Journal of Contemporary History Copyright © 2011 The Author. Vol. 46(1), 82–108. ISSN 0022-0094.
DOI: 10.1177/0022009410383296

Jennifer M. Miller

The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in US-Japanese Relations

Abstract
The Cold War brought forth an unprecedented level of global interactions, creating relationships that not only brought states together but altered the trajectories of societies. To explore the impact of the Cold War on postwar Japan, this article examines the negotiations between the United States and Japan over Japanese membership in the Mutual Security Program, the United States' postwar military assistance program. It considers debates over Japanese rearmament and their effect on Japan's economy and democracy, both within Japan and between Japan and the United States, the negotiations that resulted in Japan's membership in the program, and Japanese reactions to this membership. It argues that Japanese rearmament both brought the United States and Japan together, and created tensions between them, highlighting the complicated Cold War dynamics between domestic and international politics. Further, it asserts that the Cold War altered the nature of the state by fostering a multilayered relationship between government policy-making, international negotiations, institutional developments, and socio-political mobilizations, creating a new political relationship that it calls the Cold War State.

Keywords: Cold War State, Japanese labor unions, Japanese rearmament, military assistance, Mutual Security Program, US-Japanese relationship

Speaking in Tokyo on March 8, 1954, US Ambassador to Japan John Allison heralded the results of months of protracted and controversial negotiations: the signing of a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Japan. Allison opened his remarks by celebrating the mutuality that he believed the agreement embodied:

> The very essence of the documents we are signing today is that they represent the beliefs, both of the Japanese and American negotiators, that their signatures will be in the mutual interest

> of both our countries, these agreements require our countries to assume mutual obligations but they give our countries mutual benefits.[1]

This agreement allowed the United States to supply military equipment and training to the growing Japanese military through the Mutual Security Program, a program through which the United States provided arms, technical and military training, and economic assistance to a variety of countries spanning the globe. Since the end of the US occupation of Japan in 1952, the United States had sought to incorporate Japan into this program, rebuilding a Japanese military that only seven years before it had sought to destroy completely. Allison thus rhetorically celebrated the conclusion of the agreement as an elevation of the US-Japanese commitment to fighting the Cold War, as the product of priorities shared by both states.

Where Allison saw mutual benefit, however, many Japanese observers saw a threat to Japanese society. Speaking in opposition to Japanese rearmament, Japanese newspapers criticized the agreement as contradicting Japan's war-renouncing constitution, while the left Socialist Party accused the Japanese government of 'dup[ing] the Diet and the people' after earlier statements that Japan would not rearm.[2] To many, rearmament was unconstitutional and set Japan's economy on the path of remilitarization, betraying hopes for a peaceful postwar democracy. For leading conservatives, on the other hand, rearmament was a chance to boost Japan's economy, still recovering from the second world war, achieve greater independence from the United States, and restore a sense of national 'spirit' to postwar Japanese society. Though the United States was clear on its desire for active Japanese defense capabilities, the Japanese had not agreed on the issue.

In the early 1950s, rearmament was a source of protracted debate between Japan and the United States and within Japan itself; US policymakers' plans to rearm Japan became part of greater debates about the nature of Japan's economy, democracy, and participation in the Cold War. In the midst of these debates, a potent point of conflict was Japanese membership in the Mutual Security Program. Examining US-Japanese negotiations over Japanese membership in this program and Japanese reactions to these negotiations from 1951 to 1954, this article explores the various arguments over rearmament that took place simultaneously, debates between the United States and Japan and within Japan itself. Indeed, the vigorous reactions of the Japanese public brought new dimensions to the United States and Japan's

1 Department of State Release No. 119, Statement by the Honorable John M. Allison, 8 March 1954. John Foster Dulles Papers, Selected Correspondence, 1891–1960, Box 82, Folder: Japan, 1954. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Public Policy Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

2 The US Embassy in Japan regularly gathered and translated Japanese press material. Quoted in US Embassy Tokyo to the Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch No. 2655, 11 June 1953, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of States, Japan, Tokyo Embassy, Classified General Records, Box 28, Folder: 350 Political Affairs, April–June 1953. National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter known as 'NARA').

bilateral negotiations, as both the US and Japanese governments feared that public reaction would undercut their plans for Japan's future. Public response thus served as a crucial factor in these negotiations and rearmament was not simply a story of negotiations between government – though this played a central role – nor of US dominance and Japanese resistance. Rather, rearmament became a story of the complicated Cold War dynamics between domestic and international politics, a dispute about the shape of postwar Japanese society, and a product of adaptation on both sides.

This article frames this dynamic of continued interaction between Cold War, government, and society through the concept of the Cold War State. Indeed, the Cold War fostered a multilayered relationship between government policy-making, international negotiations, institutional developments, and socio-political mobilizations. It is this dynamic – one that took place both within and between societies – that brought forth a deepened interaction between international politics and the concerns of domestic societies, creating the Cold War State. Though the United States and Japan remained committed to each other, the nature of this commitment changed the social, political, and institutional context surrounding it, changes that in turn altered the US-Japanese relationship. The concept of the Cold War State thus seeks to capture the broader contexts within which these two countries interacted. This framework illuminates the importance of exploring how Cold War era developments, conflicts, and global relationships, by interacting with and shifting the concerns of domestic societies, evoked both interior and exterior pressures on relationships between states. It is in this contextual dynamic that an exploration of Japanese membership in the Mutual Security Program holds broader implications for the study of Cold War international relationships.

To highlight the importance of this context in the US-Japanese relationship, this article seeks to explore the processes of US policy-making while also highlighting active Japanese participation in the rearmament debate, the Japanese government's opinions on US policies and planning and, more broadly, the reception of the US-Japanese alliance itself. In order to explore Japanese government planning surrounding the treaty, it utilizes Japanese Foreign Ministry materials released in the last several years.[3] However, it goes beyond the government-level relationship to incorporate Japanese public responses on both the Right and the Left as an integral element of the development and functioning of this relationship. Only by exploring public engagement with US policy can we understand fully the pressures placed on the Japanese government, which ultimately constrained the US-Japanese alliance and US maneuverability in post-occupation Japan. Public responses, therefore, were not mere reactions; rather, they became a constitutive element of the policy-making process on both US and Japanese sides.

3 Specifically, materials contained in the 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, released in December 2003 by the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

By focusing attention on both US and Japanese sources, this article seeks to create a more multilayered picture of post-occupation US-Japanese relations. In doing so, it also brings together two histories that are commonly told separately from one another: postwar US-Japanese relations and the development of Japan's postwar democracy, especially social and political activism.[4] As highlighted by John Dower and Gavan McCormack, the US-Japanese relationship in the 1950s was unequal in many respects,[5] yet it was also marked by negotiations and a public dynamism, especially in the intensity of Japanese reactions to US policy, that became integral to the relationship between these two states. Though recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of concepts of mutuality and consensus in the post-occupation US-Japanese relationship, this scholarship has not fully incorporated the socio-political activities of the Japanese people as a key facet in the development of this relationship after the occupation.[6] Similarly, scholarship on post-occupation Japan often focuses on how Japan responded to its wartime experiences, particularly the atomic bombing, while under-emphasizing the central role played by the Cold War and myriad ways in which the US intervened deeply in the relationship between the Japanese government and public.[7] Indeed, it is precisely because issues highlighted by US Cold War policy toward Japan, especially rearmament, intersected profoundly with central questions of postwar Japanese democracy, especially questions of peace, independence, and national identity, that it is vital to place these two histories in dialogue with one another.

It is thus necessary to place the rearmament debate at the nexus of apprehensions about government, society, and the Cold War; exploring Japanese rearmament requires examination of the contradictory forces present in international relationships. Indeed, the process of negotiating Japanese membership in the Mutual Security Program both brought the United States and Japan together and created distance between them. Despite the difficulties of the negotiations, the two governments did not openly consider breaking their alliance or giving up on the agreement, demonstrating that both sides believed that they benefited from their relationship. Moreover, through the Mutual Security

4 Examples include Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History* (New York 1997); Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* (New York 1997); John Welfield, *Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London 1988).

5 See John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954* (Cambridge, MA, 1979); and idem, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York 1999); Gavan McCormack, *Client State: Japan in American Embrace* (London 2007).

6 See Jennifer M. Miller, 'Constructing Cold War Sovereignty: Building Political Consensus in the U.S.-Japanese Alliance, 1951–1954', Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2005; and John Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945–1960* (Stanford, CA, 2005).

7 See, for example, James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu, HI, 2001) and Mari Yamamoto, *Grassroots Pacifism in Postwar Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation* (London 2004).

Program, the United States gave large amounts of aid and training to the Japanese military, playing a constitutive role in Japan's military development and spurring on Japan's own limited military planning. US policymakers further secured a Japanese commitment to US Cold War goals, though a more limited commitment than they would have liked. Rearmament is thus a story of institutional development, of the United States' desire and, though limited, success in creating a Japan mobilized to participate in the Cold War.

Rearmament, however, also evoked other facets of the Cold War State, as Japan's growing commitments brought alterations not only to the structure of the state but also to Japanese politics and society. As the rearmament debate progressed, it helped to mobilize Japanese opposition from both the Right and the Left to the Japanese government, to the US-Japanese alliance, and to the structures, institutions, and alignments brought forth by Japan's growing Cold War commitments. Indeed, as rearmament intersected with debates over the future of Japanese society, it created a new basis on which the Japanese people criticized the Japanese government, not simply for governmental defense planning or for the existence of the US-Japanese alliance, but for the growing belief that the Japanese government did not authentically represent the democratic, economic, and peaceful interests of the Japanese people. Rearmament was such a contentious process precisely because it tied together a varied array of concerns about Japan's past and future – from fears of repeating the experiences of the second world war to concerns over Japan's Cold War role, Japanese independence, the nature of the Japanese economy, and the representative qualities of Japanese democracy. The debate over Japanese rearmament thus fostered the processes of the Cold War State, contributing to a broader dynamic that extended beyond bilateral government relations to engage goals, developments, and concerns shared and contested throughout society.

The story of Japanese rearmament begins in the initial years of the US occupation, which unleashed a flood of conflicting opinions about Japan's future, ranging from Japanese leftist desires for a peaceful, neutral, unarmed society to conservative fears of a weak, defenseless Japan. In the early years of the occupation, the US pursued goals of 'democratization and demilitarization', dismantling and purging the Japanese military. Yet as Cold War frictions became increasingly apparent all over the world, the United States forsook its emphasis on an unarmed Japan to begin rebuilding the Japanese military. By the end of the occupation, the US had committed itself to a program of Japanese rearmament, creating conflicts with both the Japanese government and public that highlighted the tense and fractious position that rearmament held in Japanese society.

Initially, under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, US occupation authorities pursued a variety of reforms that they believed encouraged Japanese democracy, including a new US-authored constitution that, under Article 9, 'renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation' and noted that

'land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained'. By 1947, however, as Cold War tensions increased, US policymakers became increasingly concerned about Japan's future defensive and economic capabilities, resulting in growing discomfort with MacArthur's reforms. The State Department Policy Planning Staff, headed by George Kennan, encouraged US policymakers to strengthen Japan's economy and secure the US-Japanese relationship through a defense pact.[8] Broader changes taking place throughout Asia – especially the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 – further reinforced US policymakers' newfound focus on reconstructing Japan.

The Korean War directly influenced Japan in two key ways. First, it made the financial benefits of the US military presence extraordinarily clear. Throughout the war, Japan served as the central mobilization point for US troops and material, and high levels of US military procurement proved to be an enormous boon to the Japanese economy, leading Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to call the war 'a gift from the gods'.[9] Japan would remember this financial boost when it came time to negotiate rearmament. Second, with Asia under military threat, US policymakers again reaffirmed their belief that a neutral or demilitarized Japan was not in the United States' or Japan's future interests.[10] After the start of the Korean War, MacArthur ordered the creation of a Japanese National Police Reserve (NPR) of 75,000 troops; the existing Maritime Safety Force also added 8500 new men.[11] As noted by John Welfield, these two actions, which were the beginnings of a postwar Japanese military, were the basis for 'all Japan's subsequent rearmament'.[12] The suddenness of

8 Schaller, *Altered States*, op. cit., 16.

9 Others called Korean War procurements 'Japan's Marshall Plan', and during the war, Japan's Gross National Product grew by approximately ten per cent per year: Bruce Cumings, 'Japan's Position in the World System', in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley, CA, 1993), 42, 50. All told, the United States spent approximately three billion dollars on wartime supplies and services in Japan during the war, almost 60 per cent of what it spent in all non-Communist European countries in the same period: Roger Dingman, 'The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1 (Spring 1993), 43.

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman General Omar Bradley made this clear in August 1950, asserting that an increase in Japan's responsibility for its own defense should mark Japanese independence. 'As the exercise of the sovereignty of the Japanese government increases, Japanese security forces should be gradually increased and appropriately armed' to assume Japan's full security burden: Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 22 August 1950, *FRUS, 1950: Volume VI, East Asia and the Pacific* (Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1976), 1281.

11 Letter from Douglas MacArthur to Yoshida Shigeru, 8 July 1950, National Diet Library, Modern Archives of Japan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_r/M010/M010–001r.html, accessed 21 February 2009. The size of the Police Reserve was held to 75,000 for the rest of the occupation, despite pressure from American planners to increase its size because of the ongoing Korean War: John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York 1999), 548.

12 John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London 1988), 72.

the creation of the NPR, however, gave the Japanese government no time to prepare the public or themselves for the rearmament debate.[13]

By opening discussions over rearmament, the Korean War also helped to revive a conservative agenda that had been discredited in the early postwar years. For example, Japanese politician Ashida Hitoshi, a former Prime Minister who had been forced to step down in 1948 because of a corruption scandal, began to openly emphasize rearmament.[14] In his diary, Ashida wrote of his 'relief' over the swift US response, asserting that Korea could turn into another world war and 'there is no salvation for those who stand aside and intone neutrality'.[15] Though Ashida talked about the need to increase defensive capabilities, he also framed rearmament as key to rebuilding Japan's 'spirit'. As he stated in a December 1950 advisory opinion requested by the US occupation authorities, 'Present-day Japan is in urgent need of unifying its national will, without which we cannot ride out the crisis.'[16] This usage of rearmament as a signifier for broader visions of Japanese society became a key element of conservative advocacy of rearmament.[17]

As the United States and Japan prepared to sign a treaty ending the occupation in September 1951, US policymakers were anxious that Japan continue to expand its military capabilities. They crafted a peace treaty that assured Japan's right to a military in the future, asserting that the final treaty 'must not contain any prohibition, direct or implicit, now or in the future, of Japan's inalienable right to self-defense.'[18] The United States and Japan also signed a bilateral security treaty that stationed US forces in Japan and served as the foundation for the post-occupation US-Japan security relationship. Contending that Japan did not have 'the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self defense', the agreement stated that Japan desired a security treaty with the United States.[19] The treaty further made clear the US belief that Japan must participate in its own defense. 'Japan will increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament that could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and

13 Otake Hideo, 'Defense Controversies and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany', in T.J. Pempel (ed.), *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes* (Ithaca, NY, 1990), 138.

14 Masaru Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics* (Princeton, NJ, 1997), 64; Otake, 'Defense Controversies', op. cit., 59–63.

15 Quoted in Otake Hideo, 'Rearmament Controversies and Cultural Conflicts in Japan: the Case of the Conservatives and the Socialists', in Tetsuya Kataoka, *Creating Single Party Democracy: Japan's Postwar Political System* (Stanford, CA, 1992), 60.

16 Quoted in Ibid., 60–1.

17 As Otake Hideo notes, 'the domestic implications of defense policies became the focal issue, while strategic arguments were only given secondary attention': Otake, 'Defense Controversies', op. cit., 145.

18 Memorandum for the President, 7 September 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 6, 1294.

19 Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 3, pt 3 (1952) (Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1955), 3331.

security.'[20] In its own assessment of the security treaty, however, the Japanese government took a narrower view, later noting in 1953 that the United States bore the treaty's obligations 'unilaterally' and that Japan's only obligations were to permit the continued stationing of US troops and to not permit the stationing of troops from third countries.[21]

In the first half of the 1950s, debates over rearmament and its effect on Japanese society resurrected and divided leading conservative figures, facilitated political organization on the Left, and became a proxy for broader discussions of Japan's future. Diverse Japanese responses to the treaty highlight the importance of exploring Japanese reactions by emphasizing that the United States and Japan had not achieved common ground on Japan's military future. Upon the conclusion of the pact, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru asserted that 'It has always been my conviction that Japan, once she regains liberty and independence, must assume full responsibility of safeguarding that liberty and independence.'[22] Yoshida simultaneously emphasized, however, that this goal would be a long time coming. 'Unfortunately, we are as yet utterly unprepared for self-defense', noting that the pact 'insures the security of an unarmed and defenseless nation'.[23] Press coverage supported the second half of Yoshida's statement, fearing that Yoshida actually underplayed Japan's desire for peace and Japan's economic difficulties.[24] An editorial in the *Asahi* newspaper, entitled 'Joy and Anxiety', commented, 'in view of the economic difficulties anticipated from now on the words spoken by Mr. Yoshida were too reserved and cannot be said to have conveyed the truthful feelings of the people.'[25]

Leftist groups in Japan also made their opposition clear, as the combined impact of the Korean War, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the security treaty became key rallying points in the early 1950s. A 1950 statement by the *Heiwa Mondai Danwakai* (Peace Study Group), composed of a variety of prominent Japanese intellectuals, forcefully advocated for Japanese neutrality. The group asserted that while the world had divided into two camps, 'for the sake of world peace, as well as for the welfare of the Japanese people, it is

20 Ibid., 3331.

21 Gaimushō [Japanese Foreign Ministry], 'Beikoku no MSA enjo ni tsuite' [On US MSA Aid], April 1953. Nichibei sōgo bōei enjo kyōtei [US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement], Kōshō junbi, sankō shiryō [Negotiation Preparations and Reference Papers], 0120–2001–10407/10408 (B'510.J/U7–1), 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, CD-Rom B'-190, No. 180725. Japanese Foreign Ministry Records, Diplomatic Record Office (Gaik ōshiryōkan). [Hereafter known as 'DRO'].

22 Quoted in John M. Hightower, 'Acheson Hails Bilateral Accord as "Bulwark for Freedom" – Ceremony Takes Place at Presidio in S.F.', *Nippon Times,* 10 September 1951, 1.

23 Ibid., 1.

24 'From Enemies to Allies', *Nippon Times*, 10 September 1951, 8. As the *Mainichi* newspaper stated, 'the Japanese resolve for peace is much firmer than expressed by Mr. Yoshida ... Japan intends neither to antagonize unduly the so-called totalitarian nations nor aggravate the opposition (between the two worlds) by joining the rank of free nations': quoted in 'Happiness Mixed with Foreboding as New Era Open', *Nippon Times*, 10 September 1951, 1.

25 Quoted in 'Happiness Mixed with Foreboding as New Era Open', *Nippon Times*, op. cit., 1.

undesirable to commit ourselves to either of the two opposing camps . . . we do not accept the impossibility of attaining a position of neutrality for Japan.'[26] This statement, issued after the outbreak of the Korean War, played a crucial role in galvanizing the Left in Japan, helping to 'turn the leftwing Socialists toward a policy of neutrality', raising questions about the United States' role in dictating Japan's future, and creating a broader leftist alignment that would play a vital role in shaping reactions to future Alliance policy.[27]

Leftists further asserted that the United States' call for Japanese remilitarization would undermine the creation of an egalitarian and democratic economy. In a 1952 journal article entitled 'Saigunbi no keizaigaku' (The economics of rearmament), Arisawa Hiromi, later president of Hōsei University, contended that rearmament meant that 'a portion of the working classes' purchasing power will be handed over to the state' and that rearmament would do little to stimulate productive growth in Japan.[28] Opposition to rearmament was therefore not simply based on questions of neutrality, constitutional limitations, or pacifism, though these played a vital role.[29] Rather, rearmament – which, as envisioned by the United States, included an industrially strong Japan capable of producing both soldiers and war materiel – posed an economic threat and a broader social threat that could undermine the promise of a peaceful, democratic postwar Japan. These debates thus further complicated the US government's attempts to shape a politically, ideologically, and popularly friendly Japan as a keystone of US policy.

Not limited to intellectual discussions, these anti-rearmament sentiments entered the political realm through the activities of the Left Socialist Party, which strongly opposed all rearmament.[30] Utilizing slogans such as 'Permanent peace and absolute independence', 'Establish peaceful industry, achieve economic independence through trade', and 'We are opposed to rearmament – youth! Don't take up swords', the Left Socialists positioned themselves as the party opposed to US policy, the conservative Japanese government, and the broader divisions of the Cold War.[31] In contrast to

26 Peace Study Group 'On Peace: Our Third Statement', *Sekai*, December 1950, excerpted in the *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan* 1, no. 1 (April 1963), 19.

27 J. Victor Koschmann, 'Intellectuals and Politics', in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley, CA, 1993), 402.

28 Quoted in Laura Hein, *Reasonable Men, Powerful Words: Political Culture and Expertise in Twentieth-Century Japan* (Berkeley, CA, 2004), 126–7. As Hein states, these economists argued that 'because resources were finite . . . remilitarization was a luxury that Japan could just not afford': ibid., 126.

29 As Hein notes, economists' 'economic concern[s] [were] subsumed into their larger point – that Japan should try for an overall peace based on neutralism and not accept a separate peace and the logic of the cold war': ibid., 130.

30 The Socialist Party had divided into Left and Right Socialists over the peace and security treaties; while the Right Socialists supported some form of safety forces, the Left Socialists strongly opposed all rearmament.

31 Daikyūkai zenkoku tōtaikai, 'Daikyūkai tōtaikai sengen: surogan' [9th Party Congress Declaration: Slogans], 30 January 1952, in *Shiryō nihon shakaitō yonjū nenshi* [Documents – A 40-year history of the Japan Socialist Party], (Tokyo 1986), 244.

pro-rearmament advocates like Ashida, who posited that rearmament would be key to developing Japan's future, the Left Socialists premised their opposition on the recent – and still vivid – experiences of Japan's wartime past. Winning a lower house seat in the 1952 election, for example, candidate Shimagami Zengorō reiterated party slogans of 'Youth! Don't take up arms! Women! Don't send your husbands and children to war!', further asserting that rearmament would intensify the US-Soviet competition, spark a third world war, and bring back 'nuclear tragedy'.[32] Similarly, victorious candidate Hara Hyō asserted his opposition to 'rearmament that will become an army in the employment of the US or USSR', contending that military buildup increased the likelihood that Japan would again be under the specter of the atomic bomb.[33] The Left Socialists further opposed rearmament on economic grounds, arguing that through MSA, the Japanese government sought to rebuild a militarized economy.[34] Anti-rearmament sentiments thus became a crucial axis of Leftist political organization.

Along with active Leftist opposition, the political situation of the early 1950s was marked by divisions within Japanese conservatives themselves, for whom rearmament also functioned as a key organizational concept. As the occupation came to a close in 1951 and 1952, US authorities de-purged thousands of prewar and wartime military and political figures, and a new wave of actors re-entered the realm of electoral politics, many as members of the majority Liberal Party. While the Yoshida government was reluctant to commit openly to rearmament, preferring instead to speak about the need to 'increase defense power', recent de-purgee Hatoyama Ichirō spoke openly of his belief of the need to revise the constitution and 'establish a self-defense force', publishing a separate Liberal Party platform prior to the 1952 election.[35] The Kaishintō (Reform Party), which argued for the 'creation of an autonomous national defense military' but was not fully decided on the necessity of constitutional revision, further complicated these conservative divisions.[36] Conservative debates over rearmament were closely tied to inter- and intra-conservative party maneuvering, and formed an important context to the MSA negotiations, especially with the United States' interest in maintaining a strong

32 Asahi Shimun, 'Saigunbi to watashi', in Otake Hideo (ed.), *Sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū, daisankai, jietai no sōtsetsu* [Collected Documents about Japan's Postwar Defense Problems, vol. 3, the Establishment of the Self-Defense Forces], (Tokyo 1993), 40.

33 Ibid., 37–8.

34 Tōseisaku shingikai [Party policy advisory council], 'MSA ni chōsenshite: heiwai keizai kensetsu gokanen keikaku' [Challenging MSA: 5-year plan to construct a peace economy], in *Shiryō nihon shakaitō yonjū nenshi*, 252.

35 *Asahi Shimbun* (evening edition), 'Saugunbi to watashi – tōsensha to kataru', [Rearmament and Me – talking with successful candidates] 2 October 1952, in Otake (ed.), *Sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, 37. See also Buntōha (Hatoyama) jiyūtō 'seikō seisaku shian' [Liberal Party, Hatoyama faction, 'Draft Policy Platform'], 10 July 1952, in Otake (ed.), *Sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, 31.

36 *Asahi Shimbun*, 'Saugunbi to watashi', in Otake (ed.), *Sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, 37.

conservative Japanese government. Indeed, this fluid and divided political situation deeply aggravated US policymakers. As Secretary of State Dulles bemoaned in a letter to former Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1953, 'I am terribly frustrated with the way things are going in Japan. There has not been any rebirth of moral strength, as in the case of Germany [and] the Government is weak and vacillating.'[37]

As Japan transitioned from occupation to sovereignty, the rearmament debate escalated and attracted an increasing amount of public attention, which would further deepen the importance of Japanese socio-political activities to negotiations over MSA. Indeed, in the 1952 elections – the first to take place after the end of the occupation – opinion surveys showed rearmament to be a major – and unsettled – national issue; when asked in 1952 about Yoshida's statement that the National Police Force should become the foundation of a new national military, 36 per cent agreed, 33 per cent disagreed, and 29 per cent said they did not know.[38] Many candidates, as the *Asahi* newspaper noted, simply sought to avoid using the word 'rearmament'.[39] Nor was the fervent debate over rearmament settled in 1952; writing about the 1953 election, the *Asahi* noted that 'even more than the general election of last October', the general public was 'placing what each party says about the rearmament problem under close scrutiny', with a general feeling that the central election problem was for 'people to decide whether or not they agree with rearmament'.[40] Along with bringing rearmament to the political forefront, the 1952 and 1953 elections changed the composition of the Diet: the Left Socialists, with their anti-rearmament platform, gained seats, while divisions amongst the conservatives weakened Yoshida considerably. After 1953, Yoshida's Liberals were no longer the majority party, 'set[ting] the stage for an intense power struggle among the major political parties of Japan' and destabilizing Yoshida's political position as his government entered controversial negotiations over MSA.[41]

37 John Foster Dulles to Dean Rusk, 29 December 1953. John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951–1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 3, Folder: Strictly Confidential – Q – S (2). Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas. As noted in NSC 125/2, the US Government was committed to 'the stability and popular position of the responsible pro-Western political forces in Japan': NSC 125/2, *FRUS, 1952–1954: Volume XIV, China and Japan* (Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 1304.

38 '*Asahi shimbun* seron chōsa' [*Asahi shimbun* public opinion survey], 21 September 1952, in Otake (ed.), *Sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, 98.

39 *Asahi shimbun*, 'Tsuyoi "saigunbi ni hantai"', in Otake (ed.), *Sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, 36.

40 *Asahi shimbun*, 'Arasowareru mondai·saigunbi' [The problem being disputed: rearmament], 16 April 1953 in Otake (ed.), *Sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, 48. Moreover, the Japanese public remained divided into 1954; in response to a survey question over whether it was necessary for Japan to build a military, 37 per cent believed it necessary, 30 per cent believed it unnecessary, 15 per cent felt it depended on the situation and 18 per cent had no opinion: '*Asahi shimbun* seron chōsa' [*Asahi shimbun* public opinion survey], 16 May 1954, in Otake (ed.), *Sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, 104.

41 Masaru Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics* (Princeton, NJ, 1997), 69.

Against this dynamic political backdrop, US policymakers paid close attention to the development of post-occupation democracy in Japan, well aware that both public pressure on the Japanese government and popular advocacy against the US-Japanese relationship could threaten their goal of creating a Japan that actively participated in its own defense and in US Cold War policies. Indeed, a study produced at the end of the Truman Administration by the Psychological Strategy Board entitled 'Psychological Strategy Program for Japan' (PSB D-27) noted the potent dynamics at work in the intersections of domestic and foreign affairs, popular opinion and government policy.[42] Stating that the dynamics of the occupation led to 'the development of new interest groups and a democratic framework which helped to broaden the base of political power and resist its exercise', the study held that there had never been a time in Japanese history when the 'strength of political authority has depended so much on public support', which was diffuse, diverse and influenced by 'the world power struggle'.[43] PSB D-27 asserted that Japanese society was openly affected by the pressures of the Cold War and in a position to pressure the Japanese government and constrain both US and Japanese maneuverability. In order to assure that this public support did not turn further against US goals – including rearmament – PSB D-27 advised the United States to reach out to varied segments of the Japanese population, including labor groups (using the CIA and covert influence if necessary), students, women, and Japanese intellectuals.[44] US policymakers believed that following the document's recommendations would be a key aspect of negotiating Japanese membership in the Mutual Security Program and, in 1953, sought to put PSB D-27 into action.[45]

The United States' stance on Japan and Japanese defense changed dramatically from the beginning of the occupation, reaching a point where the US believed rearmament was central to Japan's function as the United States' key Cold War ally in Asia. However, the rearmament's divisive status in Japan, combined with the end of the US occupation, placed new pressures on this relationship by opening it to intense public scrutiny: scrutiny that led

42 As of Spring 2008, the copies of PDB D-27 held by the Truman and Eisenhower Libraries still contained redactions. The National Archives, however, has fully declassified the copy held at the archives in College Park. I have based this analysis on this fully declassified copy.

43 Psychological Strategy Board, 'Psychological Strategy Program for Japan' (PSB D-27), January 10, 1953, 3–4. RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Lot File No. 62 D 333, Executive Secretariat, Psychological Strategy Board Working File, 1951–1953, Box 4, Folder: PSB D-27. NARA.

44 Ibid., 21.

45 Memorandum from Mallory Browne to George A. Morgan, 'Present Situation of D-27, "Psychological Strategy program for Japan"', 17 June 1953. White House, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953–1961, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central File Series, Box 13, Folder: PSB 091 Japan (3), Eisenhower Library. Though PSB D-27 was a Truman administration document, the Eisenhower administration elevated psychological planning as a key element of their Cold War strategy. See Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS, 2006).

to socio-political mobilizations in Japan, complicated the authority of the Yoshida government, and challenged Japan's commitment to the US-Japanese alliance. Indeed, many Japanese hoped that the occupation had opened the doors to a very different Japanese future, one marked by the intertwined goals of peace, democracy, and egalitarian economic growth, a future that rearmament seemed to threaten. The Japanese government, desiring continued economic support from the United States, yet also not wishing to lose its hold on the country, sought to placate both sides, while other conservatives positioned rearmament as to the future of both Japan and their own political careers. As the United States and Japan prepared to embark on actual rearmament negotiations, the path to an agreement was not entirely clear: Japanese reactions to the peace and security treaties, concerns about the future of Japanese society, and the Japanese government's non-committal stance on rearmament and its desire for economic aid thus came together to create a combustible backdrop to negotiations between the United States and Japan.

The different political, governmental, and popular positions articulated in early rearmament discussions and planning intensified through the negotiations over Japanese membership in the Mutual Security Program. In particular, the fact that the United States and Japan never fully reached an agreement on the purpose of, or even the desire for, Japanese military expansion led to a protracted negotiating process. While the Japanese government ultimately committed itself to rearmament within the US-Japan alliance, this commitment was not without complications. The US struggled to get the Japanese government and public to understand and adopt its Cold War priorities, opening rearmament negotiations to difficult pressures upon and between the two states. In the end, Japanese membership in the Mutual Security Program highlighted the necessity of compromise in the US-Japanese relationship. Though neither the United States nor Japan achieved all their objectives in this agreement, both governments saw virtue in their continued co-operation. Yet while this co-operation would further enmesh the United States in Japanese society through the strengthening of the Japanese military, it fostered opposition to these changes in both the political and social realms, further fostering the processes of the Cold War State.

During the occupation, the United States provided weapons for Japan through Department of Defense appropriations, which reached the hundreds of millions of dollars by the end of the Korean War in 1953. In the early 1950s, however, US policymakers argued that the USA could no longer arm a soon-to-be sovereign Japan out of the Defense Department and began discussing Japanese membership in MSA, tentatively budgeting aid for Japan with the goal of creating a ten-division force (300,000).[46] Prime Minister Yoshida

46 Robert Lovett to the Secretary of State, 6 December 1952. RG 59, State Department Central Decimal File, Japan, 794.5 MSP 12–552. NARA. The same goal was also given in NSC 125/2 and thus was part of official US policy toward Japan.

never officially accepted US figures, but 'agreed informally to increase the NPR to approximately 110,000 [troops] during June or July of 1952', and other government figures 'accepted as logical' reaching 180,000 by the end of March 1953.[47] Yoshida also established the National Safety Force (NSF), transforming the NPR, in Yoshida's words, into 'something along the lines of a Self Defense Force'.[48] Still, this discussion of 110,000 or even 180,000 troops was well shy of US policymakers' plans for 300,000 Japanese troops. Though Japanese participation in the Mutual Security Program has been regarded 'as a foregone conclusion', the agreement ultimately required almost a year of negotiations over issues such as force totals and military budgets, military versus economic aid, and Japan's future in the US-Japan alliance.[49]

Japan's reluctance to commit to MSA stemmed, in part, from the contentious nature of rearmament in Japan and its complex political implications, along with potential conflicts with Japan's constitution and concerns about both Japan's economy and the obligations required under MSA law. Though the Mutual Security Program dated from 1949, the United States extended its commitment to military assistance by passing the Mutual Security Act (MSA) in 1951; section 511 of this Act 'required that signatory states agree to six principal conditions, including a willingness to develop and maintain the defense capabilities of individual countries and the free world as a whole.'[50] This provision, which seemingly contradicted Japan's constitutional limitations on military development and raised questions about the Japanese role in collective security, would become a central issue while negotiating Japanese participation in the program.

Though the US-Japan Security Agreement had articulated US hopes that Japan would rearm, the Japanese Foreign Ministry dismissed this clause as a 'unilateral expectation' from the United States. Rather, it asserted that Japan could reaffirm its commitment to the 'intention that it should gradually increase its defense power' to create grounds for an MSA agreement that did not directly violate the constitution yet demonstrated a commitment to defensive strength. The Foreign Ministry concluded that while MSA and the Japanese constitution were not inherently contradictory, Japan would 'have no choice but to accept obligations that risk becoming problems in the eyes of our constitution.'[51] Still, it refrained from openly discussing rearmament as the way to fulfill MSA conditions and from connecting MSA to military expansion, a large contrast to US

47 Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, op. cit., 190.

48 Welfield, *Empire in Eclipse*, op. cit., 79.

49 Ibid., 99.

50 Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, op. cit., 191. Though 'MSA' refers to the Act itself, Americans and Japanese, along with scholars writing about this relationship, often used 'MSA' when talking about the Mutual Security Program. I have maintained this usage. For a history of the origins of the Mutual Security Program, see Chester J. Pach, Jr., *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1991).

51 Ibid. Foreign Ministry, 'Beikoku no MSA enjo ni tsuite' [On US MSA Aid], April 1953, DRO.

security planning. The Japanese government also continued to be apprehensive about the political consequences of the agreement, resulting from the increasingly tenuous position of Yoshida's Liberal Party. As the Foreign Ministry noted, MSA's 'legal possibility' did not mean 'political possibility', emphasizing the extent to which the rearmament debate had complicated Japanese governmental authority.[52]

Despite the swirl of questions surrounding rearmament and MSA, the United States and Japan exchanged notes, made public on 26 June 1953, that both articulated Japan's desire to participate in the program and demonstrated a distance between US and Japanese positions vis-à-vis rearmament. Writing to the US Embassy, the Japanese Embassy sought clarification on two key issues related to MSA. First, Japan wanted reassurance that the United States would not force Japan to rearm past what its economy could support. Second, the Japanese government wanted to confirm that Japan could fill the MSA's section 511 requirement of 'military obligation' by continuing to uphold the bilateral security treaty. The United States responded by noting that MSA was tailored to each country's economic capabilities, along with the tantalizing statement that US military procurement in Japan would likely increase with Japanese participation in the program. Though the United States had no intention of extending separate economic assistance to Japan, it did utilize Japan's desire for economic opportunities as a point in MSA's favor. As the Japanese Foreign Ministry had previously framed MSA as the only way to 'receive direct aid from the United States', hopes for increased procurement and economic support were a key factor behind its movement to an agreement.[53] The US embassy further stated that Japan would not be required to utilize forces beyond the previously agreed-upon security treaty (reassuring Japan that its forces would not be used for Asia's collective defense) and that Japan's contribution would be relative to 'its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic conditions'.[54]

Summarizing the effect of this exchange of notes, US Ambassador John Allison stated that it was 'a crystallization of the [Japanese] Government's opinion that MSA was politically feasible and economically desirable' and that the Japanese government's 'firm attitude' would be key to securing an agreement.[55] Allison further noted, however, that the Japanese government continued to take a limited stance vis-à-vis rearmament, stating that Yoshida's Cabinet argued that 'MSA fits the Government's position on defense, especially if interpreted to mean that the United States will not "demand" increase of the NSF, amendment of the Constitution, or dispatch [of] Japan's forces overseas.'[56] US policymakers, however, certainly sought to use MSA to

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Exchange of notes re. MSA, 26 June 1953: *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. 14, 1445–7.
55 The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State, 6 July 1953: *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. 14, 1454.
56 Ibid., 1456.

achieve an increase in the NSF – Secretary of State John Foster Dulles instructed US negotiators that MSA would not move forward without a concrete Japanese commitment to force expansion – and hoped that the revision of the Constitution's Article 9 would not be far behind.[57] An agreement to negotiate thus did not mean an agreement on the future effects or expanse of the program itself. Indeed, the Japanese continued to emphasize the economic aspects of the agreement. At the opening of MSA negotiations in July 1953, Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo reasserted that 'the development of Japan's defensive capabilities is to be predicated on her economic stability and development since it is recognized that defensive strength must build on a stable economic base.'[58]

The next eight and a half months of negotiations reflected this tension over MSA's ultimate purpose and goals, especially as Japan sought to internally reconcile its own commitment to the agreement. In particular, the United States and Japan clashed over Japan's desire for economic assistance, which the Japanese government hoped to obtain not only for economic reasons, but to facilitate a positive public reception to MSA. These conflicts are especially clear in recently released Japanese records of the initial negotiations, during which Japanese and US representatives sought to agree on a treaty draft; indeed, these records demonstrate that Japan, highly concerned about both national growth and public reaction, lobbied repeatedly for an economically expansive definition of 'rearmament' rather than accepting the US version of the MSA agreement. The opening paragraph of the preamble of Japan's first treaty draft, for example, stated that the treaty's provisions should be subject to 'economic priority'. The United States replied that 'the US does not contemplate an economic agreement but rather an agreement for military aid in order to develop Japan's self-defense capabilities... it might not be consistent with the purposes of MSP to say that economic aspects have clear priority.'[59] The Japanese, however, sought to use the agreement to lay out a broader concept of mutual defense that opened the door to economic assistance, noting that 'it

57 John Foster Dulles to the US Embassy, Tokyo, 14 July 1953. RG 59, State Department Central Decimal Files, Japan, 1950–1954, 794.5 7–1453, NARA.

58 'Address of Mr. Katsuo Okazaki, Foreign Minister of Japan, on the opening of the negotiations for an agreement between Japan and the United States of American under the Mutual Security Program', 15 July 1953. Nichibei sōgo bōei enjo kyōtei kankei ikken [Matters Related to the US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement], Kijiroku nado [Record of Proceedings], 0120–2001–10416, (B5.1.0.J/U703), 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, CD-Rom B'-190, No. 180735. DRO.

59 Conference for the Negotiation of the MSA Agreement, third meeting, 24 July 1953, 2–3. Nichibei Sōgo bōei enjo kyōtei kankei ikken [Matters related to the US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement], Gijiroku dai ni kan [Record of Proceedings, second volume], 3. Dai san kai kaigi (7 gatsu 24 hi) [3. The Third Meeting (7.24)], 0120–2001–10416, (B5.1.0.J/U703), 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, CD-Rom B'-190, No. 180737, DRO; Conference for the Negotiation of the MSA Agreement, fourth meeting, 27 July 1953, 4–5. See also Nichibei Sōgo bōei enjo kyōtei kankei ikken [Matters related to the US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement], Gijiroku dai ni kan [Record of Proceedings, second volume], 4. Dai yon kai kaigi (7 gatsu 27 hi) [4. The Fourth Meeting (7.27)], 0120–2001–10416, (B5.1.0.J/U703), 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, CD-Rom B'-190, No. 180738, DRO.

is important to emphasize that mutual defense involves economic and political assistance as well as military assistance.' The Japanese negotiators further argued that an acknowledgment of Japan's economic situation would 'obviate the impression of the Diet and public that a MS agreement means only military assistance and immediate rearmament'.[60] Throughout the negotiating over the draft, the Japanese representatives expected the treaty to be closely parsed by the public and they sought to eliminate any vague or controversial elements, while also creating the impression that the agreement would have expansive positive benefits for Japan.

Negotiations also centered on Japanese troop increases, and Japan's defense budget, issues that deeply penetrated Japanese governmental autonomy.[61] Combined with an internal Japanese agreement that altered Japan's defense structure to meet internal and external threats, Allison worked with Foreign Minister Okazaki to reach a confidential bilateral agreement in January 1954 to expand the Japanese military; though this agreement paved the way for the signing of a formal military assistance agreement, force additions were at a level far below those originally desired by US policymakers.[62] Yet, strongly encouraged by Allison, US policymakers accepted this as the best Japan would do.[63] The final conditions dictating Japanese membership in MSA thus represented a set of compromises between the United States and Japan; while Japan agreed to increase its own military strength, the United States was not in a

60 Conference for the Negotiation of the MSA Agreement, fourth meeting, 27 July 1953, 5; Conference for the Negotiation of the MSA Agreement, sixth meeting, 21 August 1953, 9. Nichibei Sōgo bōei enjo kyōtei kankei ikken [Matters related to the US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement], Gijiroku dai ni kan [Record of Proceedings, second volume], 6. Dai rokkai kaigi (8 gatsu 14 hi) [6. The Sixth Meeting (8.14)], 0120–2001–10416, (B5.1.0.J/U703), 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, CD-Rom B'-190, No. 180742, DRO.

61 In October 1953, Yoshida associate Ikeda Hayato traveled to Washington, DC, to negotiate, more directly, a choice that Allison attributed to Yoshida's desire to ascertain loans and economic assistance. Ikeda offered to negotiate forces goals in return for US economic aid, but the United States held fast to its belief that Japan's economy was capable of unassisted development. The talks ended without agreement, revealing continued disparities between US and Japanese conceptions of MSA and foreign aid.

62 Tokyo Embassy to the Secretary of State, 12 March 1954. RG 59, State Department Central Decimal Files, Japan, 1950–1954, 794.5 MSP/3–1254. NARA. In late 1953, Yoshida and Progressive Party leader Shigemitsu Mamoru reached agreement to modify the structure of the National Safety Agency (Japan's Defense Agency), agreeing that its forces would address both internal and external threats. According to John Swenson-Wright, it was this agreement – 'a major step toward conservative unity on defense matters' – that would allow the United States and Japan to move forward with MSA. The government also signed legislation that converted the NSA into the National Self-Defense Agency, establishing the core of today's Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense forces: Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, op. cit., 196.

63 Allison focused in particular on Japan's budget difficulties, noting that Yoshida had been forced to make cuts in areas other than defense: 'There has been and continues to be considerable agitation against decreases [budget cuts], particularly in such items as social security and welfare funds. At least four Ministry of Finance officials have been psychically beaten by irate mobs protesting against budget cuts': Telegram 1718 from Tokyo to the Secretary of State, 12 January 1953. RG 59, State Department Central Decimal Files, Japan, 1950–1954, 794.5 MSP/1–1254. NARA.

position to dictate fully Japanese military development and US policymakers chose a workable agreement, rather than push for controversial goals that could undermine Japan's conservative government and, ultimately, the United States' own desire to maintain a close alliance with Japan.

On 8 March 1954, the United States and Japan finally signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that would allow Japan to receive assistance under MSA. The agreement also established a US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Japan, which would help train Japanese forces, and included some limited gestures to Japan's economic hopes as the USA acknowledged, though it did not commit to, a goal of $100 million of offshore procurement in Japan.[64] Speaking at the signing ceremony on 8 March 1954, Okazaki emphasized that this agreement did not mean a change in Japan's military status: 'There are no new and separate military duties. Overseas service and so on for Japan's internal security force will not arise.'[65] US responses to the program, however, presented MSA as a celebration of Japan's commitment to its own defense and the broader free world. As a United States Information Agency telegram described, 'Approval of the agreement by both Houses of the Japanese Diet itself represents a real victory for elements in Japan favoring the development of Japanese defense forces in cooperation with the free world over those favoring neutralism and opposing Japan's alliance with the free world.'[66]

The United States framed MSA as a new point of agreement around US Cold War priorities, yet the agreement ultimately laid bare a variety of conflicting issues and tensions in the US-Japanese relationship. MSA was the product of compromise; Japan signed the agreement without the hoped-for economic aid and Japanese force totals never equaled those desired by the United States. As US and Japanese presentations of the final agreement demonstrate, the actual nature of the Japanese military remained a source of disagreement. US policymakers hoped to use MSA to bring the United States and Japan together and, ultimately, military commitments and compromises engendered through the agreement lasted through the Cold War and beyond. The process of negotiating Japanese MSA membership, however, fostered political and social mobilizations that placed pressures on both the Japanese government and the US-Japanese alliance, raising questions over the future and viability of this relationship.

The negotiations over MSA and Japanese rearmament fostered the processes of the Cold War State, inextricably tying together domestic and international

64 Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, op. cit., 198–9. See also Welfield, *Empire in Eclipse*, op. cit., 106–8. The agreement also included investment guarantees, and the United States planned to sell Japan approximately $50 million in surplus agricultural products; some of these profits would be directed toward the development of Japanese defense industries.

65 Welfield, *Empire in Eclipse*, op. cit., 107.

66 United States Information Agency to certain USIS Posts, 'Military Assistance to Japan', 7 May 1954. RG 469 Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948–1961, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Japan Subject Files, 1950–1959, Box 2, Folder: Japan – Defense [1 of 2]. NARA.

concerns to give MSA greater significance within Japanese society. These negotiations thus emphasize the importance of considering domestic social and political interactions in examining the construction and outcome of international relationships. In seeking to make Japan better equipped to participate in its own defense, the United States' focus on Japanese rearmament also encouraged opposition to the United States, the Japanese government, and the broader impact of the Cold War on Japan. Indeed, the agreement signed by the United States and Japan in 1954 did not – and could not – quell Japanese concerns about rearmament. Reactions to MSA demonstrated that, although rearmament had brought US and Japanese defense planning together, it had also raised issues within Japan that were not easily mollified, laying the foundation for future frictions and oppositions both within Japan and between Japan and the United States. As Andrew Gordon notes, 'People in Japan were straining to define the meaning of their postwar democracy in a shifting international and domestic context' – and in 1953 and 1954, MSA formed a crucial part of this context.

In presenting MSA publicly, the Japanese government sought to anticipate public reaction by framing MSA as a signifier of Japan's return to the global community and emphasizing the program's economic advantages. In March 1954, the Foreign Ministry published a long pamphlet entitled 'An Explanation of MSA Aid'. The pamphlet tried to counter the popular criticism that through MSA, the United States sought to 'enslave' Japan by emphasizing that a variety of European and non-European countries received US aid, including the recently independent India and Indonesia, countries that did not always agree with US policy.[67] 'Countries that are currently receiving aid are receiving it based on their own intention to become free.'[68] The Foreign Ministry further dismissed as baseless the claim that Japan would become overly militarized and subordinate to the United States by emphasizing that Japan's defense planning was Japan's problem to solve, that defense remained a small portion of Japan's budget, and that 'in an age like today with danger always lying dormant', protecting oneself through collective security had become a commonly accepted idea.[69] The Foreign Ministry further emphasized the economic benefits to Japan, claiming that if Japan tried to strengthen both its defense capabilities and reach economic stability simultaneously, it was likely that neither would be accomplished.[70] Finally, the Foreign Ministry directly confronted critiques that MSA represented a betrayal of Japanese peace and democracy. It accused MSA's detractors of acting in bad faith by confusing and misleading the public, and encroaching on 'citizen's instinctual patriotism and national

67 Gaimushō jōbō bunkakyoku [Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 'MSA kyōtei no kaisetsu' [An explanation of the MSA Agreement] (Tokyo, March 1954), 4–6.
68 Ibid., 9–10.
69 Ibid., 45–6.
70 Ibid., 17.

[*minzoku*] feelings'.[71] Ultimately, the Foreign Ministry framed the MSA as contributing to Japan's development and its future, facilitating its participation in the free world alongside other states, and strengthening the economic and defensive capabilities necessary to both domestic stability and international activity.

Despite the government's effort to frame MSA as positive for Japan's future development, reactions in Japan were mixed. Several factions of Japanese society, especially conservatives, supported the agreement.[72] Business and industrial groups, such as *Keidanren* (Federation of Economic Organizations) and the Japanese Ordnance Association, sent the Japanese government multiple reports detailing the ways in which MSA aid would boost Japan's economy, asserting that through the program, Japan could establish its manufacturing base, and that it held an important meaning for the future of the Japanese people.[73] Opposition to the agreement, however, remained high throughout 1954, reflecting ongoing fears about the impact of MSA on Japanese political and economic structures and concerns that MSA would draw Japan deeper into international tensions, lead to overseas deployment of Japanese troops, and increase the likelihood of war.[74] *Asahi* newspaper, for example, asserted that upon the signing of the agreement, people were reminded that they still held 'great doubts', especially over the question of military obligations, while *Yomiuri* newspaper noted that the agreement stipulated nothing on 'situations

71 Ibid., 44.

72 US Policymakers and the Japanese government relied on this support to assuage concerns about opposition to the agreement. As noted in an Embassy telegram, 'There are... forces more weighty than the press and the left wing opposition that are supporting the Government and approval of the Agreement. These are the power of the bureaucrats, and the influence of the financial and the industrial circles. Backed by their strength the Government expects no difficulty in seeing the Agreement through the Diet and securing early approval.' Tokyo Embassy to the Department of State, 'Signing of the Japan–MSA Agreement: News Summary', 22 March 1951. RG 59, State Department Central Decimal Files, Japan, 1950–1954, 794.5 MSP/1–2154. NARA.

73 Kendanren, bōei sangyō iinkai [Federation of Economic Organizations, Defense Manufacturing Committee], MSA ukeire ni kansuru ippanteki yōbō iken [General Requests and Opinions on Receiving MSA Aid], 6 August 1953. Nichibei Sōgo Bōei Enjo Kyōtei Kankei Ikken (MDAA) [Matters Related to the US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement], Chinjō, seikan kankei, kakushu chinjōsho, seigansho, chōsa shiryō nado [items such as petitions and surveys], 0120–2001–10422, (B5.1.0.J/U7–8), 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, CD-Rom B'-191, 180785, DRO; The Japanese Ordnance Association, 'Desired Regarding Receiving MSA Assistance from a Technical Point of View,' 1 September 1953. Nichibei Sōgo Bōei Enjo Kyōtei Kankei Ikken (MDAA) [Matters Related to the US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement], Chinjō, seikan kankei, kakushu chinjōsho, seigansho, chōsa shiryō nado [items such as petitions and surveys], 0120–2001–10422, (B5.1.0.J/U7–8), 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, CD-Rom B'-191, 180785, DRO.

74 Gaimushō [Foreign Ministry], MSA no kyōtei no shomei ni taisuru naigai no hankyō [Domestic and Foreign Responses on the Signing of the MSA Agreement], Nichibei Sōgo Bōei Enjo Kyōtei Kankei Ikken (MDAA) [Matters Related to the US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement], Yoron, shimbun chōsa, naigai hōdōburi, kokunai kasha iken, naigai hankyō nado [Items such as Public opinion, newspaper surveys, domestic and foreign news, domestic reporter's opinions, domestic and foreign responses], 0120–2001–10422, (B5.1.0.J/U7–8), 18th Disclosure of Diplomatic Records, CD-Rom B'-191, 180783. DRO.

outside the frame of the Constitution', such as dispatching troops overseas, and that 'Japan had entered a step deeper into military relationship with the United States'.[75] Many Japanese believed MSA to be a new commitment for Japan, even as the Japanese government downplayed its military nature. As concerned Foreign Ministry officials noted, it was likely that MSA would only perpetuate, rather than solve, the intense political positioning over rearmament that had marked the last several years.

Indeed, Leftist groups continued to utilize MSA as an argument against the Japanese government, critiquing it as an inauthentic representation of the Japanese people and presenting MSA as a clear threat to their everyday lives. Labor Unions emphasized this point particularly strongly, especially the General Council on Trade Unions (Sōhyō), which played a central role in Japan's peace movement and made opposition to rearmament and MSA central to its political activity in 1953 and 1954.[76] Sōhyō's critiques of MSA centered on the dangers that the agreement symbolized for Japan's economy and broader socio-political structures, tying the impact of MSA directly to the future of an economy still recovering from the distress of war. A statement from a 1953 economic conference, for example, asserted that 'the political uncertainty and economic panic that we are facing has arisen from the contradictions of war policy. In order to bring this under control, we must establish a policy of a peace economy', a goal for which 'labor unions themselves must fight'.[77] Sōhyō further participated in the establishment of the *Heiwa keizai kokumin kaigi* (People's Conference for a Peace Economy), which called for the 'establishment of a peace economy against militarism and fascism', asserting that the 'origins of [the economic and political] anguish [of laborers, farmers, small businesses and urban citizens] is that through MSA, American military subordination over Japan's government and economy will again deepen [and] monopoly capitalism will be strengthened'.[78] In an article in the widely read

75 Gaimush, MSA no ky tei no shomei ni taisuru naigai no hanky; *Yomuri Shimbun*, 'On signing of MSA treaty', 9 March 1954. Tokyo Embassy to the Department of State, 'Signing of the Japan-MSA Agreement: News Summary', March 22, 1951. RG 59, State Department Central Decimal Files, Japan, 1950–1954, 794.5 MSP/1–2154. NARA.

76 As part of its peace activism, in 1951, Sōhyō founded the *Nihon heiwa haishin kokumin kaigi* (National Congress for the Promotion of Peace) and asserted that Japan must not align with either Cold War camp, that it should not sign a one-sided peace treaty, and that 'armed force will never produce peace. Peace can only be produced through peaceful methods.' Nihon heiwa haishin kokumin kaigi no kessei taikai: seimei [Founding Conference of National congress for the promotion of peace: statement], 18 July 1951, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei: dai san kan, 1950–1954* [Collected Documents and the Postwar Japanese Labor Movement, vol. 3, 1950–1954] (Tokyo 2005), 245.

77 Sōhyō keizai senmonka kaigi: tōgi no ketsuron, tatakai no tenbō [Sōhyō Conference of Economic Specialists: Discussion conclusions, battle prospects], 11 April 1953, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei,* op. cit., 514.

78 Heiwa keizai kokumin kaigi yobi kaigi: tōron no ba – heiwa keizai kokumin kaigi no seikaku [Preparatory Conference for the People's Conference for a Peace Economy: discussion – the

journal *Chūō Kōron*, Sōhyō leader Takano Minoru argued that MSA would cause cuts in social welfare affecting workers, farmers, and housewives, while 'small business [would] go bankrupt and unemployment [would] increase sharply'.[79] By framing MSA as having a direct impact on economic development, Sōhyō sought to impress that MSA was not a mere abstract but a fundamental threat to its members' daily lives.

Sohyo's opposition was not limited to economics, however, and the organization also argued that the agreement undermined the systems and spirit of Japanese democracy. In a meeting with the US Embassy Labor Attaché, for example, the Hiroshima Sōhyō chapter contended that 'Rearmament under the present economic conditions will kill freedom and democracy in Japan. Workers must oppose the "military budget" and MSA in order to protect their livelihood and the Government is already trying to force measures through the Diet to throttle such opposition.'[80] In his *Chūō Kōron* article, Takano 'urged the "masses" to get control of local assemblies in order to circumvent the Government's attempt to silence their protests in the Diet.'[81] Though Sōhyō's campaign did not prevent MSA from passing, Takano used MSA as the basis for criticizing the interests of the Japanese government, the workings of Japanese democracy, and the nature of postwar Japanese society. In addressing these issues, Sōhyō encouraged active participation; rearmament was a development that suppressed the possibility of peaceful democracy and thus merited sustained, active resistance.

Sōhyō's emphasis on activism highlights how the tensions, debates and political positioning evoked by MSA cultivated the creation of new political organizations such as the Kenpō Yōgo Kokumin Rengō, also known as the Goken Rengō (Citizen's Federation to Protect the Constitution). The Goken Rengō was supported by Sohyō and both the Right and Left Socialist parties, along with labor unions, women's groups, youth groups, and a variety of intellectuals and religious organizations, and led by Katayama Tetsu, a Socialist leader who had been prime minister in 1947.[82] At a preparatory conference held in December 1953, working against the 'government's rearmament policy',

character of the people's conference for a peace economy], 16 May 1953, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei*, op. cit., 514; Daiikkai heiwa keizai kokumin kaigi: kyōtō he no daiippo – tōron yōyaku [The first People's Conference for a Peace Economy: first steps of the joint struggle – summary of the debate], 15 December 1953, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei*, op. cit., 516–7.

79 Foreign Service Despatch 1271 from US Embassy to the Department of State, 'Conferences with Labor Leaders in Southern Honshu, February 14 to 20th', 11 March 1954. RG 469 Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948–1961, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Japan Subject Files, 1950–1959, Box 8, Folder: Japan – Labor. NARA.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Allen B. Cole, George O. Totten and Cecil H. Uyehara, *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan* (New Haven, CT, 1966), 135. The Japanese Communist Party, however, did not participate. 'Goken rengō: undō hōshin' [Federation to Protect the Constitution: movement objectives], 15

Goken Rengō declared that it sought to develop a movement that came from 'all classes', overcoming factions and political parties to protect the 'peace constitution' to the 'bitter end' in order 'to hold fast to the principles of peace and democracy upon which the constitution is based'.[83]

In such statements, the Goken Rengō linked the fate of the constitution directly to active participation in Japanese democracy, contending that the organization 'encourages the realization of citizens that they are the sovereign that decides whether constitutional revision is right or wrong', and that it sought to 'crush the ambitions of reactionary forces opposed to the concentration of citizens' power'.[84] Laying out its various goals, the organization pledged to open an office in Tokyo and undertake publicity activities, including constitutional study groups, citizens' conferences, and the publication of pamphlets and leaflets, along with committing all organization members to utilize the slogan 'let's protect the peace constitution' on all communications, adding a sense of activity to its efforts.[85] In a pamphlet later published by the Goken Rengō, Takakuwa Sumio, a professor at Aichi University and one of the leading intellectuals in the peace movement, reiterated these issues, asserted that 'the biggest cancer blocking the safety of Japan is those who love war and argue for the revision of the constitution'.[86] Like Takano, Takakuwa called for vigilance. 'For us at present, the first issue is rearmament, the second and third issues are also rearmament, and to the end it is rearmament. In order to prevent rearmament, we must protect the current constitution', and the Japanese people must be 'concerned for the fate of the constitution to the same extent you are for your own health'.[87] MSA did not merely evoke opposition; by closely

January 1954, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei*, op. cit., 714.

83 Goken rengō junbikai: seimei [Preparatory Conference of Union to Protect the Constitution: Declaration], 19 December 1953, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei*, op. cit., 712; Goken rengō kessei taikai: sengen [Meeting to organize the federation to protect the constitution: statement], 19 January 1954, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei*, op. cit., 713.

84 Goken rengō junbikai: seimei [Preparatory Conference of Union to Protect the Constitution: Declaration], 19 December 1953, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei*, op. cit., 712.

85 Goken rengō: kiyaku [Federation to protect the constitution: bylaws], 15 January 1954; Goken rengō: undō hōshin [Federation to Protect the Constitution: movement objectives], 15 January 1954, both in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei*, op. cit., 714; Goken rengō: undō hōshin [Federation to Protect the Constitution: movement objectives], 15 January 1954, in Hosei daigaku ohara shakai mondai kenkyujo [Hosei University, Ohara Social Problems Research Institute (ed.)], *Nihon rōdō undo shiryō shūsei*, op. cit., 714.

86 Takakuwa Sumio, 'Kenpō kaihan no josei ni koshite: tokuni saigunbi mondai o chūshin ni' [Opposing the circumstances of constitutional modification: focusing in particular on the rearmament problem] (Tokyo 1954), 90.

87 Ibid., 6, 18.

linking US policy with the fate of the Japanese people, it became the basis of appeals for sustained opposition within Japan.

Rearmament and MSA highlighted key tensions running through postwar Japanese society. It raised questions about Japan's independence and the future of Japan's military, about Japan's economy and the nature of Japanese democracy. By mid-decade, among leftist commentators, MSA had become code for concerns that the Japanese government was acting in conjunction with the United States against the interests of the Japanese people. In 1955, Marxist historian Inoue Kiyoshi published the popular *Jōyaku Kaisei* (*Treaty Reform*), his account of the 'unequal treaty period', when Japan reopened relations with western countries in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the preface, Inoue made it clear that he meant his text to have contemporary relevance, stating that

> Look, for example, at how our nation suffers more and more every day from the Mutual Security Act, and the 'Peace' treaty and the Japan-U.S. 'Security' treaty that are resurrecting militarism in our country and preventing the establishment of our own autonomy. [By joining forces with other groups we can] build a truly national peace government in Japan and finally rid ourselves of the San Francisco peace treaties and the oppression of the Mutual Security Act.[88]

Inoue framed MSA as part of a long narrative of western oppression, but also a story of threat caused by Japanese governmental reactions to the West; it was a government that did not value truly 'national peace'. Opposition to MSA thus contributed to a growing critique that 'the Japanese state still seemed more concerned with satisfying the demands of the West than with responding to the concerns of the Japanese people' and that the Japanese people were 'being oppressed by [their] own state for economic and political purposes that were not designed for [their] benefit', calling into question the representative and functional nature of Japanese democracy.[89]

MSA evoked challenges to US policy, Japanese conservative authority, and Japanese interest in the US-Japanese alliance, while leaving the issue of rearmament open to continued tension between the United States and Japanese governments. In July 1954, only a few months after the agreement, Japanese officials informed the United States of plans to reduce Japan's 1954 defense budget and curtail the promised new forces. Allison, having pushed hard for US policymakers to accept Japanese positions, was frustrated: 'their actions indicate that Japan does not consider itself an ally or a partner of the United States but rather a nation which for the time being is forced by circumstances to cooperate with the United States but which intends while doing so to wring out of this relationship every possible advantage at the minimum cost.'[90] Following this development, Allison cautioned US policymakers not to underestimate the forces

88 Quoted in Kevin Doak, 'What is a Nation and Who Belongs?: National Narrative and Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth Century Japan', *The American Historical Review* 102(2) (April 1997), 305, no. 68. See also Inoue Kiyoshi, *Jōyaku Kaisei: Meiji no minzoku mondai* [Treaty Reform: The Problem of the Meiji Nation] (Tokyo 1967 [1955]), i–v.

89 Doak, 'What is a Nation and Who Belongs?', op. cit., 305.

90 Quoted in Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, op. cit., 199.

of neutralism in Japan, which he noted drew from military, political, social, and economic foundations, and wondered if it was in the United States' interest to expend 'major effort' for only slight Japanese defense increases.[91]

In essence, the tensions of popular pressure identified by the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) several years before remained strong, despite US efforts and Japanese government agreements supporting rearmament. Allison essentially admitted that the United States had failed in a key goal: getting Japan to adopt US Cold War priorities as its own priorities. Rather than strengthening Japanese Cold War commitments, US policies were stirring increased opposition in Japan. Indeed, Yoshida's long tenure as Prime Minister came to a close at the end of the year, undone by questions of scandal, pressure from the Left and the Right, and his continued failure to secure economic aid from the United States. Allison recommended that the United States reconsider its policy to emphasize a shift from 'defense to economics and internal security' to find issues on which the United States and Japan could agree.[92] Within the United States, the impact of this conclusion was ultimately reflected by a new NSC document for Japan, which emphasized that 'The amount and timing of the build-up of Japanese military forces should relate to the necessity for developing political and economic stability, as well as military strength, in Japan. The United States should avoid pressing the Japanese to increase their military forces to the prejudice of political and economic stability.'[93]

Moreover, this change in strategy was, in part, premised on the experiences of rearmament. A memorandum from the Operations Co-ordinating Board, which sought to centralize and co-ordinate foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration, stated that since NSC 125/2, 'it had become evident that hoped for expansion of Japanese military capabilities would not materialize' and that the new document sought to 'apply the experience gained in U.S.-Japanese relations since the end of the occupation'. The result of this reassessment was 'a major change in emphasis and approach'.[94] The reactions of the Japanese people and the political opposition were not mere context for US policy; rather, the experience of negotiating MSA – and the visceral reactions to both the Japanese

91 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Secretary of State, 9 September 1954: *FRUST 1952–1954*, op. cit., 1717–18.

92 Ibid., 1717–19. Allison's argument for the need to shift the grounds of US policy comments were not fully accepted by all segments of the US defense establishment, where opinion over Japanese rearmament continued to vary in 1954. In contrast to Allison's assertions, General John E. Hull, Commander in Chief of US Far East Command, contended that 'U.S. policy with respect to defense should not be dictated by the [Japanese] Conservative position' and that 'increasing political stability ... should not be given absolute priority in the U.S. programs': 'Reappraisal of U.S. Policy Toward Japan', 8 February 1955, 3–4. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953–1961, Special Staff File Series, Box 4, Folder: Japan (1). Eisenhower Library.

93 NSC 5516/1, 9 April 1955: *FRUS, 1955–57*, op. cit., 13, 57.

94 Memorandum to Elmer B. Staats from John E. MacDonald, NSC 5516/1 (Japan), 21 April 1955, 1. White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–1961, OCB (Operations Coordinating Board) Central File Series, Box 47, Folder: OCB 091. Japan (File #3) (1) [April – October, 1955]. Eisenhower Library.

government and US-Japanese planning that these negotiations created – both cautioned the US against neglecting public responses and increased tensions that would erupt in the future, especially during the renegotiation of the US-Japanese security treaty at the end of the decade. These tensions exploded in the late 1950s and 1960 with large-scale protests against the revision of the US-Japan security treaty, challenging not only the US-Japanese relationship and United States' security vision for Japan, but the authority and representativeness of the Japanese government – all of which, as demonstrated by MSA, were fundamentally altered by close co-operation in US Cold War policy.

Ultimately, MSA both deepened the US-Japanese relationship and raised tensions within it. The United States was correct in its belief that MSA represented a new commitment to US Cold War policy, creating institutional sites of US-Japanese cooperation that continued throughout the Cold War, and leaving a lasting US imprint on the Japanese military. From 1954 to 1956, the United States provided $345 million of materiel, equipment and training to Japan's three service branches under MSA.[95] If proposed programs for 1957–8 are taken in account, along with the materiel provided to Japan in the early 1950s from Defense Department appropriations, the total was $1.229 billion.[96] By 1961, over 3000 Japanese military officers had trained at US military bases and schools.[97] Yet, for all the military, financial, and institutional connections fostered by MSA, the broader issue of rearmament highlighted vast distances between the United States and Japan that the two countries struggled to bridge throughout the 1950s. The United States and Japanese governments had competing priorities vis-à-vis rearmament and the broader nature of the Cold War threat, and, despite settling the MSA issue, never fully reconciled these differences.

On a broader level, these frictions reflected the controversial position that rearmament occupied in postwar Japan. Rearmament raised issues over Japan's postwar identity and the nature of picking sides in the Cold War fight. Could Japan be a neutral, pacifistic nation? Was Japan truly independent? Rearmament further became a base upon which to criticize the Japanese government for betraying a leftist vision of a peaceful economy and functioning democracy, and a rightist vision of an independent and 'spirited' Japan, a point of political reference over concerns about the Japanese government's position as the voice of the Japanese people. In essence, rearmament became a key element of the Cold War State, a point of tension through which Cold War

95 Headquarters, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan, APO 500, 'Briefing for the Committee of Citizen Advisors on the Mutual Security Program', 12 February 1957, Section: 'Military Assistance Programming', 1. US President's Citizen Advisors on the Mutual Security Program (Fairless Committee): Records, 1956–7, Box 16, Folder: Japan (6). Eisenhower Library.
96 Ibid., 2. By 1962, '98 percent of the weapons held by the Self-Defense forces, 99 percent of their ammunition, 82 percent of their communications equipment, and 70 percent of their vehicles had been obtained from the United States under MSA aid': Welfield, *Empire in Eclipse*, op. cit., 111.
97 Welfield, *Empire in Eclipse*, op. cit., 111.

concerns intersected with the concerns of postwar Japan – tensions that came to a head in large-scale, extensive Japanese protests against the renegotiation of the US-Japanese security treaty in 1960 – and served as a nexus where the lines between domestic and foreign became blurred and, ultimately, indistinguishable.

It is in this intertwined context, a blurring of domestic and foreign, that the broader implications of the debate over Japanese rearmament become clear. The US occupation of Japan was a period of contradiction, one marked simultaneously by imperialism and genuine democratic development, by cultural misunderstandings and appreciations, by a complex dialectic between dictate and negotiation.[98] These processes did not end with the end of the occupation; if anything, Japan's newly sovereign status made the US-Japanese relationship even more fraught with ambiguities and negotiations, affected by a complex dynamic of public activism, Cold War global tensions, and questions of political control. The postwar US-Japanese relationship was thus not marked simply by US dominance or Japanese resistance to US plans, but rather continual negotiations that pulled these two states together; this is not to say that these two states interacted as equals, but to emphasize the importance of understanding *how* they related to one another.

These continual negotiations percolated through Japanese society, and fostered both new commitments and oppositions, ultimately altering the shape of state and society. Indeed, it is in examining the nature, development, and consequences of the Cold War State, a broader, cyclical dynamic between the Cold War and society, between institutional development and socio-political organization, between policy-making and agreement with, and resistance to, these policymakers' goals, that the US-Japanese relationship provides broader insights into the nature of international relationships during the Cold War era. The experiences of negotiating Japanese rearmament opened both the United States and Japan to a unique set of pressures brought forth by the Cold War, pressures that not only encouraged firm international commitments but that affected domestic society in far-reaching and unexpected ways. These pressures were not unique to the United States and Japan; moreover, rather than being exterior to the US-Japanese relationship, they played a central part in shaping how that relationship was understood by the Japanese people and in creating the context within which the two governments related to each other. To understand the full impact of the Cold War, it is thus necessary to frame international relationships as consistently interacting with, and often inseparable from, domestic societies, for it is these interactions that gave birth to the Cold War State.

Jennifer M. Miller
is a PhD candidate in international history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

98 The literature on the US occupation is vast: examples include John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, op. cit.; and Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York 1999).