


Security Assessment

O2Lab VRust Team

03/24/2022 21:21:53







Contents

Summary	3
Overview	4
Project Summary	4
Audit Summary	4
Vulnerability Summary	4
Findings	5
Finding Statistic	6
Issue: 0: IntegerFlow	7
Issue: 1: IntegerFlow	9
Issue: 2: IntegerFlow	11
Issue: 3: IntegerFlow	13
Issue: 4: IntegerFlow	15
Issue: 5: MissingKeyCheck	17
Appendix	19
Finding Categories	19
Gas Optimization	19
Mathematical Operations	19
Logical Issue	19
Language Specific	19
Coding Style	19
Checksum Calculation Method	19
Disclaimer	21



Summary

This report has been prepared for O2Lab VRust Team to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the O2Lab VRust Team project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques. The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.



Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	O2Lab VRust Team
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solana
Crate	bridge
GitHub Location	https://github.com/parasol-aser/vrust
sha256	Unknown

Audit Summary

Delivery Date	03/25/2022
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis
Key Components	

Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total
Critical	6
Major	0
Medium	0
Minor	0
Informational	0
Discussion	0



Findings




Figure 1: Findings



Finding Statistic

Category	Count
IntegerFlow	5
MissingKeyCheck	1

ID	Category	Severity	Status
0	IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved
1	IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved
2	IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved
3	IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved
4	IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved
5	MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved



Issue: 0: IntegerFlow

Category	Severity	Status
IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved

Location

program/src/api/verify_signature.rs:100:25: 100:50

```
(current_instruction - 1)
```

Code Context

Vulnerability at Line: 100

```
if current_instruction == 0 {
95
            return Err(InstructionAtWrongIndex.into());
96
        }
        // The previous ix must be a secp verification instruction
99
        let secp_ix_index = (current_instruction - 1) as u8;
100
        let secp_ix =
101
           solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_instruction_at_checked(
            secp_ix_index as usize,
102
            &accs.instruction_acc,
103
        )
104
105
```

Call Stack



· description:

A mild bug. This int overflow involves a function call to "'let current_instruction = solana_program::sysvar::instructions::l &accs.instruction_acc,)?; (https://docs.rs/solana-program/1.9.1/solana_program/sysvar/instructions/fn.load_current_ Load the current Instruction's index in the currently executing Transaction. (Constrain: current_instruction>=0 (not general enough to model)). And it has a check at line 95: current_instruction != 0 (this could be modeled into the overflow checker.)

- link:
- alleviation:

Checker could be updated for x - 1 and a check on x == 0 or x >= 0, add constrains handling. (Needs a solver to handle the case where the instruction is current_instruction - 5 or x - y (a variable).)



Issue: 1: IntegerFlow

Category	Severity	Status
IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved

Location

/home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.9.4/src/message/legacy.rs:466:20466:29

```
466 index * 2
467
```

Code Context

Vulnerability at Line: 466

```
if index >= num_instructions as usize {
461
                 return Err(SanitizeError::IndexOutOfBounds);
462
            }
463
464
            // index into the instruction byte-offset table.
465
            current += index * 2;
466
            let start = read_u16(&mut current, data)?;
468
            current = start as usize;
469
            let num_accounts = read_u16(&mut current, data)?;
470
```

Call Stack



```
fn instruction::VerifySignatures::execute(){//
   /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
   2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs:68:21: 74:22
   }
        fn api::verify_signature::verify_signatures(){//
           program/src/api/verify_signature.rs:68:1: 219:2 }
            fn
               solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_instruction_at_ch
               /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
               1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
               1.9.4/src/sysvar/instructions.rs:71:1: 86:2
                fn
                  solana_program::message::Message::deserialize_instruction
                  /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
                  1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
                   1.9.4/src/message/legacy.rs:455:5: 497:6
                   }
```

· description:

 $Built-in\ library\ for\ instruction\ serialization\ and\ deserialize_instruction.$

- link:
- alleviation:

Not a real bug. The parameter index is calculated as secp_ix_index from solana_program::sysvar::inst
Another argument is an external argument (can be fake). However, the instruction id variable
is also with a check on if index >= num_instructions as usize (Line 461 in the report),
and therefore, it is hard to reason about the value of the condition to revise the checker.



Issue: 2: IntegerFlow

Category	Severity	Status
IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved

Location

/home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.9.4/src/serialize_utils.rs:25:21: 25:33

```
25 *current + 1
26
```

Code Context

Vulnerability at Line: 25

Call Stack



```
fn api::verify_signature::verify_signatures(){//
                          program/src/api/verify_signature.rs:68:1: 219:2 }
                          fn
6
                             solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_instruction_at_ch
                              /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
                             1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
                              1.9.4/src/sysvar/instructions.rs:71:1: 86:2
                              }
                              fn
                               solana_program::message::Message::deserialize_instruction
                               → /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
                               → 1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
                                  1.9.4/src/message/legacy.rs:455:5: 497:6
                                 }
         fn solana_program::serialize_utils::read_u8(){//
            /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
            1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
            1.9.4/src/serialize_utils.rs:24:1: 31:2
```

description:

Not real. There is a check at line 25: data.len() < *current + 1. If *current += 1; over-flows, the if condition would fail.

- link:
- · alleviation:

Similar to the first case, we can implement something specific to this case (if condition(has x + 1); some stmts; x += 1), but this is not generalize enough.



Issue: 3: IntegerFlow

Category	Severity	Status
IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved

Location

/home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.9.4/src/serialize_utils.rs:35:21: 35:35

```
*current + len
36
```

Code Context

Vulnerability at Line: 35

Other Use Case for Variable: *current + len

```
let e = Pubkey::new(&data[*current..*current + len]);
```

· Call Stack



```
fn instruction::dispatch(){// /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
3
              2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs:89:13: 99:14
              }
               fn instruction::VerifySignatures::execute(){//
                  /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
                  2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs:68:21: 74:22
                  }
                       fn api::verify_signature::verify_signatures(){//
                          program/src/api/verify_signature.rs:68:1: 219:2 }
                           fn
6
                              solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_instruction_at_ch
                              /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
                              1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
                               1.9.4/src/sysvar/instructions.rs:71:1: 86:2
                               fn
                                   solana_program::message::Message::deserialize_instruction
                               → /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
                                  1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
                                  1.9.4/src/message/legacy.rs:455:5: 497:6
                                   }
                               \hookrightarrow
          fn solana_program::serialize_utils::read_pubkey(){//
            /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
            1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
             1.9.4/src/serialize_utils.rs:33:1: 41:2
```

· description:

Similar to ID 2

- link:
- alleviation:

Similar to ID 2



Issue: 4: IntegerFlow

Category	Severity	Status
IntegerFlow	Critical	UnResolved

Location

/home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.9.4/src/serialize_utils.rs:59:21: 59:40

```
*current + data_len
60
```

• Code Context

Vulnerability at Line: 59

```
pub fn read_slice(
54
       current: &mut usize,
55
       data: &[u8],
56
       data_len: usize,
57
   ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, SanitizeError> {
58
       if data.len() < *current + data_len {</pre>
            return Err(SanitizeError::IndexOutOfBounds);
61
       let e = data[*current..*current + data_len].to_vec();
62
       *current += data_len;
63
64
```

Other Use Case for Variable: *current + data_len

```
let e = data[*current..*current + data_len].to_vec();
```

Call Stack



```
fn instruction::dispatch(){// /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
3
              2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs:89:13: 99:14
              }
              fn instruction::VerifySignatures::execute(){//
                 /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
                 2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs:68:21: 74:22
                  }
                      fn api::verify_signature::verify_signatures(){//
                          program/src/api/verify_signature.rs:68:1: 219:2 }
                          fn
6
                             solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_instruction_at_ch
                              /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
                           → 1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
                              1.9.4/src/sysvar/instructions.rs:71:1: 86:2
                              fn
                                  solana_program::message::Message::deserialize_instruction
                               → /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
                                  1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
                                 1.9.4/src/message/legacy.rs:455:5: 497:6
                                  }
         fn solana_program::serialize_utils::read_slice(){//
            /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
            1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-
             1.9.4/src/serialize_utils.rs:54:1: 65:2
```

· description:

Similar to ID 2

- link:
- alleviation:

Not relevant to this case, but some new heuristics: we could develop something to filter out overflow that on the LHS of "<" and RHS of "<", or underflow on the RHS of "<" and LHS of ">" with an error reported afterwards (if the added number is small, therefore, the result is small enough to trigger the error). For example: if x + 1 < y { return Err(SanitizeError::IndexOutOfBounds); }, if x+1 may overflow, it will trigger the error.



Issue: 5: MissingKeyCheck

Category	Severity	Status
MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved

Location

/home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/processors/peel.rs:214:52: 214:80

```
ctx.info().data.borrow_mut()
215
```

- Code Context
- Function Definition:

```
fn peel<I>(ctx: &'c mut Context<'a, 'b, 'c, I>) -> Result<Self>

193
```

Vulnerability at Line: 208

```
return
203
                             Err(SolitaireError::AlreadyInitialized(*ctx.info().key));
204
                     (false, T::default())
205
                 }
206
                AccountState::Initialized => {
207
                     (true, T::try_from_slice(&mut
        *ctx.info().data.borrow_mut())?)
209
                AccountState::MaybeInitialized => {
210
                     if **ctx.info().lamports.borrow() == 0 {
211
                         (false, T::default())
212
213
```

Other Use Case for Variable: ctx.info().data.borrow_mut()



· Call Stack

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/ubuntu/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
      1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.9.4/src/entrypoint.rs:120:9: 127:10
      }
      fn instruction::solitaire(){// /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
2
         2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs:101:13: 108:14
          }
          fn instruction::dispatch(){// /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
3
           → 2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs:89:13: 99:14
              }
           \hookrightarrow
               fn instruction::PostVAA::execute(){//
4
               → /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
                 2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs:68:21: 74:22
                       fn <api::post_vaa::PostVAA<'b> as
5

→ solitaire::FromAccounts<'a, 'b, 'c>>::from(){//
                          program/src/api/post_vaa.rs:54:10: 54:22 }
                           fn <solitaire::Data<'b, T, IsInitialized> as
6

→ solitaire::Peel<'a, 'b, 'c>>::peel(){//
                           → /home/ubuntu/VRust/wormhole/wormhole-
                           → 2.7.3/solana/solitaire/program/src/processors/peel.rs:192:5:
                              236:6 }
```

description:

It does have ctx.info().data.borrow_mut, but no transaction involved.

- link:
- alleviation:

We could prioritize the bug reported with a transaction, transfer, or any other cirical functions involved.



Appendix

Security Assessment

Copied from https://leaderboard.certik.io/projects/aave

Finding Categories

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Mathematical Operations

Mathematical Operation findings relate to mishandling of math formulas, such as overflows, incorrect operations etc.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.

Language Specific

Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of private or delete.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

Security Assessment 03/24/2022 21:21:53

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.



Disclaimer

Copied from https://leaderboard.certik.io/projects/aave

This report is subject to the terms and conditions (including without limitation, description of services, confidentiality, disclaimer and limitation of liability) set forth in the Services Agreement, or the scope of services, and terms and conditions provided to you ("Customer" or the "Company") in connection with the Agreement. This report provided in connection with the Services set forth in the Agreement shall be used by the Company only to the extent permitted under the terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement. This report may not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to or relied upon by any person for any purposes, nor may copies be delivered to any other person other than the Company, without CertiK's prior written consent in each instance.

This report is not, nor should be considered, an "endorsement" or "disapproval" of any particular project or team. This report is not, nor should be considered, an indication of the economics or value of any "product" or "asset" created by any team or project that contracts CertiK to perform a security assessment. This report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technologies proprietors, business, business model or legal compliance.

This report should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. This report in no way provides investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort. This report represents an extensive assessing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology. Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. CertiK's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. CertiK's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies, and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze. The assessment services provided by CertiK is subject to dependencies and under continuing development. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results. The services may access, and depend upon, multiple layers of third-parties.