Variables, Parameters, Equations - Tarne & Bezemer & Theobald (2020)

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1 Variables

	Indices		
<i>i</i> index for household	index for household, unique identifier; attributes of i include y, b, Ξ, k		
j index for each indiv	index for each individual housing and rental transaction; attributes for		
j include i of seller	j include i of seller and buyer, $k, p_{k,t}, r_{k,t}$		
k index for house, from	index for house, from 1 to total number of houses, attributes of k include		
Q, owner _i , resident _i	, days on the market,		
t index for the curren			
Q index quality value	Q index quality value of house, value between 0 and 34		
	Variables		
c_i	non-essential consumption	(1)	
y_i	annual gross total income	(3)	
$y_i^m \\ y_i^m, emp$	monthly gross total income	(4)	
$y_i^{m,emp}$	monthly employment income, dependent on	(5)	
	age and income percentile of hh. Calibrated		
	against UK data		
$y_i^{m,rent}$	monthly rental income, dependent on rented-	(6)	
	out property		
$y_i^{m,div}$	monthly dividend income, paid out of com-	(7)	
	mercial bank's interest income, dependant on		
	household's deposits		
I_t	aggregate monthly interest payments	(7)	
$I_t \sum_{\substack{i=1\\ y_i^{i=1}}}^{i=n_{p,t}} b_{i,t} $ $y_i^{m,net} $ $T(y_i^{emp})$	total financial wealth	(7)	
$\overline{y_i^{disp}}$	monthly disposable income	(8)	
$\overset{\circ}{y_i^{m,net}}$	monthly net total income	(9)	
$T(y_i^{emp})$	monthly tax expenditure, dependent on an-	(9)	
	nual gross employment income	()	
$Insurance(y_i^{emp})$	monthly insurance expenditure, dependent on	(9)	
~ 6	annual gross employment income	. /	
s_i^m	monthly saving of hh i	(10)	

b_i	current bank balance	(11)
W^h	total housing wealth	(11) (12)
SH	set of hhs in social housing. This includes BTL	(14)
~ =-	investors when they enter the simulation and	()
	bid for their home.	
R	set of hhs renting a house.	(15)
OO	set of hhs living in their bought home without	(16)
	having investment property.	` /
BTL	set of hhs that live in their bought home and	(17)
	bought at least one more house. If a household	
	can buy more than its home is set exogenously.	
action	types of actions agents perform involving a	(19)
	probability	
Prob	probability of $i \in SH$ to bid for home	(20)
(placing a bid) $_{t,k}^{SH\to OO}$, .
$p_{t,k}^{SH \to OO}$ $q_t^{SH \to OO}$	desired expenditure for buying a home	(21)
$q_t^{SH \to OO}$	maximum mortgage principal for $i \in SH$	(22)
$d_t^{SH \to OO}$	downpayment for $i \in SH$	(23)
$d_{\min,t}^{SH \to OO}$	downpayment for $i \in SH$ set by bank	(24)
int_t	mortgage interest rate	(25)
int_t^{spread}	interest rate spread, set by the bank	(25)
g_t	expected monthly house price appreciation,	(26)
1.	same for all HHs	(27)
$h_t = ref$	house price index	(27)
$p_Q^{ref} \\ n_t^{hmsales}$	reference price for quality Q	(27)
	total number of housing transactions in t	(27)
$m_{k,i,t}$	mortgage payment principal, either calculated as $q^{SH\to OO}$	(28) (28)
$q_{i,t}$	principal, either calculated as q	(20)
	or $q_t^{BTL} \to BTL$, depending on the agents class	(20)
$rac{\overline{r_{Q,t}}}{r_Q^{ref}}$	expected average rental price for Q	(29)
r_Q	rental reference price	(30)
Prob	probability to place bid on rental market	(31)
$ (\text{placing a bid})_t^{SH \to R} $ $r_t^{SH \to R} $	hid price vental market i C CU	(22)
$Prob(\text{to SH})_t^{R \to SH}$	bid price rental market $i \in SH$	(32) (33)
$1700(00511)_t$	probability to go to social housing for agent $i \in \mathbb{R}$	(33)
Prob	probability of $i \in OO$ to place an offer for its	(34)
(offering home) $_t^{OO \to SH}$	home on the housing market	(01)
$p_{i,t,k}$	initial offer price for home $(p_{i,t,k}^{OO o SH})$ or in-	(35)
• -7-1"4	vestment property $(p_{i,t,k}^{BTL} \to BTL)$	` /
if k unsold in $t-1$:	monthly price reduction of unsold houses al-	(36)
$p_{t,k}$	ready on the market	
$n_{p,t}$	total number of households	(37)

$\overline{p_{Q,t}}$	expected average sale price for house with quality Q	(38)
$\begin{array}{c} Prob \\ (\text{placing a bid})_t^{BTL} \to BTL \end{array}$	probability to invest	(39)
$p_t^{BTL} \rightarrow BTL$ Ω_i	bid price for investment property expected yield of capital investment	(40) (41)
$d_t^{DTL} \to BTL$	downpayment for $i \in BTL$	(42)
$AOO \rightarrow BTL$	- *	` /
$a_{\min,t}^{CO}$ $q_{t}^{BTL} \rightarrow BTL$	downpayment for $i \in BTL$ set by bank	(43)
q_t^{OO} , ETE	maximum mortgage principal for $i \in BTL$	(44)
r_t^{yield}	overall rental yield	(45)
$rac{\overline{o_{Q,t}}}{D_t^{rm}}$	average occupancy for a house of quality Q	(46)
D_t^{rm}	average days on rental market	(47)
$D_{k,t}^{rm} \\ r_{k,t}^{BTL \to BTL}$	days on the rental market of house k	(47)
$r_{k,t}^{BTL o BTL}$	initial offer rental price	(48)
if k not rented out in $t-1$:	price reduction rental offer	(49)
$r_{k,t}^{BTL o BTL}$		
$Prob(\text{placing offer})_{t,k}^{BTL \to BT}$	^L probability of placing offer for investment	(50)
,	property	
$\Psi_{k,i,t}$	expected effective yield	(51)
$u_{k,t}$	equity of house k	(52)
$r_{k,t}^{yield}$	rental yield of house k	(53)
$p_{k,t}$	sale price of house k realised in auction	(54)
$p_{t,k}^{offer} \ p_{t}^{bid} \ $	set of offer prices in housing market	(55)
p_t^{bid}	set of bid prices in housing market	(56)
r_{t}^{exp} yield	expected rental gross yield	(57)
$r_{k,t}^{exp}$ yield $r_{k,t}^{exp}$ o_{Q}^{exp}		(58)
	expected occupancy	
nbid up	when offered house receives more than one hid	` /
$p_k^{ m Bid\ up}$	when offered house receives more than one bid,	(59)
$p_k^{ m bid}$ up	when offered house receives more than one bid, the price is 'bid up'	(59)
$p_k^{ m bid}$ up l	when offered house receives more than one bid, the price is 'bid up' bid-up price variable, chosen at random from	` /
$p_k^{ m bid}$ up	when offered house receives more than one bid, the price is 'bid up' bid-up price variable, chosen at random from a geometric distribution	(59) (60)
$p_k^{ m bid}$ up l	when offered house receives more than one bid, the price is 'bid up' bid-up price variable, chosen at random from	(59)

2 Parameters

Recurring parameters, like α or ϵ are numbered according to the number of the equation they appear in.

		Parameters
(1)	$c_0 = y_{m.min}^{param}$	essential consumption, set to
	,	minimum monthly earnings

(1)	$\alpha_i = 0.99, 0.96, 0.93,$
	0.9, 0.85, 0.6;
	$\beta_i = 0.0075, 0.006, 0.005,$
	0.004, 0.002, 0.0002;
	$\gamma = 0.25$

marginal propensities to consume due to income (α_i) and wealth (β_i) set according to households income percentile Ξ_i (1st quarter, 2nd quarter, 3rd quarter, 4th quarter, top 10%, top 1%)

Calibrated to match the UK wealth distribution and financial wealth to mortgage debt relation (Wealth and Asset Survey (2020))

(2)
$$\zeta = 2, \, \delta = 0.8$$

(5) Ξ_i , value between 0 and 1

sumption response when house-holds experience negative equity. income percentile of hh i, set at birth of hh, according to calibrated distribution monthly essential consumption by every hh. $y_{m,min}^{param} = \text{monthly}$ minimum earnings (£492.7)

liquidity preference and con-

minimum earnings for a married couple from income support

$$y_{m,min}^{param} = 492.7$$

 $\chi = 0.8$

 $\psi = 6$

(20) $\beta_{(20)} = \frac{1}{3500}$ (21) $\alpha_{21} = 4.5, \quad \beta_{21} = 0.08,$ $\varepsilon_{21} = N(0, 0.5)$ sensitivity parameter

equation can be understood as setting the desired expenditure so that the long-term cost of the house (which takes into account the expected house capital appreciation) is a noisy fraction of income

LTV ratio (can be specified differently for for first-time buyers, owner-occupiers, buy-to-let investors. Set exogenously.

LTI ratio set exogenously by the bank and central bank, and dependent on characteristic of hh. Maximum fraction of the hh's income to be spent on mortgage repayments under stressed conditions

$$(22) \qquad \nu = 0.5$$

(22)

(22)

(22) $\alpha_{22} = 300$ 25-year mortgage contract with monthly payments

(23)
$$\alpha_{23} = 10.35 (11.15),$$

 $\beta_{23} = 0.898 (0.958)$

scale parameter α_{23} and the shape parameter β_{23} for first-time buyers (owner-occupiers)

Calibrated against mortgage approval/housing transaction ratio, Bank of England core indicators average 1987-2006

(25)	$i_{base}^{param} = 0.005,$ $i_{t=0}^{spread} = 0.03$	base and interest rate is set exogenously, fixed	
(26)	$\alpha_{26} = 0.44, \ \beta_{26} = -0.007$	represents the house price trend households estimate	estimated from NMG Survey and Land Registry data for 2014/2018
(27)	$ \ln(p_Q^{ref}) = N(12.1186, 0.6414) $	Distribution of house reference prices for each quality band	Input calibrated from Land Registry Price Paid Data for 2011
(29)	$\rho_{(29)} = 0.84$	Decay factor to adjust for lower absolute market turnover in the model opposed to the real econ- omy	
(29)	$ \ln(r_Q^{ref}) = N(6.0708, 0.4796) $	Distribution of rental reference prices for each quality band	calibrated from English Housing Survey data for 2012-2013
(34)	$\zeta_{34} = \frac{1}{17}$	long-term selling probability once every 17 years	English Housing Survey (EHS) data for 2011
(35)	$\theta(0,1)^p$	Distribution of initial house sale price mark-ups over average price of same quality houses; de- fined between 0 and 1	based on back- projecting Zoopla data using HPI data
(35)	$\epsilon_{35} = U(0,1)$	random number between 0 and 1	111
(36)	$\epsilon_{36} = N(1.603, 0.617)$	Monthly probability of reducing the price of a house on the mar- ket	calibrated against Zoopla data
(39)	$\alpha_{39} = 0.5, \beta_{39} = 50.0$	α is the maximum share of post- tax income that investors want to spend on mortgage payments, β is intensity of choice on effec- tive yield	
(41)	$\delta_i = 0.5 \text{ or } 0.9$	weight of BTL hh i on capital yield (as opposed to rental yield)	
(42)	$\epsilon_{42} = RN \sim U[0, 1]$	Random number between 0 and 1	
(44)	$\xi = 1.25, i_{BTL}^{param} = 0.05$	Interest Cover Ratio (ICR) value and "stress interest rate" for BTL-investors exogenously set	

by Central Bank

(45)	$ \rho_{45} = 0.82 $	Decay factor to adjust for lower	
		absolute market turnover in the	
		model's rental market than in	
		the real economy	
(46)	$\rho_{46} = 0.995$	Decay factor to adjust for lower	
, ,	•	absolute market turnover in the	
		model opposed to the real econ-	
		omy	
(46)	$\alpha_{(46)} = 18$	average tenancy length in	ARLA - Members
` /	(10)	months	survey of the Pri-
			vate Rented Sector
			Q4 2013
(48)	$\theta(0,1)^r$	Distribution of initial rental price	based on back-
()	(, ,	mark-ups over average price of	projecting Zoopla
			- • • -
		tween 0 and 1	data
(58)	547 = 18 months in days	expected occupancy based on 18	
()	V	month rental contract followed	
		by a number of days waiting	
(58)	547 = 18 months in days	expected occupancy based on 18 month rental contract followed	O

		Initialisation	
variable	value		comments

3 Agent states, probabilities and prices




Figure 1: Agent states, probabilities to change states and respective bid and ask prices

4 Equations

desired consumption:

$$c_{i,t}^{desired} = c_0 + \alpha_i y_{i,t}^{m,disp} + \beta_i \left(b_{i,t} + \gamma(w_{i,t}^h - q_{i,t}) \right)$$
(1)

consumption:

$$c_{i,t} = \begin{cases} \text{if } b_{i,t} - (c_{i,t}^{desired} - y_{i,t}^{m,disp}) < \zeta y_{i,t}^{m,disp} &, c_{i,t} = \alpha_i y_{i,t}^{m,disp} \\ \text{if } c_{i,t}^{desired} < 0 &, c_{i,t} = 0 \\ \text{if equity position negative} &, c_{i,t} = \delta c_{i,t}^{desired} \\ \text{else} &, c_{i,t} = c_{i,t}^{desired} \end{cases}$$
(2)

gross income yearly:

$$y_{i,t} = 12y_{i,t}^m (3)$$

gross income monthly:

$$y_{i,t}^{m} = y_{i,t}^{m,emp} + y_{i,t}^{m,rent} + y_{i,t}^{m,div}$$
(4)

employment income:

$$y_{i,t}^{m,emp} = f(age_{i,t}, \Xi_i) \tag{5}$$

rent income:

$$y_{i,t}^{m,rent} = r_{k,i,t}^{BTL \to BTL} \tag{6}$$

dividend income:

$$y_{i,t}^{m,div} = I_t \cdot \frac{b_{i,t}}{\sum_{i=1}^{i=n_{p,t}} b_{i,t}}$$
 (7)

disposable income:

$$y_{i,t}^{m,disp} = y_{i,t}^{m,net} - y_{m,min}^{param} - m_{k,i} - r_{k,i}^{SH \to R}$$
 (8)

net income:

$$y_{i,t}^{m,net} = y_{i,t}^m - T(y_{i,t}^{emp}) - Insurance(y_{i,t}^{emp})$$
 (9)

saving:

$$s_{i,t}^{m} = y_{i,t}^{m,disp} - c_{i,t} (10)$$

bank balance:

$$b_{i,t} = b_{i,t-1} + s_{i,t}^m (11)$$

total housing wealth:

$$W^h = \sum_{i=0}^k \overline{p_{Q,k,t}} \tag{12}$$

states agents can be in:

$$i \in SH \cup R \cup OO \cup BTL \tag{13}$$

agents in social housing:

$$SH = \{ \text{households who enter the simulation}, \\ \text{renters whose contracts just ended}, \\ \text{homeowners who sold their home in } t-1 \}$$
 (14)

renters:

$$R = \{\text{households who rented a home}\}$$
 (15)

owner-occupiers:

$$OO = \{\text{households who bought a home}\}$$
 (16)

buy-to-let investors:

$$BTL = \{\text{households who bought more than one house}\}$$
 (17)

general rule for bids and offers to be made:

$$i \begin{cases} \text{bids or offers if } RN \sim U[0,1] < Prob(\text{action}) \\ \text{does not act if } RN \sim U[0,1] \ge Prob(\text{action}) \end{cases}$$
 (18)

types of actions:

probability of $i \in SH$ to bid for home (see arrow 1 in Figure 1):

 $Prob(\text{placing a bid})_{i,t,k}^{SH\to OO}$

$$= \frac{1}{1 + exp(-\beta_{20}[12\overline{r_{Q,t}} - (12 \cdot m_{i,t}^{SH \to OO} - p_{i,t,k}^{SH \to OO} \cdot g_t)])},$$
(20)

if action is taken is decided by using equation (18).

desired expenditure for buying a house¹:

$$p_{t,k}^{SH \to OO} = \min \left(q_{i,t}^{SH \to OO} + b_{i,t}, \quad \frac{\alpha_{21} 12 y_i^{m,emp} \exp(\varepsilon_{21})}{1 - \beta_{21} g_t} \right)$$
(21)

maximum mortgage principal for $i \in SH^2$:

$$q_{i,t}^{SH \to OO} = \min(\text{LTV, LTI, Affordability constraint})$$

$$q_{i,t}^{SH \to OO} = \min \left(\frac{b_i \chi_{i,t}}{1 - \chi_{i,t}}, \quad y_i \psi, \quad y_i^{m,d} \nu \frac{1 - (1 + \frac{int}{12})^{-\alpha_{22}}}{\frac{int}{12}} \right)$$
 (22)

downpayment for $i \in SH$:

$$d_{i,t}^{SH\to OO} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \Xi \le 0.3\\ \max\left(d_{\min,i,t}^{SH\to OO}, & h_t F^{-1}((\Xi_i - 0.3)/0.7)\right), & \text{if } \Xi > 0.3 \end{cases}$$
(23)

 $F^{-1}(\alpha_{23}, \beta_{23})$: inverse cumulative log-normal distribution function

downpayment for $i \in SH$ set by bank:

$$d_{\min,i,t}^{SH \to OO} = p_{i,t,k}^{SH \to OO} - q_{i,t}^{SH \to OO} \tag{24} \label{eq:24}$$

mortgage interest rate:

$$int_t = int_{base}^{param} + int_t^{spread} (25)$$

expected HPI appreciation:

$$g_t = \alpha_{(26)} \left[\left(\frac{h_{t-1} + h_{t-2} + h_{t-3}}{h_{t-13} + h_{t-14} + h_{t-15}} \right)^{\frac{1}{24}} - 1 \right] - \beta_{(26)}$$
 (26)

 $^{^1}SH \rightarrow OO$ can be read as: "for changing from the social housing to owner occupier state."

 $^{^2}$ LTI and Affordability constraint can be deactivated. LTV ratios can be agent-type and time dependent.

house price index:

$$h_{t} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_{t-1}^{hm \ sales}} p_{k,t-1,j}}{\sum_{j=1}^{n_{t-1}^{hm \ sales}} p_{Q,t-1,j}^{ref}}$$
(27)

mortgage payment:

$$m_{k,i,t} = q_{i,t} \frac{\frac{int_{t=s}}{12}}{1 - (1 + \frac{int_{t=s}}{12})^{-300}}$$
 (28)

s = mortgage contract starting period

expected average rental price for Q:

$$\overline{r_{Q,t}} = 0.25 \cdot \left(\rho_{(29)} \overline{r_{Q,t-1}} + (1 - \rho_{(29)}) \frac{\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n_{Q,t-1}^{rm \ sales}} r_{k,t-1,j} \right)}{n_{Q,t-1}^{rm \ sales}} \right) + 0.75 r_Q^{ref} \cdot \text{RPI}_t$$
(29)

rental price index:

$$RPI_{t} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_{t-1}^{rm \ sales}} r_{k,t-1,j}}{\sum_{j=1}^{n_{t-1}^{rm \ sales}} r_{Q,t-1,j}^{ref}}$$
(30)

probability to place bid on rental market (see arrow 5 in Figure 1):

 $Prob(\text{placing a bid})_t^{SH \to R} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } i \in \text{SH already placed bid on housing market} \\ 1, & \text{if } i \in \text{SH did not place bid on housing market} \end{cases}$ (31)

bid price rental market $i \in SH$:

$$r_{i,t}^{SH \to R} = 0.33 y_{t,i}^{m,emp} \tag{32}$$

probability to go to social housing for agent $i \in \mathbb{R}$ (see arrow 6 in Figure 1):

$$Prob(\text{to SH})_t^{R \to SH} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if rental contract valid} \\ 1, & \text{if rental contract expired} \end{cases}$$
 (33)

probability of $i \in OO$ to place an offer for its home on the housing market (see arrow 2 in Figure 1):

$$Prob(\text{offering home})_t^{OO \to SH} = \frac{1}{12}\zeta_{34}$$
 (34)

if action is taken is decided by using equation (18).

initial offer price for home or investment property:

$$p_{t,k} = \max(q_{k,t}, \quad \theta(\epsilon_{35})^p \cdot \overline{p_{Q,t}}) \tag{35}$$

monthly price reduction of unsold homes or investment properties already on the market:

if
$$k$$
 unsold in $t-1$: $p_{t,k} = \begin{cases} p_{t-1,k}(1 - \exp(\varepsilon_{36})), & \text{with probability } 0.06\\ p_{t-1,k}, & \text{with probability } 0.94 \end{cases}$
(36)

total number of households:

$$n_{p,t} = \#SH_t + \#BTL_t + \#OO_t + \#R_t \tag{37}$$

expected average sale price for house with quality Q:

$$\overline{p_{Q,t}} = 0.25 \cdot \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_{Q,t-1}^{hm \ sales}} p_{k,Q,t-1,j}}{n_{Q,t-1}^{hm \ sales}} + 0.75 h_t p_Q^{ref}$$
(38)

probability to invest (see arrow 3 and 4 in Figure 1):

$$Prob(\text{placing a bid})_{t}^{BTL \to BTL} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \sum m_{i,k} > \alpha_{39} y_{i,t}^{m,net} \\ 1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{1 + e^{(-\beta_{39}\Omega_{i,t})}}\right)^{\frac{1}{12}}, & \text{if else} \end{cases}$$
(39)

bid price for investment property³:

$$p_{0t}^{BTL} \to BTL = q_{it}^{BTL} \to BTL + b_{t,i}$$
 (40)

expected yield of capital investment:

$$\Omega_{i,t} = \frac{p_t^{\stackrel{BTL}{C} \to BTL}}{d_t^{\stackrel{BTL}{C} \to BTL}} (\delta_i g_t + (1 - \delta_i) \overline{r_t^{yield}}) - \frac{m_{k,i,t}}{d_t^{OO} \to BTL}$$

$$\tag{41}$$

downpayment for $i \in BTL$:

$$d_t^{\stackrel{BTL}{OO} \to BTL} = \max \left(d_{\min,t}^{\stackrel{BTL}{OO} \to BTL}, \quad p_{t,k}^{\stackrel{BTL}{OO} \to BTL} \cdot (0.3 + 0.1 \cdot \epsilon_{35}) \right) \tag{42}$$

 $³p^{BTL} \rightarrow BTL$ can be read as: "price for a house for BTL agents and Owner-Occupiers that would then become BTL agents."

downpayment for $i \in \mathsf{BTL}$ set by bank:

$$d_{\text{min},t}^{BTL} \to BTL = p_{t,k}^{BTL} \to BTL - q_t^{BTL} \to BTL$$

$$\tag{43}$$

maximum mortgage principal for $i \in BTL$:

 $q_t^{BTL} \rightarrow BTL = \min(\text{LTV}, \, \text{interest cover contstraint (ICR)})$

$$q_t^{BTL} \to BTL = \min \left(\frac{b_{i,t} \chi}{1 - \chi}, \frac{b_{i,t}}{\frac{\overline{r_t^{yield}}}{\xi \cdot i_{BTL}^{param}}} \right)$$
(44)

mortgage payment for $i \in BTL$: overall rental yield⁴:

$$\overline{r_t^{yield}} = \rho_{45} \overline{r_{t-1}^{yield}} + (1 - \rho_{45}) \cdot \frac{\sum_{Q=1}^{N_Q} \left(\frac{12n_{Q,t-1}^{rm \ sales} \overline{r_{Q,t-1}} \cdot \overline{o_{Q,t-1}}}{\overline{p_{Q,t-1}}} \right)}{n_{t-1}^{rm \ sales}} \tag{45}$$

average occupancy for a house of quality Q:

$$\overline{o_{Q,t}} = \frac{\alpha_{(46)}}{\alpha_{(46)} + \rho_{(46)} \overline{o_{Q,t-1}} + (1 - \rho_{(46)}) \overline{D_{t-1}^{rm}}}$$
(46)

average days on rental market:

$$\overline{D_{t-1}^{rm}} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n_{t-1}^{rm} \ sales} D_{k,t-1,j}^{rm}}{n_{t-1}^{rm} \ sales}$$
(47)

initial offer rental price:

$$r^{BTL \to BTL_{k,t}} = \theta(\epsilon_{35})^r \cdot \overline{r_{Q,t}} \tag{48}$$

price reduction rental offer

if k not rented out in
$$t-1$$
: $r_{k,t}^{BTL\to BTL}=0.95r_{k,t-1}^{BTL\to BTL}$ (49)

probability of placing offer for investment property (see arrow 4 in Figure 1):

Prob(placing offer)_{t,k}^{BTL \to BTL} =
$$\begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } i \text{ has only 2 houses} \\ 1 - \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{(-\beta_{39}\Psi_{k,i,t})}}\right)^{\frac{1}{12}}, & \text{else} \end{cases}$$
(50)

⁴the sum is the average flow yield, which I could put in a separate formula

expected effective yield:

$$\Psi_{k,i,t} = \frac{\overline{p_{Q,t}}}{u_{k,t}} \left(\delta_i g_t + (1 - \delta_i) r_{k,t}^{yield}\right) - \frac{m_{k,i,t}}{u_{k,t}}$$

$$(51)$$

equity of house k:

$$u_{k,t} = \overline{p_{Q,t}} - q_t^{BTL} \to BTL \tag{52}$$

rental yield of house k:

$$r_{k,t}^{yield} = \frac{12r_{k,t}}{\overline{p_{Q,t}}} \tag{53}$$

housing market clearing process

round 1, step 1:

$$\forall \; BTL \; \max_{k \leq \max\left(r_{k,t}^{exp \; yield}\right)} \left(p_{t,k}^{offer} \leq p_{t}^{STL \to BTL}\right)$$

$$\forall \; SH \; \max_{k \leq \max(Q)} \left(p_{t,k}^{offer} \leq p_{t}^{SH \to OO}\right)$$

round 1, step2:

of fer is machted, if
$$\exists !\ BTL \lor SH : p_{t,k}^{offer} < p_t^{bid} \rightarrow p_{k,t} = p_{t,k}^{offer}$$
 else $p_{t,k}^{offer} = p_{k,i}^{bid-up}$, then pick randomly one bid with $p_{k,i}^{bid-up} \le p_t^{bid} \rightarrow p_{k,t} = p_{k,i}^{bid-up}$ (54)

round 1, step 3:

return unmatched offers and bids into the pool

round 2 and following: repeat until:

- bid = 0
- offer = 0

set of offer prices

$$p_{t,k}^{offer} = \{p_{k,t}^{BTL \rightarrow BTL}, p_{t,k}^{OO \rightarrow SH}\} \tag{55}$$

set of bid prices:

$$p_t^{bid} = \{p_C^{^{BTL}} \rightarrow ^{BTL}, p_t^{SH \rightarrow OO}\}$$
 (56)

expected rental gross yield

$$r_{k,t}^{exp\ yield} = \frac{12\overline{r_{Q,t}} \cdot o_Q^{exp}}{p_{k,t}^{offer}} \tag{57}$$

expected occupancy:

$$o_Q^{exp} = \frac{547}{547 + \overline{D_{t-1}^{rm}}} \tag{58}$$

bid-up price in auction:

$$p_{k,i}^{\rm bid~up} = 1.0075^l \tag{59}$$

choosing bidding-up variable \boldsymbol{l} from a geometric distribution:

$$P(l) = (1 - e^{-7B/30})^{l-1} e^{-7B/30}$$
(60)

rental market clearing process

round 1, step 1:

$$\forall SH \max_{k \le \max(Q)} \left(r_{t,k}^{BTL \to BTL} \le r_t^{SH \to R} \right)$$

round 1, step2:

round 1, step 3:

return unmatched offers and bids into the pool

round 2 and following: repeat until:

- bid = 0
- offer = 0