The Rise of Authoritarianism in the 21st Century

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Introduction

Since taking office, President Biden's main foreign policy objective has been restoring America's global standing by rebuilding and strengthening democratic alliances across the globe. On December 9-10, 2021, the Biden Administration held the first-ever "Summit for Democracy" where President Biden called the defense of democracy "the defining challenge of our time" (The White House, 2021). The Summit for Democracy sought to present solidarity among the world's democracies by bringing together leaders from over 100 democratic countries to promote democratic renewal in the wake of rising authoritarianism (The White House, 2021). During his address to the Summit, Mr. Biden emphasized that "Democracy doesn't happen by accident. We have to renew it with each generation. And this is an urgent matter on all our parts, in my view, because the data we're seeing is largely pointing in the wrong direction" (Detrow, 2021). Like Mr. Biden stated, over the last ten to twenty years the data surrounding democratic countries has looked grim with evidence of significant democratic backsliding. According to Freedom House, since 2006 there have been sixteen consecutive years of democratic decline around the world (Grothe & Vepa, 2022). To measure levels of democracy, Freedom House examines a country's degree of political rights and civil liberties. Political rights are broken down into three subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. The four subcategories of civil liberties are Freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy

and individual rights (Freedom House, 2022). Figure 1.1 above gives examples of how political

rights scores and civil liberties scores have changed across particular countries from 2016 to

2022. Together, these measures are used to categorize countries into three categories: free, partly

free, and not free (Freedom House, 2022). As illustrated on the left in Figure 1.2, the percentage of countries classified as 'Free' has steadily dropped since 2013 while the percentage of 'Not Free' countries has grown to over 30% in 2022. This democratic downturn has meant that in

Figure 1.2. Percentage of countries with various levels of freedom from 2013 to 2022. Freedom house measures countries based on data from 195 countries and 15 territories

2021 80% of the world's population lived in a country that was considered either partly free or

not free. That is up significantly from the 54% of the world's population that did not live in a free

country in 2005 (Grothe & Vepa, 2022).

Contrary to this contemporary slide in democratic values around the world, in the early

1990s satellite states within the Soviet Union were gaining their own freedoms by declaring their

independence from the USSR. At the time, the international relations scene was filled with

optimism and hope as these newly independent states began to form independent democratic

governments. In Poland, the Solidarity Trade Union pushed for political reforms included in

"The Round Table Agreement" which was signed on April 4, 1989, leading to the creation of

elections for a bicameral legislature and a president. In June 1989, Hungary dismantled its

section of the physical Iron Curtain that separated its borders from Austria, allowing passage to

the Western world (Haass, 2017). These events helped usher in democratic governments in

Hungary and Poland which led them to adopt closer relations to the West over the coming years by joining the European Union (EU) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 symbolically heralded the peaceful dissolution of the Cold War with the reunification of Germany (Haass, 2017). As the Soviet Union neared collapse more states declared their independence and began to choose their own alliances, forms


Figure 1.3. Liberal democracy scores throughout the world

of government, and security agreements. Several of these newly independent states moved towards adopting Western style democratic governments and values. This helped increase the worldwide average liberal democracy index by a full point from 1989 to 1995 as illustrated on the above in Figure 1.3 (Coppedge et al., 2022).

Amid the resolution of the Cold War, on September 11, 1990, President George H. W. Bush presented his idea of a 'new world order' in a speech to a joint session of Congress during Saddam Hussein's military invasion of Kuwait. Mr. Bush stated:

> The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective -- a new world order -- can emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars

raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born,

a world quite different from the one we've known… This is the vision that I shared with

President Gorbachev in Helsinki. (Bush, 1990)

Mr. Bush's vision for a new world order became a reality as a coalition of thirty-five countries

was assembled by the United States, under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 678,

to force Iraq out of Kuwait's sovereign territory and restore Kuwait's government (Haass, 2017).

With liberal democracy scores hitting record highs year after year, as shown in Figure 1.3, along

with the world uniting around the principles of state sovereignty, Mr. Bush's new world order

seemed to be taking shape. So, thirty years later, how could Mr. Bush's new world order have

fallen apart so quickly to where the dominant headlines of international relations today are about

democratic backsliding and the violation of state sovereignty with Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

Therefore, this research paper will seek to understand the factors that are associated with the rise

in authoritarian governments around the world during the 21st century. As will be shown, value

changes across society due to changing socioeconomic conditions will produce a backlash

among the older populations who consequently lend support to populist candidates. Once

populist leaders are in office, little stands in their way of bashing against the guardrails of

democracy as these now authoritarian-populists begin to rule in the name of 'the people'.

Literature Review

In order to investigate this research question, the literature review will be divided into

several sections that examine common findings and themes from the established literature and

theories. The first section focuses on the methods people use to adopt political belief systems.

Sections two and three go on to describe the various ways that people adopt values and how

those values can change over time. These sections are designed to give a greater understanding

of the various psychological mechanisms at play when people are developing values, specifically their political values. Section four examines cultural backlash theory which discusses how increased economic security post-WWII along with period effects have been shaping society's values. Under the right conditions during election years these influences can drive society's support for populist leaders. Finally, section five examines the definitions of populism and authoritarianism to understand Inglehart's investigation of authoritarian-populists. This section will also detail historical examples of populists taking power and progressing into authoritarian rule to illustrate that this is not a new phenomenon.

How Political Belief Systems are Developed

First, it is crucial to understand how ordinary people form a political identity and how that will then influence their vote choice. In 1964, Phillip Converse investigated the concept of what it meant for people to develop a political belief system. Converse found that the public conceptualizes politics in four distinct ways: ideologues, group benefits, nature of the time, and no issue content (Converse, 1964). Ideologues focus on the philosophical policies and positions that define their political party and thereby make it unique from other parties' ideologies. Group benefits describes people who make political decisions by relying on the opinions of groups they are a part of or with whom their identity is invested. Nature of the times states that people's political decisions are based on if their perceived well-being has improved or declined when a particular party was in power. Based on this perception people will either reward the party in power by voting for them or punish them by voting for the opposition. Finally, no issue content describes people's political understanding as being based on the personality of the candidate running for office, not partisan affiliation. These people are also described as simply voting randomly (Converse, 1964). Out of these four conceptualizations, Converse found that group

interests is the most common way people interact with politics at about 45% of voters (Converse, 1964).

According to social psychology research, people use a variety of mental shortcuts, called heuristics, as an easier way to think about and then make complex decisions (Jonassen, 2003). For the 'nature of the times' and 'ideologue' categories, people have to either understand the nuanced differences between political parties or how a particular political party has impacted their well-being. With 60% of citizens unable to name all three branches of the United States government and over 50% unable to name even a singular Supreme Court Justice staying attuned to rapidly changing political party differences seems extremely unlikely for the common citizen (Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2019 & Birnbaum, 2018). Since the public lacks information on core aspects of government, how can they be expected to know the nuanced differences various political parties have on a wide range of issues that can change every election season? This is where people rely on heuristics, specifically their availability heuristic to recall information about politics when trying to decide who to cast their vote for. The availability heuristic states that people will make a decision based on a recent experience or information that is readily available to them (Jonassen, 2003). As a result, people will commonly think back to conversations with those they trust, like a neighbor or a group they are a part of, as they employ Converse's idea about group benefits to make political decisions. The literature in social psychology has consistently emphasized the impact of in-group favoritism where one gives preferential treatment to members of their ingroup over outgroup members. As people rely on their in-groups for information regarding politics, events that are not even impacting the individual directly can influence their vote simply because it is affecting the group they are a part

of (Mutz, 2021). As long as the threat or issue is shared by one's in-group, the individual does

not need to be personally affected for them to react to it (Mutz, 2021).

Social Factors Influencing Political Affinity

There are a variety of psychological and sociological reasons that determine which

political leaders or parties a person chooses to identify with and support. Christopher Federico

postulates that both social and individual factors contribute to a particular person's placement on

the left-right political spectrum (Federico, 2011). Specifically relating to social factors, Federico

identifies social relationships and group interests as playing a decisive role in developing a

person's ideological affinity. Federico's analysis is framed by Converse's group benefits theory

by his emphasis that people adopt the views of groups that they relate with (Federico, 2011). The

first, and perhaps most important, social relationship you have in your life is with your parents.

During infancy, infant's brains experience tremendous growth with the rapid development of

synapses, through a process called synaptogenesis. Synaptogenesis facilitates the creation of

neural networks which helps advance an infant's ability to learn, create memories, and acquire

language (Gambrill, Barria, & Huganir, 2011). When a parent is interacting with their child

during this critical period of development, the child begins to acquire some of the social

behaviors and habits of their parent (Belsky, 1984). In this same vein, Federico notes that

decades of research has suggested that ideological positions are likely to be transmitted from

parents to their children (Federico, 2011; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2013). This is especially

true if both parents harbor similar political beliefs and politics are discussed frequently (Federico

2011). Thus, as development continues, synapse can either be strengthened or weakened

depending on how often the synapse is used following a 'use it or lose it' philosophy (Gambrill,

Barria, & Huganir, 2011). Therefore, as the child continues to develop and the parent continues

to interact with their child, the more likely the child's synapses related to their parent's political beliefs/values are going to be strengthened (Federico, 2011; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2013).

Federico's idea of group interests and social relationships are not mutually exclusive toward impacting a person's political affinity. To illustrate group interests and social relationships combined effect, we can turn to Theodore Newcomb's famous study on undergraduates at Bennington College. Upon arriving at Bennington College, the freshman population was fairly conservative in their political views. However, Bennington's upperclass students and faculty members were largely liberal in their political views resulting in the overall college political environment leaning liberal. So, as the conservative freshman became more integrated with the college by participating in clubs, sporting events, and classes they increasingly identified with the campus's socially liberal environment. Exceptions to this case were the freshman who remained close to their families rather than integrating into Bennington college's environment resulting in them retaining more of their conservative political positions (Newcomb, 1943). In addition to social factors, research has also emphasized the role individual psychological factors play in influencing one's political ideology.

Individual Factors Influencing Political Affinity

Various individual factors can impact a person's ideological affinity including how successful someone is at satisfying their basic needs along with personality characteristics (Federico, 2011). Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, seen in Figure 2.1 on the left, is a pyramid structure that suggests that people are motivated to fulfill the basic needs on the

Figure 2.1. Citation: Diagram obtained from J. Finkelstein under GNU Free Documentation License

bottom of the pyramid prior to moving up to more advanced needs (Maslow, 1943). From bottom to top Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs progresses from physiological needs, to safety, to love and belonging, to esteem, and finally reaching the pinnacle with self-actualization (Maslow, 1943). When analyzing an individual's placement on Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and how that relates to their political affiliation, researchers tend to examine a person's underlying levels of comfort with uncertainty and threat. Generally, this type of research has illustrated that strong needs for security and certainty, located at the bottom of Maslow's Hierarchy, are correlated with supporting political conservatism (Federico 2011). On the other hand, individuals with weaker needs for security and certainty reside at the top of Maslow's hierarchy where they work towards more transcendent needs by achieving their personal potential. In turn, these individuals at the top of Maslow's hierarchy are associated with greater liberalism (Federico 2011).

As Hitler and Mussolini's armies marched across Europe during World War II, ordinary citizens across a variety of European countries took active roles in Nazi atrocities such as the Holocaust. As psychological research was expanding after WWII, a significant amount of this new research was dedicated to understanding how ordinary citizens could willingly carry out these horrible acts. For their part, Theodor Adorno and colleagues conducted research on the factors that were associated with people adopting far right ideological positions, specifically directed towards fascism. At the time of their study in the late 1940s, the most prominent psychological theory revolved around Sigmund Freud's field of psychoanalysis. Therefore, to understand how people could turn to far-right ideological positions in support of Hitler's fascist regime, Adorno utilized Sigmund Freud's theories about the management of anxiety through defense mechanisms. Specifically, Adorno examined Freud's defense mechanisms of repression and projection. Repression involves the banishing of arousing thoughts, feelings, and memories

from one's consciousness, while projection is where people attribute their own unwanted motives, feelings, or attributes onto others (American Psychological Association, n.d.). An example of projection is that person A hates person B, but person A will rationalize that hatred by believing that person B hates them. Adorno and colleagues argued that harsh childrearing led individuals to repress hostility towards their parents or other traditional authorities and project their frustrations outward onto scapegoats (Adorno et al., 1950). These scapegoats tended to be people who were outsiders of their traditional community and usually took the form of minority groups, like the German Jewish population. Because of Freud's theories, Adorno and colleagues viewed children who experienced harsh childrearing as being more susceptible to joining and participating in far-right ideological parties later in life (Adorno et al., 1950). With a modern day perspective, it is essential to note that many of Freud's theories from which Adorno's research is based have been heavily criticized. For example, modern psychologists claim that even if repression does happen, it is a rare mental response. On top of that, most research today points to the fact that under high stress, associated stress hormones will actually enhance memory, the opposite effect of what Freud's idea of repression postulates (Ballinger, 1998). However, the parent-child relationship remains a key point of interest for modern day measures of authoritarianism. Instead of survey questions asking about people's views on policy issues that those holding authoritarian/populist values would likely support, such as anti-immigration laws, today's survey batteries ask questions related towards individuals' personal preferences (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Examples of indirectly measuring authoritarianism would be asking people what qualities they'd prefer their child to have 'obedience to authority' or 'caring towards others'. According to the Schwartz scale, those answering 'obedience to authority' would display higher levels of authoritarian values because of their emphasis on conformity (Inglehart, 2008).

Asking survey questions in this manner is done to avoid the social desirability effect, where people modify or suppress their own viewpoint in favor of giving one that adheres to the majority opinion. This is especially pertinent when the questions being asked are controversial (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Macro Longitudinal Analysis on Value Change

As opposed to understanding an individual's ideological affiliation as a combination of social and individual factors, Inglehart chose to use a macro level analysis to investigate how society's values change over time. Following World War II, there was remarkable peace and economic growth in the Western world thanks to a variety of factors including the Marshall Plan, expansion of the welfare state, increased access to college education, and rapid urbanization rates (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). These changes helped usher in drastically new societal conditions reinforcing the idea that "survival was secure" (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Post-WWII generations were not growing up under conditions of hunger and economic insecurity that characterized generations who lived during the Great Depression (Inglehart, 2008). As a result of this increased prosperity following WWII, Inglehart proposed that value change would occur among these post war generations who would be growing up under markedly better conditions than older generations had. Correspondingly, research has confirmed Inglehart's theory that value change has been occurring with the younger generations. As early as 1970, Inglehart observed unique sets of values for both the members of the older generations and the generations that have grown up after WWII (Inglehart, 2008). With that data Inglehart

Figure 2.2. Graph cited from Inglehart, 2008

gathered in 1970 Figure 2.2 shows that the post-WWII generation is much more likely to hold post-materialist values than their counterparts from the older generations (Inglehart, 2008). Not only that but they are the only age demographic where those holding post-materialist values outnumber the materialists. Post-materialist values incorporate ideas of self-expression, belonging, and intellectual satisfaction (Inglehart, 2008). In addition, post-materialist values are significantly correlated with socially liberal values like respecting the human rights of minority groups, protecting the environment against climate change, and cosmopolitanism of a single world community (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). On the other hand, materialists emphasize economic and physical security over self-expression and intellectual satisfaction. This is because these older generations grew up during the Great Depression and both World Wars where survival was anything but secure (Inglehart, 2008). It is important to point out when understanding the rise of post-materialism that these value changes are not evidence of life-cycle differences, where as people age they transition from post-materialist to materialist values (Inglehart, 2008). Instead Inglehart found that each generation's views on post-materialism remained remarkably consistent as time went on, illustrating that the rise of post-materialism reflects an intergenerational value change (Inglehart, 2008). The literature in Developmental psychology supports this claim as people develop their values during their adolescence but then once into adulthood their basic values become crystallized where little change in values occurs (Rokeach, 1974). This is a crucial distinction because as members of the younger generation replace those dying from older generations, Inglehart proposed that society's overall values would become more post-materialist.

With the expansion of post-materialist values potentially overtaking those who hold materialist values identified in a particular region or country potentially, a tipping point in

society's values is likely within reach. A change in the relative size of majority and minority groups, as seen by the rise of post-materialists, can spark a decisive shift in collective attitudes and behaviors (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) As post-materialist values become more mainstream in the population, people at odds with those values, like materialists, might come to suppress their contrarian opinion. This is postulated in the Spiral of Silence theory where individuals self-censor their now minority viewpoint because they fear social penalties, such as isolation or loss of status (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In turn, once post-materialist values start to become dominant, then factors such as conformism and social desirability effect begin to accelerate post-materialist values (Inglehart, 2018). The pace of value change can influence whether people will adhere to the spiral of silence. For example, people with more conservative materialist views who perceive that their values are slipping to a marginal status within their community are likely to feel threatened by the loss of respect for their values. In turn, this feeling can translate into anger and resentment among those holding materialist values as they feel they have been forgotten by society (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). On top of this, period effects such as economic downturn or outgroup threat via immigration can lead to heightened materialist sentiment among all age demographics temporarily as economic and physical security is weakened (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). During this time a golden period can occur where materialist values surge throughout society triggering an authoritarian reflex among the population.

Reasons/Examples Behind the Rise of Authoritarians-Populists

Before diving into Inglehart's concept of authoritarian-populists, it is critical to understand each of these terms separately to better understand how they interact. To start with populism, Norris and Inglehart define it with two important beliefs. First, populism challenges the legitimate authority of the establishment. Popular populist targets of the establishment

include "the mainstream media ('fake news')…politicians ('drain the swamp')…public-sector bureaucrats ('the deep state')… the European Union ('Brussels bureaucrats')" (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Second, populist leaders assert that the legitimate source of power in a democracy resides with the people. In this regard, populists view the lived experience of the everyday man as being morally superior to any intellectual's book learning. As a result, populists' ideals seek to delegitimize the authority of elected representatives, scientists, scholars, judges, and journalists who are all seen taking power from the people (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). At the core, populism asserts who should rule a country, while saying nothing about what policy decisions should be made to run that country (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Moving on to the definition of authoritarianism, Inglehart and Norris outline it in three major parts. The first part that authoritarians emphasize is the importance of security against the chaos of disorder as exemplified by foreigners stealing our jobs or terrorists threatening our safety. The second part refers to the value of group conformity to preserve traditional ways of life, like defending conventional European values. The third and final part is the need for loyal obedience toward strong leaders who protect the group and its customs (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In contrast to populists who direct their attention towards the domestic establishment, authoritarians target group outsiders such as immigrants, Muslims, and members of the LGBTQ community (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Specifically, populists focus on 'first order principles' deciding who should lead decision making within a country, typically assigning that role to 'the people' as opposed to the domestic establishment. On the other hand, authoritarians emphasize 'second order principles' that relate to the specific values and policies that should guide a country's government (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

History is filled with examples of populist political outsiders coming to power only to rule with the iron fist of authoritarianism as they claim to be the one true voice of the people. Levitsky and Ziblatt illustrate this trend by emphasizing key historical examples of charismatic political outsiders being co-opted by mainstream politicians during times of crisis. These fateful political alliances have brought to power political outsiders who mainstream politicians thought they could control. The goal of the mainstream politician is to control the outsider and their following by using the outsiders' movement for the politician's own gain (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019). However, throughout history these types of situations have backfired spectacularly. In early 1930s, Germany's Parliament failed to deliver majorities on account of the Great Depression leading President Paul von Hindenburg to invoke a constitutional article allowing him to name a chancellor to lead the government. After several chancellors failed to govern Germany, von Hindenburg along with Franz von Papen turned to a political outsider with a mass following who German leaders thought they could manage in order to stabilize the government. Adolf Hitler was chosen as Germany's next chancellor with the architect of the plan von Papen saying, "Within two months, we will have pushed [him] so far into a corner that he'll squeal" (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019). Von Hidenberg and von Papen's political gamble on Hitler to lead Germany was a profound miscalculation. Soon after he became chancellor, Hitler used Reichstag Fire to limit the rights and freedoms of German citizens. When President von Hidenberg died Hitler merged the powers of the presidency with the chancellorship to become Germany's first Führer. Hitler was not the only one to benefit from these fateful alliances as remarkably similar paths were followed by Benito Mussolini in 1920s Italy, Hugo Chávez in 1990s Venezuela, and Alberto Fujimori in 1980s Peru (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019). The key for all of these populist leaders was their charismatic power with the people that mainstream politicians attempted to

harness for their own purposes. These examples are in some ways outliers for their times as during the Cold War, nearly three out of every four democratic breakdowns were a result of a coup d'état (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019). Now, this is not to say that those leaders were non-violent before assuming power. In fact, that is anything but the case with Chavez's two failed coup attempts and Hitler's failed insurrection during The Beer Hall Putsch in 1923 just to name two (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019). Examples of populist political outsiders coming to power only to become authoritarian rules are not simply relics of the past but are shaping up to be democracy's main challenger in the 21st century.

Populists open the door for potential authoritarian rulers by tearing down democratic guardrails that keep leaders in check by emphasizing the voice of the people. As people holding materialist values feel threatened by the rise of post-materialism, they tend to feel forgotten by society. Accordingly, materialists will believe that the people's voice, in essence the materialist's voice, has become unrepresented in society. In turn this will create a demand for populist values among materialists that focuses on the people's voice rather than government institutions or policy makers (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). What happens though, according to Norris and Inglehart, is that it is much easier for populists to 'destroy the old than rebuild the new' in terms of government which results in the potential for the rise of an authoritarian leader to attack democratic norms and practices (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). These authoritarian-populists frame attacks on democratic norms as an effort to improve democracy by making the courts more efficient (court packing), combating corruption (jailing dissidents), and cleaning up the election process (restricting voter access or gerrymandering) (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019). These steps are also taken when the leader views checks and balances as hindering their ability to carry out their agenda. In turn, an authoritarian leader who claims to be 'the voice of the people' can institute

policies that drastically change the laws or constitution. Typically, these changes allow for violence against enemies/political opponents of the leader in power or limit civil liberties of the media and those who criticize the government (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019). Hence the combination of these terms by Norris and Inglehart as 'authoritarian-populists' to define not only the platform these people use to come to power, but also illustrating their likely destructive policies towards democratic institutions once in power (2019).

Research Design

Norris and Inglehart's cultural backlash theory will serve as the foundation to investigate the factors that are associated with the rise in authoritarian leaders around the world since the mid-2000s. Since cultural backlash theory relies on societal value change to explain the recent surge of support for populist candidates throughout the world, a basic understanding of how people adopt values from a political science and psychological point of view was established. Phillip Converse researched how people develop a political belief system, coming to the conclusion that the public conceptualizes politics in four distinct ways: ideologues, group benefits, nature of the time, and no issue content. Converse found that the most common way voters rationalize political decisions is based on the group benefits framework (Converse, 1964). Based on Converse's findings, research from Diana Mutz was used to qualify the impact that group benefits can have on shaping voters' political decisions. Specifically, the idea that as long as one's ingroup was affected by a world event, like a job loss or economic crisis, the individual does not have to be personally affected for them to feel threatened by the event. Subsequently this feeling leads the individual to react to the event as if they were personally impacted (Mutz, 2021). Later, this idea will help explain broad support for populist candidates despite the fact that large chunks of the electorate did not personally experience the job loss, economic struggle, or

ingroup threats from minorities. Moreover, Maslow's hierarchy of needs can be connected to Inglehart's description of materialist and post-materialist value structure. Those at the top of Maslow's hierarchy would be considered more post-materialist because they have fulfilled all of the more basic needs below, thus achieving a greater sense of security. On the other hand, materialists would fall at the bottom of Maslow's hierarchy since they are more concerned about physiological and safety needs such as economic and physical security. Therefore, materialists cannot move up the hierarchy towards self-actualization until they perceive their most essential needs as being satisfied.

According to Freedom House, since 2006 democratic values around the world have declined for sixteen consecutive years (Grothe & Vepa, 2022). As a result, in 2021 80% of the world's population lived in a country that was considered either partly free or not free. That is up significantly from 54% of the world's population who lived in either a partly free or not free in 2005 (Freedom House, 2022). Clearly, something is happening to influence so many countries, including democracies, to turn towards authoritarian rule since 2005. Therefore, cultural backlash theory will be utilized to identify several factors that have influenced a country's shift towards electing authoritarian-populist leaders.

Since cultural backlash theory relies on value change over time to explain the recent surge in support for populist candidates, it will be pivotal to determine what values and economic conditions are most impactful. To understand these factors' impact on society is crucial to chart these independent variables change over time. Therefore, the statistical method that will be relied on will be time series graphs to illustrate the change in society's values over time along with vote share of particular political parties. Time series graphs are preferred so that the reader can understand how a population's shifting values have impacted political party support over a

certain time period. By doing a time series analysis, a clear direction of causality can be established by assessing which events came first. Once the independent variables have been charted over time, a logistic regression will be employed using the independent variables from a single round of the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS will be used to match the ratings of individuals on all of the various independent variables, specifically value indices, to which party they supported in their country's national election. The logistic output will be used to determine the direction of the beta coefficients each variable has on predicting vote for an authoritarian-populist party. The results from the logistic regression will be used to either confirm or refute the findings from the times series analysis using cultural backlash theory to explain increased vote share for authoritarian-populist parties. In addition, logistic regression will be an easy way to check if values for an authoritarian-populist's base change over time once their supported candidate is in power, illustrating an incumbency effect.

The analysis section of this research project will be examined through two levels of analysis. The first unit of analysis will be a conglomerate of countries or regions throughout the world to examine the effects of cultural backlash theory. Because data is not evenly available for all regions around the world the macro level analysis will focus predominantly on European countries, located in appendix. Europe's largest advantage is the abundance of data sources exploring European society such as the European Social Survey, European Values Survey, and the Eurobarometer. Based on the analysis of the independent variables across European society, which will be further divided down into northern, southern, eastern, and western regions, specific countries of interest can be identified. Therefore, the second unit of analysis will be specific countries that have become prime examples of this recent global trend towards authoritarian regimes. Cultural backlash theory will then be applied to these specific countries using logistic

regression to see if the independent variables can predict the increasing vote share for authoritarian-populist candidates.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable that will be measured to map the rise of authoritarianism in the 21st century is the vote share for authoritarian-populist parties in national elections. For measuring the vote share for authoritarian-populist parties, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and European Society Survey (ESS) data sets will be used. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey estimates political parties' ideological positions and policies based on expert analysis and research. Therefore, the CHES will be used to identify which parties qualify as authoritarian-populist parties. If parties received scores above 80 (out of 100) on the standardized authoritarian-libertarian index and had scores above 80 (out of 100) on the populism scale these parties were qualified as being authoritarian-populist parties (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Independent Variables

The independent variables that will be measured to investigate their effect on the vote share for authoritarian-populist parties are based on cultural backlash theory which includes post-materialism and period effects. In order for a post-materialist shift to occur, the country must be 'physically and economically secure' (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Therefore, only countries that the World Bank classifies as 'high income' or 'upper middle income' will be investigated for this analysis. In addition, it is vital to note that high economic levels are a better predictor of post-materialist values than high economic growth rates (Inglehart, 2018). This illustrates that countries' physical and economic security is dependent upon the amount of time the economy has grown rather than simply high economic growth in the present. Post-materialism is associated with a country's

growing gender equality, greater support for gay rights, and increasing ethnic diversity. In addition, post-materialist values are highly correlated with socially liberal values such as tolerance of diversity, human rights, and environmental protection. Because of this significantly high correlation, socially liberal values can be used as a proxy to measure post-materialist values (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). To analyze post-materialist values the following socially liberal value measures from the European Social Survey, described in Chart 3.1, will be combined into an index variable called 'SocialLibValues'.

Chart 3.1

ESS Variable	Description
wmcpwrk	Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family
mnrgtjb	Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce
freehms	Gay & lesbians should be free to live life as they wish
euftf	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far
imwbcnt	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
rlgdgr	How religious are you

(Norris & Inglehart, 2019)

Post-materialist values can also be measured using a 4-point and 12-point index in the World Values Survey. For simplicity the 4-point index will be used. A score of 4 identifies post-materialist values while a score of 1 marks materialist values. A value of either 2 or 3 indicates mixed values (Inglehart et al., 2020). The idea behind incorporating post-materialist values as an independent variable is that the rise of post-materialist values will inherently lead to the decline of materialist values. This societal value change could further the demise of materialist values during a tipping point as the social desirability effect and conformism reinforce post-materialist values. However, if those harboring materialist values see that they are becoming a minority in society at the tipping point, an authoritarian reflex could occur entrenching their materialist values. Therefore, creating a

demand for politicians to represent the views of the forgotten materialists (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Consequently, the rise of materialist values can also bring to light authoritarian and populist values as materialists struggle to maintain their hegemony in society. For measures of authoritarian values, the standardized Schwartz scale will be used since that is the primary index that Inglehart and Norris use for their analysis. The standardized Schwartz scale is created by taking the mean of five variables from the ESS listed in Chart 3.2 to create a new variable called "SchwartzScale" (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). SchwartzScale will then be calculated on a range from 1-6 where 1 corresponds to higher

Chart 3.2

ESS Variable	Description
impsafe	Important to live in secure and safe surroundings
ipfrule	Important to do what is told and follow rules
ipbhprp	Important to behave properly
ipstrgv	Important that government is strong and ensures safety
imptrad	Important to follow traditions and customs

(Norris & Inglehart, 2019)

authoritarian values and 6 corresponds to lower authoritarian values. If more than two of these variables in Chart 3.2 are missing in the dataset, then the Schwartz scale will not be calculated. As mentioned in the literature review, the key benefit of the Schwartz scale is to avoid the social desirability effect by asking about these personal preferences instead of policy choices.

To measure populist values, a populist values index will be created using the same five variables from the ESS that Norris and Inglehart employed in their study. The populist scale is created by taking the mean of the five variables described in Chart 3.3. Like the

Schwartz scale, if more than two of these measures are missing, then the populist scale

will not be calculated. In the following analysis this populist index variable will be called

Chart 3.3

ESS Variable	Description
trstplt	Trust in politicians
trstplc	Trust in the police
trstprt	Trust in political parties
trstprl	Trust in country's parliament
trstlgl	Trust in the legal system

(Norris & Inglehart, 2019)

"PopulistScale". The results of PopulistScale will be displayed from 0-10, where 0

indicates greater populist values, via distrust in the institutions mentioned in Chart 3.2,

while a value of 10 corresponds to lower levels of populist values.

For the other independent variable of period effects, Norris and Inglehart identify

economic grievances and immigration as being the two most prominent. Unlike the rise of

post-materialism, which changes society's values over a long period of time through

intergenerational value change, period effects have an immediate but temporary impact

(Norris & Inglehart, 2019). According to Inglehart, per capita income is one of the best

readily available factors that can predict economic security and therefore a rise or decline

in post-materialist values (2018). As a result, data about Gross National Income per capita

over time from the World Bank will be used to measure whether a country is currently

experiencing economic hardship or not. Specific emphasis will be given to the time period

around the 2008 financial crisis that hampered economic growth worldwide.

Understanding how well countries rebounded from the 2008 financial crisis should give a

good understanding to the levels of economic security felt during this time. In addition, it

is pivotal to remember from the literature review that as long as one's ingroup was affected by the economic crisis, the individual does not have to be personally affected for them to feel threatened by the event (Mutz, 2021).

For immigration, the number of actual immigrants going to a country can shape public opinion towards them, but also this is not necessarily key. Therefore, countries' perceptions of immigration and immigrants themselves will be measured using an anti-immigration index that Norris and Inglehart used from the European Social Survey (2019). The anti-immigration index is created by calculating the mean of the three variables described in Chart 3.4. In the analysis, the immigration index will be called "ImmigrationScale". The anti-immigration index will not be calculated if one of these

Chart 3.4

ESS Variable	Description
imbgeco	Immigration bad or good for country's economy
imueclt	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
imwbcnt	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

(Norris & Inglehart, 2019)

variables are missing. As large, unexpected immigration patterns occur, such as the 2015 European Refugee Crisis, this will lead to an increase of materialist values. Since materialists already feel their cultural values are being overshadowed by the post-materialists, the idea of having foreigners push their own values on society will be viewed with the same level of threat. However, even the perception of immigrants enforcing their own values among the population would be enough to highlight a materialist reaction. Like was stated during the economic argument, individuals do not need to see firsthand the effects of immigrant's values to feel threatened by them. As long as they associate their in-group as being negatively affected by immigrants that will be

enough to trigger a materialist backlash leading to support of authoritarian-populist leaders

who campaign against immigrants (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Mutz, 2021).

<div align="center">

Research Analysis

</div>

Macro Region of Europe

Examining regions will be the initial unit of analysis to understand the impacts of cultural

backlash theory. Europe will serve as the primary region of this analysis since it has a wide array

of diversity coupled with extensive amounts of available survey data. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 on the

left show that the European region appears to mirror changes in liberal democracy index scores

for the world which both peaked in 2011 and have declined ever since. Since 2011 average

Trends in Liberal Democracy Worldwide

Data obtained from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) version 12

Figure 4.1. Liberal democracy scores throughout the world

liberal democracy scores across Europe have decreased by over a full point. Clearly, whatever is happening around the world to decrease liberal democracy scores is having a meaningful impact on European society, which makes European society a good sample to investigate. Breaking European society down further into four geographic regions, we can establish which parts of Europe experienced the greatest decline in liberal democracy. Geographic

Trends in Liberal Democracy Throughout Europe

Data obtained from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) version 12

Figure 4.2. Liberal democracy scores throughout Europe

regions are defined by V-Dem using the geographic classification used in the United Nations

Statistics Division. Figure 4.3 below shows scores for the liberal democracy index across the

four European regions. As is evident in Figure 4.3 democracy scores remained remarkably

constant across Northern and Western Europe despite the occurrence of two major period effects.

However, democracy scores for the eastern and southern European regions began to steadily

decline starting in 2010 for eastern Europe and 2012 for southern Europe, illustrating that

democratic backsliding across Europe is predominantly taking place in countries located in eastern and southern Europe. This finding will be critical to identify a country for the case study analysis. In order to understand why liberal democracy scores across Europe have been in significant decline in the last decade,

Figure 4.3. Liberal democracy scores throughout Europe

the assumptions of cultural backlash theory will be examined. Specifically, this will be

investigated by understanding society's value change over time with specific emphasis on period

effects.

The first independent variable that will be examined is post-materialist values across

Europe. To recap, because of the increased economic prosperity after WWII, Inglehart proposed

that younger generations would develop values that would diverge from the values of older

generations. Then through intergenerational value change older generations who predominantly

held materialist values would be replaced in society with members of the younger generation

who hold post-materialist values. In turn, this would shift society's overall values towards

post-materialist ones (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Post-materialist values characterize those of the

younger generation that focus on self-actualization at the top of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. As

Federico pointed out, individuals at the top of Maslow's hierarchy have weaker needs for

security and certainty and are consequently associated with greater liberalism. Individuals with

strong needs for certainty and security reside at the bottom of Maslow's hierarchy where they are

correlated with supporting political conservatism (Federico, 2011). Since socially liberal values

are highly correlated with greater postmaterialist values, socially liberal values can be used as a proxy to measure post-materialist values as illustrated in Figure 4.4 (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). As shown in Figure 4.4, post-materialist values, grouped by various age cohorts,


Figure 4.4. Socially liberal values over time across Europe as a proxy for post-materialism

highlight a clear distinction between those in the traditionalist age cohort and the rest. This is

explained by the fact that the traditionalist cohort included anyone born before 1945, so it makes

sense that those who grew up in conditions right after WWII were seen as not being as physically

and economically secure as those who grew up in later generations (Inglehart, 2008). In addition,

right around the 2008 Great Recession post-materialist values declined significantly with materialist values peaking in 2010, providing evidence of


Figure 4.5. Post-materialist values across Europe using WVS

society's shift to materialist values during a period effect. Figure 4.5 above reveals the frequency

of post-materialist values across Europe over time in relation to materialist values and those who

had mixed values using data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 1981-2020). Figure

4.5 shows the slow and steady decline of people holding materialist values since wave 3, leading

to increases in people holding post-materialist and mixed values categories over time in Europe.

Especially considering the fact that it appears that post-materialist values will soon eclipse

materialist values, Europe appears to have been poised to reach the tipping point, potentially

triggering the spiral of silence or a reaction among the materialists as they lose their dominant

position in society.

Period Effects

The second set independent variable under analysis are period effects. The two main

period effects that Norris and Inglehart identity are economic grievances and immigration.

Unlike the slow rise of post-materialism through intergenerational replacement that can take

decades to significantly impact a society's values, period effects are an immediate but temporary

phenomenon. Period effects can temporarily reverse the long-term process of generational value

change leading to heightened materialism throughout society regardless of age cohort (Norris &

Inglehart, 2019). In 2008, the world experienced drastic economic decline during the Great

Recession. As seen on the right in Figure 5.1, the European Union (EU) experienced negative

GNI per capita growth in 2008 and 2009. The recession impacted the job markets as millions of

people became unemployed and
therefore reduced the processing
power of a large portion of their
economy. Poor economic conditions

European Union GNI per capita growth (annual %)

Data obtained from World Bank

Figure 5.1. GNI per Capita Growth across the EU

struck the EU again in 2012 with another year of negative GNI per capita growth. European recovery from the Great Recession continued to stagnate until 2014 when GNI per capita growth reached pre-Great Recession levels as seen on the left in Figure 5.2. After 2014, Europe appeared to have economically recovered with continued positive economic growth likely until the Coronavirus pandemic rocked the world in 2020. However, economic damage on account of the Great Recession had already been done.

Figure 5.2. GNI per capita growth in Constant 2015 US$

Turning to the impact of immigration, just like economic grievances, the impact (or perceived impact) of mass immigration into one's home country can galvanize support for rising materialist values. If people already holding materialist values feel that they are becoming a minority in society, mass influxes of people (whether significant or not) with different languages, religions, or customs can reinforce this position (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In turn, social tensions will flare up as materialists will view immigrants as a threatening force to their already in jeopardy materialist values. During the peak of the European Refugee Crisis in 2015, 1.26 million people applied for asylum in the EU (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Because of the streams of refugees that flooded into Europe during this crisis,


Figure 5.3. Immigration index values over time across Europe

Norris and Inglehart noted that as a whole, "Europe now hosts more migrants than any other region" (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Figure 5.3 above shows perceptions of immigrants and immigration across Europe. To recap, higher levels of anti-immigration are represented by lower values on the immigration index. Despite the 2015 European Refugee Crisis, there is no discernible effect on average immigration views across all of Europe. Now, if the ESS data was able to be broken up into regions like southern and eastern Europe, as is able to be done with the V-Dem data, that experienced the greatest surges of refugees to their borders, their values regarding immigration should be significantly different.

In addition to anticipating rising materialist values when a society experiences period effects, Norris and Inglehart also predicted an authoritarian reflex would occur among materialists who feel threatened by loss of respect for their values (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This authoritarian reflex among materialists would lead to higher levels of authoritarian and populist values creating a demand for politicians to address these rising concerns. However, during period effects supply side effects like cues from party leadership and media coverage can activate latent authoritarian or populist values among the socially conservative materialists leading to the same result (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Taking into account the impact of both period effects and intergenerational value change, there is no discernible impact on the level

Figure 5.4. Schwartz scale values over time across Europe

of authoritarian values across Europe. In fact, from 2002 to 2018, Figure 5.4 shows average

authoritarian values across Europe remain remarkably steady despite the appearance of two

significant period effects being the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2015 Refugee Crisis. However,


Figure 5.5. Populist values index over time across Europe

what did change significantly was an increase of average populist values across Europe. Specifically, Figure 5.5 illustrates that populist values gained greater traction during the 2008 financial crisis, reaching a peak in 2010. Populist values only recovered to their pre-recession levels in 2014, which is

around the same time Europe's economy reached pre-recession levels. This indicates that

between 2006 to 2014 Europe as a whole became significantly more populist. This shift

potentially opened up the door for populist candidates throughout Europe to jump on the demand

side issues of voters by campaigning to their wants. Therefore, when the analysis shifts to

individual countries it is expected that more populist candidates and their parties will have had

better results gaining a larger percentage of the vote than they had in previous years.

Case Country Analysis

From the regional analysis that divided Europe into four separate regions in Figure 6.1, it

was evident that eastern and southern Europe both began to experience significant democratic backsliding in the 2010s. Therefore, a country for the case analysis section will be picked from


Figure 6.1. Liberal democracy scores throughout Eastern Europe by individual countries

either of these regions that could have elected an authoritarian-populist leader because of the effects described in cultural backlash theory. Breaking down liberal democracy scores in Eastern Europe by country, it becomes apparent in Figure 6.1 that Hungary and Poland experienced drastic democratic backsliding in the 2010s. Since 2010, Hungary's democracy sources have been steadily declining, appearing to have hit a floor starting around 2018. On the other hand, Poland experienced a much steeper decline in democracy scores starting in 2016 and has yet to reach its floor yet. Democratic declines in both of these countries started immediately after national elections were held and a new party assumed power. In Hungary's 2010 national elections, Viktor Orbán and political party Fidesz won the election with enough seats to achieve the 2/3s majority required to modify the country's constitution. During Poland's 2015 national election, Beata Szydło led her right winged Law and Justice party to victory. Both of these parties elected in Hungary and Poland were opposition parties prior to winning their respective elections. In addition, using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Norris and Inglehart classified both Orbán's Fidesz party and Szydło's Law and Justice party as authoritarian-populist parties based on measures discussed in the research design. So, what influenced voters away from incumbent parties and towards these authoritarian-populist parties? Looking at Figure 6.1 it appears that period effects could have played a significant role in both elections. For Hungary's 2010 election, Europe was still in the midst of the 2008 Great Recession that was wrecking economic devastation throughout the region. Poland's 2015 election took place right in the middle of the 2015 European refugee crisis where 1.26 million people applied for asylum in the EU (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Hungary

Early on in the 2008 Great Recession, many economists had thought that the effects of this crisis would not dramatically impact central and eastern European countries like Hungary. Their rationale behind this was that banks in this region was "not exposed to US sub-prime losses and were well capitalized" (Darvas, 2008). However, living in an interconnected globalized world spooked investors as they started to pull out of investments in emerging economies like Hungary. Out of all the eastern European countries, Hungary was hit the hardest because the Hungarian government already had high levels of government and external debt (Darvas, 2008). Above in Figure 7.1, Hungary started to see economic growth decline in 2007 even before the 2008 Financial Crisis.

Figure 7.1 GNI per capita Growth in Hungary, annual percent change

2009 was Hungary's worst year economically as their GNI per capita growth dropped by almost 4%. It would take Hungary until 2013 to achieve pre-recession growth rates. As in Figure 7.2, Hungary's GNI per capita essentially stagnated between 2006 and 2013. This economic disaster in Hungary required the aid of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which granted Hungary a $25 billion financial aid package (Carare, 2009). Clearly


Figure 7.2. GNI per capita in Hungary, Constant 2015 US$

widespread economic damage impacted Hungary during the Great Recession. However, it is

important to keep in mind that people do not have to be personally affected by an economic

downturn for someone to feel threatened by it. This can even lead people who did not lose a job

during the Great Recession or were not
impacted by it to act and vote as if they
were (Mutz, 2021). As illustrated by
Figure 7.3, materialist values across
Hungary surged in response to the Great
Recession peaking in 2010, the same
year Viktor Orbán was elected. Clearly,
the Great Recession was having an
effect on Hungary's values during this

Figure 7.3. Socially liberal values over time in Hungary as a proxy for post-materialism

time. However, at this point it cannot be stated if this value shift helped Orbán win the election.

That idea will be explored a little later on during the logistic regression analysis. The shift

towards materialist values in Hungary
coincided with other value shifts across
Hungary's society. As illustrated below
in Figure 7.4, values relating to
authoritarianism did not change at all
across Hungary around the time of
Orbán's election. This finding is
consistent with the macro analysis of
Europe where authoritarian values also

Figure 7.4. Schwartz index values over time in Hungary

remained constant despite two period effects taking place. Based on the literature review,

specifically the subsection "Reasons/Examples Behind the Rise of Authoritarians-Populists" I

believe authoritarian values not being impacted by period effects is expected. This is because in

that subsection, authoritarian values were described as focusing on the specific values and

Figure 7.5. Populist index values over time in Hungary

policies that should guide a country's government. Authoritarianism does not revolve around who should lead or be in charge of the government, just how they should go about leading. Populism focuses on who should lead a country, ultimately placing power with the people and away from the political elites

(Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Therefore, since populism focuses on 'first-order principles' of who

should rule, while authoritarianism emphasizes 'second-order principles' of what policies and

political decisions should be made once in power, it would make sense that populist values

would have a greater impact on electing a particular candidate than authoritarian values. As

shown in Figure 7.5 above, this just might be the case as populist values peaked in 2008. Peak

populist values occurred two years before Hungary's election as candidates were beginning to

position themselves to pitch their case to voters. Interestingly enough, the ESS analyzed Hungary

after the 2010 election had taken place. So, knowing that the party in power effect can change

people's views and values overnight, it might be possible that the decline of populist values in

2010 is reflective of Viktor Orbán coming to power. Since the populist index is measured by

gauging people's level of trust in politicians, political parties, and parliament it would make

sense that Orbán followers would have negative views of these institutions when their candidate

and party is not in power. However, when Orbán and Fidesz won the 2010 election these values

might immediately swap to supporting these institutions now that their party is in control,

culminating in a honeymoon effect. This will be further explored in the logistic regression

section.

Shifting towards Hungary's views on immigration, Figure 7.6 shows increasing

anti-immigration sentiment until 2006 where it promptly reversed course and Hungary became

slightly more accepting of immigration, peaking in 2012. After 2012 is where the beginning

Figure 7.6. Immigration index values over time in Hungary

effects of the European Refugee Crisis can be seen impacting the values of Hungarian society as anti-immigration views intensify significantly with peak anti-immigration views occurring in 2016. This is one year after the height of the European Refugee crisis in Europe. However, anti-immigration views

significantly change only after Orbán is elected as Hungary's leader. Since the goal of this

analysis is to understand what values and societal changes influenced Orbán's rise to power, it

appears that these changes regarding views on immigration came too late. However, these

anti-immigration views might have helped Orbán in his reelection campaign in 2018 as he

looked for new ways to reinvigorate his base.

Logistic regression is utilized to complement the time series analysis, to see if the

predicted effects of the independent variables do indeed significantly increase the probability of

voting for Orbán's authoritarian-populist party. Below in Table 7.1 is the logistic regression

output for supporting Fidesz over all other parties in Hungary's 2010 national election. There are

a couple of key findings from this output that need to be described. First, as predicted with the

times series analysis, as authoritarian and anti-immigration values increase (in effect going lower

down their respective scales), this increases the probability of voting for Fidesz. However, this is

not the same case for the populist scale. As populist values decrease (in effect going up the

populist scale), this increases the probability of voting for Fidesz. Initially, this does not make

Table 7.1	Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates				
Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Wald Chi-Square	Pr > ChiSq
Intercept	1	2.1534	0.5089	17.9023	<.0001
Schwartz Scale	1	-0.1909	0.1161	2.7029	0.1002
Populist Scale	1	0.1390	0.0434	10.2657	0.0014
Immigration Scale	1	-0.0925	0.0454	4.1435	0.0418
rlgdgr	1	0.1302	0.0283	21.2209	<.0001
agea	1	-0.0282	0.00530	28.3505	<.0001

sense because why would populists not vote for the populist party, especially in the midst of the

2008 Financial Crisis. However, this finding gives evidence to my discussion earlier in this

section about the party in power effect. Since the ESS measured Hungarians' values after the

2010 election had taken place, those most likely to vote for Fidesz no longer held populist

values. As Fidesz political party took power, and convincingly too with a 2/3s majority, their

supporters would immediately have faith in Hungary's politicians, political parties, and

parliament because their political preference is holding the power.

In order to understand the populist element of Orbán's party it was necessary to find an

election where he was not an incumbent and where he lost the election so that his supporters'

views towards trusting various aspects of Hungary's institutions would remain the same when

the ESS interviewed his supporters after the election. Just such an opportunity arose in 2006.

Upon running logistic regression with the 2006 data, located in Table 7.2 below, we found that as

populist values increase (in effect going down the populist scale), this increased the probability

of voting for Orbán's Fidesz party. This finding highlights that Orbán's rise to power in Hungary

did in fact incorporate a populist element but ended once he was in office. This finding also fits

nicely with Norris and Inglehart's description of populism as addressing who should rule while

Table 7.2	Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates				
Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Wald Chi-Square	Pr > ChiSq
Intercept	1	1.4194	0.4485	10.0140	0.0016
SocialLibValues	1	-0.0130	0.0104	1.5754	0.2094
SchwartzScale	1	0.0230	0.1099	0.0438	0.8343
PopulistScale	1	-0.2455	0.0408	36.2194	<.0001
ImmigrationScale	1	-0.0662	0.0362	3.3439	0.0675
rlgdgr	1	0.1947	0.0276	49.6883	<.0001
agea	1	-0.0239	0.00541	19.5966	<.0001
agesq	1	0.000022	5.254E-6	16.8433	<.0001

authoritarianism concerns itself with particular policies once in power. This is evident in Table

7.2 as the populist scale is a significant predictor of voting for Fidesz while authoritarianism

values (Schwartz Scale) is not even close to being significant. Finally, contrary to the times

series analysis that identified rising materialism as beneficial to Orbán's rise, neither the 2010

nor 2006 models showed that materialism was a significant predictor in increasing the

probability of voting for Fidesz. In fact, adding materialism as a predictor in the 2010 model

made the model worse by lowering the adjusted R-squared value compared to when it was not in

the model.

The last topic utilizing logistic regression to investigate Hungary is the impact of the

2015 European Refugee Crisis on Orbán's reelection in 2018. As illustrated by Figure 7.6,

Hungary began to develop significantly more anti-immigration values after 2012 with steep

increases until they peaked in 2016, one year after the European refugee crisis and two years

before Orbán was up for reelection. Logistic regression to predict voting for Orbán's Fidesz party

in 2018 is listed below in Table 7.3. There are a couple of interesting things to note from this

output. Immigration values are once again a significant factor to predict voting for Fidesz. As

anti-immigration values increase (immigration scale goes down in this case), so too does the

Table 7.3	Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates				
Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Wald Chi-Square	Pr > ChiSq
Intercept	1	-4.2136	0.5638	55.8479	<.0001
SocialLibValues	1	-0.2529	0.0779	10.5416	0.0012
SchwartzScale	1	-0.0193	0.0778	0.0617	0.8039
PopulistScale	1	0.3961	0.0325	148.1480	<.0001
ImmigrationScale	1	-0.1169	0.0374	9.7585	0.0018
rlgdgr	1	0.1590	0.0303	27.4699	<.0001
agea	1	0.1152	0.0184	39.0348	<.0001
agesq	1	-0.00111	0.000178	39.1855	<.0001

probability of voting for Fidesz over all other parties in the field. However, in the 2018 model,

materialist values are a significant predictor in increasing the probability of voting for Fidesz.

Just as the time series analysis would have predicted for the other models, as socially liberal

values go down (indicating greater materialism) this increases the probability of voting for the

authoritarian-populist party Fidesz. Another interesting feature about this model is that age

(agea) does not relate to voting for Fidesz in a linear manner but rather a curvilinear manner, hence the addition of age squared term (agesq). In the case of the 2018 and 2006 models, the extremely younger along with the

Figure 7.7. Participants were grouped by into 10 catergories where lower numbered groups correspond to lower age and higher numbered with higher ages

extremely older voters are more likely to not vote for Fidesz as seen on the left in Figure 7.7.

This finding is quite odd because it goes against Inglehart's idea of intergenerational value

change where the younger generations should be more supportive of post-materialist values than

older generations and consequently be opposed to the materialist backlash supporting

authoritarian-populist parties (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). However, one possible explanation to

why the far older populations were significantly less likely to vote for Fidesz is that they still

remembered firsthand the horrors that the rise of Fascism brought to Europe in the 1930s and

40s. Then seeing the rise of another far-right party today in Fidesz has discouraged them from

voting for Fidesz.

Conclusion

Norris and Inglehart's cultural backlash theory argues that society's values have been

changing since WWII on account of increasing economic and physical security. They

specifically state that since WWII post-materialist values have been constituting a larger and

larger share of values in advanced industrial societies. Post-materialist values are significantly

correlated with socially liberal values, while materialist values emphasize economic and physical

security (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). A change in the relative size of majority and minority

groups, as seen by the rise of post-materialists, can spark a decisive shift in collective attitudes

and behaviors (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). A key shift during this time is the reaction of the once

dominant materialists as they either conform to the emerging post-materialist values as described

in the spiral of silence theory or they rebel against the loss of respect for their values. This paper

was focused on the latter where materialists, angry that their values were being forgotten, rallied

together around a populist leader resulting in a cultural backlash. When looking at the impact

cultural backlash theory had on the rise of authoritarian-populists, this rise was specifically

measured as the vote share for an authoritarian-populist party in a country's national elections. The independent variables that were examined to understand the influence cultural backlash theory had on the vote share for an authoritarian-populist party were authoritarian values, populist values, immigration values, immigration values, socially liberal values (proxy for measuring post-materialist values), religion, and age. The analysis of these variables was broken down into two levels of analysis, a macro analysis of European and a case country analysis of Hungary. The European level focused on a longitudinal analysis observing how each of the independent variables changed over time to see if there was any measurable value change worth investigating further at the country level. There were significant value changes across Europe specifically around the period effect of the 2008 Great Recession. Across Europe, Materialist values peaked in 2010 along with populist values. On the other hand authoritarian values and immigration values remained remarkably constant across Europe during this time period. These value shifts towards greater materialist and populist values after a period effect gave enough credence to Norris and Inglehart's cultural backlash to investigate further at the country analysis. Hungary was chosen for the country level analysis because their democracy scores had been in significant decline since 2010, the same year populist and materialist values peaked in Europe. In order to see if any of the independent variables were significant predictors of voting for an authoritarian-populist party in Hungary logistic regression was used. The logistic regression analysis yielded some surprising results. Two of the big ones surrounding the direction of populist values in predicting a person who votes for an authoritarian-populist party and the insignificance of age. When Hungary's authoritarian-populist leader, Viktor Orbán, won the 2010 national election immediately his supporters lost their populist values. Which made the 2010 logistic regression seem entirely odd that lower populist values was a significant predictor of

voting for Orbán's party Fidesz, the exact opposite of what cultural backlash theory predicted. In order to test if this really was the case or if a party in power effect was taking place, logistic regression was applied to Hungary's 2006 election where Orbán was also a candidate but lost. The 2006 logistic analysis showed the greater populist values an individual had the higher probability they would vote for Orbán's which is exactly what cultural backlash theory predicts and suggests that a party in power effect was taking place as Orbán's supporters instantly because trustworthy of government institutions now that he was in charge. Another interesting finding from the logistic analysis on Hungary was that age interacted with voting for an authoritarian-populist party in a curvilinear manner. As cultural backlash theory predicted, the youngest people were the least likely to vote for an authoritarian-populist party. However, the oldest age group was almost equally less likely to vote for an authoritarian-populist party. This made the variable age an insignificant predictor the first time I ran the logistic regression model. Once age was squared to fit a curvilinear model, it became a significant variable. Now, this finding that the oldest age group is less likely to vote for an authoritarian populist party goes against cultural backlash theory which predicts that older people would be more likely to support these types of parties. Understanding why the oldest cohort in Hungary was least likely to support this type of party would make for a great follow up study. One of my initial thoughts is that this age group of Hugnarians experienced some sort of cohort effect like witnessing firsthand the rise of fascism in Europe leading to WWII. Understanding the impacts that an authoritarian-populist leader can have may have turned this age group off voting for Viktor Orbán in Hungary's 2010 election. One of the major limitations of this research surrounds the time the independent variables were measured in respect to the dependent variable. The European Social Survey (ESS) data was set up so that people were asked retroactively about who

they voted for in the last election, but their values were measured at the current time of the survey. So, as was discovered with the party in power effect shifting the populist values of Orbán's base pre and post-election, there could be a mismatch between people's values that influence them to vote for a particular party and their values after the election is over. This is even more important with political decisions because with populist values that measure trust in government institutions. If your supported candidate did not win the election, you would be inclined to distrust the government more on the sole fact that an opposition candidate whom you did not like won the election.

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Appendix

1. List of countries that were qualified as Europe for the analysis:

Country Abbreviation	Country Name
AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CH	Switzerland
CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czechia
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
ES	Spain
FI	Finland
FR	France
GB	United Kingdom
HR	Croatia
HU	Hungary
IE	Ireland
IS	Iceland
IT	Italy
LT	Lithuania
LV	Latvia
ME	Montenegro
NL	Netherlands
NO	Norway
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RS	Serbia

SE	Sweden
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia

2. Specifications for how age cohorts were grouped:

Year Born	**Age Cohort**
1900 - 1945	Traditionalists
1946 - 1964	Boomers
1965 - 1979	Gen X
1980 - Present	Millennials and Younger

3. Other variables used in the logistic regression model:

rlgdgr	How religious are you (scale 0-10 where 0 is not religious at all and 10 is very religious
Agea	Age of Respondent
Agesq	Age of Respondent squared