Integrity

Contents

Introduction

- Integrity: maintaining accuracy and completeness of data
- Goal
  - Prevent adversary from modifying data
  - More feasible: detect if data has been altered
- Examples
  - Protecting files on disks
  - Assuring installation of correct software
  - Assuring the delivered packet has not been tempered with in traffic

Message Authentication Code

Compute TAG

$$t = S(k, m)$$

Verify TAG

$$1 = V(k, m, t)$$

$MAC\ I = (S, V)$ defined over (K, M, T) is a pair of algs.:

$$S : K \times M \rightarrow T$$

$$V : K \times M \times T \rightarrow \{0,1\}$$

$$|M| \gg |T|$$

such that

$$\forall\, k \in K, m \in M: \quad V(k, m, S(k, m)) = 1$$

Adaptation of: Dan Boneh, Cryptography I, Stanford.

Is a shared secret required?

- Is all these secrecy required?
- Could we not just simply use
  - MD-5 or
  - SHA-{1,2,3} or
  - CRC?

Secure MAC

- Attacker's power: **Chosen message attack**
  - For $m_1 \ldots m_q$ attacker is given $t_i = S(k, m_i)$
- Attacker's goal: **Existential forgery**
  - Produce a **new** valid (m, t) s. t.

$$(m, t) \notin \{(m_{1,} t_1) \ldots (m_q, t_q)\}$$

Implications

$\rightarrow$ attacker cannot produce a valid tag for a new message

$\rightarrow$ given (m, t) attacker cannot produce (m, t') for $t \neq t'$

Secure MAC (def)



$$b = 1 \quad \text{if } V(k, m, t) = 1 \text{ and } (m, t) \notin \{(m_1, t_1) \ldots (m_q, t_q)\}$$

$$b = 0 \quad \text{otherwise}$$

$I = (S, V)$ is a **secure MAC** if for all "efficient" adversaries A

$$\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{MAC}}[A, I] = \Pr[\text{Chal. outputs } 1]$$

is "negligible".

Secure MAC

- Negligible?
  - Assume less than 2^{-80}

- Suppose a *S(k, m)* computes 10-bit tags
  - Is such a MAC secure, why?

(Recall) Secure PRF

- Let $F : K \times X \to Y$ be a PRF
  - $Funs[X, Y]$ the set of all functions from X to Y
  - $S_F = \{F(k, -) : \forall k \in K\} \subseteq Funs[X, Y]$

Intuitively

  - A PRF is secure if a random function in $Funs[X, Y]$ is indistinguishable from a random function in S_F



$|S_F| = |K|$

$|Funs[X,Y]| = |Y|^{|X|}$

Adaptation of: Dan Boneh, Cryptography I, Stanford.

(Recall) Secure PRF (def.)

- For $b \in \{0, 1\}$ define experiment EXP(b) as



- Def: *F* is a secure PRF if for all eff. adversaries A $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{PRF}}[A, F]$ is negligible.

$$\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{PRF}}[A, F] := \left| \Pr[\mathrm{EXP}(0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathrm{EXP}(1) = 1] \right|$$

Secure PRF → Secure MAC

- For a PRF $F : K \times X \to Y$ define MAC $I_F = (S, V)$

$$S(k,m) := F(k,m)$$

$$V(k,m,t) := \begin{cases} 1 & t = F(k,m) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- **Thm**. If F is a secure PRF and $1/|Y|$ is negligible (i.e. $|Y|$ is sufficiently large), then I_F is a secure MAC.

Truncating MACs based on PRFs

- Lemma: Suppose $F: K \times X \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is a secure PRF. So is $F_t(k,m) := F(k,m)[1 \ldots t]$ for all $1 \leq t \leq n$

- If (S, V) is a MAC based on a secure PRF that outputs *n*-bit tags, then the truncated MAC that outputs *w* bits is also secure.
  - As long as 2^{-w} is still negligible

Examples of secure MAC

- AES (or any secure PRF)
  - A secure MAC for 16-byte (128-bit) messages
- Longer messages?
  - **CBC-MAC**
  - **HMAC**
- Both convert a small-PRF into a big-PRF

ECBC-MAC



$$F : K \times X \to X$$ (a secure PRP)

$$F_{\mathrm{ECBC}} : K^2 \times X^{\leq L} \to X$$

$$X^{\leq L} = \bigcup_{i=1}^{L} X^i$$

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBC-MAC

Hash-MAC (HMAC)

- Built from *collision resistance*
- Let $H : M \to T$ be a hash function $|M| \gg |T|$
- A **collision** for H is a pair $m_0, m_1 \in M$ such that:

$$H(m_0) = H(m_1) \text{ and } m_0 \neq m_1$$

- Function H is **collision resistant** if for all *explicit* “eff.” algs. A $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{CR}}[A, H]$ is negligible.

$$\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{CR}}[A, H] := \Pr[A \text{ outputs collision for } H]$$

- Example: SHA-256

MAC from CR

- Let $I=(S,V)$ be a MAC for short messages over (K,M,T) (e.g. AES)
- Let $H: M^{\text{BIG}} \to M$
- Def: $I^{\text{BIG}}=(S^{\text{BIG}},V^{\text{BIG}})$ over (K,M^{BIG},T) as:

$$S^{\text{BIG}}(k,m):=S(k,H(m))$$

$$V^{\text{BIG}}(k,m,t):=V(k,H(m),t)$$

- **Thm**. If I is a secure MAC and H is collision resistant, then I^{BIG} is a secure MAC.
- Example: $S(k,m):=\text{AES}_{\text{2-block-CBC}}(k,\text{SHA-256}(m))$

Example: Integrity using CR hash

- Protecting software packages (Linux distros)





- User downloads a package and verifies it using hashes in public space
  - If *H* is collision resistant, the attacker cannot modify packages without being detected
- We require <u>no shared secret</u>, but we need a <u>read-only public space</u>

Adaptation of: Dan Boneh, Cryptography I, Stanford.

Generic attack on CR

- Let $H: M \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ be a hash function $|M| \gg 2^n$
- Generic algorithm to find a collision

1)Chose $\sqrt{2^n} = 2^{\frac{n}{2}}$ random messages: $m_1 \ldots m_{2^{n/2}} \in M$ distinct w.h.p.

2)For $i = 1 \ldots 2^{n/2}$: compute $t_i = H(m_i)$

3)Look for a collision $(t_i = t_j)$. If not found, go to 1.

- How many iterations before we find a collision?

The birthday paradox

- **Thm.** Let $r_1 ... r_n \in [1 ... B]$ be independent and identically distributed integers. If we sample $n = 1.2 \times \sqrt{B}$ samples from interval $[1 ... B]$ then the probability of finding a collision is

$$\Pr[\exists i \neq j : r_i = r_j] \geq 0.5$$

- Approximation of collision probability given *n* samples with Taylor series

$$p(n) \approx 1 - e^{\frac{-n(n-1)}{2B}}$$

Collision probabilities



Generic attack on CR

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  2)For $i = 1 \ldots 2^{n/2}$: compute $t_i = H(m_i)$

  3)Look for a collision $(t_i = t_j)$. If not found, go to 1.

- How many iterations before we find a collision?
  - ~ 2
  - Running time $O(2^{\frac{n}{2}})$

Example CR hash functions

Function	Digest (tag) size [bits]	Generic attack time
MD-5	128	2^{64}
SHA-1*	160	2^{80}
SHA-256	256	2^{128}
SHA-512	512	2^{256}
Whirpool	512	2^{256}

* Found collision by performing $2^{63.1}$ evaluations https://shattered.it

Merkle-Damgard construction

- <u>Goal:</u> given CR function for **short** messages, construct CR function for **long** messages



- CR for short messages (compression function) $h: T \times X \to T$
- CR for long messages $H: X^{\leq L} \to T$
- PB: padding block



  - If no space for PB, add an extra block
- **Thm.** If *h* is CR, so is *H.*

Compression functions

- Built from block ciphers $E : K \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$
- Several constructions
  - **Davies-Meyer**

    $$h(H, m) := E(m, H) \oplus H$$
  - Matyas–Meyer–Oseas
  - Miyaguchi–Preneel



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-way_compression_function

Example: SHA-256

- Merkle-Damgard iterative construction
- Davies-Meyer compression function
  - Block cipher: SHACAL-2



MAC from M-D hash func.

- Can we construct a MAC directly from *H*? (e.g SHA-256)
- Naive attempt $S(k,m) := H(k \| m)$
  - Is it secure?



  - If you knew $H(k \| m)$ could you compute $H(k \| m \| \mathrm{PB} \| w)$ for any w ? How?
  - Length-extension attack

Standardized solution: HMAC

- Most commonly used on the Internet
  - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104
- Given CR hash function *H,* define a MAC as

$$S(k,m) := H(k \oplus \mathrm{opad} \quad \| \quad H(k \oplus \mathrm{ipad} \| m))$$

  - Built from a black-box implementation of SHA-256
  - Assumed to be a secure PRF
  - TLS 1.2 requires support of HMAC-SHA1-96 (TLS 1.3 does not)

Authenticated Encryption

Contents

- Ciphertext integrity
- AE definitions
- Chosen Ciphertext Attack
- Constructions
  - Encrypt-then-MAC
  - Encrypt-and-MAC
  - MAC-then-Encrypt

Authenticated Encryption (AE)

- Everything demonstrated so far provides
  - either integrity
  - or confidentiality (security against eavesdropping)
- CPA security does not provide secrecy against active attacks (where an attacker can tamper with ciphertext)
  - ➔ If you require integrity → **MAC**
  - ➔ If you require integrity and confidentiality → **AE**

AE: Desired properties

- An authenticated encryption system $\zeta = (E, D)$ is a cipher where

as usual $E : K \times M \times N \to C$

but $D : K \times C \times N \to M \cup \{ \perp \}$ $\quad \perp \notin M$

Nonce

CT is invalid (rejected)

- Security: the system must provide
  - **semantic security under CPA**, and
  - **ciphertext integrity**
    - an adversary cannot create a new valid CT (such that would decrypt properly)

Ciphertext integrity (def)

Let $\zeta = (E, D)$ be a cipher with message space M



$$b = 1 \quad \text{if } D(k, c) \neq \perp \text{ and } c \notin \{c_1 \ldots c_q\}$$

$$b = 0 \quad \text{otherwise}$$

Def: $\zeta = (E, D)$ has **ciphertext integrity** if for all “efficient” adversaries A: $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{CI}}[A, \zeta]$ is “negligible”.

$$\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{CI}}[A, \zeta] = \Pr[\text{Chal. outputs } 1]$$

Authenticated Encryption

- Def: A cipher $\zeta = (E, D)$ **provides authenticated encryption (AE)** if it is
  1) semantically secure under CPA, and
  2) has ciphertext integrity.

- Do the following ciphers provide AE:
  - AES-CBC,
  - AES-CTR,
  - RC4?
- Why?

Authenticated Encryption

- Implication 1: Authenticity



- An attacker cannot create a new valid $c \notin \{c_1 \ldots c_q\}$
- If message decrypts properly $(D(k, c) \neq \perp)$, it must have come from someone who knows secret key *k*
  - But it could be a replay

- Implication 2: Security against **chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)**

Chosen ciphertext security

- Adversary's power: **CPA** and **CCA**
  - Can encrypt any message of her choice
  - Can decrypt any message of her choice *other than some challenge*
  - (still conservative modeling of real life)
- Adversary's goal: **break semantic security**
  - Learn about the PT from the CT

Chosen ciphertext security (def)

- Let $\zeta=(E,D)$ be a cipher defined over (K,M,C)
- For $b\in\{0,1\}$ define experiments EXP(b) as



Adaptation of: Dan Boneh, Cryptography I, Stanford.

Chosen ciphertext security (def)

- Def. Cipher $\zeta=(E,D)$ is CCA secure if for all efficient adversaries A $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{CCA}}[A,\zeta]$ is negligible.

$$\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{CCA}}[A,\zeta]:=\left|\Pr[\mathrm{EXP}(0)=1]-\Pr[\mathrm{EXP}(1)=1]\right|$$

- Thm. A cipher that provides AE is also CCA secure.
- Implication. AE provides confidentiality against an active adversary that can decrypt some ciphertexts.
- Limitations
  - AE does not prevent replay attacks
  - Does not account for side channels attacks (timing)

Ex: AES-CTR is not CCA secure

- Recall
  - AES-CTR is effectively a stream cipher
  - Malleability of stream ciphers

Encrypt then MAC

- MAC computed over cipher text
- Used in IPsec, always provides AE
  - Use separate and independent keys



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption

Encrypt and MAC

- MAC computed over plain text and sent unencrypted
- Used in SSH
- Use separate and independent keys



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption

MAC then encrypt

- MAC computed over plain text and then encrypted before sending
- Used in TLS/SSL
- Use separate and independent keys



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Three AE approaches



AE: Standardized solutions

- Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
  - CTR mode encryption then CW-MAC
  - Made popular by Intel's PCLMULQDQ instruction
- CBC-MAC then CTR mode encryption (CCM)
- EAX
- All support ***authenticated encryption with associated data*** (AEAD)