Article

Protest and Accountability without the Press: The Press, Politicians, and Civil Society in Chile

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Abstract

We examine political news in Chilean newspapers after elections were reestablished, including a recent period of civic protests of policies linked to the authoritarian past. Data show that similar to journalism in Western democracies, throughout the twenty-one years under study, journalists relied upon official sources, allowed politicians to set the news agenda, and eschewed civil society in favor of representing citizens as voiceless individuals. However, news frames changed during the protest period in unexpected ways given current understandings of the press and civil society. During the protest period, the press framed a greater percentage of coverage as issues and offered contextualization while continuing to privilege official sources, defer agenda setting to politicians, and disregard collective organizations. Based on research elsewhere, issue frames and context may reorient causal attribution for social problems and encourage greater participation. Shortly after the study period, reform topped the political agenda, and disputed policies were overhauled. Connecting content to protests through time sequencing, findings suggest rethinking the relationship between civil society visibility in the press and processes of social accountability. They also provide an example of how legacies of authoritarianism may affect the press under democracy, helping advance theories of press performance beyond experiences in the West.

Keywords

journalism, civil society, political participation, democracy, Latin America

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Introduction

Relying upon western democratic experiences or normative theories, much of the literature on media–civil society relations argues that the press either does or should provide a public arena where civil society may contest public policies and demand accountability from government. Media visibility, according to this research, is a necessary ingredient for social movements to build consensus and mobilize participation around policy change. Similarly, the press has been called an important and perhaps even necessary ally of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements pressing for social accountability in Latin American democracies. Press visibility and even active support for civil society groups are considered crucial in processes of social accountability, which have been found to reinforce traditional mechanisms of citizen control over politicians and governments.

Our study examines these claims and assumptions in a newly restored democracy. It provides an empirical examination of the public arena the Chilean press created between 1990 and 2011 as civil society reemerged to contest the social policies and structural limitations of a democratic system designed to reassure outgoing autocrats that socioeconomic policies and power structures would not greatly change under democracy. After the study period, politicians responded to several of the movements' major demands by passing significant social and political reforms. Although we do not claim the protesters achieved all of their demands, there was a significant policy response.

The study nests the recent six-year period of civil protest within a longitudinal content analysis of political news conducted across twenty-one years since Chileans restored democracy in 1990. We link our measures of official, citizen, and civil society representations in the press to Chile's major political events through time sequencing, what Neuendorf (2002: 61–70) calls a "second-order linkage," based upon the assumption that major protests and elections dominated the political news agenda in the years when they occurred.

Understanding Chilean press behavior during civic protests helps refine theories of the press, politics, and civil society by assessing these relationships outside of the historical and institutional contexts of the more-stable western democracies where most of these theories were formulated. To do so, we asked the following research questions:

Research Question 1: Were civil society organizations given the opportunity to advocate for policy change and launch processes of social accountability in the press by being mentioned and especially quoted in political news?
Research Question 2: Did the press diminish opportunities for civil society organizations to mobilize or persuade by representing citizens in political news as atomized individuals who are spoken for rather than collective organizations that have voice?
Research Question 3: Did the press diminish opportunities for civil society organizations to mobilize or persuade by emphasizing the actions and perspectives of

the official sphere made up of government officials and politicians by predominantly mentioning and quoting them in the news?

Research Question 4: Did the press diminish opportunities for civil society organizations to mobilize or persuade by ceding control over the political news agenda to government officials and politicians?

Research Question 5: Did the press diminish opportunities for civil society organizations to mobilize or persuade by excluding background information and using news frames that support popular demobilization and closed processes of elite policy making?

We ask these questions of the elite political press read by Chile's political and policy establishment, as well as political news in popular tabloids that the same press companies price to attract low-income readers. This allows us to assess whether coverage changed in relevant ways depending upon whether the publication targeted the political elite or popular sectors from which many of the protesters emerged.

Our findings in some ways reflect and in other ways diverge from coverage patterns of politicians and civil society documented largely in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe. The western-based phenomenon of indexing political news to official perspectives and sources held true in the Chilean setting, and we also encountered a Chilean version of a journalistic "protest paradigm" supporting the status quo as researchers have in the United States and Hong Kong. However, findings that press behavior changed in other ways supporting policy change and political accountability contradicted claims of the necessity of press visibility for social movement success, and likewise suggested a rethinking of theories from Latin America about how the press may contribute to social accountability processes. During the protest period, the press framed a greater percentage of coverage as issues and offered contextualization while continuing to privilege official sources, defer agenda setting to politicians, and disregard collective organizations. Based on research elsewhere, issue frames and context may reorient causal attribution for social problems and mobilize participation. Thus, in contrast to normative theories and empirical studies, the evidence suggests that accountability processes worked without the press. Politicians and bureaucrats responded to protesters' issue agendas in their public statements, and a passive postauthoritarian political press covered them.

The Press, Politics, and Civil Society

Research in the United States and Europe has found that the press emphasizes official sources in its coverage of social movements, and of politics more generally, while alternatively ignoring collective organizations or disparaging them depending upon movements' goals and tactics (Boyle et al. 2005; Entman and Rojecki 1993). The press in western democracies tends to "index" national political coverage to the range of sources and opinions of elite politicians and officials, a phenomenon particularly documented in the U.S. press (Bennett 1990; Bennett et al. 2006; Benson and Hallin 2007). Although studies have found evidence of indexing in the United States, the

United Kingdom, France, and Israel, there is evidence that indexing in countries with multiparty parliamentary systems produced greater inclusion of civil society voices than indexing in countries with two-party majoritarian systems (Benson and Hallin 2007; Sheafer and Wolfsfeld 2009).

For protest news specifically, research in the United States and Hong Kong has documented a routinized template of coverage that marginalizes movements and civic organizations demanding change. These include reliance on official sources and news agendas, reduced presence of sources from protest groups, invocation of individual citizens as mainstream society that supports the status quo, and use of antagonistic frames (McLeod 2007; McLeod and Hertog 1999).

Recent studies have begun to elaborate differences in the protest paradigm depending upon the ideological orientation of media outlets and the degree of structural pluralism in communities or societies. Weaver and Scacco (2012) found that U.S. media outlets treated the conservative "Tea Party" movement differently depending upon their ideological orientations, whereas Lee (2014) found negative framing and exclusion of protesters' voices was more likely to emerge in politically conservative Hong Kong newspapers, especially when protesters targeted political issues. McCluskey and colleagues (2009) found that newspapers in U.S. communities with lower levels of structural pluralism, a concept representing the distribution of power, were less likely to quote protesters than newspapers in communities with higher levels of pluralism.

A related thread of research argues that even though social movements and change-oriented civic organizations can use social media to reach sympathizers, they still require mainstream media publicity to build consensus and recruit from the wider public as well as trigger elite reactions (Cammaerts et al. 2013; Koopmans 2004). According to this research, movements must obtain standing in the media before influential targets will grant recognition and respond to demands. Gamson (1990: 147) thus calls media the "central battleground" for challenging groups in the United States, whereas Koopmans contends from the German context that contemporary political contestation occurs not in the streets, but in

> the indirect, mediated encounters among contenders in the arena of the mass media public sphere. Authorities react to social movement activities if and as they are depicted in the mass media, and conversely movement activists become aware of political opportunities and constraints through the reactions (or non-reactions) that their actions provoke in the public sphere. (Koopmans 2004: 114)

Studies of social accountability processes in Latin American democracies often echo the media visibility claim of social movement research from the North, even suggesting that media participation through investigative reporting is necessary for social accountability to arise. In a strong version of this claim, Peruzzotti (2011) states,

> the presence of independent or watchdog journalism is essential for the success of any action of social accountability . . . The impact of any movement or NGO is directly proportional to the amount of media visibility it is able to gather. (p. 58)

Social accountability occurs when public denunciations impose reputational costs on politicians for perceived wrongdoing (Peruzzotti and Schmulovitz 2006). Social accountability can be achieved through public shaming, but is most likely to produce policy change when it activates other mechanisms of accountability, such as the "vertical" mechanism of control through elections or the "horizontal" mechanisms of congressional investigations and court interventions (O'Donnell 1998; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000).

The concept of social accountability responds to observations that traditional forms of accountability remain weak in many Latin American presidentialist systems, but that under certain conditions, governors still react to public denunciations (Peruzzotti and Schmulovitz 2006; Waisbord 2000). The concept was developed in contemporary Argentina after the exit of a military junta from political power unshackled an externally diverse press system. Argentina's military government never institutionalized to the degree of the Chilean regime and departed political power in a weaker position than its Chilean counterparts (Loveman and Davies 1997). While repression of journalists was severe (Knudson 1997), media system pluralism reemerged after the return to democracy in Argentina (Hughes 2006). The contemporary Argentine press considers both politicians and members of mobilized civil society organizations as "primary definers" of the news agenda (Waisbord and Peruzzotti 2009: 704) and provides an arena for civil society to define wrongdoing, identify those responsible, and deliberate on solutions (Bonner 2009).

Other research has found that political news in many western democracies tends to be presented episodically without context to orient readers and framed as insider political games (Pedersen 2012; Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2006). Several researchers have similarly described market-driven or "tabloidized" news styles as being devoid of context or linkage of wider issues or social problems. Tabloid and market-driven news styles expanded in Latin American journalism when political and economic systems liberalized in the 1980s and 1990s (Guerrero and Márquez 2014; Hallin 2000), increasing in both mainstream news and new tabloids aimed at the popular sectors.

Background information is important in the press–civil society relationship because studies have shown that when news consumers have contextualized thematic information, as opposed to decontextualized episodic coverage, they are more likely to attribute problems to societal conditions and failed policies rather than individualize blame, as well as take a more critical stance toward elected officials (Iyengar 1992, 1994). If coverage is contextualized, it may educate readers to the problems that motivate mobilization, protesters' goals, and why civil society organizations turn to protest as a tactic.

Framing studies analyze the internal organization and emphases of articles based upon the assumption that frames reveal important insights about journalism culture and audience effects, among other things (De Vreese and Semetko 2002; Shoemaker and Reese 2013). Issue-framed news resembles Iyengar's (1992) thematically framed coverage, which was more likely than episodic coverage to prompt viewers to attribute responsibility to societal factors and government behavior. Alternatively, many studies have found that framing politics as an insider

game increases cynicism, while recent evidence suggests framing political news as issues is more likely to mobilize citizens (Pedersen 2012; Shehata 2014).

To what degree do these findings travel? We briefly review the recent development of the Chilean press and political system before turning to our methodology and findings, believing, like Sheafer and Wolfsfeld (2009), that understanding institutional legacies and current political structures is crucial for data interpretation.

The Press under Authoritarianism and Restored Democracy

Chile's externally diverse and combative press system did not survive the country's seventeen-year dictatorship. Prior to the 1973 coup, Chile's press exhibited signs of a polarized pluralist system, with high political parallelism, external pluralism, and commentary-oriented journalism (Hallin and Mancini 2004; see also Bresnahan 2003; León-Dermota 2003). Every ideological strand found in the country's wide-ranging multiparty system was replicated in the press. Under the version of democracy that emerged after the dictatorship, newspapers reflect far narrower views than the press of the previous democratic period (Bresnahan 2003; León-Dermota 2003). Dailies *El Mercurio* and Copesa together own 90 percent of press outlets and are described as reflecting the establishment Center-Right to far Right.

The ownership concentration and rightward orientation of the present-day press have been attributed to a pact pro-democracy politicians made with autocrats at the end of the dictatorship to ensure the military's peaceful departure from government. Press properties transferred to private sector allies during the dictatorship stayed in their hands after the return to democracy and no public subsidies were allotted to restore external diversity in the press system. According to León-Dermota (2003), the pact assured that the press under democracy would remain "well tied down."

Another legacy of the pacted political transition could be journalistic norms. Today's journalists in greatest numbers voice a preference for civic roles that facilitate individual political participation through voting, but are less supportive of roles encouraging broader participation. In response to questions about potential civic roles of journalism (Mellado 2011: 283–85), the largest percentage in a national sample of journalists (44.1 percent) believed providing citizens with information to make political decisions was "extremely important." Journalists voiced lower support for roles associated with political participation beyond voting. These functions were advocating for social change (26.7 percent) and motivating people to participate in civic activity or political discussion (25.9 percent). These preferences closely reflect establishment views of acceptable forms of political participation (Hagopian 2005).

The Political System under Restored Democracy

Chile has been lauded for its peaceful transition from authoritarian rule, but criticized for the restricted range of political competition, expression, and participation democracy has produced. These limitations were built into the structures of restored democracy, and many have remained in place for reasons analysts

attribute to fear of instability, a near-hegemonic economic ideology, a culture of closed elite-based policy making, and structurally limited elections (Aguero 2003; Navia 2010; Teichman 2011).

The 1973–1990 dictatorship banned political parties, killed, disappeared, or tortured more than forty thousand people, and by one estimate severely traumatized at least two-hundred thousand people while blaming a "hyper" mobilized society for initiating political violence. By imposing a laissez-faire economic model benefiting largest financial groups, and eradicating progressive political, labor, and social organizations, the military regime dismantled structures for collective action (Hagopian 2005). When democracy was reborn in 1990, a constitution enacted during the dictatorship protected many limitations established under authoritarianism. Members of the alliance of opposition political parties, called the *Concertación*, agreed to the institutional design to ensure the military would hold elections and leave power as promised.

Among the constitution's requirements were appointed senatorial seats that gave General Augusto Pinochet and other dictatorship leaders a built-in veto on progressive reforms. Appointed seats were finally removed in 2005, but a two-seat, proportional design for election to the lower house, called the Chamber of Deputies, remained. Chamber electoral districts sent two deputies to Congress, but candidates from a single party had to carry 60 percent of the vote to win both seats. This happened in only about 5 percent of districts, inflating the Right's representation in the chamber (Navia 2010). The "binomial" district design also created incentives to form party coalitions as it was impossible to win without them. In practice, this affected only the Left as the Right was ideologically narrower. The effect was to truncate the ideological spectrum in the chamber compared with the wider population, and through that erode policy responsiveness expected from elections (Hagopian 2005).

Concertación members also set aside changes in policies that weakened labor organization and public education quality in favor of ameliorating the worst poverty through targeted programs (Navia 2010). *Concertación* administrations successfully halved the poverty rate, but Chile's economic inequality remains among the highest in Latin America, with wealth especially concentrated in the richest 10 percent. Many supporters hoped the election of Socialist Party *Concertación* member Michelle Bachelet in 2006, the fourth uninterrupted *Concertación* presidency, would finally open policy making to equalizing reforms. However, Bachelet's promise to broaden participation in policy making was absent from priorities once in office, and calls to reform the districting process went nowhere.

Street protests erupted early in her first term, reviving fears of a hypermobilized populous among some of her advisors (Navia 2010). *Concertación*'s base constituencies protested policies that favored macroeconomic growth rates over social equity, environmental protection, and indigenous claims on ancestral lands (Fernandez and Vera 2012; Teichman 2011). The protests gathered numbers unseen since the political transition period. They were organized by constituencies disenfranchised by elite-driven policy making, colloquially called *cupulismo*, and marked the return of collective action (Fernandez and Vera 2012; Teichman 2011). Table 1 provides a protest timeline.

Table 1. Major Protests in Chile, 2006–2011.

Year	Protesters	Issue
2006	Students	Education Quality and Access
2007	Urban Services Users	Transantiago Cost and Delays
2007	Labor	Wages, Collective Bargaining
2008	Students	Education
2010	Students	Education
2010	Indigenous	Mapuche Land Rights and Police Violence
2011	Students	Education
2011	Environmentalists	Aysen Hydroelectric Dam
2011	Indigenous	Mapuche Land Rights, Autonomy

Source. Ruiz (2007, 2012); Teichman (2011); *The New York Times, Global Voices*, and other media websites.

In 2006, more than 800,000 high school students went on strike nationally in protest of education quality and difficult access to higher education. After arresting thousands, the government formed a large advisory council. Students and teachers walked out of the council months later, returning to protests in 2008, 2010, and 2011 (Ruiz 2012; Teichman 2011). In 2007, temporary workers took to the streets with organized labor unions whose reform petitions had been ignored. Like students, subcontracted workers not only protested material conditions but also demanded legal reform to change structures. Labor laws prevent formal sector workers from striking as a sector across companies unless management agrees, fragmenting workers into inconsequential numbers and individual firms. Temporary workers, predominantly female, are prohibited from striking at all, have no job security or benefits, and earn about one-third the rate of formal sector laborers (Ruiz 2012; Teichman 2011).

Lower income city dwellers made up a third group of protesters following reorganization of Santiago's transportation system, Transantiago, in 2007. To increase efficiency, the plan cut the number of buses in half, transferring routes of small independent operators to a few large companies. Numerous new transfers added hours to travel time. Along with exhaustion, this meant lost wages, leisure time, and time to spend with children. Neighborhood associations organized protests across the city. Finally, indigenous people and environmentalists have been at odds with macroeconomic policies since the return to democracy. Mapuche protesters and police clashed in 2010 and 2011 as the indigenous group opposed state-supported energy and commercial forestry mega-projects in Chile's South. Indigenous and environmentalist protests exploded again in 2011 over a proposal to build four hydroelectric dams (Latta and Cid Aguayo 2012).

Method

The study encompasses the period since the restoration of elections, assessed in five-year intervals between 1990 and 2005, and then in yearly increments during the protest years from 2006 to 2011. This allows us to nest the protest period within

the longer time span to identify whether the press relationship with politicians and civil society remained consistent, changed across time generally, or changed during the protest period.

Although the overall period studied comprises 21 years, 40 percent of the stories in the sample were from one 6-year time period, specifically between 2006 and 2011, as we wanted to analyze in more depth what happened in press performance during the most-active period of protest since democracy was restored.

Sampling and Data Collection

The political content of five general-interest Chilean newspapers with national circulation was analyzed, including two elite commercial newspapers *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*, a third elite broadsheet produced by the state, *La Nación*, and the two popular newspapers with national coverage, *Las Últimas Noticias* and *La Cuarta*. By including elite and popular newspapers, we capture press created for a wider swath of the public and can compare whether popular and elite press styles diverged in ways significant for the press relationship with civil society. The sample includes the two conglomerates that dominate print media (El Mercurio S.A.P. and Copesa), as well as the only national state-owned newspaper. *El Mercurio* is a conservative elite newspaper, while *La Tercera* has tried to distinguish itself by being Center-Right. *La Nación* was primarily owned by the government until 2012. Its print edition was discontinued in 2010 and its much smaller digital presence was sold to a private company in 2012. During the period we study, *La Nación* held a smaller participation in the media market than the other newspapers in the sample and maintained a pro-government stance. The tabloids *Las Últimas Noticias* (LUN) and *La Cuarta* (which belong to El Mercurio S.A.P. and Copesa, respectively) target lower income population segments.

Through the constructed week method, a stratified-systematic sample of each newspaper was selected. For each media outlet, one Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday edition was randomly selected for each semester of every year, making sure that every month of the year was represented by at least one day, thus assuring no over-representation of a particular period. Specifically, two constructed news weeks were sampled per year, per newspaper. The unit of analysis was the news story. A news story was understood as the group of continuous verbal and visual elements that refer to the same topic. Within each selected sample, all stories associated with politics were considered. A news item was considered political news and included in the sample when it corresponded to information related to formal and institutionalized political power in Chile. This includes news about governments and their services at all levels (local, provincial, and national). It also includes the activities of all government branches at the national level, including the executive, parliament, and the judicial branch. It also included stories about elections for government posts at all levels and stories focused primarily on the actions of political parties. The sample does not include news about politics in other countries unless it was primarily about the actions of the Chilean foreign affairs ministry, reception of a head of state by government authorities in Chile, or a presidential trip abroad.

We did not include supplements and/or magazines or the features sections. We also made a distinction between news and opinion, so articles in the newspapers' editorial sections as well as letters to the editor and opinion columns were excluded. Photographs with a caption only, single quotes, and headlines only were not considered as news items. A total of 7,386 news items were coded, of which 3,005 appeared between 2006 and 2011.

Fifteen independent coders were trained in the application of a common codebook. Coder-trainer tests were performed to ensure that they had similar understandings of the codebook to yield acceptable intercoder agreement. The coding was done manually between 2012 and 2013. After the coding was finished, a new coding of a randomly selected 10 percent of the total sample was carried out to determine intercoder reliability. Using Krippendorff's alpha, overall intercoder reliability was .75.[1]

Measures

To respond to Research Questions 1 through 3, following Benson and Hallin (2007), we coded for the explicit presence of individual citizens such as bystanders or people potentially affected by policies and protests; civil society organizations or movements operating outside of the state or economic market and their explicitly stated representatives or members including protesters; and explicitly mentioned members of the official sphere including government officials and employees at all levels, members of the partisan coalition holding the presidency at the time of coding, and members of the partisan opposition at the time.

To answer Research Question 4, we operationalized control over the political news agenda by coding news triggers. Coders were asked to indicate if the item was triggered through government officials' and politicians' initiatives, even when not literally mentioned, including press conferences, other events to which journalists were invited, or statements specifically prepared for an interview. These features may be evident to the coder where the item extensively quotes from an event, debate, or speech (Wolfsfeld and Sheafer 2006). A second option was to code the item as the journalist's or newspaper's initiative, including independent investigation by the journalist or newspaper staff, as well as changes in focus that add wider perspectives or transform the original premise for the story.

Finally, we answered Research Question 5 by coding for background information and news framing in the following manner. Background information was coded as factual information that would assist citizens in understanding political developments and was separated temporally from current facts (Benson and Hallin 2007). Background information includes explaining officials' positions or decisions (how they have voted, how they have previously behaved), the reasons behind demonstrations or protests, or the objectives of citizen groups, among others.

Coders were finally asked to indicate whether the news item mainly focused on game framing or on public policy issues. The game frame focuses on competition, winners and losers, or politicians' personal popularity, sometimes in combination (Aalberg et al. 2012; Valentino et al. 2001). Issue frames emphasize factual description

of public problems and issues, as well as possible consequences, alternative solutions, and policies advocated such as legislative reforms or executive branch decisions (Rhee 1997; Valentino et al. 2001).

Findings

Political News Without Civil Society

Were civil society organizations given the opportunity to advocate for policy change and social accountability in the mediated public arena by being mentioned or quoted in political news? Data answering this question are reported in Table 2 as percentages of all political items with members of civil society mentioned or quoted on an annual basis, and then as adjusted standardized residuals for year-to-year chi-square tests.[2] They show that NGOs and social movements were given relatively few opportunities to enter the public arena created in the press and that these opportunities declined over time, with the exception of a single year prior to the protest period during which a reform-oriented candidate became president. Contrary to normative theories of the press in democracy, the presence of civil society organizations and their members declined by about half over the twenty-one-year period, from 11 to 6.1 percent when represented in news as sources, and from 18.1 to 9.2 percent when mentioned as actors in political news. These declines occurred in both elite and popular newspapers, and the decline across the entire time span (1990 vs. 2011) was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 4{,}571$, $p \leq .05$ for the elite press; $\chi^2 = 9{,}482$, $p \leq .005$ for the popular press).

Tracking the annualized adjusted standardized residuals across time, we see the presence of civil society both as political actors and news sources declined across the entire period with the clear exception occurring during the initiation of the reformist government of President Ricardo Lagos in 2000, including every year of the protest period. This means the Chilean press reduced the representation of citizens as organized collectives over twenty-one years of democratic consolidation, including the protest years, with the exception being a year of government-led reform.

Based upon this evidence, civil society had little opportunity to express its views in the public arena provided in the press and these rare opportunities declined across the entire democratic period as well as in every year of protest.

Citizens as Voiceless Individuals

Instead of collective actors outside of the state or economic market, were citizens represented in the press as atomized individuals who lacked voice? By comparing the presence of individual citizens and civil society in political news, also in Table 2, we see that citizens were much more often represented as individuals who are mentioned without being used as sources. This means individual citizens were talked about rather than represented as participating in the discussion of policies and politics or as demanding accountability. However, while there were very few stories that quoted individual citizens as sources, these tended to significantly grow in presence over twenty-one

Table 2. Individual Citizens, Civil Society, and the Official Sphere (Percentage of News Items and Adjusted Standardized Residuals; *N* = 7,386).

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
As sources										
Individual citizens										
Percentage	3.3	1.5	7.6	5.5	8.2	5.6	6.5	5.6	6.6	5.7
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	−3.5	−5.7	3.8	0.4	2.9	0.4	1.6	0.6	1.6	0.5
Civil society organizations										
Percentage	11	7.4	13.5	6.5	5.6	5.6	6.7	7	7.4	6.1
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	3.6	−0.9	6.5	−1.4	−2.1	−2	−1.5	−1.2	−0.8	−1.8
Politicians and officials										
Percentage	73.3	70	70.6	69.7	74.9	76.9	70.4	72.9	75.1	74
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	0.9	−1.9	−1.3	−1.2	1.4	2.2	−1.1	−0.5	1.7	0.8
As actors										
Individual citizens										
Percentage	32.8	22.7	34.3	34.3	30.1	29.8	27.6	39.2	35.2	41.5
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	−0.5	−7	1.5	1.2	−1	−1.1	−2.5	3.8	1.6	4.4
Civil society organizations										
Percentage	18.1	10.9	17.4	10	7	8.2	9.4	8.6	9.6	9.2
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	7.5	−1.4	5.5	−1.9	−3.4	−2.5	−2.3	−2.8	−2.1	−2.1
Politicians and officials										
Percentage	92.9	88.8	94.2	91.8	93.4	95.4	94.7	94.7	93.5	92.8
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	−0.5	−5.5	1.9	−0.9	0.4	1.9	1.8	1.9	0.8	0.3

years, and especially in the period of protest from 2006 to 2011 (χ^2 over the full period = 64,268; $p \leq .001$). This means that as Chile's young democracy aged, the press increasingly gave voice to individual citizens even though their overall presence in political news remained very low.

Two years stand out when examining this trend and help to clarify the relationships between coverage of individual citizens and major political events such as protests and elections. Quoting individual citizens jumped in 2000, when *Concertación* candidate Lagos was elected in January and installed his government promoting political reform. The second-largest expansion occurred in 2006. That was the year Michelle Bachelet was elected, promising to create a "citizens' government," and by year's end faced surging protests. This suggests that it was officials' rhetoric and policy promises that prompted the press to include a few more citizen voices rather than either actions by civil society or a change in journalistic culture as democracy aged.

Looking at representations of individual citizens as actors who are mentioned but not quoted, their presence increased across the longer time span (χ^2 = 87,312, $p \leq .001$), from 33 percent in 1990 to 41.5 percent in 2011, more than in the case of the source analysis. Data in the shorter protest time span tell a more nuanced story. In the first three years of protests, from 2006 to 2008, the presence of individual citizens vis-à-vis other actors in the news went down and then rose again during the election campaigns in 2009 when protesters took a break and the first conservative coalition president took office in 2010. (However, individual citizens' presence also grew in 2011, which was another protest year without major electoral activity.) These trends

Table 3. Individual Citizens as Sources and Actors Mentioned According to Media Type (Percentage of News Items and Adjusted Standardized Residuals; *N* = 7,386).

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
As sources										
Elite										
Percentage	2.5	1.7	6.5	4.4	4.3	3.5	3.7	4.7	5.5	3.6
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	−2.7	−2.9	3.7	0.5	0.3	−0.4	−0.4	0.8	1.9	−0.4
Popular										
Percentage	5.3	1.1	10.3	13.8	24.7	15.6	25.6	11.5	12.5	16.7
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	−3	−6.7	0.9	1.6	5.1	1.9	5.3	0.9	1.2	2.4
As actors										
Elite										
Percentage	29.2	27.2	32.6	31.6	25.7	25.5	22.4	36.1	34.4	41.8
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	−1	−1.8	1.2	0.5	−2	−2	−4.2	2.7	1.9	4.8
Popular										
Percentage	36	17.1	35.6	53.3	42.7	46.8	57.7	55.4	35.7	41.4
Adjusted Standardized Residuals	0.6	−8.9	0.4	3.5	1.5	2.1	4.2	4.1	0.2	1.2

make sense when we consider that journalists' professed role orientations suggest they are more comfortable informing voters than motivating participation in political discussions, civic organizations, or social change.

Statistically significant differences between coverage of individual citizens in the elite-oriented press (χ^2 = 8,015, $p \leq .005$) and popular newspapers (χ^2 = 28,788, $p \leq .001$) further clarify these patterns. Table 3 shows year-to-year percentages and adjusted standardized residuals for individual citizens as sources and actors in popular and elite newspapers. Data show that both types of newspapers increasingly included individual citizens as sources and actors in political coverage across the entire democratic period, but the popular newspapers were much more likely to do so and the increases occurred across the entire period. When we look at the changes from 2006 to 2011, the elite press reduced the presence of individual citizens in political news when protests surged from 2006 to 2008, increased their presence in the campaign year of 2009 and the first year in office of conservative President Sebastián Piñera in 2010, and then reduced individual citizens' presence again in the protest year of 2011. Meanwhile, the popular press increased individual citizens' presence as sources and actors across the entire six-year period including the years of major protests. These findings support claims that tabloidization individualizes experience more than elite approaches, but at the same time cannot support the idea that tabloidization is somehow more harmful to civil society's objectives because tabloids were more likely to give voice to individual citizens and present them in a wider variety of contexts including protest years.

Overwhelming Official Presence and Perspectives

Our third research question asked whether official presence and perspectives precluded civil society participation in the press arena. Looking again at Table 2, we see

the presence of official actors and sources is overwhelming compared with civil society. Politicians and government officials were quoted in 70 to 77 percent of news items across the entire twenty-one years. Official sources increased slightly in 2006, 2007, and 2010, the highest years of protest, but these percentages were not significantly different from other years ($\chi^2 = 12.685$, $p = ns$). Officials and politicians were mentioned as actors in 93 percent of stories across time. Significant differences were registered due to a unique 4 percent decrease from the average during 1995, when an economic crisis was affecting business leaders ($\chi^2 = 39.989$, $p \leq .001$).

Official Control of the Agenda

Research Question 4 asked whether the Chilean press ceded control over the political news agenda to the official sphere. We examined control over the political news agenda by assessing whether politicians and government officials "triggered" news items. Our data show official control of the news agenda was as overwhelming as official presence. These actors triggered 93 percent of political news items across the entire democratic period, including the protest period (one-way $\chi^2 = 2{,}352.6$; $p \leq .001$). This decisive control of the news agenda did not show any significant change across the entire period ($\chi^2 = 9.435$, $p = ns$), so civil society protests did not disrupt official agenda-setting control.

Greater Contextualization and Issue Frames

Our last research question asked whether the press supported civil society by including background information about politics and policy, and framing political news as public issues rather than insider games. Data show newspapers did gradually increase the inclusion of background information. The presence of background information tended to increase until 2007, when it stabilized ($\chi^2 = 134.797$, $p \leq .001$). Overall, only 20 percent of the news stories included background information, however, so while the presence of context grew, this feature remained present in a minority of stories. Data also register significant differences between the popular press ($\chi^2 = 15{,}388$, $p \leq .001$) and the elite press ($\chi^2 = 70{,}369$, $p \leq .001$) at all points of the twenty-one years analyzed. The elite press included more contextualized information in political news, as international research on tabloid news styles suggests, but both types of newspapers increasingly added context.

Framing politics as a game was a dominant and significant characteristic over the entire democratic period, one-way $\chi^2(1) = 283.30$, $p \leq .001$.[3] On average, six of ten news stories framed politics as a game. Nevertheless, the data showed an overall decrease (from 67.5 to 57.8 percent) in the presence of game framing ($\chi^2 = 84{,}896$, $p \leq .001$) and an increase (from 32.5 to 44.2 percent) in issue framing ($\chi^2 = 91{,}791$, $p \leq .001$). Type of newspaper did not explain any differences in this respect; both elite and tabloid newspapers increased issue framing in similar amounts and rates of growth. The increase in issue framing occurred in the last three years of the study period, that is, three years into the era of popular mobilization. Thus, we find evidence that a new

political scenario, in which civil society was mobilized to press for political and policy change in the streets, coincided with an opening to issue framing in the press.

Discussion

Data collected across twenty-one years of restored democracy in Chile, including a six-year period of renewed civic mobilization, reveal that political journalism gave few opportunities to civil society organizations to advocate for policy change or launch processes of social accountability in the press. Political journalism in both the elite press serving the political establishment and the tabloid press aimed at popular sector readers overwhelmingly represented citizens as atomized individuals who are spoken for rather than collective actors who have voice. Political journalists instead emphasized the actions and perspectives of government officials and at the same time ceded control over the political news agenda to government officials and politicians.

Until this point, data show the Chilean press behaving much as theory derived from western liberal contexts would expect. However, at the same time that they excluded collective actors and ceded agenda-setting control to political and policy elites, political journalists increased the presence of background information and shifted news frames away from political gamesmanship toward issues. While contextualization increased more in the elite press, in line with ideas about tabloid versus elite newspapers, political journalism in both types of newspapers added context and increased issue frames across the democratic period.

In addition to calling for caution in the generalization of theories across the wide variety of contemporary democratic press systems, the findings raise questions about the roles press coverage played in the accountability processes the protests unleashed as greater contextualization and issue framing have helped citizens reattribute responsibility for social problems to politicians and political structures in other contexts. Shortly after the study period, reformist Senators voted to replace the binomial districting structure with a proportional election system for the lower house. Passage in the Chamber of Deputies and the signature of an enthusiastic second-term Bachelet were expected soon thereafter. Beyond political reform, Bachelet announced and the parliament passed the first phase of the largest educational reform in Chile's democratic period, funded by a tax overhaul (*Reuters* 2015; Marty 2015). Legislation on labor rights was to follow. The demands of civil society, and the first loss of the Center-Left *Concertación* presidential candidate to the Right, in 2010, could have strengthened vertical accountability pressures by reminding *Concertación* politicians that their electoral base could stay at home on election day.

Conclusion

Although a unique country-specific study, this work contributes to research outside the United States and Europe, as well as to social accountability theories from Latin America, by providing a specific illustration of how a country's particular institutional, cultural, and historical context effects the generalizability of hypotheses about

press interactions with the state and civil society. In summary, the findings from this study support indexing as a generalizable phenomenon although probably for reasons related to legacies from the authoritarian period (e.g., a political culture fearing popular mobilization, the concentration and conservatism of press ownership, and an electoral structure limiting the range of ideological representation by creating only two viable party coalitions). There is also evidence of a Chilean version of the protest paradigm in democratic journalism that ignores civil society while atomizing citizens as voiceless individuals, conditions that likely originate in the same mix of democratic liberalism and holdover authoritarianism.

However, the findings reveal a weakness in the civil society literature on press visibility by suggesting that civic mobilization can influence press frames in ways that enhance civil society objectives even when civil society itself is not visible in the press and official actors control the news agenda. The data suggest civil society influence on the press occurred because politicians felt enough pressure for accountability through elections to respond to civic mobilizations in public pronouncements even though the Chilean electoral structure was created to limit the ideological breadth of political representation and support policy stability. Given that politicians almost exclusively triggered political news and the voices of collective actors were largely absent, it makes most sense that politicians and government officials themselves prompted the increase in issue framing by raising the contested issues in official press conferences, releases, and other pronouncements. In other words, civic pressures for government accountability influenced politicians and then changes in politicians' rhetoric influenced the press in ways affirmative for civil society influence, rather than the other way around. If we posit an iterative process based on this evidence, it runs from civil society to political representatives, and then to the press, which is contrary to most empirical studies and to the normative assumptions of liberal press theories making the press an intermediary between civil society and the political system.

Our results suggest social movement theory and social accountability theory may thus exaggerate the need for the media to give direct publicity to movement members and demands, or even further to act as allies to social movements and NGOs demanding accountability in new democracies. The press was neither the motor of democratic reform nor the caboose, as some have framed the question of the media's role in democratization (Lawson 2002), but rather the press was a passenger of change. It publicized politicians' responses to social accountability pressures from civil society, which mobilized without the overt support of the press. As civil society surpassed authoritarian repression and overcame depoliticization under restored democracy, politicians responded and press frames changed in ways that could support further mobilization and ultimately political and social reform.

We believe these findings reflect larger historical–institutional processes in Chile that diverge from patterns in countries where much of the research on civil society and the press, or even social accountability in new democracies, has been conducted. The patterns of press coverage we document suggest that "traces" of the country's past institutional structure and political culture continue to influence how the press is articulated with the political system and civil society, a phenomenon Milton (2000: 23) has

noted in other new democracies. The previous authoritarian regime's realignment of press property ownership, the durability of political culture fearing mobilization across the authoritarian and democratic periods, and the pacted mode of transition back to democracy continue to shape the arena the press provides for political contestation.

We reiterate that there are two limitations to our study. One is its second-order linkage of content to social protests. Content analysis even with the unique nested design of our longitudinal study cannot alone do more than suggest the change in press frames responded to the resurgence of collective action in the manner we have laid out here. Our hypotheses about why frames changed without civil society visibility in the press should be tested in future case studies making a direct linkage between specific social protests and possible political responses. A second limitation is that we had to rely on other research to argue that the shift from game framing to issue frames could have influenced citizen appraisals and participation. We similarly are limited to studying the arena of elite contestation in the press rather than social media or television. Testing the effects of the press, television, and social media coverage on civil society in the Chilean context, and new or restored democracies generally, should be on the agenda of study.

However, the timing of the protests, the loss of the 2010 election, and the subsequent reelection of Bachelet and a roster of reformist parliamentarians in 2014 are suggestive that *Concertación* politicians perceived shifts in patterns of political appraisal and participation in the direction implied by increases in issue frames and contextualization. The pattern of coverage across twenty-one years then suggest a change in the environment pressured politicians to respond in the press in an attempt to preserve their electoral base. At the very least, these results call for reevaluation of common assumptions, and some research claims about the press, politicians, and civil society based upon empirical study in a wider range of democratic contexts. The Chilean case suggests that when other mechanisms of accountability work, even weakly, an indexing press that eschews civil society may support social movements, social accountability, and eventually democratizing reforms simply by going along for the ride.

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Notes

1. Intercoder reliability per individual measure was as follows: Individual citizens as sources (Ka: .72), mentioned as actors (Ka: .71); Civil society as sources (Ka: .75), mentioned as actors (Ka: .72); News triggers (Ka: .81); News frames (Ka: .84); and Background information (Ka: .72).

2. Residuals are deviations of the annual number of stories from the predicted annual number of stories under the chi-square model. Standardized residuals are divided by their standard errors to be comparable year-to-year.
3. Data on framing between 2006 and 2011 were previously reported in Mellado and Rafter (2014).

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