Modification and constructional blends in the use of proper names

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This paper discusses a range of attested examples of NPs in which proper names are preceded by articles, determiners, and adjectives, arguing that such instances do not constitute a change into a common noun category. On the basis of such examples, it is claimed that the meaning of proper names relies not on unique reference, but on frame metonymy. Frames evoked by proper names interact with NP constructions, yielding a range of uses driven by the discourse context. Further, it is shown how the use of modified proper names in copular constructions is best explained through the framework of *blending* and the concept of *constructional compositionality* (as defined in Dancygier and Sweetser 2005).

Keywords: proper names, modification, blending, frame metonymy, copular constructions, constructional compositionality, reference

Most of the traditional philosophical literature defines proper names as representing 'unique reference', and assumes that proper names function as specialized pointers to objects, locations, or people in the actual world. Traditional grammars have accepted the 'unique reference' idea and enriched it with a number of observations regarding the differences in grammatical behavior of proper names (PNs) and common nouns. The former are typically not used with articles or modifiers (so that it is appropriate to talk about *Einstein*, but not about **this Einstein* or **the tall Einstein*), and these limitations in grammatical patterns available seem to reinforce the 'unique' status of the referents of PNs.

In what follows I want to question the 'unique reference' interpretation. First, as will be shown throughout the paper, PNs are not as restricted in accepting modifiers as is often thought, though they are not totally unrestricted either. Secondly, a look at the use of PNs in actual discourse also suggests that the 'unique reference' effect can be seen as resulting from a specific form of construal — from frame metonymy. I will argue that PNs achieve uniqueness through construals which

Constructions and Frames 3:2 (2011), **208–235**. DOI 10.1075/cf.3.2.03dan
ISSN 1876–1933 / E-ISSN 1876–1941

rely on very specific and rich frames — such that only one referent in the given discourse context can fit the frame evoked. The nature of these frames and their manipulation in various attested uses will be established throughout the discussion below. Among others, I will look at the ways in which frames are affected in modification of PNs by function words such as articles and genitives, and by various types of adjectives.

Finally, I will consider the status of phrases with modified PNs from the point of view of constructional features.[1] I will rely initially on the work on modification presented in Sweetser (1999) and Turner and Fauconnier's work on constructions as blends, but I will also expand on an approach to constructional meaning which argues for a constructions-specific mechanism termed *constructional compositionality* (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005). The concept reflects various observations suggesting that construction specific forms (such verb forms) may appear in contexts other than fully-profiled constructions and contribute to the overall meaning in ways relying on selective projection (as described in blending theory), rather than on the additive mechanisms of compositional semantics. Overall, I will show how constructional meaning can emerge from the combination of background frames, broad constructional patterns, and constructionally restricted meaning of lexical items.

In what follows, I first clarify the distinction between proper names and common nouns. The next section gives a definition of frame metonymy and explains how frame metonymy is useful in accounting for the meaning of proper names. The main part of the paper then discusses three structural types of modified proper names: modification by articles, modification by adjectives, and proper names in so-called XYZ-constructions. The final section summarizes the most important findings.

In the next section, I will start with an overview of the issues concerning the proper vs. common noun distinction.

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1. In this paper, the view of constructions used is modeled after the mental spaces and blending approach, represented, among others, in Fauconnier and Turner (1996), Dancygier and Sweetser (2005), and also the papers gathered in Fauconnier and Sweetser (1996). While I generally treat constructions as form-meaning pairings (following the models described in Goldberg (1995, 2006) and Croft and Cruse (2004)), I argue that there is some degree of compositionality involved as well. The framework being developed here assumes that constructional meaning can involve multiple levels of generalization (in the spirit of Goldberg's (2006) discussion of 'lumpers' and 'splitters'); also, it builds on the work by Dąbrowska (2004) and Tomasello (2000) which suggests that more complex constructions (e.g. the transitive construction) are acquired by generalizing on more specific patterns.

1. Proper names versus common nouns

Traditionally, the grammar distinction between proper names and common nouns relies on their different syntactic behavior and the difference in reference. While common nouns accept a variety of modifiers, and can typically be characterized as having both denotative meaning and an extension, proper names are different from them in many respects: they do not accept modifiers in the same way and use different spelling conventions, they have unique reference and are rich in connotative meaning.

However, the claim that PNs rely strictly on reference, rather than sense, appears to be too strong. Searle (1969) suggested "that a proper name is a kind of shorthand description", while Langacker (1991) attributes all PNs with aspects of meaning such as type specification (representing a human male, a pet dog, a country, etc.) and grounding (roughly understood as definiteness). At the same time, according to Langacker, the unique reference of PNs comes from an attendant Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM) wherein PNs are given to individuals so that they can be uniquely identified. Furthermore, lack of such unique reference (as in *the Steve I met in the pub*) indicates a common noun status, since the ICM is not thus invoked. Finally, recent research by Marmaridou (1989, 1991, 2000) adds new dimensions to the analysis. Not only does she give an exhaustive description of the available formal schemas, but she also develops the ICM idea, and argues that PNs can be seen as "shortcuts for whole ideas and thoughts" (1989), while the seemingly non-standard uses can be explained in terms of the theory of relevance. Also, the idea of ICMs is further developed in Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007).

With respect to the main focus of this paper, modification,[2] the crucial question is the distinction between common nouns (which can be modified), and proper names, which typically cannot. However, Van Langendonck (1999) and Vandelanotte and Willemse (2002) suggest that PNs are not as distinct from common nouns as it was previously thought. In particular, they observe that PNs can be used as common nouns too (with unique or not unique reference) and conclude that they do not necessarily involve unique referents, but 'proprial lemmas,' which can then be used as proper or common. In this paper, I want to build on their research to propose an interpretation of PNs which explains many of their non-standard uses by relying on the concept of frame metonymy. I have looked mostly at written discourse, from various samples of journalistic prose (news

2. In what follows I am assuming the broad, traditional understanding of modification, covering all formal means of expanding an NP (this includes articles and other determiners, as well as adjectives).

commentaries, op-ed pieces, etc.), mostly published in their on-line versions in the last five years (they are all marked as WebNews).

The distinction between common nouns and proper names has been formulated here as follows:

- common nouns require that a category, classical or radial, is formed; modification patterns then depend on the structure of the category, as various categories make different forms of modification possible. The categories may be characterized as having a denotation as well as an extension; some rely on frames, but the frames are anchored to the category as a whole, not to an individual member.
- proper names can be used meaningfully if there is an established link between the expression and a contextual frame structured by the speaker's/hearer's knowledge of a person, location, document, etc. The frame evoked will define the referent as a member of a common noun category (Langacker's *type specification*), but it will also contain frame-related information which applies to the one referent intended. The use of a PN suggests that a frame should be contextually available, but it does not carry the assumption that the referent is uniquely identified by virtue of having a name.

Expressions such as *London, the Golden Gate Bridge, Heinrich Heine*, or *the Magna Carta* are good examples of PNs. They suggest a category membership (city, bridge, poet, document), but also rely on the appropriate knowledge which has to be available to discourse participants. For example, most users' knowledge of geography and cultural landmarks will let them interpret the reference of *London* and *Golden Gate Bridge*, but not all of them will readily access *Heine*'s role in German poetry and the historical facts that gave rise to *the Magna Carta*. Such users will probably recognize these as PNs, but may need to ask questions in order to build the frame which makes the use of such terms possible.

In addition, Vandelanotte and Willemse (2002) argue convincingly that terms like *Friday* or *winter* are generic PNs — they have many features of PNs, but the reference is not unique. Both are classic examples of expressions which build their semantics on frames (see Fillmore 1985, Lehrer and Kittay 1992) and the speaker's familiarity with a frame (in these cases, of weekly or yearly cycle) is indispensable in processing such terms.

To sum up, PNs often rely to some degree on general category membership (person, bridge, mountain, document, etc), but the accompanying frame is indispensable in understanding the term. The frame is anchored to an individual member of a category, not to the category as a whole. The richness of the frame is what makes unique reference natural, but it doesn't guarantee it. The next section elaborates on the ways in which frames are used in PNs.

2. Frame metonymy and constructional meaning

The role that frames play in the semantics of language was originally described in Fillmore (1985), but the concept of a frame also appears in the analyses of metonymic expressions of various kinds. Koch (1999) and Blank (1999), for instance, rely on the frame as a structure which offers an interpretation of metonymy-based historical changes in the lexicon, but which also helps define types of metonymies in general. Also, the discussion of metonymy in terms of domains and subdomains (cf. Croft 1993, Ruiz de Mendoza 2000, Ruiz de Mendoza and Diez Velasco 2002) clearly relies on the features domains share with frames. At the same time, recent discussion (see Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006 and Croft 2006) reveals some problems in the consistent use of the concept of a 'domain'. Furthermore, as Panther (2006) argues convincingly, metonymies are more efficiently treated as usage events, relying on the indexical function of metonymy and the contribution of the conceptualizer. The latter is indeed central to the argument being developed here, since the availability of the frame and the contextual reasons for highlighting selected aspects of it are aspects of meaning construction which matter in the interpretation of PNs.

Frame metonymy has been discussed as the kind of usage where an expression targeting one aspect of a frame is used in a way which relies on the evocation of the entire frame. It was initially introduced briefly in Sweetser and Fauconnier (1996), in the discussion of examples of referential metonymy such as *The ham sandwich wants his check*. In such instances, it can be argued, 'customers' and 'dishes' are both aspects of the same frame, and so referring to a customer in this way relies on the entire frame being available and on the understanding of the relations within it. The validity of the observation can further be seen in the possibility of another aspect of the frame to be used instead, with a similar effect. That is, one waiter can alert the other by saying *Table 3 wants his check*, and matching the 'customer' with the 'restaurant table number' instead of picking a dish. These are clearly not cases of part-for-whole or other such metonymic patterns, but they are cases of metonymy nevertheless — hence the term frame metonymy.

Mental spaces theory treats frame metonymy as a phenomenon present in both the grammar and the lexicon. Recent research (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005, Dancygier 2005, 2009) points to a number of phenomena in language use which rely on metonymically evoking frames. In their discussion of conditional constructions, Dancygier and Sweetser argue that constructions (as form-meaning pairings) can also be seen as frames. They discuss a range of constructions in English which, like conditionals, carry predictive meanings (such that an unpredicted assumption expressed in one clause can serve as the background for the prediction formulated in the other clause). Specifically, a conditional such as *If you*

reboot your computer, the new software will become available expresses a predictive correlation between an action and the resulting situation. But the same correlation can be expressed through coordinate constructions such as *You reboot your computer, and the new software will become available* or *Reboot your computer, or the new software will not become available*. Crucially, all these constructions express predictive meanings based on some salient constructional features such as the use of the verb forms or the presence of two clauses the contents of which can be sequentially and causally linked. If predictiveness of a construction is treated as a frame, then specific grammatical features may metonymically stand for it and evoke predictive conditional meanings without explicit conditional markers. As this suggests, complex meanings, such as predictiveness, may emerge via different formal paths, and thus form-meaning pairings may rely on salient but partial constructional components.

Frame metonymy in grammar leads to a view of constructions which deviates somewhat from the most common models. First, it allows us to see constructions profiling similar meanings as related and postulate families of constructions in a well-motivated fashion. Also, perhaps more importantly, it allows us to talk about constructional components as carriers of aspects of constructional meaning, which can sometimes be detached from the entire constructional format. Some predictive constructions provide good examples of this. For example, I have seen an airport ad of a luxury car which said (under a picture of a shiny vehicle): *Miss the flight, still make the meeting*. The nearest paraphrases of this statement are all predictive constructions (*If you miss the flight, you can still make the meeting, You miss the flight and you can still make the meeting*, etc.). All these constructions rely on two features: the verb forms in the antecedent clause (*miss*) and the pairing of the clauses. If we consider the verb form itself, it is not clear how we should label it. It could be seen as present tense (*if you miss the flight…*) or as an imperative (*miss the flight*). But the meaning does not match any of the common uses of the present tense and is most certainly not imperative (the traveler is not told to miss the flight). It is, as was argued in Dancygier 1998 and Dancygier and Sweetser 2005, a constructionally determined marker of the non-predicted component clause of a predictive construction. Going into the details of how the present tense and the imperative can converge on this 'unpredicted clause' meaning is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is crucial to observe that there is a verb form which signals a specific aspect of predictive meaning and can thus evoke a predictive conditional frame even when other aspects of conditional form are not profiled. This general function of frame metonymy in grammar was discussed in Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) under the rubric of *constructional compositionality*.

The assumption underlying the concepts of both frame metonymy and constructional compositionality is that meaning construction relies on mechanisms

which are not necessarily using conceptual structures holistically. In other words, constructions consist of components and, while they may typically have holistic interpretations, these interpretations may arise out of partial, compositional contributions of their components. Compositionality here does not mean that the meaning of the whole is a simple sum of its parts, but that constructional meaning relies on various aspects of the meaning of its component expressions (or constructions), without necessarily importing these meanings in all their specificity. The present tense and the imperative seem to be independent constructions, but predictive constructions, whether using an indicative or an imperative form, rely on what these forms share — the meaning of an unpredicted but possible future occurrence. In fact, an imperative may not be an inducement or a deterrent also outside of predictive constructions, as in emotional poetic exclamations such as *Mountains and hills come, come and fall on me, And hide me from the heavy wrath of God!* (from Christopher Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus*), which nevertheless have the speaker considering a potential (and in this case desirable) though unlikely future occurrence. The point of this discussion is thus to suggest again that the same form does not always profile the same constructional meanings, but can partially contribute to the emergence of such meanings.

Phenomena which can be explained through constructional compositionality range across various aspects of grammar. For example, Dancygier (2005) shows how the use of grammatical features such as 3rd person singular verb form, a reflexive marker, and a dative defines a cluster of impersonal and middle constructions in Polish by frame metonymically evoking construals specific to these individual forms. Similar phenomena in English are discussed in Dancygier (2009). Each of the forms can be described independently as a construction, but when they appear alongside each other, they profile some aspects of their constructional meaning, though not all, and yield new constructions in the process. Such processes of meaning emergence are discussed throughout this paper.

The next section shows how the concept of frame metonymy applies to the meaning of proper names.

3. Proper names and frames

Most uses of a PN have a frame-metonymic function. By evoking the frame the speaker gives the hearer access to information necessary for matching the frame with the referent intended. In contrast to earlier research, I argue that the lack of accessibility of an appropriate frame does not automatically yield a common noun. It is entirely possible for the hearer not to have access to the frame the speaker is evoking (whether because the hearer never encountered it or because the speaker

is relying on the framing only available to her). The lack of accessibility of a frame usually prompts questions such as *Ted who?*, or *Who is Ted Kennedy?*. Also, if more than one frame is evoked, more information will be required, as in *Which Kennedy?*[3] or *Do you mean John my neighbor or John my travel agent?*. But the *assumption* of the frame being available is invariably there. Finally, as I will show, evoking the frame may be appropriate in a construction where it does not lead to unique reference — on the contrary, it may be done in order for the frame to be partially applied to another referent.

Describing PNs as expressions which metonymically refer to complex frames raises questions about the meaning-emergence role of expressions such as articles or adjectives. Modification is not necessary here in identifying the referent, since the referent is sufficiently identified by the whole frame (hence the idea of unique reference), but it is possible if only some selected aspect/s of the frame are profiled by the modifier (e.g., *a new Einstein* might foreground the "scientific genius" part of the frame, and background the details of personal identity). This approach would also explain the status of expressions like *Friday*, which are like PNs in that they rely on a contextually available frame, but like common nouns in that the cyclical nature of the frame allows for multiple referents; as a result one can say both (1) and (2), where (1) applies generically to any day defined by the weekly cycle, while in (2) a specific run of the cycle is intended, so the frame is modified and made to apply to one situation only:

(1) Friday is my laundry day.

(2) This Friday is my laundry day.

Modification of PNs should thus be understood constructionally — that is, in terms of a match between the type of information brought in by the modifier and its correspondence with a given aspect of the category being modified. The framework which successfully describes numerous cases of modification is blending. Examples discussed in Sweetser (1999), Coulson (2001) and Fauconnier and Turner (1996, 1998, 2002) suggest that frames are exploited differently in different adjective-noun combinations. For instance, the multiple meanings of adjectives like *safe* ('not causing danger' versus 'not exposed to danger') are instances of different blends of the frame of 'danger' with objects referred to. As Sweetser (1999) shows, the frame of the adjective *safe* profiles two roles — that of the source of danger and of the potential victim, while also including a 'barrier' separating the potential victim from the source of danger. In examples such as *a safe beach*, the frame of *safe* has the beach profiled as the source of danger, while *a safe child*

3. I am grateful to George Lakoff for drawing my attention to such examples.

profiles the potential victim. The frame is thus used in different adjective-noun blends, foregrounding different components, but in both cases the entire frame is being evoked. My discussion of the modification of PNs will rely on similar principles.

PNs have very rich frames. The richness of this contextually available information is what makes it possible to understand the reference as unique. At the same time, the richer the contextual information in the frame, the more possibilities for modification. For example, the name of *Mount Waddington* relies on the category "mountain", and may profile information about its location and special features (e.g. the highest peak in British Columbia). However, modification is uncommon in this case, because standard knowledge of the referent is very limited (though some people may have an enriched view of the mountain). On the other hand, the name *(Mount) Everest*, even though essentially similar, calls up a much richer contextual frame. Apart from location and information about height, there are numerous stories of failed attempts to climb the mountain, of heroism, tragedies, recent commercialization, symbolic status of 'the ultimate' challenge, etc. As I show below, modifiers are more common in such cases, because aspects of the frame themselves open such possibilities. Interestingly, however, it is uncommon to use modifiers to simply add information typically predicated about the category "mountain"; that is, it would be weird to say ??a *dangerous Everest*, or ??a *steep Everest*, because these kinds of information are already specified in the frame. As the examples below suggest, modifiers which can actually be used call up specific aspects of the frame, but also foreground them in ways similar to the examples with the adjective *safe*.

Why is the concept of frame metonymy more adequate in the case of PNs than "unique reference"? First, the "uniqueness", when it is indeed a part of the interpretation, is a *result* of the frame called up, rather than being assumed by it. If one refers to one's dog as *Spot*, there is no assumption that there is necessarily just one Spot, but there is only one Spot the speaker wants to refer to, and then the speaker's frame has to contain information about Spot's owner, breed, looks, or character. Any speaker referring to some *Spot* will thus use the frame which is contextually available (for instance, the cartoon character in children's books, or the dog owned by George W. Bush).

Frame metonymy further accounts for a broad (and unpredictable) range of meanings a PN can acquire. The name *Pinatubo* may refer to a volcano in the Philippines or to aspects of the frame which the reference to the mountain calls up, and the latter usage typically coincides with the presence of modification. For example, geologists talk about *the ancestral Pinatubo* or *the modern Pinatubo*), while in 1991, after Pinatubo erupted violently, the name was used to refer to the "event" part of the frame, as in *Pinatubo, one of the most destructive volcanic eruptions*…,

or to any other volcanic eruption of that magnitude, as in *If we had another Pinatubo today,…, are we ready for the next Pinatubo?*. The modifiers (*the ancestral, another, next*) help structure the frame by adding temporal sequentiality and non-unique reference.

It might seem sufficient to label all these examples as instances of metonymy (e.g. 'Pinatubo' for 'the eruption of Pinatubo'). But what such an approach would overlook is the fact that such instances are hard to generalize, because the contextual frame available to discourse participants decides on what kinds of metonymies are possible or not. When a caption under a picture of a destroyed house said *Pinatubo was here!* (to refer to the physical force of the pyroclastic flow), the metonymic reference was highly frame-specific, and would not be clear today, twenty years after the eruption. The available spectrum of metonymic usage can change in time, along with the content of the contextual frame available to discourse participants. In 1991/92, journalistic prose often referred to destructive events as *a political Pinatubo* or *an emotional Pinatubo*. Such phrases are no longer used, as the frame has lost its contextual salience. Also, it would not be adequate to describe such cases as 'figurative,' as it is done in Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007), since the shifts in the interpretation result from specific uses of the frames, rather than more general 'literal-to-figurative' shifts.

Under my interpretation, many uses of PNs typically described as metonymies should be enriched with a more thorough treatment of the framing involved. To give just one example, in his overview of approaches to metonymy Barcelona (2011) discusses the well-known cases of AUTHOR FOR WORK metonymies, exemplified in *Proust is hard to read*, where *Proust* means 'Proust's literary work.' Barcelona follows Croft (1993) in claiming that 'literary work' is secondary to the meaning of 'Proust', because it is an extrinsic sub-domain (as opposed to the fact that Proust was a person). Barcelona extends this concept beyond the 'intrinsic/extrinsic' contrast, among others, in terms of the level of conventionality (the 'person' meaning is more conventionally a part of the 'Proust' domain than 'literary work'). In the case of *Proust is hard to read* and other similar examples it is crucial that the context may foreground various components of the frame, regardless of the level of conventionality. In other words, in the example Barcelona considers, the context of 'reading' makes the 'literary work' reading definitely more natural than any other one. It seems that the discussion confuses what people generally know about people like Proust with the construal which a given sentence will make more or less salient. The context does not even have to be so specific. In the title of de Botton's book "How Proust can change your life," the name of Proust will most likely suggest reading even though literature is not explicitly mentioned — it is enough that the reader recalls that Proust has been dead for a while and so is not capable of acts of kindness in the reader's future. Various aspects of the frame

may thus be foregrounded for contextual reasons, not because of the nature of the domain represented.

Another interesting aspect of the structure of frames associated with PNs is that names are often used to represent values in what has been referred to as *role-value mappings* (cf. Fauconnier 1994/1985, 1997, Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996). In literature on mental spaces it is often noted that a mental space of a 'role,' such as *the President*, is pragmatically linked to a space of 'values' — possible fillers, which are thus selected depending on the aspects of the context called up, such as location or time (so *the President* could refer to Bill Clinton, to George W. Bush, as well as Vladimir Putin or Jacques Chirac). The availability of role-value links explains a number of uses of both proper names and role descriptors, but it is important to note that both the values and the role are often designated in the same phrase, as in *my sister Mary* or *President Putin*. In all such cases, it is clear that the extension of the name to include role designation is important to the evocation of the desired frame, rather than to the clarification of unique reference.

These instances may not be viewed as instances of modification in the proper sense, but they are interesting as confirmations of the fact that the frame structure aligned with a name may explicitly include the referent's participation in other frames (such as family and kinship frames, or the frame of a political system). However, some similar descriptors profile roles which are temporary and context-specific, as their purpose is to clarify how the individuals are to be seen for the purposes of current discourse, as in (3) and (4):

(3) Academy Award-winning actor Tom Hanks is telling the story of one Army unit's journey from D-Day to the end of the war. (WebNews)

(4) Vietnam vet Kerry moved from Senate witness to senator. (WebNews)

These examples suggest that role descriptors are added to PNs to satisfy discourse needs, and that such expressions rely on the interaction between frames. This would suggest that, like *safe beach* and *safe child*, these instances are best described in terms of frames and their exploitation in discourse.

In the next two sections, I will consider examples of PNs accompanied by articles and adjectives. The sections will describe the nature of frame interaction in the instances where PNs are being modified.

4. Modification by articles: Instantiation versus reference

Some PNs obligatorily use the definite article (*the Himalayas*), but most appear without any determiners (Langacker 1991 sees this as a result of the referents'

grounding). Consequently, the cases where PNs are used with articles are primary examples when modification is involved.

The relationship between PNs and article usage is best seen in copular constructions. In a typical copular sentence, such as *Henrietta/My sister/The woman in red is a teacher*, the subject NPs are referring expressions, while the subject complement expression (*a teacher*) is not. Langacker 1991 uses the term 'instantiation' here,[4] to suggest that the uses do not involve definiteness or referentiality, but represent 'an instance' of the *teacher* category which is neither unique nor previously known to the participants. It is thus natural to say *Tom Hanks is an actor* (with the referring expression in the subject and a non-referring one in the predicate), but unusual to say **An actor is Tom Hanks*, since the referring expression *Tom Hanks* appears in the non-referential position in the predicate. Also, an unspecified actor cannot be an instance of a concept which is uniquely framed. However, in sentences like (5), a PN appears in the predicate, and with an indefinite article:

(5) Think you are an Einstein? (on-line advertisement of children's games)

The frame associated with Einstein's name (being gifted and creative, though not ordinary) has been detached (or decompressed)[5] from the unique referent (Albert Einstein) and used to profile an unspecified instance of a person with Einstein-like qualities. As a result, the presence of the article signals the way in which the name has been used to fit the schema of a copular construction.

Similar effect can be observed in the *There*-construction, where an indefinite NP follows *be* in the sentence, as in *There is a man on the phone*. When a PN appears in the same position, as in (6):

(6) There is a Tom Hanks on the phone.

the indefinite article signals the speaker's lack of familiarity with the individual, even though the existence of a unique referent of the name *Tom Hanks* is not in question. Examples like (6) make it clear that it is misleading to describe such usage as a shift from a proper name to a common noun, since the actor's name does not acquire any meaning independent of who he is. What happens is in fact the exact opposite of the Einstein case — the name does not call up any frame in the speaker's mind, but it retains its ability to refer to an individual, while the frame evocation expected is deferred to the hearer.

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4. 'Instantiation' is not the only meaning of copular constructions. See Sakahara 1996 for more discussion.

5. In terms of blending theory, we would say that it has been 'decompressed'. Typically, our understanding of a unique identity is compressed to yield a coherent concept which can be manipulated as a whole. That type of compression does not hold in example (6).

The way examples like (6) are interpreted relies on the standard use of a PN, such that it requires a referent and the frame characterizing that referent. The use of *a* signals that the referent is available, but the frame is not. Such usage is most common with names which are not familiar to the speaker, hence the somewhat humorous effect of (6), where the speaker could be expected not only to recognize the identity of the famous actor, but to be thrilled to have him call.

Another interesting case is the use of PNs with the definite article and in the plural form. This construction seems to be the standard choice for cases such as *the Joneses*, referring collectively to members of a family. The construction involves multiple referents, while attributing them all with shared features, such as address, family history, life style, etc.

However, the same form is used in examples like (7), where families are not referred to:

(7) The rhetoric about "globalization," which is often harmless enough in every sense, still conceals the view of the Le Pens and the Haiders that America is undermining the healthy and organic and familiar "nation state." (WebNews)

It appears that the use in (7) does not deviate crucially from the norm. As in the family name case, there are multiple referents sharing the same connotative frame (views on immigration and multicultural society). The difference is that the name to be pluralized is not the name of the primary family member (presumably, the father), but of the primary representative of the frame targeted in the discourse (consider the unacceptable combination such as **the Le Pens and the Mozarts*).

Finally, the definite article (with extra stress) is used with PNs in constructions which are meant to confirm the match between the person currently referred to and the frame the name calls up. It is common in the cases where a famous person unexpectedly appears in the immediate context of the discourse participants.

(8) A: 'My sister is getting married to Tom Hanks.'
B: 'The Tom Hanks?'

As in the preceding cases, the construction essentially relies on the temporary decompression of the referent and the frame. Interestingly, this use is often found in questions referring to preceding discourse events which introduce the name or the referent. Questions like that can thus be glossed as "The name just mentioned calls up a familiar frame, but the referent indicated is not expected in the discourse context".

To conclude, using articles with PNs does not indicate a shift to a common noun status, but plays selectively on the possibility of separating the referent from the frame which is assumed to uniquely characterize it, him or her. The crucial

reliance of the referential function of PNs on the accompanying rich frame is thus highlighted.

PNs with articles are also common in the often mentioned AUTHOR FOR WORK type of metonymy, as in *He owns a Picasso*, where the name stands for a painting by Picasso. The indefinite article is then justified by the target concept, but we should note that this type of metonymic use is also crucially reliant on the frame. It makes sense to talk about *a Picasso*, but not *a Smith*, unless Smith is known to the speaker and hearer as a famous author. Barcelona (2000b, 2011) argues that such attested metonymies need to be "socially conventionalized", but it seems to be more specific to explain them via the variety of information available within a frame. For example, the frame will also explain the nature of the 'work' as a valuable (and bounded) object: a poem by Byron would not typically be talked about as *a Byron*, since it is usually an element in a collection and cannot be manipulated (or sold) as such. The frame which represents the nature of the author's 'work' thus makes metonymic uses of PNs possible, while social conventions are too broad a category.

Overall, in uses with PNs articles seem to perform their usual functions, such as negotiating the accessibility of referents (as in examples (6) and (8)). In the remaining cases the frames evoked are used as the core meaning of the PNs, in a way which downplays reference and highlights the possibility of a frame to be attached to referents other than the ones conventionally associated with the PN frame. In (5), the use is prompted by the overall meaning of the copular construction (in its 'instance' sense), where the referential co-alignment of the subject and the predicate makes it possible for the frame to be decompressed from the persona of Einstein. If the predicate NP is to represent an instance used to characterize the referent of the subject NP, then it is possible for the 'instance' to be represented by a frame decompressed from its PN referent. In (7), for comparison, we seem to be looking at an independent construction (*the PN+plural*), which creates a category of referents based on the framing they share with the prototypical case represented by the PN. It seems, then, that PN frames can be manipulated together with the referents, or can be detached to participate in constructions in which reference is less central to the meaning.

In the next section I will consider the cases of interactions between PN frames and those signaled by adjectives. I will argue that such instances participate in an interesting family of constructions.

5. PNs and modification patterns involving sub-frames

The frames metonymically represented by PNs are not necessarily treated as permanently characterizing the referent and they are not treated as indivisible wholes. Many examples of modification, especially by adjectives, serve to establish sub-frames, often of temporary or even temporal type. Perhaps with respect to the specific function of such modifiers, the repertoire of adjectives which can in fact be used with PNs is quite limited. In my search for data I kept on running into the same adjectives again and again (at least with some of the constructions). As I will show, the availability of adjectives as modifiers of complex frames is strictly dependent on the nature of the frames — which limits the choice of areas of meaning which lend themselves to modification.

Examples like (9) and (10) show adjectives, accompanied by indefinite articles, signaling temporary characterization of the referent.

(9) They showed a not so happy Tom Hanks muttering something that seemed rather colorful (and rightfully so). (WebNews)

(10) A combative Vladimir Putin tells Mike Wallace he should question his own country's democratic ways before looking for problems with Russia's. (WebNews)

All of these examples present the referent on a specific occasion. The assumption is that Hanks' facial expression would be happier on another day, and that Putin isn't always combative. One special feature of such phrases is that, even though they are used in the attributive position, they are understood as describing a temporary feature of the referent. As Bolinger (1967) observed, attributive adjectives typically represent permanent characterization (*a navigable river* is always navigable), while post-posed or predicative adjectives are primarily used for description of temporary features (*the only river navigable* or *the river is navigable* tend to be read as applying to a limited period of time). In the case of PNs, much of the permanent characterization is a part of the frame (hence the weirdness of ??*a dangerous Everest*), and thus the adjective, together with the indefinite article, signals an 'instance' meaning similarly to what we saw in copular constructions. It is also worth noting that such uses are possibly more common in journalistic prose, where information packaging favors some degree of conciseness.

The use exemplified in (9) and (10) is thus markedly different from the cases where PNs are used with adjectives, but without an article:

(11) To begin, here we are in sunny California. As we walked down the street today towards a breakfast location… (WebNews)

(12) Residents in smoggy Toronto are no more likely to support parking bans than people in the rest of the province. (WebNews)

Such examples are not cases of temporary characterization, and are best described as cases of 'frame-internal' modification. The adjectives *sunny* and *smoggy* function as timely "reminders" of what the places are generally or prototypically like, not as descriptions appropriate to a given time and place. Given the absence of an article, one could claim that the usage calls up the usual frame, with some of its contextually more relevant features highlighted, so that the 'adjective + proper name' combination still functions as an unmodified PN.

The above cases use a rather broad selection of adjectives, as appropriate to the situation or the frame. In other cases of adjectival modification, the choice of adjectives becomes rather limited. The ones encountered most often are ones like *new, old, next, another* or *different*. Contrary to the cases we saw above, where the primary frame remained essentially unchanged, these are used to distinguish sub-frames of the frame, often marking different stages in the development of the frame. What the adjectives do then is either separate a temporal sub-frame, or signal an important change affecting the structure of the frame.

(13) The former director of the CIA has been named as the likely minister of information in the new Iraq. (WebNews)

When *new* or *old* are applied to common nouns, they typically signal a different referent or another value of a role, as in *my new/old shoes*. In (13), for comparison, the referent (the country of Iraq) remains constant, but two different frames are applied. The "old" Iraq is presumably the one before the toppling of Saddam Hussein (and not ancient Mesopotamia), while the "new" Iraq is the political formation which emerged after the American intervention. The use of the adjectives (both *old* and *new*) depends on a significant change, which renders a pre-existing framing inapplicable to the new situation. For comparison, *the same old* signals lack of expected change, presumably not in reference to pre- or post-Saddam situation:

(14) It's the same old Iraq, just a tiny bit worse than it was last month. (WebNews)

Finally, similar effect of change within the frame is signaled with the adjective *different*.

(15) Now it appears the we are now dealing with a different Putin — one who says "yes, but…", indicating that he is willing to work with the West, … (WebNews)

Such cases of modification do not use adjectives like *new* or *different* to suggest that there is a new referent of the noun modified. On the contrary, the referent is assumed to be the same, and the change applies to internal features of the frame, or to the nature of the role.

Finally, let us note the cases where sub-frames are established not with respect to change or temporal dimension, but to differences in characterization:

(16) In "The Accidental Autocrat" (March *Atlantic*), Starobin portrays Russia's leader as a complex mixture of seemingly incongruous parts. There is Putin the fighter a man who describes himself as having a "pugilistic nature," and who has long held a black belt in judo. There is Putin the canny former KGB operative — rigorously trained to calculate his every move and to dispense information sparingly. And then there is Putin the believer — a man of faith, who as a child absorbed his mother's strong Orthodox Russian beliefs and continues to practice devoutly. (WebNews)

Examples like (16) seem similar to standard expressions such as *Edward the Confessor* or Beanie Babies' names like *Bucky the Beaver*, but can be more elaborate and in fact are needed to distinguish different sub-frames, which is not the case with standard PNs using the same format. That is, *Bucky the Beaver* is not primarily contrasted to other beavers or other personas of Bucky, but simply needs to be identified as a beaver (in contrast to, let's say, *Stinky the Skunk*). The use in (16) thus relies on a specific form PNs can take in various contexts (*PN+the+(modifier)+N*), but uses the formula to exploit contrasting aspects of the frame in order to point out the incongruity within it.

PNs are common also in constructions relying on rich frames and relations between them. One group of such constructions has been labeled by Fauconnier and Turner (2002) as *XYZ* constructions. The next section outlines the way in which PNs interact with these constructional meanings.

6. PNs and the *XYZ* family of constructions

In example (13) above I illustrated the shift within the frame which did not involve a new referent. In this section I will consider examples of constructions where the frame is detached from its referent and assigned to another referent. The first example is (17):

(17) Is Iraq Becoming a New Vietnam? (WebNews)

In (17), the use of *Vietnam* does not preserve the reference to the country. Instead, another country (Iraq again) is framed in terms of the political situation

systematically correlated with the one which occurred in Vietnam. Both Iraq and Vietnam are being presented as now framed in the same way. There are clear existing parallels — both countries were torn with internal conflict and the US intervened in order to end it. However, the past failure to achieve the goal in Vietnam, and huge costs of the operation, are aspects of the frame which are now presented as the expected future result in Iraq.

Effects similar to *new* in (17) can be achieved with the use of *another*, as in the headline *Are We Trapped in Another Vietnam?* (WebNews). As in the case of *new*, the speaker relies on the shared pre-existing frame and the parallels with the new situation. However, the use of *new* (or *another*) here is markedly different from the usage we saw in (13) above. The most important difference is that the referent of *a new/old Iraq* is still Iraq, albeit in a different situation, while *a new Vietnam* does not refer to Vietnam, but to Iraq instead. The 'Vietnam' frame has thus been detached from its referent (the country of Vietnam), and assigned to a new referent, Iraq. In other words, the frame in (13) is new, because it has changed, while the one in (17) is new, because it has been projected from the referent of another PN. The resulting blend relies on specific selective projections from inputs representing two independent referents.

The usage is very similar to what Fauconnier and Turner (2002) have described as the *XYZ* construction. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) discuss examples similar to *The Pope is the father of all Catholics*, defining them as *XYZ* constructions (*X is the Y of Z*).[6] These constructions are based on the construal in which the relation between two elements W and Y (father-child) is projected into the emerging blend in which two other elements (X and Z) are now linked by a similar relation (the Pope-all Catholics). Crucially, the meaning of the construction relies on unmentioned counterpart W (child) and the blend based on the projection of relations available in the framing. Furthermore, which specific relation will be projected is dependent on available framing — so that to some user the relation is that of love and care, and to other it may consist in discipline and tough expectations. The construction has been represented as follows:

The Pope is the father of all Catholics
X is the Y of Z
X (*Pope*), Y (*father*), Z (*Catholics*), W (*unmentioned [child]*)
X is a counterpart of Y; Z is a counterpart of W;
Y-W relationship is projected into the blend;
X-Z relationship thus emerges.

6. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007) discuss similar examples, also including examples with PNs, but they do not consider the constructional implications of such lexical choices.

Similarly, the construction represented in (17) could be labeled *XnewZ* construction, and can be represented as follows:

Iraq (X) is a new Vietnam (Z)
X is a new Z
X (*Iraq*), Y (*US military presence* — unmentioned), Z (*Vietnam*)
X is a counterpart of Z (*Iraq* is a counterpart of *Vietnam*)
Y-Z relationship is projected into the blend;
Y-X relationship thus emerges.

This construction also relies on unmentioned component (Y), which depends crucially on the frame available. In my interpretation, Y refers to the 'US military presence,' but it could also be construed as 'a costly war' or 'an unpopular decision'. The *XYZ* and *XnewZ* constructions are similar and both rely on the counterpart relations and on the projection of a familiar frame into a new situation. What is more, for the projection to take place the frame has to be present in the speaker's and hearer's minds, and has to be evoked by the use of the Z term. PNs are common in this kind of construction, precisely because they call up rich frames, accessible to different interlocutors.

At the same time, the re-assignment of the frame to another referent requires that a phrase like *a new Vietnam* either appears in the subject complement of a copular construction, or is implied to have been extracted from one. The phrase could not be interpreted in the way described above if there were no reference to Iraq available in the context. Furthermore, the construction is hard to interpret in absence of the adjective *new*, as in ??*Iraq is a Vietnam*, or ??*Iraq is Vietnam*, because these constructions suggest an (unacceptable) straightforward identity of two referents or frames. The adjective thus has a construction-specific meaning which can be paraphrased as 'the subject of the construction (Iraq) is being structured by a new frame, imported from the predicate PN (Vietnam).'

'X is a new Z', with an indefinite article, is a variant of the construction in which the 'instance' meaning of the copular construction is highlighted. But some of the most common examples one can find use the definite article instead, which changes the meaning of the copular construction into an identity relationship without changing the nature of the underlying counterpart relations or of frame allocation. Examples are very common (and not restricted to PNs):

(18) Is 60 the new 40?
Green is the new black.
As climate changes, is water the new oil?
Pale is the new tan.
Green is the new red — activism is not terrorism. (WebNews)

In all these cases the frame formerly associated with the nominal in the predicate position is now applied to the entity in the subject of the construction (the frames evoked are middle-age, fashion, highly valued commodity, healthy-looking skin, and color terms standing for political orientations). Crucially, the specific part of speech of the subject expression is less important than the framing, and the predicate expressions 'nominalize' whichever part of speech was present in the subject. This bleaching of word class assignment seems to be central to the way the construction works. Naturally, PNs appear in this usage too, in both nominal positions:

(19) Is Evan Mack the new Mozart?
Johnny Depp is the new Humphrey Bogart. (WebNews)

In both their variants (definite and indefinite) *XnewZ* constructions rely on the form and meaning of familiar constructions: copular constructions first of all, in their instantiation and identity uses, but also *XYZ* constructional blends, and the constructionally determined use of adjectives such as *new*.

The constancy of underlying meanings (a familiar frame is decompressed from its referent and projected into the construal of another referent), along with a distinct salience of the most common formal patterns (copular constructions, adjective *new*) suggest that there are constructional phenomena involved. Also, the meanings of the expressions considered in this section cannot be arrived at outside of the constructional meaning prompted — as I pointed out above, the sentence identifying Iraq as Vietnam would be nonsensical outside of the frame-decompression and frame-projection pattern. The participants' familiarity with the frames is also an important precondition, which stresses the crucial role frames play in this context. There is some room for a range of lexical items to be used, but they have to support the same counterpart relations. For example, the verb *to be* can be substituted by verbs suggesting copular meanings and possibly adding the meaning of 'change', such as *become* or *arise* (both can be understood as "'be' in the future"). Similarly, the adjectives *next* and *another* largely duplicate the meaning of *new* and allow the frame-projection meaning to arise.

Various parts of the construction's profile may suffice under various conditions. For example, questioning the identity relation in negative copular constructions makes copular sentences acceptable with PNs both in the subject and the subject complement, as in *Iraq is not (no) Vietnam*, which rejects the idea that Iraq is in fact *a new Vietnam*.

Quite clearly, the sentence cannot be read as rejecting an identity relation and is intended to evaluate and juxtapose the frames evoked. The use of negation relies on evoking a possibility of someone drawing comparisons between the two frames, and rejecting that possibility. It is thus a clear example of a construction

which in terms of Verhagen's (2005) framework is a construction relying on an intersubjective construal.

Furthermore, there are other variants of the construction, involving different adjectives and determiners. The next case of adjectival modification to be mentioned here is modification with denominal adjectives, such as *musical* or *political*. It is has been said repeatedly that such adjectives do not have clearly specifiable meanings and that their interpretation varies from noun phrase to noun phrase (the attempts to analyze them as derived from clauses, as in Lees 1960 or Levi 1978, also did not resolve the issue). Suffice it to say that *a musical instrument* and *a musical genius* use *musical* in senses which are as different as they are elusive. An analysis showing how the concept of *music* blends with that represented by the head noun would explain the lack of predictability of meanings that may arise, but such an analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is clear that the use of denominal adjectives as modifiers of PNs is best accounted for in terms of blending (along the lines proposed in Turner 1991, 1998, and then Fauconnier and Turner 2002). Their discussion of *XYZ* constructions in which a de-nominal adjective substitutes the Z noun makes it clear that expressions with adjectives can be analyzed along the same lines.

Examples of such constructions with PNs (such as *North Pole, Titanic, Einstein, Vietnam, Disneyland*, to mention but a few) are numerous and easy to find. The phrases typically call for an interpretation which can be glossed as "a counterpart of PROPER NAME in the area of NOUN" (where the noun is changed into a denominal adjective in the construction itself). That is, the phrase *social and political Himalayas* in the summary of Wilde's play *An Ideal Husband* describes Lord Chiltern as reaching the heights equivalent to those of the Himalayas in the domain of social status and political career.

(20) Sir Robert Chiltern (Jeremy Northam) has reached the social and political Himalayas in Victorian London. (WebNews)

Let us also note that the interpretation is made easier by the fact that both domains involved are structured with a vertical UP/DOWN schema, literally or metaphorically, or both. The Himalayas are definitely structured by the vertical orientation schema (in terms of height), while being also structured so metaphorically in terms of achievement; the domains of social status or political career are also metaphorically structured this way (*high status*, *peak of career*, etc.). Such an alignment of the frames makes the use of the construction easier and more salient.

In the examples below, the phrase *a political Everest* appears in a political commentary on the highest possible electoral victory.

(21) More than half the school bond issues in California lose. To win in this state, bonds must earn a "supermajority" — two-thirds of the votes cast. Such a threshold is a political Everest. No U.S. president has ever won the hearts of two out of every three voters; Bill Clinton won only 43 percent of the vote in 1992. (WebNews)

The resulting blend resembles the *new Vietnam* one. The PN *Everest* is projected from the input which contributes the crucial elements of the frame. Finally, while the Everest frame is typically applied to the domain of climbing, in the blend it is applied to the domain of politics, the same domain to which the actual referent (electoral supermajority) normally belongs. Briefly, then, the PN gives the frame, while the rest comes from the referent.

All the modification constructions I have looked at above confirm that the constructional behavior of PNs relies primarily on the structure and salience of the frame characterizing the referent. It is also clear that the uniqueness of the referent, while possibly a norm, is not the defining feature of PNs, since many of the uses reviewed above depend either on coordinating the match between the frame and the referent, or on applying the frame to another referent.

Finally, the family of constructions includes the possibility of adding a genitive form, to represent the way in which the shifting frames affect a participant:

(22) Iraq is George Bush's Vietnam.[7]

In Dancygier (2009) the variant of the construction in which the genitive appears was described in terms of 'experiential viewpoint.' In the example above, seeing the war in Iraq in terms similar to the war in Vietnam is not changed, but it is enriched with the additional aspect of meaning — that the war might have been framed this way from the perspective of one person, the politician responsible for its success. The 'experiential viewpoint' meaning is best captured through the morphological genitive form,[8] since an *of*-genitive, as in ???*Iraq is the Vietnam of Bush*, does not seem to convey the same perspectival construal. The format of the construction can be described as follows:

X is Z's Y
X (*Iraq*), Y (*Vietnam*), Z (*Bush*), W (*unmentioned [Johnson]*)
X is a counterpart of Y; Z is a counterpart of W;

7. Ted Kennedy's 2004 comment, quoted by CNN.

8. The experiential viewpoint role of the genitive is confirmed in other constructions discussed in Dancygier (2009), such as *One person's X is another person's Y* construction (as in *One person's trash is another person's treasure*).

> Y-W relationship (*Johnson got into an unpopular war [Vietnam] that he couldn't win or get out of*) is projected into the blend; X-Z relationship thus emerges (*Bush got into an unpopular war[Iraq] that he won't be able to win or get out of*).

To conclude, the family of *XYZ* constructions includes several types of variations. The *XYZ* construction, as originally described in Fauconnier and Turner (2002), profiles three entities out of the four related by the meaning of the construction and does not particularly favor PNs, though they are likely candidates, given that all *XYZ* instances rely on frames and relations among them. Also, there are variants discussed here — such as using the adjective *new* to mark the re-alignment of the frame with another referent, using the denominal adjectives to clarify the domain in which the frame evoked applies, or adding a genitive to profile the experientially salient participant. These require PNs more saliently, because of the need to evoke uniquely rich framings. In spite of the formal differences, these constructions are naturally seen as a family of constructions. The nature of the projection of the frames from one referent to another remains the same across the types, but it can be slightly reconstrued or enriched through salient forms. The available formal options exemplify the concept of constructional compositionality.

7. Conclusions

The review presented throughout this paper does not exhaust the possible types of modification of PNs. However, it is clear that PNs can appear with modifiers in a variety of contexts. Modification constructions vary in form — from article usage, through adjectives, to copular and *XYZ* constructions, while the meanings expressed through modifiers crucially depend on the dual structure of the PN category: the existence of a referent and a rich frame distinguishing the referent. PNs can be seen as instances of frame metonymy — the frame cannot be the 'meaning' of a PN, but it is what is evoked (and necessary for understanding) when a PN is used; the lack of a frame makes it impossible to use the name. Furthermore, since the frame (and not the referent) is central to the understanding of a PN, it is common for PNs to be used to signal frames alone.

The above observations suggest that modified PNs do not become common nouns. The arguments for such a shift assume that the common/proper distinction is a binary distinction, and that it is a distinction in the type of reference. What the analysis above suggests, though, is that this is not the case. The feature which is crucial to the functioning of a PN is not its unique reference, but its unique and rich framing. As we could see, all the cases of modification result from the

need to treat the frame as a complex and possibly divisible knowledge structure, or from the fact that the speaker's lack of familiarity with the frame causes difficulties in understanding reference. Since the modification patterns available to PNs are limited and strictly dependent on what I consider to be their primary function — frame metonymy — there is no question of common nouns emerging as a result.

The role constructional meaning plays in examples such as *a new Vietnam* and *a political Everest* is important. Expressions like these are easily conceived of as non-referential subject complements of copular constructions, in which the subjects (*Iraq, electoral supermajority*) are the intended referents. However, these are also constructionally specific predications, because they manipulate the frame available to assign a new framing to the referent — whether the framing is temporally determined, as in *a new Vietnam*, or restricted to a domain, as in *political Everest*. Furthermore, the framing can also be viewed from the experiential or attitudinal perspective of a specific individual. It is then accompanied by a referring expression in the genitive form which selects the individual affected, as in *Iraq is Bush's Vietnam*.

I have already noted that it is not necessary for such constructions to appear in full copular form. In a typical case, the intended referent (implicit subject) is retrievable from the context, as in the case of the headline *Are we trapped in another Vietnam?*, where the referent (Iraq) is not explicitly mentioned until later in the text of the commentary. In (20), however, the phrase *social and political Himalayas* cannot be traced back to any overt copular sentence, and in many other cases the identification of the referent depends on the context rather than on any specific constructional feature or independent mention.

It seems that these examples can be explained most plausibly and realistically via conceptual integration. First, the meanings expressed are not entrenched and need to be computed anew as the constructions emerge. Furthermore, as the *Pinatubo* examples above indicate, the phrases coined in this way are only as stable as the frame they build on, so that they can easily disappear or become difficult to understand. What I am arguing, then, is that the meaning of constructions in which PNs are modified by adjectives such as *new* or *political* emerges *compositionally* (along the lines of constructional compositionality) based on the contribution of the elements. The argument developed throughout the paper suggests the following generalizations:

– all the major types of nominal modification constructions can be used with proper names, without automatically moving the PNs to the common noun category;

- the meaning of each modification type (articles, genitive determiners, adjectives) is based on the interaction of frames (which further supports the modification model proposed in Sweetser (1999));
- in modification structures, frames are evoked as complete knowledge structures, but specific uses may profile selected aspects of the frame rather than the whole; in some cases the referent of the PN may be detached from the frame;
- frame metonymy plays a central role in the meaning of PNs, and is the source, rather than the result of 'unique reference';
- PNs participate in a range of constructions related to the so-called *XYZ* constructions; we can thus talk about a family of *XYZ* constructions;
- the *XYZ* family of constructions relies on a cluster of forms (such as copular constructions, *new*-adjectives, denominal adjectives, *of*-genitives, morphological genitives); the overall meaning of such constructions emerges via mechanisms of conceptual integration;
- the role of specific constructional components is most accurately determined in terms of constructional compositionality;
- meaningful differences among various members of the *XYZ* family (such as the difference between constructions with denominal adjectives and those with *new*-adjectives) emerge from the compositional contributions of types of modifiers profiled and the types of interaction between frames they prompt.

In this view, individual forms and expressions, if present, compositionally contribute to an emergent blend, which will be computed on the basis of the structure available in the inputs set-up, and the knowledge structures which the speaker can rely on. It would be difficult to identify the specific constructional schema which would then explain the changes in meaning as a case of 'override' (see Michaelis 2003), since the emergent meaning relies to an equal degree on the copular construction schema, on the lexical role of proper names, and on nominal modification schemas and the blends they prompt.[9] This combination of factors suggests that the constructional meaning in these cases emerges through the mechanisms described within blending. Also, the interaction across constructional meanings is crucially based on available frames.

9. The concept of 'override' was introduced in Michaelis (2003). It describes the interaction between lexical and constructional meaning, such that if there is a mismatch between an item and the construction it is inserted into, constructional meaning will 'override' the specific features causing the clash. For instance, if a mass noun like *beer* is used in a count form, e.g. with an indefinite article (*a beer*), its mass meaning is being overridden.

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