全ちこれ上 Full Audit Report BTFD Coin Security Assessment





BTFD Coin Security Assessment

FULL AUDIT REPORT

Security Assessment by SCRL on Wednesday, November 6, 2024

SCRL is deliver a security solution for Web3 projects by expert security researchers.



Executive Summary

For this security assessment, SCRL received a request on Thursday, October 31, 2024

Client		Language	Audit Method	Confidential	Network (Chain	Contract		
BTFD Coin		Solidity	Whitebox	Public	Ethereu	m	0x6AAbBCE	679815974580dE2875	a22AfF3dEba1bA8
Report Version	on	Twitter		Telegram			Website		
1.2		https://x.com/b	tfd coin	https://t.me/	btfd coin		https://ww	vw.btfd.io/	
Scoring:		Scoring							
		0	1 2	3 4	5 6	7	8 9	10	
Vulnerak	oilit	y Summary		1	2		0	0	Ō
	7	Total Find	dings Ur	nresolved	Resolved		Mitigate	Acknowledge	Decline
	0	Critical High					pose a se blockchai High-seve	everity is assigned to securi vere threat to the smart con n ecosystem. Perity issues should be addre te risk of exploitation and p	ntract and the entire
•	0	Medium					reasonab	tial to fix medium-severity le timeframe to enhance the contract.	
•	1	Low	1 resolved				advisable	u-severity issues can be less to address them to improvosture of the smart contra	ve the overall
	0	Very Low						severity is used for minor minimal impact and are go	
•	1	Informational	1 unresolved				direct sec	ategorize security findings rurity threat to the smart of hese findings provide addit andations	ontract or its users.
•	1	Gas- optimization	1 resolved					ins for more efficient algori nents in gas usage, even if ecure.	



Audit Scope:

File	SHA-1 Hash
BTFD.sol	61adb448d007cc24e4b72acfac9fcb0abc1e7d3e

Audit Version History:

Version	Date	Description
1.0	Friday, November 1, 2024	Preliminary Report
1.1	Saturday, November 2, 2024	Preliminary Report [with re-assessment]
1.2	Wednesday, November 6, 2024	Full Audit Report [with re-assessment]

Audit information:

Request Date	Audit Date	Re-assessment Date
Thursday, October 31, 2024	Friday, November 1, 2024	Saturday, November 2, 2024

Smart Contract Audit Summary



Security Assessment Author

Auditor: Mark K. [Security Researcher | Redteam]

Kevin N. [Security Researcher | Web3 Dev]

Yusheng T. [Security Researcher | Incident Response]

Document Approval: Ronny C. CTO & Head of Security Researcher

CEO & Founder

Digital Sign

ID: AD5B9861-829F-4ABA-A674-D9F98A78E0B1 Reason: Digitally signed by <contact@scrl.io> November 06, 2024 08:24 AM +07



Disclaimer

Regarding this security assessment, there are no guarantees about the security of the program instruction received from the client is hereinafter referred to as "Source code".

And **SCRL** hereinafter referred to as "**Service Provider**", the **Service Provider** will not be held liable for any legal liability arising from errors in the security assessment. The responsibility will be the responsibility of the **Client**, hereinafter referred to as "**Service User**" and the

Service User agrees not to be held liable to the service provider in any case. By contract Service Provider to conduct security assessments with integrity with professional ethics, and transparency to deliver security assessments to users The Service Provider has the right to postpone the delivery of the security assessment. If the security assessment is delayed whether caused by any reason and is not responsible for any delayed security assessments.

If the service provider finds a vulnerability The service provider will notify the service user via the Preliminary Report, which will be kept confidential for security. The service provider disclaims responsibility in the event of any attacks occurring whether before conducting a security assessment. Or happened later All responsibility shall be sole with the service user.


Security Assessment Is Not Financial/Investment Advice Any loss arising from any investment in any project is the responsibility of the investor.

SCRL disclaims any liability incurred. Whether it's Rugpull, Abandonment, Soft Rugpull, Exploit, Exit Scam.

Security Assessment Procedure

- Request The client must submit a formal request and follow the procedure. By submitting the source code and agreeing to the terms of service.
- 2. Audit Process

 Check for vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities from source code obtained by experts using formal verification methods, including using powerful tools such as Static Analysis, SWC Registry, Dynamic Security Analysis, Automated Security Tools, CWE, Syntax & Parameter Check with AI, WAS (Warning Avoidance System a python script tools powered by SCRL).
- 3. Security Assessment Deliver Preliminary Security Assessment to clients to acknowledge the risks and vulnerabilities.
- 4. **Consulting**Discuss on risks and vulnerabilities encountered by clients to apply to their source code to mitigate risks.
 - a. **Re-assessment** Reassess the security when the client implements the source code improvements and if the client is satisfied with the results of the audit. We will proceed to the next step.
- 5. **Full Audit Report** SCRL provides clients with official security assessment reports informing them of risks and vulnerabilities. Officially and it is assumed that the client has been informed of all the information.





Risk Rating

Risk rating using this commonly defined: $Risk\ rating = impact * confidence$ Impact

The severity and potential impact of an attacker attack

Confidence Ensuring that attackers expose and use this vulnerability

Confidence	Low	Medium	High
Impact [Likelihood]			
Low	Very Low	Low	Medium
Medium	Low	Medium	High
High	Medium	High	Critical

Severity is a risk assessment It is calculated from the Impact and Confidence values using the following calculation methods,

Risk rating = impact * confidence It is categorized into

7 categories severity based



For Informational & Non-class/Optimization/Best-practices will not be counted as severity

Category






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About SCRL



Source Units in Scope

Source Units Analyzed: 1

Source Units in Scope: 1 (100%)

Ty pe	File	Logi c Cont racts	Inter face s	Li ne s	nLi ne s	nS LO C	Com men t Line s	Com plex. Scor e	Capa bilitie s
	src/Coin Token.so	3	2	35 2	28 1	125	168	96	Š ♣ -☆-
₩ •	Totals	3	2	35 2	28 1	125	168	96	Š ♣

Legend: [-]

- Lines: total lines of the source unit
- nLines: normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
- nSLOC: normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
- Comment Lines: lines containing single or block comments
- **Complexity Score**: a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)



Visibility, Mutability, Modifier function testing

Components


Contracts	E Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1	0	0	0


Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.



StateVariables





Dependencies / External Imports

yes

Dependency / Import Path	Count
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol	1



Vulnerability Findings

ID	Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Category	Status
SEC-01	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)	Low	Best Practices	Resolved
CEN-01	Centralization Risk (Token Distribution)	Informational	Centralization	Acknowledge
GAS-01	Use Custom Errors	Gas-optimization	Gas Optimization	Resolved





SEC-01: Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)	Low	Check on finding	Best Practices	Resolved

Finding:

CoinToken.constructor(string,string,uint256,uint256,address,address).feeReceiver_(src/CoinToken.sol:348) lacks a zero-check on :

• address(feeReceiver_).transfer(msg.value) (src/CoinToken.sol#350)

Recommendation:

Check that the address is not zero.

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

Alleviation:

BTFD Team already **resolved** this issue.



CEN-01: Centralization Risk (Token Distribution)

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Centralization Risk (Token Distribution)	Informational	Check on finding	Centralization	Acknowledge

Finding:

Despite the Token Contract <u>not containing any malicious functions</u> that can be executed by the Owner, But, it has been identified that token contracts do not adequately define token distribution, with only one token holder **owning 100% as of Saturday, November 2, 2024**. This presents a significant risk of centralization, and all potential participants must give careful consideration to this matter.

We strongly urge all participants **always promptly to verify token holdings** at https://gopluslabs.io/token-security/1/0x6AAbBCE679815974580dE2875a22AfF3dEba1bA8 or https://etherscan.io/token/0x6AAbBCE679815974580dE2875a22AfF3dEba1bA8#balances

***Note: Please note that SCRL is not responsible for any investments. And this document is not an investment recommendation document. If any project is in the pre-sale stage, please participate it at your own risk. https://chat.scrl.io/hc/scrl-help-center/articles/1717548722-understand-the-risk-of-de-fi-web3

Recommendation:

We recommend creating a distribution token & liquidity lock contract to clearly define the distribution ratio for tokens such as Developer, Marketing, Liquidity, and further considerations below.

In terms of timeframes, there are three categories: short-term, long-term, and permanent.

For short-term solutions, a combination of timelock and multi-signature (2/3 or 3/5) can be used to mitigate risk by delaying sensitive operations and avoiding a single point of failure in key management. This includes implementing a timelock with a reasonable latency, such as 48 hours, for privileged operations; assigning privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent private key compromise; and sharing the timelock contract and multi-signer addresses with the public via a medium/blog link.

For long-term solutions, a combination of timelock and DAO can be used to apply decentralization and transparency to the system. This includes implementing a timelock with a reasonable latency, such as 48 hours, for privileged operations; introducing a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement; and sharing the timelock contract, multi-signer addresses, and DAO information with the public via a medium/blog link.

Finally, permanent solutions should be implemented to ensure the ongoing security and protection of the system.

Alleviation: BTFD Team acknowledge this issue.



GAS-01: Use Custom Errors

Vulnerability Detail	Severity	Location	Category	Status
Use Custom Errors	-	Check on finding	Gas Optimization	Resolved

Finding:

```
File: CoinToken.sol
261:
             require(currentAllowance >= amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds
allowance");
300:
             require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "ERC20: decreased allowance
below zero");
308:
             require(sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
309:
             require(recipient != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");
             require(senderBalance >= amount, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds
313:
balance");
323:
             require(owner != address(0), "ERC20: approve from the zero address");
324:
             require(spender != address(0), "ERC20: approve to the zero address");
```

Recommendation:

Replace error strings with custom errors to reduce deployment and runtime costs. This approach can lead to significant gas savings in Solidity 0.8.4 and above, as custom errors consume less gas than error strings. More information can be found in the Solidity documentation on custom errors.

Alleviation:

BTFD Team already **resolved** this issue.



SWC Findings

ID	Title	Scanning	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Complete	No risk
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Complete	No risk
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	Complete	No risk
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	Complete	No risk
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Complete	No risk
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Complete	No risk
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Complete	No risk
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Complete	No risk
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Complete	No risk
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Complete	No risk
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Complete	No risk
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Complete	No risk
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Complete	No risk
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Complete	No risk
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Complete	No risk



SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Complete	No risk
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Complete	No risk
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Complete	No risk
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Complete	No risk
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Complete	No risk
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Complete	No risk
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Complete	No risk
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Complete	No risk
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Complete	No risk
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Complete	No risk
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Complete	No risk
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Complete	No risk
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Complete	No risk
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Complete	No risk
SWC-129	Typographical Error	Complete	No risk
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Complete	No risk



SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Complete	No risk
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Complete	No risk
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Complete	No risk
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Complete	No risk
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Complete	No risk
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Complete	No risk





Contracts Description Table

Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
BTFD	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata		
L		Public !	•	NO!
L	name	External !		NO!
L	symbol	External !		NO!
L	decimals	External !		NO!
L	totalSupply	External !		NO!
L	balanceOf	External !		NO !
L	transfer	External !		NO!
L	allowance	External !		NO!
L	approve	External !		NO!
L	transferFrom	External !	•	NO!
L	increaseAllowance	External !	•	NO!
L	decreaseAllowance	External !		NO!
L	_transfer	Internal 🗎		
L	_mint	Internal 🗎		
L	_approve	Internal 🗎		
L	_spendAllowance	Internal 🔒		



Legend


Symbol	Meaning
	Function can modify state
	Function is payable








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
Call Graph













UML Class Diagram

```
BTFD
                                       BTFD.sol
Private:
 _balances: mapping(address=>uint256)
 _allowances: mapping(address=>mapping(address=>uint256))
 _totalSupply: uint256
 _name: string
 _symbol: string
 decimals: uint8
Internal:
 _transfer(from: address, to: address, amount: uint256)
 _mint(account: address, amount: uint256)
 _approve(tokenOwner: address, spender: address, amount: uint256)
 _spendAllowance(tokenOwner: address, spender: address, amount: uint256)
External:
 name(): string
 symbol(): string
 decimals(): uint8
 totalSupply(): uint256
 balanceOf(account: address): uint256
 transfer(to: address, amount: uint256): bool
 allowance(tokenOwner: address, spender: address): uint256
 approve(spender: address, amount: uint256): bool
 transferFrom(from: address, to: address, amount: uint256): bool
 increaseAllowance(spender: address, addedValue: uint256): bool
 decreaseAllowance(spender: address, subtractedValue: uint256): bool
Public:
 constructor(__name: string, __symbol: string, __totalSupply: uint256, __decimals: uint8)
```



About SCRL

SCRL (Previously name SECURI LAB) was established in 2020, and its goal is to deliver a security solution for Web3 projects by expert security researchers. To verify the security of smart contracts, they have developed internal tools and KYC solutions for Web3 projects using industry-standard technology. SCRL was created to solve security problems for Web3 projects. They focus on technology for conciseness in security auditing. They have developed Python-based tools for their internal use called WAS and SCRL. Their goal is to drive the crypto industry in Thailand to grow with security protection technology.

をSCRL

Support ALL EVM L1 - L2

Smart Contract Audit

Our top-tier security strategy combines static analysis, fuzzing, and a custom detector for maximum efficiency.

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