### **Final Attack Models Report**

Authentication schemes

Mobile Plataform Hybrid Application
Application domain type m-Payment

Authentication Yes

Biometric-based authentication; Factors-based authentication; ID-based

authentication

Has DB Yes
Type of data storage SQL
Which DB MySQL

Type of data stored Personal Information; Confidential Data; Critical Data

User Registration Y

Type of Registration Will be an administrator that will register the users

Programming Languages HTML5 ; Javascript ; PHP

Input Forms Yes
Upload Files No
The system has logs Yes
The system has regular updates Yes
The system has third-party No
System Cloud Environments Private Cloud

Hardware Specification Yes

HW Authentication Basic Authentication (user/pass)

HW Wireless Tech 3G; 4G/LTE; 5G; Bluetooth; Wi-Fi; GPS; NFC

Data Center Phisical Access Yes

### **Malicious QR Code Attacks**

In this type of attack, one of the strategies used by the attackers, after coding the malicious links, is to take them to phishing sites or execute fraudulent codes. In addition, in order to end this type of attack, the attackers often print the malicious QR codes on small stickers that are pasted on pre-existing QR codes. On the other hand, attackers often change selected modules from white to black and vice versa in order to replace the original encoded content.

#### Definition

QR code-based attack is defined as an attack that attempts to lure victims into scanning a QR code that directs them to malicious websites. The key idea behind QR code attacks is that victims might trust the web page or the printed material on which the QR code is displayed, and assume that the associated code is harmless. In addition, attackers use malicious QR codes to direct users to fraudulent web sites, which masquerade as legitimate web sites aiming to steal sensitive personal information such as usernames, passwords or credit card information.

### **Technical Impact**

Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands.

### **Risk Analysis**

• High Risk.

# **Likelihood Exploits**

• Low.

### **Attacker Powers**

- Direct the user to an exploit or phishing site;
- Perform other attacks such as phishing, farming and botnet; \* Distribute malware; \* Extraction of personal and confidential data from smartphones and tablets via command injection or traditional buffer overflows by reader software;
- · Steal users' Money via fraud;
- Social Engineering attacks via spear phishing e.g. leaving a poster of a QR Code on the parking lot of a company (instead of the traditional attack with an USB drive) offering discount in a nearby restaurant is a new attack vector which is likely to be successful.

### Recommendations

To ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to malicious QR Code attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed to ensure authenticity, integrity and authenticity of the data.

# Malicious QR Code Attacks Diagram

```
Goal: To steal sensitive personal information
AND
|-1. 1. Create a malicious QR Code or modify QR Code
| OR
| |-1. Attacking automated processes
| OR
| |-1. Command and Code Injections
| |-2. Malware
| |-3. Fraud
| |-2. Attacking human interactions
| OR
| |-1. Phishing
| |-2. Fraud
| |-2. Fraud
| |-4. Attacking Reader Software
```

# **SQL Injection Attacks**

In this type of attack, an attacker could provide malicious input with a clever mix of characters and meta characters from a form (e.g., login form) to alter the logic of the SQL command.

### **Definition**

Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection Attack is a code injection technique commonly used to attack web applications where an attacker enters SQL characters or keywords into an SQL statement through superuser input parameters for the purpose to change the logic of the desired query.

## **Technical Impact**

- Read Application Data;
- · Bypass Protection Mechanism;
- Modify Application Data.

# Likelihood of Exploit

• High.

#### Risk

Critical Risk.

# **Attacker's Powers**

- · Identify parameters vulnerable to injection;
- Discover DBMS and version;
- · Discover relational scheme;
- · Extract data;
- · Add/modify data;
- · Cause denial of service;
- Evade detection;
- · Bypass authentication;
- Execute commands;
- · Elevate privileges.

### Recommendations

To ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to SQLi attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed to ensure authenticity, confidentiality, access control, integrity, privacy and authenticity of the data.

#### Reference

1. [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html]

## **SQL Injection Attacks Diagram**

Goal: Get full access to data base
AND
|-1. Identify the vulnerability
|-2. Create attack script
|-3. Inject attack script
|-OR
||-1. Use input fields in the web
||-2. Use URL
|-4. Execute attack script on the server

# Flooding or Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) Attacks

Flooding is an enhanced Denial of Service (DoS) attack type, originating from multiple network attack surfaces that were previously compromised to disrupt the services or resources provided by the target server. It differs from DoS in that it generates more traffic, so that the targeted server cannot handle requests. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow.

### **Definition**

The Flooding attack attempts to make a service unavailable to intended users by draining the system or network resource. Attackers can now launch various DDoS attacks, including resource-focused attacks (e.g., network bandwidth, memory, and CPU) and app-focused attacks (e.g., mobile applications, database service) from almost every attack places. This type of attack can be executed as follows:

- TCP Flood;
- UDP Flood:
- ICMP Flood:
- HTTP Flood;
- SSL Flood;
- Amplification;
- ML Flood;
- BlueSmacking.

### **Technical Impact**

- · Crash, Exit, or Restart;
- · Bypass protection mechanism;
- Other.

# **Typical Severity**

Medium.

# Risk

• High.

### Likelihood of Exploit

• High.

## Attacker's Powers

- · Make features and services unavailable to authorized users;
- · Perpetrate other types of attacks and even extract sensitive and critical data.

### Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the Flooding attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed.

### References

1. [[https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html]

### Flooding Attacks Diagram

```
Goal: Stop the system or application availability
OR
- 1. Launch Application Layer DoS/DDoS Attack
| AND
   |- 1. Compromise machine(s) to support in flooding via botnet
   - 2. DOS/DDoS tool installation
      |- 1. Back
      |- 2. RUDY
      I-3. SSL Flood
      |- 4. HTTP Flood
      |- 5. XML Flood
      - 6. DNS Amplification
      - 7. Voip Flooding
- 2. Launch Protocol DDoS attack
   |- 1. Compromise machine(s) to support in flooding via botnet
   - 2. DoS/DDoS tool installation
   OR
     - 1. Land
      |- 2. Neptune (TCP SYN flood)
      |- 3. Ping of Death
      |-4. Teardrop
      I - 5. TCP SYN-ACK flood
      |- 6. ACK & PUSH ACK flood
      1. 7. RST/FIN flood
      |-8. P2P
    - 9. BlueSmacking
- 3. Launch Volume DDoS attack
   |- 1. Compromise machine(s) to support in flooding via botnet
   |- 2. DoS/DDoS tool installation
   OR
      |- 1. Smurf (ICMP Flood)
      |- 2. Spoofed/non-spoofed UDP flood
      - 3. DNS flood
      - 4. VoIP Flood
      - 5. ICMP echo request
      - 6. Fraggle
      - 7. Amplification
      - 8. TCP Flood
      I-9. Mail Bomb
 - 4. Permanent DoS
```

# XML Injection Attacks

It is an attacking technique used against XML-based applications to modify or compromise their normal operation.

# Definition

XML Injection (XMLi) attacks are carried out by injecting pieces of XML code along with malicious content into user inputs in order to produce harmful XML messages. The aim of this type of attacks is to compromise the system or system component that receives user inputs, making it malfunction (e.g. crash), or to attack other systems or subsequent components that process those injected XML messages. This type of attack can be classified into 4 categories:

- Deforming: Attack input values of Type 1 are XML meta-characters, such as <, >, ]] >, that are intro- duced to compromise the structure of generated XML messages;
- Random closing tags: Attack input values of Type 2 are random XML closing tags (e.g., < /test>), aiming at deforming the generated XML messages to reveal
  their structure:
- Replicating: Attack input values of Type 3 are strings of characters consisting of XML tag names and malicious content;
- Replacing: Attack input values of Type 4 are similar to those of Type 3 but they involve multiple input fields in order to comment out some existing XML elements and inject new ones with malicious content.

### **Attacker Powers**

- · Obtain confidential information;
- · Change the underlying business logic of the destination.

#### Recommendations

To ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to Spoofing attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed to ensure authenticity, integrity, privacy and authenticity of the data.

# **XML Injection Attacks Diagram**

### Goal: Disclosure or modification of the internal data

# AND

- I- 1. Create malicious content
- l- 2. Inject pieces of XML code along with malicious content into user inputs

#### - OR

- I- I- 1. Deforming
- I- 2. Random closing tags
- I- 3. Replicating
- I- 4. Replacing

# **Session Hijacking Attack**

An attacker impersonates a legitimate user through stealing or predicting a valid session ID.

### **Definition**

The necessary condition for the session hijacking attack to occur is the existence of architectural vulnerabilities in the absence of protection for the storage of session identifiers. This vulnerability generally occurs in web applications written in PHP in previous versions (e.g., PHP 4.0 to PHP 4.1.2), As described in CVE-2002-0121.

# **Technical Impact**

- · Read Application Data;
- · Gain Privileges or Assume Identity;
- Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands.

# **Risk Analysis**

Critical.

# Likelihood of Exploit

• High.

### **Attacker Powers**

- Steal Session ID;
- Impersonation of a legitimate user and confidential information from a legitimate user.

# References

- 1. [https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2002-0121/];
- 2. [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html];
- 3. [https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html].

# **Session Hijacking Attack Diagram**

Goal: To gain unathorized access to the application |- 1. Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) I AND |- 1. The attacker interacts with the target host and finds authenticate users session IDs |- 2. The attacker steals a session ID from a valid user |- 3. The attacker tries to use the stolen session ID to gain access to the system |- 2. Session Fixation AND |- 1. Setup the Attack (setup a session) |- 1. The attacker chooses a predefined identifier that they know I- 2. The attacker creates a trap session for the victim |- 2. Attract a victim by fixate the session I- 1. Attackers can put links on web sites |- 2. Attacker establish rogue proxy servers that give out the session ID and then redirect the connection to the legitimate service |- 3. Attackers can email attack URLs to potential victims through spam and phishing techniques I- 3. Abuse the victim's Session via takeover the fixated session |- 1. The attacker loads the predefined session ID into their browser and browses to protected data or functionality. |- 2. The attacker loads the predefined session ID into their software and utilizes functionality with the rights of the victim. 3. Session Sidejacking AND |- 1. The attacker uses sniffing tools to capture a session token from traffic |- 2. The attacker attempts to insert a captured session token into communication with the targeted application to confirm viability for exploitation |- 3. The attacker leverages the captured session token to interact with the targeted application in a malicious fashion, impersonating the victim - 4. Cross Site Tracing AND |- 1. Determine if HTTP Trace is enabled at the web server with which the victim has an active session 1-2. Identify mechanism to launch HTTP Trace regues |- 3. Create a malicious script that pings the web server with HTTP TRACE request |- 4. Execute malicious HTTP Trace launching script |- 5. Intercept HTTP TRACE response

### Spoofing Attacks

In a nutshell, spoofing attacks consist of spoofing the caller ID in order to impersonate a trusted entity and thus obtain confidential information in a disguised manner.

### Definition

In this type of attack, the attacker can spoof the "Caller ID" and impersonate him as a legitimate user, i.e., an attacker could spoof the "Caller ID" and impersonate a trusted party. Recent studies have also shown how to spoof MMS messages that appeared to be messages from a number that operators use to send alerts or update notifications. In addition, base stations can also be counterfeited. On the other hand, there is also the mobile application spoofing attack, which consists of an attack where a malicious mobile application mimics the visual appearance of another one. The goal of the adversary is to trick the user into believing that she is interacting with a genuine application while she interacts with one controlled by the adversary. If such an attack is successful, the integrity of what the user sees as well as the confidentiality of what she inputs into the system can be violated by the adversary.

### **Technical Impact**

- Bypass Protection Mechanism;
- Gain Privileges or Assume Identity.

# Risk Analysis

· Critical Risk.

### Likelihood of Exploit

High.

# **Attacker Powers**

- Faker caller ID;
- · Monitoring of calls and access to the confidential information of legitimate users from voice or text messages.

### Recommendations

To ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to Spoofing attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed to ensure authenticity, integrity, privacy and authenticity of the data.

#### References

1. [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html].

### **Spoofing Attacks Diagram**

```
Goal: Accessing resources or obtain banking and other critical information
OR
|- 1. Content Spoofing
OR
   |- 1. Checksum Spoofing
   |- 2. Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
   |- 3. Counterfeit GPS Signals
|- 2. Action Spoofing
OR
   |- 1. Clickjacking
   | OR
   | |- 1. Flash File Overlay
       |- 2. iFrame Overlay
   |- 2. Android Activity Hijack
   |-3. Credential Prompt Impersonation
   |- 4. Tapjacking
|- 3. Resource Location Spoofing
| OR
   |- 1. Redirect Access to Libraries
   | OR
       |- 1. Symlink Attack
       |- 2. Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths
       |- 3. Search Order Hijacking
       I-4. DLL Side-Loading
   |- 2. Establish Rogue Location
   | OR
     |- 1. Evil Twin Wi-Fi Attack
      |- 2. Cellular Rogue Base Station
       |- 3. Scheme Squatting
      |- 4. BitSquatting
       |- 5. TypoSquatting
       |- 6. SoundSquatting
       |- 7. Homograph Attackvia Homoglyphs
       |- 8. Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS
|-4. Identity Spoofing
| OR
   I-1. Pharming
   J- 2. Phishing
   | |- 1. Spear Phishing
     |- 2. Mobile Phishing
       |- 3. Voice Phishing
   |-3. Fake the Source of Data
   |- 4. Principal Spoof
   |-5. Signature Spoof
```

# **VM Migration Attacks**

A malicious user can start or redirect the migration process to a different network in which he has access or untrusted host, or it can just be copied and used elsewhere, which compromise the VM with the passwords, credentials on it and in case of coping it makes it difficult to trace the attacker.

# Definition

VMs roll back to their previous state if an error occurs. Unfortunately, this factor can re-expose them to security vulnerabilities, and attackers can gain benefit to attack on this compromised hypervisor. It is important to protect the data during migration. In fact, this is the defending of data privacy and integrity from various network attacks during migration. Live migration might be susceptible to many attacks like "man-in-the-middle", "denial-of-service" and "replay. The data during

the migration can be sniffed or tampered easily as it is not encrypted.

# **Technical Impact**

- Read Application Data (lack of confidentiality);
- Modify Application Data (lack of integrity and confidentiality).

# **Risk Analisys**

• High Risk.

# Likelihood of Exploit

• High.

### **Attacker Powers**

- · Launch attacks such as man-in-the-middle, DoS and replay;
- Detect or tamper with data during migration as it is not encrypted.

### Recommendations

To ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to VM Migration attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed to ensure authenticity, integrity, privacy, confinement, and authenticity of the data.

### References

1. [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/311.html].

# **VM Migration Attacks Diagram**

```
Goal: Obtain user confidential data
AND
|- 1. Initiate migration of desired VM/data
|- 2. Obtain and process captured files
| AND
   |- 1. Remote captured files
   | OR
     |- 1. Exfiltrate via network
      |- 2. Exfiltrate via removable media
      |- 3. Exfiltrate via capture device
     |- 4. Exfiltrate via Wireless
   |- 2. Process captured files
   | OR
      |- 1. Local
      | AND
      | |- 1. Obtain forensic apps
          | OR
          | |- 1. Downloads existing apps
          | |- 2. Write customs application
          |- 2. Introduce forensic apps into the system
      | |- 3. Execute applications
          | AND
      | | - 1. Opportunity to run processor-intensive
          | |- 2. Write to run executable/binary Files
          | |- 3. Exclusive access to one or more PCs
         | |- 4. Suficiente storage
      J-2. Remote
      | AND
          |- 1. Obtain forensic apps
          OR
          | |- 1. Downloads existing apps
            |- 2. Write custom apps
          |- 2. Execute applications
          | OR
          | |- 1. . File recovery
      | | |- 2. Registry analysis
|- 3. Install network tap
| AND
   |- 1. Physical access to desired cable(s)
      |- 1. Trial and error
          |- 1. Access to significant proportion of cable infranstructure
          |- 2. Suficiente storage space
          |- 3. Time!
      |- 2. Understand cable/network infrastructure
   |- 2. Tap and connect listening computer
     |- 1. Expose cable and connect tap device
     |- 2. Install packet capture device
     |- 3. Connect tap to capture device without dropping connect
   1-3. Time!
   |- 4. Possession of dedicated hardware
      |-1. Obtain
       |- 2. Introduce into the organization covertly
```

### **Malicious Insiders Attacks**

This type of attacks ocurre when there is a malicious entity (client, employee, Hypervisor, Cloud Provider/Broker, etc.) takes advantage of its privileges to covertly carry out any malicious activity such as information theft and data destruction or physical infrastructures.

### Definition

Malicious Hypervisor, Malicious Clients, Malicious Cloud Provider/Broker, etc. are all the other terms which can also be used as an alternative to malicious insiders. This kind of attack occurs from client to server when the person, employee or staffs who know how the system runs, can implant malicious codes to destroy everything in the cloud system.

# **Technical Impact**

- Read Application Data;
- · Read Files or Directories;
- Modify Application Data;
- Modify Files or Directories;
- Gain Privileges or Assume Identity.

# **Analysis of Risk**

• High.

# **Likelihood Of Exploit**

• High.

# **Attacker Powers**

• Implants malicious codes to destroy everything in the cloud system; \* Steals confidential data.

# Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to Malicious Insiders attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed.

### References

1. [https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/285.html].

# **Malicious Insiders Attacks Diagram**

```
Goal: Stop the system availability
communication resources
OR
|- 1. Alteration
| OR

    |-1. Unauthorized alteration of registry

  |- 2. Launch virus or malware injection
|- 2. Snooping
OR
  |- 1. Misuse
  |- 2. Violation of organization policy
|-3. Elevation
| AND
  |- 1. Acquire admin privilege
      |- 1. Send email exploit
      |- 2. Poor configuration
      AND
        |- 1. Steal password
         | OR
      | | |- 1. Sniff network
     | | |- 2. Rout Telnet
|-4. Distribution
| AND
  |- 1. File sharing
  | OR
      |- 1. E-mail
      | OR
         |-1. Local account
         |- 2. Web-based account
      J-2. Electronic Drop Box
      OR
         |-1. FTP to file
         |- 2. Internet
         | OR
         | |- 1. Post to new group
           |- 2. Post to website
      J-3. Online chat
      |- 4. Copy to media
      | OR
         |- 1. Card memory MicroSDXC
         |- 2. CD-Room
         |- 3. USB Drive
```

# **VM Escape Attacks**

This type of attack occurs when an application escapes from the VM and gains control of VMM, as it escapes the VM privilege and obtains the root privilege.

# Definition

VM escape is where an application running on a VM can directly have access to the host machine by bypassing the hypervisor, being the root of the system it makes this application escape the VM privilege and gain the root privilege. In this type of attack the attackers attempt to break down the guest OS in order to access the hypervisor or to penetrate the functionalities of other guest OS and underlying host OS. This breaking of the guest OS is called as escape. If the attackers escapes the guest OS it may compromise the hypervisor and as a result it may control over the entire guest OS. In this way the security breach in single point in hypervisor may break down all the hypervisor. If the attacker controls the hypervisor, it can do anything to the VM on the host system.

#### **Risk Analysis**

Critical Risk.


### **Attacker Powers**

- Shutdown and eliminate target or victim VMs, resulting in the loss and destruction of data or information;
- Compromise the hypervisor and other resources.

# Recommendations

To ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to VM Escape attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed to ensure authenticity, integrity, privacy, authenticity and confinement of the data.

### **VM Escape Attacks Diagram**



### Side-Channel Attacks

It is a type of attack enabled by leakage of information from a physical cryptosystem.

#### **Definition**

Side-channel attacks use statistical models such as differential analysis and correlation analysis on the information leaked from the cryptographic device during runtime. While early attacks required attackers to be in physical possession of the device, newer side-channel attacks such as cache-timing attacks or DRAM row buffer attacks are conducted remotely by executing malicious software in the targeted cloud environment. Regarding smartphones/tablets, they have developed more sophisticated side-channel attacks that target the built-in sensors of these devices, allowing them to infer keyboard input on touchscreens through sensor readings of native applications and websites, infer a user's location by the power consumption available in the proc file system (procfs), and infer a user's identity, location and diseases through procfs.

- · Time-driven side-channel attack;
- · Trace-driven side-channel attacks;
- · Access-driven side-channel attacks.
- Power Analysis;
- Electromagnetic Analysis;
- Laser/optical;
- Clock/power Glitch;
- Temperature Variation;
- EMFI:
- Differential Computation Analysis
- Reflection/hands;
- Smudges;
- Network Traffic Analysis;
- USB Power Analysis;
- Wi-Fi Signal Monitoring;
- Figerprinting Devices;
- Data-usage Statistics;
- Page Deduplication;
- Procfs Leaks;
- Microarchitectural Attacks;
- · Location Inference;
- · Speech Recognition;
- · Soundcomber;
- · Sensor-based Keyloggers;
- Rowhammer.

### **Technical Impact**

- Modify and Read Memory;
- Read Files or Directories;
- Modify Files or Directories;

- Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands;
- · Gain Privileges or Assume Identity;
- Bypass Protection Mechanism;
- Read Application Data;
- Modify Application Data;
- · Hide Activities.

# **Risk Analysis**

· High Risk.

# Likelihood of Exploit

· Low.

#### **Attacker Powers**

- · Steal cryptographic information;
- Extract cryptographic key;
- Obtains confidential data or sensitive information.

### Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the side-channel attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

### References

- 1. Grassi, P.A., et al., 2017. Digital identity guidelines. URL: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP. 800-63-3.pdf, doi:https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3.
- 2. Spreitzer, R., et al., 2018. Systematic classification of side-channel attacks: A case study for mobile devices. IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials 20, 465–488. doi:10.1109/COMST.2017.2779824.

# **Cross VM Attacks Diagram**

Goal: Stealing and accessing sensitive user or system information |- 1. Passive | OR |- 1. Physical | OR | |- 1. Local (Chip, Device) OR | | |- 1. Power Analysis Attacks | |- 2. Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks | |- 3. Smudge Attacks | |- 4. Shoulder Surfing and Reflections |- 5. Hand/Device Movements |- 2. Vicinity (Wire/Communication) OR | |- 1. Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks | |- 3. Shoulder Surfing and Reflections | |- 3. USB Power Analysis J- 4. Wi-Fi Signal Monitoring |- 3. Remote (Sofware, Web) OR | |- 1. Linux-inherited procfs Leaks | |- 2. Data-Usage Statistics | |- 4. Microarchitectural Attacks 1-4. Sensor-based Keyloggers |- 5. Fingerprinting Devices/Users |- 6. Location Inference | |- 7. Speech Recognition | |- 8. Soundcomber |- 2. Logical | |- 1. Local (Chip, Device) | | OR | | |- 1. Differential Computation Analysis | |- 2. Vicinity (Wire/Communication) OR | |- 1. Network Traffic Analysis | |- 3. Remote (Sofware, Web) OR П | | |- 1. Fingerprinting Devices/Users |- 2. Page Deduplication | |- 3. Linux-inherited procfs Leaks |- 2. Active OR | |- 1. Physical | OR | |- 1. Local (Chip, Device) | | OR | | |- 1. Clock/Power Glitching | | |- 2. Electromagnetic Fault Injection | |- 3. Laser/Optical Faults | | |- 4. Temperature Variation |- 5. NAND mirroring |- 2. Vicinity (Wire/Communication) |- 3. Remote (Sofware, Web) | OR | | |- 1. Microarchitectural Attacks | | |- 2. Rowhammer |- 2. Logical | |- 1. Local (Chip, Device) | |- 1. Differential Computation Analysis |- 2. Vicinity (Wire/Communication) | |- 1. Network Traffic Analysis |- 3. Remote (Sofware, Web)

# **Tampering Attacks**

#### **Definition**

This type of attack occurs whenever an unauthorized user has physical access to the device. When this access is realized, it is possible to loss, leakage, access or unintentionally disclose of the data or applications to unauthorized users, if the mobile devices are misplaced, lost or theft.

## **Technical Impact**

Read and Modify Application Data.

#### **Attacker Powers**

- · Sending high malicious traffic stream;
- Huge messages to targeting mobile devices to make unused or reducing the capability;
- · Access and steal users confidential data.

#### Recommendations

To ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to malicious Tampering attack, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security tests present in the full report are followed to ensure authenticity, integrity, privacy and authenticity of the data.

#### **Tampering Attacks Diagram**

Goal: To compromise the system or system component

#### OR

- I- 1. Penetration
- I- 2. Monitoring
- I- 3. Manipulation
- l- 4. Modification
- I- 5. Substitution

# Bluejacking, Bluesnarfing and BlueSmacking Attacks

These are DDoS-type attacks that target a Bluetooth wireless network in order to shut down activity on it. It usually occurs through an attack coming from a connection of malicious entities in a target network.

### Definition

Bluejacking occurs by sending unsolicited messages between the mobile devices (host nodes) over the Bluetooth connection. The unauthorized information can be accessed from a mobile device through Bluesnarfing to Bluetooth enabled devices using OBject EXchange (OBEX) protocol. Through the Bluejacking attack, attackers can send unwanted sounds, videos to other Bluetooth enabled devices. Bluesnarfing attack consists of using Bluetooth connection for the purpose of stealing sensitive information (contacts, emails, passwords, photos, and other useful data) from wireless devices such as smartphones, tablets and IoT. In a Bluesmacking cenario attack, an adversary uses Bluetooth flooding to transfer large packets to Bluetooth enabled devices over the L2CAP protocol with the goal of creating a DoS.

# **Technical Impact**

- · Resource Consumption;
- · Malware Injection;
- Unreliable Execution;
- · Read Data.

# **Typical Severity**

Medium.

# **Risk Analysis**

High Risk.

### Likelihood of Exploit

Medium.

#### Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the Bluejacking, Bluesnarfing and BlueSmacking attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

#### References

1. atel, N., Wimmer, H., Rebman, C.M., 2021. Investigating bluetooth vulnerabilities to defend from attacks, in: 2021 5th International Symposium on Multidisciplinary Studies and Innovative Technologies (ISMSIT), IEEE, Ankara, Turkey. pp. 549–554. doi:10.1109/ISMSIT52890.2021.9604655.

## Bluejacking, Bluesnarfing and BlueSmacking Attacks Diagram

Goal: To make services unavailable, to inject malware and to steal user/system sensitive information AND 1. Adquire and setup penetration testing tool 2. Turn on Bluetooth on penetration testing tool, such as Kali Linux |- 3. Installing "hcitool" and executing "hciconfig" 4. From the terminal, scan the connected Bluetooth (hcitool scan) devices |- 5. Make sure you can ping all device by using <12ping "MAC address"> command OR |- 1. Bluesmack/DoS Attack AND |- 1. Clone DOS attack script from GitHub or another repository |- 2. Implement DoS attack using python3 Bluetooth-DOS-Attack.py from DoS attack script folder |- 3. Specify the target address of the device using MAC address of them (Target addr > "MAC address") - 4. Setup packages size and Treads counts (e.g., Packages size > 600; Treads counts > 512) Bluejacking |- 1. Execute bluetooth-sendto --device='MAC Address' 'file.mp3' command from mobile device to target mobile device |- 3. Bluesnarfing AND |- 1. Execute bluesarfing attack using bluesnarfer -r 1-100 -b (Bluetooth device address) command from Kali Linux

# **GPS Jamming Attacks**

This is a DoS attack that targets the GPS sensor, aiming to make this service (position, path, speed, direction, time, and distance) unavailable to users of the target mobile devices.

### **Definition**

This attack aims to interrupt or obstruct the communication between the emitting satellite and the device (smartphone/tablet) receiving the GPS signal. Normally, the attack consists of blocking the signal from the receiver, since the receiving signal is weaker compared to the broadcasting signal, and can be carried out in two different ways:

- · Blanket Jamming;
- Deception Jamming.

### **Technical Impact**

· Service unavailability.

# **Typical Severity**

• High

### **Risk Analysis**

· High Risk.

### Likelihood of Exploit

Low.

### Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the GPS Jamming attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

#### References

1. CAPEC-627: Counterfeit GPS Signals.

## **GPS Jamming Attacks Diagram**

Goal: Disrupt and make GPS services unavailable

#### AND

- |- 1. Acquire jammer tool (e.g., )
- |- 2. Setup jammer tool

#### OR.

- |- 1. Cigarette lighter COTS GPS jammers
- |- 2. SMA-battery COTS GPS jammers
- |- 3. Non SMA-battery COTS GPS jammers
- |- 4. Wide-band COTS GPS jamming attacks on maritime systems
- |- 5. GPS jamming attack on PMUs

### **DoS (Cellular) Jamming Attacks**

This type of attack aims to dominate and disrupt communication between a user's mobile device and the cell tower by actively transmitting signals.

### Definition

Interference attacks target radio communication technology (communication between smart devices and base stations). This attack can be caused by noise, interference, disruption or by sending corrupted data packets, with the purpose of causing DoS in the physical transmission of signals on certain routes.

### **Technical Impact**

Resource Consumption.

### **Typical Severity**

• Low.

# **Risk Analysis**

High Risk.

### Likelihood of Exploit

• Low.

### Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the DoS Jamming attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

### References

 CAPEC-605: Cellular Jamming. 2.Moorthy, V., Venkataraman, R., Rama Rao, T., 2020. Security and privacy attacks during data communication in software defined mobile clouds. Computer Communications 153, 515–526. URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140366419317268, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2020.02.030.

# **DoS Jamming Attacks Diagram**

Goal: To disrupt cellular wireless communication OR |- 1. Generic jamming attacks |- 2. WCDMA CPCPCH jamming attacks | AND |- 1. Forcing a user to leave WCDMA RAN |- 2. Switch to GSM by interfering the CPCPCH signal |- 3. Synchronization signals jamming attacks |- 4. PDCCH/PUCCH jamming attacks | OR |- 1. Downlink control information (DCI) jamming attack |- 2. Control format indicator (CFI) jamming attack |- 3. Uplink control channel attack |-5. PDSCH/PUSCH jamming attacks OR |- 1. User data corruption jamming attack |- 2. System information block (SIB) jamming attack |- 6. PBCH jamming attacks |- 7. PHICH jamming attacks |- 8. Reference signal jamming attacks | OR |- 1. Reference signal jamming attack |- 2. Reference signal nulling attack |- 3. Singularity jamming attack in MIMO-OFDM communications |- 9. Random Access Jamming Attacks |- 10. 5G learning-based applications jamming attacks | OR |- 1. Jamming attack on environmental sensing capability |- 2. Adversarial attack on mmWave beam pattern prediction |- 3. Jamming attack on network slicing capability

# **Cryptanalysis Attacks**

This attack consists in deciphering a ciphered message without knowing the decryption key by exploiting vulnerabilities in the cryptographic algorithm.

### **Definition**

Cryptanalysis focuses on finding vulnerabilities in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decrypt the ciphertext without knowing the secret key. In addition, this can have other purposes such as Total Breach, Global Deduction, Information Deduction, and Distinguishing Algorithm.

# **Technical Impact**

Read Data.

# **Typical Severity**

• Very High.

# **Risk Analysis**

· Very High Risk.

### Likelihood of Exploit

• Low.

# Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the Cryptanalysis Attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

# References

1. CAPEC-97: Cryptanalysis.

### **Cryptanalysis Attacks Diagram**

```
Goal: To discover hidden texts using cipher or discover secrets used in cipher systems to hide one or more texts

OR

|-1. Passive Attacks
| OR

| -1. Ciphertext-only attack
| -2. Known-plaintext attack
| -3. Chosen-plaintext attack
| -4. Adaptive chosen-plaintext attack
| -5. Chosen-ciphertext attack
| -6. Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack
| -7. Active Attacks
| OR

| -1. Brute-force attacks
| -2. Man-in-the-Middle attacks
```

# **Reverse Engineering Attacks**

Typically, this attack consists of using specific tools to analyze the target application (feature or resources), within its own local environment, downloaded from a mobile application store, such as Apple's App Store and Google's Play Store, respectively.

#### **Definition**

Reverse engineering attacks (REA) target the assets embedded in software. In such an attack scenario, the attacker by reverse engineering attempts to steal confidential information, such as embedded cryptographic keys or intellectual property in the form of algorithms. There are two ways of carrying out this type of attack:

- · White Box Reverse Engineering;
- Black Box Reverse Engineering.

### **Technical Impact**

- Reveal information about back end servers;
- Reveal cryptographic constants and ciphers;
- Steal intellectual property;
- · Perform attacks against back end systems;
- Gain intelligence needed to perform subsequent code modification.

### Risk Analysis

• High Risk.

# Likelihood of Exploit

• Low.

# Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the Reverse Engineering attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

#### References

- 1. Basile, C., et al., 2019. A meta-model for software protections and reverse engineering attacks. Journal of Systems and Software 150, 3–21. URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S0164121218302838, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jss.2018.12.025.
- 2. M9: Reverse Engineering.

# **Reverse Engineering Attacks Diagram**

Goal: To gain access to sensitive information from systems and users

OR

|-1. Black Box Reverse Engineering Attacks
| OR

| -1. Analysis of Packet Timing and Sizes
| -2. Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack
| -3. Compromising Emanations Attack
| -2. White Box Reverse Engineering Attacks
| OR

| -1. RetrieveEmbedded Sensitive Data
| -2. ReverseEngineer an Executable to Expose Assumed Hidden Functionality
| -3. ReadSensitive Constants Within an Executable
| -4. LiftingSensitive Data Embedded in Cache

### **Audit Log Manipulation Attacks**

This type of attack targets log files for the purpose of manipulating (deleting, reading, and altering) them.

#### Definition

In a log file audit manipulation attack scenario, an attacker injects, manipulates, deletes, or forges malicious entries in the log file in an attempt to deceive a log file audit or to cover impressions of an attack. The success of this type of attack depends on the insufficiency of log file access controls mechanisms.

#### **Technical Impact**

· Modify Data.

### **Typical Severity**

· High.

### **Risk Analysis**

High Risk.

# Likelihood of Exploit

• High.

# Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the Audit Log Manipulation Attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

# References

1. CAPEC-268: Audit Log Manipulation.

### **Audit Log Manipulation Attacks Diagram**

```
Goal: To mislead an audit of the log file or cover tracks of an attack

OR
|- 1. Web Log Tampering
| AND
| |- 1. Determine Application Web Server Log File Format
| |- 2. Determine Injectable Content
| |- 3. Manipulate Log Files
|- 2. Log Injection-Tampering-Forging
| AND
| |- 1. Determine Application's Log File Format
| |- 2. Manipulate Log Files
```

# Wi-Fi Jamming Attacks

In a scenario of this type of attack, the attacker targets the wireless network made available from the access point, with the aim of making it unavailable.

### **Definition**

This is a denial-of-service attack that blocks the radio frequency, making access to the Wi-Fi network and consequently to the Internet unavailable. Generally, two techniques are used to carry out this type of attack, namely: 1) The attacker may flood the Wi-Fi access point (e.g. the retransmission device) with deauthentication frames; 2) Another method is to transmit high levels of noise on the RF band used by the Wi-Fi network.

# **Technical Impact**

• Resource Consumption.

### **Typical Severity**

• High.

### **Risk Analysis**

• High Risk.

# Likelihood of Exploit

Medium.

### Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the Code Inclusion attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

### References

1. CAPEC-175: Code Inclusion.

# **Code Inclusion Attacks Diagram**

Goal: To disrupt wireless connections of Wi-Fi devices OR |- 1. Generic jamming attacks | OR |- 1. Constant jamming attack |- 2. Reactive jamming attack |- 3. Deceptive jamming attack |- 4. Random and periodic jamming attack |- 5. Frequency sweeping jamming attack |- 2. Timing synchronization attacks | OR |- 1. Preamble jamming attack |- 2. Preamble nulling attack |-3. Frequency synchronization attacks | OR |- 1. Asynchronous off-tone jamming attack |- 2. Phase warping attack |- 3. Differential scrambling attack |-4. Channel estimation (pilot) attacks OR |- 1. Pilot jamming attack J- 2. Pilot nulling attack |- 3. Singularity jamming attack |-5. Cyclic prefix attacks 1-6. Beamforming attacks |-7. Jamming attacks on MAC packets | OR |- 1. CTS corruption jamming attack |- 2. ACK corruption jamming attack |- 3. Data corruption jamming attack |- 8. Rate adaptation algorithm attacks

# Wi-Fi SSID Tracking Attacks

Unlike code injection, in this type of attack, an attacker exploits a weakness in the target in order to force arbitrary code to be retrieved locally or from a remote location and executed.

# Definition

This type of attack aims to obtain sensitive data (location, routine, trajectory, etc.) of users of mobile devices using Wi-Fi networks to access the Internet. Furthermore, it consists of using sophisticated sniffing devices to bypass authentication (for closed networks), extract and identify the MAC address of the mobile device and establish a match with its potential owner.

### **Technical Impact**

- · Read Data;
- · Bypass Protection Mechanism.

# **Typical Severity**

• Low.

### **Risk Analysis**

· Very High Risk.

### Likelihood of Exploit

Medium.

# Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the Wi-Fi SSID Tracking attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

#### References

1. Matte, C., 2017. Wi-Fi tracking: Fingerprinting attacks and countermeasures. Ph.D. thesis. Université de Lyon.

# Wi-Fi SSID Tracking Attacks Diagram

Goal: To obtain user' sensitive information

#### AND

- |- 1. Acquire sniffing tool (e.g., Airodump, TCPDump, Wireshark)
- |- 2. Setup sniffing tool near a grocery store and monitor shopping habits
- |- 1. Visually identify target
- |- 2. Monitor wireless communications and log device identifier
- |- 3. Follow the target in the street for N minutes, while keeping in transmission range
- |- 4. Search the log for a MAC@ that have been seen all along the N minutes.

# **Byzantine Attacks**

In a Byzantine attack scenario, the attacker targets the routing protocols of an ad hoc wireless network, aiming to access and modify sensitive data exchanged between two or more entities on this network.

#### **Definition**

In a mobile ad hoc wireless network, Byzantine attacks are defined as attacks that target routing protocols, in which two or more routers collude to drop, fabricate, modify, or divert packets in an attempt to disrupt routing services.

# **Technical Impact**

- · Read Data;
- · Modify Data;
- · Denial of service.

### **Typical Severity**

• High.

# **Risk Analysis**

· High Risk.

# Likelihood of Exploit

Medium.

# Recommendations

In order to ensure that the mobile application is resilient or immune to the Byzantine Attacks, it is recommended that the measures described in the good practice report and the security testing present in the full report are followed.

### References

1. Yu, M., et al., 2009. A secure routing protocol against byzantine attacks for manets in adversarial environments. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology 58, 449–460. doi:10.1109/TVT.2008.923683.

# **Byzantine Attacks Diagram**

Goal: To disrupt the whole network communication and transmission of data

#### AND

- |- 1. Making the active set of internal network nodes malicious
- |- 2. Control the entire network

# OR

- |- 1. Black hole or sink hole attacks
- |- 2. Byzantine Wormhole attacks
- |- 3. Byzantine Overlay Network Wormhole Attack
- |- 4. Gray hole attacks
- |- 5. Flood Rushing attack
- |- 6. Selfish Node Attack