

Extend Commitment Protocols with Temporal Regulations: Why and How

ELISA MARENGO

Advisor: MATTEO BALDONI

Co-advisor: CRISTINA BAROGLIO

Università degli Studi di Torino.
{emarengo, baldoni, baroglio}@di.unito.it

RuleML-DC 2011 - Barcelona, July 19th, 2011

What I will talk about

We want to find a *coordination* mechanism for

- *autonomous agents*

in the context of

- *open*
- *heterogeneous*

systems




Figure: Coordination schema by M. Huns & L. Stephens [Weiss, 1999]

Interaction protocols' point of view

do not make assumptions on the agents' behaviour

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


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The context

To solve the coordination task we have to be aware that

- *protocols*: they need to be verifiable
- *autonomy*: no introspection
 - ▶ No mentalistic approaches for coordination
 - ▶ Only observable behaviour can be judged
- *autonomy*: we cannot tell agents what to do
 - ▶ No procedural approaches
 - ▶ No methods invocation: they are not objects
 - ▶ It is not planning
- *heterogeneity*: no assumptions on their implementation
 - ▶ They belongs to different owners
 - ▶ We know the roles, not the players

Commitment Protocols?

Commitment protocols [Singh, 2000, Yolum and Singh, 2001a]:

$C(\text{debtor}, \text{creditor}, \text{antecedent}, \text{consequent})$

- **Social state:** contains commitments and other literals that are relevant to their interaction;
- **Social actions:** defined in terms of operations onto the social state;
- **Regulative nature:** debtors should act in accordance with the commitments they have taken.

They meet the requirements

- do not impose actions to the agents (*respecting autonomy*)
- social and observational semantics of the communication
 - ▶ no introspection (*respecting autonomy and heterogeneity*)
 - ▶ they are verifiable (*according to protocol requirement*)
- coordination is realized by means of *social expectations* (*respecting autonomy and heterogeneity*)

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What is missing?

Commitment protocols

- realize coordination through **what** condition is to be achieved [Winikoff et al., 2005]
- disregard coordination through **how** conditions should be achieved: **temporal ordering** [Baldoni et al., 2010]

Temporal regulations

To rule the evolution of the social state distinguishing

- legal evolutions
- undesired evolutions

Temporal regulations define **patterns of interaction** that

- represent conventions, norms, preferences, habits, rules and suchlike
- allow for prevision: agents can have expectations on each others' behaviour

How to specify patterns of interaction?

In a way that:

- does not compromise the **flexibility** of agents behaviour
- does not compromise the agents' **autonomy**
- fosters **openness** (agents can easily enter/leave a system)
- introduces modularity:
 - ▶ easier **re-use** of protocols in different contexts
 - ▶ easier **customization** of protocols
 - ▶ easier **composition** of protocols

Constitutive and Regulative Specifications

To meet these requirements

enhanced commitment-based protocol formal framework

[Baldoni et al., 2011]:

- explicit distinction between a **constitutive** and a **regulative** specification [Searle, 1969] of the protocol
- **constitutive specification**: how actions affect the social state
- **regulative specification**: rules the evolution of the social state

Constitutive specification

$$\begin{aligned} A &\rightarrow (\text{Action means Operation if Cond})^+ \\ \text{Action} &\rightarrow \text{protocolAction} \\ \text{Operation} &\rightarrow \text{Op}(\text{commitment}) \mid \text{fact} \mid \\ &\quad \text{Operation} \wedge \text{Operation} \\ \text{Op} &\rightarrow \text{CREATE} \mid \text{DELETE} \mid \text{RELEASE} \mid \text{DELEGATE} \mid \\ &\quad \text{ASSIGN} \mid \dots \\ \text{Cond} &\rightarrow \text{literal} \mid \text{Cond} \wedge \text{Cond} \mid \text{Cond} \vee \text{Cond} \mid \\ &\quad \text{Cond XOR Cond} \end{aligned}$$

Constitutive specification

- the *means* construct amounts to a *counts-as* relation [Searle, 1995]
- similar to [Chopra, 2009, Singh, 1999, Yolum and Singh, 2001b]

Regulative specification

2CL: Constraints among Commitment Language

allows *declarative*, *constraint-based* representation of patterns of interaction

- we defined a set of operators and their negations [Baltoni et al., 2010]
- grounded on LTL
- allows for the specification of constraints among literals and commitments
- constraints have a *regulative nature*:
 - ▶ intuitively: restrict the set of legal execution paths
 - ▶ *do not* specify *which* actions should bring conditions about
 - ▶ *any* evolution, of the social state, that respects the constraints respects the protocol

Relation	Type	Positive	LTl meaning	Negative	LTl meaning
Correlation	base	$A \bullet \multimap B$	$\Diamond A \supset \Diamond B$	$A \bullet \not\multimap B$	$\Diamond A \supset \neg \Diamond B$
	persistence	$A \bullet \multimap B$	$\Box(A \supset (A \wedge B))$	$A \bullet \not\multimap B$	$\Box(A \supset \neg(A \wedge B))$
Co-existence	base	$A \bullet \bullet B$	$A \bullet \multimap B \wedge B \bullet \multimap A$	$A \bullet \not\bullet B$	$A \bullet \not\multimap B \wedge B \bullet \not\multimap A$
	persistence	$A \bullet \bullet B$	$A \bullet \multimap B \wedge B \bullet \multimap A$	$A \bullet \not\bullet B$	$A \bullet \not\multimap B \wedge B \bullet \not\multimap A$
Response	base	$A \bullet \multimap B$	$\Box(A \supset \Diamond B)$	$A \bullet \not\multimap B$	$\Box(A \supset \neg \Diamond B)$
	persistence	$A \bullet \multimap B$	$\Box(A \supset (\Diamond B \wedge (A \cup B)))$	$A \bullet \not\multimap B$	$\Box(A \supset \neg(A \wedge B))$
Before	base	$A \multimap \bullet B$	$\neg B \cup A$	$A \not\multimap \bullet B$	$\Box(\Diamond B \supset \neg A)$
	persistence	$A \multimap \bullet B$	$\neg B \cup (A \cup B)$	$A \not\multimap \bullet B$	$\Box(\Diamond B \supset \neg A)$
Cause	base	$A \bullet \multimap \bullet B$	$A \bullet \multimap B \wedge A \multimap \bullet B$	$A \bullet \not\multimap \bullet B$	$A \bullet \not\multimap B \wedge A \not\multimap \bullet B$
	persistence	$A \bullet \bullet \multimap B$	$A \multimap \bullet B \wedge A \bullet \multimap B$	$A \bullet \not\multimap \bullet B$	$A \not\multimap \bullet B \wedge A \bullet \not\multimap B$
Premise	base	$A \multimap B$	$\Box(\bigcirc B \supset A)$	$A \not\multimap B$	$\Box(\bigcirc B \supset \neg A)$
Immediate after	base	$A \multimap B$	$\Box(A \supset \bigcirc B)$	$A \not\multimap B$	$\Box(A \supset \bigcirc \neg B)$

Table: 2CL constraint relations and their semantics in LTL.

A commitment machine for our protocols

Legal executions

- a legal execution of a commitment-based protocols enriched with 2CL regulative specification:
 - ▶ is accepted by the commitment machine built upon the constitutive specification [Winikoff et al., 2005]
 - ▶ satisfies the LTL formulas corresponding to the regulative specification

We implemented an extension of Winikoff et al.'s enhanced commitment machine [Winikoff et al., 2005]

- the output is an annotated and colored graph of the possible interactions
 - ▶ **paths** represent the possible interactions given the constitutive specification
 - ▶ **annotations** highlights violations and unsatisfied constraints
- by working on facts and events, and by considering a subset of LTL: verification can be performed on states, rather than on paths

Modularity for Business Protocols

In the context of regulations that change along time

- business protocols must be *compliant to regulations*
- **modularity** simplifies the task of adapting them to the new regulations
- new regulations usually impose the execution of new activities to be interleaved with the previous existing one
- modularity is needed to simplify the **grafting** of the new regulations onto existing business protocols

By separating constitutive and regulative specification

- new activities are added to the constitutive specification of the protocols
- new temporal regulation declaratively specify *when, how, where* the added activities are to be used: *grafting points*

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
A Real-world Case Study: OECD Guidelines

Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data:

- protecting data owners from the violation of their fundamental rights
- encouraging the flow of data by increasing trust between countries

Pre-guidelines Data Flow Protocol

- (a) *ask_data* **means** *asked_data* if $\neg \text{asked_data}$.
- (b) *send_data* **means** *sent_data*
if *asked_data* \wedge $\neg \text{sent_data}$ \wedge $\neg \text{refuse_data}$.
- (c) *refuse_data* **means** *refuse_data*, $\text{CANCEL}(C(dc, \text{asker}, \text{sent_data}))$
if *asked_data* \wedge $\neg \text{sent_data}$ \wedge $\neg \text{refuse_data}$.




Grafting of OECD Guidelines

New activities

- (d) *periodically_verify_accuracy* **means** *accuracy_verified*
if $\neg \text{asked_data} \wedge \neg \text{accuracy_verified}$.
- (e) *check_accuracy* **means** *accuracy_verified*
if $\text{asked_data} \wedge \neg \text{accuracy_verified}$.
- (f) *verify_purpose* **means** *purpose_verified*
if $\text{asked_data} \wedge \neg \text{purpose_verified}$.
- (g) *notify_owner* **means** *owner_notified*
if $\text{sent_data} \wedge \neg \text{owner_notified}$.

New regulations

- (c1) *purpose_verified* $\rightarrow \bullet$ *sent_data*
- (c2) *accuracy_verified* $\rightarrow \bullet$ *sent_data*
- (c3) *sent_data* $\bullet \rightarrow$ *owner_notified*
- (c4) *purpose_verified* $\rightarrow \bullet$ *refuse_data*
- (c5) *accuracy_verified* $\rightarrow \bullet$ *refuse_data*






Figure: Reachability graph for the Data Flow protocol extended with OECD Guidelines.

A tool for the analysis

This tool can be used by the analysts in order to:

- identify the risk of violations the interaction can encounter
- helping the decision on when to apply **regimentation** or **enforcement** [Jones and Sergot, 1994]

A Real-world Case Study: MiFID


- MiFID: Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
- protection of the clients of financial service agencies
- introduces new regulations that financial services must follow

Constitutive specification

- (a) *propose_solution* **means** *proposed_RiskL* if ...
- (b) *reject_proposal* **means** *rejected_proposal*,
 $\text{RELEASE}(C(fp, inv, invested))$ if ...
- (c) *sign_order* **means** $\text{CREATE}(C(inv, bank, contract_ended))$,
 accepted_proposal, *order_signed* if ...
- (d) *countersign_contract* **means** *contract_countersigned*,
 $\text{CREATE}(C(bank, inv, executed_order))$, *invested* if ...
- (e) *send_contract* **means** *contract_sent* if ...
- (f) *notify* **means** *notified* if ...
- (g) *end* **means** *executed_order*, *contract_ended* if ...

Regulative specification

- (c1) *notified* $\rightarrow \bullet$ *contract_ended*
- (c2) *contract_sent* $\bullet \rightarrow$ *notified*



MiFID regulation


- MiFID dictates how the interaction with the client should be carried
- violation of some constraint does not affect the sale directly, but creates a **risk of sanction** and a **risk of exposure** for the intermediary

New activities

- (h) *interview* means *investor_identified*, *document_supplied* if ...
- (i) *profile* means $\text{CREATE}(C(fp, inv, evaluation))$, *investor_classified* if $\neg \text{investor_classified} \wedge \text{investor_identified} \wedge \neg \text{contract_ended} \wedge \neg \text{contract_abort} \wedge \neg \text{rejected_proposal} \wedge \neg \text{fi_discarded}$.
- (j) *classify* means *classified* if ...
- (k) *fi_evaluation* means $\text{CREATE}(C(fp, inv, proposed_RiskL))$, *evaluation* if ...
- (l) *fi_discard* means *fi_discarded*, $\text{CANCEL}(C(fp, inv, invested))$, $\text{CANCEL}(C(fp, inv, proposed_RiskL))$ if ...
- (m) *order_verification* means *order_verified*, $\text{CREATE}(C(bank, inv, executed_order))$ if ...
- (n) *withdraw* means *contract_abort*, $\text{RELEASE}(C(bank, inv, ex_order))$, $\text{CANCEL}(C(inv, bank, contract_ended))$ if ...

New regulations

- (c3) $C(fp, inv, invested) \bullet \rightarrow \text{investor_identified} \wedge \text{document_supplied}$
- (c4) $\text{investor_classified} \rightarrow \bullet C(fp, inv, propose_riskL)$
- (c5) $\text{evaluation} \wedge \neg \text{fi_discarded} \rightarrow \bullet \text{proposed_RiskL}$
- (c6) $\text{order_verified} \rightarrow \bullet \text{contract_countersigned}$



Current and Future work

- operational semantics for our commitment machine
- how to:
 - ▶ reify regulations into business relationships?
 - ▶ bring normative force to the specification?

First step: REGULA, committing to regulations
[Marengo et al., 2011]

$C(\text{debtor}, \text{creditor}, \text{ant}_1 \cdot \text{ant}_2 \dots, \text{cons}_1 \cdot \text{cons}_2 \dots)$

- temporal regulations can be expressed inside commitments
- ‘.’ (*before* [Singh, 2003]) is a temporal operator on events: *both events must occur and in the specified order*

About REGULA

Control

It is the problem to establish whether an agent can bring about an event or complex action so as to detach or discharge a given commitment

- innate control
- social control

Safety

A commitment is safe for its debtor when the coordination necessary to fulfill the regulation is *supported* by commitments by the other agents involved, i.e. when:

- the debtor *controls* the negation of the antecedent (avoiding the commitment become active)
- or, whenever the antecedent holds, the debtor *controls* the residuation of the consequent (there is a way to satisfy the commitment)

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the *reviewers* for the helpful suggestions, the mentors, my advisor *Prof. Matteo Baldoni*, and co-advisor *Prof. Cristina Baroglio* and Dr. Vivana Patti.



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