

Voting and volateality:
Explanation of electoral behavior in British elections 2015, 2017

Bogdan Romanov, Group A1



Academic and practical relevance

Unexpectedly high levels of volatility voting for UK in 2015 and 2017

Increase of volatility indicates the democratic deficit?

Lack of empirical tools, explaining fluctuations in volatility, apart from surveys

UK 2017 case is overlooked

Data and empirical design

British Election Study, survey data, two waves:

Wave 4, March 2015 — 2015 Elections

Wave 12, May-June 2017 — 2017 Elections

Logistic regressions and model, predicting if voter casts a vote against preferences

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

H0. British voters have voted against their preferences due to the ***strategic voting*** — their former party had little success chances (Franklin et al., 1994, pp. 547–550);

H1. British voters have voted against their preferences due to the ***expressive voting*** — the electorate does not lose interest in the former party altogether but tries to draw attention that the other party has more beneficial policies (Franklin et al., 1994);

H2. British voters have voted against their preferences due to the ***economic voting*** — turning away because of ineffective economic development (Tavits, 2005);

H3. British voters have voted against their preferences due to ***external shock*** — Brexit affected the electorate's secondary beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007)



Combined logistic model for both Strategic and Economic voting and prediction metrics

Model:	Logit	Pseudo R-squared:	0.436
Dependent Variable:	DV_hasContradictions	AIC:	12692.4648
Date:	2019-05-01 18:04	BIC:	12796.4112
No. Observations:	21936	Log-Likelihood:	-6333.2
Df Model:	12	LL-Null:	-11227.
Df Residuals:	21923	LLR p-value:	0.0000
Converged:	1.0000	Scale:	1.0000
No. Iterations:	8.0000		

	Coef.	Std.Err.	z	P>|z|	[0.025	0.975]
Intercept	-3.7170	0.1305	-28.4815	0.0000	-3.9727	-3.4612
C(isPIdCon)[T.1.0]	-0.8969	0.0624	-14.3676	0.0000	-1.0192	-0.7745
gender[T.Female]	-0.1401	0.0457	-3.0654	0.0022	-0.2297	-0.0505
country[T.Scotland]	-0.1241	0.0664	-1.8690	0.0616	-0.2542	0.0060
country[T.Wales]	0.0793	0.0815	0.9738	0.3301	-0.0803	0.2390
PIdSuccess	0.0587	0.0021	28.6300	0.0000	0.0547	0.0627
GEVSuccess	0.0937	0.0021	43.6668	0.0000	0.0894	0.0979
PIdSuccess:GEVSuccess	-0.0018	0.0000	-48.6185	0.0000	-0.0018	-0.0017
PIdFailure	1.2592	0.0809	15.5649	0.0000	1.1007	1.4178
GEVFailure	-0.4287	0.0850	-5.0459	0.0000	-0.5953	-0.2622
changeEconomy	0.3862	0.0279	13.8414	0.0000	0.3315	0.4409
C(isPIdCon)[T.1.0]:changeEconomy	-1.1680	0.0595	-19.6388	0.0000	-1.2845	-1.0514
age	0.0043	0.0014	3.0122	0.0026	0.0015	0.0071

Metric	Value
Accuracy	86,92%
Recall	68,6%
Precision	68,62%

Results

1. The UK voter who expects his or her ideologically proximate party to lose will cast the vote for a party with more chances to win in order not to waste it within first-pass-the-post electoral rule. This pattern is observed on 2015 and 2017 models but more vivid for 2017 elections.

2. However, even though the voter perceived his or her ideologically proximate party to win, they referred to signal voting and gave a vote for another party, in order to emphasize the overlooked salient issues addressed by other party.

3. Economic voting was also observed in UK elections 2015, 2017. Even thought the voters who did not ideologically affiliate themselves with Conservative party, in general were satisfied with economic wellbeing, so they voted for this one and not the original party choice. Vice versa logic is applicable to Conservative party supporters.

4. Finally, in the same premise as with signal voting, voters tend to vote for parties, which do promise to resolve an issue bothering a voter the most, despite the initial ideological proximity.