Measuring Severity in Statistical Inference

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1 Introduction: *modus tollens* in statistical inference.

Statistical inference mimics the logical form

$$x$$
 (data) $\rightarrow \Theta$ (claim).

The degree of warrant enjoyed by the claim depends on the data and the strength of the " \rightarrow " relation. **Severity** [3, 2] measures the strength of its contrapositive:

$$\neg\Theta\rightarrow\neg x$$
.

Large severity affirms the support of x for Θ .

2 Quantifying severity in statistical inference.

Let $x \in \mathcal{X}$ be the observable data, $\mathbf{C} = \{C_1, C_0\}$ be a pair of *critical regions* that partition \mathcal{X} , and $\{\Theta_0, \Theta_1\}$ be a pair of *inferential conclusions* that partition $\mathbf{\Theta}$.

Definition 2.1 (inferential claim). The function $T(\cdot; \mathbb{C}) : \mathcal{X} \to \{\Theta_0, \Theta_1\}$ is a binary *inferential claim* based on x, where

$$T(x;\mathbf{C}) = \begin{cases} \Theta_1 & \text{if } x \in C_1 \\ \Theta_0 & \text{if } x \in C_0. \end{cases}$$
 (2.1)

Definition 2.2 (inferential strategy). Suppose for every $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $\mathbf{C}_a = \{C_1(a), C_0(a)\}$ is a partition of \mathcal{X} such that for $a, a' \in \mathcal{A}$ where a < a', $C_1(a) \subseteq C_1(a')$. Then, the collection of inferential claims

$$\mathcal{T} = \{ \mathsf{T}(\cdot; \mathbf{C}_a) : \mathcal{X} \to \{ \Theta_0, \Theta_1 \}, a \in \mathcal{A} \} \tag{2.2}$$

is called an *inferential strategy*.

An inferential strategy provides a sense of *informativeness* conveyed by the data. A data value is more informative about a conclusion if more inferential claims from the same strategy arrive at that conclusion with that data.

Definition 2.3 (data informativeness). Let $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$, and \mathcal{T} be an inferential strategy whose claims are indexed by \mathcal{A} . Say that x is *more informative* than x' about Θ_i with respect to \mathcal{T} , if there exists some $a \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $T_a(x) = \Theta_i$ and $T_a(x') = \overline{\Theta}_i$, for i = 0,1.

Corollary 2.1. If x is more informative than x' about Θ_i w.r.t \mathcal{T} , then x' is more informative than x about $\overline{\Theta}_i$.

Definition 2.4 (severity). The *severity* of an assertion $\Theta \subseteq \Theta$, as substantiated by an inferential claim T (Def. 2.1) derived from the inferential strategy \mathcal{T} (Def. 2.2) and based on data x, is

$$S(\Theta; T = \Theta_i) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta} P_{\theta}(X \notin C_i^x), \qquad i = 0, 1,$$
(2.3)

where $X \sim P_{\theta}$, $\theta \in \Theta$, and

$$C_1^x = \bigcap_{a: T(x, C_a) = \Theta_1} C_1(a),$$
 (2.4)

$$C_0^x = \overline{C}_1^x \tag{2.5}$$

are the respective attained critical regions.

Remark **2.1***. Modus tollens:*

- $X \notin C_i^x$: hypothetical or future realization of X results in an inferential claim that is the opposite of the one drawn from the current evidence x;
- $\theta \notin \Theta$: as the parameter varies in the range that is complement to Θ .

Remark 2.2. $X \sim P_{\theta}$:

- (*Frequentist*) sampling distribution indexed by $\theta \in \Theta$;
- (*Bayes*) conditional prior or posterior predictive distribution marginalized over nuisance parameters.

3 Severity: properties.

A measure of evidential support should satisfy (see [4]):

- Coherence: the larger the hypothesis is, the more support there is;
- *Informativeness*: the farther into the hypothesis the data are, the more support there is.

Theorem 3.1 (coherence). For a pair of assertions Θ , $\tilde{\Theta}$ satisfying $\Theta \subseteq \tilde{\Theta}$,

$$S(\Theta; T = \Theta_i) \le S(\tilde{\Theta}; T = \Theta_i) \tag{3.1}$$

for all $\Theta \in \Theta$ and $i \in \{0,1\}$.

Theorem 3.2 (informativeness). If the data x is more informative than x' about Θ_i with respect to \mathcal{T} for some $i \in \{0,1\}$, then for all $\Theta \in \Theta$,

$$S(\Theta;T(x) = \Theta_i) \ge S(\Theta;T(x') = \Theta_i).$$

The severity enjoyed by an assertion Θ depends on the design of the inferential strategy \mathcal{T} , rather than the specific inferential claim derived from it.

Theorem 3.3 (strategic equivalence). For fixed data $x \in \mathcal{X}$, let T_a and $T_{a'}$ be two inferential claims derived from the inferential strategy \mathcal{T} such that $T_a(x) = T_{a'}(x) = \Theta_i$, where $i \in \{0,1\}$. Then for all $\Theta \in \Theta$,

$$S(\Theta; T_a(x) = \Theta_i) = S(\Theta; T_{a'}(x) = \Theta_i). \tag{3.2}$$

Theorem 3.4 (subadditivity). For fixed data $x \in \mathcal{X}$, let T_a and $T_{a'}$ be two inferential claims derived from the inferential strategy \mathcal{T} such that $T_a(x) = \Theta_i$ and $T_{a'}(x) = \overline{\Theta}_i$, where $i \in \{0,1\}$. Then for all $\Theta \in \mathbf{\Theta}$,

$$S(\Theta; T_a(x) = \Theta_i) + S(\Theta; T_{a'}(x) = \overline{\Theta}_i) \le 1.$$
(3.3)

The equality attains if Θ *is a singleton.*

4 Severity in binary classification.

A classifier T aims to discern between the following two assertions:

 Θ_- : patient x is healthy, vs. Θ_+ : patient x is ill.

The severity of the ill/positive diagnosis is $(\mathcal{X} = \Theta = \{-,+\})$ in this case):

$$S(\Theta_+;T(x)=\Theta_+) = \inf_{x \in \Theta_-} P_x(X \in \Theta_-) = Pr(X \in \Theta_- \mid x \in \Theta_-) = Specificity(T).$$

On the other hand, the severity of the healthy/negative diagnosis is

$$S(\Theta_{-};T(x) = \Theta_{-}) = \inf_{x \in \Theta_{+}} P_{x}(X \in \Theta_{+}) = Pr(X \in \Theta_{+} \mid x \in \Theta_{+}) = Sensitivity(T).$$

5 Severity in frequentist inference.

Consider a family of tests for the pair of null and alternative hypotheses Θ_0 and Θ_1 , characterized by the collection of rejection regions $\{R(\alpha)\}$, $\alpha \in (0,1)$. The *attained* power function is

$$\beta(\theta;x) = P_{\theta}(X \in \mathbb{R}^x) \tag{5.1}$$

where $R^x = \bigcap_{\alpha:x \in R(\alpha)} R(\alpha)$ is the *attained* rejection region, and $p_x = \sup_{\theta \in \Theta_0} \beta(\theta;x)$ is the *p*-value of the test.

Corollary **5.1 (severity and** p**-value).** *The inferential strategy* T*, characterized by critical regions that are rejection regions of a family of hypothesis tests:* $C_1(\alpha) = R(\alpha)$ *, satisfies that for every* $T \in T$ *,*

$$S(\Theta_1;T(x)=\Theta_1)=1-p_x,$$

Furthermore, if the attained power function $\beta(\theta;x)$ satisfies $\sup_{\theta \in \Theta_0} \beta(\theta;x) = \inf_{\theta \in \Theta_1} \beta(\theta;x)$ for $x \in \mathcal{X}$, then

$$S(\Theta_0;T(x)=\Theta_0)=p_x.$$

Corollary **5.2** (severity and the attained power function). Suppose $\Theta = \mathbb{R}$, and consider one-sided assertions of interest $\tilde{\Theta}_0 = (-\infty, \tilde{\theta}]$ versus $\tilde{\Theta}_1 = (\tilde{\theta}, \infty)$. If the attained power function $\beta(\theta; x)$ is continuous and monotone increasing in θ for every x, we have that

$$S(\tilde{\Theta}_1;T=\Theta_1)=1-\beta(\tilde{\theta};x),$$

and

$$S(\tilde{\Theta}_0; T = \Theta_0) = \beta(\tilde{\theta}; x).$$

Remark 5.1. Under the assumption of Corollary 5.2, the attained power function $\beta(\theta;x)$ is a **significance function** [1] (also called the *p*-value function), which is also a **confidence distribution** [5].

Severity in Bayesian inference: an illustration.

Suppose the sampling distribution is $X \sim Bin(n,\theta)$. Consider

$$\Theta_0: \theta \sim \delta_{\left(\theta = \frac{1}{2}\right)}$$
 versus $\Theta_1: \theta \sim \text{Unif}(0,1)$.

Notice that both Θ_0 and Θ_1 are *singleton* sets. This is the setting known as the Lindley's paradox.

The marginal likelihood for the data under the two respective assertions are

$$P(X=x \mid \Theta_0) = \binom{n}{x} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^n \quad \text{and} \quad P(X=x \mid \Theta_1) = \int \binom{n}{x} \theta^x (1-\theta)^{n-x} d\theta = \frac{1}{n+1}.$$
 Under equal prior probabilities, $P(\Theta_0) = P(\Theta_1) = 0.5$, the Bayes factor

$$BF(x;n) = \frac{P(x \mid \Theta_0)}{P(x \mid \Theta_1)} = (n+1) \binom{n}{x} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^n. \tag{6.1}$$

The Bayesian inferential strategy. The Bayesian inferential strategy is to endorse Θ_1 if the attained Bayes factor BF(x;n) falls below a certain pre-determined threshold. This creates critical regions of the form

$$C_1(a) = \left\{ x \in [n] : \left| x - \frac{n}{2} \right| > a \right\} \tag{6.2}$$

for some $a \ge 0$, and $C_0(a) = \overline{C}_1(a)$. For illustration, suppose n = 100 and x = 35. The attained critical region for the inferential strategy is

$$C_1^{35} = \{x < 36 \text{ or } x > 64\},$$

and
$$C_0^{35} = \overline{C}_1^{35}$$
.

Case 1: A ten-fold Bayes factor. Adopt a specific inferential claim that a Bayes factor less than 0.1 is considered strong evidence towards Θ_1 . This effectively sets a=14 in (6.2). The attained Bayes factor $BF(x=35;n=100)=8.72\times10^{-2}$, and the inferential claim results in the conclusion $T_{14}(35)=\Theta_1$, with severity

$$S(\Theta_1; T_{14}(35) = \Theta_1) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta_1} P_{\theta} \left(X \notin C_1^{35} \right) = Pr \left(36 \le X \le 64 \mid \theta = \frac{1}{2} \right) \stackrel{\cdot}{=} 99.65\%.$$
 On the other hand, the severity for the unendorsed claim Θ_0 is

$$S(\Theta_0; T_{14}(35) = \Theta_1) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta_0} P_{\theta} \left(X \notin C_1^{35} \right) = \sum_{x=36}^{64} \int \binom{n}{x} \theta^x (1-\theta)^{n-x} d\theta = \frac{29}{101}.$$

Case 2: A hundred-fold Bayes factor. Adopt a more stringent inferential claim, that only a Bayes factor less than **0.01** would be considered strong evidence towards Θ_1 . This is equivalent to setting a = 18. The inferential claim concludes $T_{18}(x=35) = \Theta_0$, with severity

$$S(\Theta_0; T_{18}(35) = \Theta_0) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta_0} P_{\theta} \left(X \notin C_0^{35} \right) = 1 - \sum_{x=36}^{64} \int \left(\begin{array}{c} n \\ x \end{array} \right) \theta^x (1-\theta)^{n-x} d\theta = \frac{82}{101},$$

whereas the severity for the unendorsed claim Θ_1 is

$$S(\Theta_1; T_{18}(35) = \Theta_0) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta_1} P_{\theta} \left(X \notin C_0^{35} \right) = 1 - P \left(36 \le X \le 64 \mid \theta = \frac{1}{2} \right) \stackrel{.}{=} 0.35\%.$$

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