



Security Assessment

O2Lab VRust Team

11/02/2022 20:55:15







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Summary

This report has been prepared for O2Lab VRust Team to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the O2Lab VRust Team project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques. The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.



Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	O2Lab VRust Team
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solana
Crate	token_bridge
GitHub Location	https://github.com/parasol-aser/vrust
sha256	Unknown

Audit Summary

Delivery Date	11/02/2022
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis
Key Components	

Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total
Critical	10
Major	0
Medium	0
Minor	0
Informational	0
Discussion	0



Findings




Figure 1: Findings



Finding Statistic

Category	Count
IntegerFlow	1
MissingKeyCheck	1
CrossProgramInvocation	8

ID	Category	Severity	Status
0	IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved
1	MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved
2	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
3	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
4	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
5	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
6	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
7	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
8	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
9	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved



Issue: 0: IntegerFlow

Category	Severity	Status
IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved

Location

program/src/api/transfer.rs:174:23: 174:50

```
data.amount / trunc_divisor
```

Code Context

Vulnerability at Line: 174

```
invoke_signed(&init_ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
169
        }
170
        let trunc_divisor = 10u64.pow(8.max(accs.mint.decimals as u32) - 8);
        // Truncate to 8 decimals
173
        let amount: u64 = data.amount / trunc_divisor;
174
        let fee: u64 = data.fee / trunc_divisor;
175
        // Untruncate the amount to drop the remainder so we don't "burn"
176

    user's funds.

        let amount_trunc: u64 = amount * trunc_divisor;
177
178
```

Call Stack



Security Assessment

- description:
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Issue: 1: MissingKeyCheck

Category	Severity	Status
MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved

Location

/home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/processors/peel.rs:211:22: 211:50

```
ctx.info().lamports.borrow()
```

- Code Context
- Function Definition:

```
fn peel<I>(ctx: &'c mut Context<'a, 'b, 'c, I>) -> Result<Self>

193
```

Vulnerability at Line: 202

```
}
197
198
            // If we're initializing the type, we should emit system/rent as
199

→ deps.

            let (initialized, data): (bool, T) = match IsInitialized {
200
                AccountState::Uninitialized => {
201
                     if **ctx.info().lamports.borrow() != 0 {
202
                         return
203
                             Err(SolitaireError::AlreadyInitialized(*ctx.info().key));
204
                     (false, T::default())
205
                 }
206
207
```

Other Use Case for Variable: ctx.info().lamports.borrow()



```
if **ctx.info().lamports.borrow() == 0 {
```

Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
     1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
     }
      fn instruction::solitaire(){//
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
         108:14 }
          fn instruction::dispatch(){//
3
           → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
             99:14 }
              fn instruction::AttestToken::execute(){//
4
                 /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                  74:22 }
                      fn <api::attest::AttestToken<'b> as
5
                       → solitaire::FromAccounts<'a, 'b, 'c>>::from(){//
                         program/src/api/attest.rs:68:10: 68:22 }
                          fn <solitaire::Data<'b, T, IsInitialized> as

    solitaire::Peel<'a, 'b, 'c>>::peel(){//
                             /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/p
                             236:6 }
```

- · description:
- link:
- alleviation:



Issue: 2: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Location

```
program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs
```

Code Context

```
pub fn complete_native(
85
        ctx: &ExecutionContext,
86
        accs: &mut CompleteNative,
        data: CompleteNativeData,
88
    ) -> Result<()> {
89
        // Verify the chain registration
90
        let derivation_data: EndpointDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
        accs.chain_registration
            .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
        // Verify that the custody account is derived correctly
95
        let derivation_data: CustodyAccountDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
96
        accs.custody
97
            .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
99
        // Verify mints
100
        if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to.mint {
101
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
103
        if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to_fees.mint {
104
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
105
106
        if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.custody.mint {
107
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
108
109
        if *accs.custody_signer.key != accs.custody.owner {
110
            return Err(WrongAccountOwner.into());
111
```



```
}
112
113
        // Verify VAA
114
        if accs.vaa.token_address != accs.mint.info().key.to_bytes() {
115
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
116
        }
117
        if accs.vaa.token_chain != 1 {
            return Err(InvalidChain.into());
        }
120
        if accs.vaa.to_chain != CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
121
            return Err(InvalidChain.into());
122
        }
123
        if accs.vaa.to != accs.to.info().key.to_bytes() {
124
            return Err(InvalidRecipient.into());
125
        }
126
127
        // Prevent vaa double signing
        accs.vaa.verify(ctx.program_id)?;
129
        accs.vaa.claim(ctx, accs.payer.key)?;
130
131
        let mut amount = accs.vaa.amount.as_u64();
132
        let mut fee = accs.vaa.fee.as_u64();
133
134
        // Wormhole always caps transfers at 8 decimals; un-truncate if the
135
         → local token has more
        if accs.mint.decimals > 8 {
136
            amount *= 10u64.pow((accs.mint.decimals - 8) as u32);
137
             fee *= 10u64.pow((accs.mint.decimals - 8) as u32);
138
        }
139
140
        // Transfer tokens
141
        let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
142
            &spl_token::id(),
143
            accs.custody.info().key,
            accs.to.info().key,
            accs.custody_signer.key,
146
            &[],
147
            amount.checked_sub(fee).unwrap(),
148
        )?;
149
        invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.custody_signer, None)?;
150
151
        // Transfer fees
152
```



```
let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
153
             &spl_token::id(),
154
             accs.custody.info().key,
155
             accs.to_fees.info().key,
156
             accs.custody_signer.key,
157
             &[],
158
             fee,
        )?;
        invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.custody_signer, None)?;
161
162
        0k(())
163
    }
164
165
```

· Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
      1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
      }
       fn instruction::solitaire(){//
2
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
          108:14 }
           fn instruction::dispatch(){//
3
              /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
              99:14 }
               fn instruction::CompleteNative::execute(){//
4
                  /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                  74:22 }
                       fn api::complete_transfer::complete_native(){//
5
                         program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs:85:1: 164:2 }
```

- · description:
- link:
- alleviation:



Issue: 3: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Location

```
program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs
```

Code Context

```
pub fn complete_native(
85
        ctx: &ExecutionContext,
86
        accs: &mut CompleteNative,
        data: CompleteNativeData,
88
    ) -> Result<()> {
89
        // Verify the chain registration
90
        let derivation_data: EndpointDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
        accs.chain_registration
            .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
        // Verify that the custody account is derived correctly
95
        let derivation_data: CustodyAccountDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
96
        accs.custody
97
            .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
99
        // Verify mints
100
        if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to.mint {
101
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
103
        if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to_fees.mint {
104
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
105
106
        if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.custody.mint {
107
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
108
109
        if *accs.custody_signer.key != accs.custody.owner {
110
            return Err(WrongAccountOwner.into());
111
```



```
}
112
113
        // Verify VAA
114
        if accs.vaa.token_address != accs.mint.info().key.to_bytes() {
115
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
116
        }
117
        if accs.vaa.token_chain != 1 {
            return Err(InvalidChain.into());
        }
120
        if accs.vaa.to_chain != CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
121
            return Err(InvalidChain.into());
122
        }
123
        if accs.vaa.to != accs.to.info().key.to_bytes() {
124
            return Err(InvalidRecipient.into());
125
        }
126
127
        // Prevent vaa double signing
        accs.vaa.verify(ctx.program_id)?;
129
        accs.vaa.claim(ctx, accs.payer.key)?;
130
131
        let mut amount = accs.vaa.amount.as_u64();
132
        let mut fee = accs.vaa.fee.as_u64();
133
134
        // Wormhole always caps transfers at 8 decimals; un-truncate if the
135
         → local token has more
        if accs.mint.decimals > 8 {
136
            amount *= 10u64.pow((accs.mint.decimals - 8) as u32);
137
             fee *= 10u64.pow((accs.mint.decimals - 8) as u32);
138
        }
139
140
        // Transfer tokens
141
        let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
142
            &spl_token::id(),
143
            accs.custody.info().key,
            accs.to.info().key,
            accs.custody_signer.key,
146
            &[],
147
            amount.checked_sub(fee).unwrap(),
148
        )?;
149
        invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.custody_signer, None)?;
150
151
        // Transfer fees
152
```



```
let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
153
             &spl_token::id(),
154
             accs.custody.info().key,
155
             accs.to_fees.info().key,
156
             accs.custody_signer.key,
157
             &[],
158
             fee,
        )?;
        invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.custody_signer, None)?;
161
162
        0k(())
163
    }
164
165
```

· Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
      1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
      }
       fn instruction::solitaire(){//
2
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
          108:14 }
           fn instruction::dispatch(){//
3
              /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
              99:14 }
               fn instruction::CompleteNative::execute(){//
4
                  /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                  74:22 }
                       fn api::complete_transfer::complete_native(){//
5
                         program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs:85:1: 164:2 }
```

- · description:
- link:
- alleviation:



Issue: 4: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Location

```
program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs
```

Code Context

```
pub fn complete_wrapped(
208
        ctx: &ExecutionContext,
209
        accs: &mut CompleteWrapped,
210
        data: CompleteWrappedData,
211
    ) -> Result<()> {
212
        // Verify the chain registration
213
        let derivation_data: EndpointDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
214
        accs.chain_registration
^{215}
             .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
        // Verify mint
        accs.wrapped_meta.verify_derivation(
219
            ctx.program_id,
220
            &WrappedMetaDerivationData {
221
                 mint_key: *accs.mint.info().key,
222
            },
223
        )?;
224
        if accs.wrapped_meta.token_address != accs.vaa.token_address
             || accs.wrapped_meta.chain != accs.vaa.token_chain
226
        {
227
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
228
        }
229
230
        // Verify mints
231
        if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to.mint {
232
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
233
```



```
if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to_fees.mint {
235
             return Err(InvalidMint.into());
236
        }
237
238
        // Verify VAA
239
        if accs.vaa.to_chain != CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
240
             return Err(InvalidChain.into());
^{241}
        }
        if accs.vaa.to != accs.to.info().key.to_bytes() {
243
             return Err(InvalidRecipient.into());
244
        }
245
246
        accs.vaa.verify(ctx.program_id)?;
247
        accs.vaa.claim(ctx, accs.payer.key)?;
248
249
        // Mint tokens
        let mint_ix = spl_token::instruction::mint_to(
251
             &spl_token::id(),
252
             accs.mint.info().key,
253
             accs.to.info().key,
254
             accs.mint_authority.key,
255
             &[],
256
             accs.vaa
257
                 .amount
                 .as_u64()
259
                 .checked_sub(accs.vaa.fee.as_u64())
                 .unwrap(),
261
        )?;
262
        invoke_seeded(&mint_ix, ctx, &accs.mint_authority, None)?;
263
264
        // Mint fees
265
        let mint_ix = spl_token::instruction::mint_to(
266
            &spl_token::id(),
             accs.mint.info().key,
268
             accs.to_fees.info().key,
269
             accs.mint_authority.key,
270
             &[],
271
             accs.vaa.fee.as_u64(),
272
        )?;
273
        invoke_seeded(&mint_ix, ctx, &accs.mint_authority, None)?;
274
275
        0k(())
276
```

₩Rust



```
277 }
278
```

• Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
      1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
      }
      fn instruction::solitaire(){//
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
         108:14 }
          fn instruction::dispatch(){//
3
           → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
           → 99:14 }
              fn instruction::CompleteWrapped::execute(){//
4
               → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                  74:22 }
                      fn api::complete_transfer::complete_wrapped(){//
5
                       → program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs:208:1: 277:2 }
```

- · description:
- link:
- alleviation:



Issue: 5: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Location

```
program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs
```

Code Context

```
pub fn complete_wrapped(
208
        ctx: &ExecutionContext,
209
        accs: &mut CompleteWrapped,
210
        data: CompleteWrappedData,
211
    ) -> Result<()> {
212
        // Verify the chain registration
213
        let derivation_data: EndpointDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
214
        accs.chain_registration
^{215}
             .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
        // Verify mint
        accs.wrapped_meta.verify_derivation(
219
            ctx.program_id,
220
            &WrappedMetaDerivationData {
221
                 mint_key: *accs.mint.info().key,
222
            },
223
        )?;
224
        if accs.wrapped_meta.token_address != accs.vaa.token_address
             || accs.wrapped_meta.chain != accs.vaa.token_chain
226
        {
227
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
228
        }
229
230
        // Verify mints
231
        if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to.mint {
232
            return Err(InvalidMint.into());
233
```



```
if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to_fees.mint {
235
             return Err(InvalidMint.into());
236
        }
237
238
        // Verify VAA
239
        if accs.vaa.to_chain != CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
240
             return Err(InvalidChain.into());
^{241}
        }
        if accs.vaa.to != accs.to.info().key.to_bytes() {
243
             return Err(InvalidRecipient.into());
244
        }
245
246
        accs.vaa.verify(ctx.program_id)?;
247
        accs.vaa.claim(ctx, accs.payer.key)?;
248
249
        // Mint tokens
        let mint_ix = spl_token::instruction::mint_to(
251
             &spl_token::id(),
252
             accs.mint.info().key,
253
             accs.to.info().key,
254
             accs.mint_authority.key,
255
             &[],
256
             accs.vaa
257
                 .amount
                 .as_u64()
259
                 .checked_sub(accs.vaa.fee.as_u64())
                 .unwrap(),
261
        )?;
262
        invoke_seeded(&mint_ix, ctx, &accs.mint_authority, None)?;
263
264
        // Mint fees
265
        let mint_ix = spl_token::instruction::mint_to(
266
            &spl_token::id(),
             accs.mint.info().key,
268
             accs.to_fees.info().key,
269
             accs.mint_authority.key,
270
             &[],
271
             accs.vaa.fee.as_u64(),
272
        )?;
273
        invoke_seeded(&mint_ix, ctx, &accs.mint_authority, None)?;
274
275
        0k(())
276
```

Security Assessment

```
277 }
278
```

• Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
      1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
      }
      fn instruction::solitaire(){//
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
         108:14 }
          fn instruction::dispatch(){//
3
           → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
           → 99:14 }
              fn instruction::CompleteWrapped::execute(){//
4
               → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                 74:22 }
                      fn api::complete_transfer::complete_wrapped(){//
5
                       → program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs:208:1: 277:2 }
```

- · description:
- link:
- alleviation:



Issue: 6: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Location

```
program/src/api/transfer.rs
```

Code Context

```
pub fn transfer_wrapped(
295
        ctx: &ExecutionContext,
296
        accs: &mut TransferWrapped,
297
        data: TransferWrappedData,
298
    ) -> Result<()> {
299
        // Prevent transferring to the same chain.
300
        if data.target_chain == CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
301
            return Err(InvalidChain.into());
302
        }
304
        // Verify that the from account is owned by the from_owner
305
        if &accs.from.owner != accs.from_owner.key {
306
            return Err(WrongAccountOwner.into());
307
        }
308
309
        // Verify mints
310
        if accs.mint.info().key != &accs.from.mint {
311
            return Err(TokenBridgeError::InvalidMint.into());
        }
313
314
        // Fee must be less than amount
315
        if data.fee > data.amount {
316
            return Err(InvalidFee.into());
317
        }
318
319
        // Verify that meta is correct
320
        let derivation_data: WrappedMetaDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
321
```



```
accs.wrapped_meta
322
             .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
323
324
        // Burn tokens
325
        let burn_ix = spl_token::instruction::burn(
326
             &spl_token::id(),
327
             accs.from.info().key,
328
             accs.mint.info().key,
             accs.authority_signer.key,
330
             &[],
331
             data.amount,
332
        )?;
333
        invoke_seeded(&burn_ix, ctx, &accs.authority_signer, None)?;
334
335
        // Pay fee
336
        let transfer_ix = solana_program::system_instruction::transfer(
337
             accs.payer.key,
             accs.fee_collector.key,
339
             accs.bridge.config.fee,
340
        );
341
342
        invoke(&transfer_ix, ctx.accounts)?;
343
344
        // Post message
345
        let payload = PayloadTransfer {
346
             amount: U256::from(data.amount),
             token_address: accs.wrapped_meta.token_address,
348
             token_chain: accs.wrapped_meta.chain,
349
             to: data.target_address,
350
             to_chain: data.target_chain,
351
             fee: U256::from(data.fee),
352
        };
353
        let params = (
             bridge::instruction::Instruction::PostMessage,
355
             PostMessageData {
356
                 nonce: data.nonce,
357
                 payload: payload.try_to_vec()?,
358
                 consistency_level: ConsistencyLevel::Finalized,
359
             },
360
        );
361
362
        let ix = Instruction::new_with_bytes(
363
```




```
accs.config.wormhole_bridge,
364
            params.try_to_vec()?.as_slice(),
365
            vec![
366
                AccountMeta::new(*accs.bridge.info().key, false),
367
                AccountMeta::new(*accs.message.key, true),
368
                AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.emitter.key, true),
369
                AccountMeta::new(*accs.sequence.key, false),
370
                AccountMeta::new(*accs.payer.key, true),
                AccountMeta::new(*accs.fee_collector.key, false),
372
                AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.clock.info().key, false),
373
                AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::system_program::id(),
374

    false),
                AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::sysvar::rent::ID,
375
                    false),
            ],
376
        );
377
        invoke_seeded(&ix, ctx, &accs.emitter, None)?;
378
379
        0k(())
380
    }
381
382
```

Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
      1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
      }
      fn instruction::solitaire(){//
2
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
          108:14 }
3
          fn instruction::dispatch(){//
             /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
              99:14 }
              fn instruction::TransferWrapped::execute(){//
                  /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                  74:22 }
                       fn api::transfer::transfer_wrapped(){//
                          program/src/api/transfer.rs:295:1: 381:2 }
```

• description:





Security Assessment

- link:
- alleviation:



Issue: 7: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Location

```
program/src/api/transfer.rs
```

Code Context

```
pub fn transfer_native(
127
        ctx: &ExecutionContext,
128
        accs: &mut TransferNative,
129
        data: TransferNativeData,
130
    ) -> Result<()> {
131
        // Prevent transferring to the same chain.
132
        if data.target_chain == CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
133
            return Err(InvalidChain.into());
134
        }
136
        // Verify that the custody account is derived correctly
137
        let derivation_data: CustodyAccountDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
138
        accs.custody
139
             .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
140
141
        // Verify mints
142
        if accs.from.mint != *accs.mint.info().key {
143
            return Err(TokenBridgeError::InvalidMint.into());
        }
145
146
        // Fee must be less than amount
147
        if data.fee > data.amount {
148
            return Err(InvalidFee.into());
149
        }
150
151
        // Verify that the token is not a wrapped token
        if let COption::Some(mint_authority) = accs.mint.mint_authority {
153
```



```
if mint_authority == MintSigner::key(None, ctx.program_id) {
154
                 return Err(TokenBridgeError::TokenNotNative.into());
155
            }
156
        }
157
158
        if !accs.custody.is_initialized() {
159
            accs.custody
160
                 .create(&(&*accs).into(), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
162
            let init_ix = spl_token::instruction::initialize_account(
163
                 &spl_token::id(),
164
                 accs.custody.info().key,
165
                 accs.mint.info().key,
166
                 accs.custody_signer.key,
167
            )?;
168
            invoke_signed(&init_ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
169
        }
171
        let trunc_divisor = 10u64.pow(8.max(accs.mint.decimals as u32) - 8);
172
        // Truncate to 8 decimals
173
        let amount: u64 = data.amount / trunc_divisor;
174
        let fee: u64 = data.fee / trunc_divisor;
175
        // Untruncate the amount to drop the remainder so we don't "burn"
176
         → user's funds.
        let amount_trunc: u64 = amount * trunc_divisor;
177
        // Transfer tokens
179
        let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
180
            &spl_token::id(),
181
            accs.from.info().key,
182
            accs.custody.info().key,
183
            accs.authority_signer.key,
184
            &[],
185
            amount_trunc,
        )?;
187
        invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.authority_signer, None)?;
188
189
        // Pay fee
190
        let transfer_ix = solana_program::system_instruction::transfer(
191
            accs.payer.key,
192
            accs.fee_collector.key,
193
            accs.bridge.config.fee,
194
```



```
);
195
        invoke(&transfer_ix, ctx.accounts)?;
196
197
        // Post message
198
        let payload = PayloadTransfer {
199
            amount: U256:: from(amount),
200
            token_address: accs.mint.info().key.to_bytes(),
201
            token_chain: CHAIN_ID_SOLANA,
            to: data.target_address,
203
            to_chain: data.target_chain,
204
            fee: U256:: from(fee),
205
        };
206
        let params = (
207
            bridge::instruction::Instruction::PostMessage,
208
            PostMessageData {
209
                 nonce: data.nonce,
210
                 payload: payload.try_to_vec()?,
                 consistency_level: ConsistencyLevel::Finalized,
212
            },
213
        );
214
215
        let ix = Instruction::new_with_bytes(
216
            accs.config.wormhole_bridge,
217
            params.try_to_vec()?.as_slice(),
            vec![
219
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.bridge.info().key, false),
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.message.key, true),
221
                 AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.emitter.key, true),
222
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.sequence.key, false),
223
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.payer.key, true),
224
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.fee_collector.key, false),
225
                 AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.clock.info().key, false),
226
                 AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::system_program::id(),
227
                 → false),
                 AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::sysvar::rent::ID,
                    false),
            ],
229
        );
230
        invoke_seeded(&ix, ctx, &accs.emitter, None)?;
231
232
        0k(())
233
234
```



235

Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
     1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
      }
      fn instruction::solitaire(){//
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
         108:14 }
          fn instruction::dispatch(){//
3
           → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
             99:14 }
              fn instruction::TransferNative::execute(){//
                 /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                  74:22 }
                      fn api::transfer::transfer_native(){//
5
                       → program/src/api/transfer.rs:127:1: 234:2 }
```

- · description:
- link:
- alleviation:



Issue: 8: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Location

```
program/src/api/transfer.rs
```

Code Context

```
pub fn transfer_native(
        ctx: &ExecutionContext,
128
        accs: &mut TransferNative,
129
        data: TransferNativeData,
130
    ) -> Result<()> {
131
        // Prevent transferring to the same chain.
132
        if data.target_chain == CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
133
            return Err(InvalidChain.into());
134
        }
136
        // Verify that the custody account is derived correctly
137
        let derivation_data: CustodyAccountDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
138
        accs.custody
139
            .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
140
141
        // Verify mints
142
        if accs.from.mint != *accs.mint.info().key {
143
            return Err(TokenBridgeError::InvalidMint.into());
        }
145
146
        // Fee must be less than amount
147
        if data.fee > data.amount {
148
            return Err(InvalidFee.into());
149
        }
150
151
        // Verify that the token is not a wrapped token
        if let COption::Some(mint_authority) = accs.mint.mint_authority {
153
```



```
if mint_authority == MintSigner::key(None, ctx.program_id) {
154
                 return Err(TokenBridgeError::TokenNotNative.into());
155
            }
156
        }
157
158
        if !accs.custody.is_initialized() {
159
            accs.custody
160
                 .create(&(&*accs).into(), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
162
            let init_ix = spl_token::instruction::initialize_account(
163
                 &spl_token::id(),
164
                 accs.custody.info().key,
165
                 accs.mint.info().key,
166
                 accs.custody_signer.key,
167
            )?;
168
            invoke_signed(&init_ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
169
        }
171
        let trunc_divisor = 10u64.pow(8.max(accs.mint.decimals as u32) - 8);
172
        // Truncate to 8 decimals
173
        let amount: u64 = data.amount / trunc_divisor;
174
        let fee: u64 = data.fee / trunc_divisor;
175
        // Untruncate the amount to drop the remainder so we don't "burn"
176
         → user's funds.
        let amount_trunc: u64 = amount * trunc_divisor;
177
        // Transfer tokens
179
        let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
180
            &spl_token::id(),
181
            accs.from.info().key,
182
            accs.custody.info().key,
183
            accs.authority_signer.key,
184
            &[],
185
            amount_trunc,
        )?;
187
        invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.authority_signer, None)?;
188
189
        // Pay fee
190
        let transfer_ix = solana_program::system_instruction::transfer(
191
            accs.payer.key,
192
            accs.fee_collector.key,
193
            accs.bridge.config.fee,
194
```



```
);
195
        invoke(&transfer_ix, ctx.accounts)?;
196
197
        // Post message
198
        let payload = PayloadTransfer {
199
            amount: U256:: from(amount),
200
            token_address: accs.mint.info().key.to_bytes(),
201
            token_chain: CHAIN_ID_SOLANA,
            to: data.target_address,
203
            to_chain: data.target_chain,
204
            fee: U256:: from(fee),
205
        };
206
        let params = (
207
            bridge::instruction::Instruction::PostMessage,
208
            PostMessageData {
209
                 nonce: data.nonce,
210
                 payload: payload.try_to_vec()?,
                 consistency_level: ConsistencyLevel::Finalized,
212
            },
213
        );
214
215
        let ix = Instruction::new_with_bytes(
216
            accs.config.wormhole_bridge,
217
            params.try_to_vec()?.as_slice(),
            vec![
219
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.bridge.info().key, false),
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.message.key, true),
221
                 AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.emitter.key, true),
222
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.sequence.key, false),
223
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.payer.key, true),
224
                 AccountMeta::new(*accs.fee_collector.key, false),
225
                 AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.clock.info().key, false),
226
                 AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::system_program::id(),
227
                 → false),
                 AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::sysvar::rent::ID,
                    false),
            ],
229
        );
230
        invoke_seeded(&ix, ctx, &accs.emitter, None)?;
231
232
        0k(())
233
234
```



235

Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
     1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
     }
      fn instruction::solitaire(){//
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
         108:14 }
          fn instruction::dispatch(){//
3
           → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
             99:14 }
              fn instruction::TransferNative::execute(){//
                 /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                  74:22 }
                      fn api::transfer::transfer_native(){//
5
                       → program/src/api/transfer.rs:127:1: 234:2 }
```

- · description:
- link:
- alleviation:



Issue: 9: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Location

```
program/src/api/create_wrapped.rs
```

Code Context

```
pub fn create_accounts(
140
        ctx: &ExecutionContext,
141
        accs: &mut CreateWrapped,
142
        data: CreateWrappedData,
143
    ) -> Result<()> {
144
        // Create mint account
145
        accs.mint
146
             .create(&((&*accs).into()), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
147
        // Initialize mint
149
        let init_ix = spl_token::instruction::initialize_mint(
150
            &spl_token::id(),
151
            accs.mint.info().key,
152
            accs.mint_authority.key,
153
            None,
154
            min(8, accs.vaa.decimals), // Limit to 8 decimals, truncation is
        handled on the other side
        )?;
        invoke_signed(&init_ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
157
158
        // Create meta account
159
        accs.meta
160
             .create(&((&*accs).into()), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
161
162
        // Initialize spl meta
163
        accs.spl_metadata.verify_derivation(
164
            &spl_token_metadata::id(),
165
```



```
&SplTokenMetaDerivationData {
166
                 mint: *accs.mint.info().key,
167
            },
168
        )?;
169
170
        // Normalize Token Metadata.
171
        let name = truncate_utf8(&accs.vaa.name, 32 - 11) + " (Wormhole)";
172
        let symbol = truncate_utf8(&accs.vaa.symbol, 10);
174
        let spl_token_metadata_ix =
175
            spl_token_metadata::instruction::create_metadata_accounts(
            spl_token_metadata::id(),
176
            *accs.spl_metadata.key,
177
            *accs.mint.info().key,
178
             *accs.mint_authority.info().key,
179
            *accs.payer.info().key,
             *accs.mint_authority.info().key,
181
            name,
182
            symbol,
183
            String::from(""),
184
            None,
185
            ο,
186
             false,
187
            true,
        );
189
        invoke_seeded(&spl_token_metadata_ix, ctx, &accs.mint_authority,
        None)?;
191
        // Populate meta account
192
        accs.meta.chain = accs.vaa.token_chain;
193
        accs.meta.token_address = accs.vaa.token_address;
194
        accs.meta.original_decimals = accs.vaa.decimals;
195
196
        0k(())
197
198
199
```

· Call Stack



```
fn instruction::solitaire(){//
         /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
         108:14 }
          fn instruction::dispatch(){//
3
           → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro
             99:14 }
              fn instruction::CreateWrapped::execute(){//
               → /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m
                 74:22 }
                      fn api::create_wrapped::create_wrapped(){//
5
                       → program/src/api/create_wrapped.rs:108:1: 138:2 }
                          fn api::create_wrapped::create_accounts(){//
6
                           → program/src/api/create_wrapped.rs:140:1: 198:2
                           → }
```

- description:
- link:
- alleviation:



Appendix

Copied from https://leaderboard.certik.io/projects/aave

Finding Categories

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Mathematical Operations

Mathematical Operation findings relate to mishandling of math formulas, such as overflows, incorrect operations etc.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.

Language Specific

Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of private or delete.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

Security Assessment 11/02/2022 20:55:15

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.



Disclaimer

Copied from https://leaderboard.certik.io/projects/aave

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