## 117TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION

## H. R. 6452

To require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National Intelligence Estimate on escalation and de-escalation of gray zone activities in great power competition, and for other purposes.

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 20, 2022

Mr. Krishnamoorthi introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

## A BILL

To require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National Intelligence Estimate on escalation and deescalation of gray zone activities in great power competition, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Gathering and Report-
- 5 ing Assessments Yielding Zero Overlooked Nefarious Ef-
- 6 forts Act".

| 1  | SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ESCA-        |
|----|--|
| 2  | LATION AND DE-ESCALATION OF GRAY ZONE                  |
| 3  | ACTIVITIES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION.                 |
| 4  | (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:            |
| 5  | (1) The conventional power of the United               |
| 6  | States has driven foreign adversaries to a level of    |
| 7  | competition that does not always depend on military    |
| 8  | confrontation with the United States.                  |
| 9  | (2) Rather than challenging the United States          |
| 0  | in a manner that could provoke a kinetic military re-  |
| 1  | sponse, foreign adversaries of the United States have  |
| 2  | turned to carrying out gray zone activities to ad-     |
| 3  | vance the interests of such adversaries, weaken the    |
| 4  | power of the United States, and erode the norms        |
| 5  | that underpin the United States-led international      |
| 6  | order.   |
| 7  | (3) Gray zone activity falls on a spectrum of at-      |
| 8  | tribution and deniability that ranges from covert ad-  |
| 9  | versary operations, to detectible covert adversary op- |
| 20 | erations, to unattributable adversary operations, to   |
| 21 | deniable adversary operations, to open adversary op-   |
| 22 | erations.  |
| 23 | (4) To adequately address such a shift to gray         |
| 24 | zone activity, the United States must understand       |
| 5  | what actions tand to aither ascalate or de-ascalate    |

such activity by our adversaries.

- (5) The laws, principles, and values of the United States are strategic advantages in great power competition with authoritarian foreign adversaries that carry out gray zone activities, because such laws, principles, and values increase the appeal of the governance model of the United States, and the United States-led international order, to states and peoples around the world.
  - (6) The international security environment has demonstrated numerous examples of gray zone activities carried out by foreign adversaries, including the following activities of foreign adversaries:
    - (A) Information operations, such as efforts by Russia to influence the 2020 United States Federal elections (as described in the March 15, 2021, intelligence community assessment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence made publicly available on March 15, 2021).
    - (B) Adversary political coercion operations, such as the wielding of energy by Russia, particularly in the context of Ukrainian gas pipelines, to coerce its neighbors into compliance with its policies.

| 1  | (C) Cyber operations, such as the use by               |
|----|--|
| 2  | China of cyber tools to conduct industrial espio-      |
| 3  | nage.  |
| 4  | (D) Provision of support to proxy forces,              |
| 5  | such as the support provided by Iran to                |
| 6  | Hezbollah and Shia militia groups.                     |
| 7  | (E) Provocation by armed forces controlled             |
| 8  | by the government of the foreign adversary             |
| 9  | through measures that do not rise to the level         |
| 10 | of an armed attack, such as the use of the             |
| 11 | China Coast Guard and maritime militia by              |
| 12 | China to harass the fishing vessels of other           |
| 13 | countries in the South China Sea.                      |
| 14 | (F) Alleged uses of lethal force on foreign            |
| 15 | soil, such as the 2018 attempts by Russia to           |
| 16 | poison Sergei Skripal in London.                       |
| 17 | (G) The potential use by an adversary of               |
| 18 | technology that causes anomalous health inci-          |
| 19 | dents among United States Government per-              |
| 20 | sonnel.  |
| 21 | (b) National Intelligence Estimate.—                   |
| 22 | (1) Requirement.—The Director of National              |
| 23 | Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence |
| 24 | Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Esti-   |

mate on how foreign adversaries use gray zone ac-

- tivities to advance interests, what responses by the
  United States (or the allies or partners of the
  United States) would tend to result in the escalation
  or de-escalation of such gray zone activities by foreign adversaries, and any opportunities for the
  United States to minimize the extent to which foreign adversaries use gray zone activities in furtherance of great power competition.
  - (2) Matters included.—To the extent determined appropriate by the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1) may include an assessment of the following topics:
    - (A) Any potential or actual lethal or harmful gray zone activities carried out against the United States by foreign adversaries, including against United States Government employees and United States persons, whether located within or outside of the United States.
    - (B) To the extent such activities have occurred, or are predicted to occur—
      - (i) opportunities to reduce or deter any such activities; and
- 24 (ii) any actions of the United States 25 Government that would tend to result in

| 1  | the escalation or de-escalation of such ac-        |
|----|--|
| 2  | tivities.  |
| 3  | (C) Any incidents in which foreign adver-          |
| 4  | saries could have used, but ultimately did not     |
| 5  | use, gray zone activities to advance the inter-    |
| 6  | ests of such adversaries, including an assess-     |
| 7  | ment as to why the foreign adversary ultimately    |
| 8  | did not use gray zone activities.                  |
| 9  | (D) The effect of lowering the United              |
| 10 | States Government threshold for the public at      |
| 11 | tribution of detectible covert adversary oper-     |
| 12 | ations, unattributable adversary operations, and   |
| 13 | deniable adversary operations.                     |
| 14 | (E) The effect of lowering the United              |
| 15 | States Government threshold for responding to      |
| 16 | detectible covert adversary operations             |
| 17 | unattributable adversary operations, and deni-     |
| 18 | able adversary operations.                         |
| 19 | (F) The extent to which the governments            |
| 20 | of foreign adversaries exercise control over any   |
| 21 | proxies or parastate actors used by such gov-      |
| 22 | ernments in carrying out gray zone activities.     |
| 23 | (G) The extent to which gray zone activi-          |
| 24 | ties carried out by foreign adversaries affect the |

private sector of the United States.

| 1  | (H) The international norms that provide           |
|----|--|
| 2  | the greatest deterrence to gray zone activities    |
| 3  | carried out by foreign adversaries, and opportu-   |
| 4  | nities for strengthening those norms.              |
| 5  | (I) The effect, if any, of the strengthening       |
| 6  | of democratic governance abroad on the resil-      |
| 7  | ience of United States allies and partners to      |
| 8  | gray zone activities.                              |
| 9  | (J) Opportunities to strengthen the resil-         |
| 10 | ience of United States allies and partners to      |
| 11 | gray zone activities, and associated tactics, car- |
| 12 | ried out by foreign adversaries.                   |
| 13 | (K) Opportunities for the United States to         |
| 14 | improve the detection of, and early warning for,   |
| 15 | such activities and tactics.                       |
| 16 | (L) Opportunities for the United States to         |
| 17 | galvanize international support in responding to   |
| 18 | such activities and tactics.                       |
| 19 | (3) Submission to congress.—                       |
| 20 | (A) Submission.—Not later than 1 year              |
| 21 | after the date of the enactment of this Act, the   |
| 22 | Director shall submit to the Select Committee      |
| 23 | on Intelligence of the Senate and the Perma-       |
| 24 | nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the       |

House of Representatives the National Intel-

ligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1),
 including all intelligence reporting underlying
 the Estimate.

- (B) Notice Regarding Submission.—If at any time before the deadline specified in subparagraph (A), the Director determines that the National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by such deadline, the Director shall (before such deadline) submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report setting forth the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such deadline and an estimated date for the submission of the National Intelligence Estimate.
- (C) FORM.—Any report under subparagraph (B) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
- (4) Public Version.—Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the

| 1  | House of Representatives the National Intelligence    |
|----|---|
| 2  | Estimate under paragraph (1), the Director shall      |
| 3  | make publicly available on the internet website of    |
| 4  | the Director an unclassified version of the key find- |
| 5  | ings of the National Intelligence Estimate.           |
| 6  | (5) Definitions.—In this subsection:                  |
| 7  | (A) Gray zone activity.—The term                      |
| 8  | "gray zone activity" means an activity to ad-         |
| 9  | vance the national interests of a State that—         |
| 10 | (i) falls between ordinary statecraft                 |
| 11 | and open warfare;                                     |
| 12 | (ii) is carried out with an intent to                 |
| 13 | maximize the advancement of interests of              |
| 14 | the state without provoking a kinetic mili-           |
| 15 | tary response by the United States; and               |
| 16 | (iii) falls on a spectrum that ranges                 |
| 17 | from covert adversary operations, to                  |
| 18 | detectible covert adversary operations, to            |
| 19 | unattributable adversary operations, to de-           |
| 20 | niable adversary operations, to open adver-           |
| 21 | sary operations.                                      |
| 22 | (B) COVERT ADVERSARY OPERATION.—                      |
| 23 | The term "covert adversary operation" means           |
| 24 | an operation by an adversary that—                    |

| 1  | (i) the adversary intends to remain              |
|----|--|
| 2  | below the threshold at which the United          |
| 3  | States detects the operation; and                |
| 4  | (ii) does stay below such threshold.             |
| 5  | (C) Detectible covert adversary op-              |
| 6  | ERATION.—The term "detectible covert adver-      |
| 7  | sary operation" means an operation by an ad-     |
| 8  | versary that—                                    |
| 9  | (i) the adversary intends to remain              |
| 10 | below the threshold at which the United          |
| 11 | States detects the operation; but                |
| 12 | (ii) is ultimately detected by the               |
| 13 | United States at a level below the level at      |
| 14 | which the United States will publicly at-        |
| 15 | tribute the operation to the adversary.          |
| 16 | (D) Unattributable adversary oper-               |
| 17 | ATION.—The term "unattributable adversary        |
| 18 | operation" means an operation by an adversary    |
| 19 | that the adversary intends to be detected by the |
| 20 | United States, but remain below the threshold    |
| 21 | at which the United States will publicly at-     |
| 22 | tribute the operation to the adversary.          |
| 23 | (E) Deniable adversary operation.—               |
| 24 | The term "deniable adversary operation" means    |
| 25 | an operation by an adversary that—               |

| 1  | (i) the adversary intends to be de-                    |
|----|--|
| 2  | tected and publicly or privately attributed            |
| 3  | by the United States; and                              |
| 4  | (ii) the adversary intends to deny, to                 |
| 5  | limit the response by the United States,               |
| 6  | and any allies of the United States.                   |
| 7  | (F) OPEN ADVERSARY OPERATION.—The                      |
| 8  | term "open adversary operation" means an op-           |
| 9  | eration by an adversary that the adversary             |
| 10 | openly acknowledges as attributable to the ad-         |
| 11 | versary.   |
| 12 | (c) Requirement To Develop Lexicon.—                   |
| 13 | (1) Requirement.—The Director of National              |
| 14 | Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence |
| 15 | Council, shall develop a lexicon of common terms       |
| 16 | (and corresponding definitions for such terms) for     |
| 17 | concepts associated with gray zone activities.         |
| 18 | (2) Considerations.—In developing the lexi-            |
| 19 | con under paragraph (1), the National Intelligence     |
| 20 | Council shall include in the lexicon each term (and    |
| 21 | the corresponding definition for each term) specified  |
| 22 | in subsection (b)(5), unless the National Intelligence |
| 23 | Council determines that an alternative term (or al-    |
| 24 | ternative definition)—                                 |

| 1  | (A) more accurately describes a concept as-     |
|----|---|
| 2  | sociated with gray zone activities; or          |
| 3  | (B) is preferable for any other reason.         |
| 4  | (3) Report.—                                    |
| 5  | (A) Publication.—The Director of Na-            |
| 6  | tional Intelligence shall publish a report con- |
| 7  | taining the lexicon developed under paragraph   |
| 8  | (1).  |
| 9  | (B) FORM.—The report under subpara-             |
| 10 | graph (A) shall be published in unclassified    |
| 11 | form.   |

 $\bigcirc$