

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

Key Authentication





- Public Key Distribution:
 - How do you trust the source of the PK?
 - Potential for attacks
- Certification Authorities (CAs)
 - Keys are signed by the state, the corporation or someone you trust.
- Distribution of Trust
 - Your trust in a key is replaced by trust in a body, the CA

Certification Authorities

- With all public key schemes (for encryption or signature), we have the problem of distributing PK so the recipient knows it is valid.
- Solution: *All choose a CA and get a copy of the CA's public signature verification key by some trusted means.*
- Note: All users **must** trust the CA

Certificates

- Every user submits their PK to the CA. The CA concatenates: *user name, user PK, expiry date, etc.* and generates a signature on this data string.
- The combination of data string and signature is called a *Public Key Certificate*. This is sent back to user.
- Anyone with CA's PK can verify the users' PK certificate and so obtain a trusted copy of the users' PK.



Cross-Certification

- If more than one CA exist, then a user may not have a trusted copy of the CA's PK needed to verify another user's certificate.
- This is solved by *cross-certificate*, i.e. one CA's PK is signed by another CA.
- The user first verifies the appropriate cross-certificate, and then verifies the user certificate itself.

Example

- Alice trusts CA1.
 - She obtains Bob's PK which is signed by the SK of CA2.
 - She obtains CA2's PK which is signed by the SK of CA1.
- Hence, she trusts Bob's PK.

Registration & RA's


- When a user wishes to be issued with a certificate the identity of the user needs to be established.
- This is the role of the registration authority (RA), which can be co-implemented with the CA.
- User must also prove he/she knows the SK corresponding to the PK being certified and that the key was generated “correctly”.

Revocation

- If a user's PK is compromised, i.e. a third party has gained knowledge of the SK then the corresponding PK must be *revoked*.
- The CA must somehow inform all users that the certificate(s) containing this PK is/are no longer valid.
- This is called *certificate revocation*.

Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

- A CRL is a way of telling users about revoked certificates.
- A CRL is a list of the serial numbers of all the certificates revoked by a particular CA, signed by the CA concerned.
- Users must ensure that they have the latest CRL.
- A CRL is a bit like the list of bad credit card numbers which used to be kept next to the tellers in supermarkets.



<https://securityboulevard.com/2020/07/crl-explained-what-is-a-certificate-revocation-list/>

What's in a PKI?

- Public-key cryptography.
- Certification authorities.
- Digital certificates.
- Registration authorities.
- ...

More generally, PKI's may contain a combination of personnel, policies, protocols, hardware, software, PK cryptography tools, and services to provide security for communications over an insecure network, such as the Internet. Different PKI's exist for different application domains.

Certificate Access

- PK certificates will typically be stored in repositories and accessed as required.
- Certificate repositories may be separated from the CA which generates them.
- The certificates DO NOT need to be stored securely.

Certificate Repositories in Chrome

The image shows the Chrome Settings - Security page with the search term 'certificate'. The 'Certificates' section is expanded, showing a list of Trusted Root Certification Authorities. A detailed view of a specific certificate is shown on the right.

Trusted Root Certification Authorities Table:

Issued To	Issued By	Expiration	Friendly Name
Baltimore CyberTrust...	Baltimore CyberTrust ...	13/05/2025	DigiCert Baltimor...
Certum CA	Certum CA	11/06/2027	Certum
Certum Trusted Ne...	Certum Trusted Netw...	31/12/2029	Certum Trusted ...
Class 3 Public Prima...	Class 3 Public Primary ...	2/08/2028	VeriSign Class 3 ...
COMODO RSA Cert...	COMODO RSA Certific...	19/01/2038	Sectigo (formerl...
Copyright (c) 1997 ...	Copyright (c) 1997 Mi...	31/12/1999	Microsoft Timest...
DigiCert Assured ID...	DigiCert Assured ID R...	10/11/2031	DigiCert
DigiCert Global Roo...	DigiCert Global Root CA	10/11/2031	DigiCert
DigiCert Global Roo...	DigiCert Global Root G2	15/01/2038	DigiCert Global R...

Certificate Information Dialog:

General | Details | Certification Path

Certificate Information

This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s):

- Proves your identity to a remote computer
- Ensures software came from software publisher
- Protects software from alteration after publication
- Protects e-mail messages
- Ensures the identity of a remote computer
- Allows data to be signed with the current time

Issued to: DigiCert Global Root CA

Issued by: DigiCert Global Root CA

Valid from: 10/11/2006 **to:** 10/11/2031

Issuer Statement

OK

Trusted Third Party (TTP)

- CA's and RA's are examples of third parties who users must trust in some way.
- Such entities are generically referred to as trusted third parties (TTP's).
 - TTP's may even know the user secret key in some network systems


PKI Examples



- X.509/PKIX
- PGP (Web of Trust)



X.509



- X.509 defines a structure for PK Certificates.
- A CA assigns a unique name to each user and issues a signed certificate, often name is the URL or email address.
- CA's are connected in a tree structure. Each CA issues a certificate for those beneath it.



X.509 Certificate Structures











PKI Trust Models

- Monopoly Model
- Oligarchy
- Delegated CA's
- Anarchy

Monopoly Model


- There is only one universally trusted CA.
- Very hard in practice.

Oligarchy

- Commonly used in browsers.
- Products come configured with many trust anchors, and a certificate issued by any one of them is accepted.

Delegated CA's

- CA can issue certificates to other CA's vouching for their PK's and vouching for their trustworthiness as CA's.
- Users can then obtain certificates from one of the delegated CA's instead of having to go to the *trust anchor* CA.
- There is a *chain of certificate* that is visible to user in this model.



Anarchy

- No centralised CA
- Used by PGP.
- Each user is responsible for configuring some trust anchors, eg. PK's of people he has met and who have handed him a business card with a PGP fingerprint (the message digest of the PK).