

Relay attacks against the Mifare Desfire card

Experiments, results and limitations

IRISA
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
Outline

- 1 Timing : Specification and implementation
 - Specification : ISO14443 standard
 - Implementation
- 2 Relay Attacks
 - State Of Art
 - Off-the-shelf tools
 - Relay attack against the Mifare Desfire card
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ISO14443 standard : layers 3 and 4

Time constraints

- The protocol activation of ISO14443-4 A card ends with the transmission of the ATS response : 75 33 92 03 80 for example.
- This response contains valuable information used in the communication between the card and the reader.



Relevant time elements when doing relay attacks

- FWT : It defines the time within which a PICC shall start its response frame after the end of a PCD frame. It is calculated by the formula : $((256 * 16)/fc) * (2^{FWI})$
- S(WTX) : When the PICC needs more time than the defined FWT to process the received block it shall use an S(WTX) request for a waiting time extension.
- $FDT(PCD \rightarrow PICC)$: This time depends on the command, and it defines the minimum time between the last bit transmitted by the PCD and the first bit transmitted by the PICC.

Implementation

Time Constraints

- Response time : It defines the time between the last bit of the command and the first bit of the corresponding response received by the PCD. It is equal to $FDT(PCD \rightarrow PICC)$ when there are no other exchanges between the command and the response.
- Timeout : It defines the maximal value of the response time. When the reader embeds a PN53x chip, the timeout is calculated by the formula :
$$\text{Timeout} = FWT + 3 * (2^{FWI}) \text{ etu}$$

ACR122

$$\bullet \quad 528ms \leq \text{Timeout} \leq 778ms$$

Timeout = 5s, Delay = 5s, Response time = 5.028s

/ Start Date	/ Sender	Frame	Byte ..	Error	/ End Date	Duration	Timing	Protocol
7474467640 ns	PCD_A	REGA	1 byte		7474522040 ns	94 400 ns		14443
7474563130 ns	PCC_A	ATQA	2 bytes		7474642410 ns	186 280 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 87.4 µs	14443
7475489600 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		7475665140 ns	186 240 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 640.5 µs	14443
7475738390 ns	PCC_A	UD_GLR	5 bytes		7476192050 ns	433 660 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 87.4 µs	14443
7477492720 ns	PCD_A	SELECT	9 bytes		7478515660 ns	792 950 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.57 ms	14443
7478607190 ns	PCC_A	SAK	3 bytes		7478880930 ns	273 340 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 67.4 µs	14443
7479478800 ns	PCD_A	RATS	4 bytes		7479496960 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 607.6 µs	14443
7481301650 ns	PCC_A	ATS	8 bytes		7482090370 ns	696 520 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 1.56 ms	14443
7489529040 ns	PCD_A	I00	12 bytes		7493365680 ns	1 047 840 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 17.26 ms	14443
7502566490 ns	PCC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		7505218160 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 2.14 ms	14443
7504489300 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		7505218160 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.9 ms	14443
8279778910 ns	PCC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		8289137610 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.50 ms	14443
8282123940 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		8282491200 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	14443
8057042530 ns	PCC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		8057401210 ns	358 680 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.57 ms	14443
8059365440 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		8059754100 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	14443
8034306150 ns	PCC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		8034664320 ns	358 680 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.57 ms	14443
8036650280 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		8037018440 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	14443
10611699630 ns	PCC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		10611828530 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.57 ms	14443
10613913930 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		10614282080 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	14443
11388833370 ns	PCC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		11389192070 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.57 ms	14443
1139117750 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		11391545680 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	14443
12166096990 ns	PCC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		1216645690 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.57 ms	14443
12168441120 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		12168809280 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	14443
12529610710 ns	PCC_A	I00	5 bytes		12529654350 ns	443 640 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 360.62 ms	14443
1254043400 ns	PCD_A	S(DESELECT)	3 bytes		12540761600 ns	283 200 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 10.43 ms	14443
12541267350 ns	PCC_A	S(DESELECT)	3 bytes		12541541090 ns	273 740 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 526.53 µs	14443

SCL3711

- $\text{Timeout} \cong 158ms$

Timeout = 3.28s, Delay = 4s, Response time > 3.099

Start Date	/ Sender	Frame	Byte	Error	End Date	Duration	Timing	Protocol
5/06 483 520 ns	PCD_A	REQA	1 byte		5/06 577 920 ns	94 400 ns		14443
5/06 649 370 ns	PCC_A	ATQA	2 bytes		5/06 533 170 ns	188 300 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 87.2 µs	14443
5/06 720 400 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		5/06 228 940 ns	186 249 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 206.4 µs	14443
5/06 330 410 ns	PCC_A	UID[1..4]	5 bytes		5/06 344 050 ns	43 180 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 87.5 µs	14443
5/06 908 640 ns	PCD_A	SELECT	9 bytes		5/06 701 600 ns	792 960 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 1.17 ms	14443
5/05 773 110 ns	PCC_A	SAK	3 bytes		5/06 694 650 ns	273 740 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 87.1 µs	14443
5/06 729 920 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		5/06 628 160 ns	188 240 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 692.4 µs	14443
5/07 010 960 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		5/07 209 200 ns	188 240 ns		14443
5/01 292 040 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		5/01 490 280 ns	188 240 ns		14443
5/03 620 320 ns	PCD_A	REQA	1 byte		5/03 714 720 ns	94 400 ns		14443
5/03 766 190 ns	PCC_A	ATQA	2 bytes		5/03 974 950 ns	188 300 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 87.2 µs	14443
5/04 167 240 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		5/04 365 480 ns	186 240 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 206.4 µs	14443
5/04 437 150 ns	PCC_A	UID[1..4]	5 bytes		5/04 380 830 ns	413 800 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 87.4 µs	14443
5/06 045 440 ns	PCD_A	SELECT	9 bytes		5/06 638 400 ns	792 960 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 1.17 ms	14443
5/06 569 990 ns	PCC_A	SAK	3 bytes		5/07 183 750 ns	273 760 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 87.3 µs	14443
5/08 030 940 ns	PCD_A	RATS	4 bytes		5/08 452 900 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 908.6 µs	14443
5/09 877 310 ns	PCC_A	ATB	8 bytes		5/10 175 850 ns	686 540 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 1.54 ms	14443
5/16 239 440 ns	PCD_A	I0[0]	12 bytes		5/17 207 260 ns	1347 840 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 5.5 ms	14443
5/19 416 730 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		5/19 775 450 ns	358 220 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 2.15 ms	14443
5/20 175 240 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		5/20 543 400 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 409.4 µs	14443
5/05 209 690 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		5/05 564 410 ns	358 220 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 774.66 ms	14443
5/06 100 360 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		5/06 463 520 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 541.3 µs	14443
6/27 115 850 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		6/27 414 570 ns	358 220 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 774.66 ms	14443
6/27 997 120 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		6/27 365 280 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 532.1 µs	14443
7/44 012 790 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		7/44 371 490 ns	358 220 ns	FDT PCD to PCDC - 774.66 ms	14443
7/43 399 360 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		7/44 271 520 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PCDC to PCD - 541.4 µs	14443
8/216 352 920 ns	PCD_A	S/DESELECT	3 bytes		8/216 636 120 ns	283 200 ns		14443

MP300-TCL2

- $\text{Timeout} \cong 624\text{ms}$

Timeout=5s, Delay = 1s, R(NAK) after each 156ms = FWT, Reponse time = 1.020s

Start Date	/	Sender	Frame	Byte...	Error	End Date	Duration	Timing	Protocol
Protocol - 14443 - 16 items(s)									
4 839 002 600 ns		PCD_A	REQA	1 byte		4 839 097 000 ns	94 400 ns		14443
4 839 167 130 ns		PCC_A	A1QA	2 bytes		4 839 355 950 ns	188 790 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 86.8 μ s	14443
6 220 515 360 ns		PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		6 220 711 500 ns	191 220 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.28 μ s	14443
6 220 783 670 ns		PCC_A	UID CLK	5 bytes		6 221 227 330 ns	443 660 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 86.7 μ s	14443
6 221 349 200 ns		PCD_A	SELECT	9 bytes		6 222 142 120 ns	792 920 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 119.2 μ s	14443
6 222 212 210 ns		PCC_A	SAK	3 bytes		6 222 405 970 ns	273 790 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 97.4 μ s	14443
7 880 596 800 ns		PCD_A	RAT3	3 bytes		7 880 965 020 ns	368 140 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.674 μ s	14443
7 881 063 820 ns		PCC_A	ATR	1 byte		7 881 433 820 ns	369 370 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 3.84 μ s	14443
13 212 070 160 ns		PCD_A	R00	12 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	13 213 150 960 ns	1 047 280 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 5.32 μ s	14443
13 369 151 720 ns		PCD_A	R/NAK0	3 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	13 369 434 500 ns	283 200 ns		14443
13 526 440 820 ns		PCD_A	R/NAK0	3 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	13 526 726 000 ns	283 180 ns		14443
13 681 714 380 ns		PCD_A	R/NAK0	3 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	13 681 997 560 ns	283 180 ns		14443
13 838 024 200 ns		PCD_A	S0/SELECT	3 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	13 838 307 380 ns	283 180 ns		14443
13 994 317 580 ns		PCD_A	S0/SELECT	3 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	13 994 600 760 ns	283 180 ns		14443
14 254 035 010 ns		PCC_A	i00	2 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	14 254 482 670 ns	443 660 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 83.19 ms	14443

Omnikey3521

- $\text{Timeout} = \infty$

Timeout = default, Delay = 2s, Response Time = 2,069s

Start Date	/ Sender	Frame	Byte...	Error	End Date	Duration	Timing	Protocol
105 626 416 600 ns	PCD_A	I[1]0	64 bytes		105 627 210 040 ns	1 306 440 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 6.45 ms	14443
105 634 454 820 ns	PICC_A	RACK0	4 bytes		105 634 539 860 ns	85 040 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 6.64 ms	14443
105 635 683 360 ns	PCD_A	I[0]1	9 bytes		105 635 683 600 ns	198 240 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.15 ms	14443
105 637 783 460 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	5 bytes		105 637 869 660 ns	106 200 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 1.84 ms	14443
105 640 019 800 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	5 bytes		105 640 203 000 ns	113 200 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2.22 ms	14443
106 414 935 680 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	5 bytes		106 415 041 880 ns	106 200 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.7 ns	14443
106 416 318 240 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	5 bytes		106 416 431 520 ns	113 280 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.28 ms	14443
107 191 060 420 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	5 bytes		107 191 166 600 ns	106 180 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.59 ms	14443
107 192 324 800 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	5 bytes		107 192 438 080 ns	113 280 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.16 ms	14443
107 204 479 920 ns	PICC_A	I[0]1	6 bytes		107 204 607 360 ns	127 440 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 512.01 ms	14443
107 709 262 320 ns	PCD_A	I[1]0	64 bytes		107 709 628 760 ns	1 306 440 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 3.65 ms	14443
107 716 826 720 ns	PICC_A	RACK0	4 bytes		107 716 911 660 ns	84 940 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 7.15 ms	14443
107 717 973 240 ns	PCD_A	I[0]1	9 bytes		107 718 171 480 ns	198 240 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.06 ms	14443
107 720 045 680 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	5 bytes		107 720 151 860 ns	106 180 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 1.84 ms	14443
107 722 117 200 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	5 bytes		107 722 230 480 ns	113 280 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.97 ms	14443
108 496 963 180 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	5 bytes		108 497 069 380 ns	106 200 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.7 ms	14443
108 498 303 160 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	5 bytes		108 498 416 440 ns	113 280 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.23 ms	14443
109 273 045 280 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	5 bytes		109 273 151 460 ns	106 180 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 774.59 ms	14443
109 274 354 560 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	5 bytes		109 274 467 840 ns	113 280 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.2 ms	14443
109 788 527 260 ns	PICC_A	I[0]1	6 bytes		109 788 654 700 ns	127 440 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 514.02 ms	14443

Hancke : Relay attack on ISO14443 type A cards I

- Terminology :
 - Mole = fake reader, Proxy = fake tag.
 - Reader = legitimate reader, Card = legitimate tag.
- Tools :
 - They use dedicated hardware to make the mole and the proxy.
 - They are interested in how to relay anti-collision commands with a minimum delay.
- Results :
 - Distance *Mole* ↔ *Card* : 10cm.
 - Distance *Proxy* ↔ *Reader* : 10cm.
 - Distance *Mole* ↔ *Proxy* : 50m.
 - Delay time : 15 - 20 us.

Kfir and Wool : Relay attack on ISO14443 type B cards I

- Terminology :
 - Leech = fake reader, Ghost = fake tag.
 - Reader = legitimate reader, Tag = legitimate tag.
- Tools : hardware and software tools that require a very high to medium attacker knowledge and cost between 100\$ and 5000\$.
- Results :
 - Distance *Ghost* \leftrightarrow *Reader* : 50m
 - Communication *Reader* \rightarrow *Ghost* : they use an active tag.
 - Communication *Ghost* \rightarrow *Reader* : they use the DSB modulation.

Kfir and Wool : Relay attack on ISO14443 type B cards II

- Distance *Leech* ↔ *Tag* : 40 - 55 cm
 - Communication *Leech* → *Tag* : Current(4A) + Antenna ($40 * 40\text{cm}^2$).
 - Communication *Tag* → *Leech* :
 - Nothing (40 cm)
 - Software based retransmissions (50 cm).
 - Signal Based retransmissions (55 cm).
- Distance *Leech* ↔ *Ghost* : not studied.

Francillon : Relay attack on PKES I


- Principle :
 - The messages related to the authentication process are relayed from the car to the key and not from the key to the car, because the car sends messages through a LF channel while the key sends messages through a UHF channel.
 - Two types of attack were proposed : wireless relay attack, and wired relay attack.
- Wired relay attack :
 - Tools: Coaxial cable, 2 antennas, 2 optional amplifiers.
 - Results :
 - Distance *Antenna1* \leftrightarrow *Car* : $\leq 30cm$.
 - Distance *Antenna2* \leftrightarrow *Key* : $\leq 2m$ without the amplifier and $\leq 8m$ with the amplifier.

Francillon : Relay attack on PKES II

- Distance *Car* → *Key* : up to 60m.
- Distance *Key* → *Car* : up to 100m.
- Delay : it only includes the propagation delay since the attack doesn't perform any additional operations.
 - Delay *Car* → *Key* : 350ns.
 - Delay *Key* → *Car* : depends only on the distance between the key and the car.
- Wireless relay attack :
 - Tools: 2 antennas, emitter, receiver, amplifier.
 - Results :
 - Distance *Antenna1* ↔ *Car* : $\leq 30cm$.
 - Distance *Antenna2* ↔ *Key* : $\leq 2m$ without the amplifier and $\leq 8m$ with the amplifier.
 - Distance *Car* → *Key* : 30m, but bigger distances may be possible..

Francillon : Relay attack on PKES III

- Distance Key → Car : up to 100m.
- Delay Car → Key : 120ns.
- Delay Key → Car : depends only on the distance between the key and the car.



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State Of Art
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Relay attack against the Mifare Desfire card

Micropross



Other Readers



Softwares

- LibNfc to program the ACR122 and SCL3711 readers.
- PCSC libraries to program the Omnikey5321 reader.
- Micropross APIs to program the MP300 - TCL2 reader.

Context

- ACR122, or SCL3711, or Omnikey3521, or TCL2 : legitimate reader.
- ACR122 : fake tag (ISO14443-4 A card emulation).
- Mifare Desfire : legitimate tag.
- ACR122 : fake reader.



Demo

Fake Reader and legitimate Tag
Legitimate Reader and fake Tag

Experiment 1 |

- Goal : Does the command size, or the response size or the data size influence the response time of the card ?
- Answer : No, they don't
- Proof :

Experiment 1 II

	Data Size W	Data Size R	Command Size	Response Size	Response Time(μs)
REQA					86
AntiColl					86
SelectRootApp			9	2	841
ListApps1			5	2	841
ListApps2			0	0	0
getKeySettings_Delete			0	0	0
authPass1_Delete			0	0	0
authPass2_Delete			0	0	0
deleteApp			0	0	0
CreateApp			11	2	4315
selectApp_reset			9	2	841
CreatefilePlain (1 Ko)	13		2	20853	
CreatefileMac (1 Ko)	13		2	23798	
CreatefileEncr (1 Ko)	13		2	19191	
getKeySettings_CK			5	4	463
authPass1_CK			7	10	846
authPass2_CK			22	10	846
ChangeKey			31	2	18814
authPass1_WR			7	10	846
authPass2_WR			22	10	921
writePlain1	0x60		65	2	4244
writePlain2	50		2	3866	
writeEncry1	0x60		65	2	4017
writeEncry2			58	2	8898
writeMac1	0x60		65	2	3413
writeMac2			54	2	7113
readPlain1	0x60		13	2	166
readPlain2			6	39	770
readMac1	0x60		13	58	2578
readMac2			6	46	1601
readEncry1	0x60		13	58	3111
readEncry2			6	50	2205
listFiles			5	5	765
deleteFile1			6	2	9077
deleteFile2			6	2	9148
deleteFile3			6	2	9223
selectApp_reset			9	2	463
authPass1_reset			7	10	695
authPass2_reset			22	10	841
reset			6	2	11290

Experiment 1 III

	Data_Size_W	Data_Size_R	N = 0.7	Data_Size_W	Data_Size_R	N = 0.7
SelectRootApp			OK			OK
ListApps1			OK			OK
ListApps2						
getKeySettings_Delete			OK			OK
authPass1_Delete			OK			OK
authPass2_Delete			OK			OK
deleteApp			OK			OK
CreateApp			OK			OK
selectApp_aid2			OK			OK
CreateFilePlain (1 Ko)			OK			OK
CreateFileMac (1 Ko)			OK			OK
CreateFileEncr (1 Ko)			OK			OK
getKeySettings_CK			OK			OK
authPass1_CK			OK			OK
authPass2_CK			OK			OK
ChangeKey			OK			OK
authPass1_WR			OK			OK
authPass2_WR			OK			OK
writePlain1	0x28		OK	0x2D		OK
writePlain2			OK			OK
writeMac1	0x28		OK	0x2D		OK
writeMac2			OK			OK
writeEncry1	0x28		OK	0x2D		OK
writeEncry2			OK			OK
readPlain1		0x28	OK		0x2D	OK
readPlain2			OK			OK
readMac1		0x28	OK		0x2D	OK
readMac2			OK			OK
readEncry1		0x28	OK		0x2D	OK
readEncry2			OK			OK
listFiles						
deletefile1						
deletefile2						
deletefile3						
selectApp_reset						
authPass1_reset						
authPass2_reset						
reset						

Experiment 1bis I

- Goal : Does the card emulation influence the response time of the card ? and what is the magnitude of the propagation time ?
- Answer :
 - Yes, the card emulation impacts the response time of the card.
 - The transmission time is not very significant compared to the processing time.
- Proof :

Experiment 1bis II

	Data Size W	Data Size R	Command Size	Response Size	Response Time(us)
REQA					86
AntiColl					91
SelectRootApp			9	2	20820
ListApps1			5	2	18918
			0	0	0
ListApps2					
getKeySettings_Delete			0	0	0
authPass1_Delete			0	0	0
authPass2_Delete			0	0	0
deleteApp			0	0	0
CreateApp			11	2	51971
			9	2	21080
selectApp_aid2			23	11	
CreateFilePlain (1 Ko)			13	2	74895
CreateFileMac (1 Ko)			13	2	76556
CreateFileEnc (1 Ko)			13	2	74102
getKeySettings_CK			5	4	19338
authPass1_CK			7	10	24502
authPass2_CK			22	10	33545
ChangeKey			31	2	44353
authPass1_WR			7	10	24105
authPass2_WR			22	10	33469
writePlain1	0x60		65	2	55997
writePlain2			50	2	49247
writeEncry1	0x60		65	2	55539
writeEncry2			58	2	58588
writeMac1	0x60		65	2	55331
writeMac2			54	2	55213
readPlain1		0x60	13	2	60042
readPlain2			6	39	39657
readMac1		0x60	13	58	57738
readMac2			6	46	44518
readEncry1		0x60	13	58	58394
readEncry2			6	50	47888
listFiles			5	5	19909
deletefile1			6	2	27428
deletefile2			6	2	27555
deletefile3			6	2	27688
selectApp_reset			9	2	20018
authPass1_reset			7	10	23709
authPass2_reset			22	10	33139



Experiment 1bis III

Response Time = 0.628s, processing time = 20820us =>
Processing time + Propagation time = 0.28s => Propagation
time = 7180us.

8:265.031.150 ns	PICC_A	ATS	8 bytes	8:265.729.650 ns	699.500 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 1.56 ms	14443
8:283.525.780 ns	PCD_A	I/O0	12 bytes	8:284.573.620 ns	1 047.840 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 17.81 ms	14443
8:286.693.450 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes	8:287.052.150 ns	358.700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 2.14 ms	14443
8:288.546.700 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes	8:288.914.360 ns	358.160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.5 ms	14443
8:913.316.090 ns	PICC_A	I/O0	5 bytes	8:913.759.730 ns	443.640 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 624.42 ms	14443
8:925.014.540 ns	PCD_A	I/O1	8 bytes	8:925.722.540 ns	708.000 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 11.26 ms	14443

Experiment 2 |

- Goal : Acceptable delays by the ACR122 reader when doing relay attack against the Mifare Desfire.
- Results :
 - Timeout = default : 0.6s for all the commands we have tested and 0.7s for someones.
 - Timeout = 5s : 4.7s for all the commands we have tested.
- Proof :

Experiment 2 II

	N = 0	N = 0.5	N = 0.6	N = 0.7	N = 0.8
SelectRootApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	KO
ListApps1	OK	OK	OK	OK	
ListApps2	OK	OK	OK	OK	
getKeySettings_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass1_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass2_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	
deleteApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	
CreateApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	
selectApp_aid2	OK	OK	OK	OK	
CreateFilePlain (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	
CreateFileMac (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	
CreateFileEncr (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	
getKeySettings_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass1_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass2_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
ChangeKey	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass1_WR	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass2_WR	OK	OK	OK	OK	
writePlain1	OK	OK	OK	KO	
writePlain2	OK	OK	OK		
writeEncry1	OK	OK	OK		
writeEncry2	OK	OK	OK		
writeMac1	OK	OK	OK		
writeMac2	OK	OK	OK		
readPlain1	OK	OK	OK		
readPlain2	OK	OK	OK		
readMac1	OK	OK	OK		
readMac2	OK	OK	OK		
readEncry1	OK	OK	OK		
readEncry2	OK	OK	OK		
listFiles	OK	OK	OK		
deleteFile1	OK	OK	OK		
deleteFile2	OK	OK	OK		
deleteFile3	OK	OK	OK		
selectApp_reset	OK	OK	OK		
authPass1_reset	OK	OK	OK		
authPass2_reset	OK	OK	OK		

Experiment 2 III

	N = 0	N = 3	N = 4	N = 4.5	N = 4.6	N = 4.7	N = 4.8
SelectRootApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	KO
ListApps1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
ListApps2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
getKeySettings_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
authPass1_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
authPass2_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
deleteApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
CreateApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
selectApp_aid2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
CreateFilePlain (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
CreateFileMac (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
CreateFileEncr (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
getKeySettings_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
authPass1_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
authPass2_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
ChangeKey	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
authPass1_WR	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
authPass2_WR	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
writePlain1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
writePlain2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
writeEncry1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
writeEncry2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
writeMac1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
writeMac2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
readPlain1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
readPlain2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
readMac1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
readMac2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
readEncry1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
readEncry2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
listFiles	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
deleteFile1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
deleteFile2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
deleteFile3	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
selectApp_reset	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
authPass1_reset	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK
authPass2_reset	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK

Experiment 2 IV

Timeout = Default, Delay = 0.8s , Response time = 0.83s

5 970 607 580 ns	PCD_A	REQA	1 byte		5 970 781 980 ns	94 400 ns		14443
5 970 853 630 ns	PICC_A	ATQA	2 bytes		5 971 042 430 ns	188 800 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 87.5 µs	14443
5 971 668 500 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		5 971 066 740 ns	196 240 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 640.5 µs	14443
5 971 938 350 ns	PICC_A	UID Clr	5 bytes		5 972 301 990 ns	443 640 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 87.4 µs	14443
5 973 942 660 ns	PCD_A	SELECT	9 bytes		5 974 735 620 ns	792 960 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.57 ms	14443
5 974 807 210 ns	PICC_A	SAK	3 bytes		5 975 080 950 ns	273 740 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 87.5 µs	14443
5 975 678 740 ns	PCD_A	RATS	4 bytes		5 976 046 900 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 607.5 µs	14443
5 977 591 050 ns	PICC_A	ATS	8 bytes		5 978 209 550 ns	698 500 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 1.56 ms	14443
5 996 104 540 ns	PCD_A	W00	12 bytes		5 997 152 300 ns	1 047 840 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 17.03 ms	14443
5 999 272 150 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		5 999 630 050 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 2.14 ms	14443
6 001 125 500 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		6 001 493 660 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.5 ms	14443
6 776 054 210 ns	PICC_A	S(WTX) Request	4 bytes		6 776 412 910 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 774.58 ms	14443
6 776 388 390 ns	PCD_A	S(WTX) Response	4 bytes		6 776 766 540 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	14443
6 827 752 170 ns	PICC_A	W00	5 bytes		6 828 195 810 ns	443 640 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 49 ms	14443
6 856 028 100 ns	PCD_A	S(DESELECT)	3 bytes		6 858 969 300 ns	283 200 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 10.5 ms	14443
6 839 474 070 ns	PICC_A	S(DESELECT)	3 bytes		6 839 740 610 ns	273 740 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 526.2 µs	14443

Experiment 2 V

Timeout = 5s, Delay = 5s, Response time = 5.028s

Start Date	Sender	Frame	Byte	Error	End Date	Duration	Time	Protocol
7/47 407 646 ns	PCD_A	REQA	1 byte		7/47 502 040 ns	94 400 ns		14443
7/47 465 630 ns	PCC_A	ATQA	2 bytes		7/47 642 410 ns	188 780 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 87.4 µs	14443
7/47 469 609 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		7/47 669 340 ns	195 249 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 64.6 µs	14443
7/47 738 350 ns	PCC_A	UID CLA	5 bytes		7/47 102 050 ns	443 660 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 87.4 µs	14443
7/47 742 220 ns	PCD_A	SELECT	9 bytes		7/47 535 680 ns	792 960 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 1.57 ms	14443
7/47 607 190 ns	PCC_A	SAK	3 bytes		7/47 893 930 ns	273 740 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 87.4 µs	14443
7/47 613 000 ns	PCD_A	RATS	4 bytes		7/47 946 960 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 607.6 µs	14443
7/40 301 650 ns	PCC_A	ATS	8 bytes		7/49 000 170 ns	696 520 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 1.96 ms	14443
7/49 029 940 ns	PCD_A	1000	12 bytes		7/49 000 880 ns	1 047 840 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 17.76 ms	14443
7/50 399 650 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		7/50 399 590 ns	350 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 2.14 ms	14443
7/50 850 000 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		7/50 210 160 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 1.5 ms	14443
7/29 738 910 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		7/20 137 610 ns	350 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 74.58 ms	14443
7/20 321 940 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		7/25 491 200 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 2 ms	14443
7/65 040 570 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		7/67 401 210 ns	356 680 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 774.57 ms	14443
7/69 306 640 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		7/69 754 800 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 2 ms	14443
9/104 306 150 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		9/104 664 430 ns	359 680 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 774.57 ms	14443
9/336 650 200 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		9/337 010 440 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 2 ms	14443
10/011 569 030 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		10/011 528 530 ns	356 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 774.57 ms	14443
10/013 913 920 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		10/14 202 090 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 2 ms	14443
11/268 033 770 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		11/369 192 770 ns	356 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 774.57 ms	14443
11/381 177 520 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		11/381 546 800 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 2 ms	14443
12/166 096 980 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes		12/166 459 690 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 774.57 ms	14443
12/168 441 280 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes		12/168 809 260 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 2 ms	14443
12/529 107 710 ns	PCC_A	1000	5 bytes		12/530 054 350 ns	443 640 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 369.02 ms	14443
12/547 414 460 ns	PCD_A	S/DESELECT	3 bytes		12/540 761 600 ns	283 200 ns	FDT PICC to PCD + 10.43 ms	14443
12/541 675 390 ns	PCC_A	S/DESELECT	3 bytes		12/541 510 090 ns	273 740 ns	FDT PCD to PICC + 526.3 µs	14443



Experiment 2 VI

Timeout = 5s, Delay = 4.6s

12.237.790.650 ns	PCC_A	ATS	8 bytes	12.238.489.150 ns	690.500 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 1.56 ms	1443
12.256.776.180 ns	PCD_A	I/O	12 bytes	12.257.924.020 ns	1.047.940 ns	FDT PCD to PCD = 18.3 ms	1443
12.259.953.290 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes	12.260.311.970 ns	358.880 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 2.15 ms	1443
12.261.806.700 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes	12.262.174.690 ns	368.160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.5 ms	1443
13.039.079.100 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes	13.039.447.280 ns	368.160 ns		1443
13.013.997.910 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes	13.014.356.610 ns	358.700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 74.57 ms	1443
13.016.342.140 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes	13.016.710.300 ns	368.160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	1443
14.591.280.750 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes	14.591.619.450 ns	358.700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 74.57 ms	1443
14.593.005.100 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes	14.593.973.230 ns	368.160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	1443
15.368.523.950 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes	15.369.082.690 ns	358.700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 74.57 ms	1443
15.370.868.100 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes	15.371.236.260 ns	368.160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	1443
16.145.786.070 ns	PCC_A	S/WTX Request	4 bytes	16.146.145.550 ns	358.680 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 74.57 ms	1443
16.149.131.950 ns	PCD_A	S/WTX Response	4 bytes	16.149.498.220 ns	368.160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 2 ms	1443
16.888.614.430 ns	PCC_A	I/O	5 bytes	16.887.058.090 ns	433.680 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 738.13 ms	1443

Experiment 3 I

- Goal : Acceptable delays by the SCL3711 reader when doing relay attack against the Mifare Desfire.
- Results :
 - Timeout = default : 0s .
 - Timeout = 5s : 4.7s for all the commands we have tested.
- Proof :

Experiment 3 II

	N = 0	N = 3	N = 4	N = 4.5	N = 4.6	N = 4.7	N = 4.8
SelectRootApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	KO
ListApps1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
ListApps2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
getKeySettings_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass1_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass2_Delete	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
deleteApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
CreateApp	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
selectApp_aid2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
CreateFilePlain (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
CreateFileMac (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
CreateFileEncr (1 Ko)	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
getKeySettings_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass1_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass2_CK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
ChangeKey	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass1_WR	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass2_WR	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
writePlain1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
writePlain2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
writeEncry1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
writeEncry2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
writeMac1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
writeMac2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
readPlain1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
readPlain2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
readMac1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
readMac2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
readEncry1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
readEncry2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
listFiles	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
deleteFile1	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
deleteFile2	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
deleteFile3	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
selectApp_reset	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass1_reset	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
authPass2_reset	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	
reset	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	OK	

Experiment 3 III

Timeout = Default, Delay = 0.2s , S(DESELECT) after 0.158s

6 745 002 620 ns	PCD_A	REQA	1 byte		6 745 097 020 ns	94 400 ns		1440
6 745 169 570 ns	PICC_A	ATQA	2 bytes		6 745 357 370 ns	188 000 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 87.3 µs	1440
6 745 549 380 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		6 745 747 620 ns	193 240 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 206.3 µs	1440
6 745 819 330 ns	PICC_A	UID Cln	5 bytes		6 746 262 990 ns	443 660 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 87.5 µs	1440
6 747 427 580 ns	PCD_A	SELECT	9 bytes		6 748 220 540 ns	792 960 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.17 ms	1440
6 748 292 170 ns	PICC_A	SAK	3 bytes		6 748 555 910 ns	273 740 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 87.4 µs	1440
6 749 466 260 ns	PCD_A	RATS	4 bytes		6 749 834 420 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 909.9 µs	1440
6 751 369 710 ns	PICC_A	ATS	8 bytes		6 753 050 920 ns	608 540 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 1.54 ms	1440
6 757 451 700 ns	PCD_A	I/O0	12 bytes		6 758 499 540 ns	1047 840 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 5.41 ms	1440
6 760 619 630 ns	PICC_A	S(NTX) Request	4 bytes		6 760 970 330 ns	358 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 2.14 ms	1440
6 761 378 300 ns	PCD_A	S(NTX) Response	4 bytes		6 761 746 460 ns	368 160 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 409.6 µs	1440
6 916 793 780 ns	PCD_A	S(DESELECT)	3 bytes		6 917 076 980 ns	203 200 ns		1440

Experiment 4 |

- Goal : Acceptable delays by the Omnikey3521 reader when doing relay attack against the Mifare Desfire.
- Results :
 - Timeout = default : ∞ .
 - Timeout = 5s : 4s for all the commands we have tested.

Experiment 5 |

- Goal : Acceptable delays by the MP300-TCL2 reader when doing relay attack against the Mifare Desfire.
- Results :
 - Timeout = default : 0.5s for all the commands we have tested and 0.6s for someones.
 - Timeout = 5s : 0.5s for all the commands we have tested and 0.6s for someones.
- Proof :

Experiment 5 II

	N = 0	N = 0.5	N = 0.6	N = 0.7	N = 0.8
SelectRootApp	OK	OK	OK	KO	OK
ListApps1	OK	OK	OK		
ListApps2	OK	OK			
getKeySettings_Delete	OK	OK			OK
authPass1_Delete	OK	OK			KO
authPass2_Delete	OK	OK			
deleteApp	OK	OK			
CreateApp	OK	OK	KO		
selectApp_aid2	OK	OK			
CreateFilePlain (1 Ko)	OK	OK			
CreateFileMac (1 Ko)	OK	OK			
CreateFileEncr (1 Ko)	OK	OK			
getKeySettings_CK	OK	OK			
authPass1_CK	OK	OK			
authPass2_CK	OK	OK			
ChangeKey	OK	OK			
authPass1_WR	OK	OK			
authPass2_WR	OK	OK			
writePlain1	OK	OK			
writePlain2	OK	OK			
writeEncry1	OK	OK			
writeEncry2	OK	OK			
writeMac1	OK	OK			
writeMac2	OK	OK			
readPlain1	OK	OK			
readPlain2	OK	OK			
readMac1	OK	OK			
readMac2	OK	OK			
readEncry1	OK	OK			
readEncry2	OK	OK			
listFiles	OK	OK			
deleteFile1	OK	OK			
deleteFile2	OK	OK			
deleteFile3	OK	OK			
selectApp_reset	OK	OK			
authPass1_reset	OK	OK			
authPass2_reset	OK	OK			
reset	OK	OK			

Experiment 5 III

Timeout = Default, TCL2 reader , Mifare Desfire card

726 887 110 ns	PICC_A	ATS	8 bytes		727 585 650 ns	698 540 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 86.1 µs	1443
731 356 920 ns	PCD_A	0 0	13 bytes		732 489 680 ns	1 132 780 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 3.78 ms	1443
733 314 410 ns	PICC_A	0 0	6 bytes		733 843 030 ns	528 620 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 841.4 µs	1443
740 318 360 ns	PCD_A	0 1	9 bytes		741 111 280 ns	792 920 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 6.49 ms	1443
741 633 610 ns	PICC_A	0 1	6 bytes		742 162 410 ns	528 600 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 543.9 µs	1443
747 767 540 ns	PCD_A	0 0	15 bytes		749 070 200 ns	1 302 680 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 5.62 ms	1443
772 927 310 ns	PICC_A	S(IVTX) Request	5 bytes		773 370 970 ns	443 660 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 23.87 ms	1443
773 581 340 ns	PCD_A	S(IVTX) Response	5 bytes		774 034 440 ns	453 100 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 220.1 µs	1443
779 332 650 ns	PICC_A	0 0	6 bytes		779 861 470 ns	520 620 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 4.32 ms	1443
786 586 580 ns	PCD_A	0 1	13 bytes		787 719 320 ns	1 132 740 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 7.73 ms	1443

Experiment 5 IV

Timeout = 5s, Delay = 0.5s

5 728 198 490 ns	PICC_A	ATQA	2 bytes		5 728 387 270 ns	188 700 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 86.7 µs	14443
8 386 801 160 ns	PCD_A	ANTICOLLISION	2 bytes		8 386 999 400 ns	188 240 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.66 s	14443
8 387 069 410 ns	PICC_A	UID CLn	5 bytes		8 387 513 070 ns	443 660 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 86.7 µs	14443
8 389 496 600 ns	PCD_A	SELECT	9 bytes		8 390 289 520 ns	792 920 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.98 ms	14443
8 390 359 310 ns	PICC_A	SAK	3 bytes		8 390 633 050 ns	273 740 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 91.2 µs	14443
10 307 753 580 ns	PCD_A	RATS	4 bytes		10 308 121 720 ns	368 140 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 1.92 s	14443
10 309 645 510 ns	PICC_A	ATS	8 bytes		10 310 344 030 ns	698 520 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 1.54 ms	14443
18 700 927 100 ns	PCD_A	0 0	12 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	18 701 974 900 ns	1047 800 ns	FDT PICC to PCD = 8.39 s	14443
18 858 017 600 ns	PCD_A	RINAK0	3 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	18 858 300 800 ns	283 200 ns		14443
19 014 308 480 ns	PCD_A	RINAK0	3 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	19 014 591 660 ns	283 180 ns		14443
19 172 068 980 ns	PCD_A	RINAK0	3 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	19 172 352 160 ns	283 180 ns		14443
19 223 262 950 ns	PICC_A	0 0	5 bytes	Invalid CID: CID not sent while it should have been.	19 223 706 610 ns	443 660 ns	FDT PCD to PICC = 50.93 ms	14443

Conclusion

The delay caused by the relay attack depends on :

- The possibility for the tag to send S(WTX) requests.
- The Timeout used by the reader.
- The processing time on the tag.

Perspectives

- Since the value of the timeout depends on the value of the FWT, it is possible to extend the value of the timeout to 5s and thus the delay of the attack to approximately 5s also. This requires that:
 - We can choose the value of the ATS.
 - We can respect the time constraints during the initialisation and activation phases.

- Card simulation with Micropross APIs.
- Relay attack on the Mifare Classic.
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