H. R. 5263

To designate an Anomalous Health Incidents Interagency Coordinator to coordinate the interagency investigation of, and response to, suspected attacks presenting as anomalous health incidents, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

September 14, 2021

Ms. Spanberger (for herself, Mr. Meeks, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Waltz, Mr. Katko, Mr. Kim of New Jersey, Ms. Slotkin, and Mr. Gonzalez of Ohio) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Reform, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To designate an Anomalous Health Incidents Interagency Coordinator to coordinate the interagency investigation of, and response to, suspected attacks presenting as anomalous health incidents, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Directed Energy
- 5 Threat Emergency Response Act".

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

- (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
- 1) Since at least 2016, United States Government personnel and their family members have reported anomalous health incidents at diplomatic missions across the world and in the United States, which are sometimes referred to as "Havana Syndrome".
 - (2) Some of the anomalous health incidents have resulted in unexplained brain injuries, which have had permanent, life-altering effects that have disrupted lives and ended careers.
 - (3) A panel of experts convened by the Bureau of Medical Services of the Department of State in July 2017 to review triage assessments of medically evaluated personnel from the United States Embassy in Havana came to a consensus that the findings were most likely related to neurotrauma from a nonnatural source.
 - (4) A 2020 report by the National Academy of Sciences found that "many of the distinctive and acute signs, symptoms, and observations reported by [affected] employees are consistent with the effects of directed, pulsed radio frequency (RF) energy" and that "directed pulsed RF energy [...] appears to

- be the most plausible mechanism in explaining these
 cases".
- 3 (5) According to the National Academy of 4 Sciences report, "such a scenario raises grave con-5 cerns about a world with disinhibited malevolent ac-6 tors and new tools for causing harm to others".
 - (6) The number and locations of these suspected attacks have expanded and, according to press reporting, there have been more than 130 possible cases that have been reported by United States personnel in Asia, in Europe, and in the Western Hemisphere, including within the United States.
 - (7) The continuing and expanding scope of these suspected attacks is impacting the security and morale of United States personnel, especially those posted overseas.
 - (8) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (including diplomatic agents) to which 180 countries are a party, protects diplomatic personnel from attacks on their persons, accommodations, or means of transport, and requires all state parties to punish and take measures to prevent such grave crimes.

- 1 (b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con-2 gress that—
- 1) the threat to United States Government personnel from suspected attacks presenting as anomalous health incidents is a matter of urgent concern and deserving of the full attention of government;
 - (2) personnel, dependents, and other appropriate individuals suffering anomalous health incidents from these suspected attacks deserve equitable, accessible, and high-quality medical assessment and care, regardless of their employing Government agency;
 - (3) diagnoses and determinations to treat personnel, dependents, and other appropriate individuals experiencing symptoms consistent with such injuries should be made by experienced medical professionals and made available by the Federal Government;
 - (4) any recriminations, retaliation, or punishment associated with personnel self-reporting symptoms is unacceptable and should be investigated by internal agency oversight mechanisms;

- (5) information sharing and interagency coordination is essential for the comprehensive investigation, attribution, and mitigation of these injuries;
 - (6) the Administration should provide Congress and the public with timely and regular unclassified updates on the threat posed to United States Government personnel by the suspected causes of these injuries;
 - (7) recent efforts by the Administration and among relevant agencies represent positive steps toward responding to the threat of anomalous health incidents, but more comprehensive measures must be taken to further assist victims, investigate and determine the cause of the injuries of such victims, and prevent future incidents;
 - (8) establishing the source and cause of these anomalous health incidents must be a top priority for the United States Government and requires the full coordination of relevant agencies;
 - (9) if investigations determine that the anomalous health incidents are the result of deliberate acts by individuals, entities, or foreign countries, the United States Government should recognize and respond to these incidents as hostile attacks; and

1	(10) any actors found to have been targeting
2	United States Government personnel should be pub-
3	licly identified, as appropriate, and held accountable.
4	SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
5	It is the policy of the United States—
6	(1) to detect, deter, and punish any clandestine
7	attacks that cause persistent injuries to United
8	States personnel;
9	(2) to provide appropriate assistance to United
10	States personnel harmed by such attacks;
11	(3) to hold responsible any persons, entities, or
12	governments involved in ordering or carrying out
13	such attacks, including through appropriate sanc-
14	tions, criminal prosecutions, or other tools;
15	(4) to prioritize research into effective counter-
16	measures to help protect United States personnel
17	from such attacks; and
18	(5) to convey to foreign governments through
19	official contact at the highest levels the gravity of
20	United States concern about such suspected attacks
21	and the seriousness of consequences that may follow
22	for any actors found to be involved.

1	SEC. 4. ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS INTERAGENCY
2	COORDINATOR.
3	(a) Designation.—Not later than 30 days after the
4	date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall des-
5	ignate—
6	(1) an appropriate senior official to be known
7	as the Anomalous Health Incidents Interagency Co-
8	ordinator; and
9	(2) an appropriate senior official in the White
10	House Office of Science and Technology Policy to be
11	known as the Deputy Anomalous Health Incidents
12	Interagency Coordinator.
13	(b) Duties.—The Interagency Coordinator shall
14	work through the President's designated National Secu-
15	rity process—
16	(1) to coordinate the response of the United
17	States Government to anomalous health incidents;
18	(2) to coordinate among relevant agencies to
19	ensure equitable and timely access to assessment
20	and care for affected personnel, dependents, and
21	other appropriate individuals;
22	(3) to ensure adequate training and education
23	for United States Government personnel;
24	(4) to ensure that information regarding anom-
25	alous health incidents is efficiently shared across rel-
26	evant agencies in a manner that provides appro-

1	priate protections for classified, sensitive, and per-
2	sonal information;
3	(5) to coordinate through the White House Of-
4	fice of Science and Technology Policy, and across
5	the science and technology enterprise of the Govern-
6	ment, the technological and research efforts of the
7	Government to address suspected attacks presenting
8	as anomalous health incidents; and
9	(6) to develop policy options to prevent, miti-
10	gate, and deter suspected attacks presenting as
11	anomalous health incidents.
12	(c) Designation of Agency Coordination
13	Leads.—
13 14	LEADS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of each relevant
14	(1) IN GENERAL.—The head of each relevant
14 15	(1) In general.—The head of each relevant agency shall designate a Senate-confirmed or other
14 15 16	(1) In general.—The head of each relevant agency shall designate a Senate-confirmed or other appropriate senior official, who shall—
14 15 16 17	(1) In general.—The head of each relevant agency shall designate a Senate-confirmed or other appropriate senior official, who shall— (A) serve as the Anomalous Health Inci-
14 15 16 17 18	 (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of each relevant agency shall designate a Senate-confirmed or other appropriate senior official, who shall— (A) serve as the Anomalous Health Incident Agency Coordination Lead for the relevant
14 15 16 17 18	 (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of each relevant agency shall designate a Senate-confirmed or other appropriate senior official, who shall— (A) serve as the Anomalous Health Incident Agency Coordination Lead for the relevant agency;
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of each relevant agency shall designate a Senate-confirmed or other appropriate senior official, who shall— (A) serve as the Anomalous Health Incident Agency Coordination Lead for the relevant agency; (B) report directly to the head of the rel-
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 (1) In General.—The head of each relevant agency shall designate a Senate-confirmed or other appropriate senior official, who shall— (A) serve as the Anomalous Health Incident Agency Coordination Lead for the relevant agency; (B) report directly to the head of the relevant agency regarding activities carried out

1	the Interagency Coordinator and the established
2	interagency process;
3	(D) participate in interagency briefings to
4	Congress regarding the response of the United
5	States Government to anomalous health inci-
6	dents; and
7	(E) represent the relevant agency in meet-
8	ings convened by the Interagency Coordinator.
9	(2) Delegation prohibited.—An Agency Co-
10	ordination Lead may not delegate the responsibilities
11	described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of para-
12	graph (1).
13	(d) Secure Reporting Mechanisms.—Not later
14	than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
15	the Interagency Coordinator shall—
16	(1) ensure that each relevant agency develops a
17	process to provide a secure mechanism for personnel,
18	their dependents, and other appropriate individuals
19	to self-report any suspected exposure that could be
20	an anomalous health incident;
21	(2) ensure that each relevant agency shares all
22	relevant data in a timely manner with the Office of
23	the Director of National Intelligence, and other rel-
24	evant agencies, through existing processes coordi-
25	nated by the Interagency Coordinator: and

1 (3) in establishing the mechanism described in 2 paragraph (1), prioritize secure information collection and handling processes to protect classified, 3 sensitive, and personal information. (e) Briefings.— 5 6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 7 the date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter for the following 2 years, the Interagency 8 9 Coordinator, the Deputy Coordinator, and the Agen-10 cy Coordination Leads shall jointly provide a brief-11 ing to the appropriate national security committees 12 regarding progress in carrying out the duties under 13 subsection (b), including the requirements under 14 paragraph (2). 15 (2) Elements.—The briefings required under 16 paragraph (1) shall include— 17 (A) an update on the investigation into 18 anomalous health incidents impacting United 19 States Government personnel and their family 20 members, including technical causation and sus-21 pected perpetrators; 22 (B) an update on new or persistent inci-

(C) threat prevention and mitigation ef-

forts to include personnel training;

dents;

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1	(D) changes to operating posture due to
2	anomalous health threats;
3	(E) an update on diagnosis and treatment
4	efforts for affected individuals, including pa-
5	tient numbers and wait times to access care;
6	(F) efforts to improve and encourage re-
7	porting of incidents;
8	(G) detailed roles and responsibilities of
9	Agency Coordination Leads;
10	(H) information regarding additional au-
11	thorities or resources needed to support the
12	interagency response; and
13	(I) other matters that the Interagency Co-
14	ordinator or the Agency Coordination Leads
15	consider appropriate.
16	(3) Unclassified Briefing Summary.—The
17	Agency Coordination Leads shall provide a coordi-
18	nated, unclassified summary of the briefings to Con-
19	gress, which shall include as much information as
20	practicable without revealing classified information
21	or information that is likely to identify an individual.
22	(f) RETENTION OF AUTHORITY.—The appointment
23	of the Interagency Coordinator shall not deprive any Fed-
24	eral agency of any authority to independently perform its
25	authorized functions

1	(g) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this sec-
2	tion may be construed to limit—
3	(1) the President's authority under article II of
4	the United States Constitution; or
5	(2) the provision of health care and benefits to
6	afflicted individuals, consistent with existing laws.
7	SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
8	There is authorized to be appropriated—
9	(1) to the Secretary of Defense \$45,000,000 for
10	fiscal year 2022, of which—
11	(A) \$30,000,000 shall be used—
12	(i) to develop the necessary medical
13	capacity to provide health assessments and
14	appropriate care to United States Govern-
15	ment personnel, dependents, and other ap-
16	propriate individuals who have symptoms
17	associated with anomalous health inci-
18	dents;
19	(ii) to develop additional capability
20	and capacity in the military healthcare sys-
21	tem to provide assessment and timely care
22	to affected United States Government per-
23	sonnel, dependents, and other appropriate
24	individuals: and

1	(iii) to fund the assessment and care
2	of civilian employees of the Department of
3	Defense and other Department of Defense-
4	affiliated non-beneficiaries, if such funding
5	is not otherwise available; and
6	(B) the remaining \$15,000,000 shall be
7	used to support—
8	(i) the efforts of the Department of
9	Defense to investigate and characterize the
10	cause of anomalous health incidents, in-
11	cluding investigations of technical causa-
12	tion, medical research, and other activities
13	in support of attribution;
14	(ii) intelligence and data analysis by
15	the Department of Defense of information
16	related to anomalous health incidents; and
17	(iii) development and implementation
18	by the Department of Defense of force pro-
19	tection and mitigation efforts; and
20	(2) to the Secretary of State \$5,000,000 for fis-
21	cal year 2022 to be used—
22	(A) to increase capacity and staffing for
23	the Health Incident Response Task Force of
24	the Department of State;

1	(B) to support the development and imple-
2	mentation of efforts by the Department of
3	State to prevent and mitigate anomalous health
4	incidents affecting its workforce;
5	(C) to investigate and characterize the
6	cause of anomalous health incidents, including
7	investigations of causation and attribution;
8	(D) to collect and analyze data related to
9	anomalous health incidents;
10	(E) to coordinate with other relevant agen-
11	cies and the National Security Council regard-
12	ing anomalous health incidents; and
13	(F) to support other activities to under-
14	stand, prevent, deter, and respond to suspected
15	attacks presenting as anomalous health inci-
16	dents, at the discretion of the Secretary of
17	State.
18	SEC. 6. DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION OF WORK-
19	FORCE GUIDANCE.
20	The President shall direct relevant agencies to de-
21	velop and disseminate to employees who are at risk of ex-
22	posure to anomalous health incidents, not later than 90
23	days after the date of the enactment of this Act, updated
24	workforce guidance to report, mitigate, and address sus-
25	pected attacks presenting as anomalous health incidents.

1 SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

2	In this Act:
3	(1) AGENCY COORDINATION LEAD.—The term
4	"Agency Coordination Lead" means a senior official
5	designated by the head of a relevant agency to serve
6	as the Anomalous Health Incident Agency Coordina-
7	tion Lead for such agency.
8	(2) Appropriate National Security com-
9	MITTEES.—The term "appropriate national security
10	committees" means—
11	(A) the Committee on Armed Services of
12	the Senate;
13	(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
14	the Senate;
15	(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
16	the Senate;
17	(D) the Committee on Homeland Security
18	and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
19	(E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
20	Senate;
21	(F) the Committee on Armed Services of
22	the House of Representatives;
23	(G) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
24	the House of Representatives;
25	(H) the Permanent Select Committee on
26	Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

1	(I) the Committee on Homeland Security
2	of the House of Representatives; and
3	(J) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
4	House of Representatives.
5	(3) Deputy Coordinator.—The term "Dep-
6	uty Coordinator" means the Deputy Anomalous
7	Health Incidents Interagency Coordinator in the
8	White House Office of Science and Technology Pol-
9	icy designated pursuant to section 4(a).
10	(4) Interagency coordinator.—The term
11	"Interagency Coordinator" means the Anomalous
12	Health Incidents Interagency Coordinator des-
13	ignated pursuant to section 4(a).
14	(5) Relevant agencies.—The term "relevant
15	agencies" means—
16	(A) the Department of Defense;
17	(B) the Department of State;
18	(C) the Office of the Director of National
19	Intelligence;
20	(D) the Central Intelligence Agency;
21	(E) the Department of Justice;
22	(F) the Department of Homeland Security;
23	and

(G) other agencies and bodies designated
 by the Interagency Coordinator.

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