> Black consists of the main categories Black Caribbean, Black African and Black Other


<sup>b</sup> Indian Continent consists of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi

Then it is shown that a considerable variation at ED level can exist within the wards. An example is the ward of Shadwell in the borough of Tower Hamlets where the share of non-Whites is 47 per cent of the total population. However, within the ward, at ED level, the percentages of non-Whites vary from 3 to 94 per cent.

Map 5-1 shows that the concentration areas are mainly situated in and around the centre of Greater London. That is in accordance with the situation in many cities in Europe and the United States. However, there also turns out to be a certain amount of distribution to the borders, of suburbanization. This is an indication that the heterogeneity that is observed by authors such as Ballard really does exist and has a spatial effect. The mixture of the non-White ethnic group, however, is too rough a measuring instrument to interpret that process further. Itemizing according to ethnic group may offer a solution.

A first differentiation can be made by looking closer at the two largest ethnic categories, the Black and the ethnic group Indian Continent (Maps 5-2 and 5-3). Map 5-2 shows the spatial distribution of Blacks across Greater London. The legend shows that the group does not have a majority in any ward, although the ward of Liddle in the borough of Southwark comes close with 46.7 per cent. Over 500 of the 780 wards (64 per cent) have a share of Blacks that is smaller than the urban average of 8.0 per cent. Compared to Map 5-1 it is apparent that there is less fanning out across the urban area. Most wards with a high percentage Black population are located in central city boroughs around the City, predominantly on the east side and just south of the river Thames, in Hackney, Haringey, Southwark and Lambeth. One borough attracts special attention, the outer London borough of Brent also has a relatively high concentration of Blacks in its population. Map 5-3 shows the spatial distribution of the Indian Continent ethnic group. First it is noteworthy that the maximum scores are considerably higher than with the Black ethnic group. The maximum of 78.8 per cent in the ward of Northcote in the borough of Ealing means a factor 10.1 in relation to the urban average. Compared to the non-White and Black groups a factor ten is high, because the equivalent number is 4.5 for the first group and 5.8 for the second. Also the distribution is more extreme: 585 of the 782 wards (75 per cent) are below the urban average of 7.8 per cent. The map shows a somewhat equivocal picture. On the one hand there is a concentration in the centre of Greater London in the borough of Tower Hamlets. On the other hand there are concentrations far in the suburbs.

The explanation can be found in the heterogeneity within the Indian Continent ethnic group, as is also shown in our fourth map, representing one specific and relatively highly segregated ethnic group, the recently arrived Bangladeshis (detailed mappings of other population categories, including Indians, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans were recently published by the London Research Centre (1997)). The quarter of Tower Hamlets is the domain of these Bangladeshis, while the Indians and Pakistanis, which have been present longer, have gradually moved to the outskirts of the city.




**Source:** OPCS census  
Manchester Computing Centre & UKborders

The category Black consists of the ethnic groups Black African (161 820 persons), Black Caribbean (284 778) and Black Other (80 391). They form 8.0% of the Greater London population.

Percentage Black.  
778 wards

■ 24.0 - 46.7 (42)
■ 16.0 - 24.0 (72)
■ 8.0 - 16.0 (162)
□ 0.0 - 8.0 (502)

MAP 5-1 Non-White ethnic group in Greater London, 1991




**Source:** OPCS census  
Manchester Computing Centre & UKborders

The category non-White consists of the ethnic groups Black (531 989 persons), Indian Continent (518 884), Chinese (55 586), Other Asian (111 834) and Other (120 182). They form 20.1 per cent of the population of Greater London.

percentage Non-White  
782 wards

■	49,4 - 91,0
■	34,8 - 49,4
■	20,1 - 34,8
□	0,0 - 20,1

MAP 5-2 Black ethnic group in Greater London, 1991



**Source:** OPCS census  
Manchester Computing Centre & UKborders

The category Indian Continent consists of the ethnic groups Indian (346 037 persons), Pakistani (87 522) and Bangladeshi (85 325). 7.8 per cent of the population of Greater London is part of this category.

Percentage Indian Continent.  
778 wards

27.6 - 78.8 (40)
17.7 - 27.6 (37)
7.8 - 17.7 (116)
0.0 - 7.8 (585)

MAP 5-3 Indian Continent ethnic group in Greater London, 1991



**Source:** OPCS census  
Manchester Computing Centre & UKborders

The category Bangladeshi consists of 85 325 persons,  
1.3 per cent of the population of Greater London.

Percentage Bangladeshi.  
778 wards

■	10.0 - 63.8	(18)
■	5.7 - 10.0	(14)
■	1.3 - 5.7	(100)
□	0.0 - 1.3	(646)

MAP 5-4      Bangladeshi ethnic group in Greater London, 1991

The position of the Bangladeshis is an especially important subject of study by scientists. The 1991 census offers the possibility to examine the Bangladeshis as a separate group. It turns out that in Great Britain 162 835 persons are registered as Bangladeshi. Over 50 per cent of them - 85 738 persons - live in Greater London. The more than eighty thousand persons do not make up more than 1.3 per cent of the population. However, a completely different picture is shown at ward level. In the ward of Spitalfields in the borough of Tower Hamlets as much as 63.8 per cent of the population of 8 444 persons consists of Bangladeshis. Compared to the urban average that is a factor of 49.1! The remarkable position of Tower Hamlets is accentuated by the fact that 42.08 per cent of the total number of Bangladeshis in Greater London live in that borough. However, within Tower Hamlets the Bangladeshis do not make up more than 23.2 per cent. Therefore, there is no question of a ghetto in the narrow sense of the word (that is, the population of the quarter does not consist (almost) entirely of inhabitants of one category).

The maps give an impression of the spatial distribution of the three ethnic groups across Greater London. With the aid of the index of segregation and the index of dissimilarity we calculated the extent to which there is segregation of the ethnic groups in relation to the rest of the population and in relation to each other. Table 5-2 shows the results of the calculation for Greater London. With scores of about forty the situation in Greater London has a considerable resemblance to the situation in Amsterdam. In fact the results of the Black ethnic group are 'better', in the sense of lower than expected, certainly when they are compared with the Black Americans in the United States, who score twice as high on the same indices (see for example Massey and Denton, 1993).

TABLE 5-2 Indices of segregation for selected groups, ward level Greater London, 1991

Ethnic group	Measure	Score
non-White versus White	index of segregation	37
Black versus Rest of the Population	index of segregation	43
Indian Subcontinent versus Rest of the Population	index of segregation	46
Chinese versus Rest of the Population	index of segregation	26
Black versus White	index of dissimilarity	45
Black versus Indian Continent	index of dissimilarity	49
Black versus Chinese	index of dissimilarity	37
Indian Continent versus White	index of dissimilarity	48
Indian Continent versus Chinese	index of dissimilarity	45
Chinese versus White	index of dissimilarity	29

TABLE 5-3 Indices of segregation for Bangladeshi, ward level Greater London 1991

Ethnic groups	Measure	Score
Bangladeshi versus Rest of the Population	index of segregation	63
Indian versus Rest of the Population	index of segregation	49
Pakistani versus Rest of the Population	index of segregation	49
Bangladeshi versus White	index of dissimilarity	65
Bangladeshi versus Indian	index of dissimilarity	67
Bangladeshi versus Pakistani	index of dissimilarity	65
Bangladeshi versus Black	index of dissimilarity	62
Indian versus White	index of dissimilarity	52
Indian versus Black	index of dissimilarity	56

The special position of the Bangladeshis can be illustrated by subdividing the Indian Continent ethnic group and calculating the indices for the subgroups. Table 5-3 shows the scores that were calculated.

The exceptional position of the Bangladeshis is confirmed by the scores in the table. The scores of the Indian Continent group as a whole were between forty and fifty, but the Bangladeshis have 62 as a minimum. The scores of Indians and Pakistanis correspond more with the results of Table 5-2. It is worth noting that very high scores are mutually reached in the relations Bangladeshi - Indian and Bangladeshi - Pakistani, and that corresponds with the idea that the Bangladeshi live mainly in the centre, while the other two groups moved more to the outskirts of Greater London.

#### Conclusion of the quantitative analysis, Greater London

It is obvious that the large variety that characterizes London cannot be described in a few pages. The broad outlines, however, are visible in the maps and tables. Within Greater London there is a considerable degree of differentiation within but also between ethnic groups. The distribution patterns reflect that diversity. The existence of internal variety has been briefly indicated by examining the Indian Continent ethnic group. In the socio-logical and anthropological literature the big differences that exist, especially between the Bangladeshi ethnic group and the Indian ethnic group, have been pointed to for some time (Ballard, 1994). The spatial reflection reinforces the conclusions in no uncertain terms. It should be noted that there will also be big differences within both populations. However, socio-economic data to work that out are absent.

Compared to the other cities written about in this book, the maximum value of 90.3 per cent non-White, which was found in one of the wards, is very high, especially considering that a total population of over 11 000 persons is involved. The indices of segregation are comparable to those in Amsterdam. Furthermore it is remarkable that the two highest values are found on the outskirts of the agglomeration. However, the concentrations are

not restricted to the outskirts; the borough of Tower Hamlets with its overrepresentation of the Bangladeshi ethnic group is situated very centrally.

Greater London is also considered to be exceptional within Great Britain. Therefore Greater Manchester presents a less unique case, to be discussed in the next section.

#### 5.4      **The ‘development’ of Greater Manchester**

As cradle of the industrial revolution Manchester had a flourishing period in particular in the nineteenth century. Although the economic centre had been moved earlier, after the Second World War the city still had much industrial employment, which, among other things, resulted in the city becoming an important destination for labour migrants. The collapse of the British industrial sector in the nineteen seventies hit Manchester extra hard because of the almost complete lack of substitute employment.

The residential pattern of today’s city had to some extent been fixed as early as about the mid nineteenth century. East Manchester became the city’s industrial base, south Manchester the home of a leafy suburb, and the core of the city became occupied by the working class, which resulted in overcrowded and unhealthy housing situations (Bristow, 1994). It was exactly these areas that inspired Friedrich Engels to fight against poverty and deprivation and those who were held responsible for it. The core of the city nevertheless provided first homes for those who flooded into the city in search of new prosperity. A further spatial differentiation between middle class and upper class developed in the better areas of the city.

Manchester developed into a Greater Manchester conurbation over a hundred years ago, when yarn and cloth, which were produced in the surrounding manufacturing towns such as Bolton, Rochdale and Oldham, started to be marketed in Manchester. Interlinked by a canal system and horse-drawn transport, Manchester became the metropolis of a manufacturing region by the 1930s.

The twentieth century brought considerable changes to the city, not only because of the changing economic structure, but also in terms of housing provision. Housing in twentieth century Britain was much more controlled by government, especially after the Second World War, and therefore huge renewal plans could be developed and - finally - executed. The city centre had already been transformed into a commercial centre in the early decades of the twentieth century. However, after 1950 the housing structure also changed substantially. Almost 100 000 unfit dwelling units that still remained were demolished and replaced by a new inner city. The new city, however, was not free of problems. The high-rise flats that were produced by industrialized building techniques in the 1960s did not solve all problems, and in fact became the core areas of later problematic poverty and deprivation. Economic changes that occurred from the late seventies were at the basis of these problems.

Over the last fifteen years, with, among other things, aid from European structural funds, hard work has been done to change over to new forms of activity. In the housing sphere too, important initiatives were taken. An interesting example is the renewal of Hulme housing estate, close to Moss Side (see below) to the south of the city centre. In the 1990s, a £50 million City Challenge bid for rebuilding Hulme housing estate was approved by central government. The interesting thing is that: "there urban renewal had come full circle after only thirty years. Hulme had been one of the city's worst slums after the War, and one of the first to be tackled by comprehensive clearance and renewal. It had been rebuilt with tower blocks and system-built maisonettes, and won architectural awards at the time. By the 1980s it had become a 'sink-estate' for the poor and deprived, with over 50 per cent of adult males being unemployed on the estate. Mismanagement, inability to maintain building and grounds, and poor construction and design in the first place, meant that by the late 1980s the municipality felt it had little option but to demolish and rebuild" (Bristow, 1994, p. 119). It remains to be seen whether that 'physical solution' will help to solve the problems. The previous one did not.

To some extent the housing history of the inner city areas of Manchester is reflected in the ethnic residential pattern of the city, as will be shown in the next section.

## 5.5           Ethnic segregation in Manchester

Just as for Greater London detailed data are available from the 1991 census. However, an important difference from Greater London is the division into a municipality of Manchester and an accompanying metropolitan area. Greater Manchester is not a continuous agglomeration such as Greater London. Barlow (1995) states that the area forms a conurbation, a collection of cities in which the borough of Manchester is more a primus inter pares than a dominant centre.

For this study it is important that in the municipality of Manchester the percentage of non-Whites is the highest of the ten municipalities that together make up the metropolitan area. The extent and quality of the policy that has been formulated in the municipality of Manchester for handling ethnic issues is comprehensive in the British context. Nevertheless it is insufficient to include only Manchester in the analysis. It turns out that the process of spatial grading that was visible in Greater London also occurs on a smaller scale in the region of Manchester; the city does not stop at the municipal boundaries. The highest concentrations of the Indian Continent ethnic group are found, for example, in the neighbouring municipality of Bolton. However, the disadvantage of a regional approach is the presence of some five municipalities in the metropolitan area containing more than 95 per cent Whites. A solution was found by splitting up the municipality (borough) of Manchester and Greater Manchester - the metropolitan area (metro). That division has been carried out in the maps. Table 5-4 shows the main ethnic groups.

TABLE 5-4 Ethnic groups in Manchester, 1991


Ethnic group	Borough of Manchester		Manchester Metro	
	Number	%	Number	%
White	352319	87.4	2346413	94.1
Black	18815	4.7	31374	1.3
Indian Continent	21699	5.4	90222	3.6
Chinese	2979	0.7	8164	0.3
Other Asian	1837	0.5	4827	0.2
Other	5494	1.4	12743	0.5
Total	403143	100.0	2493743	100.0

Source: OPCS 1993 Table 6

The table shows that 12.6 per cent of the population of the borough of Manchester belongs to the non-White ethnic group. For Greater Manchester that figure does not even reach one half. However, an average at a certain scale can hide considerable variation at a lower scale. Map 5-5 shows the spatial distribution of the non-White ethnic group across Manchester at ward level. The entire borough of Manchester was mapped, while for the other nine boroughs we chose a reflection of only those wards that score above the urban average of the borough of Manchester.

Within Greater Manchester, while the highest percentage of non-Whites at borough level can be found in the borough of Manchester, at ward level the two highest percentages are found in the boroughs of Bolton (the ward of Derby with 46.2 per cent) and Trafford (the ward of Clifford with 45.2 per cent). The map does not immediately show an unequivocal pattern. Within the borough of Manchester there is obviously an overrepresentation in the geographical centre, which corresponds with the centre of the borough. At a metropolitan level it is shown that there is indeed a conurbation, with more urban centres.

In Greater London, summing to a non-White group turned out to conceal quite a few differences between individual ethnic groups. Therefore, Map 5-6 shows the spatial distribution of the Black ethnic group. Compared to Map 5-5 it is striking that the group is much more oriented towards the borough of Manchester than the non-White group as a whole. The peak is the ward of Moss Side in the borough of Manchester with a share of 30.5 per cent of a total population of 13 117. Compared to the more than 46 per cent that the highest scoring ward in Greater London has, the score in Moss Side is moderate. However, compared to the urban average in the borough of Manchester there is a multiplier of 6.5, which is higher than the 5.8 noted for Greater London. The quarter of Moss Side was the scene of fierce riots in 1981.




**Source:** OPCS census  
Manchester Computing Centre & UKborders

The category non-White consists of the ethnic groups Black, Indian Continent, Chinese, Other Asian and Other. The share of this category in the municipality of Manchester is 12.6 per cent, and in the metropolitan area 5.9 per cent.

Percentage non-White.

■	37.6 - 46.2
■	25.1 - 37.6
■	12.6 - 25.1
□	0.0 - 12.6

MAP 5-5 Non-White ethnic group in Manchester, 1991




**Source:** OPCS census  
Manchester Computing Centre & UKborders

The category Black consists of the ethnic groups Black African, Black Caribbean and Black Other. This category forms 4.7 per cent of the municipal and 1.3 per cent of the metropolitan population.

**Percentage Black**

17.5 - 30.5
11.1 - 17.5
4.7 - 11.1
0.0 - 4.7

MAP 5-6      Black ethnic group in Manchester, 1991



**Source:** OPCS census  
Manchester Computing Centre & UKborders

The category Indian continent consists of the ethnic groups Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. This category forms 5.4 per cent of the municipal and 3.6 per cent of the metropolitan population.

Percentage Indian continent.

■	19.3 - 42.0
■	12.3 - 19.3
■	5.4 - 12.3
□	0.0 - 5.4

MAP 5-7 Indian Continent ethnic group in Manchester, 1991

The Indian Continent ethnic group turns out to be less oriented towards the borough of Manchester (Map 5-7). The three highest scoring wards, all three of them, are even situated outside the borough of Manchester. A peak is the ward of Derby in the borough of Bolton with an Indian Continent share of 42.0 per cent in a population of 12 974 persons. In Bolton 6.9 per cent of the population considers themselves among the Indian Continent ethnic group; so a maximum of 42.0 per cent means a multiplier of 6.1. The maximum score in a ward in the borough of Manchester contrasts poorly, with 26.0 per cent. It seems that there is a form of suburbanization that we also saw in Greater London. However, that hypothesis would only hold if data for 1981 were to show that more members of the group lived in the borough of Manchester at that time. Due to the fact that ethnicity data are absent in the 1981 census the exact answer to that question cannot be given.

The extent to which the various ethnic groups are spatially distributed across an area can be indicated by the indices of segregation. Table 5-5 shows the results of an analysis at municipal and metropolitan level. The figures in the table show a stronger segregation than in Greater London. The clearly higher scores at metro level were suggested by the maps. In Greater Manchester the ethnic groups live separated from each other, at the same time being concentrated in clusters. It is striking that the highest values in the table are noted for the Indian Continent versus White relation.

#### **The socio-economic situation of ethnic groups in Manchester.**

Compared to the very extensive description of ethnicity, the discussion of socio-economic variables in the census is not easy.

TABLE 5-5 Indices of segregation for selected groups, ward level 1991

Ethnic group	Measure	Borough of Manchester	Greater Manchester
Non-White versus White	index of segregation	43	56
Black versus Rest of the Population	index of segregation	46	55
Indian Continent versus Rest Pop.	index of segregation	51	64
Chinese versus Rest of the Pop.	index of segregation	26	31
Black versus White	index of dissimilarity	49	57
Black versus Indian Continent	index of dissimilarity	44	53
Black versus Chinese	index of dissimilarity	26	42
Indian Continent versus White	index of dissimilarity	54	65
Indian Continent versus Chinese	index of dissimilarity	41	57
Chinese versus White	index of dissimilarity	31	32

Nonetheless, to give an impression of the differences in socio-economic characteristics of the various ethnic groups we used the literature and interviews.

Table 5-6 shows that there is a considerable variation between ethnic groups as far as the tenures in the living situation are concerned.

The big difference between Black and Indian continues to exist when we split up the groups. Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis all score above 60 per cent owner-occupied, while the Black Caribbean group scores 32.1 per cent owner-occupied. The difference within the Indian group that could be expected on the basis of the results between Indians and Bangladeshis in London was indeed found in an analysis of the average occupation of dwellings. An average of one or more persons live per room in 31.4 per cent of the Bangladeshi households. That percentage is 9.2 per cent for Indians and 2.3 per cent for Whites.

The data on unemployment in Table 5-7 show especially a difference between Black and White. The distribution of the scores across the ethnic groups is not surprising, considering the descriptions in the literature (Peach, 1996, Ballard, 1994) and compared to the situation in most of the other countries included in this book, where unemployment among ethnic minority groups is also considerably higher than among the autochthonous population. The unemployment figure as a whole (Total row) is remarkably high in the borough of Manchester.

TABLE 5-6 Ethnic groups according to tenure, percentages, 1991

Ethnic group	Owner-occupied	Rent municipality	Rent other	House-holds
White	41.0	39.0	18.7	153580
Black	28.7	49.3	21.0	7396
Indian	68.0	11.6	19.5	5174
Total	41.2	29.3	21.0	166150

Source: OPCS 1993 Table L49

TABLE 5-7 Labour market in the borough of Manchester, 1991

Ethnic group	%	%
	Unemployment	own company
White	17.8	7.4
Black	30.0	4.5
Indian Continent	27.3	23.4
Total	18.7	8.1

Source: OPCS 1993 Table L09

### **Conclusion of the quantitative analysis, Manchester**

For more than one reason the case Manchester is an interesting case among the other cities of this project. The tendency that was observed in Greater London that ethnic minority groups, and especially members of the Indian Continent group, also live in the suburbs was observed in Manchester too. The borough of Manchester, in name the central city of the agglomeration, functions as the main place of residence for the Black ethnic group. Due to the specific spatial composition of the metropolitan area the indices of segregation end up high compared to Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf or Greater London. The high scores on the indices of segregation go together with the lowest share of minorities of the total population of all cities of this project. Just as in Frankfurt am Main, where the opposite is true, that is a clear illustration of the fact that the two concepts are constructed in different ways.

## **5.6 Policy in London and Manchester**

### **Introduction**

With the benefit of hindsight, the election of Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979 can be called a turning point in British history. In the years that passed under her leadership and that of John Major, her successor, society acquired a totally different character. The functioning of the market and competition count as directive, co-ordinating principles. Neither did the policy on ethnic groups remain unchanged. With the introduction of recent regulations they have to compete with other groups in order to secure the financial means that were earmarked for them in the past. In other words: here too the functioning of the market replaces fixed patterns. Certainly in view of the cautious attempts in the Netherlands to organize the social security system more according to market principles, the British policy is worth meticulous study. Many of the measures that are under discussion in the Netherlands have been reality in Great Britain for years.

For other reasons, too, Great Britain is an interesting example to policymakers overseas. In Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and many other countries (problems of) first and second generation minorities are mainly addressed in policy debates. Great Britain had an earlier peak in immigration and therefore at this moment the policy has to deal with the needs of the second and third generations of immigrants. A readjustment of policy has proved to be necessary, of which a change in the basis for registration of the population is an example.

### **Institutional context**

Remarkably enough, the cradle of Western democracy does not have a written constitution. The word of Parliament is law, with the result that the party in power in British government has ample opportunities to implement changes in society. The central gov-

ernment consists of Ministers of the Crown (about 100) who are selected from the dominant party in Parliament. Each Minister is head of a department. The head of the central government is the cabinet of Senior Ministers under chairmanship of the Prime Minister. This study will repeatedly refer to the Department of the Environment (DoE) and the Home Office.

A number of government duties are not undertaken by departments but by quangos: quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations. At the moment there are no fewer than 2000 quangos, but with a certain variation according to government control and responsibilities. A frequently mentioned objection to quangos is that they are not under any democratic control. Together the quangos account for about 20 per cent of all spending in the public sector (Byrne, 1994, p. 6). This study will repeatedly refer to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), a quango that is in charge of formulating policy recommendations in the field of equal opportunities and anti-discrimination. CRE deals with the implementation and enforcement of the Race Relations Act 1977 and is in the end responsible to the Home Office. CRE has a research budget and publishes a large number of studies and guidelines (Codes of Practice), aimed at the general public as well as at professional institutions. The legal status of CRE is semi-judicial, i.e. it is advisory and regulating. Although a CRE judgement counts heavily, not all its recommendations are adopted in policy.

Giving up duties to quangos is a form of functional decentralization, with the additional objective of preventing overburdening of central government. Another way in which the central government can contract out duties is by delegating them to local government. It is explicitly a matter of contracting out because in Great Britain the relation between central and local is characterized by the concept of *ultra vires*. That principle means that the local government is only allowed to do what has been explicitly permitted by the central government. One of its results is the great extent of centralization that occurred within the government (see Byrne, 1994). The most visible form of centralization was the abolition of metropolitan governments in April 1986. From that moment on only municipalities without co-ordinating metropolitan governments have remained in the metropolitan areas of London and Manchester (32 and 10 boroughs respectively). The boroughs ought to co-ordinate together how to deal with matters that transcend municipal boundaries. In practice that usually means the installment of *ad hoc* joint boards that work without direct democratic control. In London, depending on the definition, 70 to 80 such cooperations are working at the moment. Less visible is the declining financial autonomy of the municipalities compared to the national government. The share of the local taxes in the budget of the boroughs declined to 14 per cent in 1993. In other words: over 85 per cent of the spending of a borough comes from national government. The central government also reserves the right to restrict to a maximum the level of local spending (rate capping). In 1991, 21 boroughs, all with a Labour council, were capped.

The position of the local government was further eroded by privatizations and the principle of opting out. Many services that were traditionally carried out by local governments were privatized. This concerned not only such matters as public transport but also development projects in city centres. Private companies, so-called Urban Development Corporations, work as a kind of enclave within the area of a local government. They are financed by and are only responsible to the central government. Moreover, they are exempt from the local influence of town planning instruments. The principle of opting out is a different procedure with a similar result. In education the schools can escape from the control of a Local Education Authority by applying for a subsidy by the central government. Under the Education Reform Act 1988 the governing body of a school can submit a request, after a vote among the parents, to the central government to become grant maintained. The government expected that in 1995 about 4000 schools would have taken that step. On the housing market opting out can take place with a local property company when another landlord wants to take over the dwellings and let them in a 'social' way. By applying for a vote the tenants can escape from the regime of the local property company (Local Housing Act 1988). (Remarkably enough the people who do not show up at the vote count as supporters of opting out.) Furthermore, the influence of the local government on the housing market declined, because in the eighties about one million rented dwellings were sold under the Right to Buy programme. It is obvious that the better dwellings of the housing stock were especially popular. There is not much clarity about the effects of Right to Buy on the housing situation of ethnic groups, which are overrepresented in the social rental sector. According to Peach (1994) the generally accepted thesis that the Black ethnic group became the victim of the sale is not correct. However, the figures he used to support that argument do not prove it unequivocally.

Besides local government, quite a number of organizations that are aimed at the welfare of ethnic groups are active at a local level. An example is the Racial Equality Council, an advisory body that can be found in many British cities with ethnic communities. In 1994 there were 86 of these councils, which received a subsidy from CRE (over £4 million, a legal commitment of CRE) and a contribution from the local governments. The level of the local contribution varies, but for the whole of Great Britain the total amount that the local governments contribute is about as much as the total amount from CRE.

In spite of the considerable extent of centralization in the British constitutional order, at a local level the reactions to the ethnic aspects of policy are very different. In some municipalities much attention is paid to equal treatment, preference policy and other forms of ethnic policy in terms both of time and finance. The municipalities have room for discretionary spending (it used to be called the 2p measure: since 1989 discretionary resource spending in London and Manchester is £5 per inhabitant) and therefore are able to spend extra money on ethnic matters. Other municipalities lag behind. Political persuasion or share of the ethnic groups turns out to be no incontrovertible indicator of the willingness to put ethnic problems on the agenda (Johnson 1989). From a methodologi-

cal point of view that fact, combined with the existence of 43 boroughs in London and Manchester, causes problems. It is not possible in this study to examine in great detail all boroughs where concentrations of ethnic groups are found for ethnic aspects of policy. We decided to choose one borough - the municipality of Manchester - and subsequently examine it comprehensively.

## Measures

### *Spatial dispersal policy*

In the outline in figures we saw evident concentrations of ethnic groups. None of the persons we interviewed gave an affirmative answer to our question whether such concentrations are a reason for (a call for) spatial dispersal measures. For example, in the past the municipality of Birmingham pursued a policy of assigning quotas for the allocation of dwellings, but this was contrary to the Race Relations Act (Flett *et al.*, 1979). A second measure they could recall was the spatial dispersal of Vietnamese boat people at the end of the seventies. When that policy proved to be unsuccessful it was abandoned as a foundation of the relief for the wave of refugees at the end of the eighties and the early nineties.

We have not found any forms of spatial dispersal policy on the housing market, the labour market and in education. Rather the contrary is the case; it was announced from all sides that an active anti-spatial dispersal policy was introduced. The housing market is a good example of the efforts that have been made to fight discrimination since the seventies. CRE played an important role in formulating the codes of behaviour that should be complied with in the allocation of dwellings. Their advice has gradually been inserted in Race Relations Acts and can be enforced by the court. Banning (implicit) forms of discrimination from the private housing market, which occupies a large share in Great Britain, is difficult, but according to our informers it is a permanent source of attention and still gives rise to a number of lawsuits a year.

### *Compensating policy*

The rapid growth of the number of immigrants in the sixties was spatially connected with the location of employment. Inequality between municipalities arose because the settlement of immigrants caused specific problems, in the field of education, for example. In the Local Government Act of 1966 the national government attempted to compensate the resulting inequality between the municipalities. Under the title *section 11* funds became available with which local governments could underwrite projects that were aimed at improving the relief of immigrants from Pakistan and the Commonwealth, with the exception of Canada and Australia: the New Commonwealth. The idea underlying the regulations was that the national government was to contribute to the labour costs of new local civil servants. To indicate that additional financing was intended local governments were forced to apply for projects having a limited term of five years at most, in

which the share of the section 11 contribution accounted for 75 per cent of the labour costs. The regulation had an open-end character, which resulted in an increase in the subsidy from £3.2 million in 1967/1968 to more than £100 million in 1983/1984 (Johnson, 1989, p. 371). In a certain sense the section 11 legislation was not area oriented, but in practice the focus on ethnic minorities guaranteed that the money nevertheless found its way to concentration areas of ethnic minorities.

In the sixties and seventies, besides the stimulating measures within the scope of section 11, policy against discrimination was developed at a national level aimed at creating equal opportunities in the housing and labour markets. In the Race Relations Act of 1976 it was made clear to local governments that they had to weigh their services and employment policies against the (not further specified) principle of equal opportunity.

The riots of 1981, which scourged a large number of city centres and which had at least partly an ethnic character, led to an intensifying of the policy aimed at ethnic groups. Especially the Scarman report, which examined the riots in Brixton in London, put the finger on the sore spot of discrimination and unemployment. Moreover, it became clear that especially the city centres, i.e. specific areas, needed assistance. In the following years of the eighties regeneration of the city centres was high on the political agenda. A huge package of measures was reviewed (Robson 1988).

However, the national government was not satisfied with the way in which the local governments made use of their powers in general and of section 11 financing in particular. This resulted in a series of new projects that were put into effect without the involvement of the local governments. In the section on the constitutional context we mentioned opting out and right to buy, but also the section 11 legislation could not escape a study. It turned out that the implementation of section 11 could be much improved, although the researchers did not doubt the necessity of a regulation like section 11. A striking conclusion of the final report was that there was an (unacceptable) difference between the municipalities as regards the utilisation of the possibilities available to them. The researchers also pointed at the more fundamental problem of the question of what future there was for equal opportunity legislation in general and for section 11 financing in particular. Is it justifiable that financial means are reserved for ethnic groups? Can subordinated groups claim (and keep claiming) a preference policy? Have ethnic groups their own, unique needs or is there only a more intense need for services that other groups use as well? The answers to these questions to a large extent determine the interpretation of the policy with respect to ethnic groups. Moreover, the answers vary in the course of time, because all parties agree that the original aim of section 11, first relief for newcomers, is out of date.

In the early nineties a difference in approach between the local and the national level surfaced. Local governments were inclined to emphasize more than the national government the ethnic dimension of social problems. A typical example was the difference in reaction to funds that were available in the European Social Fund for the programme of

social exclusion. According to the principle of subsidies the EU left it to the national governments to think of criteria according to which money would be granted. The local governments wanted to include ethnicity, but the national government under Prime Minister Major mentioned as the only criterion for the distribution of the funding the presence of former soldiers who had become unemployed due to the end of the cold war. In the end, as a compromise, a list with criteria was sent to Brussels, on which ethnicity as well as soldiers could be found. The European commission itself decided to remove the military part from the application.

A second example is the trouble that local governments have to take to introduce policy that favours ethnic groups. Under the Local Government Act 1988 municipalities are obliged to examine how a service can be provided at least cost. A meticulous audit by the national government ensures that that measure is actually complied with. The result is that it has become legally very difficult for local governments to enter into a contract with a contractor who is just a little more expensive but, for instance, employs a high percentage of minorities.

A third example, and perhaps the most radical, is the founding of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). SRB will admit about 20 programmes of five different departments, among with the section 11 funds. With the abolition of section 11 the only flow of money that was intended for ethnic groups will disappear. Applications for, for instance, translation projects will have to compete with other projects that are not aimed at ethnic groups. In the words of an interviewee: "It is not about being Black or Indian anymore, but about the needs that people have".

These three examples show that a tendency is visible in Great Britain to define policy less in ethnic terms than in the past. At local level the national policy is accepted out of necessity, but private accents are laid within the margins that still exist. A good example of the trouble a local government can take to organize the policy according to its own view is the approach of the municipality of Manchester.

Within Great Britain Manchester counts as a municipality that is actively formulating policy for ethnic groups within its boundaries. It is beyond the reach of this report to go extensively into the (history of the) many measures that have been developed. However, we can give an impression, in which the reaction of the municipality to the national measures that were mentioned is especially interesting.

The riots in the Moss Side quarter in 1981 formed in Manchester, just as in many British municipalities, a catalyst for the development of new policies. A Race Unit and an Equality Unit were founded, in which over 50 civil servants were employed in 1984. The rapid growth of the number of civil servants was achieved on the one hand by making an appeal to specific subsidies, such as section 11 funds, and on the other hand by reserving money from the general funds of the municipality.

The fact that the recently founded Race and Equality group in Manchester consists of only two civil servants indicates that much has happened since 1984. The decline in the number of directly active persons is, on the one hand, the result of a cut in the funding. On the other hand it is also a confirmation of the success that was achieved over the past few years. Now executive departments themselves are handling ethnic problems, while in the initial period a special department dealt with them. The organizational broadening that took place can be best indicated by the concept of communication. It not only involves employing civil servants in the various departments that are aimed at 'ethnic' problems. The intention is that civil servants at all levels become aware of the ethnic dimension that in daily practice is attached to many problems. That line of thought led in Manchester, for example, to the publication of a forty-page Code of Practice on Recruitment and Selection that was offered to more than 4 000 managers in 1989.

Communication is not only important within the machinery of government. In the end the ethnic groups themselves should become aware of what is possible. It would go too far to mention all of the great number of initiatives that have been developed in this field. A recent example is the creation of link workers who assist the various ethnic groups in approaching the municipal departments. The link workers have been selected on the basis of their roots in the community and in a way they function as points of address for the inhabitants as well as for the civil servants. The respondents considered the intended two-way traffic of the interaction as especially essential to the success of the project.

Underlying all the programmes that have been realized in Manchester is the concept of ethnic monitoring. A meticulous record is kept of the share of the various ethnic groups in the number of municipal employees, in housing applications, in the stock of rented dwellings and among pupils of public education. The introduction of ethnic monitoring in 1986 showed, for example, that the municipality as employer had an overrepresentation of white males. On the basis of that fact the municipality paid great attention to a programme to come to a proportionally composed number of employees. Equality targets, as they are called, have been formulated for the year 2000 and very good progress has been indicated in a number of publications.

The abolition of section 11 funds was very much regretted in Manchester, because the feeling was that the money was well spent. An example of local use of that money is the financing of translation and education projects. In the schools that fall under the responsibility of the municipality, 120 people were employed under section 11. Moreover, a local translation and interpreting service was founded which offers services in more than fifty foreign languages. The existence of these projects will be at risk when they have to compete in the Single Regeneration Budget in the future. The dissatisfaction that existed at local level was ventilated, for example, at a local conference, at which the representative of the national government was fairly heavy criticized. The official leaflet on equal opportunity calls the decision unfortunate and, according to a Race and Equality officer in the borough of Manchester, serious consideration is being given to taking over the

projects that currently fall under section 11 with money from general funds. However, it is a problem that the municipality is bound to the *Standard Spending Assessment*, a spending standard that was created by national government.

In conclusion we can say that the reduction in funding was the greatest concern of the persons who are employed by local governments. In principle people could agree with less emphasis on the ethnic side and more attention to the needs of the whole population, but it was feared that the specific needs of the ethnic population would become disregarded when their projects have to compete with other, non-ethnic applications.

### Evaluation

At the time we wrote this study the policy with regard to minorities was undergoing such radical readjustment that none of the interviewees dared to venture an evaluation. In a certain sense the national government is incorporating into policy the conclusions of an evaluation of the section 11 legislation from the end of the eighties. However, it seems that ideological motives of the Major government influenced the interpretations of the researchers. We think that the policy as it is now under construction should take root first before any sensible statements can be made on its effectiveness and its results.

We did get the impression that a number of programmes could in fact be classified under specific policy although the framework of concepts that was used actually does not give reason to do so. In a number of boroughs there is an investment in problem quarters on a large scale under the heading City Challenge (Brixton in London, Hume in Manchester, for example). Reading between the lines, it becomes clear that the presence of ethnic groups really is a factor that influences the choice of areas and that the measures can work out favourably for ethnic groups. However, due to the choice of ethnicity as a criterion for admittance in policy (see Chapter 1) a deeper analysis of City Challenge projects falls outside this study. In any case, it becomes clear how difficult it is to come to an exhaustive policy analysis.

### Conclusion of the policy section

The *laissez-faire* ideology with which Great Britain has been enamoured in the past fifteen years has not left the minorities policy undisturbed. A 'de-ethnification' has taken place, or in other words a transition from specific to universal policy. It is not sure that the change in government from Conservative to Labour will mean a return to the former situation. The discussion of the past few years on the future of ethnic policy with a transition to third and fourth generation immigrants has a greater emphasis on the needs of the entire population than on ethnic policy. The difference between Labour and the Conservatives is more the availability of financial means. A second item that deserves attention is the development of ethnic monitoring. In a certain sense there is a contradiction: on the one hand there is less policy attention to specific ethnic policy, while on the other hand pointing out differences between ethnic groups becomes increasingly possible. The

difference in perception between the local and national government forms a partial explanation for the contrast, although it should be noted that the national government can make or break the local enthusiasm for ethnic monitoring through legal measures.

### 5.7 Conclusion

The above discussion of Great Britain and of London and Manchester has thrown light on a number of striking developments. In the first place it is striking that there seems to be a de-ethnicification of policy. Specific regulations for minorities are being reduced; they have to compete with other groups or projects. From an organizational point of view the emphasis is coming to lie more on output financing and a direction function for minorities policy from the side of the government. Comparable processes are going on in other countries in Europe. However, a difference between most countries and Great Britain is the broader acceptance of the concept of ethnic monitoring in Great Britain. They obviously keep a finger on the pulse concerning the situation of ethnic groups on the labour or housing markets. For minorities it is important that it becomes more difficult to define possible problems away when there are figures at hand. Nevertheless, it cannot be stated that the policy is a derivative of the statistical data. The change that has been described seems to have a clear ideological component, for instance at the moment that the government is actively attempting to withdraw.

## **6      Sweden: Stockholm**

Sweden has for a long time been considered the paradigm of the successful European welfare state. Affluence, full employment and optimum social care were linked to each other almost as a matter of course. In the nineties the Swedish success formula seemed to be dead. Unemployment has increased sharply and all kinds of social services have come under pressure, according to OECD reports. Ground has also been lost in comparison to other European countries. Measured in terms of Gross National Product, Sweden dropped from third position on the European list in 1970 to eleventh position in 1991. At first glance the crisis started in the early nineties, but looking back the first signals of problems turn out to have been visible in the early eighties. The turbulence did not remain limited to economic indicators but, for instance, also resulted in the conservatives coming into power in 1991, after dominance by the social democrats of more than half a century.

In Swedish society, more than elsewhere in Europe and in spite of the good social services, having a job is still a *sine qua non*. However, the declining employment means, among other things, that competition on the labour market has increased. For migrants as well as for women and young people, it has become more difficult to find a job or stay at work in this climate. Figures from the Swedish Bureau of Statistics SCB show that unemployment among migrants increased dramatically between 1990 and 1994. For example, for Turks the unemployment percentage increased from 3.1 in 1990 to 22.5 in 1994. Among Iranians, who were not counted as a separate category in 1990, an unemployment percentage of 42.5 was noted in 1994. Although unemployment among Swedes or among persons from the other Nordic countries increased sharply as well in the period mentioned, the share is not much higher than 10 per cent.

This chapter will discuss whether and if so to what extent concentration and segregation of migrants is considered a problem. The traditional Swedish means for integrating immigrants used to be the labour market. However, because the ideal of full employment has disappeared further and further from view a reconsideration is taking place. Before we go into concentration and segregation in more detail, and the related policy issues, Swedish history and practice of immigration will be discussed in Section 6.1, followed by a brief introduction of the recent development of Stockholm (Section 6.2).

## 6.1 Immigrants in Sweden

The immigration pattern of Sweden very closely resembles that of the other European countries. In the sixties and the early seventies labour migrants were recruited in Finland and in the other Scandinavian countries, as well as in Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece. Remarkably enough the Finns were practically not integrated at first, in spite of their arrival from a neighbouring country. The immigration pattern changed in the seventies. Labour migration lost something of its significance while the absolute and relative importance of family reunification and of refugees/asylum seekers increased. Consequently, in terms of phasing Sweden keeps up with the other countries of this study. Because of the different categories of labour migrants and the large number of refugees that were admitted the country nevertheless receives a special place.

The (labour) migration from the Scandinavian countries continues to play a role to this very day. Immigration from the neighbouring country Norway, for example, amounted to over 10 000 persons in 1989. The difference from the labour migrants from the Mediterranean area lies in the return migration: almost all immigrants from the Scandinavian countries return, while the non-Scandinavian groups tend to stay in Sweden. Over the last ten years the share of immigrants from outside Europe - and with that the 'visible' migration - increased. Most middle-aged inhabitants of Stockholm had never seen *visible minorities* in their childhood. "When I grew up I hadn't ever seen a black man", one of our informants said. From 1986 Sweden has admitted large groups of political refugees from countries such as Iran and Chile. For example the number of persons that were born in Iran increased from 3 348 to 48 693 persons between 1980 and 1994, in other words a 15-fold increase. Just as in the other European countries, the immigration legislation was recently tightened up.

Once migrants have arrived, the Swedish naturalization legislation is quite liberal compared to the other countries in this study. The concept of length of stay takes a major place in the system of naturalization, with a difference between Scandinavian nationalities (2 years) and nationalities from outside Scandinavia (5 years). According to SCB half a million of the more than eight million inhabitants were naturalized in 1990 (SCB 1991). The Swedish statistics link up with practice by not only using the concept of nationality

but also the concept of native country of the first and second generation. Data from SCB show that the share of the 'immigrant' population for Sweden as a whole increases from 6 per cent when nationality is used, through 11 per cent when native country is used to 18 per cent when native country of the first and second generation is used.

## 6.2        The 'development' of Stockholm

The metropolitan area of Stockholm consists of 22 municipalities and has over 1.5 million inhabitants. The municipality of Stockholm has about 700 000 inhabitants. According to Borgegård and Murdie (1994), whose work is gratefully referred to in much of this section, the morphology of Stockholm can be divided into four major areas: a compact inner city, developed primarily between 1880 and 1930, but including the Old Town dating from the Middle Ages, and recently transformed; older suburbs developed in the 1930s and 1940s forming a semi-circle to the south and east of the inner city (low density); garden suburbs, developed primarily at railroad and tram stations in the early parts of the century; and satellite suburbs, developed after the Second World War in association with the construction of extensive mass transit facilities. Much of that development occurred during the Million Programme when one million new houses were built in Sweden between 1965 and 1974, 200 000 of which in Stockholm. Most of these new dwellings were built in the inner and outer suburbs. On top of this structure a dual structure can also be discerned, north of Stockholm versus south. The physical and economic structures of north (higher quality in general) and south (lower quality) are clearly differentiated.

The developments in housing over the last fifteen years, right after the turbulent period of the Million Programme, were characterized by gentrification and upgrading of the centre of Stockholm. The most important changes in the existing residential stock were tenure conversions from private rental to owner-occupied co-operatives and the conversion of smaller flats into larger ones. Between 1970 and 1990 tenant-owned co-operatives increased from 11 per cent of the inner city stock to 29 per cent, while flats with three rooms or more increased from 23 per cent to 33 per cent of the total stock. Besides that, an increase in the office function is visible in parts of the centre. The result of the two developments is that for the lower income groups there are fewer housing opportunities in the centre. Even the long sustained - and still valid - objective of the Swedish government to maintain a spatial integration of various types of dwellings and socio-economic groups can change little about this. The inner city has increasingly become the area where young, multi-earning, professional workers households are living who have been able to find jobs in the new urban economy of Stockholm.

Today's Greater Stockholm corresponds in many respects to the stereotype picture of the modern city: a strongly increased service sector, especially in the field of finance, in-

surance and real estate, in health care and education; an increase in the productivity of the remaining industry; and a decentralization of industrial companies and routine office activities. Now approximately 80 per cent of employment in the Stockholm area is in service activities. Much of the new high-tech activity and economic activity has developed along the E4 corridor, between Stockholm and the airport of Arlanda.

The transformations of the residential and economic structures have had its effects upon the social structure. The differentiation between inner city, inner suburbs and outer suburbs is clearly visible, as well as the north-south distinction. Especially the latter distinction has existed for several decades. As early as in 1950 labour voters were to be found in the south and conservatives and liberals in the north. That pattern has continued and is reflected by other indicators, such as income, occupational status, social assistance, health conditions and death rates. The Million Programme has enforced the divide, because the majority of new social housing was built in the southern part of Stockholm. The new social housing tends to contain a larger proportion of low-income households, unskilled manual employees, single parent families, and foreign citizens.

The north-south divide is not absolute, though. If a more detailed level of analysis is applied, many variations of the simple dual pattern show up. Over recent years a trend towards the settlement of higher status households can be found in the inner suburban areas too.

The housing and economic characteristics of (Greater) Stockholm and the context of the declining welfare state evoke - on the face of it - many recognizable images. In a great many respects the urban structure and the urban and social developments resemble the situation and what is happening in many other countries and cities. A more detailed examination, however, shows that not only the starting points but also part of the changes have their own characteristics.

### **6.3              Ethnic segregation in Stockholm**

Where ethnic immigrants tend to have lower skills and status, we should not expect them to be able to settle in the inner city of Stockholm, but in the areas where the Million Programme was realized instead. In this section, we elaborate on the settlement pattern of immigrants in Stockholm.

Table 6-1 shows an outline of the principal native countries of the population in Sweden, the agglomeration of Stockholm and the central city of Stockholm. The table shows that a larger part of the population (16.6 per cent) of the agglomeration of Stockholm was born outside Sweden than could be expected on the basis of the national share (10.5 per cent). However, within the agglomeration of Stockholm the share remains constant (16.6 per cent versus 16.8 per cent).

TABLE 6-1 Native country at three spatial levels, 12 December 1994

Native country	Sweden	%	Agglomeration of Stockholm	%	Municipality of Stockholm	%
Finland	207796	2.4	62948	4.1	23346	3.3
Former Yugoslavia	112340	1.3	12437	0.8	6018	0.9
Turkey	29242	0.3	12877	0.8	5355	0.8
Iran	48693	0.6	13014	0.8	6645	0.9
Greece	12440	0.1	6504	0.4	4077	0.6
Outside Sweden	922055	10.5	258074	16.6	118412	16.8
Inside Sweden	7894326	89.5	129583	83.4	585215	83.2
Total	8816381		1553909		703627	

Source: SCB 1995

Former Yugoslavia consists of Bosnia Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. In entire Sweden also Croatia (2108), Slovenia (206) and Macedonia (487) are included.

The latter is remarkable when compared to Amsterdam where a big difference was observed between the central city and its surrounding areas (see Chapter 2). That difference becomes especially striking when one realizes that the numbers of inhabitants of the agglomeration and the central city in Amsterdam and Stockholm correspond very well.


Of the individual groups only the Finns can be clearly identified in the statistics. However, the position on Sweden's eastern border does not mean that the Finns easily merge into Swedish society: there is still a gap between the two groups which shows itself in poor integration. From a Dutch point of view that is remarkable because in the Netherlands hardly any attention is paid to immigration or integration problems of Germans or Belgians. The other individual groups have shares of about 1 per cent. Even as the scale becomes finer, 1 per cent remains the rule. An important cause is the spatial policy that was pursued under the heading *whole of Sweden*. More attention will be paid to that in the policy section.

It turns out to be no simple task to deduce a classification of ethnic minority groups that is comparable with the other metropolitan areas. At the level of Sweden extensive information is given for 117 nationalities or native countries. Groups can be composed by adding up relevant categories. However, as the scale becomes finer a large number of nationalities / native countries disappear from the publications. At local level the number of native countries has been reduced to 25. In spatial terms the district of Stockholm consists of 25 municipalities, a number that was reduced by Borgegård (see, for example, his 1994, p. 260) to 22 municipalities for the more functionally defined agglomeration of Stockholm. The disadvantage of the local scale is the municipality of Stockholm, which only contains nearly half of the total number of inhabitants of the agglomeration (see previous table). An attempt to obtain data on nationality or native country within the ag-

glomeration - preferably within the municipality of Stockholm - was unsatisfactory. The only data at neighbourhood level that have become available concern native country within and outside Sweden for 298 spatial units. The data are from 1990. Map 6-1 shows the data. Of course the map can hardly be compared with the maps for minority groups in the other metropolitan areas. As we said, at neighbourhood level we did not find data split up into native country and/or nationality. To give an impression nonetheless, Map 6-2 shows four categories of native country per municipality. It proved to be possible to work at local level with data of 31 December 1994. By combining the five maps a number of conclusions can be drawn.

Within the municipality of Stockholm - the central city - the principal concentrations of persons that were born outside Sweden can be found outside the inner city, in the north as well as in the south of Stockholm. The concentration in the quarter of Frescati-Ekhagen runs on into the neighbouring municipalities of Solna and Sundbyberg. A second centre lies at the southern side of Stockholm, with an overflow into the municipalities of Botkyrka and Huddinge. Map 6-2 shows that the persons who were born in Finland or Turkey are overrepresented in the second centre, but not in the first. Especially persons born in Turkey turn out to be overrepresented in the municipality of Botkyrka, where the second centre is partly found. The concentration of 4.6 per cent at local level is very high in view of the agglomeration average of 0.9 per cent. Within the agglomeration about a fifth of all persons who were born in Turkey live in Botkyrka, while the share of the total number of inhabitants of the municipality is less than 5 per cent in the agglomeration. However, the data do not allow a link to be made between the concentration quarters at neighbourhood level and the concentration of the Turkish category at local level. For natives of Iran the opposite applies: overrepresentation at the northern side, but not at the southern side. The North Mediterraneans have an overrepresentation in both centres. In all cases there is a sharp boundary between the municipalities with concentrations and the municipality of Stockholm (which has part of both centres within its territory), which can be explained by pointing at the relatively large population of the municipality of Stockholm. In other words, within the municipality of Stockholm the concentrations tend to dissolve. The Turkish category has a considerable concentration in Botkyrka. For the other three categories it is rather striking how little the highest score deviates from the group average of the agglomeration. On calculating the multipliers the results remain under 2.5, which is low compared to the values that apply in Amsterdam or Brussels, and this indicates a relatively even spatial distribution of the groups.

In explanation of the pattern found, the respondents pointed especially at the (functioning of the) housing market. The relatively recent immigration is a second factor that explains the concentration of immigrants in social rented dwellings from the seventies and eighties. The Million Programme, referred to earlier, was realized just when migration began to get off the ground. An ample supply of rented dwellings was created through that programme.




Source: SCB en Universiteit van Umea.

Foreigners are classified as not born in Sweden; they often have the Swedish nationality.  
227 104 foreigners (15.3 per cent) are living in the metropolitan area of Stockholm.

Percentage foreigners.  
289 areas.


31.4 - 56.2	(11)
23.4 - 31.4	(15)
15.3 - 23.4	(47)
0.0 - 15.3	(193)
less than 250 inhabitants	(23)

MAP 6-1 Persons who were born outside Sweden and living in Stockholm, 1990




Percentage born in Finland.  
average 4.2 per cent in 22 municipalities

■ 6.0 - 8.8 (3)
■ 2.5 - 6.0 (16)
■ 0.0 - 2.5 (3)




Percentage born in Iran  
average 0.8 per cent in 22 municipalities

■ 1.3 - 2.0 (3)
■ 0.3 - 1.3 (16)
■ 0.0 - 0.3 (3)



Percentage born in Turkey.  
average 0.9 per cent in 22 municipalities

■ 0.9 - 4.6 (4)
■ 0.0 - 0.9 (18)



Percentage born in Yugoslavia or Greece  
average 1.2 per cent in 22 municipalities

■ 1.7 - 2.3 (2)
■ 0.7 - 1.7 (10)
■ 0.0 - 0.3 (10)

/ boundary between the inner and the outer parts of the metropolitan area  
/ municipal boundary

MAP 6-2 Percentage of persons who were born outside Sweden

However, the quality of part of these dwellings left and leaves much to be desired, for which reason they ended up at the bottom of the housing market. In the ample Swedish housing market all this resulted in the concentration of many 'weak' households (unemployed, immigrants) in this sector. The allocation of house building sites of the Million Programme within the agglomeration of Stockholm was not aimed at the central city, as was said before. Therefore, the immigrants became distributed across outer municipalities.

In the previous chapters it turned out to be possible in all cases to express the degree of segregation arithmetically. However, the limited detailed statistical data makes the calculation of the indices of segregation in the case of Stockholm a perilous undertaking. At the lowest level, the neighbourhood, we have not found a subdivision according to native country or nationality. Without these data it is, by definition, not possible to calculate indices of segregation. At the level of the municipalities there is information available per native country, but here the extent of the municipality of Stockholm compared to the other 21 municipalities causes an insurmountable problem. The difference in number of the population between the number one (Stockholm) and the number two (Huddinge) is a factor 9.2 ( $703\ 627 / 76\ 379$ ). Such an unequal division of inhabitants has such consequences for the indices of segregation that we have refrained from that calculation.

### **Conclusion of the quantitative analysis**

The modest data reveal that the central city is hardly different from its neighbouring areas as regards the share of immigrants. That is a remarkable fact, which seems to be connected with the housing market. The opinion that concentrations occur across the whole agglomeration was confirmed in an analysis according to native country at local level. It turned out impossible to calculate the relevant indices of segregation.

## **6.4 Policy in Stockholm**

### **Introduction**

In the introduction to this chapter we wrote that the Swedish model has lost its gloss over the past few years. Especially the rapidly increased unemployment is a threat to the extent to which the whole system of social services remains affordable. The large problems caused a number of Rotterdam policy researchers to conclude in 1993 that "therefore the Swedish model can rather be considered a special cultural-historical fact in Sweden to which frequently is referred back; an idealized, unattainable situation" (Van Twist 1993 p. 47). Our informants had a similar opinion. It goes almost without saying that an economic and social revolution of this size will not leave policy on minorities and social problems undisturbed. A reorientation is indeed taking place, which is very inter-

esting to the other countries because the Swedish approach served as an example for (employment) policy for a long time. Now that Sweden itself is being forced to establish priorities in its welfare state, the outside world can learn from it.

### **Institutional context**

Until recently Sweden had an exemplary position in many European policy circles, especially in the fields of (re)training and employment. What, however, rarely emerged in the reflections is the difference in institutional structure between Sweden and the other countries. In Sweden, the central government is not quick to interfere. On the contrary, the municipalities have a much stronger position. In 1990 the share of government spending of the Gross National Product was 8 per cent, while that of the municipalities was 21.5 per cent. The municipalities levy income tax and are dependent on money they receive from the national government for only some 25 per cent.

Just as in the other countries in this study the national government determines the guidelines for immigration. In Sweden, too, the inflow of asylum seekers over the past few years has led to heated discussions; in March 1995 the Swedish minister of immigration was forced to withdraw his proposal to "send away" (it was said that firmly) some thousands of Bosnians. The local communities in the South of Sweden, where many Bosnians ended up, took the position via their spokesmen, the churches, that such thoughts could only be expressed if the country of origin could be called safe once again. This example shows that the influence of the local level in Swedish society is considerable. The strong position of the municipalities can also be traced back to the attitude of the Social Democratic Party, which used the municipalities as an instrument for its policy of reform. In the nineties the financial relation between local and national level has changed somewhat (see Montin, 1995, p. 27). On the one hand special purpose payments and the compensation for actual spending have been replaced as much as possible by lump sum financing. In that way the municipalities have become even more free to determine themselves how to spend their own financial means. However, the problem for the municipalities is that the national government has disposed of more and more duties (has decentralized) without offering extra financial means. Moreover, in the early nineties the national government claimed the right to bind the level of local taxes to a maximum. In spite of that development local governments in Sweden have at first sight a considerable degree of autonomy, compared to a number of other countries in this study. At this moment modest experiments with boroughs are going on. A word of caution is called for when the Swedish administrative relations are discussed: not only are changes occurring rapidly, but also "the (present) administrative relations and the distribution of power in the national government are not transparent, and they are judged very differently" (Van Twist 1993 p. 52).

An outline of the institutional relations is not complete without referring to two committees that were especially established to study social problems. In the municipality of Stockholm the council established a committee for social integration in the spring of 1995. The committee is aimed at starting a discussion on the definition of social integration and policy support, which should lead to an improved approach to the problems. The committee has an advisory status and is not related to an executive government body. Its establishment is a good example of the transformation that Swedish society is going through at the moment: nothing existed yet in this field, neither in this nor in other Swedish cities.

At a national level a 'committee for urban development' was established, which comes directly under the Prime Minister. That committee, in spite of its name, occupies itself with social integration. The committee reported for the first time at the end of 1995. The two committees give an impression of the recent character of the theme of social integration in Swedish society. For years, foreign delegations came to Sweden to observe the Swedish model, but now the Swedes themselves are interested in the experiences with social integration that have been acquired abroad. It is not a coincidence that the committee of Stockholm paid a working visit to the Amt für Multi-Kulturelle Angelegenheiten (AMKA) in Frankfurt am Main in the autumn of 1995.

## Measures

### *Spatial dispersal policy*

So far the national government has pursued an explicitly rural dispersal policy for migrants who have recently arrived, according to the so-called Whole-of-Sweden strategy. The national government entered into contracts with the municipalities to accept a certain amount of immigrants. During the first eighteen months the municipalities were subsidized for the costs of accepting immigrants. The expectation was that the immigrants would have found jobs after eighteen months at most. From that moment on the immigrants would be accepted in Swedish society as a matter of course. Due to the sharp increase in unemployment the bottom actually fell out of this strategy. As a matter of fact, evaluations showed that many migrants moved to the cities. Since the spring of 1995 the policy has changed: immigrants have been allowed to decide for themselves where they want to live from the second day of their stay. It is expected that the share of immigrants in the large cities, which is actually higher than could be expected on the basis of the national average, will increase further.

At borough, local or district level we have not found forms of integral spatial dispersal policy. However, in the housing market it turned out, in a study in the borough of Rinkeby in Stockholm, that a form of spatial dispersal policy did indeed exist. That municipality, with nearly 14 000 inhabitants, has a social status in Sweden which is comparable to that of many system-built high-rise blocks that were built during the nineteen

sixties and seventies in many cities almost all over the world. As in many other cities, the physical environment looks quite decent.

In interviews it turned out that the largest housing corporation in Rinkeby pursues a selective admittance policy that is legally permitted, or at least tolerated. The arguments in favour of that policy are mainly found in the image and the assumed possibility to let the dwellings in the quarter in the longer term. The fact is, the corporation does not have to fear loss of income in the short term. If a tenant can no longer pay the rent, the payment is always guaranteed through social security. The housing corporation policy even persists - and is considered financially safe - when about 10 per cent of the dwellings are unoccupied. The housing corporation states that that policy is unavoidable, because the corporations themselves are increasingly held responsible for the rental incomes and the exploitation. So they are increasingly coming to act as landlords. In the light of that interpretation the housing corporation does not admit a concentration of immigrants to its housing stock. In connection with the increasing private conditions the responsibility for the relief of immigrants should be more distributed.

#### *Compensating policy*

In all interviews the problem of unemployment emerged as the most central one. The loss of employment had two consequences for immigrants in Sweden. In the direct sense it became much more difficult for immigrants to find jobs. More indirectly a number of persons expressed their fear that unemployment could stimulate right-wing extremism among the autochthonous population. Opinion polls show that a potential group of 10 to 15 per cent of the voters would vote for an extreme right-wing party. The dissatisfaction that exists among part of the Swedish voters is also illustrated by the rapid growth of the communist party.

In recent years, in accordance with policy, much time and money has been spent on tackling the problem of unemployment. The attention that has traditionally been paid in Sweden to the retraining of the unemployed has been intensified. In the more integral, territorial aimed sense, a number of programmes were started that are aimed at the large cities. In the first place the local governments set up two programmes of SEK 140 million (about 13 million Euro) and SEK 125 million (12 million Euro), respectively, that are aimed at improving the living conditions and increasing employment in the suburbs. In the second place, advanced plans existed to submit proposals to the social funds of the EU. The most important programme of SEK 500 million (47 million Euro), which was also set up by the national government at the insistence of the cities of Gothenburg and Stockholm, is aimed at 'dilapidated' suburbs and at issues such as safety, jobs and schools. It is no wonder that that programme was pursued by the large cities in Sweden, because in the present situation of unemployment the weight falls unilaterally on the shoulders of these cities. The three programmes are territorial aimed - they channel

funding to the suburbs - but are not directly intended for immigrants. Therefore, in the strict sense, there is no specific policy.

According to our respondents it does not fit into the Swedish (policy) tradition to target programmes explicitly at minorities through ring-fencing regulations. The fear of creating an image of positive discrimination is great. That became evident, for example, in the programme for day nurseries. Traditionally that programme has had a fine reputation in Sweden. Over the past five years many day nurseries were closed as a result of the ailing economy. The local government of Stockholm tried to prevent the loss of that facility in the areas with most problems, which led to more cuts in other areas. However, an attempt in that direction led immediately to fierce reactions from the autochthonous Swedish middle class in the centre of Stockholm. The population that lived there had great problems with the selective policy. In one of the interviews it was remarked that one of the problems Sweden is struggling with at national and local level exactly is "how to give people equal treatment in this country of equality".

Nevertheless, for example in the government financial contribution to schools, a component is incorporated that counts the number of immigrant children. Schools with many immigrant children can receive extra money to employ more teachers. And a start has been made towards making it compulsory to participate in programmes that are aimed at improving integration. Compulsory training in the Swedish language for unemployed adults was mentioned as an example.

### Evaluation

According to our respondents, in the past the explicit 'Whole of Sweden' strategy fitted well into the then current socio-economic situation. However, the strategy was not sufficiently flexible to handle the increase in unemployment. It is still too early to evaluate the effects of the recent measures and the extent to which their objectives may be achieved.

### 6.5

### Conclusion

The outsider of Europe turns out to be confronted with the reality of Europe and the EU, just like the other countries. The advanced welfare state is being reduced under the pressure of unemployment and the requirements for admission to the EMU. At this moment it is difficult to assess how ethnic segregation will develop. The impression has been created that there is no large basis in Sweden for extra financial funding for minorities, since formulating policy with ethnic criteria does not square with the ideal of equality that is highly developed in Swedish society. On the other, hand supporters of positive action can derive a strong argument from the disadvantaged position that minorities have, especially on the labour market at this moment. For the time being it remains uncertain which way the balance will go.

Issues that are connected with immigration, integration and ethnicity became more important in French society over the past few years. Traditionally the virtues of assimilation are pointed to in France, which can be illustrated by referring to the two ex-prime ministers who came from immigrant families (Balladur: Iranian-Turkish origin; Bérégovoy: Ukrainian origin). However, not everyone is convinced of the virtues of pluralism. The rise and stabilization of the extreme right-wing Front National is an omen that not all French still believe in an open-hearted admission and integration policy. Especially the Algerians and other South Mediterraneans have to pay, according to the ideology of the Front. The recent problems in Algeria, with the coming of terrorism to the French territory, obviously do not help in the creation of a good image. Everyone, including the opponents of the Front National, agrees that the hopeless situation in a number of suburbs of Paris and Lyon is socially undesirable. Moreover, it is evident that the population of the problem quarters does not form a reflection of the French population: there is an overrepresentation of South Mediterraneans without jobs, education or opportunities. The fear of exclusion of large groups of the population has gradually become justified. With a certain regularity contributions are published in the media in which the French suburbs are compared with the ghettos in the United States. A radical picture is painted, although most articles remain fairly impressionistic. This chapter initiates a more scientific study of the situation in the agglomeration of Paris. The situation of the groups of migrants in Paris and its surroundings is not only special because of the size of the population, but also because of the fact that the restructuring processes as a result of the embedding in the world economy are stronger here than in the rest of France. The central government contributes by supporting the idea that the city should be fully able to play its role at the centre of the world-wide web of cities. The ambition stretches at least to

Paris as capital of Europe. The reconstruction of central Paris for that purpose restricts the opportunities for housing and employment of the socio-economically weaker, including the groups of recent immigrants.

In sections 7.3 and 7.4, respectively, a description will be given of concentration and segregation in the Paris agglomeration and the policy reaction to that. Prior to that, section 7.1 will discuss the more general immigration practice in France and section 7.2 goes into some key elements of the recent history of Paris.

## 7.1 Immigrants in France

Immigration in France is certainly not a new phenomenon. As early as in 1931 6.6 per cent of the population consisted of immigrants. An explanation for the constant immigration surplus can, to an important degree be found in the demographic characteristics of the French population itself. The low fertility rates show that the population barely achieves the replacement rate. The more or less permanent character of immigration, in combination with this demographic ‘necessity’, explains the French tradition of defining identity not in ethnic or racial but more in cultural terms.

Since the Second World War the increase in the size of the immigrant population has taken place in three periods: a relatively modest increase in the period of recovery of the French economy (1946-1954), a rapid increase during the large modernization of France (1954-1974) and a slowing down in the increase since then (the figures this classification is based on go up to and including the 1990 census). There were different regulations for admittance in these periods. The first period had restrictions through linking a residence permit to having a regular job and linking family reunification to having sufficient accommodation; the second period had freer admittance followed by bilateral recruitment agreements per country; the third period had a very restrictive policy and unsuccessful attempts to start a return process. Now the admittance policy, just as elsewhere, is increasingly concentrating on the restriction of the streams of refugees and asylum seekers. The legal regulations concerning admittance and residence were tightened up in 1993. For the first time in long time, the acquisition of French nationality was also submitted to stricter regulations in that year.

Having the French nationality is a condition for the most important political and social rights. Compared to other European countries it is relatively simple for an immigrant to acquire the French nationality. The legislation, for example, is quite different from that in Germany, where it turned out to be much harder for (Mediterranean) immigrants to acquire the German nationality. The difference can mainly be traced back to the distinction between *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli*. The first concept, which is the leading principle in Germany, is often translated as blood relationship. France has the principle of *ius soli*, which has the idea of territorialism in it. Normally that principle means that all persons

who stay (long-term) on French territory and those who were born there are French citizens, with the accompanying rights. A child of two non-French parents which is born in France, has lived the last five years in France, and does not have a police record, can automatically acquire French citizenship when it reaches the age of eighteen. Moreover, every child, one of whose parents was born in France, automatically obtains French nationality. In practice that means that the third generation immigrants obtains French nationality by definition. Furthermore the French naturalization procedures are rather liberal (Ireland, 1994, p. 75); for example in the early eighties a general pardon was proclaimed for 150 000 illegal aliens.

There are no exact figures on the combined effect of that legislation, but Brubaker (1992) stated that as a result of the three procedures mentioned nearly the whole group of 400 000 second-generation Algerians who were born in France have French nationality, and that two thirds of the 1.2 million immigrants under 18 will also ultimately obtain French nationality.

From what has been stated above it becomes clear that the French data should be considered with a certain degree of caution. The major source of data is the census, which was carried out for the last time in 1990. Concerning nationality the three major categories are French, French by acquisition, and Immigrant. The French by acquisition category tends to show the effect of the naturalization procedures. Usually the category is expressed as a percentage of the total of the French category, but of course it can also be added to the Immigrant category to obtain a distinction between the categories that is less based on nationality and more on ethnicity. First of all, as with all countries that are involved in this study, we are interested in the Immigrant category. That system of registration causes problems especially in the case of the Algerians. The situation can be compared with that of the Surinamese in the Netherlands, who have the Dutch nationality but who are regarded as a target group in minorities policy. In France only the nationality that is stated in the passport of the person concerned is considered; there is no system of registration as in the Netherlands. Apart from the low score that such a registration produces, in practice the answers to the questions of the census turn out not to be always reliable. Young people of Algerian parents who have only the French nationality according to their passports sometimes state that they have the Algerian nationality out of 'a kind of pride' according to Paul White, the geographer.

The importance of the 'French by acquisition' category becomes clear from the number of 1.4 million in the 1982 census for France as a whole. However, the annoying thing is that no subdivision into earlier (or second) nationality is given. From the literature a picture emerges that there is a difference in groups according to their inclination towards naturalization. Guillon (1992) stated that the Portuguese are less inclined to apply for French nationality than, for example, persons from former Yugoslavia.

## 7.2 The ‘development’ of Ile de France and Paris

From a political, economic or social viewpoint no city in France comes close to Paris. The question of what exactly is meant by Paris, however, is not easy to answer. Traditionally the city has been identified with the department 75, with 2.15 million inhabitants according to the latest census of 1990. As with most cities in this study the administrative boundaries are only an indication of the real extent of the city. In real terms Paris extends over eight departments, of which department 75 is the centre. In the so-called first ring (*petite Couronne*), in which the departments 92, 93 and 94 are situated, there is a completely urbanized area that constitutes an integral part of the Paris agglomeration. In the second ring (*grande Couronne*), which the departments 77, 78, 91 and 95 are part of, the closely built-up city gradually changes into agricultural areas and woods. The eight departments together form the region of *Ile de France*.

Although we might start a description of the evolution of Paris with the settlement of the Ile de la Cité, it is probably more appropriate to start with the transformations that took place some 150 years ago, especially those under the Haussmann Prefecture. Much of Paris’ current urban social structure was shaped at that time, when poor inner city inhabitants, in a period of autocracy, were forced to move from the city of Paris towards the urban periphery, and were replaced by a richer population. After that event almost nothing happened until the arrival of De Gaulle as President of the Fifth Republic. Then things started to change again. The Fifth Republic, according to Carpenter *et al.* (1994) “with its increasingly monarchical style of Presidency, has had the added nuance of the rivalry, over the period 1985–1995, between the Socialist Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac (then Mayor of Paris)”. The strong right-of-centre local administration has had a number of implications for issues of social and urban geography. In the mid-1950s the Paris agglomeration contained some of the worst inner city slum housing in Northern Europe; large suburban *bidonvilles* (shanty towns) of immigrants; and huge numbers of substandard housing. The then Minister of Construction outlined two major objectives: to put an end to the ‘inhumane housing conditions’ of 500 000 French households; and to ‘reconquer’ the central quarters and to endow them with a structure and architecture worthy of our age. *Grands Ensembles* (social housing estates) were created, such as Sarcelles and La Courneuve. These became the housing opportunities for the poorer members of society and for those displaced from the new inner city renewal schemes. However, as a result, over the years these suburban social housing estates have come to be seen as the real problem areas of the entire agglomeration, characterized by high unemployment rates, ethnic tension, periodic unrest, and so on.

At the same time several conservation areas were designated (*secteurs sauvegardé*), among them the Marais. Although planners and inhabitants intended to make every effort to prevent the exodus of low-income groups and artisans, and their replacement by the most wealthy category of residents, social coherence and community networks were broken because of the process of renewal. Eventually, gentrification and social change appeared to be inevitable. The high social status of the city was perpetuated by the respective policies. Carpenter *et al.* (1994) concluded that Paris had been undergoing a process of *embourgeoisement* (gentrification) for over thirty years. That process also touches on the areas that were built up in the nineteenth century as working class neighbourhoods, particularly in the eastern part of the city. As a result the city of Paris stands out from the suburbs as an area of the *bourgeois* residence. The inner suburbs, with their *grands ensembles*, are still the most problematic areas. Since Paris still presents more opportunity for renting furnished property, temporary employment, and wider community support, compared to suburban locations, many elderly persons and immigrants try to survive right there. The overall result is increased polarization within Paris as well.

### 7.3 Ethnic segregation in Paris

In Paris, too, the residential segregation patterns will reflect the processes sketched above, socially and ethnically. Table 7-1 shows an outline of the principal nationalities in the city (department 75) and in Ile de France (the collection of eight departments).

TABLE 7-1 Nationalities in Paris and Ile de France, 1990

Group	Paris	%	Ile de France	%
Total	2151245	100.0	10660075	100.0
Français	1810755	84.2	9282659	87.1
Français par acquisition	126152	5.9	489913	4.6
Étranger	340490	15.8	1377416	12.9
Espagnol	22395	1.0	59572	0.6
Italiens	10857	0.5	51001	0.5
Portugais	44847	2.1	304811	2.9
Algérien	43161	2.0	238955	2.2
Marocain	26558	1.2	155674	1.5
Tunisien	26018	1.2	75965	0.7
Afrique Noire	28308	1.3	113599	1.1
ZO Azie	13937	0.7	52850	0.5
Turcs	7772	0.4	40795	0.4

Source: INSEE 1992

The table shows that 15.8 per cent of the population of Paris has a foreign nationality. For Ile de France as a whole that share declines to 12.9 per cent. By using a definition that is based on nationality there will be an inevitable underestimation in the French situation compared to a definition that is based on ethnicity. The *Français par acquisition* category forms a possibility to better approach the size of the last group. Added to the percentage of immigrants the category causes an increase in the share of non-French to 21.7 and 17.5 percent, respectively.

The composition of the immigrant population changed considerably over the course of time. Initially the largest group were the Algerians, among which even the French who returned from Algeria at the end of the colonial war in 1962 can be ignored. The table shows that the Algerians were still the second largest category of immigrants in the Paris region in 1990. From the sixties the number of Portuguese increased sharply, with consequently the highest share of all nationalities in the table. In an international context the concentration of Portuguese is surprising; in none of the previous chapters was a striking presence of Portuguese observed. In the last census period (1982-1990) the number of Algerians as well as the number of Portuguese declined somewhat. Spaniards and Italians, important groups before, declined in number long ago. Moroccans, West Africans, and also Tunisians to a degree, South East Asians and Turks belong to the more recently increasing groups. We should add that the large numbers of incoming inhabitants of the Polynesian and Caribbean areas that are under French supervision are left out of the description here. The predominant importance of the colonial inheritance and the poorer neighbouring countries in the origin of the migrants is obvious. The stereotyping of migrants has focused increasingly on the *maghrebins*, popularly previously called *nord-africans* or *arabes*. This category of migrants hardly considers itself as a community. The differences between them according to region of origin are still heavily accentuated.

Since the slackening of the increase in the immigrant population after 1974 its composition has become more and more 'normal': sex ratios have approached 1 and age divisions have become less extreme. The number of mixed marriages of members of migrant groups with French citizens is steadily increasing, also it is between maghrebins and French.


Not only is it a tricky business to use nationality as categorization in the census, but the availability of spatial units in the Paris agglomeration is also difficult to use. There are serious problems concerning the itemization of the data according to spatial level. INSEE published the results of the 1982 census on a finer spatial level, but refrained from it in 1990 due to the stricter privacy legislation. The result is that *fewer* data are available in France, contrary to all other countries in this study. Of the department 75 - with a total number of inhabitants of 2 151 254 - nothing is published by INSEE under the level of *quartiers* or *arrondissements*. In the first case this involves a subdivision into 80 units, of which the columns of French nationality and immigrant nationality are important for us.

However, for an itemization of the immigrant category into separate nationalities, only the rougher district, with 20 units, is available. So the average size of a district consists of over 100 000 inhabitants. Compared to the other cities in this study that is extremely high. The limited availability of the data obstructs a better result.


In the other departments of Ile de France the situation as regards data material is even less rosy. INSEE publishes the data on French - Immigrant at the level of *communes* as a minimum. The number of inhabitants of these communes varies, from a few hundred inhabitants to over 100 000. The itemization according to nationality is only available at a higher scale than that of communes. For the three departments of the first ring (92, 93, 94) an itemization according to nationality is made available for four communes. By subtracting the figures of the four *communes* from the total of the department the data of the other part of the department can also be deduced. The result is a subdivision into five units - for a total number of inhabitants of more than 1 million per department. In the second ring a subdivision for two municipalities is given, plus a figure for the urban area and the countryside. Three relevant units can be calculated: the two municipalities and the rest of the urban area.

A last remark concerns the difference between Ile de France, the urban area of Paris and the definition that INSEE uses for the agglomeration of Paris. A large part of the surface area of the second ring of Ile de France is not included in their definition of the agglomeration of Paris. Some geographers arrive at other boundaries when they do count cities such as Meaux or Melun to the urban area of Paris on the basis of indicators such as living - working relations. These two cities fall outside the boundaries of the agglomeration of Paris with INSEE. In this report we followed the definition of INSEE, because of which the map of the second ring shows some white spots.


Map 7-1 shows the spatial distribution of the category étranger (immigrant) across the agglomeration of Paris. The eighty quartiers that together make up department 75 are visible. The map shows an overrepresentation of immigrants in the northern direction from the centre. Within department 75 that is especially, and almost uniquely, the Goutte d'Or near the Gare du Nord. Paul White compares the presence of immigrants of all kinds of nationalities in that area with the Chicago of the twenties of this century (1987, p. 195). Striking is the overflow from the northern part of department 75 to the neighbouring department 93. The *communes* of Aubervilliers and Saint-Denis score highest on that point. Map 7-2 shows the spatial distribution of South Mediterraneans across the agglomeration of Paris. At this point we should make some remarks regarding the data presented. There are some objections of a methodological nature to Maps 7-2 and 7-3, with possible consequences for their interpretation. First, compared to Table 7-1 the ten times smaller number of units attracts attention (see the legend). Furthermore, the definition of an agglomerate of Paris in the outer ring means that the urban category has not been calculated completely correctly.



MAP 7-1 Étranger in the agglomeration of Paris, 1990




Source: INSEE.




Overall, 4.6 per cent of the population of metropolitan Paris is part of the category South-Mediterranean.

Percentage South-Mediterranean 45 areas	
10.4 - 12.8	(2)
7.5 - 10.4	(5)
4.6 - 7.5	(13)
0.0 - 4.6	(23)
less than 250 inhabitants	(2)

MAP 7-2      South Mediterraneans in the agglomeration of Paris, 1990



Source: INSEE



Overall, 3.9 per cent of the population of metropolitan Paris is considered North-Mediterranean.

Percentage North-Mediterranean.  
45 areas

7.1 - 8.6	(4)
5.6 - 7.1	(6)
3.9 - 5.6	(9)
0.0 - 3.9	(24)
less than 250 inhabitants	(2)

MAP 7-3 North Mediterraneans in the agglomeration of Paris, 1990

The basis of the urban category, as it is published by INSEE in the departmental *série verte*, besides a large number of *communes* that are situated within the agglomerate of Paris, also has a small number of *communes* that are situated outside the agglomerate. The calculated percentage of South and North Mediterraneans has only been used to distinguish the *communes* within the agglomerate. So it is possible that the highest percentages are situated outside the agglomerate of Paris. The precise answer to that question cannot be discovered, although the literature gives cause to doubt this hypothesis.

The Algerians occupy the main place within the group of South Mediterraneans. The *communes* of Aubervilliers and Saint-Denis turn out to have the highest percentages. The larger presence of South Mediterraneans on the northern side of the agglomeration corresponds with the picture that emerges in the literature (for example White 1987). The results of the 1982 census, in which separate nationalities per *commune* were published, showed about the same pattern for the spatial distribution of the Algerians. They have turned out to hold on to the original settlement pattern in the vicinity of industrial employment over the years, although more and more low-skilled jobs are being lost.

The immigration of North Mediterraneans consisted in France for a larger part than in other countries of Portuguese. Map 7-3 shows the spatial distribution across the agglomeration of Paris for the category North Mediterraneans as a whole. Compared to the South Mediterraneans in the previous map it is noteworthy that the spatial distribution is more directed towards the (south) east. Here too we can see relatively stable settlement patterns.

In explanation of the patterns we should point at the characteristics of the housing market in the first place. To alleviate qualitative and quantitative housing shortage houses were built on a large scale on the outside of the agglomeration in the sixties and seventies. A number of the blocks that were built then are currently struggling with considerable social problems. Thus the greater part of the violence that bursts out from time to time takes place in the suburbs. In the policy section we will discuss in detail the policy reaction of the French government to the unrest in the suburbs. Some observers point out that the visibility of the social problems in the suburbs does not mean that there are no problems outside the suburbs. For example, according to one of our informers the misery on the highest floors of the blocks of flats in the upper middle class quarters where the former servant rooms are situated is greatly underestimated.

The limited availability of data influences our latitude to calculate indices of segregation in a useful way. Sufficient information is available to calculate the various measures for department 75. For the index of segregation of étranger versus other population the division into 80 quartiers can be used. For the indices of segregation and dissimilarity of the other categories the data of the twenty districts can be used. Although in the latter case there is a high average number of inhabitants in the spatial units compared to the other

cities in this project, the indices do give useful information, bearing that limitation in mind.

However, the maps show that Paris does not end at the boundaries of department 75. Especially the first ring shows municipalities with a high share of immigrants. In view of the available data it is no use calculating indices of segregation. For the index of segregation of étranger versus other population 460 spatial units are available. The number of inhabitants of the *communes*, however, varies in such a way that caution is called for in interpretation. For all the other categories it is not useful to calculate the indices of segregation. In the first ring data are available for only five spatial units, for which, on top of that, one of the five is a factor ten larger than the other four. In the second ring even fewer units are available. To give nonetheless an impression the scores for a number of nationality groups on the index of segregation and the index of dissimilarity were calculated and are presented in Table 7-2.

On the basis of the scores in the table the conclusion could be drawn that things are not so bad with the segregation according to nationality in Paris and surroundings. However, we think that such a statement cannot be made, considering the size of the territory. Although a comparison with figures from another city is not possible, the table does offer the possibility to compare between nationality groups (within the table). In that way one can deduce that the Portuguese in department 75 are less segregated than the Algerians (index of segregation). Furthermore, it turns out that the Portuguese and the Algerians, compared to each other, have the highest score within the Paris context.

### **Conclusion of the quantitative analysis**

The limited availability of statistical material does not make it easy to describe the patterns of concentration and segregation in the Paris agglomeration. The data do show that the presence of ethnic groups is more directed towards the outside of the agglomeration compared to other metropolitan areas in this project.

TABLE 7-2 Indices of segregation for department 75 and the agglomeration of Paris, 1990

Nationality	Measure	Dep. 75	Agglom.
Étranger versus Other Population	index of segregation	11	20
Algerians versus Other Population	index of segregation	23	
Portuguese versus Other Population	index of segregation	12	
Portuguese versus Algerians	index of dissimilarity	31	
Portuguese versus French	index of dissimilarity	12	
Algerians versus French	index of dissimilarity	24	

## 7.4

### Policy in Paris

#### Introduction

In principle the French policy on migrant groups is strongly dominated by an emphasis on assimilation due to traditional views about French citizenship. The inadequate visibility of ethnicity in the statistics is one of the results of that line of thought. In the field of policy we found hardly any instruments specifically aimed at ethnicity.

Under the influence of the slackening in the economic growth that started in the seventies the influx and presence of migrants has increasingly become a political problem. According to some authors the centralist government tradition in connection with the assimilation rhetoric and the dwindling economic possibilities, especially for migrants, have started an unusually strong political mobilization, especially of the second generation migrants. Such a mobilization underlines the discrepancy between the promise that assimilation shows and the actual situation, and is expressed in the concept of exclusion, which has been used in France from the seventies. Among the autochthonous French a movement has started that offers resistance to a number of changes in French society and that has concentrated on, among other things, the 'problem of immigration' in the course of time. The Front National affects the idea of assimilation for recent migrants. In the course of time this political party, which is now relatively stable and established, has spread more broadly than only in the vicinity of concentrations of migrants.

In the policy this polarization in public opinion leads to further debate about the question of how France should deal with its new inhabitants. A relatively large part of the population is sensitive to the idea that the emphasis should lie on closing off admittance to the French nation for newcomers. Apart from that supporters of pluralism within France have arisen. They have taken an increasingly fierce stand against the defendants of the ancient principle of assimilation who point out that assimilation has been going on for a long time, albeit with a great deal of trouble. The present problems may also be considered a phase in that process, which the various groups, and especially the government, should handle sensibly. In fact it seems that the French governments follow just that line. Just as in other countries, attempts have been made in France to curb the influx of new migrants. In the official figures that has indeed led to a decline in the influx. Thorough checks are made at the French borders, despite the Schengen agreement. Of course, the effectiveness of such checks is hard to determine.

#### Institutional context

The national government in France is historically very dominant in the administrative system. The simple fact that Paris is by far the most important city in France also causes a large degree of solidarity between the national government and the city. And another thing is the custom of many (national) presidents of immortalizing their period of office with *Grands Projets* in Paris, which causes a further identification of the state and the

city in the image. In this study it is primarily important that the national government determines the guidelines on migration and naturalization. As we said before, compared to, for example, Germany, France has a liberal regime in which it has become possible for many immigrants to acquire French nationality. Second, a glance at the national government is necessary because of the role it played in the development of Paris and its surroundings. Not only did the national government govern the municipality of Paris until 1977, it also played a crucial role in the construction of the *grands ensembles* in the suburbs, where large-scale social problems occur at present.

The composition of the government, and especially that of the cabinets according to duties, has a high degree of variability in France. The responsibilities with regard to the policy for the large cities are constantly subject to rearrangement. Historically, the Ministry for Construction (Equipement) is involved in public housing. The Ministries of Education and Home Affairs are also continuously involved. Changes are taking place in the fields of Social Services and Welfare. A Ministry for City Problems (*Ministère à la Ville*) functioned for a short time from 1990. Moreover, from 1991, *sous préfets à la ville* were appointed at a departmental level by the new ministry. In general, periods in which all parts in this field are placed in a superministry are alternated with times of fragmentation with itemization according to, for example, unemployment and labour market, care for the elderly or health care. At this moment the administrative system is in such a phase.

In the eighties the dominant position of the national government decreased somewhat due to decentralization efforts. The position of the *communes* and departments has strengthened, which is visible for instance in the increasing share that the local taxes make up in the Gross National Product. In the period 1970-1990 the share of the local taxes in the GNP increased from 3.4 per cent to 6 per cent. At the level of the *communes* (municipalities) the Paris agglomeration consists of a large municipality (Paris) surrounded by a few hundred smaller *communes*, of which the number of inhabitants varies strongly. Since 1977 the inhabitants of Paris have been allowed to elect their own mayor. Together with the larger prospects offered by the decentralization legislation, the policy in the *commune* of Paris has become oriented more towards the city itself and less towards the ups and downs of the whole region. The system of the departments - next to the *communes* the second pillar in the French administrative system - was radically reorganized under De Gaulle in 1962. The present division has originated in large measure from that time. Paris is an exception in the French system, because it is at the same time both a *commune* and a department.

The specific needs of the Paris region, with a city that gradually outstripped more rural *communes* (without these being dissolved), resulted in a number of initiatives to come to regional tuning. The first regional government was founded in the sixties, and this was changed into the Ile de France region under the management of a Préfet de Région and a regional council in 1976. The main duties of the regional governments are the (planning) co-ordination of the suburbs and the construction of infrastructure.

The problems of the new housing estates at the borders of the cities, and especially also in the Paris agglomeration, have been subject to a separate, increasingly developed *Politique de la ville* since the early eighties. At a central level it is carried out by the *Délégation interministérielle à la Ville* (DIV), an umbrella for the *Conseil National des Villes* (CNV) and the *Comité Interministériel des Villes* (CIV). This department especially has to co-ordinate the activities of the sectoral ministries. The individual budgets are small. It is the same system that is used in the policy of town and country planning. The political responsibility has been allotted differently in the course of time. Almost from its beginning DIV had also to deal with the radical regionalization of management that took place in France. Because of that the newly established regional councils, such as that of Ile de France, and the traditional municipalities got more power.

All in all it is remarkable how complex the Paris region is, administratively speaking. The decentralization policy from the early eighties has not made things easier. In view of the large number of parties involved in decision making, it is difficult to compile an outline of the relevant measures. That applies to the scientists who want to concern themselves with Paris, but also, as will be shown in the following section, for the policy makers themselves, who are losing increasing amounts of time to co-ordination efforts.

## Measures

### *Spatial dispersal policy*

As was mentioned in the introduction of the section on policy, there is no specific policy aimed at improving the social situation of groups of migrants in the country. So no examples of an integral spatial dispersal policy were found. The same applies to the more limited variants of spatial dispersal policy such as, for example, distribution in education according to ethnicity.

The absence of spatial dispersal policy according to ethnicity does not mean that there are no forms of non-ethnic policy that have major consequences for the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. In the city of Paris under mayor Chirac a policy of upgrading of certain quarters where many immigrants lived in a poor socio-economic situation was consciously pursued (also Section 7.2). White (1995) described a process in which, with a number of legal instruments, the socially weak are gradually pushed to the neighbouring departments of the first ring. In particular two instruments were applied from 1977: the *Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Ville de Paris* (SDAU, strategic regional development plan) and the *Plan d'Occupation des Sols* (POS, local land-use plan). Although the policy does not have a specifically ethnic effect, in practice especially South Mediterraneans turn out to be hit by this measure: "this exclusion of the interests of certain groups is therefore subtle: the perceived North African district of the Goutte d'Or is targeted for renewal but not the Chinatown areas of the Arts-et-Métiers

quarter or elsewhere" (White 1995 p. 6). In other words problematical cases are literally deported. As was argued before, this continues the tradition of Baron de Haussmann who started it almost 150 years ago.

### *Compensating policy*

In fact, the same applies to compensating policy as for spatial dispersal policy: there is hardly policy that works with ethnic admission criteria, but at the same time there is policy with evident consequences for minorities.

In France the urban problems are in fact a permanent issue on the policy agenda. Until the seventies the priority was clearing the poor situation in the slums, in particular at the city border of Paris. Large-scale house building projects were carried out in that period. The ZUP (*Zone à Urbaniser par Priorité*) programme functioned from 1958 until the early seventies, which was replaced by the ZAC (*Zone d'Aménagement Concerté*) programme. As noticed before, in Section 7.2, at the end of the seventies the urban problems changed: the *grands ensembles* themselves had to deal with major (social) problems. The occurrence of riots such as the *rodéos de 3 V* (joyriding and vandalism in Vaulx-en-Velin, Villeurbanne and Vénissieux) in 1981 caused the underlying decline to surface more clearly. In 1981, as a reaction to that development, a *Commission National de Développement Social des Quartiers* (CNDSQ) was established, which advocated a multidimensional approach to the social problems in the *grands ensembles*. Twenty three areas - in particular the larger *grands ensembles* - were selected in 1982. In the middle of the eighties besides CNDSQ a number of sometimes competing initiatives were developed (see Bertoncello, 1995). In 1988 CNDSQ, together with a number of other organizations, was rearranged into DIV (see the section on institutional context).

The common denominator of the majority of the projects that were established by the various authorities is the territorial character of the measures. A number of (problem) quarters are selected - although it is often not clear on what grounds - in which subsequently, through a combined action of various layers of management, a policy initiative is taken to solve social problems. It is striking that the financial means are used more and more selectively: of the recently developed *Grands Projets Urbaine* only 12 areas can still be pointed out that are amply supplied with financial means. The latest initiative is the programme of the Minister for Integration, who has developed a *Programme National d'Intégration Urbaine* (also indicated as the Marshall plan for the *banlieue*). This provides for a wide range of compensating measures, but also for an increase in police supervision. In the light of the stringency of the French budget, all 38 proposals should be considered for their financial consequences with more than usual insistence.

The integral territorial programmes can be itemized into the subfields of employment, housing and education. In the labour market many inhabitants of the suburbs score badly. Attempts to create extra jobs for young, low-skilled unemployed, who often come from

migrant groups, have generally been unsuccessful. Modest experiments with employment in local supermarkets, in the construction industry and in other small and medium-sized businesses were occasionally carried out. Due to the often bad opening up of the *grands ensembles* the accessibility of work at other places can be a real problem. On that score it is suspected that the concentrations of migrants in central Paris are possibly somewhat better off. However, not much real knowledge on that subject is available. As in other countries, the French government attempts to involve young, poorly educated unemployed in employment through a combination of fiscal and direct contributions to employers and mobilization activities of the job centres (here working by authority of the state). A variant - *Contrat-initiative-emploi* - which was propagated by the new French president Chirac during his campaign is now being introduced.

As regards education, a specific policy for improving the situation of concentrations of migrant children was found. The policy is initiated by the national Ministry of Education. In implementation of fighting unwanted deprivation (a kind of education priority policy) data are collected that give a picture of the number of migrant children that go to the school. Since the early eighties schools with a relatively large number of problem pupils have been granted extra funding. At the start of each school year the situation at the schools is revealed through lists on which, per class, the age (an indication of the deprivation) and nationality of the pupils is stated. Subsequently a possible deprivation at school can be translated into extra funds and premiums for the teaching staff. In addition to a higher wage classification they can claim a premium after three years. In practice it turns out that many of the persons concerned do not reach that term or leave as soon as the premium has been made available.

Housing allocation in the social sector by local landlords who are connected to municipalities and housing associations is important in the *grands ensembles*. From the seventies these dwellings have had a more uniform occupation, because the somewhat better situated people moved to houses of their own. It is common practice that adult children of migrants that are living in a municipality gain access to the local social housing sector without too many problems. Newcomers from migrant groups can be refused for many reasons: not enough income, long distance to work, too large a family. In that way concentrations of population categories now remain roughly stable.

### Evaluation

From what has been written above it emerges that the French government has initiated the necessary measures to tackle the urban problems. In many programmes the underlying reasoning is that the problem quarters that had just arisen should not be left to fend for themselves but, on the contrary, had to become involved with the rest of the city again. On the foundation of DIV this was stated most explicitly: "*éviter 'les villes à deux vitesses' et permettre aux quartiers marginalisés de devenir à terme des quartiers à part entière de la ville*" (Bertoncello, 1995, p 3). On the one hand attention was fixed on

controlling physical decline (compare urban renewal). On the other hand physical relations with the rest of the municipality and also with the wider agglomeration had to be created. However, from the start it was obvious that social measures were also necessary. A form of organization that was much used was the choice of a selected number of problem quarters in which *chefs de projet* tried to initiate actions that could relate to physical and social aspects. At the start the élan of the people that were responsible for the projects made their environments enthusiastic, and the co-ordination that was needed was effected with the aid of a starting subsidy from DIV. Gradually the burden of co-ordination became heavier and the direct involvement of the *chefs de projet* in initiating projects became less. It was noted that in a social field attempts to bring schools into contact with police and justice to start projects to prevent criminality were often successful. But here too it turned out to be difficult to keep the employees for a longer time. After some years a high turnover among the *chefs de projet* occurred.

The difficulties of implementation had a number of backgrounds. First, the decentralization of government made the political arena more complex. A growing number of people who were responsible joined the game. The local politicians had to be won over for each project, because now in many cases they had the power to decide on the budget. The capital city status of Paris caused extra complications. The nominal separation of competencies between local and regional government on the one hand and national government on the other hand was here even more difficult to put into practice than elsewhere because of the extra attention the national level paid to the local problems. Besides, the domain of the Politique de la Ville was defined increasingly widely. It is true, the problem neighbourhoods remained in the centre. But since they were considered to be so interwoven with the rest of the urban agglomerations, the people responsible for the central policy inclined increasingly to extend the number of participants. As a result it became necessary to create continually new co-ordination mechanisms. Furthermore, the number of quarters that were taken as starting points for actions was growing. At the moment it is certainly not only recent high-rise building quarters any longer. However, at the same time a large part of the available credits (now one third of the total) and manpower was put into a limited number of large-scale actions to improve the physical situation of a number of quarters once again. Due to that, attention for the social problems declined again.

The Politique de la Ville is not necessarily aimed at migrant groups, but of course it does have to deal with them. The extent to which it has made an impression on the actual activities cannot be determined from the information obtained. According to our informers this policy effort has in general played a useful part in creating some harmony between the sectoral departments and it has made the experiments easier which became necessary after the decentralization in the French governmental system. There is some scepticism about the question of whether DIV is still able to introduce innovative practices in the French governmental practice which could lead to improvements in the sphere of urban

problems. It seems that the level of ambitions that initially were aimed at undoing the deprivations in the quarters involved, is now restricted to preventing the expected 'social explosions' in these quarters. There is also some doubt about whether the explicit territorial line of approach of the Politique de la Ville is correct, considering the actual spatial distribution of the problems.

Summarizing, we can say that a great deal of policy is produced, but it is not directly aimed at the specific needs of migrant groups. The government inevitably encounters the specific problems of migrant groups in daily practice. In some cases an *ad hoc* solution is used and in addition discretionary powers are used at lower levels to take specific decisions (in particular at housing distribution).

### **7.5 Conclusion**

In view of the previous history the existence of social problems in a number of French suburbs can hardly be characterized as a recent phenomenon. A large number of policy initiatives have been developed. However, the social dimension of the problems turns out to be difficult to tackle, although it should be noted that the idea that social problems are important has taken root. The national government pays hardly if any attention to the specific needs of the immigrant population in the suburbs. However, in daily practice the problems turn out to be positively connected to ethnicity. At the level of lower governments - in any case informal or semi-official - the ethnic dimension of the social problems is increasingly recognized. However, with reference to the admittance criterion that was used as normative for the ethnic dimension of policy in this study, it should be concluded that there is no specific ethnic policy in France.

# **8            Canada: Toronto**

The situation in a number of ghettos in the United States is for many Europeans a spectre for the problem quarters in their own cities. However, American society cannot simply be compared with the European societies, and that is the reason why we have attempted in this study to broaden the framework of comparison with seven West European metropolitan areas. In this chapter Canada will be presented as a country that figuratively can bridge the (extreme) practices in the United States and the more moderate, but at the same time highly varied situation in Western Europe. Similarities exist between Canada and the United States in the fields of immigration history, liberal interpretation of the welfare state and the relatively young age of their cities. However, Canada is less extreme in terms of racial tensions and the formation of ghettos than the United States. The metropolitan area of Toronto was chosen because the highest percentage of immigrants of the Canadian metropolitan areas live in that area.

## **8.1            Immigrants in Canada**

Canada and immigration are concepts that are closely connected. Until recently there were hardly any obstacles to entering the country as an immigrant and becoming accepted in Canadian society. Migration is not a recent phenomenon, but its character has changed strongly in the course of time. The most large-scale immigration took place in the period 1903-1914, with peaks of about 400 000 immigrants a year. After the Second World War the annual number of immigrants reached (well) over 200 000 in 1957, 1967, 1974 and in the period 1990-1994. From the sixties the share of immigrants from outside Europe has increased strongly. Over the last few years the arrival of people from Hong

Kong, who did not want to await the takeover by China in 1997, has attracted much attention.

Immigration to Canada takes place within the framework of the Immigration Act, section 7 of which is especially important. This section concerns the annual elaboration of the policy at federal (Canadian) level. For instance, it indicates what numbers of immigrants, refugees, and others who are admitted to Canada on humanitarian grounds are expected or aimed for on the basis of social and economic grounds. The upper limits that were indicated in the plan for 1995 were clearly lower than in the previous years, for both family-related as well as economic migration (skilled workers and business people). For 1995 the federal government determined that newcomers had to integrate as rapidly as possible and had to contribute to Canada, without increasing the expenditure for social programmes. "This means raising selection standards; ensuring that Canadians honour their responsibilities towards sponsored family members; and achieving an appropriate balance between the economic and family components of immigration" (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1994a, p 7). To these proposals it was added that all qualified persons who ask for immigration and who are part of the family and economic compartment would be admitted. The intended decline of the number of immigrants was a forerunner of a reorientation in the direction of fewer immigrants who, however, can immediately contribute to the Canadian economy. It is expected that in the end the number of family-related immigrants will decline. In this regard it is important that a recent study has shown that 14 per cent of the sponsored family-related immigrants receive social benefits. The government is attempting to drive that percentage down. It is still true, and it has never been otherwise, that all immigrants are considered permanent inhabitants. The concept of guest worker is practically unknown. Moreover, it is still true that when you are once accepted as a landed immigrant you automatically become a Canadian citizen with voting rights after three years.

The economic immigrants are subdivided into skilled employees and business people. The first category is selected on the basis of criteria that are recorded in the immigrant selection (points) system. The labour market qualification is determining. Education, skills, availability and command of the language are the most important admittance criteria. Canada is actively recruiting in areas such as Hong Kong, Germany, the Middle East and Latin America.

The *Right-of-landing-fee* (a head tax) of 1995 has made it more difficult to enter Canada. Every adult immigrant has to pay Can \$ 975, independent of his or her income, to be eligible for the status of landed immigrant. Of course immigrants from poorer parts of the world can hardly afford such an amount. In the opinion of our conversation partners the introduction of the head tax symbolized the change of a 'supportive stimulative policy' into a 'restrictive policy'. The result is that fewer immigrants with a weak socio-economic position are admitted.

In Canada a comprehensive census is conducted every five years. The most recent census took place in 1991. Statistics Canada, who organized it, gives various options for looking at the ethnic or cultural background of the population. The importance of language within the Canadian context is revealed in the variable 'mother tongue'. This mainly involves a division into English, French and Other. Second, the variable 'country of birth' is included, with the main purpose to be able to distinguish between persons who were born inside or outside Canada. Third, Statistics Canada distinguishes a number of religions. Fourth, the concept of 'ethnic origin' is elaborated. In determining ethnic origin the question is asked to which ethnic or cultural group the ancestors of the person concerned belonged. When the definition is strictly observed no one is 'Canadian': Canada was, thus, possibly the only country in the world where a citizen could not declare himself or herself as a national of the country' (Krotki, 1990, p. 415). Until 1986 the choice was a single cross - 'single origin' - but in practice increasing numbers of people filled in two or more ethnic categories. Statistics Canada sanctioned the practice in 1986, because of which the category 'multiple origin' was officially justified. In addition the category 'Canadian' was introduced.

However, each of the definitions - mother tongue, country of birth, religion or ethnic origin - has its objections. For example, some important categories of immigrants, such as the Jamaicans, turn out to speak English fluently. The second generation Italians, born in Canada, could be considered Canadian, but in general they feel strongly Italian in a cultural sense. The religious category Jews can still be very different in terms of their culture. The division into ethnic origin loses clarity as the multiple category increases. On the advice of the respondents and on the basis of the literature we consulted, we will use the division according to ethnic origin in this chapter.

## 8.2           The 'development' of Toronto

The Toronto we refer to in this chapter is Metropolitan Toronto, founded in 1953 and corresponding largely with the then existing *daily urban system*, a concept that was based on the labour relations within a metropolitan area. Metropolitan Toronto is part of the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA). In 1991 the latter area had a population of approximately 3 893 000, while Metropolitan Toronto had a population of 2 250 000. Metropolitan Toronto includes six municipalities: the City of Toronto (the central city), East York, York, Etobicoke, North York and Scarborough. Whereas Metropolitan Toronto has grown only relatively slowly since 1971, and its share in CMA dropped, the City of Toronto has lost a relatively small share of its population. Like many other cities, Toronto has experienced a decline in manufacturing activities in the central city and an increase in the outer areas. An increase in the central city could be shown for office space developments requiring frequent face-to-face contacts. The City is still a major focus of

financial activities, high value retailing and entertainment. It has also experienced considerable residential gentrification since the 1970s resulting in a loss of affordable housing (Murdie, 1994, p. 439).

Toronto CMA has grown rapidly during the last few decades. Several factors may be mentioned that facilitated that growth, among them the Trades Agreement with the United States and the migration of businesses from Montreal to Toronto, as a result of the implementation of French language laws in Quebec and the possibility of Quebec's secession from Canada (Murdie 1998). Toronto is the leading city of Canada in almost every meaning of the word.

A crucial role with respect to the social and ethnic structure of the city is played by the stock of public housing, which is administered by the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority (MTHA). Public housing is a residual form of social housing developed to accommodate low income households. The development of public housing was terminated in the late 1970s and replaced by nonprofit and co-operative housing that is designed to house a wider range of income groups. MTHA is the oldest and largest supplier of public housing in Toronto. The Association administers about 33 000 units of rent/geared-to-income housing in Metropolitan Toronto. Most of the units were constructed in the 1960s and 1970s. The Public Housing Programmes were designed to avoid ghettoization by providing a mix of incomes within developments, although since 1986 there has been a shift back to less income mix, and in 1993 the Canadian government curtailed its expenditure on new social housing (Murdie, 1994, p. 442). Public housing was built throughout the metropolitan area, and therefore also in the inner suburbs. Murdie (1998) refers to evidence from the 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses, which shows the emergence of the inner suburbs as the home for many of Toronto's least well-off households, among them low income Blacks and new immigrants, and related it to the low cost public rental housing opportunities.

### **8.3              Ethnic segregation in Toronto**

Of all Canadian metropolitan areas, Toronto has the largest share of immigrants in its population. The large presence of earlier immigrants in the city and the (presumed) economic opportunities causes annually more than half of all Canadian immigrants to choose for the province of Ontario, and within that mainly for the metropolitan area of Toronto. In 1992, 55 per cent of the Canadian immigrants chose for the province of Ontario, and 54 per cent of these 55 per cent chose metro Toronto; almost 30 per cent of all immigrants ended up in Toronto. The composition according to area of origin of the immigrants has changed radically in the post-war years. Four waves can be distinguished according to area of origin:

- the fifties and sixties: Germany, Ukraine, Poland, Italy

- the sixties and seventies: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Caribbean (Jamaica, Trinidad), China
- the seventies and eighties: Portugal, Caribbean, China, South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka)
- the eighties and nineties: China, Hong Kong, South Asia, South East Asia (Philippines, Vietnam), Caribbean, Poland, Somalia, Portugal.

The 1991 census showed that the long-term immigration had produced a share of the population of metropolitan Toronto that was born outside Canada of 38 per cent. Table 8-1 shows an outline of the results of the 1991 census according to ethnic origin.

The share of multiple origin in both metro Toronto as well as in the city of Toronto lies above 20 per cent. The largest category of single ethnic origin is British. No more than 17.2 per cent of the total population can be rated in that category. This fragmentation contrasts with the West European case studies in which the gap between the largest group and the second is much wider, regardless of the way records are kept.

It turned out to be impossible to achieve greater clarity according to composition at a detailed spatial level for the Multiple Origin category. The figures of a higher level - census metropolitan area Toronto with nearly 4 million inhabitants - show that nearly three quarters of the Multiple Origin category consists of the British and Other subcategory.

The most important spatial unit that was used in the census in metropolitan areas is the 'census tract'. When defining the census tracts relatively homogeneous areas with between 2500 and 5000 inhabitants are aimed for. The urban area that is known as Metropolitan Toronto consists of 481 census tracts. With a total number of inhabitants of 2 255 170 the average number of inhabitants of a tract is over 4 600 persons.

In Map 8-1 the ethnic origin categories Italian, Chinese, East Indian, Portuguese, Black and Jewish have been added together and expressed in terms of percentages in relation to the total population per census tract. The sum of the individual groups nevertheless turns out to have led to remarkably high maximums in a number of census tracts. In addition the map clearly shows that the maximums are scattered across the entire metropolitan area. The highest value of 80.4 per cent is reached at the border of the metropolitan area in North York. However, the second and third highest values are reached in the City of Toronto (78.7 per cent and 72.7 per cent). Due to the way in which census tracts are set up, there is no distortion because of small numbers of inhabitants at such high scores; in the three highest scoring areas the population consists of about 4 000 persons. The maximum of 80.4 per cent is a factor 2.7 larger than the metropolitan average, while at the bottom of the list 279 of the 475 census tracts (59 per cent) score lower than the average of metropolitan Toronto.


TABLE 8-1 Ethnic origin in metropolitan Toronto and the City of Toronto, 1991

Ethnic origin	Metropolitan	%	City of	%
	Toronto		Toronto	
British	390315	17.2	107960	17.2
Canadian	128795	5.7	29325	4.7
Italian	176860	7.8	28770	4.6
Chinese	170830	7.5	52435	8.4
East Indian	77140	3.4	9025	1.4
Portuguese	81385	3.6	51930	8.3
Jewish	80085	3.5	20075	3.2
Black	88800	3.9	13285	2.1
Other Single	565820	25.3	150030	24.0
Multiple Origins	495140	22.1	164940	26.3
Total	2255170	627775		

Source: 1991 Census of Canada

In view of the nearness of and the similarities with the United States, the position of the Black category is interesting. Map 8-2 shows the spatial distribution of persons with a Black ethnic origin. The highest value - 23.2 per cent - is reached in Etobicoke on the border with North York. The map shows that the boundary between the two municipalities forms a real barrier, because on the other side in the municipality of York - in the quarter with a share of minorities of 80.4 per cent - the share of Blacks is 0 per cent. The maximum of 23.2 per cent is a factor six larger than the metropolitan average. At the bottom of the list, 325 of the 481 tracts (68 per cent) score lower than the metropolitan average. Compared to the black population in the United States the spatial pattern of the Black category is deviant. They can be found in particular outside the central urban area, with the exception of some centrally situated 'old-style' public housing residential areas, such as Regent Park. As was already suggested in Section 8.2, the black population has an overrepresentation in the areas with public housing with low rents. Their presence there has increased strongly. Murdie (1994) found that in 1971 only 4.2 per cent of the privately rented dwellings of the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority (MTHA) were occupied by black tenants. In 1986 that share turned out to have increased to 27.4 per cent. It concerns very cheap and poor privately rented dwellings. In fact, these are the bottom of the housing market.

Map 8-3 shows the spatial distribution of Portuguese ethnic origin. Over the last ten years the number of persons who count themselves among that group has increased strongly. It turns out that the Portuguese are much more strongly oriented towards the centre of the metropolitan area - the City of Toronto and the municipality of York - than, for instance, persons of Black ethnic origin.




**Source:** Prof. R. Murdie / C. Teixeira

The category minorities consists of the ethnic origins Italian, Chinese, East Indian, Portuguese, Black and Jewish, totalling 29.7 per cent of the population of metropolitan Toronto.

Percentage minorities.  
475 census tracts

■ 65.3 - 80.4 (14)
■ 47.5 - 65.3 (68)
■ 29.7 - 47.5 (114)
□ 0.0 - 29.7 (279)

**MAP 8-1**      **Minorities in Metropolitan Toronto, 1991**




**Source:** Prof. R. Murdie / C. Teixeira

The category Black (88 800 persons) forms 3.9 per cent of the population of metropolitan Toronto.

**Percentage Black.**  
481 census tracts

■	11.7 - 23.2 (22)
■	7.8 - 11.7 (41)
■	3.9 - 7.8 (87)
□	0.0 - 3.9 (325)

**MAP 8-2** Ethnic origin Black in Metropolitan Toronto, 1991



Source: Prof. R. Murdie / C. Teixeira

The category Portuguese (81 385 persons) forms  
3.6 per cent of the population of metropolitan Toronto.

Percentage Portuguese.  
481 census wards

■	20.5 - 58.7 (24)
■	12.0 - 20.5 (14)
■	3.6 - 12.0 (42)
□	0.0 - 3.6 (395)

MAP 8-3 Ethnic origin Portuguese in metropolitan Toronto, 1991

Nearly 80 per cent of all the Portuguese in metropolitan Toronto live in the City of Toronto or York. The maximum of 58.7 per cent is as much as a factor 16.3 larger than the metropolitan average. On the other hand, 395 of the 475 census tracts (83 per cent) contain fewer Portuguese than would be expected on the basis of the metropolitan average. On the basis of these figures we must conclude that the Portuguese are distributed unevenly. The literature (Teixeira, 1995; Metroplanning, 1994) points at the strongly developed sense of family which, together with an 'accidental' first settlement in the City of Toronto, has led to a concentration.

The map shows that there are clear concentrations of ethnic groups. In particular the Portuguese are clearly clustered in the City of Toronto. To give the global impressions more foundation the indices of segregation and dissimilarity have been calculated for a number of groups in Table 8-2. The table shows that the Portuguese group is most segregated in metropolitan Toronto. On the basis of the maps it was to be expected that the Portuguese group would score highly as compared to the Black group, because the first group is concentrated in the City of Toronto while the latter group is more distributed across the whole agglomeration. However, it is surprising that the Portuguese group also scores highly as compared to the other groups in the table. Apart from the index of segregation of British - Other Population the scores are substantially higher than in Amsterdam (Tables 2-4 and 2-5). On the other hand, it can be concluded that the scores on the indices of segregation for Blacks are much lower than the values that are noted in the literature for the neighbouring country, the United States. The conclusion should be that Canada, on the points mentioned in the introduction is more comparable to the United States than to the West European countries; the segregation of the Black group is of quite a different order.

TABLE 8-2 Indices of segregation and dissimilarity for a number of groups in 1991, 475 census tracts

Ethnic origin	Measure	Score
British versus Other Population	index of segregation	23
Minorities versus Other Population	index of segregation	42
Black versus Other Population	index of segregation	40
Portuguese versus Other Population	index of segregation	64
Chinese versus Other Population	index of segregation	48
Italian versus Other Population	index of segregation	51
Black versus British	index of dissimilarity	48
Black versus Portuguese	index of dissimilarity	68
Black versus Chinese	index of dissimilarity	54
Portuguese versus British	index of dissimilarity	68
Portuguese versus Chinese	index of dissimilarity	72

According to our respondents and the literature consulted (see also Section 8.2) an important explanation for the patterns of segregation lies in the location of public housing. This type of dwellings, for which the rent that must be paid depends on income ('rent geared to income housing'), was built in the entire metropolitan area, and not only in the inner city as in the United States. As stated before, in the seventies a switch was made to building non-profit co-operative housing; social rent of a better quality and with a larger socio-economic mix than public housing. The construction of non-profit co-operative housing went on until the provincial government announced a building freeze in the mid-nineties. Under the current neo-conservative government the social services, including public housing, have been drastically cut. In 1995 the proportions of property was more or less as follows: 60 per cent of the stock were owner-occupier dwellings, 30 per cent were rented dwellings, of which 75 per cent private rented and 25 per cent social rented. Furthermore, there is a grey area of privately developed, subsidized dwellings for recent immigrants. The rents are low, but the quality is often correspondingly poor.

### **Conclusion of the quantitative analysis**

The public housing complexes are not spatially concentrated, due to which no accumulation of socio-economically weaker inhabitants has occurred. A series of ghettos in the central urban area, as can be observed so often in the US, cannot be found in Toronto. The spatial distribution of the Black group across the entire agglomeration forms a striking difference from the United States. Furthermore, the Portuguese group had the highest score on the index of segregation.

## **8.4 Policy in Toronto**

### **Introduction**

Compared to the European countries, where large-scale immigration started only after the fifties, Canada has known a much more prolonged immigration. It is not incorrect to state that immigration is a permanent phenomenon in Canadian society. Its long duration also implies that Canadian society, and with that also the Canadian government, must have become used to the fact that immigrants are not immediately integrated into the society they enter. Moreover, not all immigrants go through the same path of development. Some groups turn out to integrate more, while others remain strongly oriented towards their own culture. Furthermore, not all groups are doing equally well in economic terms. One could ask how the Canadian government reacts to the problems and opportunities that are connected with immigration. In accordance with the set-up of this study, our attention is mainly focused on the reaction of the urban government. In the quantitative section it turned out that there was less visible segregation than in a number of cities in the United States. Nevertheless, among the Portuguese there turned out to be a consid-

erable degree of concentration in the City of Toronto. In this section we will pay attention to the reaction of the government to the problems of segregation, concentration and integration.

### **Institutional context**

Canada has a federal form of government with considerable powers devolved to the provinces. The starting points for immigration policy are determined at a federal level. In that field the central role is played by the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration. Below the federal level Canada has ten provinces and two territories. Toronto is situated in the province of Ontario. In the interviews with our respondents it was stated every time that the decision making within the province of Ontario governs what is happening with respect to immigrants. That decision making concerns all fields, from employment policy, social security, housing to policy aimed directly at immigrants. In Toronto the local level consists of two tiers of government. The metropolitan government - the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto - has authority in the six municipalities that are also indicated in the maps. Its most important duties are police, public transport, social services and welfare assistance. To carry out these duties the metropolitan government had a budget of Can \$ 3.5 billion in 1995, about half of which was financed by the province of Ontario, one third came from taxes and one fifth from profits of activities. Six local governments are functioning at municipal level, which, for example, deal with fire brigades and health care.

Besides the government authorities a large number of ethnically specific non-governmental organizations (ngos) are functioning. In fact there are three levels of ngo's. The first level is aimed at an ethnic group and has clear roots in its own community. The budget varies between \$ 20 000 and \$ 100 000 on the basis of competition for subsidy, which in many cases comes from organizations at the second level. The second level concerns established private organizations, which are aimed at a broader category of immigrants and which are organized more professionally. One of the larger organizations is COSTI, with an annual budget of some \$ 55 000 000. The third level concerns the co-ordinating organizations; they often work with objectives that are more broadly formulated, not just being related to immigration. Here the leading organization is United Way. This organization manages to collect a great deal of money and channels it to lower levels. The importance of the ngos for immigrants, for instance in the field of providing information, is large. Most of these organizations also have strong ties with the more institutional organizations that are active in the field of immigrant care. Our respondents assumed that the large number of, often small, organizations is extremely relevant to the total image of 'responsiveness' in Toronto. More adequate reactions are expected from small organizations, because they are best at supplying services that are attuned to the culture. By now a real 'forest' of 160 ngos (estimated) has arisen. In one of the interviews, for example, it

was remarked that there are at least 40 African community organizations, all of which have formulated their own objectives and, on the basis of project plans, have applied for subsidy and - so far - have been granted it. The budget restrictions will probably have the effect that the small organizations that operate in each other's vicinity will have to co-operate more and that they will do that in a more institutional setting.

## Measures

### *Spatial dispersal policy*

Ideas on the spatial dispersal of the population were not found. The pursuit of (forms of) a dispersal policy is not an issue at any governmental level. A more indirect form of spatial dispersal which was not intentionally aimed at ethnic groups was the policy to realize a certain dispersal of the then new complexes of social rented dwellings after 1953. The result is that at the moment, especially at those spots, concentrations of persons with Black ethnic origin are visible in each of the municipalities in metropolitan Toronto. Other more compulsory policy, such as an obligation to adapt to the host society, is not known in Toronto, either.

The call for spatial dispersal may not be heard very often, but also in Toronto the NIMBY (not in my back yard) law turns out to be in force. Recent publications in the press have made it clear that there are at least two spatial conflicts at the moment. The first concerns the large and recent influx of poor Somali refugees, who ended up slightly concentrated in mainly privately rented dwellings in a few blocks of flats along Dixon Road in Etobicoke (these are condominiums, which are let by absentee owners). The owners of the owner-occupied flats who live around them are strongly opposed to that concentration, because their dwellings would be decreased in value. In 1993 street riots even occurred in this area. The second NIMBY case concerns Chinatown II, a large (Hong Kong) Chinese concentration in suburban territory on the border of metropolitan Toronto. This is a concentration of very wealthy inhabitants who organize their own commercial facilities, which for example has been expressed in the construction of a huge shopping centre with only Chinese shops and explanations in Chinese. Here too the spatial concentration has led to feelings of anxiety, because the white middle class feels pushed aside. In both cases, though, the authorities never considered pursuing a certain spatial dispersal policy.

### *Compensating policy*

In the institutional section it was stated that a large number of ngos are active in Toronto. A division into three was made according to size and significance of the organizations. Although a spatial interpretation is not always chosen in the activities of the organizations, a large number of programmes can be placed under the heading of compensating policy. It is obvious that it is not possible to list the activities and objectives of all of the roughly 160 ngos. The following list of programmes that support the settlement

and integration of immigrants and refugees in Toronto can nevertheless give an impression of the size of specific compensating policy. We listed the following programmes (the amounts mentioned only concern metropolitan Toronto, situation 1993 or 1994, unless otherwise stated):

- LINC (Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada): \$ 29 110 000; spread over 54 non-profit organizations in Metro-Toronto, received 39 per cent of the amount; five school boards received 51 per cent of the amount. Six other boards received about 9 per cent of the total. 9 533 clients were attended to.
- Host: \$ 514 000; 271 newcomers were aided.
- AAP (Adjustment Assistance Program): \$ 17 645 000. Aimed at refugees. 1 654 refugees were aided.
- OSIP: \$ 1 986 858 for the benefit of non-profit, community-based immigrant and refugee organizations in Toronto; financed by the Ministry of Citizenship.
- ISAP (Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Programme): \$ 4 508 100 (in 1994: \$ 4 118 000) for the benefit of Toronto for direct aid to immigrants in concentration areas. The amount was granted to 38 organizations. In Metro-Toronto 57 384 new clients were attended to and in total 644 509 clients.
- Metro Community Services Department and SSGP (Social Services Grant Programme): \$ 4 504 702. This programme is not specifically aimed at immigrants.
- Multicultural and Race Relations Division, Chief Administrative Officer's Department \$ 309 400
- CCP (Citizenship and Community Participation); multiculturalism and citizenship Canada; Central Ontario (including Metro-Toronto); \$ 2 198 760.
- CP (Community Support) multiculturalism and citizenship Canada; Central Ontario (including Metro-Toronto): \$ 779 200.

It was expected (by almost all respondents) that due to the more restrictive immigration policy and the general budget cuts in society, in particular imposed by the provincial government, especially the first level of organizations - that closest to the population - will be strongly reduced, possibly later the second level, too.

The most general level, which serves the whole population, was expected to be probably the last to have to deal with cuts. The argument the government always uses with these cuts is that these ethnically specific organizations are sufficiently financially effective, but our respondents doubted the tenability of that argument. In general most effectiveness is expected at the first level, close to the population. The opinion is that some co-ordination at level two would be of help. The large bureaucratic organizations at levels two and three met with the most suspicion from our respondents.

In council housing in Toronto, apart from the public and non-profit segments we mentioned, a group specific segment can also be pointed out, in which ethnically specific projects started too. There are non-profit organizations, such as the Portuguese Immigr-

grant Aid Association, that build non-profit housing for their ethnic group. The means that are needed are requested from the federal government. They are often focused on housing for the elderly within their own community. This even happens with immigrants who still hold on strongly to their culture of living in an extended family, like the Portuguese (Teixeira, 1995). However, it is anticipated that these cultures and values will peter out in the second and third generation. Permitting private ethnic housing corporations is not considered to be a factor that risks the creation of segregation. In Canada, in the spirit of a policy of pluralism, the aim is integration of immigrants, especially in the fields of education, language and access to employment., not so much in the field of housing. Consequently, spatial segregation is not an issue, in contrast to what we found in, for example, the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden.

An exception (in the sense that it is an issue) concerns the public housing estates in Toronto, in particular the complexes with a high share of black inhabitants. The public housing stock (though making up not more than 5 per cent of the total stock) turns out to be easy to residualize; people live there at the bottom of the housing market. In Murdie's words there is a situation of 'constrained choice' (Murdie, 1994). The inhabitants who live there, are in general 'trapped': cut off from public transport, from employment and from all kinds of services. These are especially the poorer immigrants.

In this case it is important that in Toronto in the early seventies the central area around the CBD was intentionally made/kept inhabitable as an attractive living and service area for a mixed population. Ethnic categories were encouraged to form their own institutions and their own services. David Crombie (mayor) was one of the dynamic forces behind this, though also influenced by Jane Jacobs who had lived in Toronto for a long time and advised the city council.

In summary, we can state that the compensating policy is strongly developed and, moreover, its nature is remarkably specific, as is indicated by the large number of organizations that are operating and are focused on specific ethnic groups. People are (were) very much inclined to support separate organizations for each ethnic group. So far, policy aimed at groups has hardly been an item of discussion within society, probably because of the long history of such policy, which was pursued with European immigrants at the start of this century. As was remarked before, that policy is under strong budgetary pressure at the moment. Cuts not only concern the small (primary) ethnically specific organizations, they also concern broader programmes, such as the Ontario Welcome Houses Programme. This programme is used by metropolitan Toronto to give immigrants their first accommodation and their first information after entering the city. Incidentally, according to our informers, it is a question whether only cuts are concerned, or also a changing ideology. The movement away from specific policy aimed at groups was found especially at provincial level. At federal level that tendency seems to be less pronounced. There, more attention would be paid to the effectiveness of small-scale, ethnic-

specific aid. On the other hand, the federal government has indicated that within some years it no longer wants to be involved in support services for immigrants.

### **8.5 Conclusion**

Segregation and concentration of ethnic groups is hardly considered a problem in Toronto. The high scores of the Portuguese on the indices of segregation, for example, do not evoke spatial dispersal policy or compensating policy in a spatial sense. Only in a few cases - such as immigrants from Somalia - is the concentration of the underprivileged considered a problem. However, it is expected that these groups will integrate, too.

The permanent character of immigration in Canadian society has led to the development of an 'infrastructure' of organizations that are aimed specifically at ethnic groups. These organizations play an important role in matters such as first relief and language acquisition. It is expected, however, that the subsidies will decline in future due to cuts by the federal and provincial governments. In this climate, which many experience as harsher, the 'economic' criteria for admittance of new immigrants - which are exceptional by West European standards - will receive even more emphasis. Many in Toronto consider the immigration of these groups not as a threat, but on the contrary as a potential boost for the urban economy.

# **9      Ethnic Segregation in Nine Metropolises**

## **9.1            Introduction**

What do we know about differences between European cities with respect to the segregation patterns of immigrants? Should social scientists (and politicians) bother about segregation? And if so, what kind of reactions can be shown at the local and state policy levels in various European contexts?

These questions, which are frequently addressed in debates on exclusion, urban ‘underclass’ formation, ethnic conflict, urban problems and immigrant integration issues, are central to the discussions in this book, too. We intended to clarify some aspects of ethnic segregation and policy responses, in particular on the basis of the outcome of comparative research carried out in nine metropolitan areas, all but one located in Europe. In this final chapter we summarize the results found in the case studies in a condensed, comparative format. In Chapter 1 we outlined the important roles of the economic restructuring process and the reformulation of the welfare state models. Since the latter factor, in particular, is regarded as the most crucial factor relevant to the ethnic residential patterns and policy in respect of ethnic or immigrant groups, we will start with a brief description of the recent trends with regard to most of the welfare states throughout Europe (Section 9.2).

## **9.2            Welfare state restructuring**

In general the corporatist and social democratic welfare state regimes seem to be losing ground, whereas more liberal regimes appear to be gaining it. In the EC countries EMU criteria have placed severe limits on state expenditure and subsequently on welfare regimes,

subsidy systems and labour market strategies. The changing orientation of the welfare states in Europe implies a shift of attention to the market sector and lower levels of state intervention. In general, we expect that the move in the direction of more liberal welfare states will result in less income redistribution, a growing income inequality, and a reduced state role in the areas of housing and health care.

The changing role of the state also carries spatial consequences. We hypothesized that in most European countries, until approximately the eighties / early nineties, the differences between categories of households in terms of access to housing, health care, education, and rights to unemployment, disability and pension benefits were small enough to prevent the rise of sharp patterns of spatial inequality. During the past years, or in some cases during the past decade, the changes in the relationship between state and market may have resulted in higher inequality and sharper spatial segregation patterns. The start of that transformation and the speed of the process differ between countries.

Since there is an obvious relationship between ethnicity, the socio-economic position of a household and the welfare state model, and since most European welfare state models were aiming at inclusion rather than exclusion, the ethnic segregation patterns were expected to be moderate compared to American examples. Recent trends, however, have fed the trend towards a wider divide between population categories. One of the processes that may stimulate sharper population segregation is the increase in the urban orientation of immigrants (Champion, 1994). At the same time, many metropolitan areas also reveal migration processes in which people can afford to either look for a house in a suburban setting, or - depending on the type of household and lifestyle - tend to settle in central (gentrified) inner city areas. The resulting double-peaked pattern, with immigrant households in between, is visible in Paris, Stockholm, Amsterdam, (parts of) London, Frankfurt and in many other European cities.

### **9.3 Spatial segregation and integration of immigrants**

The intra-urban spatial outcome of the restructuring process and the welfare state transformations combined with the increase in the urban orientation discussed above, is a relative concentration of immigrants in certain neighbourhoods of the city. Some of these are characterized by decline, deterioration and social decay. Many of their inhabitants have few skills and have poor prospects of entry into the labour market.

It is at this point that the spatial segregation of immigrants, the 'living apart of ethnic groups relative to society or to each other' is assumed to be linked to the (lack of) opportunities to integrate in society. Frequently, a direct negative relation is assumed between integration and segregation. Low levels of spatial segregation in society - in education, in social life, at places of residence and at work, implying better opportunities to get in touch with each other - are commonly regarded as being helpful to integration into society.

However, it should not be ruled out that a certain level of segregation may also function as an asset in the survival strategy of poor immigrants directly after their arrival in a new society. Newcomers may be well served by living in an ethnic community - a temporary colony (Boal, 1976) - as they take their first steps in the new environment they have migrated to. That strategy, by the way, is not unique to immigrants. In a sense, segregation is a universal phenomenon. Many people who can afford to will try to live together with socially and culturally more or less similar persons and households, and by doing so, they will segregate themselves from others, for whom only a constrained choice is left (Murdie, 1994). These processes do not necessarily develop along ethnic lines. Manifestations of such processes of segregation are concentrations of young people with similar lifestyles in certain inner city neighbourhoods, of the elderly in other neighbourhoods, of specific, often well-off immigrant groups in ethnic neighbourhoods, such as the Japanese in Amsterdam and Düsseldorf, or the recently arrived Hongkong Chinese in Toronto, or the concentration of higher socio-economic groups in many suburban neighbourhoods of metropolitan areas throughout the world.

Considering the inevitable fact that segregation is ever present, most people tend to accept certain levels of segregation. At the same time, if the level of segregation passes a certain threshold many seem convinced that the negative, disintegrating effects of segregation come to prevail. Whether such mechanisms operate in the same way in European metropolises still has to be seen.

#### **9.4 Segregation patterns in nine metropolitan areas**

Before we offer a comparative summary of some of the results of the case studies, we would once again like to stress that comparative research in this field is extremely difficult. We had to deal with four problems:

- a) the definition of the population categories involved; in some countries nationality is a basis for registration (France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden), in other countries the definition is based on ethnic groups (the Netherlands, UK and Canada); in addition, some register on the basis of self-identification (UK, Canada, France), whereas the other countries register data according to the information given in the passport.
- b) the variation of the levels of scale at which data are available; data appeared to be available at a level of approximately 10 000 inhabitants per area, except for Paris, which on average applies much larger units. In all cases we have tried to compare metropolitan areas as these are known locally. Except for the German cities we succeeded in this effort.

- c) a restricted number of cases; only nine case studies were carried out; it was not possible to do more due to the labour and time consuming interviews focusing on local and state policy responses.
- d) the variation of the information across time. In some cities recent data (Jan. 1995) were available, whereas other cities could only be described on the basis of census data (frequently from 1990 or 1991).

An awareness of these differences may help to put the final results into the proper perspective.

Although the variation in terms of ethnic segregation patterns and policy responses happened to be extremely large, it may still make sense to present a few indices and typologies. It is our belief that it is possible to distinguish between certain types of segregation patterns. To provide some basic comparable information first, we calculated the share of immigrants in each of the areas investigated. The share of immigrants in the urban areas under study generally lies above 20-25 per cent of the population (except for Düsseldorf and Manchester).




FIGURE 9-1 Share of immigrant population<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Amsterdam is probably overrated in comparison with the other cities because of (1) the definition: Amsterdam: ethnic minorities; London and Manchester: non-White; Brussels, Frankfurt am Main, Düsseldorf, Paris and Stockholm: foreigners (nationality); Toronto: ethnic origin. The Dutch definition covers a larger part of the population than the other definitions; and (2) because of time: Amsterdam data 1 January 1995, other cities range from 1990 to 1994. The share of immigrants in the other cities would probably be higher if 1995 data had been available.




FIGURE 9-2 Index of segregation (IS) in six cities

The share of immigrants is probably of less importance than the spatial distribution within the urban area. Of the two instruments that were applied as means to describe the spatial patterns - segregation indices and maps - we only present the first here. Figure 9-2 shows the scores on the Index of Segregation (IS) for the six cities for which it made sense to calculate them. The North African category in Brussels attains highest value, while the British cities and Amsterdam take intermediate positions and German cities show the lowest values, indicating a relative mix of the category concerned in comparison with the rest of the population. We should bear in mind that Amsterdam has somewhat lower indices of segregation than other large Dutch cities, such as Rotterdam. The position of Dutch cities in terms of ethnic segregation in a European context seems to be closer to the upper end of the distribution than to the lower. On the other hand, other British cities may show sharper segregation patterns than those visible in London and Manchester.

The conclusions drawn from the indices of segregation are confirmed by the information on the indices of dissimilarity (ID values) between specific categories. Figure 9-3 shows the results for the six cities and the four categories that were portrayed in Figure 9-2.

Again, the North African category in Brussels shows the highest level of segregation. The British cities come second, followed by Amsterdam. The ID values in both German cities are remarkably low, indicating relatively mixed populations.




FIGURE 9-3 Index of dissimilarity (ID) in six cities

The four categories involved are in fact sums of several nationalities / ethnic groups. At the sub-level, the highest mark is set by the Bangladeshi ethnic group in Greater London. The Index of Dissimilarity between Bangladeshis and Indians reaches a score of 67, while the segregation between Bangladeshis and Whites reaches 65. Apart from the omission of the Bangladeshi ethnic group, Figure 9-3 remains accurate.

The IS and ID values provide information on the equality or inequality of the spatial distributions. However, nothing can be said about the exact and main locations of population categories within the metropolitan area, and nor whether the neighbourhoods with an overrepresentation of a population category are located adjacent to other neighbourhoods with overrepresentation or not. To get that information one needs to analyse the maps. We refer to these maps in the respective Chapters 2-8 in this book. From these map presentations we have tried to generalize and thus distinguish four types of spatial patterns:

- type 1: Patterns in which immigrants can be found in many locations of the metropolitan area, with the highest concentrations of specific categories in the centre of the city: North Africans in Brussels, Blacks and Bangladeshis in London and Blacks in Manchester.
- type 2: Patterns in which immigrants can be found in many locations of the metropolitan area, with the highest concentrations of specific categories outside the city centre: Turks,

Moroccans and Surinamese in Amsterdam, refugees and other immigrants in Stockholm and Blacks and refugees, for example, in Toronto.

type 3: Patterns where immigrants can predominantly be found in the centre of the metropolitan area. High scores per neighbourhood are only reached by the accumulation of several immigrant categories. Examples are Frankfurt and Düsseldorf.

type 4: Patterns where immigrants can predominantly be found outside the centre of the metropolitan area, where also the highest concentrations of specific categories of immigrants can be found: for instance, North Africans in the *grands ensembles* of Paris.

Additional information suggests that most areas with concentrations of immigrants from non-industrialized countries are characterized by low income households, high unemployment figures and sometimes also by poor social and physical conditions in the neighbourhoods. The impression is that social and physical conditions are worse in cities such as Brussels, Paris, London, Manchester and Toronto and better in Amsterdam, Stockholm, Frankfurt and Düsseldorf.

The analyses of the metropolitan areas permit us to suggest some hypothetical 'explanations' for the patterns shown. At least three major factors are relevant. First, the differences seem to be associated with the urban histories of the areas involved. The urban restructuring of Paris by Haussmann in the 19th century and by Chirac and others during the Fifth Republic, the conservation of the Canal zone with its aristocratic mansions in Amsterdam, or the recent gentrification of Stockholm's centre have all resulted in inner cities that are relatively inaccessible to lower income households, including immigrants. Second, the migration history of the area is important. When did immigration peak? What was the character of the city at that time, its economic position, the character of the housing market, etc? This seems to be important if we want to understand the patterns of specific categories of immigrants in cities such as Toronto, London and Amsterdam. Recent immigrants with lower socio-economic positions tend to be found in neighbourhoods that can be classified as the 'bottom end' of the housing market, whereas older generations of immigrants, who may also have had poor skills and low incomes, have often been able to improve their positions. For example, recently immigrated Somali refugees in Toronto live in cheap private rented accommodation in the city's unattractive outskirts; recent asylum seekers in Amsterdam and Stockholm can be found in cheap and unattractive social rented accommodation in peripheral neighbourhoods, Bangladeshis live in deteriorated inner city wards in London. On the other hand, immigrants from southern Europe who came to Amsterdam during the fifties seem almost completely integrated now, as are many early immigrant Indians and Pakistanis in London, and Italians in Toronto. Third, the functioning of the local housing market plays an important role. The social housing stock, the volume of which is mainly determined by specific welfare state regulations, provides residence for (low income) immigrants. The actual role that social

housing plays for immigrants is also influenced by accessibility factors, i.e. the waiting list and rent level. Recent immigrants often have to wait several years before they have accumulated sufficient rights of entry. The effect of the rent level depends mainly on the welfare state arrangements. Models in which contrasts between households are reduced will result in less segregated patterns than models in which contrasts are sharpened, we believe. In some cases immigrants, (because of volume or accessibility constraints in the social sector), predominantly have had or preferred to rely on the private sector. As the private sector consists of both rental (residual and higher status) and owner-occupation, each country will show different outcomes. For instance, the British pattern shows higher than average levels of owner-occupation for the Indian Continent ethnic group while at the same time lower levels (and therefore higher than average renting levels) exist for the Caribbean ethnic group. With a much smaller size of the social housing stock than in the UK, low income immigrants in Brussels mainly live in a residual, low quality rental sector. The spatial patterns that evolve are closely linked to the distribution of the different types of housing in the city. It turns out that most of that social housing stock can be found outside the central parts of the city, see Paris, for instance.

In conclusion, the shares of immigrants in the cities we studied do not vary extensively, although somewhat lower figures were noted in Manchester and Düsseldorf. The levels of segregation and the spatial patterns of immigrants are more varied. German cities tend to show relatively mixed populations. Brussels shows the highest indices of segregation, followed closely by London and Amsterdam, which also show relatively clear, though not absolute, segregation patterns. Paris'immigrants (for whom we could not calculate indices) tend to be concentrated as well, predominantly in *grands ensembles* and segregated from other parts of the population. Toronto, the city with the longest and richest immigration history and also characterized by substantial numbers of low income immigrants, shows high indices of dissimilarity, but no extreme spatial concentrations. Immigration history, urban history and the functioning of the housing market were mentioned as relevant factors in understanding the spatial patterns.

## 9.5 Local and state policy reactions

As far as we know, few international comparative studies exist that are aimed at achieving a better understanding of the variety of segregation patterns encountered. In other words, very little is known about the background to segregation and most of what is said about it is highly speculative, as were our interpretations in the former section. Following this line of reasoning, policy reactions can only be based on restricted insight into the phenomenon. However, not all politicians are willing to wait until the 'final' answers to all questions are given (perhaps they assume these answers will never be given or they feel that they know all the answers

already!). Some do respond to (political) pressure or their own sense of urgency and take action. That, in our opinion, is exactly what has happened during the past decades, when politicians responded to the urban problems in the large cities. Bearing that in mind, we directed our study at the following question: What kind of action do different political bodies take when they try to mitigate the problems that are assumed, rightly or wrongly, to be associated with a concentration of ethnic immigrants in the metropolitan areas under investigation?

In the policy analysis a distinction has been made, where possible, between state level and local level policies. A second differentiation was thought to be relevant between general policy, with measures accessible to everyone, regardless of nationality or ethnic origin, and specific policy, accessible to specific national or ethnic categories. Within each of these 'mega' types of policy - general and specific - we distinguished between other types of variation. General as well as specific policy may be of an integrative, area-based character or of a sectoral type (housing policy, labour market policy, etc., separately).

Special attention was given to the various types of specific policy, i.e. policy in which the nationalities or ethnic immigrants were addressed as categories. Two types of policy measures received attention. The first relates to spatial dispersion of ethnic categories or specific nationalities. The second relates to efforts to compensate arrears of these categories.

Although it is clear that informal strategies are also important in dealing with segregation, the comparative character of our study forced us to consider only formal policies.

Before we focus our attention on some details of the policy measures, we should first answer the question of whether segregation is regarded a problem at all. The answer to that question can be brief: all countries in our research project pay a certain amount of attention to segregation issues. In most European countries, with France at the top, the urban problems debate has focused on 'social exclusion' for many years. Almost instantaneously, spatial connotations were associated with the concept. In Britain people talk about 'those inner cities'. Cities in Germany try to avoid '*amerikanische Verhältnisse*' (American situations). In the Netherlands problematic neighbourhoods are often called '*probleemcumulatiwijken*' (multiple deprivation areas).

### **General - specific**

As a rule, in almost all countries we have studied, forms of specific policy were applied, directly aimed at the immigrant categories. The only exception to this rule is France, which continues, at least formally, to focus on general policy measures only. After the hot summer of 1995 in the Parisian suburbs, the Minister of Integration even called for a Marshall Plan aimed at the *grands ensembles*: the Programme National d'Intégration Urbaine. Although the *grands ensembles* are mainly inhabited by ethnic minorities from North Africa, the Marshall plan should still be considered as a form of general policy, albeit an area-based one. The program is not reserved for or only accessible to ethnic minorities. Everyone living in the

targeted areas will benefit from it. Due to the fiscal crisis of the French state, the plans that finally got ratified were on a significantly smaller scale than was originally intended.

The Marshall Plan should not be regarded as a new plan. Other multidimensional (general) strategies to tackle the problems in the *grands ensembles* had been developed previously, among other things by the DIV, the *Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville*, which co-ordinated a Politique de la Ville of several sectoral ministries aimed at area-based strategies.

The disinclination for specific policies could be explained by the universal French policy towards immigrants, which has always been dominated by assimilation objectives and a generous naturalization policy. It is said that French culture does not leave much room for other - ethnic - cultures. An initiative like 'education in your own language' in the Netherlands, in which ethnic minorities learn in the language of their parents' country, is hard to imagine in the French public school system; all ethnic groups are considered French, therefore no need for specific programs could possibly arise.

As far as the other countries are concerned, ethnicity or nationality have been made part of the policy measures in one way or another, at least alongside a general policy. However, there turn out to be more differences than similarities. As has been said, we have focused attention on two sub-types of specific policy in particular: spatial dispersion policy and compensating policy.

#### *Spatial dispersion policy*

Table 9-1 summarizes the various forms of spatial dispersion policy per case, including their effectiveness. Several countries/cities have discussed or tried to formulate specific spatial policy measures. The argument that is frequently given for that kind of measures is that a dispersed immigrant population, and consequently a better mixed population, would help to integrate immigrants in society, and thus avoiding the rise of ethnic ghettos. Frequently, however, that type of policy turned out to be unsuccessful, mostly because of conflicts with the national constitutions or with prevailing interpretations of democracy, or other ideologies. In many cases spatial dispersion ideas did not pass the discussion stage, with the exception of the asylum seekers issue. After their entry in the country of destination, they frequently were and are dispersed across the country in an effort to house as many of them as possible in a short period of time. This type of policy has been applied in Germany, Sweden, Britain and the Netherlands, for a longer or shorter period of time.

Generally, the spatial dispersion discussion was conducted at the state level. In the Netherlands one local level initiative became infamous. In the early seventies the municipality of Rotterdam tried to establish a formal spatial dispersion policy aimed at ethnic immigrants. That initiative was blocked by the state, since it turned out to be unconstitutional. However, from time to time, and even in 1995, the debate has flared up again (as has the opposition).

In Belgium a nation-wide spatial dispersion policy was operating until 1995 (see Chapter 3).

TABLE 9-1 Spatial dispersion : policy and effectiveness, 1995

Case	Policy	Effects
Amsterdam	discussion 70s (s, l), 80s (l)	unsuccessful
Brussels	section 18 bis (s)	abolished in 1995
London	discussion 70s (s)	unsuccessful
Manchester	discussion 70s (s)	unsuccessful
Frankfurt am Main	discussion 70s (s)	
Frankfurter Vertrag	90s (l)	unsuccessful, operational
Düsseldorf	discussion 70s (s)	unsuccessful
Stockholm	housing association (l)	operational, tolerated
Toronto	no debate	
Paris	no debate	

Abbreviations: s = debate / policy at state level; l = debate / policy initiated at a local level.

Municipalities were allowed to refuse settlement of non-EU citizens on the basis of section 18bis, once they received permission from the federal government. However, insiders considered the effects of that law as only marginal. In their view section 18bis was merely meant as a signal to the indigenous population rather than an effective instrument. Most municipalities that were allowed to apply section 18bis did allow immigrants to settle on an informal basis. In fact, only two out of nine cases we studied turn out to apply some form of direct spatial dispersion policy at the present time: the municipalities of Frankfurt am Main and (housing associations in) Stockholm. In both cases the policy basis is related to the housing allocation system.

Dispersal policy in Frankfurt is formal and laid down in a Treaty, the Frankfurter Vertrag, signed by the municipality, the housing authority and the most important private developers in the housing sphere. The core of the Treaty is the fixing of the shares of several population categories in each neighbourhood. Of all existing and new rental dwellings a maximum of 30 per cent should be let to immigrants, 10 per cent to *Aussiedler* and 15 per cent to people on welfare. The Treaty was developed to prevent the rise of ghettos, but several counter effects do occur. Some old neighbourhoods already house 60 per cent or more immigrants and could house more because of the type of dwellings available. Under the treaty, further growth is impossible and that even leads to vacancies, because few indigenous German households want to live in a 'foreign' area. On the other hand, some high rent areas have serious problems in finding sufficient immigrant households to settle there, again with vacancies as a threatening result. Here too the higher income German households try to stop the (modest) invasion of immigrant households. Furthermore, the rental sector is not large enough to house all immigrants. These immigrants are forced to rent or buy at the private market. The experience is that those who rent in the private sector are frequently worst off (see also Chapter 4).

In Stockholm spatial policy is merely a practice of local housing associations. They are afraid of rising rent arrears in the future. Increasingly, housing associations become responsible for their own budget, and they try to share the risks of housing low income and unemployed people.

It is interesting that the cities in which spatial dispersion policy really was or is applied, are all located in countries in which local authorities have a relatively strong position, relative to the state level. The position of central government is much stronger in Britain, France and the Netherlands than in Belgium, Germany or Sweden. For example in Amsterdam in 1993, only 8.5 per cent of the local budget originated from local taxes. The same holds true for the London boroughs, with an average of only 14 per cent. In German cities, however, the share of local taxes in the local budgets turned out to rise above 30 per cent.

We also consider it important to stress that in both cases that still focus on spatial policy, Frankfurt and Stockholm, the awareness of the permanency of the presence of immigrants in their environments has only recently become clear.

Canada is a specific case. The character of the liberal welfare state does not correspond with spatial allocation systems at all.

Although no specific dispersal policies could be found in France, more general spatial dispersion policy has existed for many years in the Parisian metropolitan area. We have already mentioned the fact that a conscious attempt was made in Paris under mayor Chirac to upgrade certain districts in the city that were in fact inhabited by large numbers of immigrants. The policy was not ethnically-specific, but North Africans turned out to be hit in particular. In fact, 'problematic households' were simply sent across the border.

A modest variant of this kind of effect can be shown in Toronto. There, there is no specific spatial policy aimed at the dispersal of ethnic immigrants. However, metropolitan housing policy after 1953 was aimed at a certain spatial distribution of new public housing. Since these dwellings have been allocated to the black population in particular, a kind of dispersed pattern for these Blacks developed.

#### *Compensating policy*

Specific compensating policy can be found in all countries. Even in France, at least some special attention is directed at the education of immigrant children. However, Great Britain and the Netherlands seem to have taken the lead, together with Canada. Table 9-2 summarizes the differences between the cases in this respect.

There are no examples in which both spatial dispersion policies and compensating measures were applied at the same time at a significant level. These concepts may, in fact, be regarded as the two extreme ends of a single continuum.

In Amsterdam it is evident that the end of the spatial dispersion discussion coincided with the start of the discussion about compensating measures. The relatively high score of Amsterdam in the education field is related to the multiplier weight of school children of immigrant parents; schools receive more money if they have a higher number of immigrant children.

TABLE 9-2 Compensating policy<sup>a</sup>

Case	Compensating policy			
	General	Education	Housing	Labour
Amsterdam (NL)	xx	xx		xx
Brussels (B)	x	x		x
London (UK)	xx	x	x	x
Manchester (UK)	xx	x	x	x
Frankfurt (G)	x			
Düsseldorf (G)	x			
Stockholm (S)		x		
Toronto (Can)	xx	x		
Paris (F)		x		

<sup>a</sup> The difference between 0, 1 or 2 'x' reflects the intensity and scope of the formal policies that were found in the cities. For a comprehensive look at the policies and the research methodology, see Breebaart *et al.* (1996).

In the labour market, specific policy was developed to stimulate proportional employment opportunities for ethnic immigrants in special projects. Recently the attention to special policy declined in favour of general policy.

The same type of change - from specific to general - could also be found in the United Kingdom. Former section 11 funds, meant to stimulate integration of immigrant households, are now part of the Single Regeneration Budget. The earmarking for ethnic immigrants has disappeared. Requests for language courses will now have to compete with other needs that are not necessarily linked to immigrant households. British cities still have many specific initiatives aimed at improving the integration into society, though: link workers, who try to help immigrants that need to contact the municipality; ethnic monitoring to provide signals of unequal labour market participation in certain segments of the labour market; and equality targets for the year 2000, etc., are among the initiatives that seem to survive in the present turbulent times. But the overall direction of change is from specific to general policy.

A remarkable fact is that in Brussels, the metropolitan area with relatively high segregation indices, only few specific policy measures were developed, especially as compared to Amsterdam. However, some new initiatives have recently been taken, which may close the gap between the two cities.

In Frankfurt attention seems to be focused on spatial dispersion policy. Only few measures in the field of compensation could be found. According to people from the newly developed institution AMKA, *Amt für Multi-Kulturelle Angelegenheiten*, an institutional body meant to improve the position of immigrants in Frankfurt, there is quite some talk about positive discrimination, but nothing has really happened yet.

Toronto's policy has, until now, been characterized by a huge number of initiatives that are specifically targeted to immigrant households, sometimes even specific households. Most of

these initiatives are aimed at the first phases of integration: to facilitate entry into the country and to learning the language and culture. But here, as in London and Amsterdam, budget cuts threaten the existence of many of these initiatives, measures and organisations.

In general there are only a few cases that have shown relatively many initiatives to compensate for deprived situations ethnic immigrants find themselves in. And where some attention to specific compensating policy measures still exists, such as in Amsterdam, London, Manchester and Toronto, we register a move from specific policy to more general initiatives. The only things left are - at best - specific language courses, meant to facilitate integration processes, and general information for specific categories. Budgetary problems, the fear that positive discrimination will not be accepted by other (uninvolved) population categories, and the political response in that respect, seem to be the most important factors triggering the change of the policy direction.

## 9.6 Conclusions and speculations

The first chapter pointed to the ‘American metaphor’ of the Black ghetto with its extreme segregation, violence and despair, as a framework for the judgement of developments in European cities. The chapters that followed have shown that this picture is not correct: levels of segregation are much lower in European cities and problems are less severe, with Toronto taking an intermediate position. On the other hand, a European metaphor was not manifested. Although the European cities can all be characterized by a spatial mix of different ethnic categories and so deserve the qualification ‘multi-ethnic metropolises’, no uniformity was found. Spatial segregation patterns included in our comparative study turn out to be quite varied. German cities show low levels of segregation, whereas Brussels shows relatively high levels of segregation. London and Amsterdam experience moderate levels of segregation patterns. Paris’s patterns could only be studied on a crude spatial level. Obviously, concentrations of immigrants can be found there as well, in the *grands ensembles* in particular. One thing is clear: no single European ‘model’ of immigrant settlement could be established.

Formal policy reactions towards ethnic segregation, or more widely towards urban problems and problem areas in European countries, are clearly different as well. The most interesting results, as far as policy reactions are concerned, based on our comparative analysis are:

- The exceptional position of France, the only country in our project which focused strictly on general policy instruments. No specific policy instruments targeted at immigrant categories were developed.
- The fact that all other countries have developed some form of specific policy instrument.

- The fact that most countries that have thought about spatial dispersion policies have abandoned that idea. Frankfurt and Stockholm are the exceptions and (still) try to formulate forms of spatial dispersion policy.
- The finding that all countries tend to redirect their policy interventions from special policy instruments to general policy instruments. This shift is most visible in Great Britain, Canada and the Netherlands.
- The fact that ethnic monitoring seems to become a new (specific?) instrument to point at unequal positions of ethnic categories in several fields of society.

We have formulated several possible explanations for what we noticed empirically. For example, it was suggested that Frankfurt and Stockholm, the only two cases that still have some form of spatial dispersion policy, both have become only recently aware of the persistence of the presence of immigrants. Their behaviour may be interpreted as an overshoot, which is not surprising given the complexity and recent character of the phenomenon.

The shift from specific to general policy was hypothetically associated with the need to cut budgets, with a general revision of the welfare state and with political motives (the rise of extreme right might have made politicians less inclined to use positive discrimination).

If we focus attention on the relation between both parts of our study, the spatial patterns of segregation and the policy reaction, we must conclude that there is hardly any relation. High levels of segregation do not coincide with high levels of policy intervention. We may even add that cities which are well known because of their urban problems, especially problems with an ethnic dimension, such as Manchester (riots in 1981 in Moss Side), London (riots in Brixton 1981, 1985), Brussels (riots in 1991) and Paris (turbulence in the suburbs in 1989, 1991, 1995) cannot be distinguished from the other cities in terms of higher levels of policy attention. Perhaps even the contrary is true. Cities with relatively quiet urban scenes, such as Amsterdam and Frankfurt, turn out to have been most active in the field of specific policy aimed at reducing segregation and/or deprivation of ethnic immigrants. However, our analysis does not allow us to say much about the causal nature of the relation.

One might want to argue that the relationship between tensions / riots and unemployment or lack of prospects is of greater relevance, and of course this variable is frequently related to ethnicity. But here, too, the explanation is not entirely on solid ground. Turks and Moroccans, as well as Surinamese blacks in Dutch cities, face unemployment figures of up to 30 or 40 per cent, which is four to six times higher than indigenous Dutch people. Still, virtually no unrest crops up in Dutch cities.

A possible but still speculative explanation for the differences as far as the prevalence of tensions is concerned is the organization of society in a broader sense, including the state attitude towards social security, and social rights of the unemployed, especially the young. We are not the first to notice that the social rights of the young differ substantially between

the countries looked at in this research project. White (1995), for example, stressed the lack of prospects and financial means available to French youth, which may indeed differ from the position of the young in other countries. But the types of policy aimed at reducing negative externalities of becoming unemployed may also have played a role. It is especially the strong corporatist societies, such as France and Belgium, that turn out to pay more attention to those who are inside than to those who are outside of the system. The privileged position of the French civil servants is a well-known example. The lack of attention for those who are excluded may have contributed to dissatisfaction.

The diversity in the European cities shows a parallel with the policy of the different types of welfare states: social democratic welfare states, showing cities with moderate segregation and policies designed to react to segregation patterns, and liberal welfare states as the opposite. This differentiation in welfare states can be held responsible for the diversity that was found in the segregation patterns and policies. It seems plausible that the welfare states in Europe have prevented sharp patterns of segregation, making use of different (welfare state) arrangements, such as income redistribution, control of the housing market, and compensating policies. On the other hand, the differences between the welfare states had their effect as well. As was pointed out before in this chapter, the restructuring of the European welfare states, generally resulting in a more liberal model, can end that cushioning effect: more inequality and sharper patterns of segregation can be expected. In the long run that might result in a European model of ethnic segregation after all.

Studies of segregation in general, and of ethnic segregation in particular, are frequently conducted under the assumption that a concentration of deprived people is a factor by itself, one that even reduces the already modest prospects of the people involved and that is also a factor that militates against integration and assimilation. We would like to stress that these assumptions are not based on systematic research carried out in Europe. That does not mean that these assumptions are irrelevant or unrealistic. On the contrary, they are extremely important, since they form the legitimization for study and policy aimed at ‘concentrated’ neighbourhoods. They could be realistic, and they have already coloured the people’s perception. But the assumptions should be the focus of research first. Therefore, we would like to stress that more systematic research needs to be undertaken, focused on the neighbourhood effect, or the concentration effect on an individual’s prospects. The need to carry out such research is becoming even more important, since the transformations going on in society might result in higher levels of segregation rather than in lower ones. This hypothesis is based on the direction of change in many states today: high levels of state involvement are being replaced by more market-led philosophies. Embracing free market principles will result in larger socio-economic differences, more competition, growing income inequalities, less redistribution, fewer subsidies, and in general in more differentiation between households in terms of income, access to good quality housing, health care and education.

This will result in sharper segregation patterns in which those who can express some choice will become separated from those who are left with no or at best only a 'constrained choice'.

## **Interviewed**

### **Brussels**

M. Berghmans, Interministerial Delegation for Urban Solidarity.

G. Leman, Centre for Equality of Opportunities and for Racism Control.

Y. van de Vloet, Regional adviser Charles Piqué.

Prof. dr. C. Kesteloot, Professor of Geography, Catholic University of Leuven.

### **Frankfurt**

Rosi Wolf-Almanasreh, Amt für Multi-Kulturelle Angelegenheiten, Frankfurt.

Werner Pohl, Wohnungsamt, Sozialen Woningbau, Frankfurt.

Prof. dr. Eike Hennig, Universität Gesamthochschule Kassel.

Prof. dr. R. Hausser, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität.

Dr. W. Bick, Amt für Statistik, Wahlen und Einwohnerwesen, Stadt Frankfurt.

### **Düsseldorf**

Herr W. Brock, acting head of the Amt für Wohnungswesen Stadt Düsseldorf.

Prof. Dr. G. Glebe, Heinrich-Heine Universität, Düsseldorf.

Frau G. Püttmann, *Ausländer* koordinaterin Sozialdezernat Stadt Düsseldorf.

Herr H.J. Schultheis, head of the Sozialamt Stadt Düsseldorf.

### **London**

Prof. Ceri Peach, University of Oxford.

Prof. Chris Hamnett, King's College London.

Dr. Margaret Byron, King's College London.

Marian Storkey, London Research Centre.

Susan McIntosh, London Research Centre.

## Manchester

Prof. B. Robson, University of Manchester.

Adolphus Ojinnaka, Race Equality Officer Manchester City Council.

Roger Conway, Partnership 2000, Manchester.

Jo Joliffe, Manchester Education Department.

Nigar Sadique, Manchester Asian Women Community Development.

Kevin Chapman, Manchester Housing Department.

## Stockholm

Karin Pilsäter: member of parliament and member of the Metropolitan Commission Board.

Anders Engström: clerk to the council of Stockholm.

Jan Johanson: manager of the borough of Rinkeby.

Per Hedstrom: manager of the housing corporation Familje Bostader

Dr. Lars Erik Borgegård: University of Umeå.

Margaretha Grape: member of the Commission for Social Integration, municipality of Stockholm.

## Paris

Mme M. Baucqué, Ecole de l'Architecture, Nanterre-Paris, former Chef de Projet in Clichy, Paris.

Prof. Th. Saint Julien, Professeur de Géographie, Paris I/CNRS-P.A.R.I.S.

Dr. H. Vieillard-Baron, Géographe Paris VIII, Membre groupe d'experts de la DIV.

## Toronto

Mohammed Dalmar, Somali Canadian Association of Etobicoke.

Barbara Emanuel, Metropolitan Toronto Community Services Department.

Ambara Muse Guled, Community Worker East African Project, Regent Park Community Health Centre.

Prof. dr. David Hulchanski, Professor of Housing and Community Planning, University of Toronto.

Simon Liston, Housing Policy Analyst Housing and Cityhome, City of Toronto

Prof. dr. Bob Murdie, Professor of Urban Geography, York University.

M.S. Mwarigha, Programme Director, Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto.

Don Richmond, General Manager Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority.

Greg Suttor, Metropolitan Toronto Community Services Department.

Dr. Carlos Teixeira, expert on Portuguese immigrants, York University

Yasmin Thomas, Headoffice Jamaican Canadian Association.

Heather Williams, Caribbean Youth and Family Services.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1 Layout of maps

The classifications that were used in the maps were based on deviations of the urban average. The real (weighted) urban average was used, not the average scores of the percentages of the areas. The lowest class of the thematic variable was defined as the area from the bottom to the urban average. The classes above the urban average were calculated on the basis of the standard deviation: for instance, class two runs from the urban average to the urban average plus the standard deviation. The disadvantage is that the boundaries come across as arbitrary. However, it counterbalances the advantage that the comparability between different cases still stands. In this way three classes above the urban average were defined for each case, for which the highest, of course, runs to the maximum value of the thematic variable concerned. To avoid a distortion due to number of inhabitants as far as possible, we chose to keep areas with fewer than 250 inhabitants out of the analysis.

## Appendix 2 Introductory text of the project for foreign informants

“The project is entitled:

*An international comparison of ethnic spatial segregation in metropolitan areas in Europe and North America.*

Aim of the research is to provide more information on segregation and policy to improve the comparative framework within which theory and policy with regard to segregation issues may be further developed. In the actual situation most information on the issues dealt with refers to rather extreme cases in large US cities”.

“We intend to reach our research goal in three ways. First, we will collect aggregate data on spatial ethnic segregation in metropolitan areas. Data are preferably on a small spatial scale. Second, we will interview key persons who have an entire overview, or are involved in national and/or local (spatial) policy issues in the field of spatial ethnic segregation (and conflicts) in metropolitan areas. Are processes perceived as problems, and by whom? What are the main lines of policy? Can you mention some specific and interesting points? We also would like to pay attention to the expected effects of the changing welfare state on ethnic

segregation issues. Third, we will analyse key publications, statistical reports, etc. in which we can find general and specific information on immigration and emigration, policy objectives in the field of segregation and interethnic relations, etc.. The cities involved are: Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Brussels, Paris, London, Manchester, Stockholm, Toronto and Amsterdam”.

**Clarification of the concepts used:**

*Ethnic groups*: substantial groups of people with foreign nationalities or other ethnic backgrounds or other countries of origin are meant. Often the ethnic population can be classified according to one of the following categories:

- population immigrated from former colonies;
- labour migrants (guest workers);
- follow-up migrants (family reunification, family formation);
- war, conflict and politically driven immigrants;

In the Netherlands (to give an example), the most important categories distinguished are Surinamese and Caribbean colony related migrants; Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants; follow-up migrants in both categories; and asylumseekers (refugees) from former Yugoslavia, Iran, etc.

*Metropolitan area and/or municipality*: It would be ideal to receive information on two levels. The first level being the metropolitan level with some subdivisions (for example the municipalities together constituting the metropolitan area; the metropolitan area of Amsterdam, for example, with about 1.5 million inhabitants, consists of approx. 50 municipalities). The second level being the core municipality subdivided into a number of neighbourhoods (for example the municipality of Amsterdam, with 700 000 inhabitants, is subdivided into 80 neighbourhoods).

*Spatial scale*: The Amsterdam example is only meant to give you some idea. Often, metropolitan areas and municipalities can be subdivided into several types of subarea. The one which is available and most close to the example, will do for us.

*Years*: The data requested have to be of recent date, and preferably also of one or more years before, to offer the opportunity to tell something about the development of the patterns.

### **Appendix 3 Items in interviews**

#### *Image*

What is the image of segregation in metropolitan areas, particularly ethnic segregation? Who has what image? Inhabitants? Policymakers?

*The concept of segregation*

To what extent is ethnic segregation regarded to be a problem?

Is there much xenophobic reaction in the population?

What is the definition of segregation? Is it often concentration?

Where are concentration areas generally located? In the inner cities or in the 19th century ring or in new (high-rise) estates?

What do you call a concentration? What percentage of immigrant or ethnic population will be involved? Is that often named a ghetto?

Is ethnic segregation perceived to be associated with socio-economic segregation? Or is ethnic segregation also presenting itself as a factor in its own right?

Is it feared that (ethnic) urban underclasses will develop? Urban underclass is defined as a concentration of poor, unemployed people without perspective to improve their situation. Poverty and lack of perspective are continued from one generation to another.

Tension and riots such as those in Brixton seemed to be related to ethnic or socio-economic segregation and urban underclass. Is their basis actually a lack of economic perspective?

Are opinions consistent, or do they differ per category? Categories: University professors, Civil servants, Politicians (Labour, Conservative, Liberal), Policymakers local level, Directors of housing associations, Inhabitants per ethnic category.

*The geographical scale: national, regional, local*

What is the difference of opinions at different levels of scale?

*Policy*

Does any specific policy actually exist aimed at repressive and restrictive policy: such as a restricted immigration policy, or selective allowance policy, or spatial dispersion policy? At which level: national, regional (sub-regional), local?

Integration policy?

Supportive and stimulating policy? Policy aimed at improving conditions in concentration areas: such as policy in which extra money for language courses is offered, or a certain percentage of vacant jobs has to be reserved for ethnic immigrants. Or urban renewal activities are carried out, etc.

Is there some form of integrated area-based neighbourhood policy, in which all problems (housing, employment, education, etc.) are dealt with simultaneously? Social renewal policy for example?

Which of those policy objectives are 'official policy' and which are unofficial, informal?

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## About the Authors

Sako Musterd is Professor of Human Geography and Planning at the University of Amsterdam and director of AME, the Amsterdam study centre for the Metropolitan Environment, a research institute of the University of Amsterdam. His research focus is on international comparative urban analysis, particularly in the fields of ethnic and socio-economic spatial segregation, social exclusion and the welfare state, and on analyses of neighbourhood effects upon social mobility.

Wim Ostendorf is an Associate Professor in Urban Geography at the University of Amsterdam and a senior researcher at the AME. His research specialisms are in similar fields to Sako Musterd's. Several publications have been written jointly. He also focuses on the development and the functioning of urban settlements and regions.

Matthijs Breebaart studied Political Geography and was a researcher at the Amsterdam study centre for the Metropolitan Environment. His interests are in ethnic segregation and the role of institutions, policy and politics. He is also trained in information science.

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