

# VMP学习笔记之ESI伪代码生成与加密 (六)

## 第六章

主题: VMP学习笔记之ESI伪代码生成与加密

- 1、构造ESI指令的基本套路
- 2、ESI伪代码加密 (保持一致性, 前面对Add系列构造出解密代码, 所以这里要反向加密)
- 3、总结加壳流程

## 学习到的知识:

- 1、知道Handle块生成的套路即可 (核心)
- 2、Esi伪代码加密不需要深入了解, 为了完整性我才写下去 (无用)

## 基础知识:

- 1、熟悉壳的都会发现壳入口都是:

pushad

pushfd


XXXX

popad


popfd

前后基本是固定的套路, 主要是中间真正模拟的代码不同

假设只加密两条, 加密后401000~401005会变成JMP



Esi伪代码



- 2、如何看Vmp\_SetEsiStruct参数对应哪条Handle块

ESI\_Matching\_Array每一组是8个字节

ESI\_Matching\_Array[2~3]: VMopcode (助记符)

ESI\_Matching\_Array[4]: 寻址方式


ESI\_Matching\_Array[5]: 大小

```
209     a6 = ~a6;
210 }
211 if ( v6->Tag > -1 || v6->Mod_Rn || v27 & 4 )
212     a5 |= 8u;
213     LOBYTE(u5) = Size_1;
214     LODWORD(u5) = Vmp_SetEsiStruct(*(struct_DisassemblyFunction **)(a4 - 4), 1, 1, v6->Tag, a5, a6, u5);
```

位数

资料\VMP主程序1.21\伪代码整理.txt


(S) 插入(N) 工程(P) 视图(V) 格式(O) 列(L) 宏(M) 脚本(I) 高级(A) 窗口(W) 帮助(H)



- 3、针对ADD系列提供对称的加密流程

加壳后动态解密

加壳前我们应该将数据加密一遍了



正文：

## 1、ESI伪代码构造的框架简单介绍

按照框架逻辑分为以下三步：

- 1、处理特殊Opcode (不重要，为了完整性)
- 2、构造Esi伪代码 (核心，看完这一步即可)
- 3、加密Esi伪代码与拼接跳转地址 (不重要，为了完整性才写下去)

```
ArrayNumber_1 = TCollection::GetCount_0((int)v1); // 获取需要Ump的流程个数（加密了多少个函数），一般demo版本只能选择一个流程加密
if ( ArrayNumber_1 - 1 >= 0 )
{
    ArrayNumber = ArrayNumber_1;
    v73 = 0;
    do
    {
        v51 = TList::Get(v1->struct_UmpAllDataPV_64, v73);
        v53 = (struc_UserUmpPEInformation *)((*int (__fastcall *)(int, int))(v1->This + 0x10))(v1->This, v51); // 获取struc_UserUmpPEInformation结构（有多少！
        if ( v53->Executable ) // 判断文件属于PE文件还是ELF文件： 0=错误 1=PE 2=ELF
        {
            if ( var8 < 1 ) // 处理特殊指令Opcode例如： call jmp
            {
                if ( !Ump_DisposeUserSpecialOpcode(v53, v52) )
                    goto LABEL_72;
            }
            else if ( var8 == 1 ) // 构造ESI伪代码
            {
                if ( !(unsigned __int8)((int (__fastcall *)(int, int))(v53->This + 0x1C))(v53->This, v1->struct_UmpAllDataPV_60) )
                    goto LABEL_72;
            }
            else if ( var8 == 2 ) // ESI伪代码加密
            {
                v56 = (int *)v1->Field_24;
                ((*void (__fastcall *)(int, int, int, int, int))(v53->This + 0x20))(v53->This, v1->struct_UmpAllDataPV_60, v1->UmpStubStart, v56);
            }
        }
        ++v73;
        --ArrayNumber;
    } while ( ArrayNumber );
}
```

## 2、Vmp\_DisposeUserSpecialOpcode函数分析

## 3、Vmp\_CreateEsiBytecode函数分析

### 3、1 构造出基本框架的Handle块

```

u4 = 0;
ArrayNumber = TCollection::GetCount_0((int)v3) - 1; // 得到用户要加密的代码行数
if ( ArrayNumber >= 0 ) // 将每一条Opcode汇编指令生成对应的Handle框架，保存在struct_DisassemblyFunction->struc_EsiBytecode
{
    ArrayNumber_1 = ArrayNumber + 1;
    Number = 0;
    do
    {
        u8 = (struct_DisassemblyFunction *)GetItem_7((int)v3, Number, v6);
        if ( CheckVMStart_UHEnd1(v3, *(_QWORD *)&u8->LODWORD_UMP_Address) ) // 判断地址合法性
            break;
        (*(void (__cdecl **)(struct_UmpAllDataPV_60 *)))(*(DWORD *)v3->prev_node + 0x18)(a1a); // 进度条的，无视 界面的东西
        if ( !Number // 判断是不是第一次进入
            || *(_BYTE *)GetItem_7((int)v3, Number - 1, v9) + 0x84 & 0x20 // 获取上一组struct_DisassemblyFunction结构
            || *(_WORD *)GetItem_7((int)v3, Number - 1, v9) + 0x24 == 0x23
            || u8->Flag & 3 )
        {
            if ( u8->UHOpcode != 0x23 ) // 解析跳转表jmp dword ptr ds:[eax*4+JumpAddr]Opcode的时候UHOpcode就是0x23
            {
                Ump_CreateVMContextHandle(u8, 0x200); // 构造VMContext的命令
                if ( u8->Flag & 2 && u8->Field_A4 )
                {
                    v10 = u3->prev_node;
                    if ( *(_BYTE *)v10 + 0x48 & 8 )
                    {
                        LOBYTE(v10) = u8->Magic;
                        v11 = v10;
                        v12 = __linkproc__ RandInt();
                        Ump_SetEsiStruct(u8, 1, 1, -1, 0x121, v12, v11);
                    }
                    else
                    {
                        LOBYTE(v10) = u8->Magic;
                        Ump_SetEsiStruct(u8, 1, 2, -1, 0x20, 20164, v10);
                    }
                    sub_493374((int)u8, 0, 0);
                    u8->Flag &= 0xFFDF;
                }
            }
            if ( !Ump_UserOpcodeDisassembly(u8, v9, (struc_AllBytecode *)v3) ) // 将Opcode生成对应的Handle块
            {
                u78 = 0;
                break;
            }
            v15 = Ump_GetNextAddressStart(u8); // 获取下一条指令地址
            if ( v15 == *(_QWORD *)&u3->UserUmpFunctionEndAddr
                || (v16 = Ump_GetNextAddressStart(u8), CheckVMStart_UHEnd1(v3, v16)) )
            {
                if ( u8->UHOpcode != 0x23 && !(u8->Flag & 0x40) )
                {
                    LOBYTE(v15) = u8->Magic;
                    v17 = v15;
                    v18 = Ump_GetNextAddressStart(u8);
                    Ump_SetEsiStruct(u8, 1, 1, -1, 10, v18, v17);
                    sub_493374((int)u8, 0, 9);
                }
            }
            u4->NextArrayNumber = Number;
            u8->struc_AllBytecode = (int)u4;
            if ( u8->UHOpcode != 0x23
                && !(u8->Flag & 0x20)
                && Number < TCollection::GetCount_0((int)v3) // 获取用户需要加密的Opcode总个数
                && *(_WORD *)GetItem_7((int)v3, Number + 1, v6) + 0x84 & 3 ) // 获取下一组struct_DisassemblyFunction结构
            {
                v19 = u3->prev_node;
                if ( *(_BYTE *)v19 + 0x48 & 8 )
                {
                    LOBYTE(v19) = u8->Magic;
                    v20 = v19;
                    v21 = __linkproc__ RandInt();
                    Ump_SetEsiStruct(u8, 1, 1, -1, 0x121, v21, v20);
                }
                else
                {
                }
            }
        }
        u4->NextArrayNumber = Number;
        u8->struc_AllBytecode = (int)u4;
        if ( u8->UHOpcode != 0x23
            && !(u8->Flag & 0x20)
            && Number < TCollection::GetCount_0((int)v3) // 获取用户需要加密的Opcode总个数
            && *(_WORD *)GetItem_7((int)v3, Number + 1, v6) + 0x84 & 3 ) // 获取下一组struct_DisassemblyFunction结构
        {
            v19 = u3->prev_node;
            if ( *(_BYTE *)v19 + 0x48 & 8 )
            {
                LOBYTE(v19) = u8->Magic;
                v20 = v19;
                v21 = __linkproc__ RandInt();
                Ump_SetEsiStruct(u8, 1, 1, -1, 0x121, v21, v20);
            }
            else
            {
            }
        }
    }
    while ( u4->NextArrayNumber < ArrayNumber_1 );
}

```

### 3、2 模拟出实际代替指令，以Push 403000为例

1、执行Vmp\_CreateVM\_POP\_Context函数，构造出VM\_POP\_CONTEXT框架

我们发现以0x12 (PUSH KEY) 开始，0x14 (push 0) 结尾。其中过滤掉ESP

```

6 int u6; // edi@11
7 int u7; // eax@12
8 signed int u8; // esi@12
9 __int16 a5; // [sp+0h] [bp-18h]@1
10 __int16 a5a; // [sp+0h] [bp-18h]@3
11 struc_PushRegister *u12; // [sp+4h] [bp-14h]@9
12
13 v2 = a1;
14 a5 = a2 | 0x20;
15 u3 = TCollection::GetCount_0((int)a1);
16 if ( !u3 ) // 判断是否第一次，(Tlist没有元素就是第一次了)
17 {
18     u2->Flag |= 0x100;
19     LOBYTE(u3) = u2->Magic;
20     Ump_SetEsiStruct(u2, 2, 2, -1, a5, 0x12164, u3); // VM_POP_CONTEXT
21     a5a = a5 & 0xFFFF;
22     if ( HIBYTE(a5a) & 2 )
23     {
24         u4 = (struc_77 *)u2->Field_A4;
25     }
26     else if ( HIBYTE(a5a) & 4 )
27     {
28         u4 = (struc_77 *)u2->struct_DisassemblyFunctionPV_A8;
29     }
30     else
31     {
32         u4 = 0;
33     }
34     if ( u4 )
35     {
36         u4 = sub_49FE40(u4);
37         u12 = (struc_PushRegister *)u4->struc_PushRegister;
38     }
39     else
40     {
41         v12 = *(struc_PushRegister **)(*(DWORD *)v2->prev_node + 4) + 0x50 + 0x308; // 主要是保存push XX (寄存器环境)对应的数字，后面会进行乱序操作
42     }
43     u5 = v12;
44     u6 = v12->AddrNumber - 1;
45     if ( u6 >= 0 )
46     {
47         do
48         {
49             // ...
50         }
51         while ( u6 >= 0 );
52     }
53 }

```

```

52 v5 = v12;
53 v6 = v12->AddrNumber - 1;
54 if ( v6 >= 0 )
55 {
56     do
57     {
58         v7 = TList::Get((int)v12, v6);
59         v8 = v7;
60         if ( v7 == 4 ) // Esp
61             v8 = 0x13;
62         if ( v4 )
63             sub_493568(v2, a5a & 0xFFFFD | 0x40, *(&v4->EncodingOfRegAtJumpsPY_08 + v8), 1);
64         LOBYTE(v7) = v2->Magic;
65         v5 = (struct_PushRegister *)Ump_SetEsiStruct(v2, 2, 2, -1, a5a, v8, v7); // VM_POP_CONTEXT
66         --v6;
67     }
68     while ( v6 != -1 );
69 }
70 LOBYTE(v5) = v2->Magic;
71 return Ump_SetEsiStruct(v2, 2, 2, -1, a5a, 0x14i64, (int)v5); // VM_POP_CONTEXT
72 }

```

2、执行Vmp\_UserOpcodeDisassembly函数，构造Push XXXX指令

首先根据VMopcode选择不同的执行流程

```

112 int savedregs; // [sp+1Ch] [bp+0h]@5
113
114 a1a = a1;
115 if ( !(a1->word86 & 1) )
116     return 1;
117 v4 = (struct_VmFunctionAddr *)a1->struct_VmFunctionAddr;
118 if ( v4 && LOBYTE(v4->Vm_Mnemonic) == 0xD )
119 {
120     sub_496A70((int)&savedregs);
121 }
122 else
123 {
124     v5 = a1a->VMOpcode;
125     v6 = (unsigned __int8)a1a->VMOpcode;
126     switch ( v6 ) // 解析作者定义的OPCode
127     {
128     case 1: // push
129         Ump_UseDisamaStruct(0, a5[0], (unsigned __int8)a3, (int)&savedregs);
130         break;
131     case 2: // pop
132         Ump_UseDisamaStruct(0, 1, (unsigned __int8)a3, (int)&savedregs);
133         break;
134     case 3: // mov and
135         Ump_UseDisamaStruct(1, a5[0], (unsigned __int8)a3, (int)&savedregs);
136         Ump_UseDisamaStruct(0, 1, (unsigned __int8)a3, (int)&savedregs);
137         break;
138     case 7: // Lea
139         Ump_UseDisamaStruct(1, 0x20, (unsigned __int8)a3, (int)&savedregs);
140         Ump_UseDisamaStruct(0, 1, (unsigned __int8)a3, (int)&savedregs);
141         sub_4954E4(a1a->Magic, a1a->First.About_Lval_Byte_Word_Dword, (int)&savedregs);
142         break;
143     case 0x5C:
144         sub_497788(0, (int)&savedregs);
145         Ump_UseDisamaStruct(0, 1, (unsigned __int8)a3, (int)&savedregs);
146         break;
147     case 0x5D:
148         v7 = a1a->First.About_Lval_Byte_Word_Dword;
149         Ump_UseDisamaStruct(0, a5[0], v7, (int)&savedregs);
150         Ump_SetEsiStruct(a1a, 1, 1, -1, 0, -1i64, v7);
151         Ump_SetEsiStruct(a1a, 4, 0, -1, 0, 1i64, v7);
152         Ump_SetEsiStruct(a1a, 2, 2, -1, 0, 16i64, a1a->Magic);

```

根据类型区别读取不同的数据

```

196 LODWORD(v5) = *(_DWORD *) (a4 - 4);
197 if ( *(_DWORD *) (v5 + 0x88) )
198 {
199     LODWORD(v5) = *(_DWORD *) (*(_DWORD *) (a4 - 4) + 0x88);
200     if ( *(_BYTE *) (v5 + 8) )
201         a5 = 7;
202 }
203 }
204 }
205 if ( !(v6->ModRM_mod_Or_Size & 8) && v27 & 2 )
206 {
207     a5 |= 0x10u;
208     v5 = ~a6;
209     a6 = ~a6;
210 }
211 if ( v6->Tag > -1 || v6->Mod_Rm || v27 & 4 )
212     a5 |= 8u;
213 LOBYTE(v5) = Size_1;
214 LODWORD(v5) = Ump_SetEsiStruct(*(struct_DisassemblyFunction **)(a4 - 4), 1, 1, -1, v6->Tag, a5, a6, v5);
215 }
216 if ( v6->ModRM_mod_Or_Size & 4 )
217 {
218     if ( v6->ModRM_mod_Or_Size & 8 )
219     {
220         v12 = v6->SIB_scale;
221         if ( v12 )
222             Ump_SetEsiStruct(*(struct_DisassemblyFunction **)(a4 - 4), 1, 1, -1, 0, (unsigned __int8)v12, 1);
223         v13 = sub_4954E4(v6->About_RegType_8_16_32, *(_BYTE *) (*(_DWORD *) (a4 - 4) + 0x9D), a4);
224         LOBYTE(v13) = v6->About_RegType_8_16_32;
225         LODWORD(v5) = Ump_SetEsiStruct(
226             *(struct_DisassemblyFunction **)(a4 - 4),
227             1,
228             2,
229             -1,
230             0,
231             0,
232             0,
233             0

```

如何看Vmp\_SetEsiStruct参数对应那条Handle块

ESI\_Matching\_Array每一组是8个字节

ESI\_Matching\_Array[2~3]: VMopcode (助记符)

ESI\_Matching\_Array[4]: 寻址方式


ESI\_Matching\_Array[5]: 大小

不就是对应我们那一句push 401000吗?

```
209     }
210     }
211     if ( v6->Tag > -1 || v6->Mod_Rn || v27 & 4 )
212     {
213         a5 |= 8u;
214         LOBYTE(v5) = Size_1;
215         LODWORD(v5) = Ump_SetEsiStruct(*(struct_DisassemblyFunction **)(a4 - 4), 1, 1, v6->Tag, a5, a6, v5);
```

资料\VMP主程序.1.21\伪代码整理.txt

(S) 插入(N) 工程(P) 视图(V) 格式(O) 列(L) 宏(M) 脚本(U) 高级(A) 窗口(W) 帮助(H)



现在我们就已经把push 401000这一条指令模拟成功了

VM\_POP\_CONTEXT ---->0x8次

VM\_PUSH\_IMM ---->push 401000

那么我们还剩下构造退出指令的代码，就是VM\_PUSH\_CONTEXT加VM\_RET


### 3、剩下代码就是构造出结尾指令的

VMP是将两条指令为一组，在最后一组代码后面加上退出指令操作

```
139     break;
140     }
141     v15 = Ump_GetNextAddressStart(v8); // 获取下一条指令地址
142     if ( v15 == *(_DWORD *)&v3->UserUmpFunctionEndAddr
143         || (v16 = Ump_GetNextAddressStart(v8), CheckVMStart_VMEnd1(v3, v16)) )
144     {
145         if ( v8->UMOpcode != 0x23 && !(v8->Flag & 0x40) )
146         {
147             LOBYTE(v15) = v8->Magic;
148             v17 = v15;
149             v18 = Ump_GetNextAddressStart(v8);
150             Ump_SetEsiStruct(v8, 1, 1, -1, 10, v18, v17);
151             Ump_CreateVM_PUSH_Ret_Context((int)v8, 0, 9);
152         }
153     }
154     v4->NextArrayNumber = Number;
155     v8->struc_AllBytecode = (int)v4;
156     if ( v8->UMOpcode != 0x23
157         && !(v8->Flag & 0x20)
158         && Number < TCollection::GetCount_0((int)v3) // 获取用户需要加密的Opcode总个数
159         && *(_DWORD *)(&v3->struc_AllBytecode + 1, v6) + 0x84 & 3 // 获取下一组struct_DisassemblyFunction结构
160     )
161     {
162         v19 = v3->_prev_node;
163         if ( *(_BYTE *)(&v19 + 0x48) & 8 )
164         {
165             LOBYTE(v19) = v8->Magic;
166             v20 = v19;
167             v21 = __linkproc__ RandInt();
168             Ump_SetEsiStruct(v8, 1, 1, -1, 0x121, v21, v20);
169         }
170         else
171         {
172             LOBYTE(v19) = v8->Magic;
173             Ump_SetEsiStruct(v8, 1, 2, -1, 0x20, 0x14i64, v19);
174         }
175         v8->struc_DisassemblyFunctionPV_A8 = *(_DWORD *)(&v3->struc_AllBytecode + 1, v22) + 164;
176         Ump_CreateVM_PUSH_Ret_Context((int)v8, 0x400, 0);
177     }
178     if ( v8->Flag & 0x40 )
179         v4 = 0;
```

执行完后如下:

## Esi伪代码



总结:

1、将两组Opcode信息保存为一组的结构是struc\_AllBytecode

```

00000000 ,-----
00000000
00000000 struct_AllBytecode struct ; (sizeof=0x3C, mappedto_368)
00000000 This dd ?
000000004 _prev_node dd ? ; 指向 struct_UserVmpPEInformationPY_50
000000008 ArrayNumber dd ? ; 第x组要加密的Opcode
00000000C NextArrayNumber dd ? ; 第x组要加密的Opcode 下一条 (如果是最后一条跟 ArrayNumber 相同)
000000010 ContextRegBuff dd 6 dup(?) ; 保存寄存器信息
000000028 ContextRegNumber dd ? ; ContextRegNumber (一般是 0x10 个)
00000002C Magic dd ? ; Magic
000000030 struct_84PY_30 dd ? ; 随机的
000000034 struct_DisassemblyFunction dd ? ; 独立生成一堆无用的忽悠人的 Esi 伪代码信息
000000038 field_38 dd ?
00000003C struct_AllBytecode ends
00000003C

```

地址	HEX 数据	ASCII
014499B0	DC DE 47 00 00 B3 40 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	荷G...侯...f...f...
014499C0	FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF	ooooooooooooooooooooo
014499D0	FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 10 00 00 00 00 02 00 00	ooooooooooooooooooo
014499E0	EC 99 44 01 E4 9A 44 01 1A 00 00 00 00 E0 47 00	鞭D...d...f...船

2、现在ESI伪代码已经构造完成，那么还剩下两个问题：

## ESI代码存在哪里?

### ESI代码对应的Index是什么?

### 3、3 针对struc\_UserVmpPEInformationPY\_50~54进行初始化或则乱序操作

struc\_UserVmpPEInformationPY\_50 == 2个Opcode为一组

struc\_UserVmpPEInformationPY\_54 == 保存特殊Opcode的

```

4  if ( v23 )
5  {
6      v23 = TCollection::GetCount_0(v3->struc_UserUmpPEInformationPY_50) - 1;
7      if ( v23 >= 0 )
8      {
9          ArrayNumber_1 = v23 + 1;
10         v24 = 0;
11         do
12         {
13             v25 = v3->struc_UserUmpPEInformationPY_50;
14             TCollection::GetCount_0(v3->struc_UserUmpPEInformationPY_50);
15             v26 = __linkproc__ RandInt();
16             TList::Exchange(v25, v24++, v26);
17             --ArrayNumber_1;
18         }
19         while ( ArrayNumber_1 ); // 打乱数组顺序
20     }
21     (*(void (*)(void)))(*(DWORD *)v3->struc_UserUmpPEInformationPY_54 + 8)(); // 元素清零
22     v27 = TCollection::GetCount_0((int)&v3->struc_UserUmpSpecialDisassemblerOpcode->This) - 1;
23     if ( v27 >= 0 ) // 根据v3->struc_UserUmpSpecialDisassemblerOpcode添加对应的数组元素
24     {
25         ArrayNumber_1 = v27 + 1;
26         v28 = 0;
27         do
28         {
29             TList::Add(v3->struc_UserUmpPEInformationPY_54, v28++);
30             --ArrayNumber_1;
31         }
32         while ( ArrayNumber_1 );
33     }
34     v29 = TCollection::GetCount_0((int)&v3->struc_UserUmpSpecialDisassemblerOpcode->This) - 1;
35     if ( v29 >= 0 )
36     {
37         ArrayNumber_1 = v29 + 1;
38         v30 = 0;
39         do
40         {
41             v31 = v3->struc_UserUmpPEInformationPY_54;
42             v32 = *(DWORD *)v31 + 8;
43             v33 = __linkproc__ RandInt();
44             TList::Exchange(v31, v30++, v33);
45             --ArrayNumber_1;
46         }
47         while ( ArrayNumber_1 );
48     }
49 }

```

### 3、4 填充补充Esi信息

获取该Esi存放的地址和获取该Handle块的Index

```

1  ArrayNumber_1 = v46 + 1;
2  v48 = 0;
3  do
4  {
5      v79 = (struct_AllBytecode *)TCollection::GetItem_7(v3->struc_UserUmpPEInformationPY_50, v48, v47);
6      LOBYTE(v79->Magic) = 1;
7      a2a = 0;
8      v49 = v79->ArrayNumber;
9      v50 = v79->NextArrayNumber;
10     v40 = __OFSUB__(v50, v49);
11     v51 = v50 - v49;
12     if ( !((v51 < 0) ^ v40) )
13     {
14         v52 = v51 + 1;
15         v72 = v79->ArrayNumber;
16         do
17         {
18             (*(void (__cdecl __stdcall *)(struct_UmpAllDataPY_60 *)))(*(DWORD *)v3->_prev_node + 24)(a1a);
19             v54 = GetItem_7((int)v3, v72, v53);
20             Ump_FindAndSetT0Struct_0(v54); // 获取当前Handle的Index, 并填充该Index
21             a2a += GetEsiBytecodeLen(v54); // 计算Esi伪代码长度
22             ++v72;
23             --v52;
24         }
25         while ( v52 );
26     }
27     *(_QWORD *)v76 = SetAddress(a1a, a2a, a3a, 0i64);
28     v56 = v79->ArrayNumber;
29     v57 = v79->NextArrayNumber;
30     v40 = __OFSUB__(v57, v56);
31     v58 = v57 - v56;
32     if ( !((v58 < 0) ^ v40) )
33     {
34         v59 = v58 + 1;
35         v73 = v79->ArrayNumber; // 这里填充struct_DisassemblyFunction+0x78
36         do
37         {
38             v60 = (struct_DisassemblyFunction *)GetItem_7((int)v3, v73, v55);
39             Ump_SetEsiBytecodeAddress(v60, (int)v76); // 设置Esi伪代码存放的地址
40             ++v73;
41             --v59;
42         }
43         while ( v59 );
44     }
45 }

```

填充前:

址	HEX 数据	ASCII
449640	A0 DA 47 00 C0 C0 40 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	攢G. 览
449650	02 00 02 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.
449660	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
449670	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00	.....

填充后:

地址	HEX 数据	ASCII
01449640	A0 DA 47 00 C0 C0 40 01 F1 56 40 00 00 00 00 00	櫛G.觉@焉@.....
01449650	02 00 02 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
01449660	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 00 00 00	.....
01449670	00 00 00 00 D4 AF 44 01 01 00 00 00 40 00 00 00	....转D#..@...
01449680	FE FE FE FE 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 C0 C0 40 01	iiiiiii! 櫛G.觉@焉@.....

Index是0, 这是未加密的

地址	HEX 数据	ASCII
0144AFD4	00 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	....
0144AFE4	14 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	■...
0144AF54	20 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	/


### 3、5 蜜汁操作，生成一堆无用的垃圾代码

各位真正逆向分析找到Esi往前跳的即可,感觉这堆指令没什么用

```

}
LOBYTE(v79->Magic) = 0;
v61 = (struct_DisassemblyFunction *)v79->struct_DisassemblyFunction;
Ump_CreateUM_POP_Context((struct_DisassemblyFunction *)v79->struct_DisassemblyFunction, 0); // 构成出POP_CONTEXT标准开头
AddEnc(v61, 0x40, v79->struc_84PV_30, 1); // 针对Add系列构造出对称的加密流程
LOBYTE(v62) = v61->Magic;
v63 = Ump_SetEsiStruct(v61, 2, 2, -1, 0, 0x11i64, v62); // UM_POP_CONTEXT
LOBYTE(v63) = v61->Magic;
Ump_SetEsiStruct(v61, 1, 2, -1, 0x20, 0x14i64, (int)v63); // UM_PUSH_CONTEXT
v64 = Ump_CreateUM_PUSH_Context((int)v61, 0, 0);
LOBYTE(v64) = v61->Magic;
v65 = Ump_SetEsiStruct(v61, 1, 2, -1, 0x20, 0x11i64, (int)v64); // UM_PUSH_CONTEXT
LOBYTE(v65) = v61->Magic;
Ump_SetEsiStruct(v61, 0xC, 0, -1, 0x20, 0i64, (int)v65); // UM_JMP
Ump_FindAndSetT0Struct_0((int)v61);
v66 = GetEsiBytecodeLen(v79->struct_DisassemblyFunction);
*(_QWORD *)v76 = SetAddress(a1a, v66, a3a, 0i64);
Ump_SetEsiBytecodeAddress((struct_DisassemblyFunction *)v79->struct_DisassemblyFunction, (int)v76);
++v48;
--ArrayNumber_1;
}
while ( ArrayNumber_1 );

```



### 3、6 Vmp\_CreateEsiBytecode函数总结

- 1、其实VMP生成Handle块套路基本都是固定模板
- 2、假设是mov模拟: push + pop 不就可以了吗  
xchg交换: push + pop 或则 xor a,b xor b,a xor a,b  
其实自己随便搞也能模拟出来
- 3、剩下比较复杂的逻辑运算跟模拟cmp指令的我专门写一篇讲解

### 4、Vmp\_EncEsiBytecodeAndCreateJmp函数分析

- 4、1 构造push 伪指令 + jmp Start指令



```

34: a3a[1] = v308->Characteristics & 0x20; // 节区属性
35: v3 = TCcollection::GetCount_0(v308->struc_UserUnpPEInformationPV_50) - 1;
36: if ( v3 >= 0 ) // 填充好Unp跳转指令 push 伪代码 jmp 调度器
37: // 注意这段循环之处理普通指令类似于: call 是进行特殊处理, 并不在这里面
38: {
39:     ArrayNumber_1 = v3 + 1;
40:     Counter = 0;
41:     do
42:     {
43:         v279 = (struc_59 *)TCcollection::GetItem_7(v308->struc_UserUnpPEInformationPV_50, Counter, v4);
44:         RandomNumber = __linkproc__ RandInt();
45:         RandomNumber_1 = RandomNumber + 1;
46:         *(_QWORD *)(v279->struct_DisassemblyFunction + 0x10) = SetAddress(a1a, RandomNumber + 0xB, word_48FEFC[0], 0i64);
47:         UMP_Address = *(_QWORD *)(v279->struct_DisassemblyFunction + 0x10); // struct_DisassemblyFunction->UMP_Address
48:         Buff[0] = *(_DWORD *) (v279->struct_DisassemblyFunction + 0x78); // EsiBytecode (未知只是猜测), 只有解析用户需要加密的Opcode代码才会产生
49:         v308 = (struc_UnpJumpAddress *) (* (int (__cdecl **)(unsigned int, void *, int *)) (*(_DWORD *)v308->struc_UserUnpPEInformationPV_48
50:                                     |
51:                                     v220,
52:                                     v221,
53:                                     v222);
54:         Unp_StructureOpcode(v308, 0, 0x68, 0); // push
55:         Unp_StructureOpcode(v308, 2, Buff[0], 0); // bytecode ;伪代码地址, 作为参数
56:         Unp_StructureOpcode(v308, 0, 0xE9, 0); // jmp
57:         Unp_StructureOpcode(
58:             v308,
59:             2,
60:             UstartUM - UMP_Address - 0xA, // 长度
61:             (unsigned __int64)(UstartUM - UMP_Address - 0xA) >> 0x20); // push + jmp = 0xA 长度? ? ?
62:         RandomNumber_2 = RandomNumber_1 - 1;
63:         if ( RandomNumber_2 >= 0 ) // 根据前面随机数为长度 (5Max); 指令后面随意填充随机字节
64:         {
65:             Counter_1 = RandomNumber_2 + 1;
66:             do
67:             {
68:                 v8 = __linkproc__ RandInt();
69:                 Unp_StructureOpcode(v308, 0, v8, (unsigned __int64)v8 >> 0x20);
70:                 --Counter_1;
71:             }
72:             while ( Counter_1 );
73:         }
74:         Unp_SetOpcodeLenOrAddress(v308, (int)&UMP_Address); // 函数功能: 设置Opcode长度和填写地址
75:         // 函数返回值: 当前Opcode地址+长度=下一条需要填充的地址

```

0008D400 350

## 5、画图总结所学内容