

PITTS PROBLEM AND HIGHER-ORDER UNIFORM INTERPOLATION

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1. Pitts problem on Heyting algebras and Elementary toposes.

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3. An approach to the problem inspired by the work of Dito Patariaia.

Pitts Problem

Definition

An algebra $(H, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, 0, 1)$ is called a *Heyting algebra* if:

1. $(H, \wedge, \vee, 0, 1)$ is a (distributive) lattice.
2. The following law holds for all $a, b, c \in H$:

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As a special example, if (P, \leq) is a poset, $\text{Up}(P)$ the upwards closed sets of P , are a Heyting algebra.

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2. The categories $\text{Sh}(X)$ of sheaves on a topological space, or more generally, $\text{Sh}(\mathbf{C})$ of sheaves on a site.
3. The effective topos Eff .

Given a topos \mathcal{E} and $A \in \mathcal{E}$, the lattice of subobjects $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(A)$ has the structure of a Heyting algebra. The Heyting algebra $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(1)$ – the **lattice of subterminal objects** – is often called the **lattice of truth values**.

Example

1. In **Set**, $\text{Sub}(1)$ is 2, the two element Boolean algebra;
2. If L is a complete Heyting algebra then in $\text{Sh}(L)$ we have $\text{Sub}(1) \cong L$.



Figure 1: Andrew Pitts (1956-)

For which Heyting algebras H is there a topos \mathcal{E} such that
 $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(1) \cong H$?

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But this leaves many natural classes without a clear answer:

1. Chain Heyting algebras?
2. Countable Heyting algebras?
3. Free and finitely generated Heyting algebras?

Reducing the problem (but not by much)

The **filter-quotient construction** of toposes ensures that if H is a Heyting algebra arising as $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(1)$, and $f : H \rightarrow H'$ is a surjective homomorphism of HA, then there is a topos \mathcal{E}' such that $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}'}(1) \cong H'$.

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Hence if there is any algebra which **fails** to appear in this way, $\mathbf{F}_{HA}(X)$ does not appear so.

Pitts' intuition: $\mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)$ must fail to appear in this way.

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Proposition (Pitts, 1981 (unpublished))

Assume that every Heyting algebra H is isomorphic to $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(1)$. Then the inclusion:

$$\mathbf{F}_{HA}(n) \hookrightarrow \mathbf{F}_{HA}(n+1)$$

has a left and a right adjoint.

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Now consider $\mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)[x]$, the Heyting algebra of polynomials. There is a map $p : \mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)[x] \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)(x)$, fixing $\mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)$, and sending x to id_{Ω} .

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Now consider $\mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)[x]$, the Heyting algebra of polynomials. There is a map $\rho : \mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)[x] \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)(x)$, fixing $\mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)$, and sending x to id_{Ω} .

Then $\forall p$ is right adjoint to $i : \mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega) \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_{HA}(\omega)[x]$, and similar with $\exists p$. This then restricts to adjoint maps on finitely many generators. □

The logical implications of this are that for each formula $\phi(\bar{p}, q)$ of intuitionistic logic, there are formulas $\tilde{\forall}q\phi(\bar{p}, q)$ and $\tilde{\exists}q\phi(\bar{p}, q)$ such that for each formula $\psi(\bar{p})$:

$$\vdash \tilde{\exists}q\phi(\bar{p}, q) \rightarrow \psi(\bar{p}) \iff \vdash \phi(\bar{p}, q) \rightarrow \psi(\bar{p}) \text{ and}$$

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$$\begin{aligned}\vdash \tilde{\exists}q\phi(\bar{p}, q) \rightarrow \psi(\bar{p}) &\iff \vdash \phi(\bar{p}, q) \rightarrow \psi(\bar{p}) \text{ and} \\ \vdash \psi(\bar{p}) \rightarrow \tilde{\forall}q\phi(\bar{p}, q) &\iff \vdash \psi(\bar{p}) \rightarrow \phi(\bar{p}, q)\end{aligned}$$

Pitts believed (for some years) that there should be some formula of intuitionistic logic without this property. Then:

Theorem (Pitts, 1992)

The above property holds for each formula $\phi(\bar{p}, q)$ of intuitionistic logic.

Pataraia doctrines

Pitts problem continued

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Dito Patariaia had the opposite intuition:



Figure 2: Dito Patariaia (1963-2011)

Pataraia worked with so called **Higher-Order cylindric Heyting algebras**. We work with an equivalent, but more categorical-logically inspired formalism, which we called **Pataraia doctrines**. These are intimately related to *triposes* and more generally, first-order hyperdoctrines with comprehension.

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Definition

The *initial type structure* is composed by pure types and indecomposable types, and is defined inductively as follows:

- 1 is an indecomposable type;
- If T is a pure type, then we have an indecomposable type PT .
- For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and every n -tuple T_1, \dots, T_n of indecomposable types such that $T_i \neq 1$, we have a pure type, denoted $\langle T_1, \dots, T_n \rangle$ (or $T_1 \times \dots \times T_n$);

$I :=$ set of indecomposable type; $V := I \times \mathbb{N}$ set of variables.

Definition

A *Pataaraia doctrine* consists of

- A family $(\mathcal{H}(X))_{X \subseteq_{\omega} V}$ of Heyting algebras.
- For all $X, Y \subseteq_{\omega} V$ and every function $\sigma: X \rightarrow Y$ that preserves types (i.e. for each $(T, n) \in X$, the first coordinate of the pair $\sigma(T, n)$ should be T), a Heyting homomorphism

$$\mathcal{H}_{\sigma}: \mathcal{H}(X) \rightarrow \mathcal{H}(Y)$$

called the *reindexing along σ* .

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- For every $X \subseteq_{\omega} V$ and every $x \in V \setminus X$, functions

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- For every pure type T , every $x : PT$ and $t : T$, an element (t, x) in $\mathcal{H}(|t| \cup \{x\})$.
- For every indecomposable type T , and every $x, x' : T$, an element $\text{eq}(x, x')$ in $\mathcal{H}(\{x, x'\})$.

Subject to a few axioms:

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3. For every indecomposable type T , for any $x : T$,

$$\text{eq}(x, x) = \top_{\mathcal{H}(\{x\})}.$$

4. For any indecomposable type T , for any $x, x' : T$, every $X \subseteq_{\omega} V$ and every surjective type-preserving function $\sigma : \{x, x'\} \rightarrow X$, we have

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5. For every pure type T , all $s = \langle s_1, \dots, s_n \rangle, t = \langle t_1, \dots, t_n \rangle, t' = \langle t'_1, \dots, t'_n \rangle : T$ with s_1, \dots, s_n all distinct and $t_1, \dots, t_n, t'_1, \dots, t'_n$ all distinct, denoting with $\sigma, \sigma' : |s| \rightarrow |t| \cup |t'|$ the function mapping s_i to t_i and t'_i , respectively, we have

$$\text{eq}_{|t| \cup |t'|}(t, t') \wedge \mathcal{H}_{\sigma}(\alpha) \leq \mathcal{H}_{\sigma'}(\alpha).$$

6. For every pure type T , every $x, x' : PT$ and every $t : T$ with no repeated variables,

$$\text{eq}_{\{x, x'\}}(x, x') = (\forall t)_{\{x, x'\}}(\epsilon(t, x) \leftrightarrow \epsilon(t, x'))$$

7. (Comprehension) For all pure types T and S , every $t = \langle t_1, \dots, t_n \rangle : T$ without repeated variables, every $x : P(T)$, every $s = \langle s_1, \dots, s_m \rangle : S$ without repeated variables such that $|s|$ is disjoint from $|t| \cup \{x\}$, and every $\alpha \in \mathcal{H}(|t| \cup |s|)$,

$$(\exists x)_{|s|}(\forall |t|)_{\{x\} \sqcup |s|}(\mathcal{H}_{|t| \sqcup \{x\} \hookrightarrow |t| \sqcup \{x\} \sqcup |s|}(\epsilon(t, x)) \leftrightarrow \mathcal{H}_{|t| \sqcup |s| \hookrightarrow |t| \sqcup \{x\} \sqcup |s|}(\alpha)) = \top_{\mathcal{H}(|s|)}.$$

The following essentially follows from the work of Pitts, Pataaraia and Johnstone:

Theorem

If F is a functor defining a Pataaraia doctrine, there is an elementary topos \mathcal{E} such that $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(1) \cong F(\emptyset)$. Moreover, for any elementary topos \mathcal{E} , the functor $\text{Hom}(-, \Omega_{\mathcal{E}})$ on the initial type system is a Pataaraia doctrine.

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To solve Pitts problem we can work with Pataaraia doctrines instead.

Pataaraia doctrines and Higher-Order Uniform Interpolation

By restricting the type system, we can obtain a more modular notion:

Definition

We say that a type $x \in I$ has power depth 0 if $x : 1$; and that it has power depth at most $n + 1$ if $x : PT$ where $T = \langle t_1, \dots, t_n \rangle$ and t have power depth at most n .

We denote by V_n the set of variables of types of power depth at most n .

Then $V_0 = \emptyset$, and $V_1 \cong \mathbf{N}$.

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Then $V_0 = \emptyset$, and $V_1 \cong \mathbf{N}$.

Definition

An n -Pataaraia doctrine is a hyperdoctrine on V_n satisfying the axioms of Pataaraia doctrine for types of power depth at most n .

A 0-Pataaraia doctrine is a Heyting algebra.

Note that (n -) Pataaraia doctrines are many-sorted algebraic theories. Hence they admit free objects.

One theorem derived by Pitts from his Uniform Interpolation, is the following:

Theorem

Every 0-Pataaraia doctrine can be extended to a 1-Pataaraia doctrine.

Proof.

For H a Heyting algebra, one defines $\mathcal{H}(\emptyset) = H$ and for each set of variables $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$, $\mathcal{H}(\{x_1, \dots, x_n\}) = H[x_1, \dots, x_n]$. □

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One possible formulation of this: **free quantifier-free 1-Pataraia doctrines over a Heyting algebra H are 1-Pataraia doctrines.**

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There, starting from a Boolean algebra B we need to generate a (Boolean) algebra corresponding to:

$$\mathcal{H}(\{x : PP1\})$$

this must contain expressions of the form:

$$\epsilon(p, x)$$

for $p \in B$. As it turns out this can be reduced to:

$$\epsilon(p, x) \cong \epsilon(p, 0) \vee \epsilon(p, 1)$$

Using this we can construct, for a given Boolean algebra B , a Pataaraia doctrine over B .

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Part of our current work concerns the following kinds of algebras:

$$H[[x]]$$

which is the Heyting algebra of formulas of a calculus containing:

1. \forall -and \exists -quantifiers defined for variables of type $P1$;
2. Equalities $eq(y, y')$ for $y, y' : PP1$;
3. Elements $\epsilon(x, y)$ for $x : P1$ and $y : PP1$;
4. It satisfies extensionality, and comprehension for formulas of type $P1$, and invariance under equality.

We denote by $F_{HA^2}(n)$ the free algebra on ω many generators for this theory. Then Pitts implication says:

Theorem

Assume that every Heyting algebra is isomorphic to $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(1)$. Then the inclusion:

$$F_{HA^2}(n) \hookrightarrow F_{HA^2}(n+1)$$

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This entails a form of higher-order uniform interpolation. So one way of furthering the study of this problem lies in studying these higher order properties and checking whether they still hold.

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For example, what should be equivalent to:

$$\exists x \, \epsilon(\phi, x)$$

in intuitionistic logic, where ϕ is any formula?

Some considerations on this were already made by Pitts:

Unfortunately, it appears that not all the results for second order logic reported here generalize to the setting of higher order logic. Whilst it is the case that Theorem 1 remains true if IpC is replaced by a quantifier-free fragment of intuitionistic higher order logic, the substitution property of Lemma 8 fails (so that one does not get an interpretation of full higher order logic in its quantifier-free fragment). It remains an open question whether every Heyting algebra can be the Lindenbaum algebra of a theory in intuitionistic higher order logic.

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Higher-Order Uniform Interpolation

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There is still much work to be done to understand how these quantifiers can be added freely, given they must often be Pitts-like quantifiers.

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Our short to medium term goals will be to find answers to some reasonable sounding problems:

1. Whether every chain arises as the truth values of a topos;
2. How to prove the higher-order uniform interpolation property above;
3. Several challenges lie in understanding the connection between quantifiers, Heyting algebras, and higher order logics.

Thank you!
Questions?