

117TH CONGRESS
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H. RES. 1480

Promoting stronger economic relations between the United States and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 16, 2022

Mr. SIRES submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

RESOLUTION

Promoting stronger economic relations between the United States and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Whereas, to maintain the role of the United States as a global economic leader and protect the national security interests of the United States, the United States must strengthen economic relations with countries in the Western Hemisphere;

Whereas ongoing supply chain disruptions resulting from the COVID–19 pandemic demonstrate the need for the United States to increase supply chain resiliency through reshoring and nearshoring initiatives;

Whereas, in 2019, the People’s Republic of China was the top supplier of goods imported into the United States, pro-

viding significant quantities of rare earth minerals, pharmaceutical ingredients, medical equipment, and other goods vital to the economic prosperity and national security of the United States;

Whereas the COVID–19 pandemic and production outages and shipping disruptions in the People’s Republic of China have jeopardized worldwide access to critical goods, contributing to an unprecedented, ongoing supply chain crisis that has exposed the severe risks of concentrating global supply chains in the People’s Republic of China;

Whereas Congress has raised concerns about the reliance of the United States on global supply chains based in the People’s Republic of China;

Whereas the People’s Republic of China has shown its willingness to use critical supplies as a political tool to advance the goals of the Chinese Communist Party, including when the People’s Republic of China—

- (1) threatened to withhold rare earth mineral shipments to Japan; and
- (2) utilized personal protective equipment and vaccines as a diplomatic tool;

Whereas findings made pursuant to a supply chain review required by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., under Executive Order 14017 (86 Fed. Reg. 11849) and released on June 8, 2021, recommended that, in addition to expanding domestic production capacity, the United States Government use diplomatic and financial tools to cooperate with allies to create more diverse, resilient, and secure supply chains;

Whereas 8 of the 13 countries in the world that recognize Taiwan are in Latin America and the Caribbean, and

nearshoring initiatives can help decrease the susceptibility of such countries to coercive economic pressure from the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the United States has free trade agreements in effect with 12 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, more than in any other geographic region, providing significant incentives to relocate international supply chains that cannot be relocated to the United States to Latin America and the Caribbean;

Whereas, in addition to existing free trade agreements and the geographic proximity of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States, there are several significant advantages for the United States Government and United States entities to relocate supply chains from the People's Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere, including—

(1) reduced distance to markets in the United States, which will lower freight costs, enable quicker adaptability to fluctuating consumer demand, and reduce the energy used to transport goods;

(2) longstanding bilateral ties and shared democratic values, which lessen the risk of geopolitical disruptions to supply chains;

(3) comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing key critical goods, including rare earth minerals, pharmaceuticals, medical goods, and semiconductors, when there is a historical inability for such goods to be entirely sourced or manufactured in the United States; and

(4) access to a highly qualified and young working-age population;

Whereas the report entitled “Widening the Aperture: Nearshoring in Our ‘Near Abroad’ ” released by the Wilson Center in April 2021 provided evidence that increasing and strengthening supply chains regionally, particularly in Colombia, Mexico, and other countries in the Caribbean and Central America, will, on average, create more jobs in the United States than international supply chains located in other geographic regions;

Whereas switching as few as 15 percent of imports into the United States from the top 10 source countries of such imports outside of the Western Hemisphere to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean would increase exports from Latin America and the Caribbean by \$72,000,000,000 annually, helping the region recover from the effects of the COVID–19 pandemic and reducing pressures encouraging migration to the United States;

Whereas, despite existing and growing opportunities for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to become crucial actors in global supply chains, including technological advances that have diminished the need to produce in countries with a low cost of labor, challenges to nearshoring remain, including—

- (1) concerns about the rule of law, corruption, and criminal activities that discourage foreign direct investment or significantly raise the costs of shifting production to the region;

- (2) concerns about compliance with and enforcement of international labor and environmental standards;

- (3) underdeveloped physical and digital infrastructure; and

- (4) regional economic fragmentation;

Whereas the governments of several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, have sought to strengthen economic relations with the United States and launched initiatives to incentivize nearshoring;

Whereas the Inter-American Development Bank (commonly known as “IDB”) has prioritized efforts to encourage nearshoring in Latin America and the Caribbean, including by—

- (1) making economic integration and the strengthening of regional supply chains 1 of 5 core pillars in the agenda outlined in the document entitled “Vision 2025, Reinvest in the Americas”;

- (2) including nearshoring as a business line of IDB Invest for the first time in the history of IDB;

- (3) hosting a high-level dialogue with more than 500 private sector leaders on December 2, 2020, to assess how to increase production capacity and supply chain resilience in the region; and

- (4) launching the largest private sector coalition in the history of the IDB to explore opportunities for reinvesting in countries in the Western Hemisphere, including through nearshoring initiatives and a toolkit to incentivize and finance nearshoring activities in the Western Hemisphere; and

Whereas the United States Government can leverage diplomatic, foreign assistance, and financing tools to strengthen the participation of Latin American and the Caribbean in global supply chains and address challenges to nearshoring, including through the activities of the United States Agency for International Development and

the United States International Development Finance Corporation: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) recognizes that increased tensions between
3 the United States and the People’s Republic of
4 China and the COVID–19 pandemic have—

5 (A) exposed severe vulnerabilities attrib-
6 utable to overreliance by the United States and
7 other countries on supply chains based solely or
8 mainly in the People’s Republic of China; and

9 (B) heightened the importance of the
10 United States diversifying its supply chains
11 through reshoring and nearshoring initiatives to
12 increase resiliency against future disruptions;

13 (2) emphasizes that reshoring efforts of suffi-
14 cient scale to increase domestic production capacity
15 and relocate supply chains to the United States re-
16 main critical and should be encouraged and imple-
17 mented;

18 (3) emphasizes that—

19 (A) nearshoring efforts should be pursued
20 in a complementary fashion to better achieve
21 more resilient, diverse, and secure supply
22 chains, particularly for goods unlikely to be
23 manufactured in the United States;

1 (B) nearshoring in Latin America and the
2 Caribbean, relative to relying on supply chains
3 in other geographic regions, has the greatest
4 potential to contribute to the economic pros-
5 perity and security of the United States while
6 also advancing the post-pandemic economic re-
7 covery of countries in the Western Hemisphere;

8 (C) nearshoring in Latin America and the
9 Caribbean provides greater opportunities for ex-
10 panding co-production operations and other co-
11 operative business ventures with United States
12 entities; and

13 (D) nearshoring in Latin America and the
14 Caribbean can complement and enhance efforts
15 by the United States to support democratic con-
16 solidation across the region by strengthening
17 the rule of law, encouraging competitiveness,
18 and raising standards on corruption, labor, and
19 environmental issues;

20 (4) supports initiatives by the Inter-American
21 Development Bank, governments in Latin America
22 and the Caribbean, and the private sector to finance,
23 incentivize, or otherwise promote nearshoring in
24 Latin America and the Caribbean;

1 (5) encourages the United States Agency for
2 International Development and the United States
3 International Development Finance Corporation to
4 strengthen programmatic support for initiatives like-
5 ly to facilitate the relocation of global supply chains
6 to the Western Hemisphere, including through in-
7 creased collaboration with each other, the private
8 sector, the Inter-American Development Bank, and
9 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean;

10 (6) calls for governments in Latin America and
11 the Caribbean to increase opportunities for
12 nearshoring in the region by—

13 (A) modernizing and consolidating physical
14 and digital infrastructure;

15 (B) combating corruption, strengthening
16 the rule of law, enhancing labor and environ-
17 mental standards, and improving democratic
18 governance; and

19 (C) pursuing other efforts to facilitate the
20 ease of doing business in and attract foreign di-
21 rect investment to the region, including by
22 leveraging strong relationships with Taiwan;
23 and

24 (7) urges the Secretary of State, in coordina-
25 tion with the United States Agency for International

1 Development, the United States International Devel-
2 opment Finance Corporation, and the heads of all
3 other relevant Federal agencies and departments, to
4 take a leading role in advancing nearshoring in
5 Latin America and the Caribbean, including by—

6 (A) strengthening support for the activities
7 described in paragraph (6);

8 (B) engaging with governments in the
9 Western Hemisphere to explore opportunities to
10 lower trade barriers, streamline customs and
11 other regulations, support capacity building
12 programs to strengthen environmental and
13 labor standards, establish incentives for mutu-
14 ally beneficial co-production arrangements, and
15 facilitate economic integration of the region;

16 (C) strengthening legal regimes and moni-
17 toring and enforcement measures relating to
18 labor standards to ensure that—

19 (i) any enhanced sourcing relationship
20 with a country does not support or beget
21 labor abuse or other human rights abuses,
22 such as those found in the People’s Repub-
23 lic of China; and

24 (ii) any new investment under a
25 nearshoring program has sufficient labor

1 standards and benefits the workers in such
2 country;

3 (D) ensuring that nearshoring activities
4 are consistent with efforts to improve supply
5 chain energy efficiency, reduce the energy used
6 to transport goods, and advance environmental
7 sustainability; and

8 (E) working in partnership with multilat-
9 eral development banks and private investors to
10 create incentives for entities to relocate supply
11 chains from the People's Republic of China to
12 the Western Hemisphere, including by financing
13 the development of regional technology hubs
14 with strong labor and environmental regula-
15 tions.

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