

SSL/TLS

SSL/TLS: Background

- SSL was originated by Netscape in 1994.
- TLSv1.0 ~ SSLv3.1, and very close to SSLv3.
- TLSv1.2 is specified by RFC 5246.
- TLSv1.3 is specified by RFC 8446.

SSL/TLS: Applications

- Web security (or HTTPS)
- VPN (e.g., CISCO AnyConnect)
- Internet of Things
- E-Commerce
- 5G

.....



Secure

<https://example.com>



[illegible]

```

m1Hrn0i8vY3j3sNC5KandpY2VydC5jb2b0vRG1naUN1cnRUTFN5U0FTSEYtYNTyMDIw
j0QELtQUyY3j3sMD4G1uIdIAQ3MDUuWkYgZ4EMAQICMcKwJwYIKwYBBQUHAgEWG2h0
j4HA6Ly93d3cuZGlnalNlcnQuY29tL0NQQUzB/BggrBgEFBQcBAQoZmHEwJAYIKwYB
BQUHMAAGGGGh0dHA6Ly9vY3MwLmRpZ2Z1JXZ0RlmlVbTBjBggrBgEFBQcAwY9aHR0
cDovL2NhY2VydHMuZGlnalNlcnQuY29tL0R0P2Z1D2XJ0VExTUjNBUB0hBMjUzMjAy
MEBMS0x0LmlydDAjBgNVHRMEAjAAMIIBfYKKwYBBAHwEQUIEAgSCAW4EggGqAwGAdw
Ct9776fP8QyIudPZwePhhqtGcpXc+xDCTKhYY069yCigAAAX8uDbEFAAAEAwBI
MEYCIQC+euD4ByGUTRp8IcnVc+XV6o9AHYQODF-jbFIKz8yjI-FAIHANFZaiIYe7Sw
d+qxeLpVt5Prge0p244GA0iRb8Rn40IvAHYANc8ZG7+xbFe/D61MbULLu7YnICZR
6j/hKu+oAM71kWBAAF/Lg2w+QAABAMARzBFa1EAYjtZ1UKEIdclK2i4HE+DPCZR
6w38+kx0YT+15DEBfBgCIEZ4egYH8c108tcqVc2EVTRoRF1FgxAT0T5Wlpy9PU7e
AHUAs3N3B+GEUPhJhtYFqdwRCUPl5LbFnDAuH3PADDNk2pZ0AAAF/Lg2xKwAABAMA
RjBEAIAmmaSvqeQ8YD5CGHXq6fZvH9j2aSOymR359gdACHfmQIgwMSMDiak1slJgh
W5nKnVsz0fMtj7BTF1x0Uan898dBusEwDQYK6oZThvcNAQELBQADggEBAB49fjgv
L8KG3NSZNRcmckCpea1EzzerAqCjMuxaqYh0pckx9bMz/ezC53F14VJWh11/yJ
Me8whnC11peau0QhWd9cWd1SbcthsAXCji3De0vJAvJtIC1UJEx9STzUXC(NamD++L+
aPjgbTQHFfokSweUt0IdKFrCgbUXEd8TZqnUUV8DX321BWVLWnJp/5u6Ee1xT9/V
fj8Iq/QRzzIGVjgRxd/91b+xD6c9/2KPH0hEP7kKBKokS0zk123i543WMBU1Ev
m714NUWjPp8Hm38geEtGnH76tzWPKvCgi2KdFaf78Z1ZnxgC/k/Rd/spUaV9hIv
naOK2usKQk9pJl0=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
subject=C = AU, ST = New South Wales, L = Wollongong, O = University of Wollongong, CN = uow.edu.au

issuer=C = US, O = DigiCert Inc, CN = DigiCert TLS RSA SHA256 2020 CA1

---
No client certificate CA names sent
Peer signing digest: SHA256
Peer signature type: RSA
Server Temp Key: ECDH, P-256, 256 bits
---
SSL handshake has read 3517 bytes and written 438 bytes
Verification: OK
---
New, TLSv1.2, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
Server public key is 2048 bit
Secure Renegotiation IS supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
No ALPN negotiated
SSL-Session:
    Protocol : TLSv1.2
    Cipher : ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
    Session-ID: DEA4C11FF2A8F5C347ED86BCD8711CC86422C00713AB6EFB2478A0D4AA016CDB
    Session-ID-ctx:
    Master-Key: 7CD9069C44AB38A65128761CF8F4E2C08DCAEC55CFBE8D00550BE94EAF8BD131007E142B900A56AB1ED17FBAEBEC8AC
    PSK identity: None
    PSK identity hint: None
    SRP username: None
    Start Time: 1662514978
    Timeout : 7200 (sec)
    Verify return code: 0 (ok)
    Extended master secret: yes
---

```

SSL/TLS Architecture




Figure 17.2 SSL Protocol Stack

SSL/TLS Architecture

SSL/TLS provides a reliable **end-to-end** security service by using TCP. It has two layers of protocols:

- **Record Protocol:** Provides basic security services to various higher-layer protocols (e.g. HTTP), and supports TLS management protocols.
- **Three management protocols:**
 - **The Change Cipher Spec Protocol:** Updates the cipher suite.
 - **The Alert Protocol:** Conveys TLS-related alerts to the peer entity.
 - **The Handshake Protocol:** Allow the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate encryption and MAC algorithms, together with secret keys used in an TLS record.

SSL/TLS Architecture

TLS connection

- A transport that provides a suitable type of service
- For TLS such connections are peer-to-peer relationships
- Connections are transient
- Every connection is associated with one session

TLS session

- An association between a client and a server
- Created by the Handshake Protocol
- Define a set of cryptographic security parameters which can be shared among multiple connections
- Are used to avoid the expensive negotiation of new security parameters for each connection

SSL/TLS Architecture

A **session state** is defined by:

- **Session Identifier.**
- **Peer Certificate:** An X509.v3 certificate of the peer.
- **Compression Method.**
- **Cipher Spec:** Specifies the encryption and hash algorithms.
- **Master Secret:** 48-byte secret shared between the client and server.
- **Is Resumable:** A flag showing if the session can be used to initiate new connections.

SSL/TLS Architecture

A **connection state** is defined by:

- **Server and Client Random.**
- **Server Write MAC Secret:** Server's key for computing MAC.
- **Client Write MAC Secret.**
- **Server Write Key:** Server's key for encrypting data.
- **Client Write Key.**
- **Initialization Vectors:** Indicates the IV, if CBC mode is used.
- **Sequence Numbers:** A value from 0 to $2^{64}-1$. Used in the MAC computation.

TLS Record Protocols

TLS Record Protocol provides two security services for application data:


■ Confidentiality:

- TLS payloads are encrypted by using symmetric encryption with a shared secret key
- AES, 3DES, RC4-128, ...

■ Message Integrity:


- A MAC is generated for TLS payloads with another shared secret key
- HMAC

TLS Record Protocol



TLS Record Protocol

Fig. 5.4 TLS Record Format




TLS Record Protocol

The Content Type:


- alert
- Handshake
- change_cipher_spec
- application data

TLS Record Protocol


TLS Record Protocol Payload




(a) Change Cipher Spec Protocol



(c) Handshake Protocol



(b) Alert Protocol



(d) Other Upper-Layer Protocol (e.g., HTTP)

TLS Record Protocol

■ Change Cipher Spec Protocol:

- Consists of a single message with the value 1.
- Used to copy the pending state into the current state so that the cipher suite is updated.

■ Alert Protocol:

- Used to convey TLS-related alerts to the peer entity.
- A number of Warning or Fatal alerts have been defined.

TLS Record Protocol

- each alert message consists of 2 fields (bytes)
- first field (byte): “warning” or “fatal”
- second field (byte):
 - fatal
 - unexpected_message
 - bad_record_MAC
 - decompression_failure
 - handshake_failure
 - illegal_parameter
 - ...
 - warning
 - bad_certificate
 - unsupported_certificate
 - certificate_revoked
 - certificate_expired
 - certificate_unknown
 - ...

Handshake Protocol

As the most complex part of TLS, the Handshake protocol allows the server and the client to finish the following tasks:

- **Agree on a version of TLS to be used;**
- **Authenticate each other (optional);**
 - Use digital certificates to learn the other's identity and public keys; issue and verify signatures.
- **Negotiate a set of cryptographic algorithms and shared keys to be used in the TLS record protocol.**

Handshake Protocol

The Handshake protocol consists of a number of messages exchanged between client and server. Each message has three fields:

- **Type (1 byte):** Indicates one of 10 messages.
- **Length (3 bytes):** The length of message in bytes.
- **Content (≥ 0 bytes):** The parameters associated with this message.



Handshake Protocol

To establish a logical connection between client and server, the Handshake protocol will run in four phases:

■ Phase 1: Establish Security Capabilities:

- Negotiate protocol version and algorithms

■ Phase 2: Server Authentication and Key Exchange:

- Server sends key exchange messages


■ Phase 3: Client Authentication and Key Exchange

- Client sends key exchange messages


■ Phase 4: Finish

- Switch to new algorithms and keys.

Handshake Protocol



Handshake Protocol



Handshake Protocol

- Key exchange methods supported by TLS1.2:
 - **RSA**: Client encrypt a secret with server's RSA public key.
 - **Anonymous DH**: No authentication (without certificates).
 - **Fixed DH**: Server has an authorized DH key, while client may or may not have an authorized DH key.
 - **Ephemeral DH**: Use one-time DH keys, which are signed by the senders using RSA or DSS.

Handshake Protocol

- ClientHello
 - Contain protocol version, client nonce as well as the client's list of preferred ciphersuites
- ServerHello
 - Contain chosen protocol version, server nonce as well as the chosen ciphersuite

Handshake Protocol

- Server Certificate
 - Required when server authentication is needed
 - X.509 certificate for one of the following type (depending on the key exchange method)
 - RSA Encryption Key
 - Fixed Diffie-Hellman Public Key
 - Digital Signature Public Key

Handshake Protocol

- Server Key Exchange
 - Required when Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman is used
 - The server's signature over the client random, server random, and Diffie-Hellman parameters is included
 - Not required when RSA key transport is used as the key exchange method

Handshake Protocol

- Client Key Exchange
 - Always included regardless of the key exchange method
 - RSA key transport: encryption of a random number under server's RSA public key
 - Diffie-Hellman key agreement: client's Diffie-Hellman key

Handshake Protocol

- Certificate Verify
 - Required when client has a certificate for RSA/DSS signature
 - Client signs all the handshake messages it has sent and received previously

Handshake Protocol

- Change Cipher Spec
 - A single-byte message to indicate that all future messages it sends will be encrypted and authenticated.
- Finished
 - A MAC calculated using the master secret key (derived from the key exchange) and the communication transcripts in the Handshake protocol

Handshake Protocol

■ Session resumption


It allows client and server to use an abbreviated handshake to resume a previously established session.

- More efficient than a full handshake
- Only to re-establish the encryption and MAC keys with **new** server nonce and client nonce

Handshake Protocol

- The key derived by an TLS key exchange method is called pre-master secret (48 bytes), which can be
 - a **secret** encrypted with server's RSA public key or
 - a **value** derived by the DH key exchange technique.
- pre-master secret → master secret → shared keys

SSL Key Derivation




PMS: Pre-Master Secret

MS: Master Secret

Nc: ClientHello.random

Ns: ServerHello.random

SSL Key Derivation



Key-block consists of (in the following order):

client write MAC secret, sever write MAC secret, client write key, server write key, client write IV, and server write IV.

TLS Key Derivation

Cryptographic computations by using PRF:


- Handshake protocol \rightarrow **pre_master_secret** \rightarrow **master_secret** \rightarrow **key-block**.
- **master_secret** = PRF(**pre_master_secret**, 'master secret',
client_random||server_random)
- **key-block** = PRF(**master_secret**, 'key expansion',
server_random||client_random)

TLS 1.3

- Static Diffie–Hellman and RSA key transport methods are removed
- All asymmetric key exchange algorithms in TLS 1.3 are based on ephemeral Diffie–Hellman to provide forward secrecy

TLS 1.3

- Unauthenticated ephemeral key exchange happens in the first two flows of the protocol
- A temporary 'handshake traffic key' is established to encrypt the remainder of handshake



Single lines denote plaintext flows; double lines denote encrypted flows using the handshake traffic key; triple lines denote encrypted flows using the application traffic key.

HTTPS

HTTPS (HTTP over SSL/TLS)

- use https:// rather than http://
and port 443 rather than 80
- encrypts
URL, document contents, form data, cookies, HTTP
headers