

# Industrialize the Tracking of Botnet Operations

A Practical Case with Large Coin-Mining Threat-Actor(s)

## Industrialize the Tracking of Botnet Operations A Practical Case with Large Coin-Mining Threat-Actor(s)



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#### Outline

- A word about Tor web gateways
- A word about Tor web gateways our setup
- Illegitimate Cryptomining
- Making sense of the data
- Sharing analyses alongside relevant indicators
- Future Works.

- Offer an HTTP or SOCKS5 proxy to the tor network,
- onion.to, tor2web.in, tor2web.it, tor2web.su, onion.re, tor2web.su, onion.com.de, onion.sh, tor2web.io, etc.
- used to protect publishers' anonymity without regards for users',
- some use official tor2web python tool<sup>1</sup>,
- can log everything,
- can tamper with users' HTTP traffic (adding ads, scripts),
- can be malicious (redirects, binary injection)
- can be used to host C2 hidden services.

<sup>1</sup>https://github.com/tor2web/

- In August 2020, we got an itch to set up a Tor web gateway, interested in understanding what is the part of truth in our previous slide,
- after very few advertisments about it on twitter and elsewhere, we started to receive repeating HTTP requests (maybe to assess the service reliability)
- On October 20th, we started to receive requests with this kind of referer:

61.153.75.222\_root\_x86\_64\_controller\_73ebe5e5ba4a522bc839d46dea1c8a3e\_NDMgK1AqICogK1Avcm9vdc8uc3lzdc VtZC1zZXJ2aWNlLnNoID4g12Rld19udwxsIDI+JjEgJgowICAqLzMgICogICogICogL2Jpb191YXNoIC91c3Ivb6llL3B5dGhvbj IUN19zaXRlLXBhY2thZ2VzL2VDb6Fzc1JlY292ZXJ5L3ZlY195ZMNvdmVye59zY3JpcHybXlzcWxfYmFrLnNoCg==

115.236.179.140\_yarn\_x86\_64\_hellowin1\_c496dacf7034371127de6f4bcad7e4c0\_NDIgKiAqICogKiAvdmFyL2xpYi9oY WRvb3AteWFybi8uc3lzdGVtZC1zZXJ2aWNlLnNoID4gL2Rldi9udWxsIDI+JjEgJgo=

41.175.8.163\_postgres\_x86\_64\_paygosandbox\_776ee77610be03536a302ca1d8acc69d\_MjQgKlAqICogKlAvdmFyL2xpY 19wZ3NxbC8uc3lzdGVtZC1zZXJ2aWNlLnNoID4gL2Rld19udWxsIDI+JjEgJgo=


117.62.172.163\_yarn\_x86\_64\_bigdata05\_b7e1f989ae02b183a2507c1ce83de468\_

• base64 decoded contents looked somethings like that:

```
1 * * * * /root/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
    * * * * /usr/local/dbappsecurity/edr/loopstart_edr.sh
0 * * * * ntpdate cn.ntp.org.cn
18 * * * * /var/lib/postgresql/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
    */1 * * * * sh /root/wxb/kill-out/wxb_kill-out.sh
    */5 * * * * sh /usr/local/bin/wxb_secure_ssh.sh
12 * * * * /home/hadoop/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
    8 * * * * /var/lib/postgresql/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
43 * * * * /var/lib/pgsql/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
```

 We soon started to collect binaries and to automate some aspects of the analysis.

#### Our setup




#### Our setup

D4 collects logs files as produced and push them in a redis list, then:

- we grok the log files and push the result in a RedisGraph,
- we use a combination of CYPHER and RedisSearch queries to navigate the data,
- we use redisinsight for the visualization

```
MATCH (b:Bot)-[r:reach]->(cc:CC)
WHERE b.firstseen CONTAINS "/Apr/2021"
RETURN b, cc
```

#### Our setup



These referers fields...

CALL db.idx.fulltext.queryNodes('Command', '"http"|"https"') YIELD RETURN node.content

These referers fields...

CALL db.idx.fulltext.queryNodes('Command', 'REDIS000\*') YIELD node RETURN node

#### External analyses

By that time other analyses with common IoCs or similar techniques appeared:

- SystemdMiner <sup>2</sup>
- PGMiner <sup>3</sup>

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
dreambus Botnet <sup>4</sup>

We are observing linux-based cryptomining botnets targeting redis, postgresql, yarn, jenkins, spark, saltsack, consul and SSH.


#### External analyses

25wlksd35c2fs55rnhlcfz3jjaujxmbmfkvrxeu7tkgnnesdhh3gghqd	dreambus
2iuu6o3zbmwynik2	
3h3gavz23bzxaucinuaxzydia2q2sksxw5w42mqn7w6ihtqyxtjzd6ad	
4iucigxvlfx4vcqn5sordersaa3a3ztjcaoszptxxo5b3pbn6nlwsfad	dreambus
4k6jta4zrwzm7u54am3vnjpnlvlbujyvrtprytf4scmrw7u3udmgqaqd	
5ixhieezozxwnvisopgxoba6ssbsrvdpxeduxb4jc6zx7s56rufrjzad	
7jmrbtrvkgcqkldzyob4kotpyvsgz546yvik2xv4rpnfmrhe4imxthqd	
aptgetgxqs3secda	SystemdMiner
bggts547gukhvmf4cgandlgxxphengxovoyo6ewhns5qmmb2b5oi43yd	dreambus
dreambusweduybcp	dreambus, PGMiner dreambus
i62hmnztfpzwrhjg34m6ruxem5oe36nulzmxcgbdbkiaceubprkta7ad	dreambus
ji55jjplpknk7eayxxtb5o3ulxuevntutsdanov5dp3wya7l7btjv4qd	PGMiner
jk5zra7b3yq32timb27n4qj5udk4w2l5kqn5ulhnugdscelttfhtoyd	PGMiner
kklulqbwyj3s3g2i2otjajef2a3kychks2t3agsbv2hdwtiymkbnueid mazeclmhbacucxin	
mhevkk4odgzqpt2hbj3hhw2uz4vhunoo55evewrgmouyiehcaltmbrqd	
nssnkct6udyyx6zlv4l6jhqr5jdf643shyerk246fs27ksrdehl2z3qd	dreambus. PGMiner
ojk5zra7b3yq32timb27n4qj5udk4w2l5kqn5ulhnugdscelttfhtoyd	dreambus, PGMiner
plgs6otqdiu7snxdfwjnidhw4ncmp5qvvxi5gepiszg75kxebwci2wad	dreambus, r divinier
qsts2vqotnlh2h5xwa7fp3iopb7h7cngknjjo4f4sxhrwcqgughipxid	dreambus
rapid7cpfqnwxodo	SystemdMiner
rxmxpzfkydkulhhqnuftbmf6d5q67jjchopmh4ofszfwwnmz4bqq2fid	Systematriner
ryukdssuskovhnwb	
sg722jwocbvedckhd4dptpqfek5fsbmx3v57qg6lzhuo56np73mb3zyd	dreambus
tencentxiy5kpccv	
trumpzwlvlyrvlss	SystemdMiner
va6xh4hqgb754klsffjamjgotlq7mne3lyyrhu5vhypakbumzeo4c4ad	
wacpnnso4ottxlyvjp2adaieaivxx2saxoymednidp3zyfoqfc5jpqad	

wdtiia7l7nhvj4dlwt64coa6y2ujyiv3w7g2pmsf5oidnfgkczeumead wzzyv2nptjuxcqoibeklxese46j4uonzaapwyl6wwhdknjlqlcoeu7id y4mcrfeigcaa2robjk3azb2qwcd5hk45xpoaddupmdwv24qoggnmdbid yrxxxqia45xxcdqfwyx4pk6ufyanazdwjibv3de7r4mrtyztt5mpw35yd



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#### They look all related

25wlksd35c2fs55rnhlcfz3jjaujxmbmfkvrxeu7tkgnnesdhh3gghqd	dreambus	related
2iuu6o3zbmwynik2		related
4iucigxvlfx4vcqn5sordersaa3a3ztjcaoszptxxo5b3pbn6nlwsfad	dreambus	related
4k6jta4zrwzm7u54am3vnjpnlvlbujyvrtprytf4scmrw7u3udmgqaqd		related
5ixhieezozxwnvisopgxoba6ssbsrvdpxeduxb4jc6zx7s56rufrjzad		related
7jmrbtrvkgcqkldzyob4kotpyvsgz546yvik2xv4rpnfmrhe4imxthqd		related
aptgetgxqs3secda	SystemdMiner	
bggts547gukhvmf4cgandlgxxphengxovoyo6ewhns5qmmb2b5oi43yd	dreambus	related
dreambusweduybcp	dreambus, PGMiner	
i62hmnztfpzwrhjg34m6ruxem5oe36nulzmxcgbdbkiaceubprkta7ad	dreambus	related
ji55jjplpknk7eayxxtb5o3ulxuevntutsdanov5dp3wya7l7btjv4qd	dreambus	related
jk5zra7b3yq32timb27n4qj5udk4w2l5kqn5ulhnugdscelttfhtoyd	PGMiner	
kklulqbwyj3s3g2i2otjajef2a3kychks2t3agsbv2hdwtiymkbnueid		related
mazeclmhbacucxin		
mhevkk4odgzqpt2hbj3hhw2uz4vhunoo55evewrgmouyiehcaltmbrqd		related
nssnkct6udyyx6zlv4l6jhqr5jdf643shyerk246fs27ksrdehl2z3qd	dreambus, PGMiner	related
ojk5zra7b3yq32timb27n4qj5udk4w2l5kqn5ulhnugdscelttfhtoyd	dreambus, PGMiner	related
plgs6otqdiu7snxdfwjnidhw4ncmp5qvvxi5gepiszg75kxebwci2wad		related
qsts2vqotnlh2h5xwa7fp3iopb7h7cngknjjo4f4sxhrwcqgughipxid	dreambus	related
rapid7cpfqnwxodo	SystemdMiner	related
rxmxpzfkydkulhhqnuftbmf6d5q67jjchopmh4ofszfwwnmz4bqq2fid	Systemawiner	related
rvukdssuskovhnwb		related
	dreambus	related
sg722jwocbvedckhd4dptpqfek5fsbmx3v57qg6lzhuo56np73mb3zyd	areambus	related
tencentxjy5kpccv	C . IV.	related
trumpzwlvlyrvlss	SystemdMiner	
va6xh4hqgb754klsffjamjgotlq7mne3lyyrhu5vhypakbumzeo4c4ad		related
wacpnnso4ottxlyvjp2adaieaivxx2saxoymednidp3zyfoqfc5jpqad		related
wdtiia7l7nhvj4dlwt64coa6y2ujyiv3w7g2pmsf5oidnfgkczeumead		related
wvzyv2nptjuxcqoibeklxese46j4uonzaapwyl6wvhdknjlqlcoeu7id		related
y4mcrfeigcaa2robjk3azb2qwcd5hk45xpoaddupmdwv24qoggnmdbid		related
yrxxxqia45xxcdqfwyx4pk6ufyanazdwjbv3de7r4mrtyztt5mpw35yd		related

Unpacking binaries

Binaries are packed with UPX and made unusable by UPX -d by modifying the magic UPX string:


```
00000010: 0200 3e00 0100 0000 2872 4c00 0000 0000
                                                 000000e0: 1000 0000 0000 0000 deda 8b5f 00ff 9941
                                                   .....A 000000e0: 1000 0000 0000 18b9 39c1 dfdd 3033
#!/usr/bln/env python
                                                                  #!/usr/bin/env python
import sys
                                                                  import sys
def main(srcFilename):
                                                                  def main(srcFilename):
   f = open(srcFilename, 'rb')
                                                                      f = open(srcFilename, 'rb')
                                                                      s = open(srcFilename+'_dfdd3033', 'wb+')
   s = open(srcFilename+' 00ff9941', 'wb+')
   header = f.read(0xea)
                                                                      header = f.read(0xea)
   s.wrlte(header)
                                                                      s.write(header)
   bindata = f.read()
                                                                      bindata = f.read()
   f.close()
                                                                      f.close()
   bindata = bindata.replace(b'\x00\xff\x99\x41'.'UPX!')
                                                                      bindata = bindata.replace(b'\xdf\xdd\x30\x33','UPX!')
   s.write(bindata)
                                                                      s.write(bindata)
   f.close()
                                                                      f.close()
   name == ' main ':
                                                                     name == ' main ':
   main(sys.argy[1])
                                                                      main(sys.argv[1])
```

Unpacking binaries


```
Packed binaries match this yara rule:
```

```
rule torcryptomining
{
    strings:
        $upx_erase = {(00 FF 99 41|DF DD 30 33)}
    condition:
        $upx_erase at 236
}
```

Unpacking binaries




#### Unpacking binaries




#### Unpacking binaries - retrohunt

- retrohunt brought 47 binaries spanning from 15th January 2021 to this day,
- XMR stratum proxies don't change over binary repacking:

```
"url": "119.205.235.58:443",
"url": "119.205.235.58:8080",
"url": "136.243.90.99:443",
"url": "136.243.90.99:8080",
"url": "153.127.216.132:8080",
"url": "164.132.105.114:443",
"url": "164.132.105.114:8080",
"url": "94.176.237.229:443",
"url": "94.176.237.229:8080",
"url": "94.176.237.229:8080",
```



- From 20 October 2020
- To 31 March 2021
- Total amount of bot seen: 27186




• Median:14 days


• Mean: 28 days

• Max: 167 days (since day 1)

Looong lasting, overconnected bots

- 8 bots are present from day one,
- and reached at least 20 C2 hidden services,
- All from China.





• Median:91 days


• Mean: 96 days

• Max: 167 days (since day 1)

### Sharing analyses alongside relevant indicators



## Sharing analyses alongside relevant indicators




#### **Future Works**

- Add collection points,
- improve binary collection,
- automatically unpack binaries, extract relevant IoCs,
- use redisearch to get insights about compromised hosts,
- automatically generate daily MISP report in the daily event,
- interface with RT to notify victims.

#### End

• For more info contact info@circl.lu

• Thank you





## Legal aspects of tor2web gateways

- Operating and running Tor web gateways come with some ethical requirements,
- If you operate it for security monitoring, share the results to improve security,
- Users are not protected and they can be abused/tracked,
- By being a tor2web operator, you expose Tor hidden services and can be considered as the hoster.