

## Frege, "On Sense and Nominatum"

Trying to accommodate the descriptive power of language


Complexities of natural languages - "exceptions" to rules of compositionality

Fundamentals adaptable to complex cases

Identity sentences: names flank a sentence for numerical identity

"Object model"

"Hesperus" is "Phosphorus"



Gets the truth condition right ("worldly import")

Part of the linguistic/descriptive significance

↳ the other one it gets blatantly wrong: cognitive significance  
what the thinker believes


"is Venus self-identical?" of course it is!

Different from "is Hesperus Phosphorus?" - has to be discovered — substantive cognitive content

in Begriffsschrift: latched on to simplest difference, which is the difference in the names themselves

"reference model": names are talking about themselves (in identity statements only)

"Hesperus" is "Phosphorus"



R<sub>CR</sub> only holds between names because of (mediated by) their nominata

"grinding" for relational fact from nominata

but connection is arbitrary



There's no content to this arrow not "grounded" in the facts that we're talking about

when Hammurabi learns "Hesperus is Phosphorus", is what he is learning some deep fact about the world/language?

or just some fact about linguistic conventions?

"Hesperus is visible in the evening" ↔ "Phosphorus is visible in the evening"

[deeper problem than just for identity sentences! problem for all sentences containing proper names...]

↳ there's a way the object is presented to you: our way of labeling the thing in the manner of which it's presented to us (connected to some fact)

"Z = II": true, but not an empirical fact — just about syntax a name=

when you want to name the first bright object in the evening sky → name it "Hesperus" (mode of presentation)

↑ this part was free/arbitrary up to convention

complexities: some modes of meaning words (like meaning "I" or "me") ↳ then: the connection of this name to the object Venus is out of our hands  
are incommutable

"I am hungry"  
"The food is ready now"  
"Polo Alto is nearby"

} all from Frege's "The Thought"

## Functional Composition

content of sentences comes functionally from contents of its parts

duality of presentation: sense: conventional/linguistic presentation/convention

nominatum: the reference/worldly object

expression: "Hesperus" = "Phosphorus"

sense: ↓ MOP<sub>Hesperus</sub>      ↓ MOP<sub>Phosphorus</sub>

nominatum:    X      R =      X

again from object model

compossibility of sentences expresses what thoughts (believable) are communicated by what sentences

### Theoretical Role of Sense

#### Epistemological / cognitive role

determine facts about cognitive significance: priority, informativeness

#### Representational

Thoughts embody truth-conditions

Modes of presentation embody reference conditions: ways a thing must be to be the referent

#### Linguistic

Expressions have descriptive import  $\rightarrow$  contribute to the expression of thoughts

Understanding descriptive import = knowing the sense

Ontology: Frege is a frank realist about actual objects, truth values, numbers, senses are

defends realism at least to the point that it seems to be baked into our language  $\hookrightarrow$  capable of truth/falsity

$\hookrightarrow$  or "live question about how the world really is"

if a thought is supposed to signify some fact about the world, what's the significance of the thing being thought about?

significance of realism: your thoughts are directed toward actual objects

senses are about being true or false, depending on whether the context gets it right

compossibility: sense of a complex expression depends only on (structure &) the senses of the constituent expressions