## 117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

## H. R. 4420

To repeal the 25 percent cap on United States contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and for other purposes.

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 13, 2021

Ms. Jacobs of California (for herself, Mr. Castro of Texas, Ms. Bass, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Phillips, and Mr. Malinowski) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

## A BILL

To repeal the 25 percent cap on United States contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "United States Commit-
- 5 ment to Peacekeeping Act of 2021".
- 6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
- 7 Congress finds as follows:
- 8 (1) United Nations (UN) peacekeeping oper-
- 9 ations are a critical force-multiplier for the United

States, and decades of research has found peacekeeping to be highly effective in reducing civilian deaths, shortening the duration of conflicts, containing the geographic spread of war, and reducing the likelihood of conflict reoccurrence and sexual and

gender-based violence.

- (2) The Government Accountability Office found in 2006 and 2018 reviews that it is eight times cheaper to financially support a United Nations mission than to deploy United States military forces.
- (3) Every UN member state is legally required to finance the UN's peacekeeping budget in order to ensure that these missions are properly resourced, and assessment rates are renegotiated every three years by the UN General Assembly. In 2018 the United States voted in support of the current rate structure, which sets United States peacekeeping contributions at 27.89 percent.
- (4) Since fiscal year 2017, the United States has accrued more than \$1 billion in debt on its financial obligations to UN peacekeeping, due to congressional enforcement of a 1994 law that limits United States contributions to 25 percent of the

- total UN peacekeeping budget in any fiscal year
   after 1995.
- (5) Since fiscal year 2000, Congress has, on a
  bipartisan basis, lifted the 25 percent cap 15 times,
  including retroactively for calendar years 2006–2008
  during the Bush Administration.
  - (6) In 2019, the Department of State reported to Congress the following impacts of growing United States arrears to the UN: "(1) Loss of vote or inability to be a member of governing bodies; (2) Diminished U.S. standing and diminished ability to pursue U.S. priorities; (3) Reduced U.S. ability to promote increased oversight and accountability through reforms that promote efficiency, cost savings, and improved management practices; (4) Reduced standing needed to successfully promote qualified U.S. citizens to assume senior management roles; and (5) Impairments of peacekeeping missions to operate, including addressing objectives that may directly impact the national security of the United States".
    - (7) United States ongoing accrual of arrears is having a negative impact on the financial health of UN peacekeeping with low and middle-income countries, who voluntarily provide the bulk of the troops,

- police, and equipment to these missions, not being adequately reimbursed for their contributions and shouldering an increasing financial burden.
  - (8) The People's Republic of China is now the second largest financial contributor to UN peace-keeping, having gone from an assessment rate of just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent in 2021, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four permanent members of the Security Council combined.
  - (9) The People's Republic of China has used this expanded influence to argue against human rights, civilian protection, and gender-based violence personnel within UN peacekeeping operations, in part using United States funding shortfalls as a pretext to downsize peacekeeping missions.
  - (10) Prior to fiscal year 2017, when the United States was paying its peacekeeping dues at the full assessed rate, the United States and the UN worked together to institute a number of cost-saving and efficiency reforms, including reducing the cost per peacekeeper by 18 percent, reducing the number of support staff, and shortening the timeline between

when a mission is mandated and when personnel, equipment, and services are fully deployed.

(11) Beginning in 2015 and with the support of the United States, the UN strengthened measures to combat sexual abuse and exploitation by peace-keepers, including strict timelines for completing investigations; immediate response teams inside peace-keeping missions to handle allegations; suspending payments to countries whose troops face credible allegations of misconduct; repatriation of units engaged in systematic abuse; establishing an online database to track allegations and investigations; appointing the first Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the first Victims' Rights Advocate; and establishing a trust fund to support and assist victims.

(12) Improving U.S. financial standing at the UN would allow the U.S. to more effectively advocate for a range of reform efforts, including supporting strategies that have been particularly effective in reducing sexual and gender-based violence where peacekeepers operate, while also continuing to strengthen measures to end instances of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations.

1	(13) In 2021, the top positions at nine UN spe-
2	cialized agencies, funds, and programs will be de-
3	cided, and the United States will be better posi-
4	tioned to argue for its own preferred candidates at
5	UN entities if it is in good financial standing at the
6	UN.
7	(14) In 2018, during the triennial scales of as-
8	sessment rate negotiations, the United States was
9	unable to deliver significant changes in rates due in
10	part to outstanding arrears.
11	(15) In 2021, the scale of assessments negotia-
12	tions will occur again and a demonstrated willing-
13	ness to pay United States assessments in full will
14	play an important role in garnering support from
15	other UN member states.
16	SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING UNITED
17	STATES ENGAGEMENT REGARDING UNITED
18	NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
19	(a) In General.—It is the policy of the United
20	States that the Permanent Representative of the United
21	States to the United Nations—
22	(1) support the development and implementa-
23	tion of standard performance assessment systems

and investigative measures to identify exemplary

- performance and address mission-specific and system-wide weaknesses;
  - (2) support the full implementation of a management reform agenda that decentralizes decision-making authority, simplifies and streamlines policy and processes, and strengthens accountability and transparency for managing United Nations offices and functions;
    - (3) advocate for the development of a common political strategy in-country among relevant actors, including regional organizations, Member States, international financial institutions, and United Nations agencies, funds, and programs;
    - (4) advocate for robust engagement with host countries and local communities, including pushing for resources to be directed to community-led peace initiatives;
    - (5) support efforts to deploy more mobile, adaptable, and agile forces for more effective peace-keeping operations;
    - (6) support the development of a system-wide strategy on sustainable peacekeeping transitions that ensure planning and decision-making is based on measurable benchmarks, including ensuring the protection of civilians:

25 tection of civilians;

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

- (7) lead and advocate for efforts to promote and protect internationally recognized human rights standards regarding United Nations peacekeeping operations, including the robust funding and support of human rights positions;
  - (8) advocate for efforts to develop a more comprehensive plan for accountability and justice, particularly relating to tracking misconduct and inclusion of survivors in decision-making, for peace-keepers and other United Nations staff involved in sexual exploitation, abuse, or other violations of human rights that contravene United Nations and United States rules, regulations, or values; and
  - (9) engage in dialogue with Member States to secure a more favorable modification of United Nations scales of assessments of the peacekeeping budget that works to diversify the funding base and create a sustainable funding plan.
- 19 (b) Advocacy of Peacekeeping Reforms at the
- 20 United Nations.—The Secretary of State shall instruct
- 21 the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
- 22 United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
- 23 United States at the United Nations to accomplish the
- 24 policy specified in subsection (a), consistent with the na-
- 25 tional security interests of the United States.

1	SEC. 4. REPEAL OF THE 25 PERCENT CAP ON UNITED
2	STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NA-
3	TIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
4	(a) In General.—Subsection (b) of section 404 of
5	the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
6	1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103–236; 22 U.S.C. 287e
7	note; relating to a limitation on United States contribu-
8	tions to United Nations peacekeeping operations) is re-
9	pealed.
10	(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.—
11	Section 404 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
12	Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 is amended by striking "(a)
13	Reassessment of Contributions Percentages.—".
14	SEC. 5. REPORTS ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO
15	ACHIEVE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
16	REFORM.
17	Section 4 of the United Nations Participation Act of
18	1945 (22 U.S.C. 287b) is amended—
19	(1) in subsection (c)—
20	(A) in paragraph (3)—
21	(i) by striking subparagraph (B); and
22	(ii) redesignating subparagraph (C) as
23	subparagraph (B);
24	(B) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and
25	(5) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively;

1	(C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the
2	following new paragraph:
3	"(4) United nations peacekeeping re-
4	FORM.—A description of the status of United States
5	efforts in the United Nations to ensure the United
6	Nations—
7	"(A) develops and implements standard
8	peacekeeping operation performance assessment
9	systems and investigative measures to identify
10	exemplary performance and address operation-
11	specific and system-wide weaknesses;
12	"(B) fully implements a management re-
13	form agenda that decentralizes decision-making
14	authority, simplifies and streamlines policy and
15	processes, and strengthens accountability and
16	transparency for managing United Nations of-
17	fices and functions;
18	"(C) develops for each peacekeeping oper-
19	ation a common political strategy in-country
20	among relevant actors, including regional orga-
21	nizations, Member States, international finan-
22	cial institutions, and United Nations agencies,
23	funds and programs:

1	"(D) fully engages with host countries and
2	local communities, including directing resources
3	to community-led peace initiatives;
4	"(E) deploys more mobile, adaptable, and
5	agile forces for more effective peacekeeping op-
6	erations;
7	"(F) develops a system-wide strategy on
8	sustainable peacekeeping transitions that en-
9	sure planning and decision-making is based on
10	measurable benchmarks, including ensuring the
11	protection of civilians;
12	"(G) implements a system-wide strategy to
13	protect internationally recognized human rights
14	standards within United Nations peacekeeping
15	operations, including robust funding and sup-
16	port of human rights positions within each
17	peacekeeping operation;
18	"(H) develops a more comprehensive plan
19	for accountability and justice, particularly relat-
20	ing to tracking misconduct and inclusion of sur-
21	vivors in decision-making, for peacekeepers and
22	other United Nations staff involved in sexual
23	exploitation abuse or other violations of

human rights that contravene United Nations

1	and United States rules, regulations, or values;
2	and
3	"(I) modifies the United Nations scales of
4	assessments of the peacekeeping budget to di-
5	versify the funding base and create a sustain-
6	able funding plan."; and
7	(2) in subsection (d)(5), by striking subpara-
8	graph (B).
9	SEC. 6. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
10	(a) Strengthening Conflict Prevention in
11	United Nations Missions.—Not later than 180 days
12	after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
13	of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
14	committees a report analyzing the ways in which conflict
15	prevention aspects of United Nations missions may be
16	strengthened. Such report shall include—
17	(1) an analysis of the performance of existing
18	early warning and rapid response systems and rec-
19	ommendations for the improvement of such systems;
20	(2) an analysis on the performance of the civil-
21	ian components of United Nations special political
22	missions and peacekeeping operations and rec-
23	ommendations for strengthening such components;
24	(3) recommendations on how other United Na-
25	tions entities, including the United Nations

- Peacebuilding Fund, special political missions, and other agencies, funds, and programs could be better coordinated in a joint strategy; and
- 4 (4) an assessment of the costs and benefits of
  5 the Department of State and the United States
  6 Agency for International Development sharing risk
  7 analysis data with select multilateral organizations,
  8 under specific circumstances, to better promote con9 flict prevention before peacekeeping engagement is
  10 needed.
- 11 Ensuring CONSIDERATIONS FOR Mission Transitions are Based on Comprehensive Assess-12 MENTS OF CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND RISKS TO CIVIL-IANS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-14 15 actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 16 17 analyzes the observed challenges, costs, and benefits of transitioning United Nations peacekeeping operations to 18 host-country security forces, including— 19
  - (1) case studies of communities that maintained peace and stabilization gains compared with communities that experienced a resurgence in instability, violence, or conflict at least five years after such a transition;

21

22

23

1	(2) an analysis of the transition process and the
2	effectiveness of measures to maintain long-term
3	peace; and
4	(3) an assessment of any additional resources
5	needed to maintain peace and stabilization gains
6	achieved after such a transition.
7	(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees De-
8	FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congres-
9	sional committees" means—
10	(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
11	the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
12	(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
13	Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
14	resentatives.

 $\bigcirc$