



VRust

Security Assessment

O2Lab VRust Team

11/02/2022 20:52:10

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Summary

This report has been prepared for O2Lab VRust Team to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the O2Lab VRust Team project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques. The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	O2Lab VRust Team
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solana
Crate	nft_bridge
GitHub Location	https://github.com/parasol-aser/vrust
sha256	Unknown

Audit Summary

Delivery Date	11/02/2022
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis
Key Components	

Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total
Critical	7
Major	0
Medium	0
Minor	0
Informational	0
Discussion	0

Findings




Figure 1: Findings

Finding Statistic

Category	Count
MissingKeyCheck	1
CrossProgramInvocation	6

ID	Category	Severity	Status
0	MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved
1	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
2	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
3	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
4	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
5	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved
6	CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

Issue: 0: MissingKeyCheck

Category	Severity	Status
MissingKeyCheck	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

/home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/processors/peel.rs:211:22:
211:50

```
211 ctx.info().lamports.borrow()
212
```

- Code Context

– Function Definition:

```
192 fn peel<I>(ctx: &'c mut Context<'a, 'b, 'c, I>) -> Result<Self>
193
```

Vulnerability at Line: 202

```
197     }
198
199     // If we're initializing the type, we should emit system/rent as
200     ↪ deps.
201     let (initialized, data): (bool, T) = match IsInitialized {
202         AccountState::Uninitialized => {
203             if **ctx.info().lamports.borrow() != 0 {
204                 return
205                 ↪ Err(SolitaireError::AlreadyInitialized(*ctx.info().key));
206             }
207             (false, T::default())
208         }
209     }
```

Other Use Case for Variable: ctx.info().lamports.borrow()

211

```
if **ctx.info().lamports.borrow() == 0 {
```

- Call Stack

1

```
fn entrypoint(){// /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
↳ 1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
↳ }
```

2

```
fn instruction::solitaire(){//
↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
↳ 108:14 }
```

3

```
fn instruction::dispatch(){//
↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
↳ 99:14 }
```

4

```
fn instruction::CompleteNative::execute(){//
↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
↳ 74:22 }
```

5

```
fn <api::complete_transfer::CompleteNative<'b> as
↳ solitaire::FromAccounts<'a, 'b, 'c>::from(){//
↳ program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs:42:10: 42:22 }
```

6

```
fn <bridge::vaa::ClaimableVAA<'b, T> as
↳ solitaire::Peel<'a, 'b, 'c>::peel(){//
↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/bridge/program/src/vaa.rs:114:14
↳ 148:22 }
```

7

```
fn <bridge::vaa::ClaimableVAA<'b, T> as
↳ solitaire::FromAccounts<'a, 'b,
↳ 'c>::from(){//
↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/bridge/program/src/vaa.rs:114:14
↳ 148:22 }
```

8

```
fn <bridge::PayloadMessage<'b, T> as solitaire::Peel<'a, 'b,
↳ 'c>::peel(){//
↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/bridge/program/src/vaa.rs:114:14
↳ 124:6 }
```

9

```
fn <solitaire::Data<'b, T, IsInitialized> as
↳ solitaire::Peel<'a, 'b, 'c>::peel(){//
↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
↳ 236:6 }
```

10

- description:
- link:
- alleviation:

Issue: 1: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

```
program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs
```

- Code Context

```
81 pub fn complete_native(  
82     ctx: &ExecutionContext,  
83     accs: &mut CompleteNative,  
84     _data: CompleteNativeData,  
85 ) -> Result<()> {  
86     // Verify the chain registration  
87     let derivation_data: EndpointDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
88     accs.chain_registration  
89         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;  
90  
91     // Verify that the custody account is derived correctly  
92     let derivation_data: CustodyAccountDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
93     accs.custody  
94         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;  
95  
96     // Verify mints  
97     if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.custody.mint {  
98         return Err(InvalidMint.into());  
99     }  
100    if *accs.custody_signer.key != accs.custody.owner {  
101        return Err(WrongAccountOwner.into());  
102    }  
103  
104    // Verify VAA  
105    // Please refer to transfer.rs for why the token id is used to store  
106    //   ↳ the mint  
107    if accs.vaa.token_address != [1u8; 32] {
```

```
107     return Err(InvalidMint.into());
108 }
109 let mut token_id_bytes = [0u8; 32];
110 accs.vaa.token_id.to_big_endian(&mut token_id_bytes);
111 if token_id_bytes != accs.mint.info().key.to_bytes() {
112     return Err(InvalidMint.into());
113 }
114 if accs.vaa.token_chain != CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
115     return Err(InvalidChain.into());
116 }
117 if accs.vaa.to_chain != CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {
118     return Err(InvalidChain.into());
119 }
120 if accs.vaa.to != accs.to.info().key.to_bytes() {
121     return Err(InvalidRecipient.into());
122 }
123
124 // Prevent vaa double signing
125 accs.vaa.verify(ctx.program_id)?;
126 accs.vaa.claim(ctx, accs.payer.key)?;
127
128 if !accs.to.is_initialized() {
129     let associated_addr =
130         ↪ spl_associated_token_account::get_associated_token_address(
131             accs.to_authority.info().key,
132             accs.mint.info().key,
133         );
134     if *accs.to.info().key != associated_addr {
135         return Err(InvalidAssociatedAccount.into());
136     }
137     // Create associated token account
138     let ix =
139         ↪ spl_associated_token_account::create_associated_token_account(
140             accs.payer.info().key,
141             accs.to_authority.info().key,
142             accs.mint.info().key,
143         );
144     invoke(&ix, ctx.accounts)?;
145 } else if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to.mint {
146     return Err(InvalidMint.into());
147 }
```

```

147 // Transfer tokens
148 let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
149     &spl_token::id(),
150     accs.custody.info().key,
151     accs.to.info().key,
152     accs.custody_signer.key,
153     &[],
154     1,
155 )?;
156 invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.custody_signer, None)?;
157
158 Ok(())
159 }
160

```

- Call Stack

```

1 fn entrypoint() { // /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
  ↳ 1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
  ↳ }
2 fn instruction::solitaire() { //
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
  ↳ 108:14 }
3 fn instruction::dispatch() { //
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
  ↳ 99:14 }
4 fn instruction::CompleteNative::execute() { //
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
  ↳ 74:22 }
5     fn api::complete_transfer::complete_native() { //
      ↳ program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs:81:1: 159:2 }
6

```

- description:
- link:
- alleviation:

Issue: 2: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

```
program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs
```

- Code Context

```
212 pub fn complete_wrapped(  
213     ctx: &ExecutionContext,  
214     accs: &mut CompleteWrapped,  
215     _data: CompleteWrappedData,  
216 ) -> Result<()> {  
217     use bstr::ByteSlice;  
218   
219     // Verify the chain registration  
220     let derivation_data: EndpointDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
221     accs.chain_registration  
222         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;  
223   
224     // Verify mint  
225     let derivation_data: WrappedDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
226     accs.mint  
227         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;  
228   
229     // Verify VAA  
230     if accs.vaa.to_chain != CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {  
231         return Err(InvalidChain.into());  
232     }  
233     if accs.vaa.to != accs.to.info().key.to_bytes() {  
234         return Err(InvalidRecipient.into());  
235     }  
236   
237     accs.vaa.verify(ctx.program_id)?;  
238     accs.vaa.claim(ctx, accs.payer.key)?;
```

```
239
240 // Initialize the NFT if it doesn't already exist
241 if !accs.meta.is_initialized() {
242     // Create mint account
243     accs.mint
244         .create(&((&*accs).into()), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
245
246     // Initialize mint
247     let init_ix = spl_token::instruction::initialize_mint(
248         &spl_token::id(),
249         accs.mint.info().key,
250         accs.mint_authority.key,
251         None,
252         0,
253     )?;
254     invoke_signed(&init_ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
255
256     // Create meta account
257     accs.meta
258         .create(&((&*accs).into()), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
259
260     // Populate meta account
261     accs.meta.chain = accs.vaa.token_chain;
262     accs.meta.token_address = accs.vaa.token_address;
263     accs.meta.token_id = accs.vaa.token_id.0;
264 }
265
266 if !accs.to.is_initialized() {
267     let associated_addr =
268         ↪ spl_associated_token_account::get_associated_token_address(
269             accs.to_authority.info().key,
270             accs.mint.info().key,
271         );
272     if *accs.to.info().key != associated_addr {
273         return Err(InvalidAssociatedAccount.into());
274     }
275     // Create associated token account
276     let ix =
277         ↪ spl_associated_token_account::create_associated_token_account(
278             accs.payer.info().key,
```

```

279         );
280         invoke_signed(&ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
281     } else if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to.mint {
282         return Err(InvalidMint.into());
283     }
284
285     // Mint tokens
286     let mint_ix = spl_token::instruction::mint_to(
287         &spl_token::id(),
288         accs.mint.info().key,
289         accs.to.info().key,
290         accs.mint_authority.key,
291         &[],
292         1,
293     )?;
294     invoke_seeded(&mint_ix, ctx, &accs.mint_authority, None)?;
295
296     Ok(())
297 }
298

```

- Call Stack

```

1  fn entrypoint() { // /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
   ↳ 1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
   ↳ }
2  fn instruction::solitaire() { //
   ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
   ↳ 108:14 }
3  fn instruction::dispatch() { //
   ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
   ↳ 99:14 }
4  fn instruction::CompleteWrapped::execute() { //
   ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
   ↳ 74:22 }
5      fn api::complete_transfer::complete_wrapped() { //
   ↳ program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs:212:1: 297:2 }
6

```

- description:
- link:

- alleviation:

Issue: 3: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

```
program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs
```

- Code Context

```
212 pub fn complete_wrapped(  
213     ctx: &ExecutionContext,  
214     accs: &mut CompleteWrapped,  
215     _data: CompleteWrappedData,  
216 ) -> Result<()> {  
217     use bstr::ByteSlice;  
218   
219     // Verify the chain registration  
220     let derivation_data: EndpointDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
221     accs.chain_registration  
222         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;  
223   
224     // Verify mint  
225     let derivation_data: WrappedDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
226     accs.mint  
227         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;  
228   
229     // Verify VAA  
230     if accs.vaa.to_chain != CHAIN_ID_SOLANA {  
231         return Err(InvalidChain.into());  
232     }  
233     if accs.vaa.to != accs.to.info().key.to_bytes() {  
234         return Err(InvalidRecipient.into());  
235     }  
236   
237     accs.vaa.verify(ctx.program_id)?;  
238     accs.vaa.claim(ctx, accs.payer.key)?;
```



```
239
240 // Initialize the NFT if it doesn't already exist
241 if !accs.meta.is_initialized() {
242     // Create mint account
243     accs.mint
244         .create(&((&*accs).into()), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
245
246     // Initialize mint
247     let init_ix = spl_token::instruction::initialize_mint(
248         &spl_token::id(),
249         accs.mint.info().key,
250         accs.mint_authority.key,
251         None,
252         0,
253     )?;
254     invoke_signed(&init_ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
255
256     // Create meta account
257     accs.meta
258         .create(&((&*accs).into()), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
259
260     // Populate meta account
261     accs.meta.chain = accs.vaa.token_chain;
262     accs.meta.token_address = accs.vaa.token_address;
263     accs.meta.token_id = accs.vaa.token_id.0;
264 }
265
266 if !accs.to.is_initialized() {
267     let associated_addr =
268         ↪ spl_associated_token_account::get_associated_token_address(
269             accs.to_authority.info().key,
270             accs.mint.info().key,
271         );
272     if *accs.to.info().key != associated_addr {
273         return Err(InvalidAssociatedAccount.into());
274     }
275     // Create associated token account
276     let ix =
277         ↪ spl_associated_token_account::create_associated_token_account(
278             accs.payer.info().key,
```

```

279         );
280         invoke_signed(&ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
281     } else if *accs.mint.info().key != accs.to.mint {
282         return Err(InvalidMint.into());
283     }
284
285     // Mint tokens
286     let mint_ix = spl_token::instruction::mint_to(
287         &spl_token::id(),
288         accs.mint.info().key,
289         accs.to.info().key,
290         accs.mint_authority.key,
291         &[],
292         1,
293     )?;
294     invoke_seeded(&mint_ix, ctx, &accs.mint_authority, None)?;
295
296     Ok(())
297 }
298

```

- Call Stack

```

1  fn entrypoint() { // /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
   ↳ 1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
   ↳ }
2  fn instruction::solitaire() { //
   ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
   ↳ 108:14 }
3  fn instruction::dispatch() { //
   ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
   ↳ 99:14 }
4  fn instruction::CompleteWrapped::execute() { //
   ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
   ↳ 74:22 }
5      fn api::complete_transfer::complete_wrapped() { //
   ↳ program/src/api/complete_transfer.rs:212:1: 297:2 }
6

```

- description:
- link:

- alleviation:

Issue: 4: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

program/src/api/transfer.rs

- Code Context

```

290 pub fn transfer_wrapped(
291     ctx: &ExecutionContext,
292     accs: &mut TransferWrapped,
293     data: TransferWrappedData,
294 ) -> Result<()> {
295     // Verify that the from account is owned by the from_owner
296     if &accs.from.owner != accs.from_owner.key {
297         return Err(WrongAccountOwner.into());
298     }
299
300     // Verify mints
301     if accs.mint.info().key != &accs.from.mint {
302         return Err(TokenBridgeError::InvalidMint.into());
303     }
304
305     // Verify that meta is correct
306     let derivation_data: WrappedMetaDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
307     accs.wrapped_meta
308         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
309
310     // Burn tokens
311     let burn_ix = spl_token::instruction::burn(
312         &spl_token::id(),
313         accs.from.info().key,
314         accs.mint.info().key,
315         accs.authority_signer.key,
316         &[],

```

```
317     1,
318     )?;
319     invoke_seeded(&burn_ix, ctx, &accs.authority_signer, None)?;
320
321     // Pay fee
322     let transfer_ix = solana_program::system_instruction::transfer(
323         accs.payer.key,
324         accs.fee_collector.key,
325         accs.bridge.config.fee,
326     );
327
328     invoke(&transfer_ix, ctx.accounts)?;
329
330     // Enforce wrapped meta to be uninitialized.
331     let derivation_data: WrappedMetaDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
332     accs.wrapped_meta
333         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;
334
335     // Token must have metadata
336     if accs.spl_metadata.data_is_empty() {
337         return Err(TokenNotNFT.into());
338     }
339
340     let derivation_data: SplTokenMetaDerivationData = (&*accs).into();
341     accs.spl_metadata
342         .verify_derivation(&spl_token_metadata::id(), &derivation_data)?;
343
344     if *accs.spl_metadata.owner != spl_token_metadata::id() {
345         return Err(WrongAccountOwner.into());
346     }
347
348     let metadata: Metadata =
349         Meta-
350         ↪ data::from_account_info(accs.spl_metadata.info()).ok_or(InvalidMetadata)?;
351
352     // Post message
353     let payload = PayloadTransfer {
354         token_address: accs.wrapped_meta.token_address,
355         token_chain: accs.wrapped_meta.chain,
356         token_id: U256(accs.wrapped_meta.token_id),
357         to: data.target_address,
358         to_chain: data.target_chain,
```

```

358     symbol: metadata.data.symbol,
359     name: metadata.data.name,
360     uri: metadata.data.uri,
361 };
362 let params = (
363     bridge::instruction::Instruction::PostMessage,
364     PostMessageData {
365         nonce: data.nonce,
366         payload: payload.try_to_vec()?,
367         consistency_level: ConsistencyLevel::Finalized,
368     },
369 );
370
371 let ix = Instruction::new_with_bytes(
372     accs.config.wormhole_bridge,
373     params.try_to_vec()?.as_slice(),
374     vec![
375         AccountMeta::new(*accs.bridge.info().key, false),
376         AccountMeta::new(*accs.message.key, true),
377         AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.emitter.key, true),
378         AccountMeta::new(*accs.sequence.key, false),
379         AccountMeta::new(*accs.payer.key, true),
380         AccountMeta::new(*accs.fee_collector.key, false),
381         AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.clock.info().key, false),
382         AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::system_program::id(),
383             ↪ false),
384         AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::sysvar::rent::ID,
385             ↪ false),
386     ],
387 );
388 invoke_seeded(&ix, ctx, &accs.emitter, None)?;
389
390 Ok(())
391 }

```

- Call Stack

```

1 fn entrypoint() { // /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-
  ↪ 1eccc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10
  ↪ }
2 fn instruction::solitaire() { //
  ↪ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs
  ↪ 108:14 }

```

3
4
5
6

```
fn instruction::dispatch() {  
    ↪ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macro  
    ↪ 99:14 }  
fn instruction::TransferWrapped::execute() {  
    ↪ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/m  
    ↪ 74:22 }  
fn api::transfer::transfer_wrapped() {  
    ↪ program/src/api/transfer.rs:290:1: 389:2 }  
}
```

- description:
- link:
- alleviation:

Issue: 5: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

program/src/api/transfer.rs

- Code Context

```
119 pub fn transfer_native(  
120     ctx: &ExecutionContext,  
121     accs: &mut TransferNative,  
122     data: TransferNativeData,  
123 ) -> Result<()> {  
124     // Verify that the custody account is derived correctly  
125     let derivation_data: CustodyAccountDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
126     accs.custody  
127         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;  
128  
129     let derivation_data: SplTokenMetaDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
130     accs.spl_metadata  
131         .verify_derivation(&spl_token_metadata::id(), &derivation_data)?;  
132  
133     // Verify mints  
134     if accs.from.mint != *accs.mint.info().key {  
135         return Err(TokenBridgeError::InvalidMint.into());  
136     }  
137  
138     // Token must have metadata  
139     if accs.spl_metadata.data_is_empty() {  
140         return Err(TokenNotNFT.into());  
141     }  
142  
143     if *accs.spl_metadata.owner != spl_token_metadata::id() {  
144         return Err(WrongAccountOwner.into());  
145     }
```



```
146
147 // Verify that the token is not a wrapped token
148 if let COption::Some(mint_authority) = accs.mint.mint_authority {
149     if mint_authority == MintSigner::key(None, ctx.program_id) {
150         return Err(TokenBridgeError::TokenNotNative.into());
151     }
152 }
153
154 if !accs.custody.is_initialized() {
155     accs.custody
156         .create(&(&*accs).into(), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
157
158     let init_ix = spl_token::instruction::initialize_account(
159         &spl_token::id(),
160         accs.custody.info().key,
161         accs.mint.info().key,
162         accs.custody_signer.key,
163     )?;
164     invoke_signed(&init_ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
165 }
166
167 // Transfer tokens
168 let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
169     &spl_token::id(),
170     accs.from.info().key,
171     accs.custody.info().key,
172     accs.authority_signer.key,
173     &[],
174     1,
175 )?;
176 invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.authority_signer, None)?;
177
178 // Pay fee
179 let transfer_ix = solana_program::system_instruction::transfer(
180     accs.payer.key,
181     accs.fee_collector.key,
182     accs.bridge.config.fee,
183 );
184 invoke(&transfer_ix, ctx.accounts)?;
185
186 let metadata: Metadata =
187     Meta-
188     ↪ data::from_account_info(accs.spl_metadata.info()).ok_or(InvalidMetadata)?;
```

```

188
189 // Post message
190 // Given there is no tokenID equivalent on Solana and each distinct
191 // ↪ token address is translated
192 // into a new contract on EVM based chains (which is costly), we use a
193 // ↪ static token_address
194 // and encode the mint in the token_id.
195 let payload = PayloadTransfer {
196     token_address: [1u8; 32],
197     token_chain: 1,
198     to: data.target_address,
199     to_chain: data.target_chain,
200     symbol: metadata.data.symbol,
201     name: metadata.data.name,
202     uri: metadata.data.uri,
203     token_id: U256::from_big_endian(&accs.mint.info().key.to_bytes()),
204 };
205 let params = (
206     bridge::instruction::Instruction::PostMessage,
207     PostMessageData {
208         nonce: data.nonce,
209         payload: payload.try_to_vec()?,
210         consistency_level: ConsistencyLevel::Finalized,
211     },
212 );
213
214 let ix = Instruction::new_with_bytes(
215     accs.config.wormhole_bridge,
216     params.try_to_vec()?.as_slice(),
217     vec![
218         AccountMeta::new(*accs.bridge.info().key, false),
219         AccountMeta::new(*accs.message.key, true),
220         AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.emitter.key, true),
221         AccountMeta::new(*accs.sequence.key, false),
222         AccountMeta::new(*accs.payer.key, true),
223         AccountMeta::new(*accs.fee_collector.key, false),
224         AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.clock.info().key, false),
225         AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::system_program::id(),
226             ↪ false),
227         AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::sysvar::rent::ID,
228             ↪ false),
229     ],

```

```
226     );  
227     invoke_seeded(&ix, ctx, &accs.emitter, None)?;  
228  
229     Ok(())  
230 }  
231
```

- Call Stack

```
1 fn entrypoint() { // /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-  
  ↳ 1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10  
  ↳ }  
2 fn instruction::solitaire() { //  
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs  
  ↳ 108:14 }  
3 fn instruction::dispatch() { //  
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs  
  ↳ 99:14 }  
4 fn instruction::TransferNative::execute() { //  
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs  
  ↳ 74:22 }  
5     fn api::transfer::transfer_native() { //  
      ↳ program/src/api/transfer.rs:119:1: 230:2 }  
6
```

- description:
- link:
- alleviation:

Issue: 6: CrossProgramInvocation

Category	Severity	Status
CrossProgramInvocation	Critical	UnResolved

- Location

program/src/api/transfer.rs

- Code Context

```
119 pub fn transfer_native(  
120     ctx: &ExecutionContext,  
121     accs: &mut TransferNative,  
122     data: TransferNativeData,  
123 ) -> Result<()> {  
124     // Verify that the custody account is derived correctly  
125     let derivation_data: CustodyAccountDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
126     accs.custody  
127         .verify_derivation(ctx.program_id, &derivation_data)?;  
128  
129     let derivation_data: SplTokenMetaDerivationData = (&*accs).into();  
130     accs.spl_metadata  
131         .verify_derivation(&spl_token_metadata::id(), &derivation_data)?;  
132  
133     // Verify mints  
134     if accs.from.mint != *accs.mint.info().key {  
135         return Err(TokenBridgeError::InvalidMint.into());  
136     }  
137  
138     // Token must have metadata  
139     if accs.spl_metadata.data_is_empty() {  
140         return Err(TokenNotNFT.into());  
141     }  
142  
143     if *accs.spl_metadata.owner != spl_token_metadata::id() {  
144         return Err(WrongAccountOwner.into());  
145     }
```

```
146
147 // Verify that the token is not a wrapped token
148 if let COption::Some(mint_authority) = accs.mint.mint_authority {
149     if mint_authority == MintSigner::key(None, ctx.program_id) {
150         return Err(TokenBridgeError::TokenNotNative.into());
151     }
152 }
153
154 if !accs.custody.is_initialized() {
155     accs.custody
156         .create(&(&*accs).into(), ctx, accs.payer.key, Exempt)?;
157
158     let init_ix = spl_token::instruction::initialize_account(
159         &spl_token::id(),
160         accs.custody.info().key,
161         accs.mint.info().key,
162         accs.custody_signer.key,
163     )?;
164     invoke_signed(&init_ix, ctx.accounts, &[])?;
165 }
166
167 // Transfer tokens
168 let transfer_ix = spl_token::instruction::transfer(
169     &spl_token::id(),
170     accs.from.info().key,
171     accs.custody.info().key,
172     accs.authority_signer.key,
173     &[],
174     1,
175 )?;
176 invoke_seeded(&transfer_ix, ctx, &accs.authority_signer, None)?;
177
178 // Pay fee
179 let transfer_ix = solana_program::system_instruction::transfer(
180     accs.payer.key,
181     accs.fee_collector.key,
182     accs.bridge.config.fee,
183 );
184 invoke(&transfer_ix, ctx.accounts)?;
185
186 let metadata: Metadata =
187     Meta-
188     ↪ data::from_account_info(accs.spl_metadata.info()).ok_or(InvalidMetadata)?;
```

```

188
189 // Post message
190 // Given there is no tokenID equivalent on Solana and each distinct
191 //   ↳ token address is translated
192 // into a new contract on EVM based chains (which is costly), we use a
193 //   ↳ static token_address
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195 let payload = PayloadTransfer {
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197     token_chain: 1,
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199     to_chain: data.target_chain,
200     symbol: metadata.data.symbol,
201     name: metadata.data.name,
202     uri: metadata.data.uri,
203     token_id: U256::from_big_endian(&accs.mint.info().key.to_bytes()),
204 };
205 let params = (
206     bridge::instruction::Instruction::PostMessage,
207     PostMessageData {
208         nonce: data.nonce,
209         payload: payload.try_to_vec()?,
210         consistency_level: ConsistencyLevel::Finalized,
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212 );
213 let ix = Instruction::new_with_bytes(
214     accs.config.wormhole_bridge,
215     params.try_to_vec()?.as_slice(),
216     vec![
217         AccountMeta::new(*accs.bridge.info().key, false),
218         AccountMeta::new(*accs.message.key, true),
219         AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.emitter.key, true),
220         AccountMeta::new(*accs.sequence.key, false),
221         AccountMeta::new(*accs.payer.key, true),
222         AccountMeta::new(*accs.fee_collector.key, false),
223         AccountMeta::new_readonly(*accs.clock.info().key, false),
224         AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::system_program::id(),
225             ↳ false),
226         AccountMeta::new_readonly(solana_program::sysvar::rent::ID,
227             ↳ false),
228     ],

```

```
226     );  
227     invoke_seeded(&ix, ctx, &accs.emitter, None)?;  
228  
229     Ok(())  
230 }  
231
```

- Call Stack

```
1 fn entrypoint() { // /home/yifei/.cargo/registry/src/github.com-  
  ↳ 1ecc6299db9ec823/solana-program-1.7.0/src/entrypoint.rs:46:9: 53:10  
  ↳ }  
2 fn instruction::solitaire() { //  
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs  
  ↳ 108:14 }  
3 fn instruction::dispatch() { //  
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs  
  ↳ 99:14 }  
4 fn instruction::TransferNative::execute() { //  
  ↳ /home/yifei/open/vrust/examples2/wormhole/solana/solitaire/program/src/macros.rs  
  ↳ 74:22 }  
5     fn api::transfer::transfer_native() { //  
      ↳ program/src/api/transfer.rs:119:1: 230:2 }  
6
```

- description:
- link:
- alleviation:

Appendix

Copied from <https://leaderboard.certik.io/projects/aave>

Finding Categories

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Mathematical Operations

Mathematical Operation findings relate to mishandling of math formulas, such as overflows, incorrect operations etc.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how `block.timestamp` works.

Language Specific

Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of `private` or `delete`.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Checksum Calculation Method

The “Checksum” field in the “Audit Scope” section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux “sha256sum” command against the target file.

Disclaimer

Copied from <https://leaderboard.certik.io/projects/aave>

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