

10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171 WS=0
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1449 Win=8688 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2897 Win=11584 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=4345 Win=14480 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=5792 Win=176 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=7202 Win=102 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=23168 Win=0 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=10164 Win=256 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=11585 Win=28960 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=13033 Win=31856 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=14481 Win=34752 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=15929 Win=37648 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=17377 Win=40544 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1825 Win=43440 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2073 Win=46336 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2121 Win=49224 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=23169 Win=52138 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=24617 Win=55024 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=26065 Win=57920 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=27513 Win=6016 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=28072 Win=6312 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	DNS	domain > operation [response] Win=0 Len=0
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=31857 Win=6312 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=34217 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=37113 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=40009 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=43712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=45801 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=48557 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=50601 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=53497 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=56213 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=59289 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=62185 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=65081 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=66985 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=69881 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171
10.5.0.179	TCP	domain > 50237 [ACK] Seq=15 Ack=73777 Win=63712 Len=0 TSV=2924684008 TSER=19947171

Hack in the Box 07 - Kuala Lumpur

agenda

- history of fuzzing
- protocol fuzzing
- fuzzable or not?
- non-sense fuzzing
- session-based fuzzing / stateful-based fuzzing
- tools | techniques
- challenges
- getting creative
- packet fun
- predictions
- resources

fuzzing history

- “born” @ university of madison in 1989 by professor barton miller and his crew
- why ?
- buzz word in the past few years
- sorta “hope” to find 0 days
- not just a http thing
- file format fuzzing
- application fuzzing
- and...

(possible definition)/ terms/ keywords/ etc

- malformed / semi-malformed/ invalid input
- random
- target
- exception-handling
- mutations
- instrumentation
- art / creativity
- agents
- negative-testing



changed the mentality of: “but... . . that packet doesn’t follow the rfc spec”

or

“hmmmm... . . but... . . people are not supposed to send these packets”

(con)fuzzable or not?



“mainstreaming” fuzzing

- numerous bugs found in the past few years
- some of them make the news
- others probably not ...
- growth in the number of specific tools

corporate fuzzing

- again, nothing new. . . but . . . if you don't fuzz, someone else will
- fuzzing became a “common practice” (regardless if it's done correctly or not)
- delivering products / services with “basic” testing is no longer acceptable

so... protocol fuzzing

- **protocol abuse**
- **test robustness of the target**
- **from instability to crashes (or to remote code execution)**
- **if it's already hard for one to follow the rfc spec, how about the “anything but...” ?**



ohhh

fuzzers are not va scanners!

what to break in a protocol?

- **structure**
- **state**
- **semantics**

- **Buffer Overflow**
- **Integer Overflow**
- **Invalid Message**
- **Format String**
- **Fragmented Field**
- **Invalid Header**
- **Null Character**
- **Wrong Encoding**
- **Invalid Index**
- **Invalid String**
- **Recursion**
- **Truncated**
- **Underflow**
- **Missing Field**
- **Mixed Case**
- **Out of Order**
- **Self-Reference**
- **Too Many Fields**
- **Invalid Offset**

what protocols to fuzz?

- all of them, of course
- but... what's the buzz? what's new? what's not mature?
 - sip
 - scada
 - ipv6
 - wireless
 - bluetooth
 - videogames

non-sense fuzzing



session-based fuzzing

- first you establish a channel with the target and then start fuzzing at that level

stateful-based fuzzing

- one step above establishing a session
- “on-the-fly” fuzzing
- (possible) better fault isolation

techniques

- random
- database
- (mix?)

some of the challenges

- **fault isolation**
- **the “bug behind the bug”**
- **“slow” protocol implementations**
- **monitor the target (memory leaks/ cpu spikes/ some type of redundancy)**

tools

- **human**
- **spike / written in c/ block-based approach**
- **protos / java / different fuzzers**
- **peach / python / “written while drinking beer at ph-neutral”**
- **antiparser / python/ fuzzer and fault injection tool**
- **dfuzz / c**
- **sulley/ parallel fuzzing capabilities /legos**

commercial


- bestorm
- codenomicon
- hydra
- mu security
- thread-x

getting creative

- use different fuzzing tools
- use the same fuzzing tool (parallel fuzzing)
- use a framework to integrate other stuff (traffic gen, nmap, exploitation tools, etc)
- “ “ “ to integrate agents for monitoring
- well... use any tools available

packets

packets (cont)



packets (again)

Sj	12	0.22909	
l1	14	0.24676	
l1	16	0.28126	
[1]	18	0.29439	
l1	20	0.30929	
	41	3.02484	
	50	3.05925	
	52	3.08003	
	54	3.11360	
	56	3.12535	
	58	3.13818	
	60	3.15316	
	62	3.17507	
	64	3.21275	
	75	6.02561	

Frame 52 (60 bytes on wire, 60 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: IBM_99:3b:13 (00:0d:60:99:3b:13), Dst: ArubaNet_c5:0e:90 (00:0b:86:c5:0e:90)
Internet Protocol, Src: 61.8.9.254 (61.8.9.254), Dst: 10.5.0.179 (10.5.0.179)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: krb524 (4444), Dst Port: 54728 (54728), Seq: 0, Ack: 1, Len: 0

Source port: krb524 (4444)
Destination port: 54728 (54728)
Sequence number: 0 (relative sequence number)
Acknowledgement number: 1 (relative ack number)
Header length: 20 bytes
Flags: 0x14 (RST, ACK)

packets (cont)

The screenshot shows a single packet captured by Wireshark. The packet details are as follows:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
1	0.000000	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHCP	DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x674c16fb

Packet details pane (expanded):

- Seconds elapsed: 0
- Boot flags: 0x0000 (Unicast)
- Client IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)
- Your (client) IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)
- Next server IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)
- Relay agent IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)
- Client MAC address: Intel_c8:eb:04 (00:04:23:c8:eb:04)
- Server host name not given
- Boot file name not given
- Magic cookie: (OK)
- Option: (t=53,l=1) DHCP Message Type = DHCP Discover
 - Option: (53) DHCP Message Type
 - Length: 1
 - Value: 01
- Option: (t=61,l=255) Client identifier
 - Option: (61) Client identifier
 - Length: 255

Hex and ASCII panes show the raw bytes of the packet, which is identified as a [Malformed Packet: BOOTP/DHCP].

Bottom status bar: Bootp/Dhcp option length (bootp.option.length), 1 byte

packets (last one)



```
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info
1 0.000000 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 DHCP DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x906c2c87
.....  
↳ Bootp flags: 0x0000 (Unicast)  
Client IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)  
Your (client) IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)  
Next server IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)  
Relay agent IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)  
Client MAC address: Intel_c8:eb:04 (00:04:23:c8:eb:04)  
Server host name not given  
Boot file name not given  
Magic cookie: (OK)  
↳ Option: (t=53,l=1) DHCP Message Type = DHCP Discover  
    Option: (53) DHCP Message Type  
    Length: 1  
    Value: 01  
↳ Option: (t=61,l=255) Client identifier  
    Option: (61) Client identifier  
    Length: 255  
    Value: DF1DCAC2093C61E3DAB2D2D4F96337A6870784807EB72893...  
End Option  
0110 00 00 00 00 00 00 63 82 53 63 35 01 01 3d ff df .....c. Sc5..=.  
0120 1d ca c2 09 3c 61 e3 da b2 d2 d4 f9 63 37 a6 87 .....<a. ....c7..  
0130 07 84 80 7e b7 28 93 e7 b9 4d 3d e5 fe f3 17 79 .....~(... M=....y  
0140 cf 41 1a eb 17 60 7c d8 7f f1 10 a3 32 63 a1 63 .A. ....|, ....2c, c  
0150 09 06 0d 2b db d8 89 6c 1c 5d ed ac ab 51 50 b4 .....+....l]...QP.  
0160 c9 04 18 e4 51 e5 9f ab 65 e1 22 6b a5 68 e9 40 .....Q....e.*K.h.@  
0170 e8 72 f5 5c 3f e6 8a 40 8e 87 08 54 b2 eb b2 66 ..r.?....@....T....f  
0180 20 36 31 f1 0a 9e 06 b7 16 49 c6 e9 47 0c f7 9e 61..... I.G...  
0190 a6 42 9e 5c d8 96 89 d2 57 b5 91 e4 f5 e9 9a 93 .B.\.... W.....  
01a0 bd 76 a8 28 4f ba 9e ea 3a b9 03 0e 6b 7b 29 ba .v.(0.... :....k{).  
01b0 d4 47 9a 5a 29 f5 02 27 0a 51 13 43 e3 00 ce 0d .G.Z)...'....Q.C...  
01c0 fa 18 06 97 b9 b4 68 4b 5e 19 05 d8 9a 00 08 2c .....HK^.....  
01d0 50 4b 9b bb f4 47 4d 3f 20 fa 1a 6e 04 1a 61 d3 PK....GM?....n..a.  
01e0 41 f2 bf b7 ee ad 60 96 88 7b fb 7c 54 12 6c e8 A..... .{.|T.l.  
01f0 23 a8 7f 9f 04 6f 01 ac bc d8 74 5b d7 24 7c 37 #....o....t[.$]7  
0200 b1 6d 45 25 5d a7 45 ae 31 a2 b6 b2 28 f3 33 c4 .mE%].E. 1....(.3.  
0210 da ab 88 77 89 df ab fd e5 82 3e 5d 9b 23 ff ...w.... .>].#.
```

Bootp/Dhcp option value (bootp.option.value), 255 bytes

P: 1 D: 1 M: 0

(con)fuzzing state of the security community

- “bad” security in depth implementations (dos?)
- again... lots of security is based on known attacks
- critical infrastructure (?)
- roi
- fuzzing is just one of the tools, but certainly has helped changing the way people think

predictions / crazy thoughts

- most people already got fuzzing
- more intelligence has to be incorporated to protocol fuzzing
 - protocol/ application “adaptation”
 - offline protocol fuzzing/ protocol correlation
 - redundant system testing
 - fuzzing through tunnels
 - proxy-fuzzing (not a-la spike proxy)
 - fuzz through/ on/ with non-standard media types (traffic shapers, etc)
- creativity is key : use the brain, for anything
- better integration with other tools
- anything is fuzzable

resources

- fuzzing mailing list by gadi evron
<http://www.whitestar.linuxbox.org/mailman/listinfo/fuzzing>
- book: fuzzing: brute force vulnerability discovery: pedram et al
<http://fuzzing.org>
- <http://labs.mysecurity.com>
- <http://www.hacksafe.com.au/blog/2006/08/21/fuzz-testing-tools-and-techniques/>
- http://www.immunitysec.com/downloads/advantages_of_block_based_analysis.pdf

questions?

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