


Hacking Blind

**Andrea Bittau, Adam Belay, Ali Mashtizadeh,
David Mazières, Dan Boneh**


Stanford University

Hacking buffer overflows



NGINX

Crash or no Crash? Enough to build exploit



Don't even need to know what application is running!

Exploit scenarios:

1. Open source



2. Open binary



3. Closed-binary (and source)



Attack effectiveness

- Works on 64-bit Linux with ASLR, NX and canaries

Server	Requests	Time (mins)
nginx	2,401	1
MySQL	3,851	20
Toy proprietary service (unknown binary and source)	1,950	5

Attack requirements

1. Stack vulnerability, and knowledge of how to trigger it.
2. Server process that respawns after crash
 - E.g., nginx, MySQL, Apache, OpenSSH, Samba.

Outline

- Introduction.
- Background on exploits.
- Blind ROP (BROP).
- Optimizations.

Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

handle_client()

Stack:

return address
0x400000

buf[1024]

Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

handle_client()

Stack:

return address
0x400000

AAAAAA
AAAAAA
AAAAAA
AAAAAA

Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

??

Stack:

return address
0x41414141

AAAAAAA
AAAAAAA
AAAAAAA
AAAAAAA

Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

Shellcode:

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
dup2(sock, 1);  
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```

Stack:

return address
0x500000

AAAAAA
AAAAAA
AAAAAA
AAAAAA

Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

Shellcode:

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
dup2(sock, 1);  
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```

Stack:

return address 0x600000
0x1029827189 123781923719 823719287319 879181823828

Exploit protections

```
void prologue() {  
    char buffer[1024];  
    int len = strlen(buffer);  
  
    /* ... */  
  
    /* Return address */  
    /* Randomized memory addresses */  
  
    /* Shellcode */  
    /* ... */  
}  
}
```

- I. Make stack non-executable (NX)
2. Randomize memory addresses (ASLR)

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
dup2(sock, 1);  
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```


Stack:

return address
0x600000

0x1029827189
123781923719
823719287319
879181823828


Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

.text:



```
dup2(sock, 0);
dup2(sock, 1);
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```

Stack:




Executable

Non-Executable


Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

.text:




```
dup2(sock, 0);
dup2(sock, 1);
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```

Stack:




Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

.text:




Stack:



Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

.text: 0x400000



dup2(sock, 0);
return;

dup2(sock, 1);
return;

execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
return;

Stack:


0x700000

0x600000

0x800000

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

.text: 0x400000 + ??



Stack:

Exploit requirements today

1. Break ASLR.
2. Copy of binary (find ROP gadgets / break NX).
 - Is it even possible to hack unknown applications?

Blind Return-Oriented Programming (BROP)

1. Break ASLR.
2. Leak binary:
 - Remotely find enough gadgets to call write().
 - write() binary from memory to network to disassemble and find more gadgets to finish off exploit.

Defeating ASLR: stack reading

- Overwrite a single byte with value X:
 - No crash: stack had value X.
 - Crash: guess X was incorrect.
- Known technique for leaking canaries.



Defeating ASLR: stack reading

- Overwrite a single byte with value X:
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
Return address

00000000000000000000000000000000

0x401183

Defeating ASLR: stack reading

- Overwrite a single byte with value X:
 - No crash: stack had value X.
 - Crash: guess X was incorrect.
- Known technique for leaking canaries.



Defeating ASLR: stack reading


- Overwrite a single byte with value X:
 - No crash: stack had value X.
 - Crash: guess X was incorrect.
- Known technique for leaking canaries.



(Was: 0x401183)

Defeating ASLR: stack reading

- Overwrite a single byte with value X:
 - No crash: stack had value X.
 - Crash: guess X was incorrect.
- Known technique for leaking canaries.




(Was: 0x401183)

How to find gadgets?

.text:

0x401183
0x401170
0x401160
0x401150
0x401140
0x401130




Stack:




How to find gadgets?

.text:

0x401183
0x401170
0x401160
0x401150
0x401140
0x401130




Stack:




How to find gadgets?

.text:

0x401183
0x401170
0x401160
0x401150
0x401140
0x401130




Stack:



How to find gadgets?


.text:

0x401183
0x401170
0x401160
0x401150
0x401140
0x401130



→ Connection hangs


Stack:



How to find gadgets?


.text:

0x401183
0x401170
0x401160
0x401150
0x401140
0x401130



Connection closes

Stack:



Three types of gadgets

Stop gadget

```
sleep(10);  
return;
```

Crash gadget

```
abort();  
return;
```

Useful gadget

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
return;
```

- Never crashes

- Always crashes

- Crash depends on return

Three types of gadgets

Stop gadget

```
sleep(10);  
return;
```

Crash gadget

```
abort();  
return;
```


Useful gadget

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
return;
```

- Never crashes

- Always crashes

- Crash depends on return



Finding useful gadgets

0x401170

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
return;
```

0x401150

```
sleep(10);  
return;
```

Stack:

other

return address
0x401170

buf[1024]

Crash!!

Finding useful gadgets

0x401170

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
return;
```

Stack:

0x401150

return address
0x401170

buf[1024]

0x401150


```
sleep(10);  
return;
```

No crash


How to find gadgets?

.text:

0x401183
0x401170
0x401160
0x401150
0x401140
0x401130





Stack:



How to find gadgets?


.text:

0x401183
0x401170
0x401160
0x401150
0x401140
0x401130



Connection hangs



Stack:



How to find gadgets?


.text:

0x401183
0x401170
0x401160
0x401150
0x401140
0x401130




Connection closes


Stack:



What are we looking for?



What are we looking for?



Pieces of the puzzle

pop rsi
ret

pop rdi
ret

pop rdx
ret

call write
ret

stop gadget
[call sleep]

Pieces of the puzzle

The BROP gadget

```
pop rbx  
pop rbp  
pop r12  
pop r13  
pop r14  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rsi  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rdi  
ret
```


```
pop rdx  
ret
```

```
call write  
ret
```

stop gadget
[call sleep]


Finding the BROP gadget

Stack:



Finding the BROP gadget

Stack:



Finding the BROP gadget

Stack:



pop rbx
pop rbp
pop r12
pop r13
pop r14
pop r15
ret

BROP gadget

Connection
hangs

Pieces of the puzzle

The BROP gadget

```
pop rbx  
pop rbp  
pop r12  
pop r13  
pop r14  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rsi  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rdi  
ret
```

```
pop rdx  
ret
```

```
call write  
ret
```

stop gadget
[call sleep]

Pieces of the puzzle

The BROP gadget

```
pop rbx  
pop rbp  
pop r12  
pop r13  
pop r14  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rsi  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rdi  
ret
```

```
call strcmp  
ret
```

```
call write  
ret
```

stop gadget
[call sleep]

Pieces of the puzzle

The BROP gadget

```
pop rbx  
pop rbp  
pop r12  
pop r13  
pop r14  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rsi  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rdi  
ret
```


PLT

stop gadget
[call sleep]

call strcmp
ret

call write
ret

Procedure Linking Table (PLT)



Fingerprinting strcmp

arg1	arg2	result
readable	0x0	crash
0x0	readable	crash
readable	readable	nocrash

Can now control three arguments:
strcmp sets RDX to length of string

Finding write

- Try sending data to socket by calling candidate PLT function.
- check if data received on socket.
- chain writes with different FD numbers to find socket. Use multiple connections.

Launching a shell

1. dump binary from memory to network.
Not blind anymore!
2. dump symbol table to find PLT calls.
3. redirect stdin/out to socket:
 - dup2(sock, 0); dup2(sock, 1);
4. read() “/bin/sh” from socket to memory
5. execve(“/bin/sh”, 0, 0)

Braille

- Fully automated: from first crash to shell.
- 2,000 lines of Ruby.
- Needs function that will trigger overflow:
 - nginx: 68 lines.
 - MySQL: 121 lines.
 - toy proprietary service: 35 lines.

try_exp(data) → true crash
false no crash

Attack complexity

