



Legislative Turnover Down Under 1946-2017: Trends and (some) Explanations

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
1. What is legislative turnover?
2. Why should we care?
3. Why Australia? Aim and context of today's presentation - research questions.
4. Legislative turnover at the assembly level.
5. Legislative turnover at the level of parties.
6. Next steps.

What is legislative turnover?




French elections 2017. Incumbents exiting

Source: National Assembly 2017




... and newcomers entering. New deputies in the French National Assembly 1946-2017



Source: Gougias, Maddens and Brans 2017

Legislative turnover French National Assembly 1946-2017



Source: Gouglas, Maddens and Brans 2017

Why should we care?



A political elite seismometer

- *“The governing elite is always in a state of slow and continuous*

transformation. It flows like

a river, never being today what it was yesterday”

Wilfredo Pareto 1916

“[elite composition] a seismometer for detecting shifts in the foundation of polities and politics”

Robert Putnam 1976

- *“Legislative turnover sets the upper limit of the transformation of the political elite”*

Mogens Pedersen 2000

A democratic thermometer (Crowther and Matonyte 2007). Democratic convalescence and more...

Descriptive representation and low turnover

“an anchor keeping the polity from moving to a more representative body”

Matland and Studlar (2004)

“arrogance, unresponsiveness and failure of competence” ...

“the dread disease of caesarism”

Lawson (1993)

Strength of legislatures and high turnover

“high rates of turnover can potentially harm the functioning of the parliament among others by breeding short-termism and instability

IPU (2012)

“shift power towards the executive branch”

Matland and Studlar (2004)

A policy barometer (Gouglas 2017)

- “a substantial influx of parliamentary ‘freshmen’ may introduce innovative policy ideas in parliament (Brunk & Mineheart, 1984)
- Although turnover “does not guarantee new policies”, it “makes them possible” (Brezinski and Huntington 1963)

An index of ...

**parliamentary
institutionalization**

- Polsby 1968

political opportunity

- Schlesinger 1966

How much turnover?

EXTENT OF ELITE CIRCULATION	INDICATION OF
95%	Complete or near to complete changes of political order (regime discontinuity)
 60%–80%?	
40%–60%	(1) Restricted systemic changes (e.g., changes of the electoral system) (2) Volatile elite structures linked to the transformation of the party system at large
20%–40%	Normal level of exchange
< 20%	Trend towards development of oligarchical structures

FIGURE 1. Levels of elite circulation

Kukllys (2013)

Source: adapted from Best, Hausmann and Schmitt (2000: 184–185).

Why Australia? My research at ANU-SPiR

Grant V437117N (FWO)



Replication of my PhD work on turnover in Western Europe 1945-2015. Global dataset

PhD Questions

- What explains LT in WE lower chambers 1945-2015?
- Do explanations differ by gender?
- How much turnover is there within and across political parties and why?

Australia


- What is the evolution of turnover in the Australian House of Representatives?
- What is the evolution of LT within parties?
- How can variability in turnover rates in the HoR and parties be explained?
- [Gender?]



Legislative turnover at the assembly level


- What is the evolution of turnover trends in time?
- How can variability in turnover rates be explained?

Legislative Turnover Trends: Australian House of Representatives 1946-2017




Source: Gouglas 2017


Nationaleirat Austria




Assemblée Nationale France




De Kamer/La Chambre Belgium




Camera dei Deputati Italy




Tweede Kamer Netherlands




Nationalrat / Conseil National / Consiglio Nazionale / Cussegl Nazional Switzerland



Riksdag Sweden



House of Commons UK



Source: Gougias,
Maddens, Brans
2017

Figure 3. Legislative turnover trends per chamber, 1945–2015. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Table 2. Descriptive legislative turnover statistics per country

Country	N	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Standard deviation
United Kingdom	18	20.7	7.9	39.6	8.4
Sweden	21	30.4	18.2	46.3	8.7
Austria	20	32.7	18.2	48.1	9.2
Belgium	21	33.5	10.4	58	12.9
Switzerland	18	36.6	29.5	44	4.4
Netherlands	20	37.5	18	52.7	10.7
France	17	41.9	21.8	76	11.7
Italy	17	46.9	30.8	74.1	11.6
Total	152	34.8	7.9	76	12.1


Australia:
24,8% →

Source: Gouglas, Maddens, Brans 2017

Matland & Studlar (2004) 1974-1994


Country	N (no. of elections)	Incumbency return rate (mean) %	Incumbency return rate (st. dev.)	Turnover per year %
United States	8	84.9	6.14	7.51
Australia	6	80.0	5.99	7.87
West Germany	3	78.7	3.60	5.77
Ireland	6	76.1	6.45	9.30
United Kingdom	4	75.7	1.51	5.58
Japan	6	74.9	6.29	7.77
Denmark	6	74.6	5.67	10.22
Sweden	6	74.1	3.77	8.63
New Zealand	5	72.5	7.74	9.17
Malta	3	71.5	5.49	5.55
Belgium	4	69.5	5.43	9.45
Iceland	4	66.4	8.27	10.47
Finland	4	65.0	2.97	9.03
Luxembourg	4	64.7	7.69	7.03
Italy	4	64.5	6.89	8.97
Greece	6	64.4	15.05	13.43
Switzerland	4	64.3	3.66	8.94
Israel	4	63.8	1.58	9.60
Netherlands	5	63.7	10.87	10.68
Austria	4	61.4	7.66	10.29
Norway	4	60.7	4.73	9.85
France	3	57.7	0.58	9.76
Spain	4	56.0	10.30	12.36
Portugal	5	54.8	8.84	19.10
Canada	4	53.1	21.25	13.01
Average		67.7		9.56

Legislative Turnover Trends: Australian House of Representatives 1946-2017



Source: Gouglas 2017


Supply & demand model of legislative turnover



Adapted from Norris
1997, Best & Cotta
2000

Legislative turnover

Factors explaining supply and demand



LT WE 1945-2015 (Gouglas, Maddens, Brans 2017)

<i>Model (4)</i>					
(Constant)	4.146	5.107		0.812	0.418
MP remuneration to GNI per head	0.887**	0.277	0.166	3.210	0.002
Duration of electoral term	0.009***	0.002	0.281	5.604	0.000
Strength of bicameralism	7.158***	1.780	0.277	4.022	0.000
Regional authority index	0.403***	0.107	0.232	3.765	0.000
Seats by leftist parties	-0.099	0.070	-0.078	-1.408	0.161
Gender quotas	4.602***	1.377	0.188	3.342	0.001
Electoral volatility	0.889***	0.105	0.504	8.505	0.000
Disproportionality	-0.059	0.160	-0.026	-0.368	0.713
Strength of personal vote	-0.778	1.797	-0.033	-0.433	0.666
District magnitude	0.031*	0.014	0.125	2.269	0.025

Notes: Dependent variable: Legislative Turnover. $R^2 = 0.298$ for model 1; $\Delta R^2 = 0.193$ ($p < 0.001$) for model 2; $\Delta R^2 = 0.187$ ($p < 0.001$) for model 3; $\Delta R^2 = 0.021$ ($p < 0.05$) for model 4. *Significant at 0.05 level; **significant at 0.01 level; ***significant at 0.001 level; two tailed test.

Causes of turnover Australian House of Representatives 1949-2010, N= 25

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	13,480			,314	,758
Opportunities	MP remuneration to GNI per head	5,823		,327	2,002	,065
	Length of legislative term	,026		,345	1,811	,092
	Regional authority index	-1,125		-,090	-,595	,561
	Increase in the size of the assembly	22,482		,533	,917	,002
Parties	Seats held by leftist parties	-,144		-,185	-,779	,449
Electoral alignments	Electoral volatility	1,618		,379	2,097	,055

a. Dependent Variable: Legislative turnover


R-square: 0,772

Adj.R-squ: 0,675

SDE: 6,66325

Quick & DIRTY

MP remuneration to GNI per head Australian House of Representatives 1959-2016




Legislative turnover at the party level


- What is the evolution of turnover trends in time?
- How can variability in turnover rates be explained?



Australian Labour Party 1946-2017



Liberal Party



National Party





Figure 1: A supply and demand model of legislative turnover within parties. Adapted from Gouglas, Maddens, Brans (2017b)



(some) causes of party MP turnover 1946-2017, N=84 (out of 118)

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
1					
(Constant)	4,235	10,905		,388	,699
Party strength	1,466	,505	,326	2,904	,005
Party age	-,106	,108	-,181	-,960	,326
Participation in previous government	-11,563	3,429	-,354	-3,378	,001
Party division	6,461	6,767	,02	,955	,343
Gender quota	2,378	6,587	,043	,361	,719
Liberal Party	-,569	5,904	-,016	-,096	,924
National Party	-,877	4,673	-,025	-,188	,852
Effective number of parties (votes)	10,184	4,682	,299	2,175	,033
Electoral system disproportionality	,145	,691	,022	,210	,835

a. Dependent Variable: Party MP turnover

R-square: 0,372

Adj.R-squ: 0,296

SDE: 13,74214

Next steps. **Your ideas welcome!**

- Collect the data for the 1901 – 1943 period
- Cross-validate all data with Patrick Leslie's
- Write a conference paper on Australia
- Examine if it is worth publishing a single case study on the basis of the Australian data
- Examine the potential for a comparative study on turnover in Westminster systems i.e. UK, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland or in Transferable Vote systems i.e Ireland, Malta

Thank you!

