

117TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 8503

To require the development of a strategy to promote the use of secure telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 26, 2022

Ms. MANNING (for herself and Mrs. KIM of California) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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## A BILL

To require the development of a strategy to promote the use of secure telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Securing Global Tele-  
5       communications Act”.

6       **SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7       It is the sense of Congress as follows:

8               (1) The United States Government should pro-  
9       mote and take steps to ensure American leadership  
10      in strategic technology industries, including tele-

1       communications infrastructure and other informa-  
2       tion and communications technologies.

3           (2) The expansive presence of companies linked  
4       to the Chinese Communist Party, such as Huawei,  
5       in global mobile networks and the national security  
6       implications thereof, such as the ability of the Peo-  
7       ple's Republic of China to exfiltrate the information  
8       flowing through those networks and shut off coun-  
9       tries' internet access, demonstrates the importance  
10      of the United States remaining at the technological  
11      frontier and the dire consequences of falling behind.

12          (3) The significant cost of countering Huawei's  
13      market leadership in telecommunications infrastruc-  
14      ture around the world underscores the urgency of  
15      supporting the competitiveness of United States  
16      companies in next-generation information and com-  
17      munication technology.

18          (4) To remain a leader at the International  
19      Telecommunication Union (ITU) and preserve the  
20      ITU's technical integrity, the United States must  
21      work with emerging economies and developing na-  
22      tions to bolster global telecommunications security  
23      and protect American national security interests.

24          (5) Multilateral cooperation with like-minded  
25      partners and allies is critical to carry out the signifi-

1       cant effort of financing and promoting secure net-  
2       works around the world and to achieve market lead-  
3       ership of trusted vendors in this sector.

4   **SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNI-**  
5                   **CATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.**

6       (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days  
7   after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary  
8   of State shall develop and submit to the Committee on  
9   Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the  
10  Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a strategy,  
11  to be known as the “Strategy to Secure Global Tele-  
12  communications Infrastructure” (referred to in this Act  
13  as the “Strategy”), to promote the use of secure tele-  
14  communication infrastructure worldwide.

15       (b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The Secretary of  
16  State shall consult with the President of the Export-Im-  
17  port Bank of the United States, the Chief Executive Offi-  
18  cer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Adminis-  
19  trator of the United States Agency for International De-  
20  velopment, the Director of the Trade and Development  
21  Agency, the Chair of the Federal Communications Com-  
22  mission, and the Secretary of Commerce, in developing the  
23  Strategy, which shall consist of an approach led by the  
24  Department of State using the policy tools, and informed

1 by the technical expertise, of the other Federal entities so  
2 consulted to achieve the goal described in subsection (a).

3 (c) ELEMENTS.—The Strategy shall also include sec-  
4 tions on each of the following:

5 (1) Mobile networks, including a description of  
6 efforts to—

7 (A) promote trusted Open RAN tech-  
8 nologies while protecting against any security  
9 risks posed by untrusted vendors in Open RAN  
10 networks;

11 (B) use financing mechanisms to assist  
12 “rip-and-replace” projects and to incentivize  
13 countries to choose trusted equipment vendors;

14 (C) bolster multilateral cooperation, espe-  
15 cially with developing countries and emerging  
16 economies, to promote the deployment of trust-  
17 ed wireless networks worldwide;

18 (D) collaborate with trusted private sector  
19 companies to counter Chinese market leadership  
20 in the telecom equipment industry; and

21 (E) review the feasibility of using low-  
22 Earth orbit satellites as a way to provide inter-  
23 net access.

24 (2) Data centers, including a description of ef-  
25 forts to—

1 (A) collaborate with trusted private sector  
2 companies to counter the growing market share  
3 of untrusted Chinese companies and to main-  
4 tain and promote United States market leader-  
5 ship in the cloud computing and data center  
6 businesses;

7 (B) utilize financing mechanisms to  
8 incentivize countries to choose trusted data cen-  
9 ter providers; and

10 (C) bolster multilateral cooperation, espe-  
11 cially with developing countries and emerging  
12 economies, to promote the deployment of trust-  
13 ed data centers worldwide.

14 (3) Sixth (and future) generation technologies  
15 (6G), including a description of efforts to—

16 (A) promote United States leadership in  
17 6G standards-setting processes;

18 (B) deepen cooperation with like-minded  
19 countries to promote United States and allied  
20 market leadership in 6G networks and tech-  
21 nologies; and

22 (C) increase buy-in from developing coun-  
23 tries and emerging countries on United States  
24 and allied 6G standards and trusted tech-  
25 nologies.

1           (4) Low-Earth orbit satellites, aerostats, and  
2           stratospheric balloons, including a description of ef-  
3           forts to—

4                   (A) develop the capabilities to rapidly de-  
5           liver wireless internet anywhere on the planet;  
6           and

7                   (B) work with trusted private sector com-  
8           panies to retain the ability to quickly provide  
9           internet connection in response to emergency  
10          situations.

11 **SEC. 4. INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL ECONOMIC AND TELE-**  
12 **COMMUNICATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE.**

13          (a) IN GENERAL.—There is established in the De-  
14          partment of State an International Digital Economic and  
15          Telecommunication Advisory Committee (“IDET”).

16          (b) PURPOSE.—The IDET shall seek to advise the  
17          Secretary of State on the formulation of United States  
18          strategies, policies, positions, and proposals on policy mat-  
19          ters relevant to digital economy, digital connectivity, eco-  
20          nomic aspects of emerging digital technologies, tele-  
21          communications, and communications and information  
22          policy. Such advice shall include matters related to United  
23          States participation in the International Telecommuni-  
24          cation Union (ITU), the Inter-American Telecommuni-  
25          cation Commission of the Organization of American

1 States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and  
2 Development, the Telecommunications and Information  
3 Working Group of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation  
4 Forum, the Group of Seven, the Digital Economy Task  
5 Force of the Group of Twenty, and other relevant tele-  
6 communications standards-setting bodies.

7 (c) CHAIR AND MEMBERSHIP.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall  
9 designate an employee of the Department of State to  
10 serve as the Chair of the IDET.

11 (2) MEMBERS.—The Chair shall appoint not  
12 fewer than 20 members to the IDET who meet the  
13 qualifications listed in paragraph (3).

14 (3) QUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERS.—Members  
15 of the IDET shall be appointed from among individ-  
16 uals who are citizens or legal permanent residents of  
17 the United States. To ensure diversity of advice, the  
18 IDET may not include more than one representative  
19 of any one particular United States organization  
20 during any period in which the IDET consists of 20  
21 members or fewer. Together, the members should  
22 represent a balance of interests and diverse view-  
23 points and have substantial expertise addressing  
24 these policy issues, participating in United States  
25 preparatory activities for conferences and meetings

1 of international organizations, and serving on United  
2 States delegations.

3 (4) ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED.—Members  
4 of the IDET shall include representatives of the fol-  
5 lowing—

6 (A) interested government agencies, whose  
7 representatives shall serve as ex officio mem-  
8 bers;

9 (B) United States organizations, including  
10 associations and scientific or industrial organi-  
11 zations that are engaged in the study of tele-  
12 communications or in the design or manufac-  
13 ture of equipment intended for telecommuni-  
14 cations services;

15 (C) civil society;

16 (D) academia; and

17 (E) organizations, institutions, or entities  
18 with specific interest in digital economy, digital  
19 connectivity, economic aspects of digital tech-  
20 nologies, and communications and information  
21 policy matters.

22 (5) REMOVAL.—The Chair may remove any  
23 member for any reason.

24 (e) SUBCOMMITTEES.—

25 (1) PRIVATE SECTOR SUBCOMMITTEE.—



1           (A) PURPOSE.—The Chair shall establish a  
2           permanent private sector subcommittee to pro-  
3           vide the perspective and expertise of private in-  
4           dustry so that an understanding of market  
5           forces, technical realities, bidding environments,  
6           and industry equities informs the recommenda-  
7           tions of the IDET.

8           (B) LEADERSHIP.—The Chair shall ap-  
9           point a chair of the permanent subcommittee  
10          from among the members of the IDET.

11          (C) MEMBERSHIP.—The subcommittee’s  
12          membership should represent the range of pri-  
13          vate sector entities in critical telecommuni-  
14          cations infrastructure and technology.

15          (2) AUTHORIZATION.—The Chair may establish  
16          such other subcommittees as the Chair may deter-  
17          mine appropriate to provide advice to the IDET on  
18          strategic planning and other communications and in-  
19          formation policy issues. Such subcommittees shall  
20          provide advice only to the IDET and shall not pro-  
21          vide advice directly to the Secretary of State.

22          (3) MEMBERSHIP.—Membership of subcommit-  
23          tees shall not be limited to a prescribed number and  
24          may include more than one member from one agency  
25          or organization designated for the subcommittee.

1 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is  
2 authorized to be appropriated \$250,000 to carry out this  
3 section.

4 **SEC. 5. REPORT ON MALIGN INFLUENCE AT THE INTER-**  
5 **NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION.**

6 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date  
7 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall  
8 develop and submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs  
9 of the House of Representatives and the Committee on  
10 Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on Russian and  
11 Chinese strategies and efforts—

12 (1) to expand the mandate of the International  
13 Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cover internet  
14 governance policy; and

15 (2) to advance other actions favorable to au-  
16 thoritarian interests and/or hostile to fair, industry-  
17 led processes.

18 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection  
19 (a) shall also identify efforts by China and Russia—

20 (1) to increase the ITU's jurisdiction over inter-  
21 net governance and to propose internet governance  
22 standards at the ITU;

23 (2) to leverage their private sectors to advance  
24 their national interests through the ITU, includ-  
25 ing—

1 (A) encouraging Chinese and Russian com-  
2 panies to leverage their market power to pres-  
3 sure other member countries to deliver favor-  
4 able decisions on ITU elections; and

5 (B) China's efforts to leverage Huawei's  
6 role as the primary telecommunications equip-  
7 ment and services provider for many developing  
8 countries to compel such countries to deliver fa-  
9 vorable decisions on standards proposals, elec-  
10 tion victories, candidate selection, and other le-  
11 vers of power at the ITU; and

12 (3) to use the influence of Chinese and Russian  
13 nationals serving in the ITU to advantage the com-  
14 panies, standards decisions, and candidates that ad-  
15 vance the CCP and Kremlin's interests.

16 (c) FORM.—The report required by this section shall  
17 be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a clas-  
18 sified annex.

19 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON MULTILATERAL COORDINATION.**

20 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-  
21 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination  
22 with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the  
23 United States, the Administrator for the United States  
24 Agency on International Development, and the Chief Ex-  
25 ecutive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation,

1 shall develop and submit to the Committee on Foreign Af-  
2 fairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee  
3 on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report that identifies  
4 opportunities for greater collaboration with allies and  
5 partners to promote secure information and communica-  
6 tions technology infrastructure, including through—

7           (1) joint financing efforts to help trusted ven-  
8 dors win bids to build out information and commu-  
9 nications technology (ICT) infrastructure;

10           (2) incorporating ICT focuses into allies' and  
11 partners' international development finance initia-  
12 tives;

13           (3) establishing working groups focused on pro-  
14 moting trusted ICT in international standard-setting  
15 bodies; and

16           (4) diplomatic coordination to emphasize the  
17 importance of secure telecommunications infrastruc-  
18 ture to countries using untrusted providers.

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