

Argumentation & Compliance

MEDICA: an illustrative Example



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Bridging Aim of Talk

**Strengthen the link between
argumentation and RuleML**

Via

Example rather than Abstract Theory

Data Access/Sharing

□ General Problem:

- Decide **Level of Access** according to **user** and **current circumstances in compliance** with legal and/or business, etc, requirements.

□ Challenge:

- Formalize and automate Legislation, Etc policies
 - **Facilitate the management/compliance of policies**
- Cognitive Interaction
 - **Explain & “Persuade” the user (possibly via a dialogue)**

Example of MEDICA

Patient Data Access: Legislation

- There are **6 Access Levels** (Read & Write)
 - Full Access
 - Partial Access
 - Read Only Access
 - Restricted Read Access
 - Suspended Access
 - No Access

- Decide **Level of Access** according to **user** and **current circumstances, etc.**

Applications in Argumentation

(Decision Making via Argumentation & Gorgias)

□ **Options**, e.g. different **levels** of medical access

□ **Preferences**

- **Dynamic preferences** over **changing environment** of the application
- **Multi-Level preferences** over different **CONTEXTS** in the application

□ **General form** of **Preferences**:

- “**Generally**, in **SITUATION** prefer O_i , **but** in **particular CONTEXT** prefer O_j .”
- **MEDICA Example**:
 - “**Generally**, deny access **but** for the **{owner}** give full access.”
 - “**Generally**, allow full access to **{owner}** **but** when **{critical tests}** suspend access.”

Argumentation & Compliance in Gorgias

□ **STEP 1: Translate the law/policy to Scenario-Based Preferences**

- **Example:** «**Generally**, **no one has access** to medical files. **But** the owner **CAN have** full access.»
- **<1, {}, access(Agn, DataID, no_access)>**
- **<2, {owner(Agn)}, access(Agn, DataID, full_access)>**

□ **STEP 2: Automatic formalization and Generation of Execution Code in Gorgias**

Medical Data Access: MEDICA

Law 138(I)/2001: Personal Data Protection

Law N. 1(I)/2005: Patient Rights

□ **Example:** «**Generally**, **no one has access** to medical files. **But** the owner **CAN have** full access.»

- **<1, {}, access(Agn, DataID, no_access)>**
- **<2, {owner(Agn)}, access(Agn, DataID, full_access)>**

□ **Execution Code in Gorgias:**

```
rule(d1(Agn), access(Agn, DataID, full_access), []).
rule(d2(Agn), access(Agn, DataID, no_access), []).
rule(hpr21(Agn), prefer(d2(Agn), d1(Agn)), []).
rule(hpr12(Agn), prefer(d1(Agn), d2(Agn)), []) :- owner(Agn)
rule(hpr_12_21(Agn), prefer(hpr12(Agn), hpr21(Agn)), []).
```

Medical Data Access: **MEDICA**

□ **MEDICA:**


<http://medica.cs.ucy.ac.cy>

□ **Demo Online**

- **user1**
- **12user12**

□ **Note in demo:**

- **Explanation**
- **Hypothetical Reasoning**



The screenshot shows a login interface titled "Control Access Login Form". It includes a "Login to site" section with a padlock icon and a prompt to "Enter your username and password to log on:". Below this are two input fields labeled "Username..." and "Password...". A blue "Sign in!" button is positioned below the password field. At the bottom, there is a link in Greek: "Ξέχασες τον κωδικό σου;" (Forgot your password?). The background of the form is a blurred image of a clipboard and a pen.

Medical Data Access: MEDICA

Law 138(I)/2001: Personal Data Protection

Law N. 1(I)/2005: Patient Rights

- **Example:** «**Generally**, **no one has access** to medical files. **But** the owner **CAN have** full access.»
 - **<1, {}, access(Agn, DataID, no_access)>**
 - **<2, {owner(Agn)}, access(Agn, DataID, full_access)>**

- **FURTHER Example:** «**Generally**, allow full access to **{owner}** **but** when **{critical tests}** suspend access.»
 - **<3, {owner(Agn),critical(DataID)}, access(Agn,DataID, suspend_access)>**

Medical Data Access: MEDICA

Law 138(I)/2001: Personal Data Protection

Law N. 1(I)/2005: Patient Rights

- «**Generally, no one has access** to medical files. **But** the **doctor CAN have** limited plus access for **therapy/medical use**.»
 - **<1, {}, access(Agn, DataID, no_access)>**
 - **<2, {doctor(Agn), medical_use(DataID)}, access(Agn, DataID, limited_plus_access)>**
- «**Generally, no one has access** to medical files. **But** the **doctor CAN have** limited access for **research purpose**.»
 - Scenarios-based preferences ...

Medical Data Access: Legislation

Law 138(I)/2001: Personal Data Protection

Law N. 1(I)/2005: Patient Rights

- «**Generally, no one has access** to medical files. **But owner's family member CAN have** limited plus.»
 - <1, {}, access(Agn, DataID, no_access)>
 - <2, {family_member(Agn)}, access(Agn, DataID, limited_access)>
- «**Generally, no one has access** to medical files. **But owner's legal representative CAN have** full access for **personal use**.»
 - Scenarios ...

Software Development via Argumentation (SoDA Methodology)

- **SoDA methodology** we model a (compliance) application by:
 - Considering **application scenarios** and **stating** the preferred/desired option(s) in each scenario: **scenario-based preferences**
 - Successively **refine** the **scenarios** and consider **combined** scenarios, **restating** at each case (level) the preferred option(s).
- **No programming or Cognitive Programming!**
 - Just **record** your expert application or user **policy/knowledge**.

Software Development via Argumentation (SoDA Methodology)

Programming =
Authoring scenario-based preferences

(Call it Cognitive Programming)

Gorgias-B :

Cognitive Programming



Conclusion

Evaluation of Argumentation

- **Argumentation vs “Carefully crafted set of rules”**
 - **Direct development** from the domain expert!
 - **No programming – Cognitive Programming!**
 - **Modularity** of Approach
 - **Claim:** Effort to accommodation new legislation in argumentation **is comparable** to effort to update the legal document.
- **Naturalness** of **argumentation** via **explanation** and **abductive/hypothetical** reasoning
 - **Argumentation** is **native** to human reasoning.

Further Reading/References

- ▣ *MEDICA paper (from MEDICA website), 2017*
- ▣ *GORGIAS: Applying argumentation. Argument & Computation 10(1): 55-81 (2019)*
- ▣ *Gorgias-B website (<http://gorgiasb.tuc.gr/>)*
- ▣ *Other references on request ...*

Gorgias

Greek Sophist c.485 — c.380 BCE



Extra (technical) Slides

Slides on Technical Translation
of Scenario-based preferences to
Gorgias framework & code

Medical Data Access: Legislation

Law 138(I)/2001: Personal Data Protection

Law N. 1(I)/2005: Patient Rights

- **Example:** «**Generally**, no one has access to medical files. **But** the owner **CAN have** full access.»
 - **<1, {}, access(Agn, DataID, no_access)>**
 - **<2, {owner(Agn)}, access(Agn, DataID, full_access)>**

- **Example:** «**Generally**, allow full access to **{owner}** **but** when **{critical tests}** suspend access.»
 - **<3, {owner(Agn),critical(DataID)}, access(Agn,DataID, suspend_access)>**

MEDICA Decision Policy

(Expressed in GORGias pseudocode)

□ Object-level argument rules:

$r1(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}): \text{no_access}(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \leftarrow \text{true}$

$r2(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}): \text{full_access}(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \leftarrow \text{true}$

$r3(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}): \text{supsend_access}(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \leftarrow \text{true}$

□ Priority argument rules

■ Default Policy - Scenario 1

■ Generally, no access:

■ $R12(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}): r1(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) > r2(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \leftarrow \text{true}$

■ $R13(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}): r1(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) > r3(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \leftarrow \text{true}$

■ Special - Contextual- Priority: Scenario 2

■ Generally, full access to owner

■ $R21(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}): r2(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) > r1(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \leftarrow \text{owner}(\text{Agn}, \text{Data})$

■ $C21(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}): R21(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) > R12(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \leftarrow \text{true}$

■ $R23(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}): r2(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) > r3(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \leftarrow \text{owner}(\text{Agn}, \text{Data})$

MEDICA Decision Policy

(Expressed in GORGias pseudocode)

□ Object-level argument rules:

r1(Agn,Data): no_access(Agn,Data) \leftarrow true

r2(Agn,Data): full_access(Agn,Data) \leftarrow true

r3(Agn,Data): suspend_access(Agn,Data) \leftarrow true

□ Priority argument rules

- Default Policy - Scenario 1

- Generally, no access:

- R13(Agn,Data): r1(Agn,Data) > r3(Agn,Data) \leftarrow true

- Special - Contextual- Priority: Scenario 3

- Generally, suspend access to owner when critical

- R23(Agn,Data): r2(Agn,Data) > r3(Agn,Data) \leftarrow owner(Agn,Data)

 - R32(Agn,Data): r3(Agn,Data) > r2(Agn,Data) \leftarrow critical(Data)


 - C32(Agn,Data): R32(Agn,Data) > R23(Agn,Data) \leftarrow true

- R31(Agn,Data): r3(Agn,Data) > r1(Agn,Data) \leftarrow owner(Agn, Data), critical(Data).

MEDICA:

Argumentation in Scenarios

- $\langle 1, \{\}, \text{no_access}(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}) \rangle$
 - $A1 = \{r1(\text{Agn}, \text{Data})\}$ argument supports option `no_access`.
 - $A2 = \{r2(\text{Agn}, \text{Data})\}$ argument supports option `full_access`.
 - $A3 = \{r3(\text{Agn}, \text{Data})\}$ argument supports option `suspend_access`.
 - $A1$ attacks $A2$, $A1$ attacks $A3$, $A2$ attacks $A3$ and vice versa.
- $A1' = \{r1(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), R12(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), R13(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), \}$ strengthens $A1$
 - $A1'$ attacks $A2$ and $A3$ but they do not attack $A1'$
 - Also $A2$ or $A3$ cannot be strengthened (by any applicable priority rule)
 - Hence $A2$ or $A3$ cannot be made admissible
 - Hence sceptical decision: `no_access` (from $A1'$)



MEDICA:

Argumentation in Scenarios

- $\langle 2, \{\text{owner}(\text{Agn})\}, \text{access}(\text{Agn}, \text{DataID}, \text{full_access}) \rangle$
- $A1' = \{r1(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), R12(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), R13(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), \}$ strengthens $A1$
 - $A1'$ attacks $A2$ and $A3$ but they do not attack $A1'$
- $A2' = \{r2(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), R21(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), R23(\text{Agn}, \text{Data}), \}$ strengthens $A2$
 - $A2'$ attacks $A1$ and $A3$ but they do not attack $A2'$
 - $A2'$ attacks $A1'$ and vice-versa
- $A2'' = A2' \cup \{C21(\text{Agn}, \text{Data})\}$
 - $A2''$ attacks $A1'$ but not vice-versa.
 - (also attacks $A1$ and $A3$ - not shown)
- Hence, only $A2''$ admissible: full access.

