否ミになり

Full Audit Report

Mobile Wallet Token Security Assessment





Mobile Wallet Token Security Assessment

FULL AUDIT REPORT

Security Assessment by SCRL on Monday, July 29, 2024

SCRL is deliver a security solution for Web3 projects by expert security researchers.



Executive Summary

For this security assessment, SCRL received a request on Thursday, July 25, 2024

Client	Language	Audit Method	Confidential	Network C	hain C	ontract		
Mobile Wallet Token	Solidity	Whitebox	Public	BNB Chai	in <u>0</u>	x81e9A4b6	dc7379D0dd6dCdD279	9236b6C8618070A
Report Version	Twitter		Telegram		٧	Vebsite		
1.0	https://x.com/n	nobilewalletinc	https://t.me/	/MW Token	<u>h</u>	ttps://mob	ile-wallet.app/	
Scoring:	Scoring				+			
	0	1 2	3 4	5 6	7	8 9	10	
/ulnerabilit	y Summary							8
0	9 Total Fin	dings Ur	9 nresolved	O Resolved	М	0 itigate	Acknowledge	O Decline
• 0	Critical					pose a sev	verity is assigned to securi ere threat to the smart co necosystem.	
• 0	High					-	rity issues should be addre e risk of exploitation and p	
• 1	Medium	1 Unresolved					ial to fix medium-severity e timeframe to enhance th contract.	
• 0	Low					advisable	-severity issues can be less to address them to improv osture of the smart contra	e the overall
• 0	Very Low						severity is used for minor s minimal impact and are ge	
• 4	Informational	4 Unresolved				direct secu	itegorize security findings urity threat to the smart co lese findings provide addit adations	ontract or its users.
- 4	Gas- optimization	4 Unresolved					ns for more efficient algori ents in gas usage, even if t cure.	



Audit Scope:

File	SHA-1 Hash
WDIStandardToken.sol	e42a9f5bf042263ec5ee5029c723d3c63fa6281f

Audit Version History:

Version	Date	Description
1.0	Friday, July 26, 2024	Preliminary Report
1.1	Monday, July 29, 2024	Full Audit Report

Audit information:

Request Date	Audit Date	Re-assessment Date
Thursday, July 25, 2024	Friday, July 26, 2024	-

Smart Contract Audit Summary



Security Assessment Author

Auditor:	Mark K.	[Security Researcher Redteam]
	Kevin N.	[Security Researcher Web3 Dev]
	Yusheng T.	[Security Researcher Incident Response]
Document Approval:	Ronny C.	CTO & Head of Security Researcher
	Chinnakit J.	CEO & Founder

Digital Sign



Disclaimer

Regarding this security assessment, there are no guarantees about the security of the program instruction received from the client is hereinafter referred to as "Source code".

And **SCRL** hereinafter referred to as "**Service Provider**", the **Service Provider** will not be held liable for any legal liability arising from errors in the security assessment. The responsibility will be the responsibility of the **Client**, hereinafter referred to as "**Service User**" and the

Service User agrees not to be held liable to the **service provider** in any case. By contract **Service Provider** to conduct security assessments with integrity with professional ethics, and transparency to deliver security assessments to users The **Service Provider** has the right to postpone the delivery of the security assessment. If the security assessment is delayed whether caused by any reason and is not responsible for any delayed security assessments.


If the service provider finds a vulnerability The service provider will notify the service user via the Preliminary Report, which will be kept confidential for security. The service provider disclaims responsibility in the event of any attacks occurring whether before conducting a security assessment. Or happened later All responsibility shall be sole with the service user.

Security Assessment Is Not Financial/Investment Advice Any loss arising from any investment in any project is the responsibility of the investor.

SCRL disclaims any liability incurred. Whether it's Rugpull, Abandonment, Soft Rugpull, Exploit, Exit Scam.

Security Assessment Procedure

- Request The client must submit a formal request and follow the procedure. By submitting the source code and agreeing to the terms of service.
- 2. **Audit Process**Check for vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities from source code obtained by experts using formal verification methods, including using powerful tools such as Static Analysis, SWC Registry, Dynamic Security Analysis, Automated Security Tools, CWE, Syntax & Parameter Check with AI, WAS (Warning Avoidance System a python script tools powered by SCRL).
- 3. Security Assessment Deliver Preliminary Security Assessment to clients to acknowledge the risks and vulnerabilities.
- 4. **Consulting**Discuss on risks and vulnerabilities encountered by clients to apply to their source code to mitigate risks.
 - a. **Re-assessment** Reassess the security when the client implements the source code improvements and if the client is satisfied with the results of the audit. We will proceed to the next step.
- 5. **Full Audit Report** SCRL provides clients with official security assessment reports informing them of risks and vulnerabilities. Officially and it is assumed that the client has been informed of all the information.





Risk Rating

Risk rating using this commonly defined: $Risk\ rating = impact * confidence$


Impact The severity and potential impact of an attacker attack
Confidence Ensuring that attackers expose and use this vulnerability

Confidence	Low	Medium	High
Impact [Likelihood]			
Low	Very Low	Low	Medium
Medium	Low	Medium	High
High	Medium	High	Critical

Severity is a risk assessment It is calculated from the Impact and Confidence values using the following calculation methods,

 $Risk\ rating = impact * confidence$

It is categorized into





For Informational & Non-class/Optimization/Best-practices will not be counted as severity

Category





Table Of Content

Summary

- Executive Summary
- CVSS Scoring
- Vulnerability Summary
- Audit Scope
- Audit Version History
- Audit Information
- Smart Contract Audit Summary
- Security Assessment Author
- Digital Sign
- Disclaimer
- Security Assessment Procedure
- Risk Rating
- Category

Source Code Detail

- Dependencies / External Imports
- Visibility, Mutability, Modifier function testing

Vulnerability Finding

- Vulnerability
- SWC Findings
- Contract Description
- Inheritance Relational Graph
- UML Diagram

About SCRL



Source Units in Scope

Source Units Analyzed: 1

Source Units in Scope: 1 (100%)

Ty pe	File	Logi c Con tract s	Inter face s	Li ne s	nLi ne s	nS LO C	Co mm ent Line s	Co mpl ex. Sco re	Capa bilitie s
Q	src/WDIStan dardToken.s ol	4	5	76 7	53 3	41 3	6	383	Š . ≑ - ∴ Σ
Q	Totals	4	5	76 7	53 3	41 3	6	383	š. ÷ - ∵ Σ

Legend: [-1

- Lines: total lines of the source unit
- **nLines**: normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
- nSLOC: normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
- Comment Lines: lines containing single or block comments
- **Complexity Score**: a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)



Visibility, Mutability, Modifier function testing

Components

Contracts	€ Libraries	National Control of the Control of t	Abstract
2	0	5	2

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.



StateVariables

Total	#Public
21	8

Capabilities

Solidity Versions observed		Experir Feature		Š (Red Fun	eive	Uses Assembly		Has Destroyable Contracts
^0.8.0				yes				
Transf ers ETH	4 Le		Delegat	æC	Uses Hash Function		ECRecove r	6 New/Create/Cr eate2
yes								



TryCatch	Σ Unchecked		
	yes		

Dependencies / External Imports

Dependency / Import Path	Count





Vulnerability Findings

ID	Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Category	Status
CEN-01	Centralization Risk	Medium	Centralization	Acknowledge
SEC-01	Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why	Informational	Best Practices	Acknowledge
SEC-02	`require()` / `revert()` statements should have descriptive reason strings	Informational	Best Practices	Acknowledge
SEC-03	Array indices should be referenced via `enum` rather than via numeric literals	Informational	Best Practices	Acknowledge
SEC-04	Functions not used internally could be marked external	Informational	Optimization	Acknowledge
GAS-01	Use `selfbalance()` instead of `address(this).balance`	Gas-optimization	Gas Optimization	Acknowledge
GAS-02	Use Custom Errors	Gas-optimization	Gas Optimization	Acknowledge
GAS-03	Long revert strings	Gas-optimization	Gas Optimization	Acknowledge
GAS-04	Use != 0 instead of > 0 for unsigned integer comparison	Gas-optimization	Gas Optimization	Acknowledge



CEN-01: Centralization Risk

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Centralization Risk	Medium	Check on finding	Centralization	Acknowledge

Finding:

```
File: WDIStandardToken.sol
451: contract WDIStandardToken is ERC20, Ownable {
593:
        function setExclusionFromFee(address account, bool value) public onlyOwner {
597:
        function setExclusionFromTxLimit(address account, bool value) public onlyOwner
601:
        function setExclusionFromWalletLimit(address account, bool value) public
onlyOwner {
        function updateMarketingWallet(address newWallet) external onlyOwner {
605:
612:
        function updateDevWallet(address newWallet) external onlyOwner {
619:
        function updateMarketingBuyTax(uint256 tax) external onlyOwner {
624:
        function updateMarketingSellTax(uint256 tax) external onlyOwner {
629:
        function updateDevBuyTax(uint256 tax) external onlyOwner {
634:
        function updateDevSellTax(uint256 tax) external onlyOwner {
639:
        function updateLpBuyTax(uint256 tax) external onlyOwner {
644:
        function updateLpSellTax(uint256 tax) external onlyOwner {
649:
        function updateMaxWalletAmount(uint256 maxWallet) external onlyOwner {
655:
        function updateMaxTransactionAmount(uint256 maxTx) external onlyOwner {
```



Explain Function Capability:

The contract provides several functions:

1. setExclusionFromFee(address account, bool value):

If value is true, the account will not be charged fees on transactions.

2. setExclusionFromTxLimit(address account, bool value):

If value is true, the account will not be subject to transaction limits imposed on other accounts.

3. setExclusionFromWalletLimit(address account, bool value):

If value is true, the account will not be subject to wallet size limits.

4. updateMarketingWallet(address newWallet):

Changes the wallet address where marketing funds are sent.

5. updateDevWallet(address newWallet):

Changes the wallet address where development funds are sent.

6. updateMarketingBuyTax(uint256 tax):

Changes the tax rate applied to marketing-related purchases.

7. updateMarketingSellTax(uint256 tax):

Changes the tax rate applied to marketing-related sales.

8. updateDevBuyTax(uint256 tax):

Changes the tax rate applied to development-related purchases.

9. updateDevSellTax(uint256 tax):

Changes the tax rate applied to development-related sales.

10. updateLpBuyTax(uint256 tax):

Changes the tax rate applied to liquidity pool-related purchases.

11. updateLpSellTax(uint256 tax):

Changes the tax rate applied to liquidity pool-related sales.

12. updateMaxWalletAmount(uint256 maxWallet):


Changes the maximum amount of tokens a wallet can hold.

13. updateMaxTransactionAmount(uint256 maxTx):

Changes the maximum amount of tokens that can be transferred in a single transaction.



Centralization Risk



Recommendation:

In terms of timeframes, there are three categories: short-term, long-term, and permanent.

For short-term solutions, a combination of timelock and multi-signature (2/3 or 3/5) can be used to mitigate risk by delaying sensitive operations and avoiding a single point of failure in key management. This includes implementing a timelock with a reasonable latency, such as 48 hours, for privileged operations; assigning privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent private key compromise; and sharing the timelock contract and multi-signer addresses with the public via a medium/blog link.

For long-term solutions, a combination of timelock and DAO can be used to apply decentralization and transparency to the system. This includes implementing a timelock with a reasonable latency, such as 48 hours, for privileged operations; introducing a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement; and sharing the timelock contract, multi-signer addresses, and DAO information with the public via a medium/blog link.

Finally, permanent solutions should be implemented to ensure the ongoing security and protection of the system.

Alleviation:

-



SEC-01: Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why	Informational	Check on finding	Best Practices	Acknowledge

Finding:

```
File: WDIStandardToken.sol

199:    function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount)
internal virtual {}

201:    function _afterTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount)
internal virtual {}

766:    receive() external payable {}

...
```

Recommendation:

- 1. Commenting Empty Functions: Provide comments for empty function bodies to explain their intended purpose or future plans. This helps maintain clarity for developers who may work with the code in the future and prevents misunderstanding about why the function body is empty.
- 2. Review Design: Ensure that the empty functions are intentionally left empty and align with the intended contract design. If the functions are meant to be implemented later, consider providing comments about their intended functionality or the reason they are currently empty.

Alleviation:



SEC-02: `require()` / `revert()` statements should have descriptive reason strings

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
`require()` / `revert()` statements should have descriptive reason strings	Informational	Check on finding	Best Practices	Acknowledge

Finding:

File: WDIStandardToken.sol

664: require(totalFees > 0);

Recommendation:

Add Descriptive Reason Strings: Include a clear and descriptive reason string in require and revert statements to explain why the condition must be true. This improves the contract's usability and facilitates easier debugging.

Reference: https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.19/control-structures.html#require-statements

Alleviation:



SEC-03: Array indices should be referenced via `enum` rather than via numeric literals

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Array indices should be referenced via `enum` rather than via numeric literals	Informational	Check on finding	Best Practices	Acknowledge

Finding:

```
File: WDIStandardToken.sol

671: path[0] = address(this);

672: path[1] = weth;
```

Recommendation:

- 1. Introduce enums for Array Indices: Define an enum to represent the indices of the array. This will improve the readability of the code by providing meaningful names for each index.
- 2. Update Array Index References: Replace numeric literals with enum values to enhance code clarity.

Reference: https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.19/types.html#enums

Alleviation:



SEC-04: Functions not used internally could be marked external

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Functions not used internally could be marked external	Informational	Check on finding	Optimization	Acknowledge

Finding:

```
File: WDIStandardToken.sol

553: function getTokenInfo() public view returns (TokenInfo memory _tokenInfo) {

565: function totalTaxFees() public view returns (uint256) {

593: function setExclusionFromFee(address account, bool value) public onlyOwner {

597: function setExclusionFromTxLimit(address account, bool value) public onlyOwner {

601: function setExclusionFromWalletLimit(address account, bool value) public onlyOwner {
```

Recommendation:

Change Visibility to external: Update the visibility of these functions to external where applicable. This will optimize gas usage and clarify that these functions are meant to be called from outside the contract.

Reference: https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.19/contracts.html#function-visibility

Alleviation:



GAS-01: Use `selfbalance()` instead of `address(this).balance`

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Use `selfbalance()` instead of `address(this).balance`	-	Check on finding	Gas Optimization	Acknowledge

Finding:

File: WDIStandardToken.sol

674: uint256 beforeEthBalance = address(this).balance;

684: uint256 ethBalance = address(this).balance - beforeEthBalance;

Recommendation:

Using address(this).balance can be less gas-efficient compared to using selfbalance() in Solidity. selfbalance() is an assembly function that can be used to retrieve the balance of the current contract with slightly lower gas costs. For external contracts, using balance(address) is more efficient than address.balance().

Alleviation:



GAS-02: Use Custom Errors

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Use Custom Errors	-	Check on finding	Gas Optimization	Acknowledge

Finding:

```
File: WDIStandardToken.sol
120:
            require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "ERC20: decreased allowance
below zero");
            require(from != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
129:
130:
            require(to != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");
135:
            require(fromBalance >= amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance");
149:
            require(account != address(0), "ERC20: mint to the zero address");
            require(account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the zero address");
164:
169:
            require(accountBalance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds balance");
182:
            require(owner != address(0), "ERC20: approve from the zero address");
183:
            require(spender != address(0), "ERC20: approve to the zero address");
                require(currentAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: insufficient allowance");
192:
            require(owner() == _msgSender(), "Ownable: caller is not the owner");
432:
440:
            require(newOwner != address(0), "Ownable: new owner is the zero address");
521:
            require(uBuyFee <= 15 ether && uSellFee <= 15 ether, "TDP1");</pre>
621:
            require(totalBuyTaxFees() <= 15 ether, "TDP1");</pre>
            require(totalSellTaxFees() <= 15 ether, "TDP1");</pre>
626:
631:
            require(totalBuyTaxFees() <= 15 ether, "TDP1");</pre>
```



```
require(totalSellTaxFees() <= 15 ether, "TDP1");

require(totalBuyTaxFees() <= 15 ether, "TDP1");

require(totalSellTaxFees() <= 15 ether, "TDP1");

require(maxWallet <= 100 ether && maxWallet >= 0.5 ether, "TDP4");

require(maxTx <= 100 ether && maxTx >= 0.5 ether, "TDP4");

require(maxAmountForTx >= amount, "TDP2");

require((balanceOf(to) + amount) <= maxAmountForWallet, "TDP3");
```

Recommendation:

Using string literals in require() statements incurs higher gas costs compared to custom errors. Custom errors provide a more efficient way to handle errors by reducing gas costs both during deployment and execution.

Refference: https://soliditylang.org/blog/2021/04/21/custom-errors/

Alleviation:



GAS-03: Long revert strings

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Long revert strings	-	Check on finding	Gas Optimization	Acknowledge

Finding:

```
File: WDIStandardToken.sol
120:
            require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "ERC20: decreased allowance
below zero");
            require(from != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
129:
            require(to != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");
130:
135:
            require(fromBalance >= amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance");
164:
            require(account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the zero address");
169:
            require(accountBalance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds balance");
            require(owner != address(0), "ERC20: approve from the zero address");
182:
183:
            require(spender != address(0), "ERC20: approve to the zero address");
440:
            require(newOwner != address(0), "Ownable: new owner is the zero address");
```

Recommendation:

Using long revert strings in require() statements can lead to higher gas costs and reduced clarity in error reporting. Shorter, more concise error messages or the use of custom errors can improve gas efficiency and maintain readability.

Alleviation:



GAS-04: Use != 0 instead of > 0 for unsigned integer comparison

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Use != 0 instead of > 0 for unsigned integer comparison	-	Check on finding	Gas Optimization	Acknowledge

Finding:

```
File: WDIStandardToken.sol
664:
            require(totalFees > 0);
691:
            if (marketingTaxFeeETH > 0) {
694:
            if (devTaxFeeETH > 0) {
            if (taxFeeForDeployer > 0) {
697:
           if (lpTaxFeeETH > 0 && halfLpFee > 0) {
701:
701:
            if (lpTaxFeeETH > 0 && halfLpFee > 0) {
741:
               if (from == swapPair && uBuyFee > 0) {
748:
               if (to == swapPair && uSellFee > 0) {
758:
               if (to == swapPair && fees > 0) {
```

Recommendation:

Replace > 0 with != 0 - Update the comparisons to use != 0 for unsigned integers.

Alleviation:



SWC Findings

SVVCTIIIdill	0 •		
ID	Title	Scanning	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Complete	No risk
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Complete	No risk
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	Complete	No risk
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	Complete	No risk
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Complete	No risk
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Complete	No risk
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Complete	No risk
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Complete	No risk
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Complete	No risk
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Complete	No risk
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Complete	No risk
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Complete	No risk
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Complete	No risk
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Complete	No risk
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Complete	No risk
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Complete	No risk



1			
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Complete	No risk
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Complete	No risk
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Complete	No risk
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Complete	No risk
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Complete	No risk
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Complete	No risk
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Complete	No risk
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Complete	No risk
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Complete	No risk
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Complete	No risk
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Complete	No risk
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Complete	No risk
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Complete	No risk
SWC-129	Typographical Error	Complete	No risk
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Complete	No risk
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Complete	No risk
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Complete	No risk



SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Complete	No risk
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Complete	No risk
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Complete	No risk
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Complete	No risk





Contracts Description Table

Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	Function Name	Visibility	Muta bility	Modifie rs
IERC20	Interface			
L	totalSupply	External !		NO!
L	balanceOf	External !		NO!
L	transfer	External !		NO!
L	allowance	External !		NO!
L	approve	External !		NO!
L	transferFrom	External !		NO!
IERC20Met adata	Interface	IERC20		
L	name	External !		NO!
L	symbol	External !		NO!
L	decimals	External !		NO!
Context	Implementation			
L	_msgSender	Internal 🔒		
L	_msgData	Internal 🗎		
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Met adata		
L		Public !		NO!
L	name	Public !		NO!



Contract	Туре	Bases	
L	symbol	Public !	NO!
L	decimals	Public !	NO!
L	totalSupply	Public !	NO!
L	balanceOf	Public !	NO!
L	transfer	Public !	NO!
L	allowance	Public !	NO!
L	approve	Public !	NO!
L	transferFrom	Public !	NO!
L	increaseAllowance	Public !	NO!
L	decreaseAllowance	Public !	NO!
L	_transfer	Internal 🗎	
L	_mint	Internal 🔒	
L	_burn	Internal 🗎	
L	_approve	Internal 🗎	
L	_spendAllowance	Internal 🗎	
L	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal 🗎	
L	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal 🔒	
IUniswapV2 Factory	Interface		
L	feeTo	External !	NO!
L	feeToSetter	External !	NO!
L	getPair	External !	NO!
L	allPairs	External !	NO!



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	allPairsLength	External !		NO!
L	createPair	External !		NO!
L	setFeeTo	External !		NO!
L	setFeeToSetter	External !		NO!
IUniswapV2 Router01	Interface			
L	factory	External !		NO!
L	WETH	External !		NO!
L	addLiquidity	External !		NO!
L	addLiquidityETH	External !	<u>@</u> S <u>D</u>	NO!
L	removeLiquidity	External !		NO!
L	removeLiquidityETH	External !		NO!
L	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External !		NO!
L	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External !		NO!
L	swapExactTokensForTokens	External !		NO!
L	swapTokensForExactTokens	External !		NO!
L	swapExactETHForTokens	External !	@SD	NO!
L	swapTokensForExactETH	External !		NO!
L	swapExactTokensForETH	External !		NO!
L	swapETHForExactTokens	External !	@SD	NO!
L	quote	External !		NO!
L	getAmountOut	External !		NO!
L	getAmountIn	External !		NO!



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	getAmountsOut	External !		NO!
L	getAmountsIn	External !		NO!
IUniswapV2 Router02	Interface	IUniswapV2 Router01		
L	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeO nTransferTokens	External !		NO!
L	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupp ortingFeeOnTransferTokens	External !		NO!
L	swapExactTokensForTokensSuppor tingFeeOnTransferTokens	External !		NO!
L	swapExactETHForTokensSupportin gFeeOnTransferTokens	External !	űs Š	NO!
L	swapExactTokensForETHSupportin gFeeOnTransferTokens	External !		NO!
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
L		Public !		NO!
L	owner	Public !		NO!
L	_checkOwner	Internal 🗎		
L	renounceOwnership	Public !		onlyOw ner
L	transferOwnership	Public !		onlyOw ner
L	_transferOwnership	Internal 🗎	•	
WDIStanda rdToken	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
L		Public !		ERC20



Contract	Туре	Bases	
L	getTokenInfo	Public !	NO!
L	totalBuyTaxFees	Public !	NO!
L	totalSellTaxFees	Public !	NO!
L	totalTaxFees	Public !	NO!
L	getMarketingBuyTax	External !	NO!
L	getMarketingSellTax	External !	NO!
L	getDevBuyTax	External !	NO!
L	getDevSellTax	External !	NO!
L	getLpBuyTax	External !	NO!
L	getLpSellTax	External !	NO!
L	setExclusionFromFee	Public !	<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	setExclusionFromTxLimit	Public !	<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	setExclusionFromWalletLimit	Public !	<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	updateMarketingWallet	External !	<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	updateDevWallet	External !	<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	<mark>updateMarketingBuyTax</mark>	External !	<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	updateMarketingSellTax	External !	onlyOw ner
L	<mark>updateDevBuyTax</mark>	External !	onlyOw ner
L	updateDevSellTax	External !	onlyOw ner



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	<mark>updateLpBuyTax</mark>	External !		<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	updateLpSellTax	External !		<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	updateMaxWalletAmount	External !		<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	updateMaxTransactionAmount	External !		<mark>onlyOw</mark> ner
L	_swapAndAddLiquidity	Internal 🔒		onlySw apping
L	_transfer	Internal 🗎		
L		External !	@s	NO!

Legend


Symbol	Meaning
	Function can modify state
	Function is payable



Call Graph remove Liquidity ETH Supporting Fee On Transfer Tokensremove Liquidity ETHWith Permit Supporting Fee On Transfer Tokensswap Exact Tokens For Tokens Supporting Fee On Transfer Tokens

swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens


swap Exact Tokens For ETH Supporting Fee On Transfer Tokens



_msgData



UML Class Diagram





About SCRL

SCRL (Previously name SECURI LAB) was established in 2020, and its goal is to deliver a security solution for Web3 projects by expert security researchers. To verify the security of smart contracts, they have developed internal tools and KYC solutions for Web3 projects using industry-standard technology. SCRL was created to solve security problems for Web3 projects. They focus on technology for conciseness in security auditing. They have developed Python-based tools for their internal use called WAS and SCRL. Their goal is to drive the crypto industry in Thailand to grow with security protection technology.

全SCRL

Smart Contract Audit

Our top-tier security strategy combines static analysis, fuzzing, and a custom detector for maximum efficiency.

scrl.io



Follow Us On:

Website	https://scrl.io/
Twitter	https://twitter.com/scrl_io
Telegram	https://t.me/scrl_io
Medium	https://scrl.medium.com/