SAP TechEd

CA163
Hands-on experience with SAP Enterprise Threat Detection

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SAP TechEd

Agenda

1. Introduction SAP Enterprise Threat Detection, cloud edition

2. SAP Enterprise Threat Detection, (public) cloud edition for Private/Public Cloud SAP Landscapes

3. Short Demo/Preview

    - Starting UI
    - Dashboards (preview)
    - Alerts
    - Forensics

Introduction
SAP Enterprise Threat Detection
Cloud Edition

What is SAP Enterprise Threat Detection

SAP Enterprise Threat Detection raises alerts in (near-) real-time, if security/compliance relevant suspicious activities happen in the application layer of your SAP landscape.

SAP Enterprise Threat Detection uses HANA technology to digest mass data log volumes, and run highly efficient automated processes to track hacker activity using SAP's predefined and easy customizable use cases.

Use case categories

Use of critical resource

Execution of critical functions, reports and transactions

Change, manipulation or spy out of business data

Change or manipulation of critical configuration

User Manipulation

Critical authorization assignment

User role create, drop or manipulation

Reference user assignment

User morphing by changing type or probable identity theft

Debugging

Debugging with change of control flow while debugging

Debugging with change of variable values during debugging

Debugging in critical systems

Debugging in systems assigned to critical roles

System Access

Failed logon with too many attempts

Failed Logon with too many password logon attempts

Logon with SAP standard users, or high privileged users

Suspicious Actions

Dynamic program execution, download

Dynamic code and system changes

SAP Enterprise Threat Detection, (public) cloud edition for Private/Public Cloud SAP Landscapes

SAP S/4HANA Private/Public Cloud: Shared responsibility

Run securely

Transparent



Customer

Business process and application usage

Customer application access

Use of SAP Enterprise Threat Detection for In-Application monitoring

SAP

Security operations and monitoring*

Network and security management

Application* and OS management

Database and storage management

Service configuration and account management

Cloud operations from SAP

SAP or hyperscaler

IaaS administration console and API

IaaS orchestration

SAP or hyperscaler

Network

Storage

Compute

Data center and hardware

Physical fabric

*Roles and responsibilities will vary depending on deployment (private, public).

Short Demo/Preview

Security Analyst View/Partner View

The Security Analyst

- does alert processing, deep dive analysis, new use case creation, …
- has a lot of tools at hand to do his job



Home
Enterprise Threat Detection: Cross-Tenant Applications
Enterprise Threat Detection: Tenant Applications
Select Tenant
Manage Alerts for All Tenants
Manage Investigations for All Tenants
Enterprise Threat Detection: Tenant Applications
Manage Settings
Manage Value Lists
Analyze Log Events
Manage Alerts
Monitor Pattern Executions
Manage Patterns
Manage Investigations
Record of Actions
Download Investigation Reports
Forensic Lab
Monitor Incoming Logs
Resolve User Identity

Hands-on goes through



SAP
Home
Enterprise Threat Detection: Cross-Tenant Applications
Enterprise Threat Detection: Tenant Applications

Select Tenant

Manage Alerts for All Tenants

Manage Investigations for All Tenants

Enterprise Threat Detection: Tenant Applications

Manage Settings

Manage Value Lists

Analyze Log Events

Manage Alerts

Monitor Pattern Executions

Manage Patterns

Manage Investigations

Record of Actions

Download Investigation Reports

Forensic Lab

Monitor Incoming Logs

Resolve User Identity



Investigation 143

Workshop Demo Customer



Subset 2

Service, Access Name
In value list: Access Names Indicating Debugging Method

Service, Program Name
In value list: Program Names Indicating Debugging Method

Count: 7

Subset 3

System Role, Actor
In value list: DebuggingCriticalSystemRoles

System ID, Actor
In value list: DebuggingCriticalSystems

Count: 7

Subset 2

System Role, Actor
In value list: DebuggingCriticalSystemRoles

System ID, Actor
In value list: DebuggingCriticalSystems

Count: 2



ange(2025/10/12 14:44:11 PM GMT+02:00 - 2025/10/13 14:44:11 PM GMT+02:00), Trigger Value 1(S4H).

Pattern	Trigger			
Sensitive Data Download via Blocklisted Reports	Measurement 1 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Resource Name' = 'C:\Users\D026896\Documents\SAP\SAP GUI\ddemo01.txt', 'Service,...			
Logon from external with SAP standard users	Measurement 1 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Event (Semantic)' = 'User, Logon, Failure', 'Network, Hostname, Initiator' = '10.79.59.150', 'Syste...			
Debugging in systems assigned to critical roles	Measurement 2 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Network, Hostname, Initiator' = 'W-PF37QJMN', 'System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'System Type, Actor' ...			
Authorization assignment by non-admin-group user	Measurement 2 exceeded threshold 1 for ('System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'User Pseudonym, Acting' = 'LUOZ_16971', 'User Pseudony...	View	Open	2025/1
Blocklisted transactions in productive system	Measurement 15 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Service, Transaction Name' = 'SE16', 'System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'User Pseudonym, Acting' =...	View	Open	2025/1
Blocklisted transactions in productive system	Measurement 8 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Service, Transaction Name' = 'SU01', 'System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'User Pseudonym, Acting' =...	View	Open	2025/1
Blocklisted Data Download in Transactions	Measurement 1 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Service, Transaction Name' = 'SE16', 'System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'User Pseudonym, Acting' =...	View	Open	2025/1
Debugging with Manipulations in Critical Systems	Measurement 2 exceeded threshold 1 for ('System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'User Pseudonym, Acting' = 'LUOZ_16971')	View	Open	2025/1
Debugging in systems assigned to critical roles	Measurement 1 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Network, Hostname, Initiator' = 'W-PF37QJMN', 'System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'System Type, Actor' ...	View	Open	2025/1
Debugging in Critical ABAP Systems	Measurement 5 exceeded threshold 1 for ('System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'User Pseudonym, Acting' = 'LUOZ_16971')	View	Open	2025/1
Generic access to critical database tables	Measurement 4 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Event Code' = 'DU9', 'Generic, Action' = 'Table Access', 'Resource Name' = 'USR02', 'System...	View	Open	2025/1
Critical DB access	Measurement 4 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Resource Name' = 'USR02', 'System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'User Pseudonym, Acting' =...	View	Open	2025/1
Successful logon from same Terminal ID with different users	Measurement 3 exceeded threshold 2 for ('Network, Hostname, Initiator'	View	Open	2025/1

Measurement 1 exceeded threshold 1 for ('Resource Name' = 'C:\[redacted]\Documents\SAP\SAP GUI\ddemo01.txt', 'Service, Program Name' = '/1BCDWB/DBUSR02', 'System ID, Actor' = 'S4H/100', 'User Pseudonym, Acting' = 'LUOZ_16971')



Logon from external with SAP standard users

Description

A successful or unsuccessful logon external attemp... Show More

Base Measurement On: COUNT(DISTINCT All)

Group By: User Pseudonym, Target; System ID, Actor; Event (Semantic); Network, Hostname, Initiator

Processor View

The Processor

- is another persona than the Security Analyst
- mainly consumes the results of the analysis



Hands-on goes through



Enterprise Threat Detection

Investigation Report 130

DATA_LOSS MGMT_INFORMED

Completion Timestamp: 2025/09/11 16:51:16 PM GMT+02:00

Closing Remarks:

Investigator: [redacted]

Report Severity: Very High

Report Status: Open

Timestamp of Download: The report has not been downloaded yet.

Downloaded By: The report has not been downloaded yet.

Enter your comment here

[redacted] created a comment.
2025/10/13 16:35:04 PM GMT+02:00
Result 3: Management was informed about the incident

	Severity	ID	Report Creation Date	Description	Customer Notification						
□	High	142	2025/09/29 11:23:00 AM GMT+02:00	Critical user cativities	No						
□	High	141	2025/09/26 14:11:51 PM GMT+02:00	Sensitive Data download	No						
□	High	140	2025/09/26 10:18:28 AM GMT+02:00	Critical Data Download	No						
□	High	138	2025/09/25 21:57:56 PM GMT+02:00	Critical Data download	No						
□	High	133	2025/09/22 17:13:32 PM GMT+02:00	USER is doing critical business manipulation	No						
□	High	132	2025/09/15 16:22:38 PM GMT+02:00	Standard User Manual Logon from different systems	No	2025/09/15 16:23:32 PM GMT+02:00	[redacted]	In Process	Medium	remark 1	LOB1
□	Medium	131	2025/09/11 17:36:59 PM GMT+02:00	Critical access abc Test	No	2025/09/11 17:37:58 PM GMT+02:00	[redacted]	No Reaction Needed		False positive, see ticket 423	
□	High	130	2025/09/11 16:48:16 PM GMT+02:00	Useer Miss-Use on same terminal ID	No	2025/09/11 16:51:16 PM GMT+02:00	[redacted]	Open	Very High		MGMT_INFORMED DATA_LOSS
□	Medium	127	2025/09/10 16:43:55 PM GMT+02:00	Test9	Yes	2025/09/10 16:45:18 PM GMT+02:00	[redacted]	No Reaction Needed	Low	Was acknowledged by ticket 158	
□	Medium	121	2025/09/10 15:12:22 PM GMT+02:00	huubui	No	2025/09/10 15:48:13 PM GMT+02:00	[redacted]	Closed			
□	Medium	117	2025/09/03 09:53:52 AM GMT+02:00	User TMSADM failed with logons	No	2025/09/03 09:57:15 AM GMT+02:00	[redacted]	In Process	Medium	checking	TMSADM SystemADMIN
□	Medium	113	2025/08/05 08:55:13 AM GMT+02:00	TestReportWorkflows	No	2025/08/05 08:55:46 AM GMT+02:00	(Unassigned User)	Closed	High	Remediated by HCM department	LOB HCM BOARD
□	Very High	93	2025/07/16 09:59:17 AM GMT+02:00	User KOJG_68809 highly suspicious activities	No	2025/07/16 10:23:24 AM GMT+02:00	(Unassigned User)				

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Contact information:

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Thank you!

SAP Bring out your best.