

(working title) Control mechanisms for working with consultants

Roel Peters
Antwerp Management School

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Abstract

Keywords:

1 Introduction

2 Relevancy

1. Trend: external > internal
2. Price of consultants
3. Hot topic: *when* to rely on consultants?
4. Productivity: is it worth it? If so, under what circumstances?
5. Job market & macro-economic aspects
6. Recent news in BE/NL

3 State of the literature

3.1 What is digital consultancy?

3.1.1 Definitions

Consultancy

Management Consultancy

IT Consultancy

Digital Consultancy

Contingent Workforce

Freelancer

Outsourcing Outsourcing is the practice of obtaining goods or services from an external provider, as a substitute for sourcing it internally (Lacity & Willcocks 2012, 2). Although Willcocks & Choi (1995, 68-69) focuses specifically on IT outsourcing (infra), most outsourcing arrangements can be located on four spectra: * Focus: control through contract

vis-à-vis results through trust and partnership * Time-scale: short-term vis-à-vis long-term * Criticality of the relationship: low vis-à-vis high * Mindset: contract out vis-à-vis strategic alliance

IT Outsourcing

Business Process Outsourcing

Total Outsourcing Definition at Willcocks & Choi (1995, 67).

According to Willcocks & Choi (1995, 70-71), “the difference in mind-set that is often thought to be required as IT outsourcing decisions become more ‘total’ in their coverage, has many similarities to the espoused need for mind-set changes for managers working in long-term strategic alliances.”

Furthermore, since working with consultants holds a risk of moral hazard (infra), maintenance and enforcement are aspects that need to be taken into account. Typically, total outsourcing relations don’t rely on trust mechanisms solely and are accompanied by contractual governance measures.

Total outsourcing entails some risks (Willcocks & Choi (1995) 77). Organizations need to be wary of the balance shifting in favor of the vendor, unless clients maintain some countervailing leverages to support the basis of their partnership.

Knowledge-intensive business service

- Contingent workforce
- Freelance
- IT Outsourcing
- Business Process Outsourcing
- Total Outsourcing
- Knowledge-intensive business services

3.1.2 Emergence

See (Armbrüster 2006, 120-130)

3.1.3 Why digital consultancy? A practical perspective

Turner (1982) provides a hierarchy of consulting purposes. The first five are traditionally associated with consultancy, while the last three are seen as by-products, and often not as explicit goals.

1. Provide requested information
2. Provide solution to given problem
3. Conduct diagnosis that may redefine problem
4. Provide recommendations
5. Assist implementation. This is not without controversy, as traditionally, some argued that “one who helps put recommendations into effect takes on the role of manager and thus exceeds consulting’s legitimate bounds.” Also, “a frequent dilemma for experienced consultants is whether they should recommend what they know is right or what they know will be accepted.”
6. Build consensus and commitment
7. Facilitate client learning
8. Improve organizational effectiveness

If we go from consultancy, in general, to IT consultancy, it is essential to understand that over the past decades, their possible roles and variety of responsibilities have expanded drastically. Swanson (2010, 20-25) has described five different ways how consultants can contribute to an organization’s innovation process through IT.

- *Business strategy*: IT consultancy can lead the organization to new pursuits and technologies they wouldn’t have discovered themselves. Second, IT consultancy can frame the need for innovation in strategic terms, and they prepare and legitimize the need for change.
- *Technology assessment*: IT consultancy can facilitate the comprehension of IT technologies and its alternatives.

- *Business process improvement*: Innovations that involve IT usually come to fruition only after business processes have been revamped. Business process changes usually require an outside-in view and offer rich opportunities for consulting.
- *Systems integration*: In many cases, introducing a new technology requires that it needs to be integrated with existing systems and users need to be onboarded. This type of IT consultancy usually requires coding skills, hands-on design and implementation expertise
- *Business support services*: Finally, once the implementation is completed, it can take a while before the solution is entirely assimilated. IT consultants can provide complementary IT services such as support and maintenance until the technology is entirely embedded in the organization.

See also (Bessant & Rush 1995).

In their 1994 study, for which they interviewed over 100 decision, Lacity et al. (1994, 10-17) group expectations with regards to outsourcing into four categories: financial, business, technical and political expectations.

3.1.4 Financial expectations

- Reducing costs
- Improving cost controls
- Restructuring IT budgets

3.1.5 Business expectations

- Focusing on core activities
- Facilitating mergers & acquisitions
- Starting-up a company

3.1.6 Technical expectations

- Improving technical service
- Accessing talent & technologies

3.1.7 Political expectations

Yup.

3.1.8 Knowledge transfer & diffusion

Return to Turner (1982).

Something about knowledge transfer here (Sturdy et al. 2009).

Nevertheless, there are constraints to knowledge transfer. According to Cohen & Levinthal (1990, 128-129), “the ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge is largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge [such as] basic skills, or even a shared language but may also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments in a given field. [...] These abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm’s *absorptive capacity*.”

There is substantial research on knowledge management (as a multidisciplinary discipline within the field of information science) and knowledge transfer (as a broad topic within the discipline). Furthermore, there seems to be some academic interest in knowledge transfer in a principal-agent context (Nan 2008, Haines & Goodhue 2003), as is the case with between an organization and their contingent workforce. This research could be key in steering and narrowing the scope of the research.

3.2 Why digital Consultancy: a theoretical perspective

According to Armbrüster (2006, 3-6), the theoretical perspectives on consultancy can be broken down into two main categories and corresponding streams of literature. The first one is the functionalist view, which sees consultants as “carriers and transmitters of management knowledge.” The second perspective argues that the functionalist perspective is too narrow in scope to grasp consulting projects: client-consultants interactions are open to distortions, and understanding them requires research. This is known as the critical view.

Altijd de link terugleggen naar PA-problemen. RBV: no knowledge transfer no success
TC: no lower transactions when no transfer

<Unsure if this part should be expanded, or even in the final paper> Nevo et al. (2007, 8-10) outlines five theoretical frameworks that contribute to the question why firms should

(not) utilize external IT capabilities.

- The *resource-based view* (RBV) claims that firms can earn sustainable above-normal returns by possessing rare and valuable resources and that they have isolating mechanisms that prevent the dissemination of those resources.
- The *micro-economic* view assumes that firms operate in fully competitive markets and, contrary to RBV, that above-normal returns are competed away by rivals or new entrants. Utilizing IT and external capabilities is simply a matter of delivering the optimal quantity of products and their prices.
- *Transaction cost economics* claims that firms are interested in identifying areas in which they can outperform market-based interactions and do themselves. The commodity-like nature of IT solutions make them very prone to being outsourced to consultants.
- *Institutional theory* does not reject the micro-economic theory that firms try to make rational choices, but acknowledges that there are cognitive and rational constraints. Consequently, the choice for internal or external capabilities involves trust, relationships, personal beliefs and aspirations.
- *Identification theory*: Individuals derive value and meaning from group membership. This can impact the involvement of external actors for IT projects in a negative way.

See also (Armbrüster 2006, 66)

3.2.1 Transaction cost economics

Canback (1998, 31) does a solid job explaining the role of transaction costs, and how consultants fit into that picture. “As companies strive to reduce the production costs by exploiting scale and scope economies, they must specialise – which in turn leads to a need for internal coordination. If transaction costs did not exist, then the largest company in each market would also be the most profitable company, since coordination between functions could be achieved without effort. But because of transaction costs, this does not happen.” The result is that blue-collar jobs disappear as production costs are reduced, while white-collar jobs, aimed at coordination, do not.

Since managers are only boundedly rational, the assumption is that there is a high demand for advice and (IT) solutions that improve coordination within and between firms.

Services in which consultants are particularly well-versed. The question to ask here is: is the transaction cost for working with external consultants lower than for working with internal consultants when it comes to knowledge production?

Canback (1998, 37-44) argues it does. According to his interpretation of transaction cost economics, the choice depends on three factors.

1. The degree of asset specificity: do physical, human or site assets have a specific usage and can they not be put to use for another purpose? Higher asset specificity leads to internalization, since no vendor is willing to tailor his product or service to one client, facing downward price pressure, since the latter acts as a monopsonist (?, 218-228).
2. Uncertainty: business cycle volatility and technical uncertainty lead to more coordination and bureaucratic transactions since it is hard and expensive to work with contracts that cover a wide range of contexts and possible outcomes. Consequently, uncertainty leads to internalization.
3. The frequency of transactions: if transactions are frequent, there will be a higher bureaucratic cost involved, once again leading to a tendency to internalize the good or service.

Canback (1998, 37) argues that it's mainly human asset specificity that favor using consultants, since their assignments typically have a human low asset specificity, since the solution or advice can be reproduced at many organizations. While it is true that consultancy assignments involve relatively few transactions (often a single one), Canback claims that transaction frequency and uncertainty are less of an influence, obscuring the fact that consultants rather thrive in a context with high complexity and uncertainty.

Argument via Williamson & Godfrey: it's about behavioral uncertainty.

Nevo et al. (2007, 16-17) concludes that his research supports the transaction cost hypothesis: "when the internal IT capability is weak, developing and implementing an IT solution is likely to cost more compared with hiring external IT consultants to do the same job." Furthermore, the reverse situation also supports the identification theory: "IT consultants will not receive the legitimacy they require [...] if their knowledge and expertise do not differ from that possessed by the in-house IT team. Under these circumstances, external IT consultants' impact on IT productivity is expected to be lower."

Nevertheless, there is a serious limitation in the work of Nevo et al. (2007). An IT project is assumed to be fixed in time, with fixed parameters. It does not account for “vendor learning” (Wu et al. 2004) during the project. Cha et al. (2009) tackles this shortcoming with a model built around two parameters:

1. (production) knowledge transfer rate: the ability of the client to capture knowledge from the vendor.
2. (coordination) knowledge depreciation rate: the ability of the client to retain coordination knowledge as it outsources IT activities.

They conclude that firms with a low production knowledge transfer rate (e.g. unmotivated employees) should insource or outsource all their IT capabilities. When they also have a high coordination knowledge depreciation rate (e.g. bad project management), insourcing is the only option. On the other hand, when both the production knowledge transfer and coordination knowledge depreciation rate are high, the optimal rate of IT outsourcing is also high.

See also (Armbrüster 2006, 12-14), (Canback 1999).

3.2.2 Resource-based View

In Willcocks & Plant (2003, 177-180), four types of sourcing options for developing IT projects are outlined, of which three involve consultants.

1. Internal development: has the the advantage of internalization of the learning outcomes, but comes with high costs related to mistakes and being the first mover.
2. Outsourcing: has the advantage of tapping into existing knowledge and experience, and the ability to get quickly up to speed. However, internalization of learning outcomes is not guaranteed, and consultants may not be familiar with existing organizational processes. For example, the development of an internal application by an external party.
3. Insourcing/partnering: has the same advantages as outsourcing, with the added bonus of facilitating the internalization of the learning outcomes. The disadvantage is mostly related to a more complex project management, with a variety of parties involved.

For example: long-term contracts with IT consultants who operate side-by-side with an organization's own staff.

4. Cheap-sourcing: when IT projects are low risk, and far from the core business, and organization should consider cheap-sourcing. This option involves low investments and effort, but also comes with no internal learning. For example: development of a new promotional website by a digital agency.

In the same research paper, Willcocks & Plant (2003, 188-189) identify two congruent four-quadrant matrices to assess sourcing options.

- By business activity: non-critical, commoditized applications should be out-sourced. Critical, commoditized applications should be insourced or built in-house, and differentiating, critical applications should be built in-house or acquired.
- By market comparison: A high-cost, low-quality market leads to in-house development, while a high-cost, high-quality market should lead to insourcing. A low-cost, low-quality market leads to cheap-sourcing and a low-cost, high-quality market is perfect for outsourcing.

3.2.3 Identification Theory

The research by Schwarz & Watson (2005, 311-313) claims that it matters *who* implements an IT project: “technology-enabled inertia can be explained through understanding an employee’s social identifications and his or her associated cognitions, where inertia exists on a sliding scale of change.” By defending their self-image, low-status groups can hinder the implementation of an application. The sourcing assessment needs to incorporate this finding.

3.2.4 Embeddedness Theory

(Armbrüster 2006, 14-16)

3.2.5 Sociological neoinstitutionalism

A theory that is systematically drawn upon (Armbrüster 2006, 6-8) is sociological neoinstitutionalism. It is based on the argument that the belief in efficiency of certain practices

or solutions drives economic actions, rather than the proven efficiency. The result is that large consultancies have been described as carriers, not only of knowledge, but of legitimacy too. After all, it's their analyses that validate management decisions.

Clearly, this view is mainly appropriated by the critical view since it raises doubts about the efficient outcomes on the practice of consultancy.

3.2.6 Signaling Theory

Another theory that falls in the camp of the critical view is that of economic signaling theory (Armbrüster 2006, 8-10). Unlike sociological institutionalism, it treats the economic actors as experienced and knowledgeable, and not as part of an institution. Signaling theory argues that in uncertain markets, suppliers invest in features that signal status, quality and reliability. In consulting this translates into degrees, certificates, using the adequate buzzwords, wearing a suit and driving a quality car.

Sociological neoinstitutionalism argues that legitimacy-seeking behavior leads to inefficient market outcomes, while signaling theory argues the opposite.

4 Problem statement

Organizations employing the services of a contingent workforce, like digital consultants, should always be aware of principal-agent problems arising from information asymmetries. This is caused by the fact that a transaction between a vendor and a buying organization involves the delivery of services in the future. As a result, opportunism is always lurking around the corner.

Two types of opportunism can be identified Clark (1993, 242):

1. Ex ante: Pre-contractual opportunism or adverse selection
2. Ex post: Post-contractual opportunism or moral hazard

Hiring consultants for digital services deserves a dedicated scope, because of the following five properties that make it very prone to opportunism (Leslie & Mary 1995, 207).

1. Information technology evolves rapidly. Consequently, it involves a high degree of uncertainty. (ex ante)

2. The underlying economics of IT changes rapidly, making it hard to evaluate the consultant's contribution. (ex post)
3. IT has penetrated all business functions. It is hard to isolate it from organizational functions (ex post)
4. The cost of switching providers are often significant. For example: some consultants have exclusivity for implementing a certain solution. (ex post)
5. Clients might be very inexperienced with regards to IT (and outsourcing it). This puts them at a disadvantage for selecting and evaluating a consultant (ex ante, ex post).

4.1 Adverse Selection

Adverse selection is associated with the client's inability to determine the client's capabilities with regards to the assignment. This analogous to Akerlof's "Lemons problem" (1970): due to the information asymmetry, clients don't want to pay more than the average price for consultants within a certain niche. While consultants of below-average quality ("lemons") benefit from this average price, above-average consultants will not want to compete, and are crowded out.

(Armbrüster 2006, 69-75) outlines various reasons for quality uncertainty and groups them in two categories.

Category 1: Formal institutional uncertainty

- Consulting is an unbounded profession.
- Consulting is an unbounded industry.
- Consulting has unbounded service lines and product standards.

Category 2: Transactional Uncertainty

- Confidentiality
- Product intangibility
- Interdependent cooperation

The economic barriers to entry (Fee et al. 2004, 463) in IT consultancy (and consultancy in general) are few to none. Anyone with experience in a specific field, sector or technology

can wrap it as advice and sell it to whoever wants to hear it. Furthermore, the author of this paper is unaware of legal barriers to entry.

According to some, assessing the quality of consultants is impossible. For example, according to Bloomfield & Danieli (1995, 40), “there can be no presumed separation between technical skills and political skills, and no ranking between the two in terms of their importance for consultancy practice and the development of IT in user organizations.” Furthermore, Bettencourt et al. (2002, 101-102) states that for knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) to succeed, a lot depends on the client. “Client co-production roles [...] are emergent, multi-faceted, and highly collaborative because clients themselves possess much of the knowledge and competence that a KIBS firm needs to successfully deliver its service solution.”

For evaluating (future) performance of consultants, one has to rely on informal and relational criteria (Wright & Kitay 2002, 277). According to Clark (1993, 250), “the main trust-producing mechanism [...] is the ‘closed’ social structure; a form of individual trust. The formal, institutional-based, trust-producing mechanisms are weak. It is the contractual guarantees, and the history of past transactions underlying reputation, which overcome the potential effects of adverse selection and moral hazard.”

Especially in a situation where past transactions are absent, “management consultancies must convey in some way to their clients that they have something valuable to offer. [...] consultants are able to take control of the process by which impressions and perceptions of their service are created. By managing the creation of these images consultants are able to persuade clients of their value and quality. Management consultancies are therefore ‘systems of persuasion’ *par excellence* and impression management is not external to the core of their work but is at its core.” (Clark & Salaman 1998, 35)

In the existing literature, these remarks are part of a critical paradigm regarding consultants (Armbrüster 2006, 4-5). Authors point to the contestable nature of consulting, the self-interest of consultancy firms, and the stretching of consultancy advice.

See also:

- (Wright & Kitay 2002)
- (David et al. 2013)

- (O'Mahoney & Sturdy 2016)

Why does digital consultancy require a separate study? - Due to long-term involvement in huge projects, can take long for reputational info to spread and kick in - Vendor is tech-savvy & can manipulate online reputation

4.2 Moral Hazard

See (Armbrüster 2006, 72-73).

Why does digital consultancy require a separate study? - Work from home - Complexity lends itself to hiding fuckups. - Digital evolves quickly

- Vergelijking maken met andere soorten consultancies.

4.3 Governance Measures

Several mechanisms have already been proposed. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230362994_12

4.3.1 Psychological contract obligations

According to Ang et al. (2004, 357), the legal interpretation of an IT outsourcing contract is too limited. Instead, they claim that the construct of a *psychological contract* is more appropriate for analyzing the relationship between an IT service supplier and customer. The strength of psychological contract theory is threefold:

1. it focuses on mutual obligations;
2. the emphasis is on psychological obligations;
3. the emphasis is on the individual level—not on the organizations as parties of the contract.

Consequently, the psychological contract not only comprises the legal contract, but also the unwritten promises, interpersonal relations, and the individual interpretations and perceptions. Since consultancy contracts can become extremely complex (with project

descriptions going into the ten thousands of words), and the involved parties entangled in multiple ways, these intangible aspects can gain prominence. The research in Ang et al. (2004, 369-70) outlines several psychological contract obligations that positively impact the success of an outsourced IT project.

- On the supplier side: (1) clear authority structures, (2) knowledge transfer by educating the customer, (3) building inter-organizational teams.
- On the customer side: (1) clear specification of requirements, (2) prompt payment, and (3) project ownership and monitoring.

Closely related is the work by Willcocks & Kern (1997, 9-13) that makes a distinction between the contractual level and the cooperative level. The contractual level is about payment for the exchange of services and the transfer of assets, information & consultants. The cooperative level involves formal communication mechanisms; personal investments in time, resources & knowledge; mutual goals & objectives and social bonds. The atmosphere surrounding the former is heavily impacted by developments at the latter. A respondent in Willcocks & Kern (1997, 9) states that “the contract is a bit like a nuclear deterrent. You need one and you have got to have a framework, but if you’ve got to use it you are probably in trouble.”

4.3.2 Reputation

See (Armbrüster 2006, 76)

Clark (1993, 243-244) asked 55 respondents about the factors that are important when choosing an executive search & selection consultancy. “Reputation of individual consultants” and “reputation of the consultancy” are in the top three factors. This reputation often arises from “a history of past transactions with individual consultants. Frequent transactions between consultants and clients leads to familiarity which underpins the latter’s assessment of the former.” In other words, because finding a new consultants implies a search cost (Wilson 2012, 1072), incumbent consultants are expected to receive new contracts as long as the cost incurred from a potential sub-optimal performance is lower than the search cost of finding a new consultant.

According to Nayyar (1990, 516) “reputation performs as an implicit contract. It is enforced by the seller’s concerns about future demand for the service provided. [...] reputation is likely to exhibit characteristics of a public good. Once acquired, it can be user over and over again in the context of other services or markets.”

I need a definition of reputation, and also some research on how reputation can be faked.

4.3.3 Regulation

Three sources of regulation can be identified (Clark (1993) 246-247):

Government Initiated Codes See Sturdy (2021, 3-4)

Self-imposed Sectoral Codes See Sturdy (2021, 4)

Contractual Obligations Lacity & Willcocks (2012, 4) describes that there is substantial evidence that positive outsourcing outcomes are associated with:

- more detailed contracts with regards to scope, service levels, responsibilities and adaption to change;
- shorter-term contracts;
- high-value contracts.

4.3.4 Formalised Transactional Contracting (Purchasing Regulation)

See Sturdy (2021, 4-5)

4.3.5 Third-party Assessors

Zucker (1985, 57-62) describes the rise of the “social overhead sector” in the 20th century. This sector acts as an “intermediary” in a variety of situations: stock brokers, real estate agents, banks, etc. The same principle can be applied to consultants: assessment by a third-party agency can prevent adverse selection.

See (Armbrüster 2006, 76-77),

4.3.6 Whistleblowing

Also media.

4.3.7 Incentivization

4.3.8 Specific Commitment

See Sturdy (2021, 12)

4.3.9 Hostage-taking and contingent fees

When there are no trust-related nor legal enforcement mechanisms, parties can be discouraged from forming long-term relationships. According to Werner & Keren (1993, 47-48), “hostages” are used in situations where rational behavior would lead to sub-optimal outcome, in the Paretoian sense. In game theoretical terms, hostage-taking is used to prevent defecting behavior.

In terms of the subject of this paper, “hostages” could come in the form of contingent fees. See (Clark 1993, 243)

5 Research Questions

Abstractie maken van zaken zoals cultuur, bedrijfsgrootte, etc. Link met HR & internaliseren van externen, externe kennis.

- 1a. Why do Belgian firms rely on digital consultants? 1b. What are inhibitors & enablers for success of digital consultants? 1c. Definition of success
2. Do Belgian firms see PA problems with digital consultants?
3. Which control mechanisms do Belgium firms have in place with regards to adverse selection and moral hazard of digital consultants?
4. Which control mechanisms positively impact success of engaging with a consultancy firm?

Research questions for side projects:

1. Why do people join a consultancy firm or become an independent consultant?
2. Do reputational effects exist on the individual consultant level or on the firm level?

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