

## Final Security Good Practices

Mobile Platform	Android App ; IoT System
Application domain type	Smart Home
Authentication	Yes
Authentication schemes	ID-based authentication
Has DB	Yes
Type of data storage	Distributed Storage
Which DB	
Type of data stored	Personal Information ; Confidential Data
User Registration	Yes
Type of Registration	The users will register themselves
Programming Languages	C/C++ ; Java
Input Forms	Yes
Upload Files	No
The system has logs	Yes
The system has regular updates	Yes
The system has third-party	Yes
System Cloud Environments	Hybrid Cloud
Hardware Specification	Yes
HW Authentication	Basic Authentication (user/pass)
HW Wireless Tech	3G ; 4G/LTE ; 5G ; Bluetooth ; Wi-Fi
Data Center Physical Access	Yes

## IoT Security

Internet of Things (IoT) devices fall into three main categories:

- Sensors, which gather data;
- Actuators, which effect actions;
- Gateways, which act as communication hubs and may also implement some automation logic.

All these device types may stand alone or be embedded in a larger product. They may also be complemented by a web application or mobile device app and cloud based service. IoT devices, services and software, and the communication channels that connect them, are at risk of attack by a variety of malicious parties.

Malicious intent commonly takes advantage of poor design, but even unintentional leakage of data due to ineffective security controls can also bring dire consequences to consumers and vendors. Thus it is vital that IoT devices and services have security designed in from the outset.

### Classification of Data

- Define a data classification scheme and document it;
- Assess every item of data stored, processed, transmitted or received by a device and apply a data classification rating to it;
- Ensure the security design protects every data item and collections of items against unauthorised viewing, changing or deletion, to at least its classification rating or higher.

### Physical Security

- Any interface used for administration or test purposes during development should be removed from a production device, disabled or made physically inaccessible;
- All test access points on production units must be disabled or locked, for example by blowing on-chip fuses to disable JTAG;
- If a production device must have an administration port, ensure it has effective access controls, e.g. strong credential management, restricted ports, secure protocols etc.;
- Make the device circuitry physically inaccessible to tampering, e.g. epoxy chips to circuit board, resin encapsulation, hiding data and address lines under these components etc.;
- Provide secure protective casing and mounting options for deployment of devices in exposed locations;
- For high-security deployments, consider design measures such as active masking or shielding to protect against side-channel attacks.

### Device Secure Boot

- Make sure the ROM-based secure boot function is always used. Use a multi-stage bootloader initiated by a minimal amount of read-only code;
- Use a hardware-based tamper-resistant capability (e.g. a microcontroller security subsystem, Secure Access Module (SAM) or Trusted Platform Module (TPM)) to store crucial data items and run the trusted authentication/cryptographic functions required for the boot process. Its limited secure storage capacity must hold the read-only first stage of the bootloader and all other data required to verify the authenticity of firmware;
- Check each stage of boot code is valid and trusted immediately before running that code. Validating code immediately before its use can reduce the risk of attacks;

- At each stage of the boot sequence, wherever possible, check that only the expected hardware is present and matches the stage's configuration parameters;
- Do not boot the next stage of device functionality until the previous stage has been successfully booted;
- Ensure failures at any stage of the boot sequence fail gracefully into a secure state, to ensure no unauthorised access is gained to underlying systems, code or data. Any code run must have been previously authenticated.

## Secure Operating System

- Include in the operating system (OS) only those components (libraries, modules, packages etc.) that are required to support the functions of the device;
- Shipment should include the latest stable OS component versions available;
- Devices should be designed and shipped with the most secure configuration in place;
- Continue to update OS components to the latest stable versions throughout the lifetime of a deployed device;
- Disable all ports, protocols and services that are not used;
- Set permissions so users/applications cannot write to the root file system;
- If required, accounts for ordinary users/applications must have minimum access rights to perform the necessary functions. Separate administrator accounts (if required) will have greater rights of access. Do not run anything as root unless genuinely unavoidable;
- Ensure all files and directories are given the minimum access rights to perform the required functions;
- Consider implementing an encrypted file system.

## Application Security

- Applications must be operated at the lowest privilege level possible, not as root. Applications must only have access to those resources they need;
- Applications should be isolated from each other. For example, use sandboxing techniques such as virtual machines, containerisation, Secure Computing Mode (seccomp), etc
- Ensure compliance with in-country data processing regulations;
- Ensure all errors are handled gracefully and any messages produced do not reveal any sensitive information;
- Never hard-code credentials into an application. Credentials must be stored separately in secure trusted storage and must be updateable in a way that ensures security is maintained;
- Remove all default user accounts and passwords;
- Use the most recent stable version of the operating system and libraries;
- Never deploy debug versions of code. The distribution should not include compilers, files containing developer comments, sample code, etc.;
- Consider the impact on the application/system if network connectivity is lost. Aim to maintain normal functionality and security wherever possible.

## Credential Management

- A device should be uniquely identifiable by means of a factory-set tamper resistant hardware identifier if possible;
- Use good password management techniques, for example no blank or simple passwords allowed, never send passwords across a network (wired or wireless) in clear text, and employ a secure password reset process;
- Each password stored for authenticating credentials must use an industry standard hash function, along with a unique salt value that is not obvious (for example, not a username);
- Store credentials or encryption keys in a Secure Access Module (SAM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Hardware Security Module (HSM) or trusted key store if possible;
- Aim to use 2-factor authentication for accessing sensitive data if possible;
- Ensure a trusted & reliable time source is available where authentication methods require this, e.g. for digital certificates;
- A certificate used to identify a device must be unique and only used to identify that one device. Do not reuse the certificate across multiple devices;
- A "factory reset" function must fully remove all user data/credentials stored on a device.

## Encryption

- When configuring a secure connection, if an encryption protocol offers a negotiable selection of algorithms, remove weaker options so they cannot be selected for use in a downgrade attack;
- Store encryption keys in a Secure Access Module (SAM), Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Hardware Security Module (HSM) or trusted key store if possible;
- Do not use insecure protocols, e.g. FTP, Telnet;
- It should be possible to securely replace encryption keys remotely;
- If implementing public/private key cryptography, use unique keys per device and avoid using global keys. A device's private key should be generated by that device or supplied by an associated secure credential solution, e.g. smart card. It should remain on that device and never be shared/visible to elsewhere.

## Network Connections

- Activate only those network interfaces that are required (wired, wireless - including Bluetooth etc.);
- Run only those services on the network that are required;
- Open up only those network ports that are required;
- Run a correctly configured software firewall on the device if possible;

- Always use secure protocols, e.g. HTTPS, SFTP;
- Never exchange credentials in clear text or over weak solutions such as HTTP Basic Authentication;
- Authenticate every incoming connection to ensure it comes from a legitimate source.
- Authenticate the destination before sending sensitive data.

## Logging

- Ensure all logged data comply with prevailing data protection regulations;
- Run the logging function in its own operating system process, separate from other functions;
- Store log files in their own partition, separate from other system files.
- Set log file maximum size and rotate logs;
- Where logging capacity is limited, just log start-up and shutdown parameters, login/access attempts and anything unexpected;
- Restrict access rights to log files to the minimum required to function;
- If logging to a central repository, send log data over a secure channel if the logs carry sensitive data and/or protection against tampering of logs must be assured;
- Implement log "levels" so that lightweight logging can be the standard approach, but with the option to run more detailed logging when required;
- Monitor and analyse logs regularly to extract valuable information and insight;
- Passwords and other secret information should not ever be displayed in logs.

(<https://www.iotsecurityfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Best-Practice-Guides-Release-1.2.1.pdf>)[<https://www.iotsecurityfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Best-Practice-Guides-Release-1.2.1.pdf>]

## Java and C# Security Flavour Implementation

Since mobile-application security for the permissions-based Android platform and currently use Java and C# programming languages, in order to ensure security in the software, the SDLC should take into account the following procedures:

- Use mechanisms that enforce access control of applications to system resources, by defining permissions and protection domains and by using access control algorithms;
- Pay attention to setting the access level (private, package, protected and public) for each reference to an element of a primitive data or to an object; \* Use mechanisms that enforce language conventions, that is, lower-level mechanisms that require, among other things, that programs interfere with the normal operation of the sandbox, during compilation, loading in the virtual machine (VM) of the bytecodes, and execution. For compilation and loading in the VM of the bytecodes, static code analysis is used, and dynamic code analysis is performed.

In the event of runtime authorization failures, when an access control policy does not grant sufficient permissions to a user or an access control policy grants users unneeded permissions, the system may be exposed to security attacks. In this case, it is recommended to use the two major approaches in the Java and .Net Common Language Runtime platforms:

\* Stack-based Access Control (SBAC): Ensure that only programs that satisfy a set of permission requirements gain access to restricted resources. SBAC systems should always stick to the Principle of Least Privilege; \* Role-based Access Control (RBAC): is a mechanism to restrict access to authorized users. RBAC systems provide access control based on permissions and roles.

Not addressing this requirement may lead to vulnerabilities explored by attacks such as: \* Missing authentication: Missing authentication is a security vulnerability that occurs in software that does not perform any authentication for functionalities that require a provable user identity or consume a significant amount of resources.

## Input Validation

**Input validation** is performed to ensure only properly formed data is entering the workflow in an information system, preventing malformed data from persisting in the database and triggering malfunction of various downstream components.

### Implementing input validation

- Data type validators available natively in web application frameworks;
- Validation against JSON Schema and XML Schema (XSD) for input in these formats;
- Type conversion (e.g. Integer.parseInt() in Java, int() in Python) with strict exception handling;
- Minimum and maximum value range check for numerical parameters and dates;
- Minimum and maximum length check for strings;
- Array of allowed values for small sets of string parameters (e.g. days of week);
- Regular expressions for any other structured data covering the whole input string (^...\$) and not using "any character" wildcard (such as . or \S)

If it's well structured data, like dates, social security numbers, zip codes, e-mail addresses, etc. then the developer should be able to define a very strong validation pattern, usually based on regular expressions, for validating such input. If the input field comes from a fixed set of options, like a drop down list or radio buttons, then the input needs to match exactly one of the values offered to the user in the first place. Free-form text, especially with Unicode characters, is perceived as difficult to validate due to a relatively large space of characters that need to be whitelisted. The primary means of input validation for free-form text input should be:

- Normalization: Ensure canonical encoding is used across all the text and no invalid characters are present;
- Character category whitelisting: Unicode allows whitelisting categories such as "decimal digits" or "letters" which not only covers the Latin alphabet but also various other scripts used globally (e.g. Arabic, Cyrillic, CJK ideographs etc);
- Individual character whitelisting: If you allow letters and ideographs in names and also want to allow apostrophe ' for Irish names, but don't want to allow the whole punctuation category.

## Client Side vs Server Side Validation

Be aware that any JavaScript input validation performed on the client can be bypassed by an attacker that disables JavaScript or uses a Web Proxy. Ensure that any input validation performed on the client is also performed on the server.

## Email Validation Basics

Many web applications do not treat email addresses correctly due to common misconceptions about what constitutes a valid address. Specifically, it is completely valid to have an mailbox address which:

- Is case sensitive in the local portion of the address (left of the rightmost @ character);
- Has non-alphanumeric characters in the local-part (including + and @);
- Has zero or more labels.

Following RFC 5321, best practice for validating an email address would be to:

- Check for presence of at least one @ symbol in the address;
- Ensure the local-part is no longer than 64 octets;
- Ensure the domain is no longer than 255 octets;
- Ensure the address is deliverable.

[https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Input\\_Validation\\_Cheat\\_Sheet.md](https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Input_Validation_Cheat_Sheet.md)

## Session Management

A web session is a sequence of network HTTP request and response transactions associated to the same user. Modern and complex web applications require the retaining of information or status about each user for the duration of multiple requests. Therefore, sessions provide the ability to establish variables - such as access rights and localization settings - which will apply to each and every interaction a user has with the web application for the duration of the session.

Additionally, web applications will make use of sessions once the user has authenticated. This ensures the ability to identify the user on any subsequent requests as well as being able to apply security access controls, authorized access to the user private data, and to increase the usability of the application. Therefore, current web applications can provide session capabilities both pre and post authentication.

### Session ID Properties

In order to keep the authenticated state and track the users progress within the web application, applications provide users with a session identifier (session ID or token) that is assigned at session creation time, and is shared and exchanged by the user and the web application for the duration of the session. The session ID is a name=value pair.

With the goal of implementing secure session IDs, the generation of identifiers (IDs or tokens) must meet the following properties:

#### Session ID Name Fingerprinting

The name used by the session ID should not be extremely descriptive nor offer unnecessary details about the purpose and meaning of the ID. It is recommended to change the default session ID name of the web development framework to a generic name, such as id.

#### Session ID Length

The session ID must be long enough to prevent brute force attacks, where an attacker can go through the whole range of ID values and verify the existence of valid sessions. The session ID length must be at least 128 bits (16 bytes).

#### Session ID Entropy

The session ID must be unpredictable (random enough) to prevent guessing attacks, where an attacker is able to guess or predict the ID of a valid session through statistical analysis techniques. For this purpose, a good PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator) must be used. The session ID value must provide at least 64 bits of entropy (if a good PRNG is used, this value is estimated to be half the length of the session ID).

#### Session ID Content (or Value)

The session ID content (or value) must be meaningless to prevent information disclosure attacks, where an attacker is able to decode the contents of the ID and extract details of the user, the session, or the inner workings of the web application.

The session ID must simply be an identifier on the client side, and its value must never include sensitive information. The meaning and business or application logic associated to the session ID must be stored on the server side, and specifically, in session objects or in a session management database or repository.

The stored information can include the client IP address, User-Agent, e-mail, username, user ID, role, privilege level, access rights, language preferences, account ID, current state, last login, session timeouts, and other internal session details. If the session objects and properties contain sensitive information, such

as credit card numbers, it is required to duly encrypt and protect the session management repository. It is recommended to create cryptographically strong session IDs through the usage of cryptographic hash functions such as SHA256.

#### Inactivity Time Out\*

Authenticated sessions should timeout after determined period of inactivity - 15 minutes is recommended.

#### Login & Logout

New session IDs should be created on login (to prevent session fixation via XSS on sibling domains or subdomains). Upon logout the session ID should be invalidated on the server side and deleted on the client via expiration/overwriting the value.

#### Cookies

The session ID exchange mechanism based on cookies provides multiple security features in the form of cookie attributes that can be used to protect the exchange of the session ID:

**Secure Attribute** The Secure cookie attribute instructs web browsers to only send the cookie through an encrypted HTTPS (SSL/TLS) connection. This session protection mechanism is mandatory to prevent the disclosure of the session ID through MitM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks. It ensures that an attacker cannot simply capture the session ID from web browser traffic.

**HttpOnly Attribute** The HttpOnly cookie attribute instructs web browsers not to allow scripts an ability to access the cookies via the DOM document.cookie object. This session ID protection is mandatory to prevent session ID stealing through XSS attacks.

**SameSite Attribute** SameSite allows a server define a cookie attribute making it impossible to the browser send this cookie along with cross-site requests. The main goal is mitigate the risk of cross-origin information leakage, and provides some protection against cross-site request forgery attacks.

**Domain and Path Attributes** The Domain cookie attribute instructs web browsers to only send the cookie to the specified domain and all subdomains. If the attribute is not set, by default the cookie will only be sent to the origin server. The Path cookie attribute instructs web browsers to only send the cookie to the specified directory or subdirectories (or paths or resources) within the web application. If the attribute is not set, by default the cookie will only be sent for the directory (or path) of the resource requested and setting the cookie.

**Expire and Max-Age Attributes** Typically, session management capabilities to track users after authentication make use of non-persistent cookies. This forces the session to disappear from the client if the current web browser instance is closed. Therefore, it is highly recommended to use non-persistent cookies for session management purposes, so that the session ID does not remain on the web client cache for long periods of time, from where an attacker can obtain it.

- Ensure that sensitive information is not comprised, by ensuring that sensitive information is not persistent / encrypting /stored on a need basis for the duration of the need
- Ensure that unauthorized activities cannot take place via cookie manipulation Ensure secure flag is set to prevent accidental transmission over "the wire" in a non-secure manner
- Determine if all state transitions in the application code properly check for the cookies and enforce their use
- Ensure entire cookie should be encrypted if sensitive data is persisted in the cookie
- Define all cookies being used by the application, their name and why they are needed

[https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Session\\_Management\\_Cheat\\_Sheet.md](https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.md)

## Cryptography

An architectural decision must be made to determine the appropriate method to protect data at rest. There are such wide varieties of products, methods and mechanisms for cryptographic storage. The general practices and required minimum key length depending on the scenario listed below:

#### Good practices

- Cryptographic algorithms are up to date and in-line with industry standards. This includes, but is not limited to outdated block ciphers (e.g. DES), stream ciphers (e.g. RC4), as well as hash functions (e.g. MD5) and broken random number generators like Dual\_EC\_DRBG (even if they are NIST certified). All of these should be marked as insecure and should not be used and removed from the application and server.
- Key lengths are in-line with industry standards and provide protection for sufficient amount of time. A comparison of different key lengths and protection they provide taking into account Moore's law is available online.
- Cryptographic means are not mixed with each other: e.g. you do not sign with a public key, or try to reuse a keypair used for a signature to do encryption.
- Cryptographic parameters are well defined within reasonable range. This includes, but is not limited to: cryptographic salt, which should be at least the same length as hash function output, reasonable choice of password derivation function and iteration count (e.g. PBKDF2, scrypt or bcrypt), IVs being random and unique, fit-for-purpose block encryption modes (e.g. ECB should not be used, except specific cases), key management being done properly (e.g. 3DES should have three independent keys) and so on.

#### Recommended Algorithms

- Confidentiality algorithms: AES-GCM-256 or ChaCha20-Poly1305;
- Integrity algorithms: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, Blake2;
- Digital signature algorithms: RSA (3072 bits and higher), ECDSA with NIST P-384;
- Key establishment algorithms: RSA (3072 bits and higher), DH (3072 bits or higher), ECDH with NIST P-384;

- Application must be capable of using end-to-end encryption via SSL / TLS in relation to sensitive data in transit and at rest.

Additionally, you should always rely on secure hardware (if available) for storing encryption keys, performing cryptographic operations, etc.

## Secure Cryptographic Storage Design

- All protocols and algorithms for authentication and secure communication should be well vetted by the cryptographic community.
- Ensure certificates are properly validated against the hostnames users whom they are meant for.
- Avoid using wildcard certificates unless there is a business need for it
- Maintain a cryptographic standard to ensure that the developer community knows about the approved ciphersuits for network security protocols, algorithms, permitted use, cryptoperiods and Key Management.
- Only store sensitive data that you need

## Use strong approved Authenticated Encryption

CCM or GCM are approved Authenticated Encryption modes based on AES algorithm.

## Use strong approved cryptographic algorithms

- Do not implement an existing cryptographic algorithm on your own, no matter how easy it appears. \* Instead, use widely accepted algorithms and widely accepted implementations.
- Only use approved public algorithms such as AES, RSA public key cryptography, and SHA-256 or better for hashing.
- Do not use weak algorithms, such as MD5 or SHA1.
- Avoid hashing for password storage, instead use Argon2, PBKDF2, bcrypt or scrypt.
- See NIST approved algorithms or ISO TR 14742 "Recommendations on Cryptographic Algorithms or Algorithms", key size and parameters by European Union Agency for Network and Information Security.
- If a password is being used to protect keys then the password strength should be sufficient for the strength of the keys it is protecting. \* When 3DES is used, ensure  $K1 \neq K2 \neq K3$ , and the minimum key length must be 192 bits .
- Do not use ECB mode for encrypting lots of data (the other modes are better because they chain the blocks of data together to improve the data security).

## Use strong random numbers

- Ensure that all random numbers, especially those used for cryptographic parameters (keys, IV's, MAC tags), random file names, random GUIDs, and random strings are generated in a cryptographically strong fashion.
- Ensure that random algorithms are seeded with sufficient entropy.
- Tools like NIST RNG Test tool can be used to comprehensively assess the quality of a Random Number Generator by reading e.g. 128MB of data from the RNG source and then assessing its randomness properties with the tool.

The following libraries are considered weak random numbers generators and should not be used:

- C library: `random()`, `rand()`, use `getrandom(2)` instead;
- Java library: `java.util.Random()` instead use `java.security.SecureRandom` instead.

For secure random number generation, refer to NIST SP 800-90A. CTR-DRBG, HASH-DRBG, HMAC-DRBG are recommended.

[https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Cryptographic\\_Storage\\_Cheat\\_Sheet.md](https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Cryptographic_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.md)

## Authentication and Integrity

### Introduction

This cheat sheet provides a simple model to follow when implementing transport layer protection for an application. Although the concept of SSL is known to many, the actual details and security specific decisions of implementation are often poorly understood and frequently result in insecure deployments. This article establishes clear rules which provide guidance on securely designing and configuring transport layer security for an application. This article is focused on the use of SSL/TLS between a web application and a web browser, but we also encourage the use of SSL/TLS or other network encryption technologies, such as VPN, on back end and other non-browser based connections.

### Architectural Decision

An architectural decision must be made to determine the appropriate method to protect data when it is being transmitted. The most common options available to corporations are Virtual Private Networks (VPN) or a SSL/TLS model commonly used by web applications. The selected model is determined by the business needs of the particular organization. For example, a VPN connection may be the best design for a partnership between two companies that includes mutual access to a shared server over a variety of protocols. Conversely, an Internet facing enterprise web application would likely be best served by a SSL/TLS model.

TLS is mainly a defence against man-in-the-middle attacks. An TLS Threat Model is one that starts with the question "What is the business impact of an attacker's ability to observe, intercept and manipulate the traffic between the client and the server".

This cheat sheet will focus on security considerations when the SSL/TLS model is selected. This is a frequently used model for publicly accessible web applications.

## Providing Transport Layer Protection with SSL/TLS

### Benefits

The primary benefit of transport layer security is the protection of web application data from unauthorized disclosure and modification when it is transmitted between clients (web browsers) and the web application server, and between the web application server and back end and other non-browser based enterprise components;

The server validation component of TLS provides authentication of the server to the client. If configured to require client side certificates, TLS can also play a role in client authentication to the server. However, in practice client side certificates are not often used in lieu of username and password based authentication models for clients;

TLS also provides two additional benefits that are commonly overlooked; integrity guarantees and replay prevention. A TLS stream of communication contains built-in controls to prevent tampering with any portion of the encrypted data. In addition, controls are also built-in to prevent a captured stream of TLS data from being replayed at a later time.

It should be noted that TLS provides the above guarantees to data during transmission. TLS does not offer any of these security benefits to data that is at rest. Therefore appropriate security controls must be added to protect data while at rest within the application or within data stores.

### Good Practices

- Use TLS, as SSL is no longer considered usable for security;
- All pages must be served over HTTPS. This includes css, scripts, images, AJAX requests, POST data and third party includes. Failure to do so creates a vector for man-in-the-middle attacks;
- Just protecting authenticated pages with HTTPS, is not enough. Once there is one request in HTTP, man-in-the-middle attacks are possible, with the attackers being able to prevent users from reaching the secured pages.

The HTTP Strict Transport Security Header must be used and pre loaded into browsers. This will instruct compatible browsers to only use HTTPS, even if requested to use HTTP. Cookies must be marked as Secure.

#### Basic Requirements \*

Access to a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in order to obtain certificates;

- Access to a directory or an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder in order to check certificate revocation status;
- Agreement/ability to support a minimum configuration of protocol versions and protocol options for each version.

[[https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Transport\\_Layer\\_Protection\\_Cheat\\_Sheet.md](https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet.md)]

## Access Control

Authorization is the process where requests to access a particular resource should be granted or denied. It should be noted that authorization is not equivalent to authentication - as these terms and their definitions are frequently confused. Authentication is providing and validating identity. Authorization includes the execution rules that determines what functionality and data the user (or Principal) may access, ensuring the proper allocation of access rights after authentication is successful.

Web applications need access controls to allow users (with varying privileges) to use the application. They also need administrators to manage the applications access control rules and the granting of permissions or entitlements to users and other entities.

### Role Based Access Control

Access decisions are based on an individual's roles and responsibilities within the organization or user base. An RBAC access control framework should provide web application security administrators with the ability to determine who can perform what actions, when, from where, in what order, and in some cases under what relational circumstances.

#### Advantages:

- Roles are assigned based on organizational structure with emphasis on the organizational security policy
- Easy to use
- Easy to administer
- Built into most frameworks
- Aligns with security principles like segregation of duties and least privileges

#### Problems:

- Documentation of the roles and accesses has to be maintained stringently.
- Multi-tenancy can not be implemented effectively unless there is a way to associate the roles with multi-tenancy capability requirements e.g. OU in Active Directory
- There is a tendency for scope creep to happen e.g. more accesses and privileges can be given than intended for. Or a user might be included in two roles if proper access reviews and subsequent revocation is not performed.
- Does not support data based access control

Areas of caution:

- Roles must be only be transferred or delegated using strict sign-offs and procedures.
- When a user changes his role to another one, the administrator must make sure that the earlier access is revoked such that at any given point of time, a user is assigned to only those roles on a need to know basis.
- Assurance for RBAC must be carried out using strict access control reviews.

## Discretionary Access Control

Discretionary Access Control is a means of restricting access to information based on the identity of users and/or membership in certain groups. Access decisions are typically based on the authorizations granted to a user based on the credentials he presented at the time of authentication. The owner of information or any resource is able to change its permissions at his discretion.

Advantages:

- Easy to use;
- Easy to administer;
- Aligns to the principle of least privileges;
- Object owner has total control over access granted.

Problems:

- Documentation of the roles and accesses has to be maintained stringently;
- Multi-tenancy can not be implemented effectively unless there is a way to associate the roles with multi-tenancy capability requirements;
- There is a tendency for scope creep to happen e.g. more accesses and privileges can be given than intended for.

Areas of caution: \* While granting trusts; \* Assurance for DAC must be carried out using strict access control reviews.

## Mandatory Access Control

Ensures that the enforcement of organizational security policy does not rely on voluntary web application user compliance. MAC secures information by assigning sensitivity labels on information and comparing this to the level of sensitivity a user is operating at. MAC is usually appropriate for extremely secure systems including multilevel secure military applications or mission critical data applications.

Advantages:

- Access to an object is based on the sensitivity of the object;
- Access based on need to know is strictly adhered to and scope creep has minimal possibility;
- Only an administrator can grant access.

Problems:

- Difficult and expensive to implement;
- Not agile.

Areas of caution:

- Classification and sensitivity assignment at an appropriate and pragmatic level;
- Assurance for MAC must be carried out to ensure that the classification of the objects is at the appropriate level.

## Permission Based Access Control

Is the abstraction of application actions into a set of permissions. A permission may be represented simply as a string based name, for example "READ". Access decisions are made by checking if the current user has the permission associated with the requested application action.

The has relationship between the user and permission may be satisfied by creating a direct relationship between the user and permission (called a grant), or an indirect one. In the indirect model the permission grant is to an intermediate entity such as user group.

A user is considered a member of a user group if and only if the user inherits permissions from the user group. Systems that provide fine-grained domain object level access control, permissions may be grouped into classes. The system can be associated with a class which determines the permissions applicable to the respective domain object.



In such a system a "DOCUMENT" class may be defined with the permissions "READ", "WRITE" and "DELETE"; a "SERVER" class may be defined with the permissions "START", "STOP", and "REBOOT".

## File Uploading

Into web applications, when we expect upload of working documents from users, we can expose the application to submission of documents that we can categorize as malicious. We use the term "malicious" here to refer to documents that embed malicious code that will be executed when another user (admin, back office operator...) will open the document with the associated application reader.

Usually, when an application expect his user to upload a document, the application expect to receive a document for which the intended use will be for reading/printing/archiving. The document should not alter its content at opening time and should be in a final rendered state.

The most common file types used to transmit malicious code into file upload feature are the following:

- Microsoft Office document: Word/Excel/Powerpoint
- Adobe PDF document: Insert malicious code as attachment.
- Images: Malicious code embedded into the file or use of binary file with image file extension.

For Word/Excel/Powerpoint/Pdf documents:

- Detect when a document contains "code"/OLE package, if it's the case then block the upload process. For Images document:
- Sanitize incoming image using re-writing approach and then disable/remove any "code" present (this approach also handle case in which the file sent is not an image).

## Upload Verification

- Use input validation to ensure the uploaded filename uses an expected extension type;
- Ensure the uploaded file is not larger than a defined maximum file size;

## Upload Storage

- Use a new filename to store the file on the OS. Do not use any user controlled text for this filename or for the temporary filename;
- Store all user uploaded files on a separate domain. Archives should be analyzed for malicious content (anti-malware, static analysis, etc).

## Public Serving of Uploaded Content

- Ensure the image is served with the correct content-type (e.g. image/jpeg, application/x-xpinstall).

## Beware of "special" files

The upload feature should be using a whitelist approach to only allow specific file types and extensions. However, it is important to be aware of the following file types that, if allowed, could result in security vulnerabilities;

"crossdomain.xml" allows cross-domain data loading in Flash, Java and Silverlight. If permitted on sites with authentication this can permit cross-domain data theft and CSRF attacks. Note this can get pretty complicated depending on the specific plugin version in question, so its best to just prohibit files named "crossdomain.xml" or "clientaccesspolicy.xml".

".htaccess" and ".htpasswd" provides server configuration options on a per-directory basis, and should not be permitted.

## Application Regular Updates

Mobile devices and platforms, such as, for example, smartphones, typically provide the capability for operating system (OS), firmware (FW) and applications updates or re-installations with reduced user involvement. The user involvement may often be limited to clicking an icon or accepting an agreement. While this reduced level of involvement may provide convenience and an improved user experience, it fails to address the issue of secure user authentication.

Mobile devices and platforms, such as smartphones, typically provide features for operating system (OS), firmware (FW) upgrades, and applications or reinstallations with reduced user engagement. User engagement may be limited to clicking an icon or accepting a contract. While this reduced level of engagement can provide convenience and enhance the user experience, it does not address the issue of secure user authentication. Thus, it is necessary to create a secure channel that provides confidentiality, integrity, authentication and data updating.

## Requirements for a secure software update

Data Confidentiality: the contents of transmitted data should be kept confidential. This also includes software updates. Thus, secure channels between the mobile device and the network manager must be set up. The standard approach to keep sensitive data secret is to encrypt the data with a key that is shared only between the intended receivers;

Data integrity: it must be possible to ensure that data packets have not been modified in transit. For mobile devices, control requests, and software updates it is critically important to verify that the contents in the packets have not been tampered with;

Data Authentication: To prevent an attacker from injecting packets it is important to make sure that the receiver can verify the sender of the packets. Data authentication ensures this property such that the receiver can verify that the received packets really are from the claimed sender. For example, for software updates, data authentication is needed such that the device can verify that the received software comes from a trusted source. Data authentication can be achieved using a MAC or Digital Signature;

Data Freshness: to protect against replay attacks, e.g., during the key establishment phase, the protocol must ensure that the messages are fresh. Data freshness ensures the security property that the data is recent and that an attacker is not replaying old data.

## Third-Party Applications

Many social networks also offer the possibility to create additional applications that extend the functionality of the network. The two major platforms for such applications are the Facebook Platform and Open Social. While applications designed for the Facebook Platform can only be executed in Facebook, Open Social is a combined effort to allow developers to run their applications on any social network that supports the Open Social platform (e.g., MySpace and Orkut).

### Requirements for a secure third-party applications

- Data Privacy;
- Data Authentication;
- Data Authorization.

Apps that process or query sensitive information should run in a trusted and secure environment. To create this environment, the app can check the device for the following:

- PIN - or password-protected device locking;
- Recent Mobile Platform or OS version;
- USB Debugging activation;
- Device encryption;
- Device rooting (see also "Testing Root Detection").