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Occupation Policies in Japan and Korea

By HUGH BORTON

JAPAN

THE four most important documents which lay down the basic occupation policies of the United States for Japan are: first, the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945; second, the Instrument of Surrender of September 2; third, the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" of August 29; and, finally, the Moscow Declaration of Foreign Ministers of December 27.¹

The Potsdam Declaration

The Potsdam Declaration was the answer of the governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain to the question of what was meant by unconditional surrender for Japan. It stated that there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence in Japan of those who were responsible for Japanese aggression, and that irresponsible militarism must be driven from the world before there could be any order, peace, security, or justice. It also provided for the occupation of Japan to achieve our objectives, and reiterated our insistence that the terms of the Cairo Declaration be carried out and that Japanese sovereignty be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we should determine. It added that the Japanese military forces would be completely disarmed, but specified that the Japanese as a people would not be annihilated nor would Japan be destroyed as a nation. In contrast to the basic policy for Germany,

the Potsdam Declaration assumed that there would continue to exist a central governmental machinery in Japan as the only way to avoid creating a myriad of unsolvable problems for our occupation authorities.² Consequently, direct responsibility was placed on the Japanese Government to remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

At the same time it was imperative that the United States and the Allies have supreme authority over Japan and be responsible for all policy matters. Secretary of State Byrnes clarified this point in the exchange of notes with Japan just prior to surrender when he defined the prerogatives of the Japanese Emperor as follows:

From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.³

Furthermore, the Surrender Instrument provided that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers could issue such orders or directives as he deemed proper to effectuate the surrender.

It was clearly established, therefore, that General MacArthur would have supreme authority in Japan but would carry out his task in the occupation of Japan through the instrument of the

¹ *Occupation of Japan—Policy and Progress* (Washington: Government Printing Office), Department of State Publication 267, pp. 4, 173.

² Hugh Borton, "United States Occupation Problems in Japan Since Surrender," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 2 (June 1947), pp. 252 *et seq.*

³ *Occupation of Japan*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

Japanese Government unless conditions warranted his taking direct action.

Initial Post-Surrender Policy

The "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" was elaborated further in a document of that title which was approved by the President on September 6, 1945, setting forth the following ultimate objectives:

To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.⁴

In order to attain these objectives, it was stated that Japan's sovereignty should be limited as described in the Potsdam Declaration, that Japan should be completely disarmed and demilitarized, that the authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism should be totally eliminated, and that the Japanese people should be encouraged to develop individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights and to form democratic and representative organizations. This statement further provides for the trial of war criminals, the demilitarization of the Japanese economy, the extraction of reparations and restitution, and the control of international trade and finance.

On June 19, 1947, the Far Eastern Commission in Washington approved the policy decision of this document in "The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

Japan," a document essentially the same as that of the United States. Consequently, the policies which were initially those of this Government have now been accepted by the other ten states members of the Far Eastern Commission.⁵

As just indicated, Allied participation in the formulation of policy for Japan is provided by the Far Eastern Commission in Washington. Established as a result of the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, the Far Eastern Commission is composed of eleven nations most vitally interested in Japanese problems, namely: China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the United States. These countries have been meeting in continuous session since February 26, 1946 and have been formulating the policies, principles, and standards with which Japan must conform to fulfill its obligations under the terms of surrender. Policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission, which must be approved by a majority of the members including the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are transmitted to General MacArthur by the United States Government in the form of directives.

Japanese attitude toward occupation

One of the first and most important problems which confronted General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP, was the over-all supervision and operation of the occupation in such a way as to assure, as far as possible, the acceptance by the Japanese of an inevitable occupation. The unusually friendly attitude which the Japanese have shown toward the occupation forces is clear

⁵ Far Eastern Commission Press Release No. 34, July 10, 1947.

evidence of the skill with which General MacArthur has conducted the occupation.

Many Japanese themselves have expressed surprise at this attitude, but have explained it by the fact that the Japanese did not blame the Allies but their own militarists for the hardships which the war brought upon them, and by the manner in which General MacArthur and our troops have conducted themselves in Japan. High Japanese Government officials have stated that the present political disunity within Japan would not exist if there were any real opposition to the occupation, because the Japanese always present a strong unified front against unacceptable outside pressure or control.

In spite of this general feeling of friendliness, officials in the Japanese Government have criticized certain aspects of the occupation. They have maintained that SCAP has interfered in the detailed activities of the Japanese people, and should have been concerned only with general matters of policy. It is claimed that this interference applies to such matters as the approval by SCAP headquarters of draft legislation implementing the Constitution, the development of educational reforms, and the general economic life of Japan. Other Japanese have objected to the occupation because of illogical and stringent censorship rules, the widespread application of the political and economic purges, and the approval of Japanese contracts for construction purposes for the occupation when such contracts were exorbitantly high.

Duration of occupation

Another important problem which has faced the United States Government has been that of the duration of the present form of occupation. The Potsdam Declaration states that the occupying forces of the Allies shall be

withdrawn from Japan as soon as the Allied objectives have been accomplished and "there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government."⁶ General MacArthur could not have recommended, therefore, at a press conference on March 17, 1947, that there should be an early peace treaty with Japan unless he were satisfied that the present government in Japan was peacefully inclined and represented the will of the Japanese people, and that the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration had been sufficiently fulfilled. Furthermore, the United States Government could not have suggested on July 11, 1947 that a conference on the peace treaty for Japan be convened on August 19 if it had not reached the same conclusions.

Democratic developments

What, then, have been the developments towards a peacefully inclined and responsible government expressing the free will of the Japanese people? In the first place, two general elections have been held since surrender. The first election, in which women participated for the first time in Japanese history, was held in April 1946. Throughout the past year there have been three main political parties in Japan: the Liberal Party, under the leadership of Premier Yoshida, with a plurality of members in the House of Representatives; the Conservative Party, with nearly as many seats in the lower house as the Liberal Party; and the Socialist or Social-Democratic Party, under the leadership of Mr. Tetsu Katayama.

The platforms of these various parties are vague, and it is especially difficult to distinguish any real difference between the two conservative groups, the Liberals and the Progressives. Success-

⁶ *Occupation of Japan*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

sors to the two leading prewar political parties, they had as their basic philosophy a desire to salvage as much of the political and economic structure as possible. The Liberal Party is the more conservative. In March 1947 the Progressive Party was dissolved and succeeded by the Democratic Party. The distinctive feature of the Socialist Party is that it advocates state ownership of the most essential industries.

In the second general election since occupation, held on April 25, 1947, the Socialists increased their representation by 45 seats and became the leading party. As they obtained only 143 seats out of a total of 466, however, it was necessary that a coalition cabinet be formed. The present Cabinet, with Mr. Katayama, the president of the Socialist Party, as Premier, was formed on May 31 on the basis of the Socialist-Democratic-People's Cooperative coalition. It is composed of 7 Socialist members, 7 members from the Democratic Party, and 2 from the People's Party. The Liberal Party, with 133 seats, refused to join the Cabinet and remains as the chief opposition party.

There are other signs which indicate that basic democratic concepts have been sufficiently accepted by the Japanese people and government to make it likely that progress toward democracy will continue after the withdrawal of the occupation forces under SCAP. Under the new Constitution which became effective on May 3, 1947, it is stated that sovereign power resides with the people and that the Emperor can act only on the advice and approval of the Cabinet and has no powers other than an ordinary constitutional monarch. Fundamental human rights are guaranteed the people, the Cabinet is responsible to the Diet, and the House of Representatives is the most powerful organ of the state.

Another distinctive advance toward

democracy in Japan is the adoption of a policy of decentralization of governmental authority. Previously almost all governmental authority was vested in the National Government. Under the provisions of the new laws, governors of the prefectures are elected, and governors and mayors are subject to impeachment by action of the prefectural assemblies or by referendum. The governor can act as an agent of the National Government only as provided by law, while the assemblies have increased authority in local matters.

Furthermore, the purging of various persons ineligible for office, such as war criminals, leading politicians and officeholders during the war years, and leaders of ultranationalistic and aggressive thought, has provided adequate opportunity for new leadership to develop in Japan and should contribute materially to its further democratization.

Obstacles of democracy

One of the factors which might retard the growth and expansion of political democracy in Japan is the influence and power of the bureaucracy. Cabinet ministers have reported that they have been forced by their subordinates, the bureaucrats, to take certain positions contrary to their best judgment, while officers in SCAP's headquarters who constantly deal with Japanese officials have been confronted with attempts on the part of the bureaucrats to oppose changes along democratic lines. The reluctance of officials of the Home Ministry and the Finance Ministry to support the new educational reform bills, the desire of the Justice Ministry bureaucrats to give the Public Procurator a salary equivalent to that of the Justice Minister, and the failure of officials in the Home Ministry to realize that the towns, villages, and prefectures have far more autonomy than heretofore, are all cases in point.

In an attempt to rectify the unhealthy influence of the bureaucrats, the Cabinet approved a draft bill on July 7, 1947 designed to eliminate the influence of the bureaucracy, and reform of the civil service is under way.⁷

Progress in educational reform

There is general agreement both among Japanese and among officials of SCAP that only through the process of education can the Japanese understand democracy. Fortunately, there has developed under the careful guidance of the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP a determination among leading Japanese educators to reform the whole educational structure. Two basic steps toward this reform have already been accomplished, namely, a law on the general principles of education and another law on the educational system, both of which have been accepted by the Japanese Diet.

The former law states that the primary responsibility of education is to train the Japanese people to contribute to the peace of the world and the welfare of humanity by building a democratic and cultural state. The law further provides that education shall aim at the fuller development of the worth of the individual and the respect for labor and a sound mind and body, and that equal educational opportunity shall be given to all.

The law on the educational system defines the types and functions of the various schools and increases the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and the local authorities at the expense of the authority of the Home Minister.

Furthermore, two specific steps have been taken to develop new teaching methods among the teachers, namely, the revision of textbooks and teachers' manuals and the formation of teacher

training institutes. On the basis of these developments it seems obvious that in the political and educational fields Japan has progressed sufficiently since surrender, in line with the objectives of the Allies, to warrant the convening in the near future of a conference on the treaty of peace for Japan.

General economic developments

Japan's present economic situation is less encouraging than its political development. There is a great scarcity of practically every type of goods, an unequal distribution of money purchasing power, and deficit financing by both Government and industry. The basic reason for this situation is that Japan's wartime economy was regulated through a combination of governmental and private controls which had diminishing effect in stabilizing prices and wages. By the time of surrender, the elaborate wage and price structure rendered control so complex that violations were widespread and a sharp rise in prices developed in the last months of 1945.

To divorce Japanese economy from the control of the militarists and the *zaibatsu*, SCAP issued a directive to the Japanese Government on September 22, 1945 which made it responsible for "initiating and maintaining a firm control over wages and prices" and for "effecting controlled distribution of commodities in short supply." Unfortunately, many of the wartime controls were prematurely abolished by the Japanese Government and various ministries began to act independently and without plan on economic matters.

In April 1946 the Japanese Government submitted to SCAP a proposal for the creation of the Economic Stabilization Board to be responsible for "formulating fundamental policies and plans with reference to urgent measures taken relating to production, distribution and consumption of commodities and to la-

⁷ *New York Times*, July 8, 1947.

bor, prices, finance, transportation and other matters." This Economic Stabilization Board was created in August 1946, but failure of the Board to take vigorous action to stabilize the Japanese economy only aggravated the general situation.⁸

In view of a deteriorating economic situation and after being convinced that the Japanese Government was not really interested in economic controls over production and distribution of commodities, including food, and over financial problems, General MacArthur wrote Prime Minister Yoshida on March 22, 1947 warning him that future food imports for Japan had been calculated on a minimum basis and presupposed the maximum utilization of indigenous food and equitable distribution of supplies for which General MacArthur held the Japanese Government responsible. He also said it was imperative for the Japanese Government to carry out its responsibilities for the control of wages and prices and for the initiation and maintenance of a strict rationing program of commodities in short supply, and to take early and vigorous steps to develop and implement the series of economic and financial controls which the current situation demanded.

It is also realized that Japan's economy will be stimulated by the beginning of private trade, even though in a restricted manner, on August 15, 1947. Certain basic economic problems still have to be settled, however, if Japan's economy is to approach self-sufficiency. These problems are: increase in raw materials to allow the normal development of peacetime industries; availability of expanded credit resources, both domestic and foreign, to stimulate the rehabilitation of peaceful

industries and the increase of exports to pay for necessary imports; and above all, revival of genuine economic incentive among both capital and labor.

Japanese peace treaty

The most important problem confronting the United States in relation to Japan is the negotiating of a peace treaty. Before such negotiations can begin, however, decisions must be reached on basic procedures to be followed at the peace conference. To this end, as the United States did not feel that the terms of reference of the Council of Foreign Ministers made it necessary to have that body consider the Japanese treaty questions, the United States proposed on July 11, 1947, to the countries members of the Far Eastern Commission, that a peace conference for Japan be convened on August 19, 1947, that it be composed of representatives from those countries, that it be outside the Commission, thus avoiding a veto in the voting procedure, and that the conference initially be composed of deputies.

Favorable replies to our suggestions were received from most of the countries, although several suggested postponement of the conference for a few weeks. The Chinese suggested a slightly modified voting procedure and the Soviet Union stated in an *aide-mémoire* of July 22, 1947 that the question of convening a peace conference for Japan should be preliminarily considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. After rejecting this suggestion, the United States received another communication from the Soviet Union reiterating its former position. On November 17, 1947 the Chinese Foreign Minister proposed to these four powers that decisions at the conference be by a majority of the eleven states compos-

⁸ For a general description of economic conditions in Japan see Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP, *Partial Staff Study on Stabilization of Wage Price Relationships*, April 1947.

ing the conference, including the concurring votes of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. The United States and the United Kingdom have not yet answered this proposal, but the Soviets again stated their former position. Obviously, therefore, further exchanges of views will be necessary before the procedural questions are settled.

KOREA

Korea is a geographical focal point in the Far East where conflicting national interests of major powers have met for centuries. Domination over Korea was a basic cause of both the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Japan's control over Korea from 1910, when it was formally annexed to the Japanese Empire, until the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945, enabled Japan to use Korea as the base of its invasion of Manchuria in 1931 which led directly to Pearl Harbor. With Korea occupied in the south up to the 38th parallel by American forces and occupied in the north by Soviet forces, it is of vital interest to the United States that a peaceful solution of the Korean problem be found and a strong and peaceful government be established throughout all of Korea as early as possible.

The basis of Allied policy toward Korea is the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, in which the United States, the United Kingdom, and China promised that Korea would in due course become free and independent. This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, to which the Soviet Union adhered when it entered the war against Japan in that summer.

A divided Korea

In preparation for the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the Far

East, it was agreed that Japanese north of the 38th parallel in Korea were to surrender to the Soviet forces, while those south of that line were to surrender to United States forces. Since the surrender of Japanese forces south of this line to our commander in Korea, General John R. Hodge, this division of the country, which was made as a military convenience, has become a political and economic barrier.

In order to solve the basic outstanding problems connected with Korea, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met in Moscow in December 1945 and agreed, with China's adherence, on the type of assistance and procedures which should be adopted to aid the Korean people in the development of self-government and the establishment of their national sovereignty. As a result of the Moscow Agreement the United States and the Soviet Union have the responsibility for taking certain specific joint action, including the calling of a conference between representatives of the American and Soviet Commands to solve the difficulties resulting from the division of Korea into two separate zones.

Lack of agreement

Such a conference was held early in 1946 but failed to achieve substantial results. Subsequently, the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission, also provided for in the Moscow Agreement, met in March 1946 in an attempt to carry out its first task, namely, the establishment of a democratic provisional government made up of Koreans from all of Korea. Unfortunately, after a month and a half of discussions and attempts in the Commission to reach agreement on the formula to be used for consulting democratic political parties and social organizations on the formulation of recommendations for a Korean provisional

government, the Commission adjourned without achieving any specific results.

The Soviet representatives on the Commission took the position that only those political parties and social organizations fully in favor of the Moscow Agreement should be consulted; while the United States maintained that such a restriction threatened a basic principle on which we have always stood, namely, freedom of speech and expression. Furthermore, if the Soviet formula had been followed it would have meant in reality that all parties and organizations except a minority Communist group would have been excluded from the consultations. Many Koreans had opposed that section of the Moscow Agreement which stated that the Joint Commission, in consultation with a Korean provisional government and Korean democratic organizations, would work out measures for assisting, probably through some form of trusteeship, the political, economic, and social program of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of national independence for Korea. These Koreans desired independence immediately.

Following the adjournment of the Joint Commission, letters were exchanged between General Hodge, the American Commander, and General Chistiakov, until recently the Soviet Commander, in an attempt to work out a satisfactory formula for consulting Koreans in the formation of a provisional government; but these attempts failed. Finally, Secretary of State Marshall transmitted a letter to Foreign Minister Molotov on April 8, 1947 in an attempt to break the deadlock.

Work resumed

After an exchange of letters, agreement was reached for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission on a

basis which provided (1) that the Joint Commission consult with Korean parties and organizations declaring their intent to uphold fully the Moscow Agreement, and (2) that individuals or parties could be excluded from further consultations with the Joint Commission only by mutual agreement and only on the ground of fomenting active opposition to the Commission, the Moscow Agreement, or one of the two powers.

On May 21, 1947 the Joint Commission resumed its work and by June 7 issued invitations to Korean parties and organizations to consult with it. A total of 39 parties and 396 social organizations in all Korea accepted these invitations and signed the prescribed declaration of intent to work with the Joint Commission in upholding the terms of the Moscow Agreement. Of these, 36 of the political parties were in southern Korea and 3 in the north. Of the social organizations, 361 were in the south and 35 in the north. Percentages by affiliation of the parties and social organizations in southern Korea were estimated as follows: rightist 45 per cent; moderate right 8 per cent; center 4 per cent; moderate left 2 per cent; Communist-dominated left 19 per cent; unknown 22 per cent. The parties and social organizations registering in northern Korea were classified as Communist-dominated.

By the end of June the Commission had again reached a deadlock on the same question that brought about its adjournment in 1946, namely, whether Korean parties or social organizations were to be excluded from consultations without a hearing because of their former statements and opinions. As a result of the failure of the Soviet delegation to respond favorably to any American proposal to break this deadlock and the failure of the Joint Commission to agree on the submission of a report, the Acting Secretary of State on August 26 dispatched a letter to the Soviet For-

eign Minister and to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China in which he proposed that "the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out." Specific proposals were incorporated with the letter, but these and the proposed meeting were rejected by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

In view of the refusal of the Soviet Union to participate in four power discussions, the United States decided to refer the problem of Korean independence to the General Assembly of the United Nations. On September 17, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall in his address before the General Assembly of the United Nations stated that despite the efforts of the United States Government to reach an agreement with the Government of the Soviet Union to restore the independence of Korea through the Joint Commission and otherwise, today the independence of Korea is no further advanced than it was two years ago. He concluded, "It is therefore the intention of the United States Government to present the problem of Korean independence to this session of the General Assembly." The General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23, 1947, by a vote of 41 to 6, decided to place the problem of Korea on its agenda for current session consideration.

On September 26, 1947, the Chief Soviet Delegate in the Joint Commission stated that "the Soviet Delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea."

The United States Delegate to the United Nations submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations a draft of a resolution which it was hoped

would make possible the early establishment by the Korean people themselves of their own government and the withdrawal of all Soviet and United States armed forces from Korea. On November 14 the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 43 to 0, with 6 abstentions, a resolution which provides for the establishment of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea composed of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria, and Ukrainian S.S.R. which shall observe elections in Korea, to be held not later than March 31, 1948, to select Korean representatives to the National Assembly which may establish a national government. The Commission shall consult with Korean representatives regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people and with the newly created national government concerning the withdrawal of armed forces and the assumption of authority by the newly elected government from the military commands.

In addition to its efforts to establish an independent, unified, and democratic Korea as soon as possible, the United States has also attempted to assist the Koreans in establishing a sound economy and adequate educational system as essential bases of an independent, democratic state. On July 15 private trade between southern Korea and the rest of the world was initiated. The need for conserving Korea's foreign exchange assets gives rise to limitations on the extent of this trade. These limitations do not cover exports of products not necessary to Korea's economy, including a wide variety of minerals and other raw materials. Under appropriations to the War Department, imports into southern Korea of foods, fertilizer, transportation, equipment, and other essential

items have been increased to assist the economy.

Educational advance

The work done by Military Government in Korea thus far in assisting Koreans to establish an educational system has been constructive in the face of many difficulties. The simple fact that there are more young people being afforded schooling in southern Korea today than in all of Korea during the period of Japanese control speaks for itself. Another significant fact is that whereas the teachers, the methods, and the ideas were formerly Japanese, at present they are Korean. Korean teachers are being trained as rapidly as possible. The Korean language is being used in the schools and the newspapers, and Korean self-expression is being encouraged. In 1946 a group of Korean educators visited the United States in order to observe our educational system. Early in 1947 a group of educators from the United States visited Korea. From this exchange and the work now in progress in Korea, our assistance cannot help leaving a lasting impression. The work of the missionaries of many denominations in Korea over a period of many years has also formed a basis for the desire on the part of Koreans to further contact with the United States.

Political advance

Turning to the political scene in southern Korea, on June 27, 1947, the Interim Legislative Assembly passed a measure which has been reported as a painstaking, practical piece of legisla-

tion reflecting credit upon the Assembly. The legislation lays the groundwork for elections to be held for the selection of members of the Legislature on the basis of equal, secret suffrage. The present Legislature consists of members half of whom are elected and half appointed. The appointees were selected by the United States Command.

The passage of the election law is a constructive step in the direction of making available to Koreans the opportunity to participate in the self-government they so earnestly desire. In the executive and judicial branches of government, the United States Military Government has been painstaking in attempting, against heavy odds, to offer similar opportunities. Koreans have been trained by Americans to assume responsibilities in the process of governmental administration. These Koreans are now assuming responsibilities with commendable results. One of the first acts of Military Government in turning over to the Koreans functions primarily their own was to establish a Bureau of Justice. This Bureau, nominally operating as a branch of Military Government, has for the past several months assumed full responsibility for the administration of justice in Korea, with the exception of cases involving security of our armed forces. These latter have been relatively slight.

In the final analysis, however, the main task in Korea is yet to be finished, namely, the establishment of a government for all of Korea. And the United States intends to continue to work toward that end.

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