Lecture 3 - Centralized and Decentralized Cryptocurrencies

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Note: This lecture is based on Princeton University's BTC-Tech: Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies Spring 2015 course.

Centralization vs. Decentralization

Centralized Banking

- Centralize: to concentrate under a single authority
- Centralized banking means there is a single institution that manages supply, inflation, and interest.
- Cryptocurrency has to satisfy:

Mathematically complex (to avoid fraud and hacker attacks)

Decentralized but with adequate consumer safeguards and protection

Preserve user anonymity without being a conduit for tax evasion, money laundering, etc.

Advantages to Centralization

• Automation:

Easily manage a large number of keys e.g. Mastercard Europe Maintain secure infrastructure and improve operations/efficiency

• Centralized Monitoring:

Record everything that happens easily; brings transparency

- Centralized Policy
- Easily update and track keys
- Easily update cryptographic schemes swap out algorithms

CentralizedCoin

- I can generate coins, and give them unique ID's. I also sign these coins.
- I can pass them to anyone else I sign the transaction; recipient can prove it's valid because it has my signature.

Recipient can sign to pass to someone else.

• Chain of hash pointers can be used to follow it back. = verify

- Double Spending Problem
- Only I can write on the chain everything has to pass through me
- This is centralized; how do you trust me?

Centralized Cryptocurrencies

• E-Gold (1996)

Operated by Gold and Silver Reserve inc

Let users open an account denominated in gold; could make instant transfers

Grew to 5 million accounts; processing over 2 billion a year

"e-Gold Special Purpose Trust" - actually held the gold; could see gold bars with serial numbers per acct.

Hackers used flaws in Microsoft Windows OS's and phishing to compromise millions of e-gold accounts

People thought it was anonymous, but really it was pseudonymous. Law enforcement identified many.

Ponzi schemes via. eBay

Patriot Act, after Sept 11, made operating a money transmitter business without a state money transmitter license a federal crime.

Taken down 2007-2013; inability to provide reliable user identification and cut off illegal activity PayPal has done a better job, but still has to deal with the same problems.

KYC - process of verifying clients' identity

• Liberty Reserve

Shut down, also by Patriot Act, in May 2013.

- E-Gold and Liberty Reserve were popularly used for money laundering and shut down
- Can be shut down by the government at any time
- DigiCash by Chaum 1990

Store money as data on your computer

Transfer anonymously

Lacked decentralization; the company's servers were used

Went bankrupt in 1998

Decentralized Cryptocurrencies

• Decentralization is not all or nothing

Partially decentralized - SMTP (email)

• Bitcoin and Decentralization

How does Bitcoin deal with decentralization?

- 1. Who maintains ledger of transactions?
- 2. Who determines which transactions are valid/invalid?
- 3. Who creates new coins

- 4. Who chooses when rules change
- 5. How do bitcoins gain value

Concensus (distributed concensus)

Distributed concensus protocol: two properties

- 1. Must end with all nodes in agreement, and value has to have been generated by honest node
- 2. When someone wants to make a transaction, the person broadcasts to the nodes that make up the network.

There is no requirement for the recipient to be on the network

Must come to concensus on which transactions were broadcast in what order

Each node has:

- 1. Single, global ledger that each node has a copy of
- 2. Pool of transactions that have been received but not verified (varies from node to node)
- How do nodes come to consensus?

At regular intervals, every node proposes its own pool to be next block

Consensus protocol with each node's input as its own block

If this protocol succeeds, then a valid block will be chosen - it doesn't matter how many people propose this block

Doesn't matter if transactions get left out; they could just be in the next block

• Problems:

Latency, not all nodes connected, internet connection, malicious nodes

Global time does not exist

- Byzantine Generals (solved by Mining)
- Paxos

 $\label{eq:makes} \mbox{Makes compromises - never produces inconsistent result, but under rare conditions, protocol can get stuck$

• How Bitcoin breaks traditional assumptions

Works better in practice than in theory - no accurate model yet exists

Only solves problems in currency context due to incentives(not distributed databases, which is where the problem originated)

Embraces randomness - concensus happens over an hour, nodes can't be certain of what's in/out; the odds just change exponentially

- Block Chain
 - Consensus without identity
 - Sybil attack

Can't gain more power by having more accounts

Satoshi's original paper had 1 cpu = 1 vote

- Implicit Concensus:

Chosen node chooses what the next block is; voting is by what is extended by the others

- Bitcoin consensus algorithm (simplified)
 - 1. New transactions broadcast to all nodes

- 2. Each node collects transactions
- 3. Random node gets to broadcast its block per round
- 4. Other nodes accept only if valid
- 5. Nodes show acceptance through including block in hash for next block

- Attacks

Stealing - even if Alice gets to decide next block, she can't steal because she has to create valid transaction; can't forge signatures

Denial of Service - even if Alice never validates Bob's transactions, an honest node will eventually do so

Double Spend - Say Alice pays Bob, and an honest node broadcasts this. and Bob accepts that he's been paid. Alice then gets to broadcast her own transaction.

She then makes a block with the emphprevBlock hash as the one before her payment to Bob. Only one of these blocks will be accepted.

- Blocks have a tendency to extend the block they hear about first
- Orphan Block
- Zero-confirmation transaction

Bob gives Alice product before transaction has been verified 6 blocks; double spend probability goes down exponentially Never a 100% guarantee

• Incentives/Proof of work

Motivation to subvert the process (picking a hopefully honest node), so reward honest nodes HashCash - with SHA-256

Can't penalize those who try to double spend, since there's no way to tell

Use bitcoins to incentivize honest nodes - mining. Reward only if it becomes legitimate transaction Every 210,000 blocks (4 years), block reward is cut in half. Geometric sum - 21 million bitcoins

• Incentives Part 2 - Transaction fees

Incentive to have your transaction verified

• New Problems With Incentives

Random node

Everyone wants to run nodes for rewards

Sybil nodes to subvert process

Solution: proof of work

• Proof of work

Mining: Hash function with nonce appended to beginning (ex: 0's)

SHA-256 used twice

Less than some value

Items used: version, prevBlockHash, merkleRoot, timestamp, bits, nonce http://www.righto.com/2014/09/mining-bitcoin-with-pencil-and-paper.html

• Proof of work cont.

Selecting nodes based on processing power/proportional

Hopefully not monopolized

proof of stake - proportion to ownership of currency (used in other cryptocurrencies)

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Hash puzzles - to make blocks, it needs to find a nonce where H(nonce \mid\mid prev\_hash \mid\mid tx \mid\mid tx \mid\mid ... \mid\mid tx) < target
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Nonce: Random number that is only used once

Hash puzzle properties: difficult, parameterizable cost (10 minutes variable target), trivial to verify

10 minutes: reduce inefficiency from having many blocks

$$meantimetonextblock = \frac{10minutes}{fraction\ of\ hash\ power}$$

• The miner gains if reward ¿ cost

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reward = block reward + tx fees
mining cost = hardware cost + operating costs
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Changing the rules

• Two types of changes - soft forks; hard forks

Soft forks are forward compatible; new rules are subset of old rules. Only applied if over 51% agree.

Hard forks are backward compatible; old rules are subset of new rules. Everyone needs to upgrade to new.

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