
# 5. Multiple Decision Treatment Regimes: Framework and Fundamentals

- 5.1 Multiple Decision Treatment Regimes
- 5.2 Statistical Framework
- 5.3 The g-Computation Algorithm
- 5.4 Estimation of the Value of a Fixed Regime
- 5.5 Key References

#### **Recall: Acute Leukemia**



- At baseline: Information  $x_1$ , history  $h_1 = x_1 \in \mathcal{H}_1$
- Decision 1: Set of options  $A_1 = \{C_1, C_2\}$ ; rule 1:  $d_1(h_1)$ :  $\mathcal{H}_1 \to A_1$
- Between Decisions 1 and 2: Collect additional information x<sub>2</sub>, including responder status
- Accrued information/history  $h_2 = (x_1, \text{ therapy at decision } 1, x_2) \in \mathcal{H}_2$
- Decision 2: Set of options  $A_2 = \{M_1, M_2, S_1, S_2\}$ ; rule 2:

 $\textit{d}_2(\textit{h}_2) \colon \mathcal{H}_2 \to \{M_1, M_2\} \text{ (responder)}, \, \textit{d}_2(\textit{h}_2) \colon \mathcal{H}_2 \to \{S_1, S_2\} \text{ (nonresponder)}$ 

• Treatment regime:  $d = \{d_1(h_1), d_2(h_2)\} = (d_1, d_2)$ 

### K decision treatment regime

#### **In general:** *K* decision points/stages

- Baseline information  $x_1 \in \mathcal{X}_1$ , intermediate information  $x_k \in \mathcal{X}_k$  between Decisions k-1 and k, k=2,...,K
- Treatment options  $A_k$  at Decision k, elements  $a_k \in A_k$ , k = 1, ..., K
- Accrued information or history

$$h_1 = x_1 \in \mathcal{H}_1$$
  
 $h_k = (x_1, a_1, \dots, x_{k-1}, a_{k-1}, x_k) \in \mathcal{H}_k, \quad k = 2, \dots, K,$ 

- Decision rules  $d_1(h_1), d_2(h_2), \ldots, d_K(h_K), d_k : \mathcal{H}_k \to \mathcal{A}_k$
- Treatment regime

$$d = \{d_1(h_1), \ldots, d_K(h_K)\} = (d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_K)$$

#### **Notation**

#### Overbar notation: With

$$x_k \in \mathcal{X}_k, \quad a_k \in \mathcal{A}_k, \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

it is convenient to define for k = 1, ..., K

$$\overline{x}_k = (x_1, \dots, x_k), \quad \overline{a}_k = (a_1, \dots, a_k)$$

$$\overline{\mathcal{X}}_k = \mathcal{X}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{X}_k, \quad \overline{\mathcal{A}}_k = \mathcal{A}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{A}_k$$

- Conventions:  $\overline{a} = \overline{a}_K$ ,  $\overline{x} = \overline{x}_K$ ,  $a_0$  is null
- $h_1 = x_1$ ,  $h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1})$ , k = 2, ..., K
- $\mathcal{H}_1 = \mathcal{X}_1$ ,  $\mathcal{H}_k = \overline{\mathcal{X}}_k \times \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{k-1}$ ,  $k = 2, \dots, K$
- $\overline{d}_k = (d_1, \ldots, d_k), \quad k = 1, \ldots, K, \quad d = \overline{d}_K = (d_1, \ldots, d_K)$

### **Decision points**

#### Decision points depend on the context: For example

- Acute leukemia: Decisions are at milestones in the disease progression (diagnosis, evaluation of response)
- HIV infection: Decisions are according to a schedule (at monthly clinic visits)
- Cardiovascular disease (CVD): Decisions are made upon occurrence of an event (myocardial infarction)

#### Perspective:

- Timing of decisions can be fixed (HIV) or random (leukemia)
- If any individual would reach all K decision points, the distinction is not important; we assume this going forward
- If different individuals can experience different numbers of decisions (CVD), the number of decisions reached is random, and a more specialized framework is required
- The latter also is the case if the outcome is a time to an event

### Example: K = 2, acute leukemia

**Decision 1:**  $A_1 = \{C_1, C_2\}, x_1 = h_1$  includes age (years), baseline white blood cell count WBC<sub>1</sub> (×10<sup>3</sup>/ $\mu$ I)

Example rule:

$$d_1(h_1) = C_2 I(C) + C_1 I(C^c), \quad C = \{age < 50, WBC_1 < 10\}$$

**Decision 2:**  $A_2 = \{M_1, M_2, S_1, S_2\}$ 

- x₂ and thus h₂ includes Decision 2 WBC₂; ECOG, EVENT (≥ grade 3 adverse event from induction therapy), RESP
- Example rule:

$$\begin{aligned} d_2(h_2) &= I(\mathsf{RESP} = 1)\{\mathsf{M_1}\,\mathsf{I}(\mathcal{M}) + \mathsf{M_2}\,\mathsf{I}(\mathcal{M}^c)\} \\ &+ I(\mathsf{RESP} = 0)\{\mathsf{S_1}\,\mathsf{I}(\mathcal{S}) + \mathsf{S_2}\,\mathsf{I}(\mathcal{S}^c)\} \end{aligned} \tag{5.1} \\ \mathcal{M} &= \{\mathsf{WBC_1} < \mathsf{11.2}, \mathsf{WBC_2} < \mathsf{10.5}, \mathsf{EVENT} = 0, \mathsf{ECOG} \leq 2\} \\ \mathcal{S} &= \{\mathsf{age} > \mathsf{60}, \mathsf{WBC_2} < \mathsf{11.0}, \mathsf{ECOG} \geq 2\} \end{aligned}$$

### Recursive representation of rules

**Fact:** If the K rules in  $d \in \mathcal{D}$  are *followed* by an individual, the options selected at each decision depend only on the evolving  $x_1, \ldots, x_K$ 

- Decision 1: Option selected is  $d_1(h_1) = d_1(x_1)$
- Between Decisions 1 and 2: x<sub>2</sub>
- Decision 2: Rule  $d_2(h_2) = d_2(\overline{x}_2, a_1)$ , option selected depends on the option selected at Decision 1

$$d_2\{\overline{x}_2,d_1(x_1)\}$$

- Between Decisions 2 and 3: x<sub>3</sub>
- Decision 3: Rule  $d_3(h_3) = d_3(\overline{x}_3, \overline{a}_2) = d_3(\overline{x}_3, a_1, a_2)$ , option selected depends on those at Decisions 1 and 2

$$d_3[\overline{x}_3, d_1(x_1), d_2\{\overline{x}_2, d_1(x_1)\}]$$

And so on...

# Recursive representation of rules

**Concise representation:** For k = 2, ..., K

$$\overline{d}_{2}(\overline{x}_{2}) = [d_{1}(x_{1}), d_{2}\{\overline{x}_{2}, d_{1}(x_{1})\}] 
\overline{d}_{3}(\overline{x}_{3}) = [d_{1}(x_{1}), d_{2}\{\overline{x}_{2}, d_{1}(x_{1})\}, d_{3}\{\overline{x}_{3}, \overline{d}_{2}(\overline{x}_{2})\}] 
\vdots 
\overline{d}_{K}(\overline{x}_{K}) = [d_{1}(x_{1}), d_{2}\{\overline{x}_{2}, d_{1}(x_{1})\}, \dots, d_{K}\{\overline{x}_{K}, \overline{d}_{K-1}(\overline{x}_{K-1})\}]$$
(5.2)

- $\overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k)$  comprises the options selected through Decision k
- $\overline{d}(\overline{x}) = \overline{d}_K(\overline{x}_K)$
- This representation will be useful later

### Redundancy

#### From the perspective of an individual following the K rules in d:

- The definition of rules  $d_k(h_k) = d_k(\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1})$  is redundant
- $a_1$  is determined by  $x_1$ ,  $a_2$  is determined by  $\overline{x}_2 = (x_1, x_2), \dots$
- But definition of  $d_k$  as a function of  $h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1})$  is useful for characterizing and estimating an optimal regime later

Illustration of redundancy: 
$$K = 2$$
,  $A_1 = \{0, 1\}$ ,  $A_2 = \{0, 1\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \{0, 1\}$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \{0, 1\}$  ( $x_1$  and  $x_2$  are binary)

- $d = (d_1, d_2) \in \mathcal{D}, d_1 : \mathcal{H}_1 = \mathcal{X}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_1, d_2 : \mathcal{H}_2 = \overline{\mathcal{X}}_2 \times \mathcal{A}_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_2$
- For each value of  $h_1 = x_1$ ,  $d_1$  must return a value in  $A_1$ , e.g.,

$$d_1(x_1=0)=0, \quad d_1(x_1=1)=1$$

# Redundancy

#### Illustration of redundancy, continued:

• For each of the  $2^3 = 8$  possible values of  $h_2 = (x_1, x_2, a_1)$ ,  $d_2$  must return a value in  $A_2$ , e.g.,

$$d_2(x_1 = 0, x_2 = 0, a_1 = 0) = 0$$

$$d_2(x_1 = 0, x_2 = 0, a_1 = 1) = 1*$$

$$d_2(x_1 = 0, x_2 = 1, a_1 = 0) = 1$$

$$d_2(x_1 = 0, x_2 = 1, a_1 = 1) = 1*$$

$$d_2(x_1 = 1, x_2 = 0, a_1 = 0) = 0*$$

$$d_2(x_1 = 1, x_2 = 0, a_1 = 1) = 1$$

$$d_2(x_1 = 1, x_2 = 1, a_1 = 0) = 0*$$

$$d_2(x_1 = 1, x_2 = 1, a_1 = 0) = 0*$$

$$d_2(x_1 = 1, x_2 = 1, a_1 = 1) = 0$$

 Configurations with \* could never occur if an individual followed regime d

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#### **Outcome of interest**

#### **Determination of outcome:**

- Can be ascertained after Decision K, e.g., for HIV infected patients, outcome = viral load (viral RNA copies/mL) measured at a final clinic visit after Decision K
- Can be defined using intervening information, e.g., for HIV infected patients with CD4 count (cells/mm<sup>3</sup>) measured at each clinic visit (Decisions  $k=2,\ldots,K$ ) and at a final clinic visit after Decision K

outcome = total # CD4 counts > 200 cells/mm<sup>3</sup>

**Convention:** As for single decision case, assume larger outcomes are preferred

E.g., because smaller viral load is better, take

outcome = -viral load

#### Potential outcomes for *K* decisions

#### **Intuitively:** For a randomly chosen individual with history $X_1$

- If he/she were to receive a<sub>1</sub> ∈ A<sub>1</sub> at Decision 1, the evolution of his/her disease/disorder process after Decision 1 would be be influenced by a<sub>1</sub>
- Suggests:  $X_2^*(a_1)$  = intervening information that would arise between Decisions 1 and 2 after receiving  $a_1 \in A_1$  at Decision 1
- If he/she then were to receive  $a_2 \in \mathcal{A}_2$  at Decision 2, the evolution of his/her disease/disorder process after Decision 2 would be influenced by  $a_1$  followed by  $a_2$
- Suggests: X<sub>3</sub><sup>\*</sup>(\$\overline{a}\_2\$) = intervening information that would arise between Decisions 2 and 3 after receiving a<sub>1</sub> ∈ A<sub>1</sub> at Decision 1 and a<sub>2</sub> at Decision 2
- And so on...

#### Potential outcomes for *K* decisions

**Ultimately:** If he/she were to receive options  $\overline{a} = \overline{a}_K = (a_1, \dots, a_K)$  at Decisions  $1, \dots, K$ 

$$Y^*(\overline{a}_K) = Y^*(\overline{a}) =$$
 outcome that would be achieved

**Summarizing:** Potential information at each decision and potential outcome if an individual *were to receive*  $\overline{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_K)$ 

$$\{X_1,X_2^*(a_1),X_3^*(\overline{a}_2),\ldots,X_K^*(\overline{a}_{K-1}),Y^*(\overline{a})\}$$

- X<sub>1</sub> may or may not be included
- Set of all possible potential outcomes for all  $\overline{a} \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}$

$$W^* = \left\{ X_2^*(a_1), X_3^*(\overline{a}_2), \dots, X_K^*(\overline{a}_{K-1}), Y^*(\overline{a}), \right.$$

$$\text{for } a_1 \in \mathcal{A}_1, \overline{a}_2 \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}_2, \dots, \overline{a}_{K-1} \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{K-1}, \overline{a} \in \overline{\mathcal{A}} \right\}$$
 (5.3)

**Example:** Acute leukemia, K = 2

$$A_1 = \{C_1, C_2\}, A_2 = \{M_1, M_2, S_1, S_2\}$$

- At Decision 1, both options are feasible for all patients
- At Decision 2, only maintenance options are feasible for patients who respond, and only salvage options are feasible for patients who do not respond
- Is the case <u>almost always</u> in multiple decision problems at decision points other than Decision 1
- Of course is also possible at Decision 1

Formal specification: For any history  $h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \mathcal{H}_k$  at Decision k, k = 1, ..., K

• The set of feasible treatment options at Decision k is

$$\Psi_k(h_k) = \Psi_k(\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \subseteq \mathcal{A}_k, \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

$$\Psi_1(h_1) = \Psi_1(x_1) \subseteq \mathcal{A}_1 \quad (a_0 \text{ null})$$
(5.4)

- $\Psi_k$  is a function mapping  $\mathcal{H}_k$  to the set of all possible subsets of  $\mathcal{A}_k$
- $\Psi_k(h_k)$  can be a strict subset of  $A_k$  or all of  $A_k$ , depending on  $h_k$
- Collectively:  $\Psi = (\Psi_1, \dots, \Psi_K)$

**Example, revisited:** Acute leukemia, K = 2

$$\mathcal{A}_1 = \{C_1, C_2\}, \ \mathcal{A}_2 = \ \{M_1, \, M_2, \, S_1, \, S_2\}$$

 Suppose C<sub>1</sub> and C<sub>2</sub> are feasible for all individuals regardless of h<sub>1</sub>

$$\Psi_1(h_1) = \mathcal{A}_1$$
 for all  $h_1$ 

If h<sub>2</sub> indicates response

$$\Psi_2(h_2) = \{M_1, M_2\} \subset \mathcal{A}_2$$
 for all such  $h_2$ 

If h<sub>2</sub> indicates nonresponse

$$\Psi_2(h_2) = \{S_1, S_2\} \subset A_2$$
 for all such  $h_2$ 

 More complex specifications of feasible sets that take account of additional information are of course possible

Fancier example: Acute leukemia, K = 2

$$\mathcal{A}_1 = \{C_1, C_2\}, \ \mathcal{A}_2 = \ \{M_1, \, M_2, \, S_1, \, S_2\}$$

• If C<sub>1</sub> is contraindicated for patients with renal impairment

$$\Psi_1(h_1) = \{C_2\}$$
 if  $h_1$  indicates renal impairment  $= \{C_1, C_2\} = A_1$  if  $h_1$  does not

 If S<sub>1</sub> increases risk of adverse events in nonresponders with low WBC<sub>2</sub>

$$\Psi_2(h_2) = \{S_2\}$$
 if  $h_2$  indicates nonresponse, WBC<sub>2</sub>  $\leq w$   
=  $\{S_1, S_2\}$  if  $h_2$  indicates nonresponse, WBC<sub>2</sub>  $> w$ 

for some threshold  $w \times (10^3/\mu I)$ 

#### Ideally:

- Specification of the feasible sets is dictated by scientific considerations
- Disease/disorder context, available treatment options, patient population, etc
- Specification of  $\Psi_k(h_k)$ , k = 1, ..., K, should incorporate only information in  $h_k$  that is critical to treatment selection

#### Regimes and feasible sets: Given specified feasible sets Ψ

- A regime  $d = (d_1, \dots, d_K)$  whose rules select treatment options for history  $h_K$  from those in  $\Psi_K(h_K)$  is defined in terms of  $\Psi$
- Thus, regimes are Ψ-specific, and the relevant class of all possible regimes D depends on Ψ (suppressed in the notation)

In practice: At Decision k, there is a small number  $\ell_k$  of subsets  $A_{k,l} \subseteq A_k$ ,  $l = 1, \dots, \ell_k$  that are feasible sets for all  $h_k$ 

• E.g, for acute leukemia,  $\ell_2 = 2$ 

$$A_{2,1} = \{M_1, M_2\}, \quad A_{2,2} = \{S_1, S_2\}$$

• If  $r_2$  is the component of  $h_2$  indicating response

$$\Psi_1(h_2) = A_{2,1}$$
 for  $h_2$  with  $r_2 = 1$   
=  $A_{2,2}$  for  $h_2$  with  $r_2 = 0$ 

Decision rules: Different rule for each subset

E.g., for acute leukemia, as in (5.1)

$$d_2(h_2) = I(r_2 = 1) d_{2,1}(h_2) + I(r_2 = 0) d_{2,2}(h_2)$$

 $d_{2,1}(h_2)$  is a rule selecting maintenance therapy for responders  $d_{2,2}(h_2)$  is a rule selecting salvage therapy for nonresponders

In general: With  $\ell_k$  distinct subsets  $A_{k,l} \subseteq A_k$ ,  $l = 1, \dots, \ell_k$ , as feasible sets

- Define  $s_k(h_k) = 1, \dots, \ell_k$  according to which of these subsets  $\Psi_k(h_k)$  corresponds for given  $h_k$
- $d_{k,l}(h_k)$  is the rule corresponding to the *l*th subset  $A_{k,l}$
- Decision rule at Decision k has form

$$d_k(h_k) = \sum_{l=1}^{\ell_k} I\{s_k(h_k) = l\} d_{k,l}(h_k)$$
 (5.5)

• Henceforth, it is understood that  $d_k(h_k)$  may be expressed as in (5.5) where appropriate

**Note:** For any  $\Psi$ -specific regime  $d = (d_1, \ldots, d_K)$ 

• At Decision k,  $d_k(h_k) = d_k(\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1})$  returns only options in  $\Psi_k(h_k) = \Psi_k(\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1})$ , i.e.,

$$d_k(h_k) = d_k(\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Psi_k(h_k) \subseteq A_k$$

- Thus,  $d_k$  need map only a subset of  $\mathcal{H}_k = \overline{\mathcal{X}}_k \times \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{k-1}$  to  $\mathcal{A}_k$
- We discuss this more shortly

### Potential outcomes for a fixed regime $d \in \mathcal{D}$

**Intuitively:** If a randomly chosen individual with history  $X_1$  were to receive treatment options by following the rules in d

- Decision 1: Treatment determined by d<sub>1</sub>
- X<sub>2</sub><sup>\*</sup>(d<sub>1</sub>) = intervening information that would arise between Decisions 1 and 2
- Decision 2: Treatment determined by d<sub>2</sub>
- $X_3^*(\overline{d}_2)$  = intervening information *that would arise* between Decisions 2 and 3 :
- $X_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1})$  = intervening information *that would arise* between Decisions k-1 and  $k, k=2, \ldots, K$
- Y\*(d) = Y\*(\overline{d}\_K) = outcome that would be achieved if all rules in d were followed

#### Potential outcomes under regime d:

$$\{X_1, X_2^*(d_1), X_3^*(\overline{d}_2), \dots, X_K^*(\overline{d}_{K-1}), Y^*(d)\}$$
 (5.6)

### Potential outcomes for a fixed regime $d \in \mathcal{D}$

**Formally:** These potential outcomes are functions of  $W^*$  in (5.3)

Define

$$\overline{X}_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = \{X_{1}, X_{2}^{*}(a_{1}), X_{3}^{*}(\overline{a}_{2}), \dots, X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1})\}, \quad k = 2, \dots, K$$

Then

$$X_2^*(d_1) = \sum_{1 \leq 1} X_2^*(a_1) I\{d_1(X_1) = a_1\}$$

$$X_{k}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-1}) = \sum_{\overline{a}_{k-1} \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{k-1}} X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) \prod_{j=1}^{k-1} I\left[d_{j}\{\overline{X}_{j}^{*}(\overline{a}_{j-1}), \overline{a}_{j-1}\} = a_{j}\right]$$
(5.7)

$$k=3,\ldots,K$$

$$Y^{\star}(d) = \sum_{\overline{a} \in \overline{A}} Y^{\star}(\overline{a}) \prod_{j=1}^{K} \mathsf{I}\left[d_{j}\{\overline{X}_{j}^{\star}(\overline{a}_{j-1}), \overline{a}_{j-1}\} = a_{j}\right]$$

Also define

$$\overline{X}_{k}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-1}) = \{X_{1}, X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}), X_{3}^{*}(\overline{d}_{2}), \dots, X_{k}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-1})\}, \quad k = 2, \dots, K$$

### Value of a *K*-decision regime

With these definitions: The *value* of  $d \in \mathcal{D}$  is

$$\mathcal{V}(d) = E\{Y^*(d)\}$$

• And an optimal regime  $d^{opt} \in \mathcal{D}$  satisfies

$$E\{Y^{*}(d^{opt})\} \ge E\{Y^{*}(d)\} \text{ for all } d \in \mathcal{D}$$
 (5.8)

equivalently

$$d^{opt} = \arg\max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} E\{Y^*(d)\} = \arg\max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \mathcal{V}(d)$$

# Optimal treatment options vs. optimal decisions

#### For a randomly chosen individual with history $H_1$ :

The optimal sequence of treatment options for this individual is

$$\underset{\overline{a}\in\overline{\mathcal{A}}}{\arg\max}\ Y^*(\overline{a})$$

which of course is not knowable in practice

- All that is known at baseline is  $H_1$ , and  $d_1^{opt}, \ldots, d_K^{opt}$  select the (feasible) options corresponding to the largest expected outcome
- From the definition of  $Y^*(d)$  in (5.7),

$$Y^{^{\star}}(\textit{d}) \leq \max_{\overline{a} \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}} Y^{^{\star}}(\overline{a}) \text{ for all } \textit{d} \in \mathcal{D} \implies Y^{^{\star}}(\textit{d}^{\textit{opt}}) \leq \max_{\overline{a} \in \overline{\mathcal{A}}} Y^{^{\star}}(\overline{a})$$

so an optimal regime might not select optimal options for this individual at each decision

 Rather, d<sup>opt</sup> leads to the optimal sequence of decisions that can be made based on the available information on this individual

**Ideally:** For  $i = 1, \ldots, n$ , i.i.d.

$$(X_{1i},A_{1i},X_{2i},A_{2i},\ldots,X_{Ki},A_{Ki},Y_i)=(\overline{X}_{Ki},\overline{A}_{Ki},Y_i)=(\overline{X}_i,\overline{A}_i,Y_i) \quad (5.9)$$

- $X_1$  = baseline information at Decision 1, taking values in  $\mathcal{X}_1$
- A<sub>k</sub> = treatment option actually received at Decision k,
   k = 1,..., K, taking values in A<sub>k</sub>
- X<sub>k</sub> = intervening information between Decisions k − 1 and k, k = 2,..., K, taking values in X<sub>k</sub>
- $\overline{X}_k = (X_1, \dots, X_k), \overline{X} = \overline{X}_K = (X_1, \dots, X_K),$  and  $\overline{A}_k = (A_1, \dots, A_k), \overline{A} = \overline{A}_K = (A_1, \dots, A_K)$
- History  $H_1 = X_1$ ,  $H_k = (X_1, A_1, \dots, X_{k-1}, A_{k-1}, X_k) = (\overline{X}_k, \overline{A}_{k-1})$ ,  $k = 2, \dots, K$
- Y = observed outcome (after Decision K or function of  $H_K$ )


#### Data sources:

- Longitudinal observational study: Retrospective from an existing database, completed conventional clinical trial with followup, prospective cohort study
- Randomized study: Prospective clinical trial conducted specifically for this purpose (SMART)

#### Longitudinal observational study: Challenges

- Time-dependent confounding: A subject's history at each decision point is both determined by past treatments and used to select future treatments
- Characteristics associated with both treatment selection and future characteristics/ultimate outcome may not be captured in the data

#### **SMART:** Randomization at •s



**Do we really need data like these?** Can't we just "piece together" an optimal regime using single decision methods on data from separate studies (with different subjects in each)?

- E.g., acute leukemia: Estimate  $d_1^{opt}$  from a study comparing  $\{C_1,C_2\}$  and  $d_2^{opt}$  from separate studies comparing  $\{M_1,M_2\}$  and  $\{S_1,S_2\}$
- Delayed effects: The induction therapy with the highest proportion of responders might have other effects that render subsequent treatments less effective in regard to survival
- Require data from a study involving the same subjects over the entire sequence of decisions

### Statistical problem

**Ultimate goal:** Based on the data (5.9), estimate  $d^{opt} \in \mathcal{D}$  satisfying (5.8), i.e.,

$$E\{Y^*(d^{opt})\} \ge E\{Y^*(d)\}$$
 for all  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ 

Challenge: d<sup>opt</sup> is defined in terms of the potential outcomes (5.6)

- Must be able to express this definition in terms of the observed data (5.9)
- In particular, for any  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ , must be able to *identify* the distribution of

$$\{X_1,X_2^{\star}(d_1),X_3^{\star}(\overline{d}_2),\ldots,X_K^{\star}(\overline{d}_{K-1}),Y^{\star}(d)\}$$

which depends on that of  $(X_1, W^*)$ , from the distribution of

$$(X_1, A_1, X_2, A_2, \ldots, X_K, A_K, Y)$$

• Possible under the following assumptions generalizing those in (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6)

#### SUTVA (consistency):

$$X_{k} = X_{k}^{*}(\overline{A}_{k-1}) = \sum_{\overline{a}_{k-1} \in \overline{A}_{k-1}} X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) I(\overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1}), \quad k = 2, \dots, K$$

$$Y = Y^{*}(\overline{A}) = \sum_{\overline{a}_{k-1}} Y^{*}(\overline{a}) I(\overline{A} = \overline{a})$$
(5.10)

- Observed intervening information and the final observed outcome are those that would potentially be seen under the treatments actually received at each decision point
- Are the same (consistent) regardless of how the treatments are administered at each decision point

Sequential randomization assumption (SRA): Robins (1986)

$$W^* \perp A_k | \overline{X}_k, \overline{A}_{k-1}, \quad k = 1, \dots, K, \text{ where } A_0 \text{ is null}$$
 (5.11)

equivalently

$$W^* \perp A_k | H_k, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K$$

- Unverifiable from the observed data
- Unlikely to hold for data from a longitudinal observational study not carried out with estimation of treatment regimes in mind
- But (5.11) holds by design in a SMART

**Positivity assumption:** With feasible sets of treatment options at each decision point, more complicated

- *Intuitively:* To identify the distribution of the potential outcomes (5.6) from that of the observed data (5.9), all treatment options in the feasible sets  $\Psi_k(h_k) = \Psi_k(\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1})$  must be *represented* in the observed data,  $k = 1, \dots, K$
- That is, there must be individuals in the data who received each of the options in  $\Psi_k(h_k)$ , k = 1, ..., K
- E.g, acute leukemia: Decision 2: there must be responders who received each of M<sub>1</sub> and M<sub>2</sub> and nonresponders who received each of S<sub>1</sub> and S<sub>2</sub>

#### Built up recursively...

**Decision 1:** Set of all possible baseline info  $h_1 = x_1$ 

$$\Gamma_1 = \{x_1 \in \mathcal{X}_1 \text{ satisfying } P(X_1 = x_1) > 0\} \subseteq \mathcal{X}_1 = \mathcal{H}_1$$

Set of all possible histories and associated options in  $\Psi_1(h_1)$ 

$$\Lambda_1 = \{(x_1, a_1) \text{ such that } x_1 = h_1 \in \Gamma_1, \ a_1 \in \Psi_1(h_1)\}$$

All options in  $\Lambda_1$  must be represented in the data

$$P(A_1 = a_1 | H_1 = h_1) > 0 \text{ for all } (h_1, a_1) \in \Lambda_1$$
 (5.12)

First component of the positivity assumption

**Decision 2:** All possible histories  $h_2$  consistent with following a  $\Psi$ -specific regime at Decision 1

$$\begin{split} \Gamma_2 &= \left[ \left( \overline{x}_2, a_1 \right) \in \overline{\mathcal{X}}_2 \times \mathcal{A}_1 \text{ satisfying } (x_1, a_1) \in \Lambda_1 \text{ and } \right. \\ &\left. P\{X_2^{^{\star}}(a_1) = x_2 \mid X_1 = x_1\} > 0 \right] \subseteq \mathcal{H}_2 \end{split}$$

Under SUTVA (5.10) and SRA (5.11), equivalently

$$\Gamma_2 = \left[ (\overline{x}_2, a_1) \in \overline{\mathcal{X}}_2 \times \mathcal{A}_1 \text{ satisfying } (x_1, a_1) \in \Lambda_1 \text{ and} 
ight.$$

$$P(X_2 = x_2 \mid X_1 = x_1, A_1 = a_1) > 0 \right]$$

Set of all possible histories  $h_2$  and associated options in  $\Psi_2(h_2)$ 

$$\Lambda_2 = \{ (\overline{x}_2, \overline{a}_2) \text{ such that } (\overline{x}_2, a_1) = h_2 \in \Gamma_2, \ a_2 \in \Psi_2(h_2) \}$$

**Decision 2, continued:** All options in  $\Lambda_2$  must be represented in the data

$$P(A_2 = a_2 \mid H_2 = h_2) > 0$$
 for all  $(h_2, a_2) \in \Lambda_2$ 

Second component of the positivity assumption

:

**Decision** k: All histories  $h_k$  consistent with a Ψ-specific regime through Decision k-1

$$\begin{split} \Gamma_k &= \left[ (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \overline{\mathcal{X}}_k \times \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{k-1} \text{ satisfying } (\overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Lambda_{k-1} \text{ and } \right. \\ &\left. P\{X_k^{\star}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = x_k \mid \overline{X}_{k-1}^{\star}(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = \overline{x}_{k-1}\} > 0 \right] \subseteq \mathcal{H}_k \ \, \text{(5.13)} \\ &= \left[ (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \overline{\mathcal{X}}_k \times \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{k-1} \text{ satisfying } (\overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Lambda_{k-1} \text{ and } \right. \\ &\left. P(X_k = x_k \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1}) > 0 \right] \end{aligned} \tag{5.14}$$

**Decision** k, **continued**: Set of all possible histories  $h_k$  and associated options in  $\Psi_k(h_k)$ 

$$\Lambda_k = \{(\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_k) \text{ such that } (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) = h_k \in \Gamma_k, \ a_k \in \Psi_k(h_k)\}$$

All options in  $\Psi_k(h_k)$  must be represented in the data

$$P(A_k = a_k \mid H_k = h_k) > 0$$
 for all  $(h_k, a_k) \in \Lambda_k$ 

kth component of the positivity assumption

:

#### Positivity assumption: Summarizing

$$P(A_k = a_k | H_k = h_k) = P(A_k = a_k | \overline{X}_k = \overline{x}_k, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1}) > 0$$
for  $h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Gamma_k$  and  $a_k \in \Psi_k(h_k) = \Psi_k(\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}),$ 

$$k = 1, \dots, K$$
(5.15)

- The positivity assumption (5.15) holds in a SMART by design if there are subjects with history h<sub>k</sub> randomized to all options in Ψ<sub>k</sub>(h<sub>k</sub>) at each Decision k = 1,..., K
- No guarantee that for a given Ψ (5.15) holds for data from a longitudinal observational study (more shortly)

**Equivalence of (5.13) and (5.14):** Assuming SUTVA, SRA, need to show for any  $h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Gamma_k$  in (5.13)

$$P(X_{k} = x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1})$$

$$= P\{X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = \overline{x}_{k-1}\}$$
 (5.16)

- Proof is by induction (k = 1, 2 are immediate)
- Repeated use of the following lemma

Lemma. Let A and H be random variables, assume  $W^* \perp A | H$ , and consider two functions  $\mathfrak{f}_1(W^*)$  and  $\mathfrak{f}_2(W^*)$  of  $W^*$ . If the event  $\{\mathfrak{f}_2(W^*) = f_2, H = h, A = a\}$  has positive probability, then

$$P\{f_1(W^*) = f_1 | f_2(W^*) = f_2, H = h, A = a\}$$
$$= P\{f_1(W^*) = f_1 | f_2(W^*) = f_2, H = h\}$$

#### Sketch of induction proof:

• We need to show for any  $h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Gamma_k$  in (5.13),  $k = 1, \dots, K$ 

$$P(X_{k} = x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1})$$

$$= P\{X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = \overline{x}_{k-1}\}$$
 (5.16)

- (5.16) is trivial for k = 1
- k = 2: (5.12) implies  $P(X_1 = x_1, A_1 = a_1) > 0$  for  $(x_1, a_1) \in \Lambda_1$ , so  $P(X_2 = x_2 \mid X_1 = x_1, A_1 = a_1)$  is well defined. Then by SUTVA and SRA, (5.16) holds

$$P(X_2 = x_2 \mid X_1 = x_1, A_1 = a_1) = P\{X_2^*(a_1) = x_2 \mid X_1 = x_1, A_1 = a_1\}$$
  
=  $P\{X_2^*(a_1) = x_2 \mid X_1 = x_1\}$ 

• For general k: Need to show  $P(\overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1}) > 0$ , so that  $P(X_k = x_k \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1})$  is well defined, and then show (5.16)

• Assume this holds for k-1 and then show it holds for k. Thus, for  $h_{k-1}=(\overline{x}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-2})\in \Gamma_{k-1}, P(\overline{X}_{k-2}=\overline{x}_{k-2},\overline{A}_{k-2}=\overline{a}_{k-2})>0$  and

$$P(X_{k-1} = x_{k-1} \mid \overline{X}_{k-2} = \overline{x}_{k-2}, \overline{A}_{k-2} = \overline{a}_{k-2})$$

$$= P\{X_{k-1}^*(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = x_{k-1} \mid \overline{X}_{k-2}^*(\overline{a}_{k-3}) = \overline{x}_{k-2}\} > 0$$

- It follows that  $P(\overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{X}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-2} = \overline{a}_{k-2}) > 0$
- Because  $h_{k-1}=(\overline{x}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-2})\in\Gamma_{k-1}$  and  $a_{k-1}\in\Psi_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-2}),$

$$P(A_{k-1} = a_{k-1} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-2} = \overline{a}_{k-2}) > 0$$

- It then follows that  $P(\overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{X}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1}) > 0$  as required
- Now show (5.16) using SUTVA, SRA, and the Lemma

By repeated use of SUTVA and SRA

$$P(X_{k} = x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1})$$

$$= P\{X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-2} = \overline{x}_{k-2}, X_{k-1}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = x_{k-1}$$

$$\overline{A}_{k-3} = \overline{a}_{k-3}, A_{k-2} = a_{k-2}\},$$
 (5.17)

• By the Lemma with  $f_1(W^*) = X_k^*(\overline{a}_{k-1}), A = A_{k-2}, H = (\overline{X}_{k-2}, \overline{A}_{k-3}),$  and  $f_2(W^*) = X_{k-1}^*(\overline{a}_{k-2}), (5.17) =$ 

$$P\{X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = X_{k-1}(a_{k-2}), (5.17) = P\{X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = x_{k} | \overline{X}_{k-2} = \overline{x}_{k-2}, X_{k-1}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = x_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-3} = \overline{a}_{k-3}\}$$

$$= P\{X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = x_{k} | \overline{X}_{k-3} = \overline{x}_{k-3}, X_{k-2}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-3}) = x_{k-2}$$

$$X_{k-1}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = x_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-4} = \overline{a}_{k-4}, A_{k-3} = a_{k-3}\}$$
 (5.18)

• By the Lemma with  $f_1(W^*) = X_k^*(\overline{a}_{k-1}), A = A_{k-3}, H = (\overline{X}_{k-3}, \overline{A}_{k-4}),$  (5.18) =

$$P\{X_{k}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = x_{k} | \overline{X}_{k-3} = \overline{x}_{k-3}, X_{k-2}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-3}) = x_{k-2}, X_{k-1}^{*}(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = x_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-4} = \overline{a}_{k-4}\}$$

Continuing to apply the Lemma and SUTVA leads to (5.16),

$$P(X_k = x_k \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1})$$

$$= P\{X_k^*(\overline{a}_{k-1}) = x_k \mid \overline{X}_{k-1}^*(\overline{a}_{k-2}) = \overline{x}_{k-1}\}$$

- Because  $h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Gamma_k$ , the RHS is > 0
- Thus, we have shown that (5.16) holds for k and

$$P(X_k = x_k \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1}) > 0$$

for 
$$h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Gamma_k$$

• Because this holds for k = 1, 2, the result follows by induction

# More precise definition of a regime: A $\Psi$ -specific regime $d = (d_1, \dots, d_K)$ satisfies

- Each rule d<sub>k</sub>, k = 1,..., K, is a mapping from Γ<sub>k</sub> ⊆ H<sub>k</sub> into A<sub>k</sub> for which d<sub>k</sub>(h<sub>k</sub>) ∈ Ψ<sub>k</sub>(h<sub>k</sub>) for every h<sub>k</sub> ∈ Γ<sub>k</sub>
- The class  $\mathcal{D}$  of  $\Psi$ -specific regimes is the set of all such d

Observational data: For given Ψ, no guarantee that all options in  $\Psi_k(h_k), k=1,\ldots,K$ , are represented in the data

Define for k = 1....K

• Define for 
$$k=1,\ldots,K$$

$$\Gamma_k^{max} = \left[ (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \overline{\mathcal{X}}_k \times \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{k-1} \text{ satisfying } (\overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Lambda_{k-1}^{max} \right.$$

$$\text{and } P(X_k = x_k \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{\mathcal{A}}_{k-1} = \overline{a}_{k-1}) > 0 \right]$$

$$\Psi_k^{max}(h_k) = \left\{ a_k \in \mathcal{A}_k \text{ satisfying } P(A_k = a_k | H_k = h_k) > 0 \right.$$

$$\text{for all } h_k = (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) \in \Gamma_k^{max} \right\}$$

$$\Lambda_k^{max} = \left\{ (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_k) \text{ such that } (\overline{x}_k, \overline{a}_{k-1}) = h_k \in \Gamma_k^{max}, \ a_k \in \Psi_k^{max}(h_k) \right\}$$

- The class of regimes based on  $\Psi^{max} = (\Psi_1^{max}, \dots, \Psi_{\nu}^{max})$  is the largest that can be considered
- So must have  $\Psi_k(h_k) \subseteq \Psi_k^{max}(h_k), k = 1, ..., K$  for all  $h_k \in \Gamma_k \subseteq \Gamma_k^{max}$

## 5. Multiple Decision Treatment Regimes: Framework and Fundamentals

- 5.1 Multiple Decision Treatment Regimes
- 5.2 Statistical Framework
- 5.3 The g-Computation Algorithm
- 5.4 Estimation of the Value of a Fixed Regime
- 5.5 Key References

## Identifiability result

**Goal, again:** For any  $\Psi$ -specific regime  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ , demonstrate that we can identify the distribution of

$$\{X_1,X_2^{^\star}(\textit{d}_1),X_3^{^\star}(\overline{\textit{d}}_2),\ldots,X_K^{^\star}(\overline{\textit{d}}_{K-1}),\textit{Y}^{^\star}(\textit{d})\}$$

which depends on that of  $(X_1, W^*)$ , from the distribution of

$$(X_1, A_1, X_2, A_2, \ldots, X_K, A_K, Y)$$

**Recall:** Recursive representation  $\overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k)$  of the treatment options selected by d through Decision k in (5.2) if an individual follows d,  $k = 2, \ldots, K$ 

$$\overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k) = [d_1(x_1), d_2(\overline{x}_2, d_1(x_1)), \dots, d_k(\overline{x}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1}))]$$

**Main result:** Under SUTVA (5.10), SRA (5.11), and positivity assumption (5.15), the joint density of the potential outcomes  $\{X_1, X_2^*(d_1), X_3^*(\overline{d}_2), \dots, X_K^*(\overline{d}_{K-1}), Y^*(d)\}$  can be obtained as

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho_{X_{1},X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}),X_{3}^{*}(\overline{d}_{2}),...,X_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}),Y^{*}(d)}(x_{1},...,x_{K},y) & (5.19) \\
&= \rho_{Y|\overline{X},\overline{A}}\{y|\overline{X},\overline{d}(\overline{X})\} \\
&\times \rho_{X_{K}|\overline{X}_{K-1},\overline{A}_{K-1}}\{x_{K}|\overline{x}_{K-1},\overline{d}_{K-1}(\overline{x}_{K-1})\} \\
&\vdots & (5.20) \\
&\times \rho_{X_{2}|X_{1},A_{1}}\{x_{2}|x_{1},d_{1}(x_{1})\} \\
&\times \rho_{X_{1}}(x_{1})
\end{aligned}$$

for any realization  $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_K, y)$  for which (5.19) is positive

• Due to Robins (1986, 1987, 2004)

**Additional definition:** Relevant realizations  $(x_1, x_2, ..., x_K, y)$  are determined by feasible sets

- Assume  $Y^*(\overline{a})$  and Y take values  $y \in \mathcal{Y}$
- Define

$$\begin{split} \Gamma_{\mathcal{K}+1} &= \left[ (\overline{x}, \overline{a}, y) \in \overline{\mathcal{X}} \times \overline{\mathcal{A}} \times \mathcal{Y} \text{ satisfying } (\overline{x}, \overline{a}) \in \Lambda_{\mathcal{K}} \text{ and } \right. \\ &\left. P\{Y^{\star}(\overline{a}) = y \mid \overline{X}^{\star}_{\mathcal{K}}(\overline{a}_{\mathcal{K}-1}) = \overline{x}_{\mathcal{K}}\} > 0 \right] \\ &= \left[ (\overline{x}, \overline{a}, y) \in \overline{\mathcal{X}} \times \overline{\mathcal{A}} \times \mathcal{Y} \text{ satisfying } (\overline{x}, \overline{a}) \in \Lambda_{\mathcal{K}} \text{ and } \right. \\ &\left. P(Y = y \mid \overline{X} = \overline{x}, \overline{A}_{\mathcal{K}-1} = \overline{a}_{\mathcal{K}-1}) > 0 \right] \end{split}$$

This equality can be shown similarly to that of (5.13) and (5.14)

**Simplification:** Take all random variables discrete, so that (5.19) and (5.20) become

$$P\{X_{1} = x_{1}, X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}) = x_{2}, \dots, X_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}) = x_{K}, Y^{*}(d) = y\}$$

$$= P\{Y = y \mid \overline{X}_{K} = \overline{x}_{K}, \overline{A}_{K} = \overline{d}_{K}(\overline{x}_{K-1})\}$$

$$\times P(X_{K} = x_{K} \mid \overline{X}_{K-1} = \overline{x}_{K-1}, \overline{A}_{K-1} = \overline{d}_{K-1}(\overline{x}_{K-2})\}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\times P\{X_{2} = x_{2} \mid X_{1} = x_{1}, A_{1} = d_{1}(x_{1})\}$$

$$\times P(X_{1} = x_{1})$$

$$(5.21)$$

for any realization  $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_K, y)$  such that

$$P\{X_1 = x_1, X_2^*(d_1) = x_2, \dots, X_K^*(\overline{d}_{K-1}) = x_K, Y^*(d) = y\} > 0$$

Need to show (5.21) = (5.22)

**Demonstration:** Factorize (5.21) as

$$P\{X_{1} = x_{1}, X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}) = x_{2}, \dots, X_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}) = x_{K}, Y^{*}(d) = y\}$$

$$= P\{Y^{*}(d) = y \mid \overline{X}_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}) = \overline{x}_{K}\}$$

$$\times P\{X_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}) = x_{K} \mid \overline{X}_{K-1}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-2}) = \overline{x}_{K-1}\}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\times P\{X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}) = x_{2} \mid X_{1} = x_{1}\}$$

$$\times P(X_{1} = x_{1})$$

All components on RHS are positive because (5.21) > 0

From (5.22), it suffices to show

$$P\{Y^{*}(d) = y \mid \overline{X}_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}) = \overline{x}_{K}\}$$

$$= P\{Y = y \mid \overline{X}_{K} = \overline{x}_{K}, \overline{A}_{K} = \overline{d}_{K}(\overline{x}_{K-1})\}$$
where  $P\{Y = y \mid \overline{X}_{K} = \overline{x}_{K}, \overline{A}_{K} = \overline{d}_{K}(\overline{x}_{K-1})\} > 0$ 

and for  $k = 2, \dots, K$ 

$$\begin{split} P\{X_{k}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-1}) &= x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-2}) = \overline{x}_{K-1}\} \\ &= P(X_{k} = x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-2})\} \\ \text{where } P(X_{k} = x_{k} \mid \overline{X}_{k-1} = \overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-2})\} > 0 \end{split}$$

• These follow immediately if, for  $\overline{X}_{K+1}^*(d) = Y^*(d)$ 

$$\{\overline{x}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1})\} \in \Gamma_k, \quad k = 2, \dots, K+1$$
 (5.23)

which can be shown by induction (first show for k = 2)

#### **Sketch of induction proof:** First take k = 2

- Because  $P(X_1 = x_1) > 0$ ,  $x_1 \in \Gamma_1$  and d is a  $\Psi$ -specific regime,  $d_1(x_1) \in \Psi_1(h_1)$ , so that  $\{x_1, d_1(x_1)\} \in \Lambda_1$
- Because (5.21) > 0,

$$P\{X_2^*(d_1) = x_2 \mid X_1 = x_1\} > 0 \implies \{\overline{x}_2, d_1(x_1)\} \in \Gamma_2$$

which is (5.23) for k = 2

- Now assume  $\{\overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{d}_{k-2}(\overline{x}_{k-2})\} \in \Gamma_{k-1}$  is true
- Because d is a  $\Psi$ -specific regime,  $d_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1}) \in \Psi_{k-1}(h_k)$  and thus  $\{\overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1})\} \in \Lambda_{k-1}$
- Because (5.21) > 0,

$$P\{X_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1}) = x_k \mid \overline{X}_{k-1}^*(\overline{d}_{k-2}) = \overline{x}_{k-1}\} > 0 \implies \{\overline{x}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1})\} \in \Gamma_k$$

completing the induction proof

#### General result: Compactly stated

$$\rho_{X_{1},X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}),X_{3}^{*}(\overline{d}_{2}),\dots,X_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}),Y^{*}(d)}(x_{1},\dots,x_{K},y) \qquad (5.24)$$

$$=\rho_{Y|\overline{X},\overline{A}}\{y|\overline{x},\overline{d}_{K}(\overline{x})\}\left[\prod_{k=2}^{K}\rho_{X_{k}|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}\{x_{k}|\overline{x}_{k-1},\overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1})\}\right]\rho_{X_{1}}(x_{1})$$

which implies, for example,

$$p_{Y'(d)}(y) = \int_{\overline{\mathcal{X}}} \left( p_{Y|\overline{X},\overline{A}}\{y|\overline{x},\overline{d}(\overline{x})\} \right)$$

$$\times \left[ \prod_{k=2}^{K} p_{X_{k}|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}\{x_{k}|\overline{x}_{k-1},\overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1})\} \right] p_{X_{1}}(x_{1}) d\nu_{K}(x_{K}) \cdots d\nu_{1}(x_{1})$$
(5.25)

•  $d\nu_K(x_K)\cdots d\nu_1(x_1)$  is the dominating measure

#### Or the value

$$E\{Y^{*}(d)\} = \int_{\overline{X}} \left( E\{Y|\overline{X} = \overline{x}, \overline{A} = \overline{d}(\overline{x})\} \right)$$

$$\times \left[ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \rho_{X_{k}|\overline{X}_{k-1}, \overline{A}_{k-1}} \{x_{k}|\overline{x}_{k-1}, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1})\} \right] \rho_{X_{1}}(x_{1}) d\nu_{K}(x_{K}) \cdots d\nu_{1}(x_{1})$$

$$(5.26)$$

- Thus, the value V(d) = E{Y\*(d)} of a regime d ∈ D can be expressed in terms of the observed data
- So it should be possible to estimate V(d) from these data
- As well as to estimate V(d<sup>opt</sup>) (later)...

## 5. Multiple Decision Treatment Regimes: Framework and Fundamentals

- 5.1 Multiple Decision Treatment Regimes
- 5.2 Statistical Framework
- 5.3 The g-Computation Algorithm
- 5.4 Estimation of the Value of a Fixed Regime
- 5.5 Key References

## Fixed regime $d \in \mathcal{D}$

**Of interest:** Estimation of the value  $V(d) = E\{Y^*(d)\}$  of a *given*, or *fixed*,  $\Psi$ -specific regime  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ 

- In its own right
- As a stepping stone to estimation of an optimal regime d<sup>opt</sup>
- We consider several methods
- Throughout, take SUTVA (5.10), SRA (5.11), and positivity assumption (5.15) to hold

In principle: From (5.25) and (5.26), can estimate  $p_{Y^*(d)}(y)$  or  $E\{Y^*(d)\}$  for fixed  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ 

Posit parametric models, e.g., for (5.25)

$$\rho_{Y|\overline{X},\overline{A}}(y|\overline{x},\overline{a};\zeta_{K+1}) 
\rho_{X_k|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}(x_k|\overline{x}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-1};\zeta_k), \quad k=2,\ldots,K 
\rho_{X_1}(x_1;\zeta_1)$$

depending on  $\zeta = (\zeta_1^T, \dots, \zeta_{K+1}^T)^T$  (or for (5.26) a model for  $E(Y|\overline{X} = \overline{x}, \overline{A} = \overline{a})$  instead)

• Estimate  $\zeta$  by maximizing the partial likelihood

$$\prod_{i=1}^{n} \left\{ \rho_{Y|\overline{X},\overline{A}}(Y_{i}|\overline{X}_{i},\overline{A}_{i};\zeta_{K+1}) \prod_{k=2}^{K} \rho_{X_{k}|\overline{X}_{K-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}(X_{ki}|\overline{X}_{K-1,i},\overline{A}_{K-1,i};\zeta_{k}) \rho_{X_{1}}(X_{1i};\zeta_{1}) \right\}$$
in  $\zeta$  to obtain  $\widehat{\zeta} = (\widehat{\zeta}_{1}^{T}, \dots, \widehat{\zeta}_{K+1}^{T})^{T}$ 

#### In principle:

Substitute the fitted models in (5.25) or (5.26)

**Major obstacle:** (5.25) and (5.26) involve integration over the sample space  $\overline{\mathcal{X}} = \mathcal{X}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{X}_K$ 

• Except in the simplest situations, e.g., all  $x_1, \ldots, x_K$  discrete and low-dimensional, the required integration is almost certainly analytically *intractable* and *computationally insurmountable* 

**Monte Carlo integration:** Robins (1986) proposed approximating the distribution of  $Y^*(d)$  for  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ ; for r = 1, ..., M, simulate a realization from the distribution of  $Y^*(d)$  as follows

- 1. Generate random  $x_{1r}$  from  $p_{X_1}(x_1; \hat{\zeta}_1)$
- 2. Generate random  $x_{2r}$  from  $p_{X_2|X_1,A_1}\{x_2|x_{1r},d_1(x_{1r});\widehat{\zeta}_2\}$
- 3. Continue in this fashion, generating random  $x_{kr}$  from

$$p_{X_k|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}\{x_k|\overline{x}_{k-1,r},\overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1,r});\widehat{\zeta}_k\}, \quad k=3,\ldots,K$$

4. Generate random  $y_r$  from  $p_{Y|\overline{X},\overline{A}}\{y|\overline{x}_r,\overline{d}_K(\overline{x}_r);\widehat{\zeta}_{K+1}\}$ 

 $y_1, \ldots, y_M$  are a sample from the fitted distribution of  $Y^*(d)$ 

Estimator for 
$$V(d) = E\{Y^*(d)\}$$
:  $\widehat{V}_{GC}(d) = M^{-1} \sum_{r=1}^{M} y_r$ 

#### **Practical challenges:**

- Development of models can be daunting due to high dimension/complexity of x<sub>1</sub>,...,x<sub>K</sub>
- Although specifying p<sub>Y|X,A</sub>(y|X, ā; ζ<sub>K+1</sub>) may be feasible for univariate Y, models

$$p_{X_k|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}(x_k|\overline{x}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-1};\zeta_k),\ k=2,\ldots,K,\ p_{X_1}(x_1;\zeta_1)$$

for multivariate  $X_k$  are more challenging to specify

• E.g.,  $X_k = (X_{k1}^T, X_{k2}^T)^T$  continuous/discrete, can factor as

$$\begin{aligned} & \rho_{X_{k1}|X_{k2},\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}(x_{k1}|X_{k2},\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-1};\zeta_{k1}) \\ & \times \rho_{X_{k2}|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}(x_{k2}|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-1};\zeta_{k2}) \\ & \text{or} \quad \rho_{X_{k2}|X_{k1},\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}(x_{k2}|X_{k1},\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-1};\zeta_{k2}) \\ & \times \rho_{X_{k1}|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{A}_{k-1}}(x_{k2}|\overline{X}_{k-1},\overline{a}_{k-1};\zeta_{k1}) \end{aligned}$$

#### Practical challenges, continued:

- Moreover, simulation from such models can be demanding
- Analytical derivation of approximate standard errors is not straightforward (frankly daunting!); use of a nonparametric bootstrap has been advocated, which is clearly highly computationally intensive

# **Bottom line:** Estimation of V(d) via the g-computation is not commonplace in practice

- The main usefulness of g-computation is as a demonstration that it is possible to identify and estimate  $\mathcal{V}(d)$  from observed data under SUTVA, SRA, and positivity
- In principle, a possible approach to estimating  $d^{opt} \in \mathcal{D}$  is to maximize  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{GC}(d)$  over all  $d \in \mathcal{D}$ ; clearly, this would be a formidable computational challenge (and is never done in practice)

**Motivation:** Alternative representation of  $E\{Y^*(d)\}$  in terms of the observed data

$$(X_1, A_1, X_2, A_2, \ldots, X_K, A_K, Y)$$

depending on

$$p_{A_1|H_1}(a_1|h_1) = P(A_1 = a_1|H_1 = h_1) = p_{A_1|X_1}(a_1|X_1)$$

$$p_{A_k|H_k}(a_k|h_k) = P(A_k = a_k|H_k = h_k) = p_{A_k|\overline{X}_k,\overline{A}_{k-1}}(a_k|\overline{X}_k,\overline{a}_{k-1})$$

$$k = 2, ..., K$$

**Define:** Evaluate at 
$$d_1(X_1)$$
,  $d_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}$ 

$$\pi_{d,1}(X_1) = p_{A_1|X_1}\{d_1(X_1)|X_1\}$$

$$\pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_k) = p_{A_k|\overline{X}_k,\overline{A}_{k-1}}[d_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}|\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})]$$

$$k = 2, \dots, K$$

**Define:** Indicator of consistency of options actually received with those selected by d at all K decisions

$$\mathcal{C}_d = \mathcal{C}_{\overline{d}_K} = I\{A_1 = d_1(X_1), \dots, A_K = \overline{d}_K(\overline{X}_K)\} = I\{\overline{A} = \overline{d}(\overline{X})\}$$

Inverse probability weighted estimator for  $V(d) = E\{Y^*(d)\}$ :

$$\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW}(d) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\mathcal{C}_{d,i} Y_i}{\left\{ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}) \right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_{1i})}$$
(5.27)

• (5.27) is an unbiased estimator for V(d) because

$$E\left[\frac{\mathcal{C}_{d}Y}{\left\{\prod_{k=2}^{K}\pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{k})\right\}\pi_{d,1}(X_{1})}\right] = E\{Y^{*}(d)\}$$
 (5.28)

under SUTVA (5.10), SRA (5.11) and positivity assumption (5.15)

Sketch of proof of (5.28): We show a more general result

$$E\left[\frac{\mathcal{C}_{d}f(\overline{X},Y)}{\left\{\prod_{k=2}^{K}\pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{k})\right\}\pi_{d,1}(X_{1})}\right] = E[f\{\overline{X}_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}),Y^{*}(d)\}] \quad (5.29)$$

so that (5.28) follows by taking  $f(\overline{x}, y) = y$ 

• Using SUTVA and (5.7)

$$E\left[\frac{C_{d}f(\overline{X},Y)}{\left\{\prod_{k=2}^{K}\pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{k})\right\}\pi_{d,1}(X_{1})}\right] = E\left(\frac{C_{d}f\{\overline{X}_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}),Y^{*}(d)\}}{\left\{\prod_{k=2}^{K}\pi_{d,k}\{\overline{X}_{k}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-1})\}\right]\pi_{d,1}(X_{1})}\right)$$

$$= E\left\{E\left(\frac{1\{\overline{A} = \overline{d}(\overline{X})\}f\{\overline{X}_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}),Y^{*}(d)\}}{\left[\prod_{k=2}^{K}\pi_{d,k}\{\overline{X}_{k}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-1})\}\right]\pi_{d,1}(X_{1})}\right|X_{1},W^{*}\right)\right\}$$

$$= E\left(\frac{P\{\overline{A} = \overline{d}(\overline{X})|X_{1},W^{*}\}f\{\overline{X}_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}),Y^{*}(d)\}}{\left[\prod_{k=2}^{K}\pi_{d,k}\{\overline{X}_{k}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-1})\}\right]\pi_{d,1}(X_{1})}\right)$$
(5.30)

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From (5.30): Must show

$$\left[\prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d,k} \{ \overline{X}_{k}^{\star}(\overline{d}_{k-1}) \} \right] \pi_{d,1}(X_{1}) = P\{\overline{A} = \overline{d}(\overline{X}) | X_{1}, W^{*}\} > 0$$
 (5.31)

• For  $(x_1, w)$  such that  $P(X_1 = x_1, W^* = w) > 0$ , show

$$P\{\overline{A}=\overline{d}(\overline{X})|X_1=x_1,W^*=w\}>0$$

- There exist  $x_2, \ldots, x_K$  such that  $P\{\overline{X}_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1}) = \overline{x}_k\} > 0, k = 2, \ldots, K$ , because  $\overline{X}_K^*(\overline{d}_{K-1})$  is a function of  $W^*$
- Using SUTVA

$$P\{\overline{A} = \overline{d}(\overline{X}) | X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\}$$

$$= P\{A_1 = d_1(x_1) | X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\}$$

$$\times \prod_{k=2}^{K} P[A_k = d_k\{\overline{x}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1})\} | \overline{A}_{k-1} = \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{x}_{k-1}), X_1 = x_1, W^* = w]$$

Must show each term in this factorization is well defined; true if

$$P\{\overline{A}_k = \overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k), X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\} > 0, \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

By induction; when k = 1

$$P\{A_1 = d_1(x_1), X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\}$$
  
=  $P\{A_1 = d_1(x_1) \mid X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\} P(X_1 = x_1, W^* = w)$ 

is positive if  $P\{A_1 = d_1(x_1) \mid X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\} > 0$ 

• This holds because  $P(X_1 = x_1) > 0$  so  $x_1 \in \Gamma_1$  and  $d_1(x_1) \in \Psi_1(x_1)$  so by positivity assumption

$$P\{A_1 = d_1(x_1) \mid X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\} = P\{A_1 = d_1(x_1) \mid X_1 = x_1\} > 0$$

• Now assume  $P\{\overline{A}_k = \overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k), X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\} > 0$  and show

$$P\{\overline{A}_{k+1} = \overline{d}_{k+1}(\overline{x}_{k+1}), X_1 = x_1, W^* = w\} > 0$$

•  $\overline{X}_{k}^{*}(\overline{d}_{k-1})$  includes  $X_{1}$ , so  $(X_{1}=x_{1},W^{*}=w)$  and  $\{\overline{X}_{k+1}^{*}(d)=\overline{x}_{k+1},W^{*}=w\}$  are equivalent, and thus

$$P\{\overline{A}_{k+1} = \overline{d}_{k+1}(\overline{X}_{k+1}), X_1 = X_1, W^* = W\}$$

$$= P[A_{k+1} = d_{k+1}\{\overline{X}_{k+1}, \overline{d}_k(\overline{X}_k)\} | \overline{A}_k = \overline{d}_k(\overline{X}_k), \overline{X}_{k+1}^*(\overline{d}_k) = \overline{X}_{k+1}, W^* = W]$$

$$\times P\{\overline{A}_k = \overline{d}_k(\overline{X}_k), X_1 = X_1, W^* = W\}$$

Must show first RHS term is > 0; by SUTVA and SRA, this term =

$$= P[A_{k+1} = d_{k+1}\{\overline{x}_{k+1}, \overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k)\} | \overline{X}_{k+1} = \overline{x}_{k+1}, \overline{A}_k = \overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k), W^* = w]$$

$$= P[A_{k+1} = d_{k+1}\{\overline{x}_{k+1}, \overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k)\} | \overline{X}_{k+1} = \overline{x}_{k+1}, \overline{A}_k = \overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k)]$$

• Because  $\{x_1,d_1(x_1)\} \in \Lambda_1$  and  $P\{\overline{X}_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1}) = \overline{x}_k\} > 0$ , the argument leading to (5.23) yields  $\{\overline{x}_{k+1},\overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k)\} \in \Gamma_{k+1}$ ,  $d_{k+1}\{\overline{x}_{k+1},\overline{d}_k(\overline{x}_k)\} \in \Psi_{k+1}(h_{k+1})$ , so this term is > 0

· Applying these results yields

$$P\{\overline{A} = \overline{d}(\overline{X})|X_1, W^*\} = p_{A_1|X_1}\{d_1(X_1)|X_1\}$$

$$\times \left(\prod_{k=2}^K p_{A_k|\overline{X}_k, \overline{A}_{k-1}}[d_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}|\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})]\right)$$

$$= \pi_{d,1}(X_1) \left[\prod_{k=2}^K \pi_{d,k}\{\overline{X}_k(\overline{d}_{k-1})\}\right]$$

which is the desired equality

Result: (5.28) holds

$$E\left[\frac{\mathcal{C}_{d}Y}{\left\{\prod_{k=2}^{K}\pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{k})\right\}\pi_{d,1}(X_{1})}\right]=E\{Y^{*}(d)\}$$

- $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW}(d)$  is an unbiased estimator for  $\mathcal{V}(d)$
- Alternative representation of  $E\{Y^*(d)\}$  in terms of observed data
- Taking instead for fixed y

$$f\{\overline{X}_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}), Y^{*}(d)\} = I\{Y^{*}(d) = y\}$$

yields an alternative representation of the marginal density of  $Y^{*}(d)$ 

**More generally:** For fixed  $(x_1, \overline{x}_2, \dots, \overline{x}_K, y)$ , treating all variables as discrete, taking

$$f\{\overline{X}_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}), Y^{*}(d)\}$$

$$= I\{X_{1} = X_{1}, X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}) = X_{2}, \dots, X_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}) = X_{K}, Y^{*}(d) = y\}$$

yields an alternative representation of the joint density

$$P\{X_{1} = x_{1}, X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}) = x_{2}, \dots, X_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}) = x_{K}, Y^{*}(d) = y\}$$

$$= p_{X_{1}, X_{2}^{*}(d_{1}), X_{3}^{*}(\overline{d}_{2}), \dots, X_{K}^{*}(\overline{d}_{K-1}), Y^{*}(d)}(x_{1}, \dots, x_{K}, y)$$

$$= E\left[\frac{C_{d} I(X_{1} = x_{1}, X_{2} = x_{2}, \dots, X_{K} = x_{K}, Y = y)}{\left\{\prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{k})\right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_{1})}\right]$$

#### **Denominator:**

$$\left\{\prod_{k=2}^K \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_k)\right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_1)$$

- Can be interpreted as the propensity for receiving treatment consistent with regime d through all K decisions given observed history
- Depends on the propensities of treatment given observed history

$$p_{A_k|H_k}(a_k|h_k) = P(A_k = a_k \mid H_k = h_k), \quad k = 1, ..., K$$

- In practice: Posit and fit models for the propensities depending on parameters  $\gamma_k$  and estimators  $\widehat{\gamma}_k$ , k = 1, ..., K; considerations for this momentarily
- These models induce models  $\pi_{d,1}(X_1; \gamma_1)$  and  $\pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_k; \gamma_k)$

In practice: IPW estimator

$$\widehat{V}_{IPW}(d) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{C_{d,i} Y_{i}}{\left\{ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_{k}) \right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_{1i}; \widehat{\gamma}_{1})}$$
(5.32)

 Consistent estimator for V(d) as long as the propensity models are correctly specified

#### Alternative estimator:

$$\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW^*}(d) = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\mathcal{C}_{d,i}}{\left\{ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_{k}) \right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_{1i}; \widehat{\gamma}_{1})} \right]^{-1} \times \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\mathcal{C}_{d,i}Y_{i}}{\left\{ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_{k}) \right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_{1i}; \widehat{\gamma}_{1})}$$
(5.33)

- Weighted average, also a consistent estimator
- Can be considerably more precise than  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW}(d)$

**Simplest case:** Two options at each decision point, feasible for all individuals,  $A_k = \{0, 1\}, k = 1, ..., K$ 

Can work with propensity scores

$$\pi_{k}(h_{k}) = P(A_{k} = 1 | H_{k} = h_{k}) = \pi_{k}(\overline{x}_{k}, \overline{a}_{k-1}), \quad k = 1, ..., K$$

$$p_{A_{1}|X_{1}}(a_{1}|X_{1}) = p_{A_{1}|H_{1}}(a_{1}|h_{1}) = \pi_{1}(h_{1})^{a_{1}}\{1 - \pi_{1}(h_{1})\}^{1-a_{1}}$$

$$p_{A_{k}|\overline{X}_{k}, \overline{A}_{k-1}}(a_{k}|\overline{x}_{k}, \overline{a}_{k-1}) = p_{A_{k}|H_{k}}(a_{k}|h_{k}) = \pi_{k}(h_{k})^{a_{k}}\{1 - \pi_{k}(h_{k})\}^{1-a_{k}}$$

$$k = 2, ..., K$$

• Using (5.2)

$$\begin{split} \pi_{d,1}(X_1) &= \pi_1(X_1)^{d_1(X_1)} \{1 - \pi_1(X_1)\}^{1 - d_1(X_1)} \\ \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_k) &= \pi_k \{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}^{d_k \{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}} \\ &\times [1 - \pi_k \{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}]^{1 - d_k \{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}}, \\ k &= 2, \dots, K \end{split}$$

• Can posit a parametric model  $\pi_k(h_k; \gamma_k)$  for each k; e.g., logistic regression models as in (3.12)

$$\pi_k(h_k; \gamma_k) = \frac{\exp(\gamma_{k1} + \gamma_{k2}^T \widetilde{h}_k)}{1 + \exp(\gamma_{k1} + \gamma_{k2}^T \widetilde{h}_k)}, \quad \gamma_k = (\gamma_{k1}, \gamma_{k2}^T)^T, \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

 $\widetilde{h}_k = (1, h_k^T)^T$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K$ , and fit via maximum likelihood to obtain  $\widehat{\gamma}_k$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K$ 

#### **More than 2 options:** Feasible for all individuals, $A_k = \{1, ..., m_k\}$

As on Slide 170, with

$$\omega_k(h_k,a_k)=P(A_k=a_k|H_k=h_k),\ k=1,\ldots,K$$
 or 
$$\omega_k(\overline{x}_k,\overline{a}_{k-1},a_k)=P(A_k=a_k|\overline{X}_k=\overline{x}_k,\overline{A}_{k-1}=\overline{a}_{k-1})$$

where

$$\omega_k(h_k, m_k) = 1 - \sum_{a_k=1}^{m_k-1} \omega_k(h_k, a_k)$$

• Then 
$$\pi_{d,1}(X_1) = \prod_{a_1=1}^{m_1} \omega_1(X_1, a_1)^{\mathbb{I}\{d_1(X_1)=a_1\}} = \sum_{a_1=1}^{m_1} \mathbb{I}\{d_1(X_1)=a_1\}\omega_1(X_1, a_1)$$

$$\pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_k) = \prod_{a_k=1}^{m_k} \omega_k\{\overline{X}_k \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1}), a_k\}^{\mathbb{I}[d_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}=a_k]},$$

$$= \sum_{a_k=1}^{m_k} \mathbb{I}[d_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\} = a_k]\omega_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1}), a_k\}$$

• Can posit parametric models  $\omega_k(h_k, a_k; \gamma_k)$  for each k e.g., multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression models

$$\omega_k(h_k, a_k; \gamma_k) = \frac{\exp(\widetilde{h}_k^T \gamma_{k, a_k})}{1 + \sum_{j=1}^{m_k - 1} \exp(\widetilde{h}_k^T \gamma_{kj})}, \quad a_k = 1, \dots, m_k - 1$$

$$\widetilde{h}_k = (1, h_k^T)^T$$
,  $\gamma_k = (\gamma_{k1}^T, \dots, \gamma_{k, m_k - 1}^T)^T$  and fit via maximum likelihood to obtain  $\widehat{\gamma}_k$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, K$ 

**Feasible sets:**  $\ell_k$  distinct subsets, each with  $\geq 2$  options in  $A_k$ 

$$A_{k,l} = \{1, \ldots, m_{kl}\}, \quad l = 1, \ldots, \ell_k, \quad k = 1, \ldots, K$$

• For  $k=1,\ldots,K$ ,  $a_k\in\{1,\ldots,m_{kl}\}=\mathcal{A}_{k,l}$   $\omega_{k,l}(h_k,a_k)=P(A_k=a_k|H_k=h_k)$ 

$$\omega_{k,l}(h_k, m_{kl}) = 1 - \sum_{a_k=1}^{m_{kl}-1} \omega_{k,l}(h_k, a_k)$$

• For k = 1, ..., K, can posit  $\ell_k$  separate logistic or multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression models

$$\omega_{k,l}(h_k, a_k; \gamma_{kl}), \quad l = 1, \ldots, \ell_k$$

• For each k = 1, ..., K, implies an overall model

$$\omega_k(h_k, a_k; \gamma_k) = \sum_{l=1}^{\ell_k} \mathsf{I}\{s_k(h_k) = l\} \, \omega_{k,l}(h_k, a_k; \gamma_{kl}), \quad \gamma_k = (\gamma_{k1}^T, \dots, \gamma_{k\ell_k}^T)^T$$

understood that  $a_k$  takes values in the relevant distinct subset

- For subsets with a single option,  $P(A_k = a_k \mid H_k = h_k) = 1$ , and no model is needed
- Induced models

$$\begin{split} \pi_{d,1}(X_1; \gamma_1) &= \sum_{l=1}^{\ell_1} \mathsf{I}\{s_1(h_1) = I\} \prod_{a_1=1}^{m_{1l}} \omega_{1,l}(X_1, a_1; \gamma_{1l})^{\mathsf{I}\{d_1(X_1) = a_1\}} \\ \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_k; \gamma_k) &= \sum_{l=1}^{\ell_k} \mathsf{I}\{s_k(h_k) = I\} \\ &\times \prod_{a_k=1}^{m_{kl}} \omega_{k,l}\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1}), a_k; \gamma_{kl}\}^{\mathsf{I}[d_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\} = a_k)]} \end{split}$$

#### In a SMART: Propensities are known

- As on Slide 90, preferable to estimate the propensities
- Estimate  $P(A_k = a_k \mid H_k = h_k)$  by sample proportions corresponding to each distinct subset  $A_{k,l}$
- Example: Acute leukemia,  $\ell_2=2$ ,  $r_2$  component of  $h_2$  indicating response  $\Psi_2(h_2)=\{\mathsf{M}_1,\,\mathsf{M}_2\}=\mathcal{A}_{2,1},\quad r_2=1$  $=\{\mathsf{S}_1,\,\mathsf{S}_2\}=\mathcal{A}_{2,2},\quad r_2=0$
- Estimate  $P(A_2 = a_2 \mid H_2 = h_2)$  for  $a_2 \in A_{2,1}$  by

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^n \mathsf{I}(R_{2i}=1)\right)^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathsf{I}(R_{2i}=1) \mathsf{I}(A_{2i}=a_2)$$

• Estimate  $P(A_2 = a_2 \mid H_2 = h_2)$  for  $a_2 \in A_{2,2}$  by

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathsf{I}(R_{2i}=0)\right)^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathsf{I}(R_{2i}=0) \mathsf{I}(A_{2i}=a_{2})$$

#### **Equivalent representation:** For both $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW}(d)$ and $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW*}(d)$

• When  $C_d = 1$ ,  $A_1 = d_1(X_1)$ , and  $A_k = d_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}$ , k = 2, ..., K, and it is straightforward that the denominator

$$\left\{\prod_{k=2}^K \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_k)\right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_{1i}; \widehat{\gamma}_1)$$

can be replaced by the fitted model for

$$\prod_{k=1}^K p_{A_k|H_k}(A_{ki}|H_{ki})$$

without altering the value of either estimator

 E.g., with 2 feasible options at each decision point, replace the denominator by

$$\prod_{k=1}^K \pi_k(H_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_k)^{A_{ki}} \{1 - \pi_k(H_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_k)\}^{1 - A_{ki}}$$

With more than 2 options, by

$$\prod_{k=1}^K \omega_k(H_{ki}, A_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_k)$$

- In some literature accounts, the estimators are defined with these quantities in the denominators
- This will be important later

#### Remarks:

- $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW}(d)$  and  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW*}(d)$  are consistent estimators as long as the propensity models are correctly specified; can be inconsistent otherwise
- Except for estimation of propensities, these estimators use data only from subjects for whom  $\overline{A} = \overline{d}(\overline{X})$
- For larger K, there are likely very few such subjects
- These estimators can be unstable in finite samples due to division by propensity of treatment consistent with d small and can exhibit large sampling variation
- As in the single decision case, even if the propensities are known, it is preferable to estimate them via maximum likelihood
- Large sample approximations to the sampling distributions of  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW}(d)$  and  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW*}(d)$  follow from M-estimation theory

**Drop out analogy:** For individuals for whom  $\overline{A} \neq \overline{d}(\overline{X})$ 

- Analogy to a monotone coarsening problem; i.e., "drop out"
- Under SUTVA, an individual with

$$A_1 = d_1(X_1), \dots, A_{k-1} = d_{k-1}\{\overline{X}_{k-1}, \overline{d}_{k-2}(\overline{X}_{k-2})\}$$

but for whom

$$A_k \neq d_k\{\overline{X}_k, \overline{d}_{k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1})\}$$
 has  $X_2 = X_2^*(d_1), \dots, X_k = X_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1})$ , i.e.,  $\overline{X}_k = \overline{X}_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1})$ 

- But his  $X_{k+1}, \ldots, X_K$  and Y do not reflect the potential outcomes he would have if he had continued to follow rules  $d_k, \ldots, d_K$
- Effectively, in terms of receiving treatment options consistent with d, the individual has "dropped out" at Decision k

**Improvement:** From the perspective of information on  $\{X_1, \overline{X}_K^*(\overline{d}_{K-1}), Y^*(d)\}$  and especially  $Y^*(d)$ 

- $\overline{X}_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1})$  is observed, but  $X_{k+1}^*(\overline{d}_k),\ldots,X_K^*(\overline{d}_{K-1}),Y^*(d)$  are "missing"
- Can we exploit the partial information from such individuals to gain efficiency?

**Dropout analogy:** Under SUTVA, SRA, and positivity, this "drop out" is according to a *missing (coarsening) at random* mechanism (shown by Zhang et al., 2013), allowing semiparametric theory for monotone coarsening at random to be used (Robins et al., 1994; Tsiatis, 2006)

#### **Define:**

Indicator of treatment options consistent with d through Decision

$$C_{\overline{d}_k} = I\{\overline{A}_k = \overline{d}_k(\overline{X}_k)\}, \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

with  $\mathcal{C}_{d_0} \equiv 1$ 

• For brevity, write  $\overline{\pi}_{d,1}(X_1) = \pi_{d,1}(X_1)$  and

$$\overline{\pi}_{d,k}(\overline{X}_k) = \left\{ \prod_{j=2}^k \pi_{d,j}(\overline{X}_j) \right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_1), \quad k = 2, \ldots, K$$

with  $\overline{\pi}_{d,0} \equiv 1$ 

· Substitution of propensity models leads to models

$$\overline{\pi}_{d,k}(\overline{X}_k; \overline{\gamma}_k), \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

$$\overline{\gamma}_k = (\gamma_1^T, \dots, \gamma_k^T)^T, k = 1, \dots, K$$

**Analogous to AIPW estimator for single decision:** Under these conditions, if the models for the propensities

$$p_{A_k|H_k}(a_k|h_k), \quad k=1,\ldots,K$$

are *correctly specified*, from semiparametric theory, all consistent and asymptotically normal estimators for  $\mathcal{V}(d)$  for fixed  $d \in \mathcal{D}$  are asymptotically equivalent to an estimator of the form

$$\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{AIPW}(d) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ \frac{\mathcal{C}_{d,i} Y_{i}}{\left\{ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_{k}) \right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_{1i}; \widehat{\gamma}_{1})} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left\{ \frac{\mathcal{C}_{\overline{d}_{k-1},i}}{\overline{\pi}_{d,k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1,i}; \widehat{\overline{\gamma}}_{k-1})} - \frac{\mathcal{C}_{\overline{d}_{k},i}}{\overline{\pi}_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\overline{\gamma}}_{k})} \right\} L_{k}(\overline{X}_{ki}) \right]$$

•  $L_k(\overline{x}_k)$  are arbitrary functions of  $\overline{x}_k$ , k = 1, ..., K

• 
$$\widehat{\overline{\gamma}}_{k} = (\widehat{\gamma}_{1}^{T}, \dots, \widehat{\gamma}_{k}^{T})^{T}, k = 1, \dots, K$$

#### Features of $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{AIPW}(d)$ :

- Taking  $L_k(\overline{x}_k) \equiv 0, k = 1, ..., K$ , yields  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW}(d)$  in (5.32)
- When K=1, because  $\mathcal{C}_{d_0}\equiv 1$ ,  $\overline{\pi}_{d,0}\equiv 1$ , and  $X_1=H_1$ , (5.34) reduces to the AIPW estimator (3.16) for the single decision case
- If all K propensity models are correctly specified, so there are true values  $\gamma_{k,0}$  of  $\gamma_k$ ,  $k=1,\ldots,K$ , the "augmentation term" in (5.34) evaluated at  $\gamma_{k,0}$ ,  $k=1,\ldots,K$ , converges in probability to zero for arbitrary  $L_k(\overline{x}_k)$ ,  $k=1,\ldots,K$
- Thus, (5.34) is a consistent estimator for V(d) with asymptotic variance depending on the choice of  $L_k(\overline{x}_k)$

**Efficient estimator:** From semiparametric theory, the estimator with smallest asymptotic variance among those in the class (5.34) takes

$$L_k(\overline{x}_k) = E\{Y^*(d) \mid \overline{X}_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1}) = \overline{x}_k\}, \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$
 (5.35)

distribution of the potential outcomes  $\{X_1, X_2^*(d_1), \dots, X_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1}), Y^*(d)\}$  and are *unknown* in practice

The conditional expectations in (5.35) are functionals of the

As in the single decision case, posit and fit models

$$Q_{d,k}(\overline{x}_k;\beta_k), \quad k=1,\ldots,K, \tag{5.36}$$

for 
$$E\{Y^*(d) \mid \overline{X}_k^*(\overline{d}_{k-1}) = \overline{x}_k\}$$
,  $k = 1, ..., K$ , and substitute in (5.34)

We present approaches to developing and fitting models (5.36)
 when we discuss optimal regimes later

**Result:** Given estimators  $\widehat{\beta}_k$ , k = 1, ..., K, obtained as we discuss later, the AIPW estimator is

$$\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{AIPW}(d) = n^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ \frac{\mathcal{C}_{d,i} Y_{i}}{\left\{ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_{k}) \right\} \pi_{d,1}(X_{1i}; \widehat{\gamma}_{1})} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \left\{ \frac{\mathcal{C}_{\overline{d}_{k-1},i}}{\overline{\pi}_{d,k-1}(\overline{X}_{k-1,i}; \widehat{\overline{\gamma}}_{k-1})} - \frac{\mathcal{C}_{\overline{d}_{k},i}}{\overline{\pi}_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{k,i}, \widehat{\overline{\gamma}}_{k})} \right\} \mathcal{Q}_{d,k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\beta}_{k}) \right]$$

- $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{AIPW}(d)$  in (5.37) is doubly robust; i.e., is consistent if either (1) the models for the propensities and thus for  $\pi_{d,1}(x_1)$  and  $\pi_{d,k}(\overline{x}_k)$ ,  $k=2,\ldots,K$ , or (2) the models for for  $E\{Y^*(d) \mid \overline{X}_k^*(\overline{d}_k) = \overline{x}_k\}$  in (5.36) are correctly specified
- If the observed data are from a SMART, the propensities are known, and  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{AIPW}(d)$  is guaranteed to be consistent regardless of the models (5.36)

**Efficient estimator:** If all models are correct,  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{AIPW}(d)$  is efficient among estimators in class (5.37), achieving the smallest asymptotic variance

#### Remarks:

- $\widehat{V}_{AIPW}(d)$  can exhibit considerably less sampling variation than the simple IPW estimators (5.32) and (5.33)
- As for  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW}(d)$  and  $\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{IPW*}(d)$ , large sample approximate sampling distribution can be obtained via M-estimation theory (although pretty involved)
- Zhang et al. (2013) propose (5.37) in a different but equivalent form following directly from that in Tsiatis (2006)

Alternative approach: When scientific interest focuses on regimes with simple rules that can be represented in terms of a low-dimensional parameter  $\eta$ 

• Formally, restrict to a subset  $\mathcal{D}_{\eta} \subset \mathcal{D}$  with elements

$$d_{\eta} = \{d_1(h_1; \eta_1), \dots, d_K(h_K; \eta_K)\}, \quad \eta = (\eta_1^T, \dots, \eta_K^T)^T$$

- Goal: Estimate the value of a fixed regime d<sub>η\*</sub> ∈ D<sub>η</sub> corresponding to a particular η\*, V(d<sub>η\*</sub>) = E{Y\*(d<sub>η\*</sub>)}
- As in the example coming next,  $\mathcal{D}_{\eta}$  may be even simpler, with

$$\eta = \eta_1 = \cdots = \eta_K$$

#### **Example:** Treatment of HIV-infected patients

- K monthly clinic visits, decision on whether or not to administer antiretrovial (ARV) therapy for the next month based on CD4 T-cell count (cells/mm³) (larger is better)
- Two feasible options: 1 = ARV therapy for the next month or 0 = no ARV therapy for the next month
- Focus on rules involving a common CD4 threshold  $\eta$  below which ARV therapy is administered and above which it is not

$$d_k(h_k; \eta) = I(CD4_k \le \eta), \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

 $CD4_k = CD4 T$  cell count (cells/mm<sup>3</sup>) immediately prior to Decision k

- $\mathcal{D}_{\eta}$  comprises regimes  $d_{\eta}$  with rules of this form
- Final outcome:  $Y^*(d_\eta)$  = negative viral load (viral RNA copies/mL) measured 1 month after Decision K if administered ARV therapy using rules in  $d_\eta$

**Focus:** Estimation of  $V(d_{\eta^*})$  for particular threshold  $\eta^*$ 

- Ideal: Data from a study where HIV patients were given ARV therapy according to  $d_{\eta^*}$  and viral load was ascertained after Decision K
- More likely: Available data are observational, with information X<sub>k</sub>, k = 1,..., K, including CD4<sub>k</sub>, options A<sub>k</sub> actually received, and –final viral load Y recorded
- In these data, there are likely very few if any individuals who received ARV therapy according to the rules in  $d_{\eta^*}$
- An approach to using these data to estimate  $V(d_{\eta^*})$  is suggested by work of Orellana et al. (2010ab)

**Marginal structural model:** A model for  $V(d_{\eta})$  as a function of  $\eta$ 

• I.e.,  $V(d_{\eta}) = \mu(\eta)$  for some function  $\mu(\cdot)$ , posit a parametric model  $V(d_{\eta}) = E\{Y^{*}(d_{\eta})\} = \mu(\eta; \alpha)$  (5.38)

referred to as a marginal structural model (MSM)

For example, a quadratic model

$$\mu(\eta;\alpha) = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 \eta + \alpha_3 \eta^2, \quad \alpha = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)^T$$

• Estimate  $\alpha$  based on the data by an appropriate method to obtain  $\widehat{\alpha}$ , and estimate  $\mathcal{V}(\mathbf{d}_{\eta^*})$  by

$$\widehat{\mathcal{V}}_{MSM}(\mathbf{d}_{\eta^*}) = \mu(\eta^*; \widehat{\alpha})$$

•  $\eta$  plays the role of "covariate" and  $\mu(\eta^*; \widehat{\alpha})$  is the "predicted value" at the particular value  $\eta^*$  of interest

**Hope:** The MSM is a correct specification of the true relationship  $\mu(\eta)$  across a plausible range of thresholds of interest

**Estimation of**  $\alpha$ : Ideally, data from a prospective randomized study

- Each subject  $i=1,\ldots,n$  is randomized to one of m predetermined thresholds  $\eta_{(j)}, j=1,\ldots,m$ , in the range of interest and receives ARV according to  $d_{\eta_{(j)}}$
- Natural estimator  $\widehat{\alpha}$  solves in  $\alpha$  the estimating equation

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \mathcal{C}_{d_{\eta(j)},i} \frac{\partial \mu(\eta_{(j)};\alpha)}{\partial \alpha} w(\eta_{(j)}) \{ Y_i - \mu(\eta_{(j)};\alpha) \} = 0$$
 (5.39)

where  $w(\eta)$  is a weight function,  $C_{d_{\eta}} = I\{\overline{A} = \overline{d}_{\eta}(\overline{X})\}$ 

- $w(\eta) \equiv 1$  yields OLS estimation
- Each subject i has treatment experience consistent exactly one of the  $\eta_{(j)}$ , j = 1, ..., m
- (5.39) is an unbiased estimating equation if  $\mu(\eta; \alpha)$  is correct

#### Observtional data: Approach is motivated by (5.39)

Experience

• Some individuals have treatment experience consistent with  $\geq$  1 values of  $\eta$ , e.g., with K=2

Consistent with

•	
$CD4_1=300, A_1=1, CD4_2=400, A_2=0$	$\eta \in (300, 400)$
$CD4_1=300, A_1=1, CD4_2=400, A_2=1$	$\eta > 400$
$CD4_1=300, A_1=0, CD4_2=400, A_2=0$	$\eta <$ 300

ullet Others have treatment experience consistent with no value of  $\eta$ 

Experience Consistent with CD4<sub>1</sub>=300, 
$$A_1=0$$
, CD4<sub>2</sub>=400,  $A_2=1$  no  $\eta$ 

**Observational data:** Estimator  $\widehat{\alpha}$  is solution to

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \int_{\mathcal{D}_{\eta}} \left[ \frac{\mathcal{C}_{d_{\eta},i}}{\left\{ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{d_{\eta},k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_{k}) \right\} \pi_{d_{\eta},1}(X_{1i}; \widehat{\gamma}_{1})} \times \frac{\partial \mu(\eta; \alpha)}{\partial \alpha} w(\eta) \{ Y_{i} - \mu(\eta; \alpha) \} \right] d\nu(d_{\eta}) = 0$$

- $d
  u(d_\eta)$  is an appropriate dominating measure on  $d_\eta \in \mathcal{D}_\eta$
- $w(\eta)$  is a weight function
- A given individual i can contribute information on multiple thresholds or none at all
- As in the IPW estimators, each of her contributions is weighted by the reciprocal of an estimator for the propensity of receiving treatment consistent with dη given observed history

For example: Interest in  $\eta \in [100, 500]$ , for j = 1, ..., m, partition  $\eta_{(j)} = 100 + 400(j-1)/(m-1)$ ,  $d\nu(d_{\eta})$  places point mass on  $\eta_{(j)}$ 

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \left[ \frac{C_{d_{\eta(j)},i}}{\left\{ \prod_{k=2}^{K} \pi_{\eta(j),k}(\overline{X}_{ki}; \widehat{\gamma}_{k}) \right\} \pi_{\eta(j),1}(X_{1i}; \widehat{\gamma}_{1})} \times \frac{\partial \mu(\eta_{(j)}; \alpha)}{\partial \alpha} w(\eta_{(j)}) \{ Y_{i} - \mu(\eta_{(j)}; \alpha) \} \right] = 0$$

- Under SUTVA, SRA, and positivity, if  $\mu(\eta; \alpha)$  and the propensity models are correctly specified, these estimating equations can be shown to be unbiased, and  $\widehat{\alpha}$  is an M-estimator
- Here, if there is a sufficient # of individuals who received treatment consistent with at least one  $\eta_{(j)}$ ,  $j = 1, \ldots, m$ ,  $\widehat{\alpha}$  should be a reasonable estimator in practice
- An augmented version of the estimating equation is possible

# 5. Multiple Decision Treatment Regimes: Framework and Fundamentals

- 5.1 Multiple Decision Treatment Regimes
- 5.2 Statistical Framework
- 5.3 The g-Computation Algorithm
- 5.4 Estimation of the Value of a Fixed Regime

#### 5.5 Key References

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