

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2479

To direct the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a report identifying efforts by the People's Republic of China to expand its presence and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and describing the implications of such efforts on United States interests, to require a briefing for Congress on the United States strategy to respond to these efforts, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 13, 2021

Mrs. MURPHY of Florida introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a report identifying efforts by the People's Republic of China to expand its presence and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and describing the implications of such efforts on United States interests, to require a briefing for Congress on the United States strategy to respond to these efforts, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Assessing China’s
3 Presence and Influence in Latin America and the Carib-
4 bean Act of 2021”.

5 **SEC. 2. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC**
6 **OF CHINA TO EXPAND ITS PRESENCE AND IN-**
7 **FLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CAR-**
8 **IBBEAN.**

9 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
10 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
11 coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,
12 the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council,
13 and the head of any other Federal department or agency
14 the Secretary of State determines appropriate, shall sub-
15 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
16 that identifies efforts by the People’s Republic of China
17 to expand its presence and influence in Latin America and
18 the Caribbean through diplomatic, military, economic and
19 other means, and describes the implications of such efforts
20 on United States interests.

21 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
22 section (a) shall include the following:

23 (1) An identification of—

24 (A) countries of Latin America and the
25 Caribbean with which China maintains the clos-

1 est diplomatic, military, and economic relation-
2 ships;

3 (B) the number and content of comprehen-
4 sive strategic partnership agreements, strategic
5 partnership agreements, or similar agreements,
6 including any non-public agreements, that
7 China has established with countries in Latin
8 America and the Caribbean, including Argen-
9 tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecu-
10 dor, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela;

11 (C) countries of Latin America and the
12 Caribbean that have joined China's Belt and
13 Road Initiative or the Asian Infrastructure In-
14 vestment Bank;

15 (D) countries of Latin America and the
16 Caribbean to which China provides foreign as-
17 sistance or disaster relief, including access to
18 COVID-19 vaccines, including a description of
19 the amount and purpose of, and any conditions
20 attached to, that assistance;

21 (E) countries of Latin America and the
22 Caribbean in which China, including its state-
23 owned enterprises and banks, have undertaken
24 significant investments, infrastructure projects,

1 and lending activities at the national and sub-
2 national level;

3 (F) countries of Latin America and the
4 Caribbean with which China has negotiated, or
5 is in the process of negotiating, trade agree-
6 ments;

7 (G) the steps China has taken to benefit
8 from the presence of natural resources in Latin
9 America and the Caribbean, including oil, nat-
10 ural gas, rare earth metals, fisheries, and agri-
11 culture products;

12 (H) the estimated number of students
13 from countries in Latin America and the Carib-
14 bean who are earning degrees in China, includ-
15 ing through scholarships provided by the Chi-
16 nese Government or Chinese entities, and their
17 courses of study;

18 (I) recent visits by senior Chinese leaders
19 to countries of Latin America and the Carib-
20 bean, and visits by senior leaders from Latin
21 America and the Caribbean to China; and

22 (J) countries of Latin America and the
23 Caribbean that maintain diplomatic relations
24 with Taiwan and any steps that China has

1 taken to encourage those countries to switch re-
2 lations to China.

3 (2) A detailed description of—

4 (A) the relationship between the Chinese
5 Government and the Government of Venezuela
6 and the Government of Cuba;

7 (B) Chinese military installations, assets,
8 and activities in Latin America and the Carib-
9 bean that currently exist or are planned for the
10 future;

11 (C) Chinese sales or transfers of defense
12 articles and services to countries of Latin
13 America and the Caribbean;

14 (D) any other form of military, para-
15 military, or internal security cooperation be-
16 tween the Chinese Government and the govern-
17 ments of countries of Latin America and the
18 Caribbean;

19 (E) the nature, extent, and purpose of Chi-
20 nese intelligence activities in Latin America and
21 the Caribbean, including in the space domain;

22 (F) China's role in transnational crime, in-
23 cluding drug trafficking and money laundering,
24 in Latin America and the Caribbean;

1 (G) Chinese efforts to build its media pres-
2 ence in Latin America and the Caribbean and
3 any government-directed disinformation or in-
4 formation warfare campaigns in the region, in-
5 cluding any campaigns conducted by China's
6 United Front Work Department; and

7 (H) efforts by the Chinese Government to
8 cultivate ties with political parties in Latin
9 America and the Caribbean as a means to build
10 influence, including any such efforts by the
11 International Liaison Department of the Cen-
12 tral Committee of the Chinese Communist
13 Party.

14 (3) An assessment of—

15 (A) the specific objectives that China seeks
16 to achieve by expanding its presence and influ-
17 ence in Latin America and the Caribbean, in-
18 cluding any objectives articulated in official
19 Chinese government documents;

20 (B) whether certain Chinese investments in
21 the region, including in port projects, Panama
22 Canal projects, and telecommunications
23 projects, could have military uses or dual uses
24 or could enable China to monitor or intercept
25 United States communications;

1 (C) the degree to which Chinese economic
2 engagement in Latin America and the Carib-
3 bean has contributed to China's economic lever-
4 age over countries in the region;

5 (D) the degree to which China uses its
6 presence and influence in Latin America and
7 the Caribbean to encourage, pressure, or coerce
8 governments in the region to support China's
9 foreign policy goals, including policy positions
10 taken by China at international institutions
11 such as the United Nations, the World Trade
12 Organization, and the World Health Organiza-
13 tion;

14 (E) documented instances of governments
15 of countries of Latin America and the Carib-
16 bean silencing, or attempting to silence, local
17 critics of China, including journalists, aca-
18 demics, and civil society representatives, in
19 order to placate China;

20 (F) environmental degradation resulting
21 from China's activities in Latin America and
22 the Caribbean, including deforestation, air and
23 water pollution, and illegal, unreported, or un-
24 regulated fishing;

1 (G) the rationale for China becoming an
2 observer at the Organization of American
3 States and a non-borrowing member of the
4 Inter-American Development Bank and the
5 Caribbean Development Bank;

6 (H) China's relationship with the Commu-
7 nity of Latin American and Caribbean States
8 (CELAC), a regional organization that excludes
9 the United States, and the role of the China-
10 CELAC Forum in coordinating this relation-
11 ship;

12 (I) public opinion about China, and about
13 China's presence in Latin America and the Car-
14ibbean, within different countries in the region;
15 and

16 (J) the specific actions and activities un-
17 dertaken by China in Latin America and the
18 Caribbean that present the greatest threat or
19 challenge to the United States interests in the
20 region.

21 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
22 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include
23 a classified annex.

24 (d) BRIEFING ON UNITED STATES STRATEGY.—Not
25 later than 30 days after submission of the report required

1 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State or the Sec-
2 retary's designee shall provide a briefing to the appro-
3 priate congressional committees on the United States
4 strategy to respond to the efforts by the People's Republic
5 of China to expand its presence and influence in Latin
6 America and the Caribbean, including a description of the
7 public policies, legal authorities, and financial resources
8 required for the United States to appropriately and effec-
9 tively counter these efforts.

10 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act:

11 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
12 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
13 mittees” means—

14 (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the
15 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
16 on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select
17 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
18 resentatives; and

19 (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the
20 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
21 on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee
22 on Intelligence of the Senate.

23 (2) LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—
24 The terms “Latin America and the Caribbean” and
25 “countries of Latin America and the Caribbean”

- 1 mean the countries and non-United States territories
- 2 of South America, Central America, the Caribbean,
- 3 and Mexico.

