Empirical problem set: Behavioral welfare analysis and estimating optimal sin taxes

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1 Overview

1.1 Table 1 replicates Table 1 from Allcott and Taubinsky (2015). Figure 1 replicates their Figure 3.

Figure 1: **Endline CFL Demand Curves**

Notes: This figure plots the endline demand curves from the TESS experiment. Observations are weighted for national representativeness.

Table 1: **Effects of TESS Information Treatment**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1(Treatment)	2.54	2.28	2.30	3.16	2.29	2.14
	(0.55)***	(0.36)***	(0.37)***	(0.37)***	(0.54)***	(0.50)***
1(Endline-Only)					-0.44	
					(0.76)	
1(Positive Treatment)						0.35
						(0.56)
R2	0.03	0.57	0.58	0.33	0.04	0.58
N	1,203	1,203	1,188	919	1,449	1,188
Baseline WTP Dummies μ	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Individual Characteristics	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exclude Max./Min. Baseline WTP	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Include Endline-Only Group	No	No	No	No	Yes	No

Notes: This table presents estimates of equation (6). The outcome variable is endline willingness-to-pay for the CFL. 1(Treatment) pools all information subtreatments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations are weighted for national representativeness.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.