



VRust

Security Assessment

O2Lab VRust Team

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Summary

This report has been prepared for O2Lab VRust Team to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the O2Lab VRust Team project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques. The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	O2Lab VRust Team
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solana
Crate	solana_escrow
GitHub Location	https://github.com/parasol-aser/vrust
sha256	Unknown

Audit Summary

Delivery Date	28/02/2022
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis
Key Components	

Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total
Critical	2
Major	0
Medium	0
Minor	0
Informational	0
Discussion	0

Findings




Figure 1: Findings

ID	Category	Severity	Status
0	MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved
1	MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved

Issue: 0: MissingKeyCheck

Category	Severity	Status
MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

src/processor.rs

- Code Context

```
94 fn process_exchange(  
95     accounts: &[AccountInfo],  
96     amount_expected_by_taker: u64,  
97     program_id: &Pubkey,  
98 ) -> ProgramResult {  
99     let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter();  
100     let taker = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;  
101  
102     if !taker.is_signer {  
103         return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature);  
104     }  
105     let takers_sending_token_account =  
106         ↪ next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;  
107  
108     let takers_token_to_receive_account =  
109         ↪ next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;  
110  
111     let pdas_temp_token_account =  
112         ↪ next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;  
113     let pdas_temp_token_account_info =  
114         ↪ TokenAccount::unpack(&pdas_temp_token_account.data.borrow())?;  
115     let (pda, nonce) = Pubkey::find_program_address(&[b"escrow"],  
116         ↪ program_id);  
117  
118     if amount_expected_by_taker != pdas_temp_token_account_info.amount  
119         ↪ {  
120         return Err(EscrowError::ExpectedAmountMismatch.into());  
121     }
```

```
116     }
117     let initializers_main_account =
118         ↪ next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
119     let initializers_token_to_receive_account =
120         ↪ next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
121     let escrow_account = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
122
123     let escrow_info = Escrow::
```

```
153     ],
154     )?;
155
156     let pda_account = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
157
158     let transfer_to_taker_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
159         token_program.key,
160         pdas_temp_token_account.key,
161         takers_token_to_receive_account.key,
162         &pda,
163         &[&pda],
164         pdas_temp_token_account_info.amount,
165     )?;
166     msg!("Calling the token program to transfer tokens to the
167     ↪ taker...");
168     invoke_signed(
169         &transfer_to_taker_ix,
170         &[
171             pdas_temp_token_account.clone(),
172             takers_token_to_receive_account.clone(),
173             pda_account.clone(),
174             token_program.clone(),
175         ],
176         &[&[&b"escrow"[..], &[nonce]]],
177     )?;
178
179     let close_pdas_temp_acc_ix = spl_token::instruction::close_account(
180         token_program.key,
181         pdas_temp_token_account.key,
182         initializers_main_account.key,
183         &pda,
184         &[&pda],
185     )?;
186     msg!("Calling the token program to close pda's temp account...");
187     invoke_signed(
188         &close_pdas_temp_acc_ix,
189         &[
190             pdas_temp_token_account.clone(),
191             initializers_main_account.clone(),
192             pda_account.clone(),
193             token_program.clone(),
194         ],
195     )?;
```



```

194         &[&[&b"escrow"[..], &[nonce]]],
195     )?;
196
197     msg!("Closing the escrow account...");
198     **initializers_main_account.lamports.borrow_mut() =
↪ initializers_main_account
199         .lamports()
200         .checked_add(escrow_account.lamports())
201         .ok_or(EscrowError::AmountOverflow)?;
202     **escrow_account.lamports.borrow_mut() = 0;
203
204     Ok(())
205 }
206

```

- Call Stack

```

1  fn entrypoint::process_instruction() { // src/entrypoint.rs:7:1: 13:2 }
2      fn processor::EscrowProcessor::process() { // src/processor.rs:16:5: 33:6
↪      }
3      fn processor::EscrowProcessor::process_exchange() { //
↪      src/processor.rs:94:5: 205:6 }
4

```

- description:
- link:
- alleviation:

Issue: 1: MissingKeyCheck

Category	Severity	Status
MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

src/processor.rs

- Code Context

```

35 fn process_init_escrow(
36     accounts: &[AccountInfo],
37     amount: u64,
38     program_id: &Pubkey,
39 ) -> ProgramResult {
40     let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter();
41     let initializer = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
42
43     if !initializer.is_signer {
44         return Err(ProgramError::MissingRequiredSignature);
45     }
46     let temp_token_account = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
47
48     let token_to_receive_account =
49         ↪ next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
50     if *token_to_receive_account.owner != spl_token::id() {
51         return Err(ProgramError::IncorrectProgramId);
52     }
53     let escrow_account = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
54     let rent =
55         ↪ &Rent::from_account_info(next_account_info(account_info_iter))?;
56
57     if !rent.is_exempt(escrow_account.lamports(),
58         ↪ escrow_account.data_len()) {
59         return Err(EscrowError::NotRentExempt.into());
60     }
61     let mut escrow_info =
62         ↪ Escrow::unpack_unchecked(&escrow_account.data.borrow())?;

```

```

59     if escrow_info.is_initialized() {
60         return Err(ProgramError::AccountAlreadyInitialized);
61     }
62
63     escrow_info.is_initialized = true;
64     escrow_info.initializer_pubkey = *initializer.key;
65     escrow_info.temp_token_account_pubkey = *temp_token_account.key;
66     escrow_info.initializer_token_to_receive_account_pubkey =
↪ *token_to_receive_account.key;
67     escrow_info.expected_amount = amount;
68
69     Escrow::pack(escrow_info, &mut escrow_account.data.borrow_mut())?;
70     let (pda, _nonce) = Pubkey::find_program_address(&[b"escrow"],
↪ program_id);
71
72     let token_program = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?;
73     let owner_change_ix = spl_token::instruction::set_authority(
74         token_program.key,
75         temp_token_account.key,
76         Some(&pda),
77         spl_token::instruction::AuthorityType::AccountOwner,
78         initializer.key,
79         &[&initializer.key],
80     )?;
81
82     msg!("Calling the token program to transfer token account
↪ ownership...");
83     invoke(
84         &owner_change_ix,
85         &[
86             temp_token_account.clone(),
87             initializer.clone(),
88             token_program.clone(),
89         ],
90     )?;
91     Ok(())
92 }
93

```

- Call Stack

```
1 fn entrypoint::process_instruction() { // src/entrypoint.rs:7:1: 13:2 }
2     fn processor::EscrowProcessor::process() { // src/processor.rs:16:5: 33:6
3         ↪ }
4         fn processor::EscrowProcessor::process_init_escrow() { //
            ↪ src/processor.rs:35:5: 92:6 }
```

- description:
- link:
- alleviation:

Appendix

Copied from <https://leaderboard.certik.io/projects/aave>

Finding Categories

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Mathematical Operations

Mathematical Operation findings relate to mishandling of math formulas, such as overflows, incorrect operations etc.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how `block.timestamp` works.

Language Specific

Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of `private` or `delete`.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Checksum Calculation Method

The “Checksum” field in the “Audit Scope” section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux “sha256sum” command against the target file.

Disclaimer

Copied from <https://leaderboard.certik.io/projects/aave>

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