




Security Assessment

# pyth2wormhole - Solana

CertiK Verified on Dec 13th, 2022





Certik Verified on Dec 13th, 2022

## pyth2wormhole - Solana

The security assessment was prepared by Certik, the leader in Web3.0 security.

### Executive Summary

#### TYPES

Bridge

#### ECOSYSTEM

Ethereum | Solana | Terra

#### METHODS

Manual Review, Static Analysis

#### LANGUAGE

Rust, Solidity

#### TIMELINE

Delivered on 12/13/2022

#### KEY COMPONENTS

N/A

#### CODEBASE

<https://github.com/pyth-network/pyth2wormhole>[...View All](#)

#### COMMITTS

b5555b80f74b88bb9f93275ab9ef293e99653f4b

[...View All](#)

### Vulnerability Summary



3

Total Findings

1

Resolved

0

Mitigated

0

Partially Resolved

2

Acknowledged

0

Declined

0

Unresolved



0

Critical

Critical risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks.



1

Major

1 Acknowledged



Major risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project.



0

Medium

Medium risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform.



0

Minor

Minor risks can be any of the above, but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions.



2

Informational

1 Resolved, 1 Acknowledged



Informational errors are often recommendations to improve the style of the code or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code.

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# CODEBASE | PYTH2WORMHOLE - SOLANA

## Repository















<https://github.com/pyth-network/pyth2wormhole>








## Commit

b5555b80f74b88bb9f93275ab9ef293e99653f4b

# AUDIT SCOPE | PYTH2WORMHOLE - SOLANA

21 files audited ● 1 file with Acknowledged findings ● 20 files without findings

| ID    | File   | SHA256 Checksum  |
|-------|--|--|
| ● ATR |  pyth2wormhole/program/src/attest.rs                  | 93e2f3157cc1de2de07c0fd4f750a4a8bbcd5d6884cb52342b1d4354c7fb7e42 |
| ● ATS |  pyth2wormhole/client/src/attestation_cfg.rs          | 59d6d7b87c1afc2adc12003c929421b95fedfb98d89b82c7faaddc4d46464789 |
| ● BAC |  pyth2wormhole/client/src/batch_state.rs              | 17f11174f7d1fd67c3485e5184c4b11df1cd688740d874832286f0b37a3de9f1 |
| ● CLR |  pyth2wormhole/client/src/cli.rs                      | 082ebefc9867bc1ed3d319c95bc345f2f4dd3ec2e8a4b125b03b3fa11844a341 |
| ● COI |  pyth2wormhole/client/src/config_file.rs            | 288cac825c0d22025c13c1e748720e70b4fa58dfbb216050033ad78b285d2e61 |
| ● LIE |  pyth2wormhole/client/src/lib.rs                    | 0b0582837b02d2059cc2d13a7693ae118b8b46961b4def50314ce59fa475f1c6 |
| ● MAS |  pyth2wormhole/client/src/main.rs                   | 0509e057139cb55820462cb189bc73c351ae4f3726b999c603fbd0fd16a1540f |
| ● MOD |  pyth2wormhole/client/tests/fixtures/mod.rs         | 539ab93d78ea9a356343baa7f08533b9389db696b263f084c35f20190ea728d8 |
| ● PAS |  pyth2wormhole/client/tests/fixtures/passthrough.rs | b64aedab07ef069c17ff05d6ca8197a310c26515014c88b61e396d143d6508db |
| ● PYF |  pyth2wormhole/client/tests/fixtures/pyth.rs        | 1102819b5a5c7313314b5f1f46db9f7ce589c9dbaa60d60d4016ae5664c7d6f2 |
| ● TEA |  pyth2wormhole/client/tests/test_attest.rs          | 76fccca19ae3f058ba1a2aefaa4a7b67e0d5c9e4bffd8248cbf6510f2b2d1999 |
| ● CAO |  pyth2wormhole/client/Cargo.toml                    | 24ee98d2c55f425e74a6de6728d5dd1c4eebb28351e7627187a4d0cc5eb47638 |
| ● COG |  pyth2wormhole/program/src/config.rs                | 5bf1ceea9c9a1af6e9273b460a09add048edf74dc5aac1a5aa14358731b4506b |
| ● INL |  pyth2wormhole/program/src/initialize.rs            | 6cae76c6d165773753157f5fc05cdec6fb7c01b438574294a3c3e8349ab58122 |

| ID    | File  | SHA256 Checksum  |
|-------|---|--|
| ● LIG |  pyth2wormhole/program/src/lib.rs        | dd2f11f049e5127bc093f12e3e083c5b00f3872fdc709533db7e761613465895 |
| ● MIG |  pyth2wormhole/program/src/migrate.rs    | e6720960a811c4148b76594dc41b4109db8eb22b086cd68d42e6bfa601805d1a |
| ● SEC |  pyth2wormhole/program/src/set_config.rs | f00a5450a4329ba17abd0151b4159ac55a1f2d3b1e0cba04b65bd4fb93786b04 |
| ● CAP |  pyth2wormhole/program/Cargo.lock        | 7ee7aae210c7c2f6403ab1eb315b5c4eb411a647b30b92f223fa7355c6e1e703 |
| ● CAA |  pyth2wormhole/program/Cargo.toml        | 5f32cb96bac2b3102d9445df98a8c22a0ea98d5d1c814ab7fa84322ee1a79491 |
| ● CAR |  pyth2wormhole/Cargo.lock                | 9f41c2159ab779f68eb660528137144d6cc76600e61a1b110f79dec0f0383c5e |
| ● CAG |  pyth2wormhole/Cargo.toml               | 9d654721034cc30c98c8a694bf3f55a9941a528fbd5945fa8434ad0cef15f629 |

## APPROACH & METHODS | PYTH2WORMHOLE - SOLANA

This report has been prepared for Wormhole to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the pyth2wormhole - Solana project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Manual Review and Static Analysis techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:


- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors;
- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

## REVIEW NOTES | PYTH2WORMHOLE - SOLANA

### Understandings

This program is the main Pyth implementation that currently exists as an on-chain contract on Solana. In order to expose these prices cross-chain, the Pyth2Wormhole Solana contract acts as a sender for Pyth prices. At regular intervals, the Pyth contract will observe the current Pyth price for selected products and produce an attestation which is then relayed over Wormhole to be consumed by the various P2W receiver contracts.

### Account Relationship



### External Dependencies

The project mainly contains the following dependencies:

| Dependency     | Version |
|----------------|---------|
| borsh          | 0.9.3   |
| pyth-client    | 0.2.2   |
| serde          | 1       |
| serde_derive   | 1       |
| serde_json     | 1       |
| solana-program | 1.10.13 |



It should also be noted here that the code dependencies are being actively developed in the current auditing version. It is necessary to keep the dependencies up-to-date to avoid potential vulnerabilities.

The on-chain program can be upgradeable after the initial deployment based on Solana's features. Also, based on the unique rent mechanism in Solana, the balance in accounts should be carefully set.

## Privileged Functions

The program contains a privileged role `current_owner` that has the right to configure and update the whole program. Specifically, it has the authority over the following functions:

- `set_config()` will alter the current settings of pyth2wormhole.
- `migrate()` will migrate the settings of pyth2wormhole.

**Additionally, if the program is upgradeable, the upgrade authority account can upgrade the account, thus causing unexpected consequences. The upgrade authority should be carefully managed.**

To improve the trustworthiness of the project, dynamic runtime updates in the project should be notified to the community.

## FINDINGS | PYTH2WORMHOLE - SOLANA



3

Total Findings

0

Critical

1

Major

0

Medium

0

Minor

2

Informational

This report has been prepared to discover issues and vulnerabilities for pyth2wormhole - Solana. Through this audit, we have uncovered 3 issues ranging from different severity levels. Utilizing the techniques of Manual Review & Static Analysis to complement rigorous manual code reviews, we discovered the following findings:

| ID               | Title  | Category                   | Severity      | Status         |
|------------------|--|----------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| <u>GLOBAL-01</u> | Centralization Related Risks                 | Centralization / Privilege | Major         | ● Acknowledged |
| <u>GLOBAL-02</u> | Versioning Issues                            | Language Specific          | Informational | ● Acknowledged |
| <u>ATR-01</u>    | Lack Of Validation Between Product And Price | Logical Issue              | Informational | ● Resolved     |

## GLOBAL-01 | CENTRALIZATION RELATED RISKS

| Category                   | Severity | Location | Status         |
|----------------------------|----------|----------|----------------|
| Centralization / Privilege | ● Major  |          | ● Acknowledged |

### Description

In program pyth2wormhole, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions:

- `migrate()` will migrate on-chain configuration from an older format.
- `set_config()` will update current settings of `pyth2wormhole`.

Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and manipulate the program settings.

Additionally, the Solana program could be upgradeable, and the upgrade authority is the deployer by default. Therefore, if the program is upgradable, and the upgrade authority account is compromised, it could lead to a malicious program upgrade, thus introducing centralization risk.

### Recommendation

The risk describes the current project design and potentially makes iterations to improve in the security operation and level of decentralization, which in most cases cannot be resolved entirely at the present stage. We advise the client to carefully manage the privileged account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., multi-signature wallets.

Indicatively, here are some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at a different level in terms of short-term, long-term and permanent:

#### Short Term:

Timelock and Multi sign ( $\frac{2}{3}$ ,  $\frac{3}{5}$ ) combination *mitigate* by delaying the sensitive operation and avoiding a single point of key management failure.

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;  
AND
- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key compromised;  
AND
- A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract and multi-signers addresses information with the public audience.

**Long Term:**

Timelock and DAO, the combination, *mitigate* by applying decentralization and transparency.

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;  
AND
- Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement;  
AND
- A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract, multi-signers addresses, and DAO information with the public audience.

**Permanent:**

Renouncing the ownership or removing the function can be considered *fully resolved*.

- Renounce the ownership and never claim back the privileged roles;  
OR
- Remove the risky functionality.

*Noted: Recommend considering the long-term solution or the permanent solution. The project team shall make a decision based on the current state of their project, timeline, and project resources.*

**I Alleviation**

[Pyth, 11/24/2022]: The team acknowledged the finding, and the aforementioned actions are currently controlled by a multi-sig wallet.

## GLOBAL-02 | VERSIONING ISSUES

| Category          | Severity        | Location | Status         |
|-------------------|-----------------|----------|----------------|
| Language Specific | ● Informational |          | ● Acknowledged |

### Description

The `pyth2wormhole` project is built depending on the `wormhole Solana`. The Solana module of the `pyth2wormhole` are derived from `wormhole Solana` and remain not updated after `wormhole Solana` commit [064228869731428e6443c761cb753cf8d1ab01e3](#).

For `wormhole Solana`, some important components for `pyth2wormhole` like `solitaire` keep updating after the project branched. For example, some important updates in `solitaire` are shown as below:

- Fix pre-funded account block in commit [2b56fcc7da4422f2270431f0f9c996021115acc0](#)
- Fix initialization check in commit [da479cf4c18b024a55ab3db87d027178fd319344](#)

Additionally, it should be noticed that, in the `wormhole Solana` commit [9aad49d631167e59790fcbc315985fd107adfbcf](#), `deps()` functions and `ToInstruction` macro are removed from `solitaire`, which will affect the client code that are using `to_ix` function.

### Recommendation

As `pyth2wormhole`'s Solana components (like `solitaire`) are heavily dependent on `wormhole Solana`, we advise the team to keep monitoring the updates and keep those dependencies up-to-date along with necessary modifications upon request.

### Alleviation

[Pyth, 11/29/2022]: The team acknowledged the finding, and the team will keep tracking the code dependencies updates.

## **ATR-01** | LACK OF VALIDATION BETWEEN PRODUCT AND PRICE

| Category      | Severity        | Location                                 | Status     |
|---------------|-----------------|--|------------|
| Logical Issue | ● Informational | pyth2wormhole/program/src/attest.rs: 231 | ● Resolved |

### **Description**

During the `attest` instruction, the program will check if the given product account matches the `prod` field in the price account. It will not check the price account record in the product account data(`px_acc` field). Our concern is that the presence of multiple price accounts for a single product account(e.g. an old price account) may result in inaccurate or invalid prices.

### **Recommendation**

We would like to check with the team about the mapping between the product account and price account, also the pair update and generation mechanism.

### **Alleviation**

[Pyth, 11/29/2022]: This is a non-issue as even if this is possible, the cross-chain contracts only cache the latest price. In addition, they are identified by the `price_id`, which is unique for every `price_account`.

## OPTIMIZATIONS | PYTH2WORMHOLE - SOLANA

| ID            | Title          | Category         | Severity     | Status         |
|---------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|
| <u>ATR-02</u> | Redundant Code | Gas Optimization | Optimization | ● Acknowledged |

## ATR-02 | REDUNDANT CODE

| Category         | Severity       | Location                                 | Status         |
|------------------|----------------|--|----------------|
| Gas Optimization | ● Optimization | pyth2wormhole/program/src/attest.rs: 150 | ● Acknowledged |

### Description

The function `attest()`, requires a `config` account, which is stated to be a `Derive` type.

```
67     pub config: P2WConfigAccount<'b, { AccountState::Initialized }>,
```

```
38     pub type P2WConfigAccount<'b, const IsInitialized: AccountState> =  
39         P2WConfigAccountV2<'b, IsInitialized>;
```

```
94     pub type P2WConfigAccountV2<'b, const IsInitialized: AccountState> =  
95         Derive<Data<'b, Pyth2WormholeConfigV2, { IsInitialized }>, "pyth2wormhole-  
config-v2">;
```

Since `Derive` types automatically have their PDA checked through the `peel()` function acquired from the `FromAccounts` macro, it does not need to be checked again.

```
72     impl<'a, 'b: 'a, 'c, T: Peel<'a, 'b, 'c>, const Seed: &'static str> Peel<'a,  
'b, 'c>  
73         for Derive<T, Seed>  
74     {  
75         fn peel<I>(ctx: &'c mut Context<'a, 'b, 'c, I>) -> Result<Self> {  
76             // Attempt to Derive Seed  
77             let (derived, bump) = Pubkey::find_program_address(&[Seed.as_ref()],  
ctx.this);  
78             match derived == *ctx.info().key {  
79                 true => T::peel(ctx).map(|v| Derive(v)),  
80                 _ => Err(SolitaireError::InvalidDerive(*ctx.info().key,  
derived).into()),  
81             }  
}
```

### Recommendation

Recommend removing the redundant code.

### Alleviation



[**Pyth**, 11/29/2022]: The team acknowledges the finding and will fix the issue in the future, which will not be included in this audit engagement.

## APPENDIX | PYTH2WORMHOLE - SOLANA

### Finding Categories

| Categories                 | Description  |
|----------------------------|--|
| Centralization / Privilege | Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds. |
| Gas Optimization           | Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.  |
| Logical Issue              | Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how <code>block.timestamp</code> works.  |
| Language Specific          | Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of <code>private</code> or <code>delete</code> .   |

### Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux `sha256sum` command against the target file.

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