

117TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 8560

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report relating to analyses of the military will to fight and the national will to fight with respect to the Governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 28, 2022

Mr. CROW (for himself and Mr. MELJER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

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## A BILL

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report relating to analyses of the military will to fight and the national will to fight with respect to the Governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Will to Fight Act of  
5 2022”.

6 **SEC. 2. REPORT ON ASSESSING WILL TO FIGHT.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1           (1) According to a study by the RAND corpora-  
2           tion, “will to fight” is poorly analyzed and the least  
3           understood aspect of war.

4           (2) In testimony before the Select Committee  
5           on Intelligence of the Senate in May 2022, top intel-  
6           ligence officials of the United States indicated that  
7           although the intelligence community accurately an-  
8           ticipated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the intel-  
9           ligence community did not accurately assess the will  
10          of Ukrainian forces to fight in opposition to a Rus-  
11          sian invasion or that the Ukrainian forces would  
12          succeed in averting a rapid Russian military occupa-  
13          tion of Kyiv.

14          (3) According to the RAND corporation, the in-  
15          telligence community estimated that the Afghan gov-  
16          ernment’s forces could hold out against the Taliban  
17          for as long as 2 years if all ground forces of the  
18          United States were withdrawn. This estimate was  
19          revised in June 2021 to reflect an intelligence com-  
20          munity view that Afghanistan’s military collapse  
21          could come in 6 to 12 months. In August 2021, the  
22          Afghan government fell within days after the ground  
23          forces of the United States were withdrawn.

24          (4) Similarly, the rapid advance of the Islamic  
25          State in Iraq and Syria and near-total collapse of

1 the Iraqi Security Forces in 2014 appeared to take  
2 the policymakers of the United States by surprise.

3 (5) The apparent gaps in these analyses had  
4 important implications for policy decisions of the  
5 United States toward Russia and Afghanistan, and  
6 suggest a need for further examination of how the  
7 intelligence community assesses a foreign military's  
8 will to fight.

9 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date  
10 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-  
11 telligence, acting through the National Intelligence Coun-  
12 cil, and in coordination with the heads of the elements of  
13 the intelligence community that the Director determines  
14 appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
15 committees a report examining the extent to which anal-  
16 yses of the military will to fight and the national will to  
17 fight informed the all-source analyses of the intelligence  
18 community regarding how the armed forces and Govern-  
19 ments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq would perform  
20 at key junctures.

21 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (b)  
22 shall include the following:

23 (1) The methodology of the intelligence commu-  
24 nity for measuring the military will to fight and the  
25 national will to fight of a foreign country.

1           (2) The extent to which analysts of the intel-  
2           ligence community applied such methodology when  
3           assessing the military will to fight and the national  
4           will to fight of—

5                 (A) Afghanistan following the April 2021  
6                 announcement of the full withdrawal of the  
7                 United States Armed Forces;

8                 (B) Iraq in the face of the rapid emergence  
9                 and advancement in 2014 of Islamic State in  
10                Iraq and Syria; and

11                (C) Ukraine and Russia during the initial  
12                phase of the invasion and march toward Kyiv  
13                by Russia in February 2022.

14           (3) The extent to which—

15                 (A) the assessments described in para-  
16                 graph (2) depended on the observations of per-  
17                 sonnel of the United States Armed Forces who  
18                 had trained Afghan, Iraqi, and Ukrainian  
19                 armed forces; and

20                 (B) such observations reflected any stand-  
21                 ardized, objective methodology.

22           (4) Whether shortcomings in assessing the mili-  
23           tary will to fight and the national will to fight may  
24           have affected the capacity of the intelligence commu-

1 nity to provide “early warning” about the collapse of  
2 government forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3 (5) The extent to which “red teaming” was  
4 used to test the assessments described in paragraph  
5 (2).

6 (6) The extent to which dissenting opinions of  
7 intelligence analysts were highlighted in final written  
8 products presented to senior policymakers of the  
9 United States.

10 (7) The extent to which analysts and super-  
11 visors adhered to the policies, procedures, directives,  
12 and best practices of the intelligence community.

13 (8) Recommendations for analyses by the intel-  
14 ligence community going forward to incorporate les-  
15 sons learned and enhance the quality of future ana-  
16 lytical products to more accurately reflect the mili-  
17 tary will to fight and the national will to fight and  
18 improve the capacity of the intelligence community  
19 to accurately predict the success or failure of the  
20 armed forces of a foreign country.

21 (d) ANNEX.—In submitting the report under sub-  
22 section (b) to the congressional intelligence committees,  
23 the Director shall also include an accompanying annex,  
24 which shall be classified, providing an inventory of the fol-  
25 lowing:

1           (1) Collection gaps and challenges that may  
2           have affected the analysis of the collapse of govern-  
3           ment forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

4           (2) Actions that the Director of National Intel-  
5           ligence has taken to mitigate such gaps and chal-  
6           lenges.

7           (e) FORM.—The report under subsection (b) may be  
8           submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall in-  
9           clude an unclassified summary of key findings, consistent  
10          with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

11          (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

12           (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
13           TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
14           mittees” means the following:

15                   (A) The congressional intelligence commit-  
16                   tees (as such term is defined in section 3 of the  
17                   National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.  
18                   3003)).

19                   (B) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and  
20                   the Committee on Armed Services of the House  
21                   of Representatives.

22                   (C) The Committee on Foreign Relations  
23                   and the Committee on Armed Services of the  
24                   Senate.

1           (2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term  
2           “intelligence community” has the meaning given  
3           that term in section 3 of the National Security Act  
4           of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

5           (3) MILITARY WILL TO FIGHT.—The term  
6           “military will to fight” means, with respect to the  
7           military of a country, the disposition and decision to  
8           fight, act, or persevere as needed.

9           (4) NATIONAL WILL TO FIGHT.—The term “na-  
10          tional will to fight” means, with respect to the gov-  
11          ernment of a country, the resolve to conduct sus-  
12          tained military and other operations for an objective  
13          even when the expectation of success decreases or  
14          the need for significant political, economic, and mili-  
15          tary sacrifices increases.

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